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Washington, D.C. 20520

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August 19, 1987

CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM

OS REGISTRY 05-1220X-87

TO:

Overseas Security Policy Group

FROM:

Louis Schwartz Chairman, OSPG

SUBJECT:

Non-Fraternization/Contact Reporting

Policy-Revised Draft

Attached is a copy of the combined non-fraternization/contact reporting policy, to include appendices which list the countries and organizations for which each respective policy applies.

Action Requested: Please review the draft and return it with your comments to the Counterintelligence Staff, Diplomatic Security Service, U. S. Department of State. We will then circulate a final draft for your review.

The Counterintelligence Staff is located in Room 1656, Main State, telephone 647-1040 or 5236 (KY-3). We would appreciate receiving your comments by noon, Friday, September 4. Thank you.

Attachment: as stated

CONFIDENTIAL DECL: OADR

(Unclassified when separated from attachment)

SUBJECT: PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS WITH FOREIGN NATIONALS AND CONTACT REPORTING RESPONSIBILITIES

I. INTRODUCTION:

Establishing and maintaining effective business and social relationships with the officials and citizens of other countries are necessary to accomplish the mission of the Foreign Service. These contacts are authorized when in the furtherance of U.S. foreign policy objectives.

Business and social relationships with the officials and citizens of the designated countries are limited to those whose performance of official duties require such contacts. The extent of such contacts is established by the Chief of Mission and the Department.

It is an unfortunate fact of life that targeting and exploitation by foreign intelligence services are occupational hazards for the employees of all foreign affairs agencies because of their job functions and access to classified information. The Department does not wish to intrude into the private lives of its employees. Nonetheless, all associations with foreign nationals must be considered in the context of your position as an official representative of the U.S. Government, not as a private citizen - that is how the foreign national will perceive you.

The Department has developed criteria governing its employees' contacts and relationships with all foreign nationals, particularly with those of countries or organizations which pose an intelligence threat to American interests.

II. SCOPE:

This instruction applies to all U.S. Government employees and their dependents assigned 1) to our diplomatic and consular posts abroad and 2) to the foreign affairs agencies in the U.S. It is also applicable to American contractors and their dependents, and to Foreign Service National employees assigned to the missions not included in Appendices I and II.

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III. POLICY REGARDING PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS WITH NATIONALS OF HIGH INTELLIGENCE THREAT COUNTRIES AND ORGANIZATIONS:

This non-fraternization policy defines high intelligence threat countries and organizations as those which are Communist or whose interests are inimical to our national security. The list of countries and organizations in this category is in Appendix I.

We know from experience that foreign intelligence services have exploited close personal relationships which have led to emotional and intimate involvement. Intimate social relationships and emotional or sexual involvement with the nationals of the designated countries are prohibited. These relationships could include: dating, sexual encounters, and/or close personal friendships. Group social contacts with Foreign Service National employees or other nationals of the countries in Appendix I may be permitted on a case-by-case basis under procedures established by the Chief of Mission.

The Regional Security Officer (RSO) must be advised when 1) a close personal (or intimate) social relationship with a foreign national of a designated country is deemed unavoidable or, for official reasons, desirable; 2) questions arise concerning the extent of any social relationship with a national of a designated country. The RSO will be responsible for reporting to appropriate post officials through procedures established by the Chief of Mission.

Failure to comply with this policy will be treated with the utmost seriousness. Consequences may include curtailment of assignment, reprimand, suspension, or even separation for cause.

The Department understands that employees may be apprehensive about reporting their own transgressions. To lessen these concerns, mitigating consideration will be given to those employees who do so. All such reports will be treated with discretion and understanding.

IV. CONTACT REPORTING RESPONSIBILITIES:

NSDD 197 requires that certain conversations and contacts with all nationals must be reported. In particular, conversations and contacts between employees and nationals of the high intelligence threat countries and organizations listed in Appendix II are of national security interest and must be reported.

