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THE PURPOSE OF INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence's Contribution to Policy Decisions

The Central Intelligence Agency and the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence were created by the National Security Act of 1947 in light of the lessons learned during World War II and, in particular, to minimize the risk of another Pearl Harbor. The object of that Act was to establish a structure that would improve the U.S. Government's ability to collect, analyze, and assess information on foreign governments and events or trends abroad. Even more, the drafters of that Act wanted to establish a structure capable of ensuring that all information relating to foreign developments bearing on major U.S. interests known to all components of the U.S. Government would be assembled, assessed and presented on a timely basis to the President and his senior advisers on foreign affairs and national security policy.

Intelligence on foreign developments that draws on the fruits and the collection and analytic resources of all components of the U.S. Government

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is called national intelligence. It can, and does, cover a broad range of subjects, including military, political, and economic matters. The primary role of the Director of Central Intelligence and thus the Central Intelligence Agency is to provide -- with the assistance of all other U.S. intelligence organizations -- this kind of national intelligence on key foreign trends and developments to those U.S. Government officials who are responsible for the formulation and implementation of national security policy. The principal "consumers" of national intelligence are, consequently, the President, the members of the National Security Council and their senior departmental subordinates, the staff of the National Security Council, the Council on International Economic Policy, and the broad range of committees and groups which support these councils.

Intelligence, of course, does not make policy decisions. Indeed, intelligence officers of the U.S. Government -- including the DCI -- carefully avoid offering policy recommendations. The root meaning of "intelligence" is "understanding." The role of the DCI, the CIA, and the whole U.S. Intelligence Community is to ensure that those who do

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make policy decisions have before them the most comprehensive body of information and analysis attainable so those decisions may be based on the best possible understanding of the foreign situations to which they relate.

In essence, intelligence is distilled, analyzed and refined information. (Information is what intelligence officers collect; intelligence is what they produce.) The process for producing intelligence involves a series of basic steps:

- the collection and assembly of raw information from all sources available, ranging from the overt news dispatches to the most secret technical devices (producing national intelligence requires drawing on all information available to the U.S. Government),
- the assessment of the validity of the raw information,
- the selection of that which is valid and pertinent to the question under consideration,
- the analysis of the information and development of objective conclusions and judgments, and

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- the presentation of the intelligence findings in a clear, succinct, and timely fashion.

Our consumers need to know how confident we are about the validity of the facts and judgments. Especially on complex problems, the evidence may support more than one assessment of future developments. National estimates therefore must often reflect this complexity, setting forth the range of alternative explanations which available evidence supports and explaining all of the major factors which may influence actions of a foreign government, including those that may be affected by various U.S. policy choices.

The matter of strategic arms limitations is a good example of the role national intelligence can play in the formulation and implementation of national security policy.

Obviously, in order to negotiate about arms limitations, those who instruct our negotiators need to know the number and kinds of strategic weapons the Soviets already have, new weapons actually under development, and any more advanced weapons that may be in their minds (and within their capabilities to produce).

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The President and his advisers also need to know if the Soviet Union is living up to the terms of agreements already reached. National intelligence can and does monitor Soviet compliance with the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement. It is the duty of the Director of Central Intelligence to inform the President of any activity or ambiguous situation that could be construed by policymakers as compliance on the part of the Soviet Union.

National intelligence also has a part to play during negotiations. The Director of Central Intelligence advises the President and the National Security Council on how well the U.S. Intelligence Community could monitor various possible agreements. It is the DCI's responsibility to advise the President as to formulations and provisions that should be included in such agreements to insure our ability to monitor it.

The national intelligence effort to keep the President and his senior advisers informed about the Soviet Union does not stop with the military and scientific considerations applicable to SALT. Soviet willingness even to try to limit strategic arms must be viewed in the larger context of the overall outlook and policies of the Soviet leadership. Here the questions that intelligence must

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answer for the policymaker are political and economic ones. How firmly committed is the Soviet leadership to the policy of detente? What internal political stresses could lead to a significant change in the Soviet attitude toward detente, or possibly even its abandonment? A prime Soviet motive for detente is the USSR's need to close the technological gap with the West, but just how pressing are its economic problems? What steps is it taking to solve these problems, and what are the chances of success?

Intelligence must stand ready to answer a broad range of questions. Some are highly specific and immediate, such as the question of whether the Soviets have introduced nuclear weapons into the Middle East. Others are general and complex, such as the long-run outlook for Japanese militarization or European integration. Across this range, the chief difference between intelligence and the information available to a regular reader of the commercial and scholarly press is that intelligence rests on all sources of information available to the U.S. Government. While the final product may not always be highly classified, the

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intelligence analyst has taken the information from the most sensitive sources into account in reaching his conclusions.

Because of their special sources, intelligence analysts can study and reach conclusions on problems which outside experts could not begin to examine. For example, the accuracy of Soviet ICBMs, or even their total number, are questions which could not be answered without these special sources. Thus it is in the military, scientific, and technical fields that intelligence's contribution is truly unique, and vital.

The Organization of the Intelligence Community

The National Security Act of 1947 provided the initial framework for a national intelligence structure. That Act created the Central Intelligence Agency, and, the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, who -- by Presidential order -- was made the chief intelligence officer of the Government. In this capacity, he is the principal foreign intelligence adviser to the President and the coordinator of all foreign intelligence activities relating to U.S. national security interests.

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This made him the head of what has come to be known as the U.S. Intelligence Community -- the term used in Presidential directives and other executive communications to embrace all of our foreign intelligence organizations. Each member of the Intelligence Community has his own department head to whom he must report and whose needs he must meet -- the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of the Treasury. The CIA is unique in that it is not part of any cabinet-level department. Through the DCI, it reports to the President. The members of the Intelligence Community are:

- the Central Intelligence Agency;
- the Defense Intelligence Agency, which is responsible for providing intelligence support to the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and other components of the Department of Defense;
- the intelligence units of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, which support the particular missions of the services and support the chiefs of these services.

