

31 October 1985
DDN-137, 138, + 139

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C 20505

Critical Intelligence Problems Committee

31 October 1985
DDW-137, 138, and 139

WEEKLY ACTIVITIES AND STATUS REPORT FOR THE DD/ICS--17 October-6 November 1985

CIPC Organizational Activities

- As reported in DDW-136, the Chairman, WSSIC, is sponsoring a meeting of the Chairmen and Executive Secretaries from several DCI production and collection communities. The DDCI and the ADDI will be in attendance. The date for this meeting has been changed to 4 November at 1400 [redacted] (Attachment 1).

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- [redacted]

- The Narcotics Follow-up Report has been received from the print shop and has been disseminated.

- The Terrorism Report has been received from the print shop and is now in the process of being disseminated.

- Our followup response to [redacted] memorandum on the status of the recommendations contained in the CIPC Terrorism Study, [redacted] has been reviewed by the DCI and returned without comment (Attachment 2).

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- Per your request, a copy of the CSEM-FIRF concept paper was provided to the D/ICS. This paper was also distributed internally for ICS management review and comment.


- Thus far the only written response to the CSEM concept paper is from COMIREX. Aside from a few minor suggestions, [redacted] thinks the proposal is "outstanding." Harry thinks it "may be worth a try" (Attachment 3).

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- * In addition, [redacted] VC/HUMINT, has advised Willi he is enthusiastic about the concept and is ready to give it a try.

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WEEKLY ACTIVITIES AND STATUS REPORT FOR THE DD/ICS--17 October-6 November 1985

- Once we have received specific written comments from the other offices, we will have a better understanding on how to proceed next.
- The critical intelligence needs package for the CIPC members' review, preparatory for the CIPC meeting, is nearing completion and should be ready for your review by early next week--4 November.
- On 30 October, the D/ICS requested that we review 45 issue papers prepared by the Vice President's Terrorism Task Force and identify for him any of the issue papers that should be brought to his immediate attention (Attachment 4).
 - Two of the most significant issue papers recommend the creation of a National Organization for Combatting Terrorism with a support staff, and the establishment of a Terrorism Fusion Center at CIA.

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WEEKLY ACTIVITIES AND STATUS REPORT FOR THE DD/ICS--17 October-6 November 1985


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- On 22 October, [redacted] attended an American Bar Association breakfast meeting where Senator Durenberger was the keynote speaker. The subject of Senator Durenberger's presentation was Congressional oversight of covert action (Attachment 6).

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SUBJECT: Weekly Activities and Status Report for the DD/ICS--(16 October-
6 November 1985)

Distribution:
1 - DD/ICS
1 - VC/CIPC
1 - ES/CIPC
1 - CIPC/Subject
1 - CIPC/Chrono

STAT DCI/ICS/CIPC, 31 Oct 1985

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ATTACHMENT 1

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ATTACHMENT 1
Pg 1 of 1

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Weapon and Space Systems Intelligence Committee

23 October 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, COMIREX
Chairman, DDAC
Chairman, CIPC ✓
Chairman, HUMINT
Chairman, JAEIC
Chairman, STIC
Chairman, SIGINT
Chairman, TTIC

FROM: Chairman

SUBJECT: Exchange Meeting

This is to confirm the new date for the subject meeting, now scheduled for 4 November beginning at 1400 . I suggest each of the chairmen spend about 5 minutes with introductions and brief discussions on current activities, problem areas we have encountered, and ideas on how we might improve communications and support each other more effectively. The DDCI and ADDI are planning to join us. Again, I look forward to seeing you on 4 November.

