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Ю	Headqu	arte	rs			DAT				20/1
FROM										
SUBJE	CT {	NERAL CIFIC	Operation	ons			•			
	a.	Unit	and miss	sion numbe	er:					
	b.	Conc	lusions:							25X 25X
		(2) (3)	would we garding anti-ai are valing fut this mi Lessons	arrant a la fighter in craft and uable into ure operates in will learned (8).	nighly sintercep d missil elligenc tions. l be hel from mis	ered from this first mission in itself successful score. The information reptors, radar defneses and ground to air les is most valuable. Negative reactions ce information and can be used in develop—The negative information gained through alpful in all future operations. See paragraphs caragraph c(7).				
	c.	Com		dequacy o						
r.C.	* Che	(1) (2) (3) (4)	require	ed for thine or support cilities and Intellibe more of used by you general or to allow alysis for present significant are	s missically report - Excellation ligence detailed, rour head comments the unit mission ituation e considerable to the conside	rt - No pro	lieve dailing types a for plannided concer an intellion brieffence data quate for order of lieve data	date.  y operation dates ing purporning the ligence ing and date available briefing battle an	ions ord of the ses; als overall nterprete-briefic e to this purposed target	der  tation ing. is
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vival, i.e., geographical data, etc. Recommend that more detailed intelligence on above subject be furnished this head-quarters. To pass intelligence information to interested parties in this area, certain communication equipment is needed. The lack of this equipment hampered the operation of this mission. When such equipment is in place, this situation should be alleviated.

(5) Internal Security: Satisfactory.

Overall coordination Coordination with Air Defense Command. and assistance from 12th Air Force has been excellent. In addition to fully briefing the Commander, 12th Air Force on this project, the Operations Officer and three senior controllers of the TACC were briefed to a limited degree. Under the original concept of operations, it was not intended to brief any personnel of 12th Air Force TACC on the aspects of the project except insofar as necessary to provide assistance to the pilot in the event of an emergency. However, the missions flown by this unit on 13 June 1956 in coordination with proved beyond a doubt the TACC had the facilities available in this theater to paint the article even thought the specific altitude was not determined. In order to suppress the friendly radar and the alert intercept system, it was necessary to brief the TAGG senior control officers (3) to insure, insofar as is possible, the suppression of friendly radar alert, and scramble system. The problems involved are not new to these people as they have been exposed to missions of this nature over the past ten years. Therefore, they are well aware of the problems involved both from the security aspect and personnel requirements to assure complete coverage of operation. To insure complete coverage of all facets, they requested the authority to brief two more senior controllers.

(7) Coordination with \_\_\_\_\_\_ The specific operational, material and logistics requirements and procedures for the conduct of operations from this area were provided by this unit to \_\_\_\_\_\_ The action and results to date have been most gratifying. Our requirements have been disceminated to the subordinate units of \_\_\_\_\_\_ for implementation.

Provide preplanned missions over a wide range of denied territory in order to assist the flight planning section by reducing the pre-takeoff computation time. This will provide more flexibility to the overall operations. All or parts of such plans can be used on last minute changes dictated by changes in the weather etc. Under the present system of operations, personnel manning and available time, changes of preparation and launching of more than two missions at any one time are remote. This could only be supported for a period of approximately three days.

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d. Comment on effect of following on mission.

(1) Aircraft main temance and supplies were excellent with the following comments.

#### SEXTANT

- 1. The sextant was not used during the mission by pilot's decision. The gear was completely operational on the preflight and post flight check. Precomputed data was furnished by navigators in the Flight Planning Section for return to Wiesbaden.
- 2. Pipeline time for support of this mission was adequate. There was a time delay in receiving a spare sextant which did not effect the mission.
- 3. Base facilities are adequate. Cleanliness is not ideal but will meet minimum standards for this short period of temporary duty. The use of a lathe and an arbor press would be helpful. Local arrangements will be made for the use of this equipment.
- 4. Conclusions and recommendations.
  - a. None at present on mission use.
  - b. Use of commercial transportation to move spare sextants.
  - c. Base facilities, while not ideal, are satisfactory.

#### ELECTRONIC

1. Support.

a. Pipeline time to ---Good.

b. Pipeline time to PBPRIME should be improved.

- Base facilities aré adequate for a short time, "advance base" type operation.
- 2. Results of Mission---Good.
  - a. Almost continuous data received. No equipment malfunctions. No recorder slow-downs.
- 3. Conclusions.
  - a. The approximate maximum signal strength over target areas was 2 milliwatts per square meter. This lasted for a few seconds several times during the mission. The aircraft had an "effective radar area" of one square meter.
  - b. There is a probability that fleeting returns could have been seen on radar screens for short periods of time.
  - c. The crude analysis equipment and lack of information on radar sets makes this conclusion little more than a hazardous guess. It is submitted as a rough field estimate of performance.