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- the intelligence units of the Department of State, which serves the Secretary of State and the Department's operating bureaus;
- the Energy Research and Development Administration, whose intelligence unit has a specialized charter devoted to the vital field of intelligence on nuclear energy departments;
- the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which is responsible for the internal security of the United States (the FBI's participation in USIB is limited to those of its activities which interrelate with foreign intelligence);
- the Treasury Department, whose recent membership reflects the growing interest in and importance of intelligence to support the formulation and implementation of foreign economic policy;
- the National Security Agency, which is responsible for signals intelligence -- the intercepting and decoding of electrically transmitted messages -- and whose head reports to the Secretary of Defense.

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These, then, are the individual members of the Intelligence Community -- CIA, DIA, the service intelligence components, State, ERDA, the FBI, Treasury, and NSA. Together, they form the United States Intelligence Board with the primary task of advising and assisting the Director of Central Intelligence in the production of national intelligence and in establishing intelligence policy, objectives, and priorities with respect to collection, production, and dissemination.

USIB, as the Board is commonly known, passes on the agreed, coordinated judgments of the entire Intelligence Community. The Director of Central Intelligence chairs the USIB at its weekly meetings and is responsible for the substantial network of specialized committees -- such as nuclear intelligence or economic intelligence -- that operates under USIB auspices.

On 5 November 1971 the President directed four management steps for improving the effectiveness of the Intelligence Community.

The first of these steps instructed the Director of Central Intelligence to draw up a consolidated intelligence program budget and to fit intelligence

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requirements to budgetary constraints. The Presidential Directive did not give the DCI any increased command authority over the other members of the Intelligence Community. He was given, however, the significant new responsibility of being informed on and expressing views with respect to the allocation of all intelligence resources in the Community, particularly those of a national character.

The second step created the Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee, which is chaired by the DCI and includes representatives of State, Defense, the Office of Management and Budget, and CIA. Its main task is to formalize previous, looser arrangements among the departments to help the Director of Central Intelligence coordinate the use of national intelligence resources -- money, manpower, and equipment.

The third step, creation of the National Security Council Intelligence Committee, was intended to provide systematic feedback of criticism and comment from high policy users of finished intelligence. It is chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and its members are the Attorney General, the Deputy

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Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs, the Chairman of the JCS, and the DCI. The purpose of this Committee is to give guidance as to what intelligence products are needed to reach decisions on U.S. foreign and defense policy. This committee will also evaluate the intelligence product from the standpoint of intelligence users on a continuing basis.

Finally, the President revised the role and composition of the United States Intelligence Board. Whereas USIB previously had some authority of its own, it is now limited to an advisory capacity to the DCI. The Treasury Department was added to the membership because of the increasing importance of foreign economic intelligence to national security policy and its implementation.

Intelligence Products

The Intelligence Community must disseminate its intelligence -- on a timely basis -- to the President, the National Security Council, and other top policy advisers. This is done through various intelligence publications whose scope, length, and format vary with the nature of the

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intelligence task they undertake and the policy-making level for which they are intended.

One vehicle is the National Intelligence Estimate, or NIE, which is intended for the highest policy level. An NIE uses the Community's present knowledge of a situation and existing data as a base line and then tries to estimate what is going to happen in some particular country or on some particular topic. Many estimates cover fairly broad topics, such as "The Outlook in Country A or Area B," and look ahead two or three years to discuss basic trends and expected lines of policy in the country or area in question. Others are more specialized papers on, for example, the Soviet military establishment. This type of estimate, built on a solid base of evidence, goes into greater detail and generally looks ahead for periods of up to five years. Such estimates focus on the USSR's strategic attack forces, air defense capabilities, and general purpose forces. The production of annual estimates on these topics is timed to assist in the planning of Defense Department force levels and budgets. There are also Special National Intelligence Estimates, or SNIIEs, which are ad hoc

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studies on important questions of the moment, such as the expected foreign reaction to some proposed -- but as yet unadopted -- course of action by the U.S. Government. As a purely hypothetical example, an SNIE might assess the likely foreign response to a U.S. initiative abroad. SNIE's are usually produced at the request of an NSC member and often get into highly sensitive matters.

NIEs reflect the considered judgment of the Intelligence Community, all working from the same data base and with access to the same information, and reflect, accurately and fully, any major differences of opinion or judgments within the Community. This is insured through the participation of all appropriate elements of the Community, through contribution of facts and judgments, in the preparation of the estimate, and by its review by the U.S. Intelligence Board. Each national estimate is produced under the auspices of a National Intelligence Officer. These officers are the direct representatives of the DCI for specific areas of the world, such as Latin America, or significant functional areas such as strategic forces. They assist the DCI by assuring that all the resources of the entire Intelligence Community are

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brought to bear on problems within their area of responsibility. The final product is presented to the President and the NSC as the DCI's estimate.

A second type of intelligence product is the National Intelligence Analytical Memorandum. These are similar to Estimates, but are intended for policy officials below the National Security Council level. Their subjects tend to be a notch below the highest and most immediate policy concerns. They are often longer than National Intelligence Estimates and usually present their analysis and supporting evidence in greater detail.

National intelligence is also relayed to senior policy levels through a variety of somewhat less formal vehicles, such as interagency memoranda -- which are less elaborate than NIEs, SNIEs or NIAMs, are usually more specific in focus and often produced against very short deadlines. They are, as the name suggests, coordinated products -- reflecting differences of opinion or judgment where these are relevant -- but sometimes draw only on the Intelligence Community components primarily concerned with a concrete issue rather than the Community as a whole.

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Apart from general reporting and analysis, there is a special vehicle developed to alert senior policy levels to an incipient crisis -- known as Alert Memoranda. These are brief papers (usually not more than two to three pages in length) designed to flag some developing situation to top level attention before it erupts into newspaper headlines. Alert Memoranda can be produced on very short notice (i.e., in an hour or so) and are produced by the Intelligence Community, under the auspices of the appropriate National Intelligence Officer. The ideal (which has been realized on one or two occasions) is for an Alert Memorandum to flag a potential crisis in time for counteraction to be taken which keeps the crisis from developing or occurring. (The best Alert Memoranda, consequently, will be proven "wrong" by subsequent events.)