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ATTACHMENT 2

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DCI/ICS 85-3834

23 October 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

25X1 FROM: [Redacted]
Director, Intelligence Community Staff

SUBJECT: Status of Actions on CIPC Terrorism Study Recommendations [Redacted] 25X1

REFERENCES: A. DCI Memorandum for the Director, Intelligence Community Staff, et al., "The Terrorism Intelligence Challenge," 18 August 1985 [Redacted] 25X1

B. DCI Executive Secretary Memorandum for the Director, Intelligence Community Staff, et al., "CIPC Study Entitled 'The Terrorism Intelligence Challenge,' [Redacted] 21 August 1985 (ER# 85-3258)

25X1 In connection with the results of the DCI's review of the CIPC Terrorism Study (Reference A) and in response to the DDCI's assignment of follow-up responsibility (Reference B), please find attached an account of actions to date concerning: (a) coordination methods for collection, and (b) countermeasures against electronically detonated explosive devices. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]
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ATTACHMENT 3

Quick Message

From:




Subject: 16 October CSEM-FIRF Package

Received: Thursday 10/24/85 at 10:35 A.M.

- Select Action - Send Quick Message Reply
- * Forward to another Recipient
- Delete Message from the In Basket

Message:

Subject package in totality is OUTSTANDING! I have a few minor suggestions which will come up to you via our copy after  has had a quick look. Even HCE says (effusively) "may be worth a try." Am much interested in hearing how others react. If we proceed, simple examples might be next near-term task.

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ATTACHMENT 4

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30 October 1985

NOTE FOR: D/ICS

FROM: VC/CIPC

SUBJECT: Terrorism Issue Papers




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1. The Executive Director of the Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism has circulated 45 issue papers to the Senior Review Group. Of these, there are 12 which we believe are of special interest to you.



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2. Attached please find a brief synopsis of each of these 12 issues, including any pertinent comments; the 12 issue papers (you might want to look particularly at the proposal sections); and a list of all 45 issue papers.



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Attachments: As stated

This memorandum may be downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL upon removal of attachments.

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WORKING PAPER
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3**ISSUE PAPER NO.** _____**COGNIZANT ACTIVITY:** All Departments and Agencies**SUBJECT:** National Organization for Combatting Terrorism

ISSUE: The organization for combatting terrorism must be compatible with the overall organizational structure of the U.S. Government, be capable of administering the programmatic aspects of the national program for combatting terrorism, be able to generate a counterterrorist strategy, and provide the operational capability for dealing tactically with terrorist threats and incidents. The existing organization utilizes the interagency approach, and the two principal components are the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism which formulates policy, manages the program, and generally outlines the counterterrorism strategy; and the Terrorist Incident Working Group which generally operates in a tactical fashion to resolve threats and incidents in an operational context.

PROPOSAL: The existing interagency approach utilizing the basic organizations of the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism and the Terrorist Incident Working Group should be retained with the following modification.

There will be established the position of National Coordinator for Combatting Terrorism in the National Security Council organization at the level of a Senior Director for National Security (Special Assistant to the President). The coordinator will:

1. Be supported by a small, full-time, dedicated staff.
2. Serve as Chairman of the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism.
3. Serve as Executive Director of the TIWG.
4. Be responsible for maintaining the programming documents of the national program for combatting terrorism.
5. Provide management coordination of the entire national program for combatting terrorism through the programming documents and the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism.
6. Provide a focal point for all matters concerning terrorism other than those clearly the sole responsibility of a single agency or department.

STAFF CONTACT:

WORKING PAPER

~~SECRET~~ISSUE PAPER NO. 11

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: STATE, DEFENSE, TREASURY, CIA, JCS, FBI

SUBJECT: Intelligence Fusion Center for Terrorism

ISSUE: All-source intelligence on terrorism should be immediately accessible to all appropriate consumers to support both incident management during crises and the day-to-day analytical and predictive process. . This accessibility can best be guaranteed by full-time collocation of representatives of the collection and analytical disciplines and, during times of crisis, operational officers from the action arms of the Government.

PROPOSAL: 1. An Intelligence Fusion Center for Terrorism should be established under the Director of Central Intelligence.

