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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

February 8, 1979

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR:

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

FROM:

ROBERT GATES *RG.*

ZB HAS SEEN

SUBJECT:

A Basis for Soviet Concern

In reading a book on United States industrial production during World War II last weekend, I came across some statistics that suggest why the Soviets at the end of the war regarded the United States with a mixture of awe and fear -- a reaction that I believe still affects the present Soviet leadership. Those statistics reflect the industrial might of a mobilized United States even 35 years ago when our industrial capacity was relatively primitive by today's standards. (U)

To put the following table in perspective it is useful to note that in 1940 when the Wehrmacht invaded the Low Countries and France, the German blitzkrieg was supported by 3,000 aircraft, 2,600 tanks, 10,000 artillery pieces and 4,000 trucks. During the following 5 years the United States produced: (U)

Warplanes	296,429
Tanks (including self propelled guns)	102,351
Artillery pieces	372,431
Trucks	2,455,964
Warships	87,620
Cargo ships	5,425

It must still be as disconcerting to the Soviets as it was then to the Germans that a country they regarded as so soft could, by the end of its second year in a war, field an army of 12 million men, fight two awesome empires at the same time, build a Navy larger than the combined fleets of its enemies and allies -- and still record a 20 percent increase in civilian spending over the last pre-war year. (U)

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A more recent experience that still inspires Soviet awe is how quickly the United States developed, produced, and deployed its 1,000 Minuteman missiles in the mid-1960s. They understand, based on our performance in World War II -- still familiar to these aged leaders -- and our rapid deployment of Minuteman, the incredible military potential of the United States. (U)

I believe these memories have served as an incentive for the Soviets to negotiate and conclude arms control agreements with the United States and to avoid a serious protracted worsening of bilateral relations such as might provoke us to mobilize our industrial military capacity and undertake a massive United States arms buildup -- which the Soviets know they could never match. The real challenge for us in dealing with the Soviets is to take better advantage of their memories and respect for our potential military power -- to make more credible to them the notion that their unconstrained actions abroad (in the Persian Gulf, Southern Africa, the Horn, etc.) risk triggering the kind of military buildup in this country they already have seen twice in the last 40 years. The 3 percent defense spending increase is a start in this direction. Other demonstrations of our will to act are necessary. (C)

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Interesting memo. Should we
make it a WR item?

Rick

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INFORMATION

January 2, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
FROM: ROBERT GATES *Rg.*
SUBJECT: US-PRC Normalization: Soviet Reaction (U)

I believe we are entering a period of an abnormally great Soviet paranoia, fed by a growing sense of isolation and Moscow's perception of a US-PRC-Japanese-NATO cabal against the USSR. This situation derives from three major developments in international life in 1978 which -- as Soviet leaders recognize -- adversely affected long-term Soviet security interests and represent serious setbacks for Soviet policy. (S)

US-PRC Normalization

Recent analyses by CIA, Embassy Moscow, and the press with respect to Soviet reaction to US-PRC normalization have been much too sanguine in my view. While the Soviets doubtlessly regarded normalization as inevitable, they must have been stunned -- as was much of the world -- by the suddenness of the announcement. They also understand the significant qualitative change in US-PRC relations that normalization means. Moreover, the Soviets are very alert to the fact -- largely ignored by Western commentaries -- that the act of normalization took place almost immediately after the US said it would not oppose Western arms sales to China. (And Soviet concern with that development was made clear by Brezhnev's letters to Callaghan and Giscard warning against arms sales to the PRC as well as Ponomarev's statements that such sales could wreck detente.) (S)

Thus, the fact of normalization and its strategic/security context almost certainly is considered by the Soviets as a serious, even dangerous long-term development. Indeed it represents the failure of Soviet efforts since 1969 to build a special relationship with the US that would isolate China for a long time. (S)

PRC-Japan Treaty

In recent years, Japan has been courted by both the PRC and the USSR to develop closer relations and make a major commitment to economic development and trade as well as closer political ties.