Another type of intelligence is current intelligence. It is designed to insure that the decisionmaker is well informed, on the basis of the latest available information from all sources, on significant world developments which may affect the interests of the United States. CIA maintains an Operations Center; functioning

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around the clock, it produces spot current intelligence and relays and routes information to recipients on a 24-hour basis in critical situations. The CIA Operations Center is also connected by rapid and secure communications to the White House Situation Room, and operations centers at the Pentagon, the State Department, and NSA.

Current intelligence has often been compared to a newspaper -- and in fact CIA's principal vehicle for the dissemination of current intelligence, the National Intelligence Daily, is printed in newspaper format. It differs from a conventional newspaper in that it is produced by a group of analysts who are experts in their fields and who have all sources of information available to them and that its content is limited to foreign activities of concern to the U.S. policymaker. The newspaper format provides the readers with a wide variety of intelligence items, from which they can pick and choose according to their interests or responsibilities. The Daily goes to the President and Vice President, members of the Cabinet and heads of the principal offices, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other top members

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of the government -- including the Chairmen of some key Congressional committees. A much shorter and more sensitive selection of such material is prepared for the President himself. Other types of current intelligence are disseminated in daily and weekly publications, special memoranda, and situation reports on crisis topics.

Still another type of intelligence production is the research study, published as Intelligence Memoranda or Intelligence Reports. These studies cover a wide variety of topics -- for example, an analysis of the various sectors of the Soviet economy, the oil industry in Iran, or the development of lasers in France. The studies are often produced in response to specific requests from the White House or from the Secretaries of State, Defense, or Treasury, or their senior officers.

There are other ways in which intelligence judgments are fed into the decisionmaking process. One is through the National Security Council apparatus and the studies of policy questions called for in National Security Study Memoranda -- commonly called NSSMs. More than 200 of these NSSMs have been commissioned. They have set in

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motion studies ranging from highly specific projects such as US Ocean Policy or US Policy Toward Greece, to lengthy and wide-ranging studies of alternative choices for the U.S. strategic postures. The function of the Intelligence Community is to supply the facts and the intelligence judgments which bear on the array of policy options which a NSSM is designed to present to the President. This process enables the Community to carry out its advisory and policy support role in a very direct fashion, and at a high level.

The Director of Central Intelligence also participates in the meetings of the National Security Council and its subordinate organizations. The Senior Review Group, for instance, reviews NSSM studies, and in crisis situations the Washington Special Action Group -- a sort of crisis management team -- meets to coordinate timely actions. These meetings and those of the National Security Council itself usually begin with a briefing by the Director on the current situation and the intelligence background of the subject under consideration.

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The Sources and Collection of Intelligence

Finally, something should be said about how national intelligence is acquired. The most important element in governing this process is the Key Intelligence Question. Each year the DCI, in consultation with the USIB, establishes a series of these questions on which he believes the Intelligence Community should focus its efforts during the year in order to meet the needs of its consumers.

This year there are 69 Key Intelligence Questions, many in turn broken down into more specific sub-questions. For instance,



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"Collection strategies" are developed for all such questions. The various collection systems and organizations available to the Community are assigned specific responsibilities for collecting information. These responsibilities are of course tailored to the capabilities of the collectors and the cost and risk of using them. If information on Soviet research in biology can be had from freely available scholarly journals, it makes no sense to try to penetrate the laboratories by clandestine means.


The major categories of sources are:

- Signals Intelligence: interception, analysis, and decryption of communications or other electronic emissions.
- Photography: collection and interpretation of overhead photography.

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- "Open Sources": foreign public broadcasts, foreign press and journals, U.S. press reporting on foreign activities, and interviews with U.S. nationals who provide foreign information voluntarily.
- Foreign Service and attache material: official reporting by US Missions abroad. (An Ambassador reports his talk with the Foreign Minister; a Defense Attache reports his visit to a military installation.)
- Clandestine collection: material derived from espionage. This involves primarily the reporting of CIA's Directorate of Operations.



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Here we come to an important point which is often imperfectly understood outside the Intelligence Community. Techniques such as those just described help us frame our estimate of other nations' capabilities -- in this case [] capabilities. Our estimate, however, may be significantly different from the []

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
We may be right and they wrong; but it is their estimate -- not ours -- which will influence their decisions. Learning their estimate, what their leaders think, is a difficult problem which communications intelligence and reconnaissance will often not be able to answer. Here, collection achieved or directed by human beings comes very much into play. It also comes into play when you get into the critical area of assessing intentions. Here, even more, it is necessary to get into the minds of other, foreign human beings -- framing assessments which are less dependent on the observable and countable than on judgment, perception and a careful weighing of political, emotional or cultural intangibles. The chief sources for political intelligence are those which reflect the interplay of human beings. In the

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intentions problem, we look to information produced by a variety of sources ranging



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The assignment of tasks is done, with as much specificity as possible, on each of the KIQs. The sum constitutes the marching orders for the managers of the individual collection systems.

The largest of these collection systems is managed by the National Security Agency. This Agency is responsible for cryptologic intelligence -- intercepting and decoding electrically transmitted messages. Its product is disseminated with admirable speed throughout the Intelligence Community and has played a vital role in many of our most crucial intelligence judgments over the years.

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The National Security Council has designated selected reconnaissance programs to be treated as national programs to be funded and operated by the Secretary of Defense. Guidance and tasking priorities for these programs are established by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation with the members of USIB. The National Photographic Interpretation Center, which is run by CIA for the entire Community interprets the photography from these programs. This work feeds into and supports intelligence production throughout the Community. Its importance was long ago proved, for example, by the detection of the Soviet medium range ballistic missiles in Cuba.

