VIA AIR (Specify Air or	Sea Pouch)	DISPATCH NO.	25X1
,	TOP SEC		
TO HEADQU	ARTERS	DATE 11 July 1956	25X1 25X1
FROM		3.0	25X1
${\tt SUBJECT} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} {\tt GENER} \\ {\tt SPECIF} \end{array} \right.$	Windon 202	23	25X1
Special Equip	on 2023 was conducted by oment utilized consisted of the flight was 8:35 hours.	on 10 July 1956 in Article 1633 the and the "S" Band Radar. Take-off was made on schedule. However forts continues to be a problem	
The Mainte Th	receipt of the his unit has no control.		20/(1
No di or auxiliary cancellation	fficulties were encountered equipment areas in the laun of Mission 2024 it was deci	in the personal equipment maintenance aching of this mission. With the ided to use Article 163 for mission been originally scheduled for this of the limited time of six (6)	Θ

No difficulties were encountered in the personal equipment maintenance or auxiliary equipment areas in the launching of this mission. With the cancellation of Mission 2024 it was decided to use Article 163 for mission 2023 rather than Article 169 which had been originally scheduled for this mission. This action was taken because of the limited time of six (6) hours on the refrigeration unit of this Article versus 39 hours on the Refrigeration unit in Article 169. When this decision was made the Camera Equipment had already been installed in both Articles. Therefore, the film exposed on this mission will indicate that it was for mission #2024 rather than #2023. A notation of this fact will accompany the film.

reported satisfactory operation of the camera equipment. However, post flight inspections revealed that the improvised rubber adapter between vacuum lines used in connection with R-6 and L-8 Cameras had become disengaged during flight. Article 163 had been modified to the one-half inch vacuum lines and the one-fourth inch vacuum line of the configuration had not been modified due to the lack of the modification kit. Until receipt of the proper kit for modification the vacuum lines in Article 163 have been reduced to one-fourth inch.

Eight hundred and fifty (850) feet of Tracker film was exposed and processed. Plotting time for this mission was three hours. Plotting was routine except for extreme diviations from course made on this mission. First two hundred (200) feet of film were underexposed due to early take-off, and partially unreadable.

Good intelligence reporting was made by

and attempted intercept

TOP SEC

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On aircraft sightings 25X1

TS NR. 155333

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N_{O}	malfunctions	occurred	with	Continuous	search	radar	plus
following	unusuals:			J			

- 1. Take-off plus 40 mins: Very strong radar burst.
- Take-off plus 1:40 mins: Many signals
 Take-off plus 2:40 mins: "Tinkling Bell". Amplitude strong. This signal is a burst of 10-15 pulses with a rep-rate of 1400-1500 pulses per second. There is a pause between bursts about equal to the duration of the burst (50% duty cycle from burst to burst). This signal lasted for about 2 mins 20 sec. The first pulse of each burst is nearly at maximum amplitude. For normal search radar, the first pulse is very weak and the amplitude builds up gradually.
 - 4. Take-off plus 3:37. Pulse bursts for 1 min 20 sec.
 - 5. Take-off plus 3:57. Pulse Bursts very weak
 - 6. Take-off plus 3:57. Single pulse radar signals.
- 7. Take-off plus 4:32 to 4:49. Scattered pulse bursts as described in note 3.
- 8. Take-off plus 4:59. Two of above signals. A further observation reveals that the number of nulses per burst varies. This may be according to a code, similar to an interrogation code.
 - 9. Take-off plus 5:19 Weak pulse bursts.
 - 10. Take-off plus 7:00. High prf radar.

All other aspects of the mission were satisfactory.

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ATTACH:

A. DOCUMENTATION OF FLIGHTS (WEATHER) A-2023. TS#155333A.

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The following report is in respected to the attached special interrogation requests. The information was acquired from D8-727 who was an observer and control officer at the 99 Fighter Division Control Center, Tassar Airfield, Mungary. Date of service: at Taszar: 24 December 1955 to 10 November 1956.

SIRI

D8-727 reported that aircraft or aircrafts involved in the August and September 1956 penetration were reported to be "Camberra" British-type aircraft. This identification was reported by Russian MIG-19 pilot who intercepted the plane over the Tassar Airfield. the message was received by DS-727 who at the time was the observer Duty Officer in the Flight Control Center in Tassar. The identification number of the aircraft was reported as obscure and blurred. At the time of the intercept the MIG-19 pilot reported that he reached an altitude of fight 18,000 meters and was unable to climb any higher, the height of the penetrating aircraft was estimated by the pilot at 20,000 meters. It was DS-727's duty as Observer Officer to guide the intercept against the target. A Russian-Hungarian interpreter was assigned to the Control Center on a 24-hour duty basis. The approximate time of the penetration was set for late August and early September 1956. It lasted for approximately two weeks while the actual penetration occurred about every second day, altogether about six times. The aircraft approached Hungary from the direction of Poland and the CSR and preceded through Hungary to Rumania in the direction of Moscov, USSR. On its return it followed approximately the same course. D8-727 was quite certain that the penetration, sogarmed at this time because he remembered

that a combined serial exercise between the Warsaw-pact nations had taken place in the early part of July 1956. This exercise took place over Hungary and the attacking forces involved CSR, Rumania, and the USSR, while Hungary supplied the defense. On the basis of this incident DS-727 set the date for August and September 1956 as the time of the penetration.

