

~~SECRET~~

4-1-17

OS REGISTRATION
~~87-0808~~

08 JUN 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Assistant
Deputy Director for Administration

25X1 FROM: [redacted]
Executive Officer
Office of Security

25X1 SUBJECT: Reducing Bureaucracy [redacted]

REFERENCE: Note from EXA/DDA dated 12 May 87; same subject
DDA 87-1011

Thank you for the opportunity to review the suggestions for "reducing bureaucracy." If the four suggestions which pertain to the Office of Security are typical, this will have been a worthwhile exercise for the Agency; each contained, at its core, a past or present bureaucratic stumbling block. The Office of Security's response to each suggestion is as follows:

STAT Regarding the "Vaulted Area" [redacted] -

25X1 On 28 May 1987, the installation [redacted]
25X1 [redacted] was completed although it will not be activated until OL completes work on physical security construction requirements per memoranda from Physical Security Division to OL/RE&CD dated 28 October 1986 and 18 May 1987.

Be this as it may, the suggestion accurately points out a problem which our own personnel have noted namely, that all too often time is wasted between construction or inspection by one component and subsequent construction or inspection by another. The offices most often involved are OS/Security Equipment Services Division, OL/Real Estate and Construction Division, DDA/Safety Staff and the requesting component.

One "old hand" recalls a time when the Office of Logistics had an officer assigned to each building or group of buildings who acted like a general contractor; the officer would monitor the construction and make sure that

25X1 [redacted]

[redacted]

S E C R E T

the work of each "subcontractor" or inspector followed closely upon completion of the previous phase. It appears that this practice is no longer followed. While the Office of Logistics seems in the best position to assume this function, the Office of Security is willing to be cooperative and responsive to the direction and coordination of such a focal point officer. We recognize that it is difficult for inexperienced component personnel to try to act in this capacity; there is too much room for confusion and delay.

Regarding the reporting of gifts -

The Office of Security strongly opposes the use of the reinvestigation polygraph test as a routine means of detecting misfeasance, malfeasance or similar misconduct. I believe an administrative solution would be more appropriate.

Regarding procedures for admitting visitors to Headquarters -

Unfortunately, we do not have the personnel to handle the telephone calls required each day to process the hundreds of visitors to the headquarters compound. In addition to preregistering visitors in person at the Security Duty Office, Headquarters personnel can preregister visitors by using electronic mail (a menu is available on the Automated Information Management System - AIM). The availability of the AIM method of visitor registration has been previously published in Headquarters Notices and will again be cited in an upcoming Notice regarding the opening of the Headquarters Visitor Control Center.

Regarding the operational naivety of young OS officers -

The Office of Security must rely on its cadre of young (inexperienced) officers for many vital tasks. While there is no instant cure for inexperience, we recognize the problem and have taken the following steps:

- ° All new Security Officers are provided with a DO orientation as part of their initial training. They are also schooled in surveillance and countersurveillance techniques and terminology.

S E C R E T

° We are considering continuation of a program, developed in 1986, in which OS polygraph and technical officers attended a workshop with DO officers to discuss mutual problems and concerns. These after-hours session were found to be very beneficial even if occasionally heated.

° We sympathize with past limitations on non-DO attendees at operational courses. The DO Senior Training Officer has been extremely cooperative in recent discussion toward enrolling OS Special Activities Division personnel in various CI courses. We would welcome the opportunity to enroll additional students in operations-related courses.

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:OS/EO/PPS (5 June 87)!

:Distribution:!
: Orig - Adse:
: 1 - EO Chrono:
: 1 - OS/Registry!
: 1 - PPS Chrono!

S E C R E T

1
REFERENCE



EXA/
Deputy Director
for Administration

DDA 87-1011
12 May 1987

NOTE FOR: Executive Officer
Office of Security

SUBJECT: Reducing Bureaucracy

Bob,


1. As you know, Bill Donnelly sent a memo to all Agency Office/Division Directors and asked them to identify any "bureaucratic stumbling blocks" which he could help solve. Attached are two responses.