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[redacted]
[redacted] an overt collection program for the monitoring of open foreign radio broadcasts, newspapers, and magazines. In addition to monitoring Radio Moscow, Radio Peking, and the Voice of the Arabs in Cairo [redacted] foreign broadcasts in 68 languages, selecting the most significant for immediate translation and dissemination to the entire Intelligence Community. It also selects and translates material from foreign newspapers and magazines. A large part of the [redacted]

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
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product is available to the academic community and the American public by subscription.

STATSPEC



In the normal course of their duties all US officials abroad acquire information. Their observations and their conversations with officials of the government to which they are posted, as well as with their colleagues from friendly countries, are a principal source of political intelligence. They also, of course, read the local press and report significant items from it. Defense and military attaches, likewise, gather much military intelligence from their normal contacts with leaders of the local armed forces. Sometimes they are invited to inspect equipment or watch maneuvers,

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and they, too, scan the local press and magazines for information on military equipment, movements, or personnel.

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UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

The United States Intelligence Board (USIB) is established to advise and assist the DCI with respect to: a) the establishment of appropriate intelligence objectives, requirements and priorities; b) the production of national intelligence; c) the supervision of the dissemination and security of intelligence material; d) the protection of intelligence sources and methods; and e) as appropriate, policies with respect to arrangements with foreign governments on intelligence matters.

Under the chairmanship of the DCI, the USIB membership consists of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Vice Chairman); Director of Intelligence and Research, State; Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; Director, National Security Agency; and representatives from Treasury, Energy Research and Development Administration, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The Military Department Intelligence Chiefs attend USIB meetings as observers.

There are thirteen committees which report directly to the USIB. Principal membership is derived from member agencies represented at the USIB. In the case of the committees, the service intelligence organizations have full membership rather than observer status. There are some committees which have participation from other agencies, which are indicated below where appropriate. Full membership in the committees are drawn from the following organizations: CIA, State, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, Treasury, Energy Research and Development Administration, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Army, Navy and Air Force. Not all are active in all committees. Each of the committees are supported by appropriate subcommittees and working groups. The thirteen committees are:

Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation (COMIREX)

The COMIREX provides staff support to, and acts for, the USIB in development and implementation of national-level guidance for overhead imagery collection and exploitation. The National Photographic Interpretation Center and operational elements serve as consultants.

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Critical Collection Problems Committee (CCPC)

The CCPC is a permanent study group responsive to requests submitted to it by the DCI. It has been relatively inactive since the establishment of the National Intelligence Officers mechanism and its future is presently under review.

Economic Intelligence Committee (EIC)

The primary mission of the Economic Intelligence Committee is to provide coordinated guidance to the collectors of foreign economic intelligence. In addition to the membership indicated above, the following representatives from other Government agencies and departments concerned with US foreign economic relations participate in the work of the committee as associate members or observers: Agency for International Development, Agriculture, Commerce, Export-Import Bank, Federal Reserve, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Overseas Private Investment Corporation, Transportation, Office of Management and Budget, Interior, Labor, US Tariff Commission, Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, Council of Economic Advisors, Council of International Economic Policy, and Federal Energy Administration.

Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee (GMAIC)

The GMAIC is responsible for the coordination of foreign missile and space intelligence within the U. S. community. Current plans for this committee call for expansion of its functions to include other weapon systems.

Human Sources Committee (HSC)

The Human Sources Committee advises and assists the DCI in the discharge of his responsibilities for the efficient allocation and effective use of community resources for the collection of positive foreign intelligence information through human sources.

Intelligence Information Handling Committee (IHC)

The IHC is responsible for facilitating the timely and coordinated handling of intelligence and intelligence information within the intelligence community and promoting the continuous improvement, integration and effective use of community information handling resources.

Interagency Defector Committee (IDC)

The Interagency Defector Committee advises USIB on policy matters which affect the defector program. The Coast Guard and USIA are represented as observers.

Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC)

JAEIC recommends national collection requirements, fosters inter-agency exchanges of information, coordinates national-level intelligence production, contributes to national intelligence estimates and provides a mechanism for community evaluations of collection programs and intelligence assessments in the field of atomic energy intelligence. The JAEIC also has the responsibility for monitoring implementation of the provisions of Safeguard (d) of the Limited Test Ban Treaty on behalf of the USIB.

Scientific and Technical Intelligence Committee (STIC)

The Scientific and Technical Intelligence Committee is to provide early warning of foreign scientific or technical advances, whether indigenous or imported, which could affect significantly the national security or national welfare of the U. S. The STIC will advise USIB on S&T matters within the committee's areas of concern. This committee replaces the Scientific Intelligence Committee which had certain weapon systems responsibilities which are being transferred to an enlarged GMAIC.

Security Committee

The mission of the Security Committee is to provide recommendations regarding security policies and procedures for the protection from unauthorized disclosure of foreign intelligence sources and methods.

SIGINT Committee

The SIGINT Committee advises, assists and generally acts for the USIB in matters involving SIGINT.

Watch Committee

The Watch Committee is about to go out of business and be replaced by a Special Assistant to the DCI for Strategic Warning; his Deputy would be from CIA with a small analysis staff supported by the National Military Intelligence Center.

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SALT Monitoring Group

The SALT Monitoring Group is responsible to the DCI for guidance to and supervision of all intelligence monitoring activities required under the strategic arms limitations agreements with the USSR. Membership consists of DDCI, Chairman; CIA; Director, DIA; and Director, INR/State.

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Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee (IRAC)

The Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee was created by the November 1971 Presidential Directive. It is chaired by the Director of Central Intelligence and has as members senior representatives from the Department of Defense, the Department of State, the Office of Management and Budget, and the Central Intelligence Agency. In order to maintain currency as to the allocation and employment of intelligence resources, the NSC Staff is represented as an observer at meetings of the IRAC. Mr. Colby has also extended invitations to the Director, National Security Agency and the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency to attend meetings as observers for those items of particular interest to their agencies in their capacity as national intelligence program managers.