2. This Terrorism Fusion Center should be created by the physical collocation of the counterterrorism intelligence collection and analytical units of the CIA, and providing them with all of the communications and computer support necessary to link them with all other appropriate units in the intelligence and policy community.

3. The Center should be closely connected to the 24-hour CIA operations center and itself have a small round-the-clock staff.

4. Positions and support should be provided for the rotational assignment to this Center of other agencies' intelligence personnel, such as DIA, JSOC, FBI, NSA, and STATE.

5. In times of crisis, the Center should be capable of accepting and supporting surge manning from affected agencies.

6. In times of crisis or during terrorist incidents, it will serve as the intelligence support staff of the TIWG, CPPG, or other crisis management groups.

7. When a capability for secure video is available, this fusion center should be linked to the operational and policy centers such as the NMCC and the WHSR through this system.

STAFF CONTACT:
(switch)

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~~SECRET~~ISSUE PAPER NO. 19

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: STATE, DEFENSE, JUSTICE, NSC, CIA

SUBJECT: Congressional Oversight of Counterterrorist Operations

ISSUE: Current legislation (the War Powers Resolution and the Hughes-Ryan Amendment) were well-intended, but written before the recent increase in international terrorist acts against Americans abroad. Sensitive, time-compressed counterterrorist operations are difficult enough to plan and execute within the Executive Branch of government -- with several agencies involved, particularly State, DoD, and the CIA -- without attempting to become too involved in an elaborate, complex consulting and reporting function to the Congress. The current Congressional reporting mechanisms are:

1. War Powers Resolution (Public Law 93-148 of 1973) -- to consult "in every possible instance" and to report within 48 hours in writing the introduction of US Armed Forces into actual or imminent hostilities.

2. National Security Act of 1947 (50 USC 413), Sec. 501 -- to "keep the ... intelligence committees fully and currently informed" of "significant anticipated intelligence activities." (The Hughes-Ryan Amendment of 1961 requires a Presidential "finding" in each case.)

The applicability of these two overlapping, complex reporting mechanisms to US military and intelligence community responses to terrorism is not at all clear. For example: Should a small military counterterrorist team -- in effect, a military "SWAT" team -- that "takes down" a hijacked aircraft overseas be considered "equipped for combat" or involved in "hostilities" in the sense of the War Powers Resolution? In other words, does the Executive Branch have to consult and/or report on such a counterterrorist operation?

Could new legislation simplify and reduce the consulting and reporting requirements for counterterrorist operations? For example, in the case of TWA 847 an appropriate threshold for a requirement to report to the Congress might have been when the planned CT operation involved the possibility of refusal 25X1 rather than execution of such a CT operation 25X1 itself. In other words the possibility of significant diplomatic repercussions of a CT operation might be a suitable reporting "tripwire" -- not the CT operation itself.

PROPOSAL: The National Coordinator for Combatting Terrorism (Issue Paper 3) should convene a working group of State, DOD, CIA, and DOJ personnel from within the IG/T which he chairs, to develop legislative proposals for simplified consulting and reporting requirements to Congressional Oversight Committee for Counterterrorist Operations.

STAFF CONTACT: ~~SECRET~~

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OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

October 16, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. NOEL KOCH, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
[redacted] CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
VADM JOHN M. POINDEXTER, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
VADM ARTHUR S. MOREAU, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

STAT

FROM: ADM J. L. HOLLOWAY, III (USN-RET) *J L Holloway*
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
VICE PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON COMBATting TERRORISM

SUBJECT: Issue Papers

Issue Papers have been distributed to all of the members of the Senior Review Group. As you noticed Issue Paper No. 23 was not included in order to avoid the entire book being classified Top Secret. Attached is our Issue Paper No. 23 which being distributed separately to the cogizant activities.

As you can see it contains sensitive information that should be given special handling. You should feel free to contact either the staff contact, [redacted] or me directly if you have substantive comments to make on the subject.