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Review on January 2, 1999
Classified by Z. Brzezinski
Reason for Extension: NSC 1.13(f)

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This year, in one of the major developments of the post World War II period (and one of the most underreported), Japan finally decided to cast its lot with China. In signing the Treaty of Friendship with Peking, Tokyo cold-shouldered the USSR and indicated its willingness to forego a potentially massive role in the development of Siberia. In broad terms, Asia's greatest economic power and its largest country put aside more than a half century of official hostility and declared their desire to work together -- explicitly for economic cooperation and mutual benefit and implicitly to prevent Soviet "hegemony." The long-term implications of Japan's decision, especially for the USSR in Asia, are enormous and, for the Soviets, entirely negative. (S)

NATO

Although a different order of historic magnitude than the "two normalizations," NATO's concern over the Soviet military buildup in Central Europe, new Soviet weapons systems and Soviet behavior in Africa, has resulted in new efforts to strengthen the alliance militarily, a development contrary to Soviet interests. At the same time, domestic pressure in the US for unilateral troop withdrawals from Europe virtually has disappeared and there is no pressure to conclude an early MBFR agreement. NATO's defense spending is back on the upswing. This development spells the failure for at least a time of Soviet efforts through detente to weaken NATO, increase opposition in the West to defense spending, and loosen ties between the US and Western Europe. (S)

Conclusion

The three developments cited above represent major strategic setbacks which threaten Soviet long-term security interests. The Soviet Union faces a China which, in Soviet eyes, is allied to the US, Western Europe and Japan. Simultaneously, it faces a reinvigorated NATO alliance, the military strength of which is growing again and several members of which are on the verge of major arms sales to the PRC. In short, I believe the Soviet leaders see themselves as isolated for at least the foreseeable future among the powerful nations of the world -- although bilateral ties with the US and Western Europe will continue. All the USSR's principal enemies are collaborating now, in many ways explicitly antagonistic to the USSR. (S)

That the Soviets view this situation in this way and with alarm is substantiated by a December 17th article in Red Star which included the following passages: (U)

"Everyone is free to choose an ally for himself as he sees fit. The Fuehrer once boasted that he was prepared to enter

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into an alliance even with the devil himself in order to achieve victory." (U)

"It was K. Marx who warned that 'a nation, like a woman, cannot be forgiven a moment's negligence when the first adventurer who comes along could commit rape against it, or her.' Unfortunately, in some gentlemen, reason often yields to lust, whereupon they cannot control themselves." (U)

"Supporters of creating 'a NATO for Asia' occupy the same anti-Soviet and antisocialist platform. The only difference is that Washington and Tokyo call the Soviet Union the 'most likely opponent,' while Peking calls it 'enemy No. 1.' But both dream of liquidating the people's revolutionary gains, recarving the borders and establishing their ascendancy in Asia and see the Soviet Union as the chief obstacle in their way." (U)

"The alliance of American imperialists, Japanese revanchists and Chinese great-power chauvinists (emphasis added-RG) is directed against the vital interests of all peoples. It has and can have no future." (U)

"The attempts by the enemies of detente to knock together a new military bloc and thereby to render the situation in the Far East more complicated requires that we display unremitting vigilance and a constant readiness to protect the motherland's interests and security." (U)

The Soviets have always been paranoid about being isolated and facing enemies on two flanks. The "potential" of such a combination in the past -- with the PRC-Japanese treaty and PRC-US normalization -- has become a "reality." Accordingly, in my view, we face a much more dangerous USSR now than in recent years. (S)

Soviet options are limited. To disrupt the new "correlation of forces" arrayed against them (or at least with their principal enemy, China), they must either reach a genuine accommodation with Japan by ceding at least some of the Kurile Islands or allay Western fears by putting an end to their support for Cuban operations in Africa. I do not expect them to do either. While they will continue to try to break up the US-NATO-PRC-Japanese alignment by blandishments and bilateral overtures (such as the conclusion of SALT), I believe we will see more threats (especially directed toward Western Europe) and offensive/subversive action in Africa, Persian Gulf, Middle East, and Southeast Asia. We are in for some tough times ahead with the USSR and should expect no restraint from Moscow in South Asia, the Persian Gulf or the arms race. (S)

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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July 17, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR:

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

FROM:

ROBERT GATES *RG.*

SUBJECT:

U.S.-USSR Relations

*Good news.
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The "spy war" and recent dissident trials ensure that the atmosphere of U.S.-USSR relations will heat up further in coming weeks and months. U.S. retaliation for the trials through denial of licensing for Sperry-Univac computers, the Dresser drillbits and placing of export controls on petroleum technology, together with possible other measures, certainly would accelerate this deterioration in relations. In light of the pessimistic prospects for the near future, a few basic propositions are worth keeping in mind:

-- The Soviets will continue to work for a SALT agreement, regardless of the extent of public polemics or their perception of Carter's political weakness. They signed the SALT I agreements two weeks after Nixon bombed and mined Hanoi and Haiphong (including hits on a Russian ship, with casualties); they negotiated through the crisis and alerts growing out of the Yom Kippur War; they negotiated and signed the Vladivostok agreement even while Ford's political standing plummeted because of the pardon; and they continued to negotiate seriously throughout 1976 when it seemed Ford would lose the nomination and then when he seemed hopelessly behind Carter. In sum, the Soviets take the long view and keep their interests clearly up front. While they obviously are aware of Carter's political troubles, if they have learned anything in recent years, it is the changeable nature of American politics. They will continue to seek agreement and worry about U.S. ratification when the time comes.