This Committee was established to advise the DCI on the preparation of the intelligence budget and the allocation of resources among programs and to ensure that they are employed in accordance with approved requirements with no unwarranted duplication. It assists in the development and review of the annual national foreign intelligence program, which is a composite of all the separate national and departmental programs contributing to the national intelligence effort. Based on the IRAC review of these programs, the DCI submits to the President each year his recommendations on the level of effort and the mixture of activities which, in his judgment, need to be funded for the attainment of the national intelligence objectives. These recommendations, once approved by the President, constitute the basis for the intelligence portion of the President's budget as it is sent to Congress.

Pursuant to the objectives and provisions of the Presidential Directive of 5 November 1971, three permanent subcommittees of the Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee were established:

Intelligence Research and Development Council

The Intelligence Research and Development Council is chaired by the Director, Defense Research and Engineering, and consists of senior representatives from the Central Intelligence Agency, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, the National Security Agency, and the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, the Director, Advanced Research Projects Agency, the Under Secretary of the Air Force, the Under Secretary of the Navy, the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (R&D), the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (R&D), and the Assistant Secretary of the Army (R&D). The Intelligence Research and Development Council explores new directions and techniques in both the hard and soft sciences which hold promise for intelligence and which should receive program resource support and application.

IRAC Working Group


The IRAC Working Group is chaired by the Director, Management, Planning and Resources Review Group, Intelligence Community Staff and consists of representatives from the Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence), Office of Management and Budget, Department of State, National Security Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Council Staff, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy. The IRAC Working Group has no formal terms of reference or charter but derives its authority from the parent Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee. However, the following are some of the functions which may be inferred from the IRAC charter:

- a. review planning guidance as it relates to national intelligence programs;
- b. review or develop fiscal guidance for the intelligence community;
- c. advise the DCI on the contents of national intelligence programs, as stated in the NIPM;
- d. review and recommend priorities for reflecting the impact of presidential budget reductions and congressional appropriation reductions;
- e. review and assess the impact of major reprogrammings of intelligence resources;
- f. receive regular reporting (both fiscal and substantive) on intelligence activities of the National Intelligence Program.

IRAC Information Working Group

The IRAC Information Working Group is chaired by the Director, Systems Evaluation, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence), and consists of representatives of the Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, State Department, Office of Management and Budget, National Security Agency, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, and the Office of the Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence for the Intelligence Community. The IRAC Information Working Group reviews the Consolidated Intelligence Resources Information System (CIRIS) and related intelligence management information systems with the objective of developing recommendations for the implementation next year and beyond of CIRIS or some other follow-on system.

COMMITTEES OF THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD AND INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES ADVISORY COMMITTEE



ANNEX

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF MISSION AND FUNCTIONS OF COMPONENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

1. Presented herein are brief summary statements of the mission and functions of the various organizational components of the Intelligence Community.

2. The sequence is as follows:	PAGE
The Central Intelligence Agency	2
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Bureau of Intelligence and Research	6
Department of Defense	
National Security Agency/Central Security Service	8
Defense Intelligence Agency	12
Intelligence Activities of the Military	
Departments and Services	15
Department of the Army	17
Department of the Navy	19
Department of the Air Force	21
Department of the Treasury	23
Department of Justice	
Federal Bureau of Investigation	25
Energy Research and Development Administration	26

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THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

ORGANIZATIONAL POSITION/AUTHORITIES

1. The Central Intelligence Agency was established under the National Security Council by the National Security Act of 1947 (61 Stat 495, 50 U.S.C.A. 403). The Director and Deputy Director are appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.

2. The National Security Act of 1947 provides that, "for the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities of the several Government departments and agencies in the interest of national security," the Central Intelligence Agency, under the direction of the National Security Council, has the following duties:

a. "To advise the National Security Council in matters concerning such intelligence activities of the Government departments and agencies as relate to national security;

b. "To make recommendations to the National Security Council for the coordination of such intelligence activities of the departments and agencies of the Government as relate to the national security;

c. "To correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the Government using where appropriate existing agencies and facilities:

Provided, That the Agency shall have no police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers or internal security functions:

Provided further, That the departments and other agencies of the Government shall continue to collect, evaluate, correlate and disseminate departmental intelligence:

And provided further, That the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure;

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d. "To perform for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies, such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally;

e. "To perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct."

3. Specific functions of the Central Intelligence Agency, particularly with respect to services of common concern, are delineated in a number of National Security Council Intelligence Directives.

MISSION

4. It is the mission of the CIA to support the Director of Central Intelligence in his responsibilities as principal advisor to the President and the National Security Council on all matters of foreign intelligence related to the national security, and to perform intelligence services of common concern as directed by the National Security Council.

INTERNAL ORGANIZATION

5. The Central Intelligence Agency is organized into four principal directorates, each headed by a deputy director, and four offices (General Counsel, Legislative Counsel, Inspector General, and Comptroller).

The directorates are:

Intelligence--which is responsible for the production of current intelligence, political, economic and strategic (military) intelligence, and basic and geographic intelligence, and for the collection of information from foreign broadcast and press media.

Science and Technology--which is involved with collection utilizing technical sensors, research and development in support of collection activities, and the production of intelligence on foreign weapons systems and other S&T topics. The National Photographic Interpretation Center is a part of this directorate.

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Operations--which is the clandestine arm of CIA.



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Administration--which embraces such services as communications, finance, medical services, logistics, personnel, security, training, and joint computer support.

COLLECTION ACTIVITIES

6. The Central Intelligence Agency has primary responsibility for U.S. clandestine intelligence activities abroad. As services of common concern, it is responsible for the conduct of clandestine collection activities outside the United States and its possessions to meet the needs of all departments and agencies; for the conduct of clandestine counterintelligence outside the United States and its possessions; and the conduct of liaison with foreign clandestine services, or, concerning clandestine activities, with foreign intelligence or security services. The CIA also conducts clandestine and special technical collection operations abroad.

7. Supplementary clandestine collection by other Government organizations with installations or commands located outside the United States and its possessions to satisfy departmental or tactical needs, and clandestine counterintelligence activities required for the security of personnel, installations and activities, are subject to coordination with the CIA as prescribed by the Director of Central Intelligence.