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Inasmuch we are working on a tight schedule I would ask your assistance in expediting the responses to all of the Issue Papers by October 30.

Attachment

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ISSUE PAPER NO. 24

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: STATE, DEFENSE, DCI, FBI

SUBJECT: Increased Coordination with Law Enforcement
Elements Domestically and Overseas

ISSUE: A terrorist act is by definition a crime. In combatting terrorism (that is anticipating, preempting, managing, resolving, punishing), classic intelligence disciplines and liaison relationships must be supplemented by close relations with local police and law enforcement elements. CIA officers are seldom trained or experienced in police matters, and tend to feel more comfortable with intelligence counterparts. FBI legal attaches tend to deal primarily with the highest echelons of police in their areas of responsibility, and seldom deal on a continuing basis with working level officers with counterterrorist responsibilities. The State Department's Regional Security Officers deal primarily in areas of physical security and personnel and consular matters (eg. U.S. citizens arrested or victimized.) There needs to be more specific attention given to overseas police relations, and in the United States the broad network of law enforcement professionals should be exposed to the plans and requirements of the national counterterrorism program.

PROPOSAL: Counterterrorism specialists, trained in both intelligence and police techniques, should be accredited to the national and local police and law enforcement elements in each country in which terrorism poses a threat to U.S interests. These officers, whether they be from CIA, FBI, State or the military, should have the highest level of training possible, linguistic and professional, and should be assigned for tours long enough to provide considerable continuity. In the U.S., law enforcement officers should be briefed by counterterrorism specialists, and their help solicited.

The DCI should establish a formal, extensive "exchange tour" program between analysts, case officers, and CT specialists of the intelligence community with analysts and special agents of the FBI and with the State Department's Bureaus of Intelligence and Research and Diplomatic Security. Successful completion of a one or two year tour in this program should be made a prerequisite to selected overseas assignment as a CIA CT specialist, FBI Legal Attache (in posts where terrorism is a major threat) or Regional Security Officer.

The DCI should be directed to take the lead in forming this cadre of counterterrorism specialists, with officers detailed to it from other agencies and departments as appropriate.

The FBI, in consultation with the Intelligence Community, should develop a program of briefings and instruction on the national program for combatting terrorism, and make this available to professional law enforcement officers who attend the National Academy at Quantico.

STAFF CONTACT:

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ISSUE PAPER NO. 30

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: DCI, FBI

SUBJECT: Terrorism Intelligence Analysts

ISSUE: As the focus on terrorism intensifies and 24-hour anti-terrorist alert centers and watch desks are created, collection requirements expand and the demand for timely and accurate analysis grows proportionately. Yet analysts specializing in terrorism remain relatively few. They rotate in and out of this specialty, and tend to limit their view to their own organization's perspective of the terrorist problem. There is a distinct need to increase the number and the qualifications of terrorism analysts.

PROPOSAL: The National Intelligence Officer for Terrorism should establish and oversee an interdepartmental career development program that will encourage a core of intelligence analysts to devote themselves to addressing terrorism as a specialty. Training, plans and resources, interagency rotations, exchanges with friendly governments, and participation in various agency and CINC gaming evolutions should be included in the program.

STAFF CONTACT:

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~~SECRET~~ISSUE NO. 39

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: STATE, DEFENSE, CIA, NSC, OMB

