

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE ¹

SECURITY CONTROLS ON THE DISSEMINATION OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION (U)

(Effective 7 January 1984)

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, Executive Order 12333, Executive Order 12356, and implementing directives thereto; policies, controls, and procedures for the dissemination and use of intelligence information and related materials are herewith established.

Part I

1. Purpose

This directive establishes policies, controls, and procedures for the dissemination and use of intelligence to ensure that, while facilitating its interchange for intelligence purposes, it will be adequately protected. This directive amplifies applicable portions of the 23 June 1982 Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO) Directive No. 1 which implements Executive Order 12356. Additional controls are established on the dissemination of intelligence to foreign governments and to foreign nationals and immigrant aliens, including those employed by the U.S. Government. Policy and procedures governing the release of intelligence to contractors and consultants are set forth in Part II of this directive. As this directive prescribes security controls on the use and dissemination of intelligence information, it bears the overall classification of CONFIDENTIAL in the aggregate. Selected paragraphs may be excerpted for use at the unclassified (Official Use Only) level by Senior Officials of the Intelligence Community (SOICs), their designees, or security officers of Community organizations when considered appropriate.

2. Definitions

- a. Intelligence information and related materials (hereinafter referred to as intelligence) includes the following classified information:
 - foreign intelligence and counterintelligence as defined in Executive Order 12333;
 - information describing U.S. foreign intelligence and counterintelligence activities, sources, methods, equipment, or methodology used for the acquisition, processing, or exploitation of such intelligence; foreign military hardware obtained for exploitation; and photography or recordings resulting from U.S. intelligence collection efforts; and
 - information on Intelligence Community protective security programs (e.g., personnel, physical, technical, and information security).
- b. "Need-to-know" is the determination by an authorized holder of classified information that access to specific intelligence in his/her possession is

¹ This directive supersedes DCID 1/7, effective 4 May 1981

required by another person to perform a specific and authorized function to carry out a national security task. Such persons must possess an appropriate security clearance and access approvals.

3. *General Applicability*

- a. The controls and procedures established by this directive shall be applied uniformly in the dissemination and use of intelligence originated by all Intelligence Community components.
- b. The substance of this directive shall be promulgated by each Intelligence Community component, and appropriate procedures permitting prompt interagency consultation will be established and promulgated. To this end, each Intelligence Community component will designate a primary referent.

4. *Use By and Dissemination Among U.S. Intelligence Community Components*

Executive Order 12356 provides that classified information originating in one U.S. agency shall not be disseminated beyond any recipient agency without the consent of the originating agency. However, to facilitate use and dissemination of intelligence within and among Intelligence Community components and to provide for the provision of intelligence to consumers, the following controlled relief to the "third agency rule" is hereby established:

- Each Intelligence Community component consents to the use of its intelligence in intelligence products of other components and to the dissemination of those products within the Intelligence Community, except as specifically restricted by this directive.

5. *Use By and Dissemination to U.S. Components Outside the Intelligence Community*

- a. Classified intelligence, even though it bears no restrictive control markings, will not be released in its original form to U.S. components outside the Intelligence Community without the consent of the originator.
- b. Any component disseminating intelligence beyond the Intelligence Community assumes responsibility for ensuring that recipient organizations agree to observe the restrictions prescribed by this directive and to maintain adequate safeguards.

6. *Dissemination to Foreign Nationals or Contractors*

- a. Intelligence, even though it bears no restrictive control markings, will not be released to foreign nationals or immigrant aliens (including those employed by, used by, or integrated into the U.S. Government) without the permission of the originator.
- b. Release of intelligence to a foreign contractor or company under contract to the U.S. Government will be made according to the provisions of paragraph 7 below through the government under which the foreign contractor or company operates. Direct release from the U.S. Government to a foreign company or contractor is prohibited.