8. As services of common concern, the Central Intelligence Agency:

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d. Provides to the departments and agencies of the United States Intelligence Board required support for foreign intelligence purposes in the field of clandestine equipment and related matters.

e. Maintains for the benefit of the Intelligence Community central indices and records of foreign counter-intelligence information.

PRODUCTION ACTIVITIES

9. The CIA is charged to produce such finished substantive foreign intelligence as may be necessary to discharge the responsibilities of the Director of Central Intelligence.

10. The Agency makes a major contribution to the writing and review of National Intelligence Estimates and other national products. It also prepares a large number of CIA memoranda and studies on political, economic, military and scientific and technical subjects for use by the Director of Central Intelligence.

COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES

11. The Director of Central Intelligence serves as chairman of the United States Intelligence Board and the Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee. The Deputy Director of CIA serves as the CIA member of each of these advisory groups and functions as chairman in the absence of the DCI.

12. Nearly all of the chairmen of USIB committees are CIA officers, and eight of the 11 National Intelligence Officers came from CIA. The Agency also provides a considerable portion of the personnel in the Intelligence Community Staff.

13. The CIA is actively involved in the drafting and development of national intelligence estimates and other national intelligence products and has major responsibility for the publication of the National Intelligence Bulletin.

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External Reviews of the Intelligence Community

Summary

This compilation of 28 surveys, investigations and studies concerning the intelligence community includes only those directed and carried out by authorities external to the intelligence community. They range in time from 1948 to the present, in magnitude of effort from one-man studies to major Government commissions, and in scope from single agencies or departments to the entire intelligence community.

Not included in this listing are an equal or greater number of studies and surveys carried out wholly within the intelligence community or within individual agencies. These generally were intended to be self-examinations of major systems, functions or organizations for purposes of making improvements.

The principal observation enabled by a review of the actions reported is that the intelligence community, in whole or in part, has been the subject of almost continuous study, review and oversight by elements of Congress and the Executive Branch ever since the current community structure started evolving after World War II.

Added to these efforts are other audits, hearings, and testimonies far too numerous to mention over the same time span, and involving at one time or another all elements and organizations within the intelligence community.

The entry in parentheses at the end of each item represents the custodian of the report.

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Report of the U. S. Commission
on the Organization of the
Executive Branch of the Government - 1947-49

(The Hoover Commission Report)

Prepared by a Presidential-Congressional Commission created by the Congress in July 1947. The Report ranged across the entire Executive Branch. What little space was specifically devoted to intelligence is under "The National Security Organization" chapter. It calls for more effective relations between the JCS, on the one hand, and the NSC, CIA, R&D Board, Munitions Board and National Security Resources Board on the other. It also called for vigorous steps to improve the CIA and its work (the CIA was barely established then) by more flexible use of military personnel.

(Open literature)

The Administration of Intelligence
in the Department of State - 15 May 1952

(The Cresap-McCormick-Paget Report)

Prepared by the management engineering firm of Cresap, McCormick and Paget under a State Department contract with the Center for International Studies of MIT. The Report found that intelligence in the State Department was vigorous and had been strengthened over the past seven years since 1945. It recommended improvements in consumer relations, the use of research analysts, planning for simplification of operations, and some refinements in organizational structure -- all in all a total of 35 specific changes. Considerable emphasis was given to consumer relations with a recommendation to designate a Consumer Relations Coordinator to perform "market research" and evaluate the adequacy of INR's responses to the "market." (State)

Survey on Communications Intelligence Activities
of the U. S. Government - 13 June 1952

(The Brownell Report)

Prepared by the Brownell Committee appointed by the Secretaries of State and Defense on 28 December 1951 to survey departmental and national needs for communications intelligence. The Committee also surveyed the allocation of responsibility and authority for the conduct of communications intelligence as a service of common concern. It recommended a true unification of the separate communications intelligence activities of the Military Services into a national agency under the Secretary of Defense. The National Security Agency was established as a result of this study.

(NSA)

The Clark Task Force Report
of the Hoover Commission on Intelligence Activities - June 1955

(The Second Hoover Commission Report)
(The Clark Report)

Prepared by a group under General Mark Clark as one of a number of task forces of the Second Hoover Commission. The major recommendations of the Report dealt with internal reorganization of CIA; establishment of a Presidential watchdog committee on intelligence with prominent citizens and members of Congress and a Joint Congressional Committee on Foreign Intelligence; greater use of military personnel by CIA; more frequent security checks on personnel; transfer of foreign publications procurement and scientific intelligence reporting from State to CIA; construction of a new CIA building; and expansion of foreign language training. (This report and the Joint Study Group Report of 1960 seem to have had the greatest impacts on the community prior to the Schlesinger Report of 1971.) (State)

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Scientific Judgments on Foreign Communications
Intelligence by the Special Intelligence Panel
of the President's Scientific Advisory Committee -
23 January 1958

(The Baker Report)

Undertaken by a group headed by Dr. William O. Baker of Bell Laboratories to look into technical aspects of the NSA cryptanalytic effort. Due to the highly classified nature of this report, further details are not included but can be made available separately. (NSA)

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The Joint Study Group Report
on Foreign Intelligence Activities
of the U. S. Government - 15 December 1960

(The Joint Study Group Report)

An across the board review of the entire intelligence community of the time, with particular emphasis on Defense intelligence activities. It recommended strengthening the JCS, recently elevated by the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, as a way to reduce the fragmentation of intelligence among the three Military Services, and this suggestion is considered to have been the origin of the Defense Intelligence Agency. It also called for a stronger coordinating role for the Director of Central Intelligence, backed by a truly inter-agency community staff. (CIA)

Report of the President's Committee
on Information Activities Abroad - December 1960

(The Sprague Report)

Dealt only peripherally with intelligence activities, concentrating instead on the "battle for men's minds." The Committee was set up by President Eisenhower in December 1959 to review the 1953 report of the Committee on International Information Activities and recommend revisions of U. S. information programs to meet the current cold war situation. Among other things, it called for stepping up broadcasts by Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty and the Radio in the American Sector (of Berlin) and for increased operations in Japan, Southeast Asia, Latin America and Africa. (NSC Staff)

Report of the President's Commission
on the Assassination of President Kennedy - 1964

(The Warren Commission Report)

Inter alia, a strong criticism that the liaison between the Secret Service and intelligence-gathering agencies was too casual, particularly with the FBI and CIA which carried a major responsibility for information about potential threats arising from organized groups within their special jurisdictions. As a result, the Secret Service reorganized its intelligence handling, formulated standards for the collection of information and set up agreements with each Federal agency that might be able to supply information bearing on Secret Service responsibilities. The volume of information resulting has required the Secret Service to automate its information handling and to secure help from the scientific community in defining violent behavior that might be aimed at those the Secret Service protects.