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#### AIRCRAFT

1. Pipeline and supply support-adequate.

2. Base Facilities—adequate. Local base support has been excellent. Accurate refueling is not possible with present units; however, arrangements are being made locally to have tankers with correct and accurate metering devices installed.

#### AUTOPILOT

Pipeline and supply support—adequate.

2. Base facilities -- adequate.

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1. Supply support for this mission was adequate.

2. Base facilities in support of operational missions are adequate. Resultant comments and equipment performance on this mission are covered by Field Engineer Report No. 1, dated 21 June 1956—

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- (2) Communications. Believe the time element needed to establish required communication should be carefully studied especially in considering staging operations.
- (3) Photography and photographic equipment. See paragraph 1 above.
- (4) Weather. See attachment 2.
- (5) Navigation. Are turns being considered in Route Planning, ie, time, course and distance?
- (6) Flight Planning. Excellent check points were made to the minute.
- (7) Flight following. The greater portion of mission #2003 was undercast and thus tracking by means of photographs was impossible. At those places where the ground was visible, major cities could be identified by reference to Army Topographic Maps. It should be noted that the horizons did not appear clearly on the duplicate positive transparency of this mission. This reduced the accuracy of the plot. The loss of the horizon lines may have been due to the general hazy conditions and this was the belief expressed by the camera contractors. This question should be answered by the photographic results of the first mission through favorable weather conditions. At present, no other method of track following exists. Recommend that more latitude in receiving certain type intelligence information be granted.

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	<b>(</b> 8)	Tactics.	See para	graph 7.			
	(9)	No other	comments.				
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25X1 FIELD ENGINEERING REPORT MISSION A-2003 25X1 Pilot: A/C 53-172 Flown: 20Jun56 Ser.#8 <u>L8</u> <u>R6</u> 18 32 25 Tracker: Ser.#7 Camera Shutter 369**7** 3363 2669 Footage: 5001 25X1 Lens 1474 1449 1456 Filter: Yellow 25 60 Magazine 33 749 749 Cycles 749 25X1 1120 1120 1120 Footage Filter Red Red Red Visual inspection, post flight check, pilots debriefing and film clips RESULTS: indicate that all photographic equipment worked properly throughout the entire mission. DISCUSSION: Approximately 80% of this mission was flown over heavy clouds at which time 75% to 100% of the ground area was covered. The film clips were difficult to evaluate due to the dense cloud coverage, however ground areas were observed on both the vertical and left oblique. These indicated good focus. Due to the sun angle and the solid clouds, the right oblique did not permit evaluation.

Three lenses selected from the best USCM results were utilized. collimator was received in time to recheck all lenses. Photographic records indicated proper focus.

The message pertaining to masking of the data housing arrived too late for action on this mission.

The configuration was turned on at 0700 and remained on for the entire flight until 1010, per Headquarters instructions. (3 hrs,10 min total)

Pre and post flight shutter speed checks indicated proper speed settings. Post flight inspection indicated that the shutter blades were in excellent condition.

The cockpit tape recording evidenced proper tone operation throughout flight.

Window covers were ejected just after take off. Frost appeared on the A/C while climbing. Suggest evaluation to see if windows cleared up.

The scope was removed the day before the mission, completely dismantled, and cleaned due to oil film on the optics. This could have caused an abort and indicates the urgency for having a spare scope on hand. advised that this was to have been furnished, however to date it has not been received. 25X1

The clock in the tracker stopped after 4 hr. 10 min. which was 40 min before take off. This clock had been timed and tested the previous week.

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Post tests show that this clock now runs good for 4 to 5 hrs then stops, therefore it will be removed from service and sent to a watch repair. Considerable moisture was noticed on the crystal after the mission. This may shorten the clock life thus substantiating our request for 100% spares. In lieu of the event recorder, the Century recorder was utilized with L-pad attenuators for pre and post flight recording of electrical programming.

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JOP SIGNET

20 June 1956

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Mission	2003	20	June	1956

A-2 Configuration, 5 and 6

Pilot	

Significant observation;

River Northwest Breslau docks extending approximately 100 ft. in river from both sides for several miles. New airfield at approximately 5213 N 1804 E long Eastwest runway. Big airfield at Edygozczc, asphlt runway, concrete ramp which appeared to run into edge of town. Airfield at Torun appears small. Grosstein big airfield easy to see. Breig big airfield easy to see. Ohla, big airfield easy to see. No route deviation. Weather;

- 1 thru 7, 6 to 8/8;
- 8, 3 to 5/8;
- 9, 6 to 8/8;
- 10, 3 to 5/8
- 11, 6 to 8/8
- 12, 6 to 8/8
- 13, 3 to 5/8
- 14 to 18, 6 to 8/8

Winds unknown.

IOP CONTRACT