7. Dissemination to Foreign Governments

- a. Intelligence, even though it bears no restrictive control markings, will not be released in its original form to foreign governments without the permission of the originator.
- b. Information contained in intelligence of another Intelligence Community component, which bears no restrictive control markings, may be used by recipient Intelligence Community components in reports provided to foreign governments provided that:
 - no reference is made to the source documents on which the released product is based;
 - the information is extracted or paraphrased to ensure that the source or manner of acquisition of the intelligence is not revealed or cannot be deduced in any manner;
 - foreign release is made through established foreign disclosure channels and procedures as set forth in the DCI Directive on Intelligence Disclosure Policy.
- c. RESTRICTED DATA and FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA are prohibited from foreign dissemination under the provisions of Sections 123 and 144 of Public Law 585, Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.

8. Authorized Control Markings and Their Use

- a. "WARNING NOTICE—INTELLIGENCE SOURCES OR METHODS INVOLVED" (WNINTEL)
 - This marking is used to identify classified intelligence whose sensitivity requires constraints on its further dissemination and use. This marking may be used only on intelligence which identifies or would reasonably permit identification of an intelligence source or method which is susceptible to countermeasures that could nullify or reduce its effectiveness.
 - Classified intelligence so marked shall not be disseminated in any manner outside authorized channels² without the permission of the originating agency and an assessment by the SOIC in the disseminating agency as to the potential risks to the national security and to the intelligence sources or methods involved. In making such assessment, consideration should be given to reducing the risk to the intelligence sources or methods which provided the intelligence by sanitizing or paraphrasing the information so as to permit its wider dissemination. To avoid confusion as to the extent of dissemination and use restrictions governing the information involved, this marking may not be used in conjunction with special access or Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) controls. This marking may be abbreviated as "WNINTEL" or as "WN."

² Unless otherwise specified by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation with the National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB) or as agreed to between originating and recipient agencies, authorized channels are the Intelligence Community, as defined in Executive Order 12333, and Intelligence Community contractors and consultants and officials of agencies represented on the NFIB as determined on a "need-to-know" basis by recipient SOICs.

b. "DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR" (ORCON)

- This marking is used to enable continuing knowledge and supervision by the originator of the use made of intelligence. This marking may be used only on classified intelligence which clearly identifies or would reasonably permit ready identification of an intelligence source or method which is particularly susceptible to countermeasures that would nullify or measurably reduce its effectiveness. This marking may not be used when an item of information will reasonably be protected by use of any other markings specified herein, or by the application of the "need-to-know" principle and the safeguarding procedures of the security classification system.
- Information bearing this marking may not be disseminated in whole or in part through briefings, incorporation into reports, or in any other manner outside the headquarters elements³ of the recipient organizations, or used in taking investigative action, without the advance permission of, and under conditions specified by, the originator. As this is the most restrictive marking herein, agencies will establish procedures to ensure that it is only applied to particularly sensitive intelligence and that timely procedures are established to review requests for further dissemination of intelligence bearing this marking. This marking may be abbreviated as "ORCON" or as "OC."

c. "NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS/CONSULTANTS" (NO CONTRACT)

- This marking is used to identify classified intelligence that shall not be released to contractors or consultants (hereinafter "contractors") without the permission of the originating agency. This marking may be used only on intelligence which, if disclosed to a contractor, would actually or potentially give him a competitive advantage which could reasonably be expected to cause a conflict of interest with his obligation to protect the information; or which was provided by a source on the express or implied condition that it would not be made available to contractors. These restrictions do not apply to consultants hired under Office of Personnel Management procedures, or comparable procedures derived from statutory authorities of department or agency heads, and who are considered to serve as extensions of their employing offices. This marking may be abbreviated as "NOCONTRACT" or as "NC."

d. "CAUTION-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION INVOLVED" (PROPIN)

- This marking is used, with or without a security classification, to identify information provided by a commercial firm or private source under an express or implied understanding that the information will be protected as a trade secret or proprietary data believed to have actual or potential value. Information bearing this marking shall not be disseminated in any form to an individual, organization, or foreign government which has any interests, actual or potential, in competition with the source of the information without the permission of the originator. This marking may

³ At the discretion of the originator, the term "headquarters elements" may include specified subordinate intelligence-producing components.

be used in conjunction with the "NOCONTRACT" marking to preclude dissemination to any contractor. This marking may be abbreviated as "PROPIN" or as "PR."