The intercept aircraft were manned by Russian and Hungarian pilots.

The MIG-19's and YAK-21's (or possibly YAK-25's) were manned solely

by Russian pilots while the MIG-17's were manned by Hungarian and

Russian pilots. MIG-17 PF night-fighters were also used as intercepts

with

and were equipped/P-1 radar sets.

During the time of this incident eight MIG-19's arrived at the Papa Airfield and remained there until 15 November 1956, the time of DS-727's escape into Austria. It is believed that more MIG-19's arrived at the Papa Airfield after the incident. It was planned that by the fall of 1956 Papa Airfield would have only MIG-19's and MIG-17's. Tassar and Keeskemet Airfields were also scheduled to receive MIG-19's and MIG-17's. However, none had arrived until 15 November 1956.

The flight of the penetrating aircrafts were tracked by radar in all the Satellite countries and were reported to the Hungarian Air Force Headquarters, Flight Control Center in Budapest, which disseminated all information by means of direct telecommunication lines and radio to the respective Bivision Flight Control Centers (HAP).

SIR II

DS-727 was familiar with the following type of radar equipment used in tracking aircraft: P-1, P-3, P-8, P-10 and P-20. The best and latest model radar set was the P-20 which was an improved version of the P-1. DS-727 heard that the Russians had a P-50-type radar set in Papa and Debrecsen and possibly at Tokol Airfields. The P-20 was a Russian-type 1954 model radar with a maximum range of 400 km. The most effective range, however, was at an antenna elevation of 5 degrees at a range of 200 km. and a height of 14,000 meters.

The P-20 radar was used for measuring heights and tracking, however, the other radars mentioned above were also used but were not as accurate.

Tracking was continuous once the aircraft was detected and it could be continued until 400 km. For ranges of the different radar sets, see attached Figure No. 3. Feding depended on altitude and weather conditions, see attached Figure No. 1. To determine the various ranges of detection at altitudes greater than 15,000 meters DS-727 requested a circular functional chart which was not available at the time of interrogation; however, he made an attempt to draw a chart on attached Figure No. 2.

Detection of aircraft was a routine procedure. The observer at the respective Control Center of penetration gives the alert to the respective Fighter Squadrons and notifies Air Force Headquarters Control Center and the Russian Control Center in Papa. Air Force Headquarters alerts all Division Control Centers and anti-aircraft radar artillery/stations as well as all Capalliter.

and USSR Control Centers. Warnings were also transmitted on Radge R-50 radio transmitters and receivers. The permanent code word used was "LEVEGO" (meaning AIR). All Satellite Control Centers and Division Control Centers listened in on a given frequency, predetermined daily. All type of radars were used for initial warning.

The following radars used in cracking or obtaining height information had the following frequencies, power output, and receiver sensitivity:

- P-20 wave length 10 centimeters, 2,800 to 3,000 megacycles;
 power output 750 kilowatts; sensitivity 7 micros.
- P-1 wave length 10 centimeters, 2,800 to 3,000 megacycles;
 power output 750 kilowatts; sensitivity 7 micros.
- P-3 wave length 1 meter; 290 to 300 megacycles;
 power output, approximately 100 to 150 kilowatts;
 sensitigity 6 micros.
- 4. P-8 and P-10 wave length, 1 meter, 290 to 300 megacycles; power output, unknown; sensitivity 4 micros.

DS-727 was familiar with the P-20 from personal experience. idekandes but only was acquainted with the other redar sets/from his studies.

fixing aircraft. The MIG-17 PF's and most likely the MIG-19's carried the following equipment: P-1 radar, MRZ Beacon IFF. The P-1 signals on the radar scope appeared in a point or in a half-moon shape.

The P-20 radar set had a A and B type scope and two PPI's. The P-3 had an A type scope. The P-8 had an A and B type scope. The P-19 had an A and B type scope also. In tracking the normal rotating mode of operation was used and the stability rate was approximately

750 to 800 per second.

See attached Sketch No. 4 for locations, type of equipment used, planned and/capability of the Hungarian Air Force fighter units and the Soviet fighter units based in Hungary.

With regard to the accuracy of the reported YAK-21 fighters, DS-727 stated that he was not certain about the identification and it could have been YAK-25's that were transferred to the Kecakemet Airfield.

22 December 1956