SUBJECT: Research and Development for Combatting Terrorism

ISSUE: In some cases R&D for combatting terrorism has tended to fall between agencies. Each agency tends to fund R&D projects of principal value to itself. Because of lower relative priority, some proposed terrorism related projects have fallen below the "funded" threshold. Others that have been funded, tend to duplicate projects funded by other agencies. In an attempt to coordinate government R&D for combatting terrorism, two different interagency committees have emerged: the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) of the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism (IG/T) and the IR&DC (Intelligence Research and Development Council), a DCI committee working with the Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism (IICT). The latter group completed a study in October 1985 of R&D requirements for intelligence collection and support for counterterrorism. Coordination between these two interagency groups has not been complete, although cooperation is steadily improving. The TSWG has identified an unfunded deficiency of [redacted] pe25X1 year over the next five years. No agency will assume funding responsibility, yet each agency agrees that "somebody" should fund the proposed R&D projects [redacted] 25X1 [redacted]. The TSWG has proposed supplemental funding for the projects, but OMB rejects such a proposal and suggests that 25X1 reprogramming of existing or budgetted funds is required. The bottom line is that R&D to combat terrorism is inefficiently funded -- multiple-agency funding of some projects and underfunding of others.

PROPOSAL: The National Coordinator for Combatting Terrorism (see Issue Paper No. 3) should be assigned coordination authority and responsibility for R&D related to terrorism. His coordination function would reduce the incidence of duplication in the funding of terrorism R&D projects and the likelihood that worthwhile R&D projects to combat terrorism go unfunded because of interagency bickering over funding responsibility.

STAFF CONTACT: [redacted]

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
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ATTACHMENT 5

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28 October 1985

NOTE FOR: D/ICS
FROM: VC/CIPC
SUBJECT: NSDD on Narcotics

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1. Attached please find an MFR by concerning the development of an NSDD on narcotics and the implications for national security. The DDCI is aware of the substance of the attached MFR; the topic might be raised by him in your weekly meeting.

2. The catalyst for this NSDD appears to be a set of DoD-endorsed recommendations which discuss an expansion of the US military's effort against the narcotics traffickers. Among other things, the DoD calls for the establishment of an all-source drug intelligence fusion center.


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3. the A/NIO/Narcotics, appears concerned that the NSC drafter may be listening too closely to advocates of a more intensified US drug interdiction effort, i.e., the Office of the Vice President and the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NNBIS), and may not have focused on the extant body of Community-endorsed recommendations to improve narcotics intelligence contained in the several CIPC narcotics studies. will be attending the next NSDD meeting this Friday (1 November).

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Attachment: As stated

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ATTACHMENT 6

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Pg 1 of 2

22 October 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Senator Durenberger Remarks at ABA Breakfast Meeting,
22 October 1985

1. The Chairman, SSCI, was the guest speaker at the monthly breakfast of the American Bar Association's Standing Committee on Law and National Security. I was a guest of one of the committee's members.

2. Durenberger's subject was Congressional oversight of covert action. He said that both the War Powers Resolution and the Intelligence Oversight Act are not designed for, but might be applicable to, terrorist situations. Although it is absolutely crucial that planning be done quickly for the application of the most appropriate military forces or intelligence assets in such situations, there is still great value in incorporating secure consultations with the Congress in the planning process. In particular, the opportunity that such consultations present for gauging public and Congressional support after an action becomes public. Durenberger acknowledged that a source of some confusion is the absence of provisions in the laws covering whom the President should consult--i.e., how to handle Congressional notification. He concluded that, as such, the laws actually inhibit, rather than encourage, executive-legislative consultations.

3. Durenberger seemed to be most concerned about large-scale paramilitary activities with overt US involvement. He said US activity in Nicaragua--a phenomenon he described as "overt-covert action"--crowds out just about everything else the oversight committees do. He said the committees can't engage in open debate of the Administration's policies because, despite their public scrutiny, they constitute covert action.

4. Durenberger's closing comments: The SSCI hasn't yet received a detailed briefing on the Achille Lauro incident. He fears that the Administration will continue to "slight" the oversight committees on counterterrorist actions. This, in turn, is likely to result in legislation containing certain parameters for the Administration's policies--he sees a need for a formalized notification process. The SSCI is sponsoring a series of seminars to consider these issues.

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SUBJECT: Senator Durenberger Remarks at ABA Breakfast Meeting,
22 October 1985

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