2. The first response identifies a problem in getting vault alarms for a room in Ames Building. The second response discusses security-related issues in paragraphs 2, 3, and 5.

3. Could you have someone look into these and get back to me with additional background information or status? Bill would like to respond to, or solve, as many of these items as is feasible.

4. Thanks for your help.

Attachments



25X1

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

Doc #1

22 April 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Record

STAT FROM:

[Redacted]

Information Control Officer
Historical Review Branch, CRD

STAT SUBJECT:

Vaulted Area

[Redacted]

1. The review process in the Historical Review Branch (HRB) involves handling many boxes of documents over a long period of time. The Classification Review Division (CRD) has to retain possession of these boxes of documents throughout the period that they are undergoing review and coordination. Since HRB began operations in the Summer of 1985 they have made do without a security approved storage vault. This has meant removing the documents to store them in safes and storing boxes wherever we could borrow safe storage space in Ames Building.

STAT 2. Last Fall, because of the obvious security hazard that this situation represented, approval was given for construction of a vault within the HRB area, [Redacted]. This construction was begun in late January 1987 and completed at the end of February. Following completion of the vault construction and after passing inspection, OS/DSB informed CRD that the completed room was ready for installation of security controls and that we should notify OS/SEB to make the installations. We notified SEB of this after 20 March 1987. We have held at least 10-12 conversations with members of the SEB staff, both at Headquarters and the [Redacted] Building. HRB has reached the absolute limits of the available safe storage areas and we must have this new vaulted area for better security and to make our operation more efficient.

STAT Ray

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

Doc #2~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

20 April 1987

25X1 MEMORANDUM FOR: [] EXA/DDA
 25X1 THRU: [] CEA/SS
 FROM: [] CEA/PLNS
 SUBJECT: Thoughts on Reducing Bureaucracy
 REF: DDA 87-0700, 1 April 1987

We circulated Mr. Donnelly's memorandum (reference) and asked all East Asia Division employees for their ideas on reducing bureaucracy. Following are some of their comments and suggestions.

25X1 1. Many expressed concern with the length of time it takes to procure new equipment. For instance, the Division began the process in October 1986 of procuring new computer and word processing equipment for one of our branches. Only last week, more than five months later, did the order reach the vendor. To alleviate some of the delays and possibly some of the expenses involved in ordering WANG equipment, [] one of our Logistics officers, suggested that, like the WANG maintenance contract, an overall Agency contract be written and specific orders placed under it. This would require that OIT consolidate information on annual requirements for WANG equipment and come up with a minimum and maximum quantity for the contract. This information should be available from previously submitted budget requests. With some coordination between OIT, the Comptroller, and Procurement Division a contract could be written to fairly specific parameters which, probably, would result in significant savings as the consolidated WANG maintenance contract did.

2. Another suggestion concerned "gifts". Currently stations submit a monthly report concerning gifts received by station personnel. We suggest that this reporting requirement be abolished. In its stead require all employees to sign a statement that they have read and understood the regulations concerning gifts. All gifts would be reported to an employee's immediate supervisor and handled on a "local" level. The question of "unreported gifts" would then become part of the re-polygraph process.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

3. It was also suggested that the procedure for the admittance of visitors to the Headquarter's compound be streamlined. Currently one must route or hand-carry a form to the first floor Security office. A simple phone call on the secure phone would be more efficient, particularly since the form does not require a signature and therefore carries no more authority than a phone call.

4. The TDY check-out procedure could also be more flexible. Currently, Central Processing will not issue airline tickets and provide advance funds until all appropriate blocks on the check-out card are initialed. All too often this results in the TDY'er spending his last day(s) trying to acquire signatures of people who frequently are not in their office and occasionally not even in Headquarters. In such cases, branch chiefs should be authorized to waiver those check out requirements considered non-essential to the TDY in question. It, of course, would be the branch chief's personal responsibility. An example of the current inflexibility is the absolute requirement that a TDY'er has attended the "Audio Awareness" briefing, held only on Friday mornings. Recently one officer had to travel 150 miles and miss a day of his assigned duties just to fulfill this requirement. The officer in question has been engaged in CI work for over three years and is well aware of the audio threat.

