

~~SECRET~~

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

NFAC #335-81
26 January 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : Bruce C. Clarke, Jr.
Deputy Director, National Foreign Assessment

FROM : Robert M. Gates
National Intelligence Officer for USSR-EE

SUBJECT : Interagency Group Meeting on Poland
1700-1830 hours, Friday, 23 January 81

1. Under Secretary of State David Newsom chaired an Interagency Meeting on 23 January to review contingency planning on Poland, receive a current intelligence report, and coordinate several outgoing cables from the Secretary to his Allied counterparts and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko. A tasking memo from State based on the meeting is at Tab A.

2. Newsom updated those new to the government on the contingencies that are the basis of current planning, specifically:

- The Polish government itself takes repressive measures.
- Kania is replaced by a hardliner, and repressive measures follow.
- The Soviets undertake maneuvers without direct confrontation but in ways that give them effective leverage or control over events.
- The Poles invite the Soviets to send troops into the country.
- The Soviets invade, resulting in resistance and bloodshed.

Newsom reported that all contingency planning has been based on the fifth, or worst case, scenario in the belief that the list of retaliatory measures could then be adapted to less dramatic scenarios. He acknowledged there has been virtually no planning for the first two contingencies -- repressive measures by a Polish regime.

DERIVATIVE CL BY SIGNER
REVIEW ON JAN87
Derived from Multiple

~~SECRET~~

NFAC #335-81
26 January 1981

SUBJECT: Interagency Group Meeting on Poland
1700-1830 hours, Friday, 23 January 81

25X1

4. There was considerable discussion of the political and economic contingencies that had been considered in recent weeks, as well as the status of consultations with the Allies. Rick Burt (Director-designate, Bureau of Political Military Affairs, State) pressed the desirability of pursuing measures that were not only punitive but also would take advantage of a Soviet invasion to obtain long-range restructuring of mechanisms such as COCOM to US advantage. After some back and forth among Newsom, Burt and Paul Wolfowitz (Director-designate, Policy Planning Staff), Newsom instructed the State representatives to prepare two papers for the Secretary: 1) a summary of economic contingency measures considered to date and the status of discussions with the Allies; and 2) a proposed list of broader objectives the US might pursue in the event of a "Polish crisis". At least the first paper is to be shared with other agencies.

5. The Interagency Group then reviewed a series of cables on Poland from the Secretary to his counterparts in Bonn, Paris, London, Tokyo, Rome, Ottawa, Canberra, and Wellington (Tab B); a message to Gromyko (Tab C); and public affairs guidance on Poland (Tab D). The cables to the Allies were to be dispatched Friday night; no time was mentioned on the message to Gromyko. (There was some byplay among the State Department representatives whether to coordinate the cables with the NSC Staff; at adjournment, sentiment was running strongly against.) CIA clearance was neither requested nor appropriate.

6. Newsom then met with State, JCS and DoD representatives (excusing the other agencies present; including State/INR) for a discussion of military contingencies. The State tasking memo at Tab A indicates that Defense is to do a status report of defense measures for Secretary Haig.

7. No subsequent meeting was scheduled, but I expect this group will meet regularly for the foreseeable future.


Robert M. Gates

[All portions of this
memorandum are classified
SECRET]

SECRET

NFAC #335-81
26 January 1981

SUBJECT: Interagency Group Meeting on Poland
1700-1830 hours, Friday, 23 January 81

DISTRIBUTION

0 - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - ER
1 - DD/NFA
1 - D/OER
1 - D/OSR
1 - Ch/OPA/USSR-EE
1 - NIO/USSR-EE
1 - NFAC Reg.
NIO/USSR-EE/RMGates/de
(26Jan81)

25X1

S/S #8101739



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

January 24, 1981

DIST:
1/24/81SECRET/EXDISP
EUR
S/P
PM
INR
E
EB
JCS
Treasury
CIA
NSC
DOD
S/S

TO: See Distribution

FROM: W/S - L. Paul Bremer, III, Acting Executive Secretary

SUBJECT: Inter Agency Group on Poland
January 23 Meeting

The following papers were tasked at the January 23 meeting of the Inter Agency Group on Poland.