(Secret Service)

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A Review of Selected NSA
Cryptanalytic Efforts - 18 February 1965

(The Bissell Report)

A virtually one-man study conducted by Richard M. Bissell after leaving CIA. He examined certain aspects of the NSA cryptanalytic effort seven years after the Baker Report. Due to the highly classified nature of this report, further details are not included but can be made available separately. (NSA)

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The Report of the House Appropriations Committee
Investigation of the Defense Intelligence Agency - 27 February 1965

(The HACIT Report of 1965)

The result of the Committee Staff investigation of DIA between May 1964 and February 1965 to: examine the extent to which the establishment of DIA had eliminated redundancy in Defense intelligence activities; review the military and civilian grade structure of DIA; and identify management and operational improvements resulting from DIA's establishment. The report was forwarded to the Secretary of Defense in June and his reply went to the Committee in October 1965. (House Appropriations Committee)

The Foreign Affairs Information
Management Effort - 10 May 1965

(The FAIME Report)

Prepared by Dunlap and Associates for the Bureau of the Budget in examining the information handling practices of State, AID, USIA, and ACDA. The Report found no program for the development of an integrated reporting system for all foreign affairs information and no common classification system for that information. As to the State Department, the Report called for greater readiness to use modern information handling methods, greater feedback from top management as to its information needs and a centrally managed information system including both development and day-to-day use. (State)

Report on Strategic Warning - 27 February 1967

(The Shute Report)

This study was commissioned by President Kennedy in 1963 to review all activities of the intelligence community bearing on strategic warning with a view to bringing the warning process up to date, taking advantage of new collection and processing systems, and planning for still newer systems then under development, especially in the area of overhead reconnaissance. The study was headed by Benjamin R. Shute, a New York lawyer, who was assisted by representatives of the major intelligence agencies. (CIA)

Report of the Guidance
and Evaluation Panel - February 1967

(The Knox Panel Report)

A year-long study of information handling within the intelligence community in response to a Presidential directive recommended by PFIAB and the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology. The study was inspired by the "information explosion" of the period and the difficulties encountered by the community in dealing with the volumes of information generated by new collection technology. The Panel found that the community had failed to exploit modern information technology and recommended that the President direct the establishment of a unified intelligence information system under the guidance of the DCI, supported by a new staff separate from CIA. (PFIAB)

The Katzenbach Report - 24 March 1967

Occasioned by the Ramparts revelations of the relations between CIA and the National Students Administration and conducted by Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Richard Helms, and John W. Gardner. This report strongly recommended against Government association with educational and private organizations operating abroad and urged establishing an American adaptation of the quasi-public British Council. The report also contains an excellent history of the evolution of mechanisms to review and control covert action operations. (NSC Staff)

The House Appropriations Committee
Investigative Team Report - March 1968

(The HACIT Report)

This investigation was focused entirely on DIA and was strongly critical of that organization's failure to accomplish what was expected when it was established in 1961. The investigation found that Defense intelligence activities continued to be fragmented among the Military Service intelligence agencies, which had nearly doubled in personnel since 1964, and which appeared to be acting as subcontractors for DIA-directed production. No recommendations were made, however, as to ways to strengthen DIA vis-a-vis the Services. (House Appropriations Committee Staff)

The DCI Special Study Group Report - 16 August 1968

(The Eaton Report)

Prepared by a panel composed of Frederick M. Eaton of Sherman and Sterling, General Norstad, Ambassador Merchant, and Dr. Fubini of IBM pursuant to a Presidential order to review SIGINT activities of the U. S. Government which had reached unprecedented size and expense by Fiscal Year 1968. The group also examined the wide differences between JCS and NSA over control of certain tactical or quasi-tactical SIGINT resources and recommended that those used for tactical support be budget outside the intelligence budgets and be controlled by the tactical commander as another force element. It also called for a strong control at the Secretary of Defense level over Defense intelligence and for a true community staff for the DCI. (CIA)

Report on Defense Intelligence - 29 July 1968

(The Froehlke Report)

Prepared for the Secretary of Defense by Robert F. Froehlke, Assistant Secretary of Defense/Administration, in continuation of recommendations in the Eaton Report for stronger, more authoritative management of Defense intelligence resources and activities. It recommended establishing a Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense as the focal point of intelligence control, a position which Mr. Froehlke filled for a time as an additional responsibility. (ASD/I)

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Costs and Benefits of the NSA Cryptanalytic Effort -
14 November 1968

(The Eachus Report)

Undertaken by a Defense study group, headed by Joseph J. Eachus, at the request of Secretary of Defense Clifford to examine the costs, possible success, intelligence value and proper size of certain NSA cryptanalytic efforts. Due to the highly classified nature of this report, further details are not included but can be made available separately. (NSA)

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Covert Operations
of the U. S. Government - 1 December 1968

(The Lindsay Report)

Prepared by a distinguished private and Government group headed by Frank A. Lindsay of ITEK to brief the incoming President on covert operations on the Clandestine Services. The report argued persuasively against proposals to separate Clandestine Services intelligence collection from covert action and to remove the Clandestine Services from CIA. It called instead for increased clandestinity by the Agency, noting that CIA was often obliged in assisting other departments to undertake risks of disclosure greater than prudent. (Frank Lindsay)