- A. Conversations and Contacts with All Nationals:
- 1. Employees must immediately report conversations and contacts with individuals of any nationality in which:
 - a. illegal or unauthorized access is sought to classified or otherwise sensitive information; or
 - b. the employee is concerned that he or she may be the target of an attempted exploitation by a foreign entity.
- B. Conversations and Contacts with Nationals of High Intelligence Threat Countries and Organizations:

Conversations and contacts with nationals of high intelligence threat countries and organizations must be reported as follows. These instructions are not intended to inhibit or discourage contact with employees or nationals of Communist or other specified countries. Rather, these procedures are to insure that the contact - the nature of the contact, as well as all relevant information developed as a result of the contact - is appropriately documented and properly disseminated.

- 1. Conversations and contacts must be reported promptly when:
 - a. a social or personal relationship is developing or recurring contact is anticipated; or
 - b. the national of the designated country appears to be making efforts to develop a relationship or expand an existing contact or introduce another party into the relationship.
- 2. Employees must also report conversations and contacts when:
 - a. substantive data pertaining to political, economic, and other official matters is developed; or
 - b. useful biographic information is obtained.
- 3. Suspicions that a Communist country official or other designated country official might be expressing defector intentions must be immediately reported.

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4. Employees who, by virtue of their positions, are primarily responsible for maintaining regular professional contact with Communist or other specified nationals on a recurring basis may report a number of contacts collectively.

For example, desk officers for Communist or other specified countries and officers assigned to our missions in these countries who are in daily contact with their professional counterparts need not report every contact individually.

- a. However, for the protection of the officer, the date/place/participants of each contact must be recorded in the body of a report which may cover a 30 day period. The report must be filed within 30 days of the last contact and may not exceed a 30 day period. Employees serving in these positions must submit a detailed report of contact if any of the criteria enumerated above are met.
- 5. Casual encounters such as a chance meeting at a large social function or other such incidental encounters are to be reported when information meeting the above criteria is developed.
- 6. All reports of contact should contain at a minimum: biographic information on the individual met, the circumstances of the contact (casual, planned, who initiated the contact), any particular interest expressed by the contact, and any plans to continue contact.
- 7. Failure to appropriately report contacts as described above will be treated seriously. Consequences may include reprimand or suspension.
- C. Dissemination of Contact Reports:
- 1. Normally, all conversations and contacts with nationals of countries and organizations listed in Appendices I and II are reported by memorandum.
- 2. Contacts of the nature described in Section IV, A and P, are to be reported to the RSO at post who will be responsible for reporting to the parent agency in accordance with their procedures.

- 3. Political, economic, and other substantive reporting of contacts with nationals of high intelligence threat countries and organizations will be distributed per appropriate reporting instructions. A copy must also be provided to the RSO at post and to the appropriate parent agency security office in Washington.
- 4. All other contacts with nationals of high intelligence threat countries and organizations must be reported directly to the RSO at post and to the appropriate parent agency security office in Washington.
- 5. RSO's will forward copies of all contact reports they receive to the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Counterintelligence Staff (DS/CI) for action or distribution to other agencies as necessary.

V. CHANGES TO THIS POLICY:

Chiefs of Mission may desire to issue their own instructions augmenting or modifying this policy. Proposed changes with an account of the relevant circumstances must be submitted to the Department of State for the attention of the appropriate agency or bureau, and to DS/CI.

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APPENDIX I

List of Countries and Organizations for Which the Non-Fraternization Policy Applies

Afghanistan	Albania	Eulgaria
Cambodia	Cuba	Czechoslovakia
East Germany	Ethiopia	Hungary
Iran	Iraq	Laos
Libya	Mongolia	Nicaragua
North Korea	PLO	Poland
PRC	Romania	South Yemen
Soviet Union	Syria	Vietnam
Yugoslavia		

This list will be revised as necessary. Foreign Service posts will be notified of revisions via telegram.

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APPENDIX II

List of Countries and Political Organizations Requiring Reporting of Contacts

Employees are to report those contacts and conversations as described above with nationals from:

Afghanistan Albania Angola Bulgaria Cambodia Cuba Czechoslovakia East Germany Ethiopia Hungary Iran Iraq Laos Libya Mongolia Nicaraqua North Korea PLO Poland PRC Romania South Africa South Yemen Taiwan Soviet Union Syria Vietnam Yugoslavia

This list will be revised as necessary. Foreign Service posts will be notified of revisions via telegram.