e. "NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS" (NOFORN)

— This marking is used to identify classified intelligence that may not be released in any form to foreign governments, foreign nationals, or non-U.S. citizens without permission of the originator. This marking may be used on intelligence which if released to a foreign government or national(s) could jeopardize intelligence sources or methods, or when it would not be in the best interests of the United States to release the information from a policy standpoint upon specific determination by a SOIC. SOICs are responsible for developing, publishing, and maintaining guidelines consistent with the policy guidance herein for use in determining the foreign releasability of intelligence they collect or produce. These guidelines shall be used in assigning NOFORN control markings, and by primary referents (paragraph 3.b. above applies) in responding to inquiries from other organizations on application of this control. This marking may be abbreviated "NOFORN" or as "NF."

f. "AUTHORIZED FOR RELEASE TO (name of country(ies)/international organization)" (REL)

— This marking is used to identify classified intelligence that an originator has predetermined to be releasable or has released, through established foreign disclosure procedures and channels, to the foreign country(ies)/international organization indicated. No other foreign dissemination of the material is authorized (in any form) without the permission of the originator. This marking may be abbreviated "REL (abbreviated name of country(ies)/international organization)." In the case of intelligence controlled under DCID 6/2, authorized distribution indicators, published separately, may be used instead of the "REL" control marking.

9. Procedures Governing Use of Control Markings

- a. Any recipient desiring to use intelligence in a manner contrary to the restrictions established by this directive shall obtain the advance permission of the originating agency. Such permission applies only to the specific purpose agreed to by the originator and does not automatically apply to all recipients.

Originators will ensure that prompt consideration is given to recipients' requests with particular attention to reviewing and editing, if necessary, sanitized or paraphrased versions to derive a text suitable for release subject to lesser or no control markings.

- b. The control markings authorized above shall be shown on the title page, front cover, and other applicable pages of documents, incorporated in the text of electrical communications, shown on graphics, and associated (in full or abbreviated form) with data stored or processed in automated data processing systems. The control markings also shall be indicated by parenthetical use of the marking abbreviations at the beginning or end of the appropriate portions. If the control markings apply to several or all portions, the document may be marked with a statement to this effect rather than marking each portion individually.

CONFIDENTIAL

- c. The control markings in paragraph 8 shall be individually assigned at the time of preparation of intelligence products and used in conjunction with security classifications and other markings specified by Executive Order 12356 and its implementing ISOO Directive. The markings shall be carried forward to any new format in which the same information is incorporated, including oral and visual presentations.

10. *Obsolete Restrictions and Markings*

The following markings are obsolete and will not be used subsequent to the date of this directive: WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED, WARNING NOTICE-INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED, WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED, CONTROLLED DISSEM, NSC PARTICIPATING AGENCIES ONLY, INTEL COMPONENTS ONLY, LIMITED, CONTINUED CONTROL, NO DISSEM ABROAD, BACKGROUND USE ONLY, NO FOREIGN DISSEM, USIB ONLY, and NFIB ONLY. Questions with respect to the current application of control markings authorized by earlier directives on the dissemination and control of intelligence and used on documents issued prior to the date of this directive should be referred to the originating agency or department.

11. *Reporting Unauthorized Disclosures*

Violations of the foregoing restrictions and control markings that result in unauthorized disclosure by one agency of the intelligence of another shall be reported to the Director of Central Intelligence through the DCI Security Committee.

Part II

12. *Policy and Procedures Governing the Release of Intelligence to Contractors and Consultants*

- a. Intelligence Community components may release ⁴ selected intelligence ⁵ to contractors and consultants (hereinafter "contractors" ⁶) without referral to the originating components provided that:

- (1) Release is made only to private individuals or organizations certified by the SOIC (or his/her designee) of the sponsoring organization as being under contract to the United States Government for the purpose of performing classified services in support of a national security mission; and as having a demonstrated "need-to-know" and an appropriate security clearance or access approval. If retention of intelligence by the contractor is required, the contractor must have an approved storage facility.

⁴ Release is the authorized visual, and, or physical disclosure of intelligence.