5. Finally, our Chief of Counter-Intelligence for China Operations made the following comment, which, although it does not concern "bureaucratic stumbling blocks" may be of interest to the Office of Security: "About a year ago I had the opportunity to work with several young Security Officers from the Washington Field Office. I was favorably impressed with the quality of the individuals but dismayed at their ignorance of operational considerations. I strongly recommend that junior Security Officers be required to attend the Clandestine Operations Familiarization Course and encouraged to enroll in other operational courses such as the SE Ops Course, China Ops Course, Counter-Intelligence Familiarization Course, etc."

25X1

[Redacted]

CEA/PLNS

25X1

[Redacted]

C O N F I D E N T I A L

CONFIDENTIAL



ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Reducing Bureaucracy

FROM: 25X1	[Redacted]	EXTENSION	NO.
25X1	Acting Executive Officer	[Redacted]	DATE
			14 May 1987

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1.				Please respond to the paragraph as indicated below by 22 May.
25X1				Thanks. [Redacted]
3.				[Redacted] (6/4). Reg wa.
ILLEGIB				- Doc #1, para 2.
C/SESD/PTS	6/1			- Doc #2, para 2.
5.				- Doc #2, para 3.
C/IG/PS	5/20			- Doc #2, para 5. <i>w/ep have by 1 JUN</i>
6.				
C/HSD	5/21			
7.				
C/SES	5/25			
8.				
9.				- DG: fyi as
EO	20 MAY 1987		20 May B	there are some
10.				touchy issues here -
11.				pls return to me for
12.				monitoring by Friday.
25X1				He [Redacted]
C/POE/PPS				
13.				
25X1				
25X1				
14.				
15.				

CONFIDENTIAL

1 June 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Policy Branch

25X1
FROM:

[Redacted]

Chief, Security Education Staff

SUBJECT: SES Response to "Thoughts in Reducing
Bureaucracy" Memo dated 20 April 87.

1. With respect to Document #2, paragraph 5, the Security Education Staff (SES) understands the writers concern. We would also like to see OS officers receive more training in these disciplines, though the demands for the courses described are such that only personnel preparing for overseas assignment are normally accepted.

2. To help overcome this situation, OS has several ongoing initiatives to provide its personnel with basic DO background information.

- ° All new Security Officers are provided with a DO orientation as part of their initial training. This orientation provides officers with an overview of the interactions between OS and DO. New officers are also schooled in surveillance and countersurveillance techniques and terminology.

- ° One running of a program, developed in 1986, has been conducted in which OS Polygraph and Technical Officers attended a workshop with DO officers to discuss mutual concerns and problems. The sessions, which were held after-hours were considered informative, occasionally heated and mutually beneficial as both offices gained an understanding of the others objectives.

°C/SES and the Senior DO/Training Officer (DO/STO) recently discussed the need for OS/Special Activities Division personnel to receive courses such as COFC and other CI courses. The DO/STO has been extremely cooperative in this endeavor and is enrolling several officers in upcoming COFC sessions.

All Portions Of This Document
Are Classified "CONFIDENTIAL"

25X1
[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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3. Although our current training curriculum does not produce experts in the DO, it does provide OS Domestic Field Agents with the basic tools necessary for supporting DO domestic operations (usually surveillances and countersurveillances). OS personnel scheduled for overseas assignment are scheduled for and do receive both Operational and Counterintelligence training before departure. If additional slots in DO courses could be made available to OS, that would be considered an additional plus.