1. Memorandum to the Secretary: A short briefing memorandum reviewing the status of allied agreement on contingency economic measures and possible additions (EB, clearing with EUR, S/P, and E; due in S/S-S by close of business Tuesday, January 27).
2. Memorandum to the Secretary: A summary review of discussion with the allies on additional defense measures (DOD, due to the Executive Secretariat close of business Tuesday, January 27).
3. Paper for Circulation to the Inter Agency Group: A review of the status and possible new measures on the question of technology transfer to the Soviets, to include a definition of general purpose computers (DOD, due prior to next meeting of the Interagency Group or COB Wednesday, January 28).
4. Paper for Circulation to the Interagency Group: A brief review of what "key allies" have already agreed, for use at the next meeting (EUR, clearing with EB, by close of business, Tuesday, January 27).
5. Circulation of Copies of the "British List" with brief explanatory summary (EB, by close of business Monday, January 26).

DRAFT

NODIS/

Bonn Immediate, London Immediate, Paris Immediate

Info: Moscow Immediate, USNATO Immediate

Subject: Poland :Views of U.S. Administration

1. Secret Entire Text.

2. Please see that the message in Para 3 from Secretary Haig is brought to the attention of the Foreign Minister as soon as possible.

3. Dear _____:

As I take up my duties as Secretary of State I wanted you to know that I have begun to review the agenda of international issues about which we share common concerns and interests. I have paid special attention to the good work that has been done by our nations on the most important and sensitive issues facing the Western world. I intend to continue working with

SECRET

SECRET

- 2 -

you and our other key Allies so that together we can contribute to agreement on consistent and coherent positions by the members of the NATO alliance and other important non-NATO nations on the challenges we face as Western democracies.

I look forward to our early meeting. There is one issue, however, where immediacy does not permit the luxury of the passage of time. The situation in Poland remains a cause for deep concern. You should know that I have sent a personal message to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko stressing that Soviet intervention in Poland would have the most profound and adverse consequences for U.S. -Soviet relations. I also emphasized President Reagan's support for the NATO Communique of December 12, 1980. The Soviets should now understand that this Administration fully shares the view that the appreciable benefits gained in the past decade in the field of East-West cooperation have been seriously damaged by Soviet actions; that Poland should be free to decide its own future; and, that detente could not survive if the Soviets were again to violate the basic rights of any state to territorial integrity and independence.

SECRET

-3-

SECRET

This expression of Allied resolve in December surely had an impact and I am hopeful that my message to Gromyko will too. However, it is even more important that we continue to use our time wisely to consult together so that we, should we have to meet in an emergency as NATO Foreign Ministers, would have available the best possible list of feasible measures from which to choose. Moreover, in recognition of the importance of finding ways to help stabilize the situation in Poland, we are giving high priority to the question of additional economic assistance for Poland.

Therefore, I believe that the dialogue presently under way among our senior officials should continue so that we can reach a consensus on these measures as soon as possible, and then use these to build a broad consensus within the Alliance and with our Pacific friends, Japan, Australia and New Zealand.

In this spirit, I writing to you and to the Foreign Ministers who participate in the Economic Summit group, and to Australia and New Zealand. My goal is to encourage each of us to consider carefully the measures they could take as part of a broad Western effort. I am also reaffirming to NATO Secretary

SECRET

SECRET

-4-

General Luns the continuing American commitment to work in concert with Allies on the challenges we face.

In closing, I look forward to working closely with you in the period ahead. We have great opportunities and great strengths in our nations and in the Western World collectively. With combined wisdom and effort, the values and goals we share will prevail.

Sincerely Alexander Haig

end text

SECRET

RF
Draft: EUR/RPM- RFHopper

x21134 1-23-81

Clearances: EUR- GSVEST *RF*

EUR- RLBarry *RF*

C-RRidgway *RF*

EUR/RPM-CHThomas *RF*

DRAFT

SECRET

NODIS/██████████

Rome Immediate, Ottawa Immediate, Tokyo Immediate

Info: Moscow Immediate, USNATO Immediate Paris Immediate,
London Immediate, Bonn Immediate

Subject: Poland--Views of U.S. Administration

1. Secret Entire Text.

2. Please see that the message in Para 3 from Secretary Haig is brought to the attention of the Foreign Minister as soon as possible.