-- Nothing the Administration can do short of military force will induce Soviet restraint in Africa or any other target of opportunity. They cannot be expected to play a helpful role in southern Africa and probably will work against peaceful resolution in the area. Watergate and Vietnam have left a legacy in American political life that gives the Soviets considerable confidence that there is virtually no chance of military confrontation with the U.S. over Soviet activities in the Third World. They will not forego the opportunity this provides. The Soviets recognize no linkage with SALT and, I believe, would

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not forego their active role in places like Africa even at the expense of SALT. It is fundamental to Soviet foreign policy and ideology.

-- Similarly, the Administration is helpless to halt Soviet actions against the dissidents. It has been clear since the early '70s that the dissidents would pay a heavy price for "detente." In the Soviet view, any relaxation of tensions and/or opening of the USSR to Western business, tourism, etc. requires renewed vigilance against subversion. Accordingly, strict action against the dissidents began long before January 1977. The Administration might be able to arrange less harsh treatment or expulsion by quiet diplomacy -- and by stilling its public condemnations, just as this approach worked in the case of Jewish emigration. But, as Jackson-Vanik showed, any effort to rub the Soviets' noses in their evil practices will be counterproductive to those we seek to help. In fact, the timing of the trials this month was intended to make plain in the starkest possible way to Carter and the world that the USSR would brook no outside interference in its treatment of Soviet dissidents. It is our decision whether our policy should be to hold the Soviet government up to the world for the dictatorship it is or to forego this general point in the hope of helping specific individuals.

-- The succession process in Moscow, including Brezhnev's fitness or lack thereof, is probably not yet significantly affecting Soviet internal or foreign policies. Common wisdom today is that the hardliners are coming to the fore, as witness the dissident trials and the spy war. I see no evidence of this so far. On arms control, the Soviets continue to show interest and movement in SALT, MBFR and CTB. In all areas outside of the rhetoric of "detente," Brezhnev himself has always been a hardliner. With respect to Africa, Afghanistan and the Arabian peninsula, I believe Soviet actions have been in response to opportunities presented and their perception of American inability to counter them rather than a new hard line. We need to keep in mind a history of Soviet involvement in Africa (Congo, Ghana, Guinea, etc.), especially their intervention in Angola in 1975 -- all predating Brezhnev's "decline."

On internal affairs, Brezhnev has always realized that a hard line internally was essential to ensure support for his detente policies. The treatment of dissidents since the mid-60s -- Sinyavsky, Daniel, Medvedev, Litvinov, General Grigorenko, etc. -- bears out the assertion that the current harsh policy and trials do not derive from Brezhnev's health

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or the succession. Those developments -- not to mention the Soviet system itself -- simply ensure that the policy will not change in the foreseeable future.

-- The Soviet leaders probably believe they are not responsible for the "sov war."

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

The publicity and high bail accompanying the arrests in N.J. both were outrageous to the Soviets, who saw this as an effort to embarrass the USSR and humiliate their Ambassador (the judge's remarks). They decided to respond in a way which they thought -- mistakenly -- would bring maximum pressure on the U.S. Government (from business and the press) to drop the charges or get a trade. They undoubtedly really do believe Shcharanskiv is guilty --

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To an extent, the above propositions are truisms. But, as things get a little rougher for a while with the Soviets, some of the analytical points ought to be freshly restated. We, like the Soviets, need to keep our long range interests in the forefront and resist political pressures to take short term actions that jeopardize such interests. Thus, the decision to go ahead with Geneva was exactly right. As the atmosphere heats up in coming days, we need to be equally clear-sighted. In this connection, I believe action to deny export licenses to Sperry-Univac and Dresser and to put petroleum equipment on the COCOM list serves both our short term and long range interests.

cc: David Aaron
Reginald Bartholomew

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