25X1



C O N F I D E N T I A L

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Reducing Bureaucracy

FROM

Chief, Headquarters Division
1E-24 Hqs

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

19 May 1987

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

EO

20 MAY 1987

Seen

1. Acting Executive Officer

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

19 May 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Executive Officer

FROM: [REDACTED]

Chief, Headquarters Security Division

SUBJECT: Reducing Bureaucracy

REFERENCE: DDA 87-0700 dtd 1 April 1987; Memo for [REDACTED]
EXA/DDA fm [REDACTED] CEA/PLNS dtd 20 April 1987 [REDACTED]

1. This memorandum is in response to the suggestion that admittance of visitors to the Headquarters compound be streamlined by allowing Agency personnel to telephone the Security Duty Office/Access Control to inform them of an expected visitor. [REDACTED]

2. The volume of requests processed daily does not allow for the registration of visitors via telephone. There are approximately 1200 visitors listed on the Visitor's Gate Access List which is published each day. Access Control processes an additional 300 to 400 requests daily. Of this number, approximately 125 requests are received with short deadlines. This requires Access Control personnel to maintain almost constant contact with the Security Protective Officers at the gates in order to supply them with updated information on last minute visitor registrations. Additionally, Access Control personnel must locate the Agency point of contact for unregistered visitors who arrive at the gates. [REDACTED]

3. Now that the Personnel Access Security System (PASS) is operational, employees should be reminded that they may pre-register visitors via the Automated Information Management (AIM) system. One should pre-register a visitor at least 24 hours in advance. The advantage of pre-registration to the sponsor/contact is that the visitor can be handled quickly, thus minimizing their having to wait a period of time in order to be registered by a receptionist. Pre-registration would also minimize the possibility of the visitor being denied access to the Headquarters compound. [REDACTED]

4. As you can see, the present system discourages last minute visitor registration and cannot accommodate standard telephone requests. However, in an emergency, Access Control will accept visitor registration information over a secure line. If you are in need of additional information on this subject, please feel free to contact [REDACTED], Chief, Security Duty Office, on extension [REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Reducing Bureaucracy

FROM:

[Redacted]

Acting Executive Officer

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

14 May 1987

TO: (C
building)

[Redacted], room number, and

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

**OFFICER'S
INITIALS**

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. Please respond to the paragraph as indicated below by 22 May.

Thanks.

[Redacted]

- Doc #1, para 2.

- Doc #2, para 2.

- Doc #2, para 3.

- Doc #2, para 5.

C/SESD/PTS

C/IG/PS

C/HSD

C/SES

[Redacted]

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CONFIDENTIAL

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Reducing Bureaucracy

FROM:	[Redacted]	EXTENSION	NO.
	Acting Executive Officer		
TO: (OW building)		DATE	
[Redacted]		14 May 1987	

TO: (OW building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED		

1.				Please respond to the paragraph as indicated below by 22 May.
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2.				Thanks,
3.				[Redacted]

4.	C/SESD/PTS			- Doc #1, para 2.
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5.	AC/IG/PS			- Doc #2, para 2.
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6.	C/HSD			- Doc #2, para 3.
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7.	C/SES			- Doc #2, para 5.
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8.				
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9.	[Redacted] Acting Executive Officer	5/19	LM	5-9: Polygraph Division is prohibited from getting into criminal malfeasance during routine reinvestigation polygraphs. They already cover a number of more important issues and to increase the number would be counterproductive to the program.
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10.				
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13.				
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14.	[Redacted]			
-----	------------	--	--	--

15.	[Redacted]			
-----	------------	--	--	--

CONFIDENTIAL

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

OS REGISTRY

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Ames Building Vault-type

87-0746K

FROM:

C/OS/PTS/PASG/SESD

R

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

1 June 1987

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. ~~CEO/OS~~

JUN 1987

see

Re 6/4~~th~~ taken -

2.

cl re 1005

6/4

ES

OL performed a "foot print" type of service in past years but in last 2 years or so this function has disappeared. They used to have one person in charge of each building or group of buildings (eg: Res/Gen). That person kept a log of all work and made sure each successive activity was carried out. Job would like to see OL again take on this role and thinks it would help avoid delays -