3. Dear _____:

It is been of great importance for our nations to consult and work together on a wide range of important issues. It will be even more so in the months ahead. As Secretary of State I look forward to the closest continuing cooperation between our two

SECRET

nations in order to promote agreement on consistent and coherent positions by [the members of the NATO Alliance and] key Western industrial democracies on the challenges we face.

In this regard the situation in Poland remains a cause for deep concern. You should know that I have sent a personal message to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko stressing that Soviet intervention in Poland would have the most profound and adverse consequences for U.S. -Soviet relations. [I also emphasized President Reagan's support for the NATO Communique of December 12, 1980.] The Soviets should now understand that this Administration fully shares the view that the appreciable benefits gained in the past decade in the field of East-West cooperation have been seriously damaged by Soviet actions; that Poland should be free to decide its own future; and, that detente could not survive if the Soviets were again to violate the basic rights of any state to territorial integrity and independence.

I am hopeful that my message to Gromyko will have the proper impact. However, it is even more important that we continue to use our time wisely to consult together so that should emergency decisions be required, our governments will have available the best possible list of feasible and compatible measures from which to choose. Moreover, in recognition of the importance of finding ways to help stabilize the situation in Poland, we are giving high priority to the question of additional economic assistance for Poland.

Therefore, I believe that the consultations presently under way with the Western European Allies and with Japan should continue so that we can reach a broad consensus within the Western family of nations.

In this spirit, I am writing to the Foreign Ministers of all the nations who take part in the Economic summit, as well as to those of Australia and New Zealand, with the goal of encouraging them to consider carefully the measures they could take as part of a broad Western effort. [I am also reaffirming to NATO Secretary General Luns the continuing American commitment to work in concert with Allies on the challenges we

face.]

In closing, I look forward to working closely and consulting with you in the period ahead. We have great opportunities and great strengths in our nations and in the Western World collectively. With combined wisdom and effort, the values and goals we share will prevail.

Sincerely Alexander Haig


end text


4. The letter to the Japanese Foreign miniister should delete the portions in brackets which make reference to NATO.


-5-


Draft: EUR/RPM- RFHopper 


x21134 1-23-81

Clearances: EUR- George S. Vest 

RLBarry 

EA/J-GSutton 

EUR/RPM-CHThomas 

C-Amb Ridgway(draft) 

DRAFT

SECRET

NODIS/

Canberra Immediate, Wellington Immediate,
Info: Moscow Immediate, USNATO Immediate Paris Immediate,
London Immediate, Bonn Immediate Tokyo Immediate

Subject: Poland--Views of U.S. Administration

1. Secret Entire Text.

2. Please see that the message in Para 3 from Secretary Haig is brought to the attention of the Foreign Minister as soon as possible.

3. Dear _____:

As I take up my duties as Secretary of State I wanted you to know that I have begun to review the agenda of international issues about which we share a concern and interest. In these areas of mutual concern which offer opportunities for cooperation, I look forward to extensive consultations with you and your government so that together we can promote the

SECRET

-2-

broadest possible agreement on consistent and coherent positions on the challenges we face as Western democracies.

There is one issue, however, where immediacy requires that we share views without delay. Poland remains a cause for deep concern. You should know that I have sent a personal message to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko stressing that Soviet intervention in Poland would have the most profound and adverse consequences for U.S. -Soviet relations. The Soviets should now understand that this Administration fully shares the view that the appreciable benefits gained in the past decade in the field of East-West cooperation have been seriously damaged by Soviet actions; that Poland should be free to decide its own future; and, that detente could not survive if the Soviets were again to violate the basic rights of any state to territorial integrity and independence.

SECRET

-3-

I am hopeful that my message to Gromyko will have the proper impact. However, it is even more important that we continue to use our time wisely to consult together so that should emergency decisions be required, our governments will have available the best possible list of feasible and compatible measures from which to choose. Moreover, in recognition of the importance of finding ways to help stabilize the situation in Poland, we are giving high priority to the question of additional economic assistance for Poland.