⁵ The term "selected intelligence" excludes Foreign Service reports and SCI. Foreign Service reports may be released only with the permission of the Department of State. Release of SCI is governed by agreements and advisements between Intelligence Community components.

⁶ Non-Intelligence Community government components under contract to fulfill an intelligence support role may be treated as members of the Intelligence Community. In that event, release will be solely for the specific purpose and will not include authority to disseminate intelligence further. Government-owned, contractor-operated (GOCO) laboratories performing classified services in support of the intelligence mission of an Intelligence Community component, and which are designated as authorized channels by an SOIC or his/her designee, are not considered as contractors subject to the provisions of this directive.

CONFIDENTIAL

- (2) The SOIC of the sponsoring agency, or his/her designee, is responsible for ensuring that releases to contractors are made pursuant to this policy statement and through established channels.
 - (3) The sponsoring agency maintains a record of material released.
 - (4) Contractors maintain such records as will permit them to account for all intelligence received, disposed of or destroyed, produced and held by them for the duration of the contract, and to permit identification of all persons who have had access to intelligence in their custody.
 - (5) Contractors do not reproduce any intelligence without the permission of the sponsoring agency, and classify, control and account for reproduced copies in the same manner as for originals.
 - (6) Contractors destroy intelligence only according to guidelines and by standards set by the sponsoring agency.
 - (7) Contractors make provisions to ensure that intelligence in their custody is not released to foreign nationals, whether or not they are employees or contractors themselves, except with the permission of the originating agency through the sponsoring agency, and then released through established channels.
 - (8) Contractors receiving intelligence do not release it: to any of their components or employees not directly engaged in providing services under the contract; or to any other contractor (including subcontractors), without the consent of the sponsoring agency (which shall verify that any second contractors satisfy all security requirements herein).
 - (9) Any SCI released to contractors is controlled pursuant to the provisions of DCI "Security Policy for Sensitive Compartmented Information", effective 28 June 1982.
 - (10) Contractors agree that all intelligence released to them, all reproductions thereof, and all other material they may generate based on or incorporating data therefrom (including authorized reproductions), remain the property of the US Government and will be returned upon request of the sponsoring agency or expiration of the contract, whichever comes first.
 - (11) Sponsoring agencies arrange for and contractors agree that, upon expiration of contracts, all released intelligence, all reproductions thereof, and all other materials based on or incorporating data therefrom, are returned to the sponsoring agency; or all or a specified part of such items are retained by the contractor under all applicable security and accountability controls when the contractor has a specific need for such retention that is validated by the sponsoring agency.
 - (12) Sponsoring agencies delete: the CIA seal, the phrase "Directorate of Operations," the place acquired, the field number, the source description, and field dissemination, from all CIA Directorate of Operations reports passed to contractors, unless prior approval to do otherwise is obtained from CIA.
- b. National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs), Special National Intelligence Estimates (SNIEs), National Intelligence Analytical Memoranda and Interagen-

cy Intelligence Memoranda will not be released to contractors. Such materials shall be marked NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS/CONSULTANTS. However, information in them may be made available to contractors, without identification as national intelligence, by the SOIC of the agency authorizing its release.

- c. Intelligence which by reason of sensitivity of content bears control markings "CAUTION—PROPRIETARY INFORMATION INVOLVED," "NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS/CONSULTANTS," or "DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR," as specified in Part I of this directive, will not be released to contractors unless special permission has been obtained from the originator.
- d. Intelligence Community security policy requires that the government maintain control over sensitive intelligence and release to contractors only that information required to perform tasks beyond the capability of the government. The DCI has determined that there are significant risks to national security in contracting out support services or functions such as operation of telecommunications centers, automated data systems or other facilities when this permits broad contractor access to all-source or other sensitive intelligence information. Accordingly, Intelligence Community departments and agencies are cautioned fully to consider the consequences of contracting out these services pursuant to Office of Management and Budget Circular A-76, or similar guidance, in cases where the government's control of sensitive intelligence would be substantially diminished or where contractor access to such data would be unnecessarily expanded.

13. Interpretation

Questions concerning the implementation of this policy and these procedures shall be referred to the DCI Security Committee.

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