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FORM 1-79 **610** USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

1 June 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Executive Officer/OS

25X1

FROM: [redacted]
Security Equipment Support Division

DATE: 1 June 1987

25X1

SUBJECT: Ames Building Vault-type [redacted]

REFERENCE: MFR from ICO/HRB/CRD, dtd 22 Apr 87, same subject

1. On 18 May 1987 Chief of the Security Equipment Support Division (C/SESD) initiated an investigation of the accusations made in the referenced MFR. The following facts were found:

a. Domestic Security Branch (DSB) had not certified the area for classified storage (see Attachment B).

b. SESD had only received two (2) telephone calls from Classification Review Division (CRD) individuals.

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2. On 28 May 1987, SESD personnel completed [redacted] installation in [redacted] Ames Building. IDS was not activated, pending completion of DSB's requirements outlined in Attachment C.

25X1



Attachments:

- A. Reference Document
- B. DSB Inspection Report (dtd 5/18/87)
- C. DSB Survey w/Attachment A

cc: C/HSD
C/SES
C/DSB

25X1

25X1



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C O N F I D E N T I A L

Dtd 18 May 87

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, External Buildings Operations Branch
Real Estate & Construction Division
Office of Logistics

1 B ATTACHMENT

25X1 FROM: [Redacted]
Chief, Physical Security Division
Office of Security

25X1 SUBJECT: Final Inspection of Proposed Vault-Type Room,
[Redacted] Ames Building

REFERENCE: Memo to C/EBOB from OS/DSB, dtd. 21 Oct 86,
same subject, W.O. 86-0448

1. As a result of reference, representatives of the Physical Security Division conducted a security survey of the cited area to determine what modifications had been completed to convert the area into a Vault-Type Room (VTR).

25X1 2. It is requested that you notify the Domestic Security Branch on extension [Redacted] when all recommended modifications or alterations have been completed.

25X1 3. Refer any questions concerning alarms to the Security Equipment Branch on extension [Redacted]. All other questions should be referred to the Domestic Security Branch.

25X1 4. Please note that compliance with these recommendations does not automatically imply that the area is accredited for storage of SCI material. Before the area can be accredited, a request for accreditation must be forwarded to the Special Security Center, Office of Security, [Redacted] Building.

25X1 [Redacted]

Attachments
Reference

C O N F I D E N T I A L

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

28 OCT 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, External Buildings Operations Branch
Real Estate & Construction Division
Office of Logistics

25X1 FROM: [redacted]
Domestic Security Branch
Office of Security

25X1 SUBJECT: Security Survey of Proposed Vault-Type Room
[redacted] Ames Building [redacted]

REFERENCE: Memo to C/PSD/OS from DSO/OIS, dated 29 Aug
86, Subject: Survey for Vault-Type Room

ATTACHMENT
c

25X1 1. As a result of reference, a representative of the
Domestic Security Branch conducted a security survey of the
cited area to determine what modifications would be necessary
to convert the area into a Vault-Type Room (VTR). [redacted]

25X1 2. It is requested that you notify the Domestic Security
Branch on extension [redacted] when all recommended modifications
or alterations have been completed. [redacted]

25X1 3. Refer any questions concerning alarms to the Security
Equipment Branch on extension [redacted]. All other questions
should be referred to the Domestic Security Branch. [redacted]

4. Please note that compliance with these recommendations
does not automatically imply that the area is accredited for
storage of SCI material. Before the area can be accredited, a

25X1 [redacted]
25X1

[redacted]

C O N F I D E N T I A L

C O N F I D E N T I A L

request for accreditation must be forwarded to the Special
Security Center, Office of Security, [redacted]
Building. [redacted]

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25X1

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Attachments:

- A. Requirements
- B. Floor Plan
- C. Reference

cc: DSO/OIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L

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