(For Canberra only) I want you to know that I am aware of your offer to make your-self available to participate in consultations with members of NATO on the types of measures that would be required should the Soviets intervene in Poland. I greatly appreciate your commitment to join in a firm response and you should know that we are currently consulting with our NATO Allies on effective arrangements for broad consultations with important countries such as yours both before and should there be an intervention. We will keep your government well informed as these NATO consultations evolve.

(for both)

It is more important than ever before that we find concrete ways to cooperate together on such matters. It is in this spirit that I am writing to our two Allies in ANZUS, as well as to other major Western democracies. My goal is to encourage each of us to consider carefully the measures they could take, in the event of a Soviet military intervention in Poland, as part of a broad Western effort.

In closing, I look forward to working closely with you in the period ahead. We have great opportunities and strengths in our nations and in the Western World collectively. With combined wisdom and effort, the values and goals we share will prevail.

Sincerely, Alexander Haig

-5

Draft: EUR/RPM- RFHopper *R*

x21134 1-23-81

Clearances: EUR-GSVest *R*
EUR- RLBarry *R*
EUR/RPM-CHThomas *R*
C-Amb Ridgway(draft) *R*
EA/ANP-FBennett *R*

DRAFT HAIG-GROMYKO MESSAGE

SECRET/SENSITIVE

Dear Mr. Minister:

I would like to thank you for your message of congratulations on my appointment as Secretary of State. I can assure you that I share your hopes for strengthening the peace and that as Secretary I will work for the development of relations between our two countries on the basis of restraint and reciprocity.

If these goals are to be realized, I believe it is essential from the start that our two government fully comprehend each other's concerns and intentions. For this reason I would like in this initial correspondence to address two issues which I consider of immediate importance.

The first deeply affects American opinion and thus the entire climate of our relations. I refer to the treatment by the official Soviet media of events surrounding the release by Iran of the 52 American diplomatic personnel illegally held captive in Tehran for over a year. The attitude of the USSR throughout our efforts to deal with the hostage crisis has already contributed to strains in our relations. Continued distortion of the facts concerning the hostages and of our policy toward Iran can only raise further doubts in this country concerning Soviet intentions.

The second is a matter of utmost potential seriousness-- the situation in Poland. I wish to make clear at the outset that there will be no change in the US position of noninterference

in Poland's internal affairs. We are prepared to do what we can to help Poland resolve its serious economic difficulties. And we are convinced that, if left to themselves, the Poles are fully capable of solving their problems themselves.

Nor do I wish to leave any doubt as to the seriousness with which the US would view efforts by the Soviet Union to influence developments in Poland through military pressure or direct intervention. This Administration fully supports the conclusions of the December 12 North Atlantic Council Communique. Any intervention in Poland would fundamentally alter the entire international situation, and the US with its Allies would be compelled to act in a manner which the gravity of the situation would require.

Mr. Minister, I cannot in this initial letter address all of the issues between us. At an appropriate time I would hope it would be possible to exchange views on a wider range of subjects, particularly the problem of Afghanistan, and the need for an early and complete Soviet withdrawal from that country. The points I have raised are those which I believe deserve immediate attention.

I would hope you would be prepared to address them in that spirit.

Sincerely,

PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE ON POLAND

-- The American people have a deep and lasting interest in events in Poland, a country with which so many Americans have personal ties. All Americans are following events in Poland with sympathy and concern.

-- We look forward to a constructive political and economic relationship with the Polish government and encourage continued cultural, economic, and financial ties between American institutions and Poland.

-- We are examining Poland's request to the previous Administration for additional economic assistance on a priority basis.

-- We believe the Poles can solve their problems without outside interference and should be left to do so. We realize that these problems will take time to resolve.

-- There should be no doubt as to the seriousness of the consequences of any Soviet intervention in Poland. The US stands behind the December 12 NATO communique which stated in part:

Any intervention (in Poland) would fundamentally alter the entire international situation. The Allies would be compelled to react in the manner which the gravity of the development would require.

-- We do not believe that Soviet intervention is inevitable but there should be no doubt that any such action would have the most severe adverse consequences for US-Soviet relations.

EUR:RLBarry:mr
1/23/81:x21752