Report on National Command
and Control Capability and Defense Intelligence - 1 July 1970

(The Fitzhugh Report)

Prepared as one of the studies by a Blue Ribbon Panel on the Defense Department, headed by Gilbert W. Fitzhugh. The report echoed the Froehlke Report on the fragmented state of Defense intelligence and called for a strong central authority in Defense, greater consumer feedback for more efficient direction of intelligence collection and production and the consolidation of several functions, such as counterintelligence being conducted separately by the Military Services. It effectively established the authority of the Assistant Secretary of Defense/Intelligence, now Dr. Hall, and foreshadowed a number of the recommendations of the Schlesinger Report. (ASD/I)

A Review of the Intelligence Community - 10 March 1971

(The Schlesinger Report)

Prepared by Dr. Schlesinger of OMB for the President, this report formed the basis of President Nixon's directive of 5 November 1971. The report recommended establishment of the DCI as the leader of the community in resource matters as well as in substance, urged stronger central management of Defense intelligence resources, called for establishment of the NSC Intelligence Committee and the Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee, called for a true Intelligence Community Staff, recommended that improvement of the intelligence product should be a matter of the highest priority. (OMB)

President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
Report to the President - 15 December 1971

(The PFIAB Economic Intelligence Report)

Prepared by PFIAB in response to President Nixon's directive of 4 June 1971 to make recommendations on the collection and dissemination of economic intelligence. The report was the first major survey of the U. S. economic intelligence effort, at least since 1960. It found that responsibility for fiscal, monetary and trade matters was fragmented among Government agencies and that the supporting intelligence effort had suffered disproportionately large reductions in recent years. It recommended that economic intelligence be considered an essential element in national security policy and urged the DCI to take the lead in formulating a broad concept of economic intelligence and resources devoted to it. (PFIAB)

(The Lehan Study)

Requested by Dr. Foster, DOD/DDR&E, on behalf of the Defense Science Board, as an analysis of technical intelligence systems and their contribution to tactical operations. The study group was chaired by Mr. Frank Lehan and gave particular attention to systems found to be receiving insufficient support. A result of the study was that certain systems had their funding increased four-fold. Most of the systems studied were ELINT systems operated by NSA and the Military Services. (DDR&E)

Report of the Ervin Subcommittee
on Constitutional Rights, Senate Judiciary Committee - 1973

(The Ervin Committee Report)

Prepared by the Ervin Committee which was formed in 1970 to inquire into allegations of U. S. Army intelligence investigations of U. S. citizens. Based on hearings held during 1971 and 1972, at which the Assistant Secretary of Defense/Administration (Mr. Froehlke) testified for the Department of Defense, a report, "Military Surveillance of Civilian Politics," was issued in 1973. This report led Senator Ervin to introduce legislation to prohibit such activities by military intelligence. Although this bill was never reported out of committee, identical legislation, the "Freedom from Military Surveillance Act of 1975," has been introduced in the Senate (Senator Matthias) and in the House (Mr. Kastenmeier). (Senate Judiciary Committee)

A Report on Economic Intelligence - 7 December 1973

(The Cherne Report)

Submitted by Leo Cherne under PFIAB auspices as an update to the 15 December 1971 PFIAB report on economic intelligence. The report contained numerous substantive observations on international economic affairs of the time and commented on the lack of effort in economic intelligence forecasts, the over-classification of much of economic intelligence production and little user feedback for guidance.



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A supplement to this report exists as a statement by Mr. Cherne to PFIAB on 4 October 1974.

The Commission on the Organization of the Government
for the Conduct of Foreign Policy -- report due 1 July 1975

(The Murphy Commission)

A joint Presidential-Congressional study commission established by the Foreign Relations Act of 1972. It is to submit to the President and the Congress findings and recommendations "to provide a more effective system for the formulation and implementation of the nation's foreign policy." The Commission may make recommendations with respect to the reorganization of the departments and agencies, more effective arrangements between the Executive Branch and Congress, improved procedures among departments and agencies, the abolition of unnecessary services and functions, and other measures to promote economy, efficiency, and improved administration of foreign policy. The Commission is divided into four Committees: Congressional (Senator Mansfield, Chairman), National Security/Intelligence (Ambassador Murphy, Chairman), International Economics (Senator Pearson, Chairman), and Public Diplomacy and Support (Congressman Zablocki, Chairman). The Commission's mandate expires on 30 June 1975. Among the subjects under study by the Commission are the relationship between intelligence and the policy-maker, resource allocation in the Intelligence Community, the

authorities for the conduct of intelligence, and the desirability of maintaining a capacity for the conduct of covert action.

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The Role of Counterintelligence*

Counterintelligence is an integral part of our national defense. By definition and by its very nature, counterintelligence is a defensive posture to the extent that it reacts primarily to intelligence initiatives of hostile intelligence services. Like any good defense, however, it cannot be static or passive. It is based upon knowledge of this country's adversaries; it seeks out and engages hostile agents and the intelligence services that employ them. The national counterintelligence defense, in other words, requires both sound preventive measures and an energetic and sustained counterattack.

The purpose of defensive and aggressive counterintelligence is to insure that adversaries who do not want to risk open confrontation cannot attain the same objectives through stealth. In more concrete terms, the purpose of counterintelligence is to identify and neutralize spies and their masters who serve our opponents.

Spycatching, by itself, is not enough, because spies are replaceable. American counterintelligence must also know who sent the spies and who supported and directed their work in this country and in friendly nations. And beyond identifying these agent handlers -- the officers of the KGB and other such clandestine communist organizations -- our counterintelligence must know how these people are motivated, recruited, trained, structured, rewarded, and punished. We need to know how they communicate with each other -- from New York or Washington, for example, to Moscow or Prague. In short, we need to know everything we can find out about them, as individuals and as organizations. And finally, what we know must be shared appropriately with other services equally concerned.

This need is even more acute today than in the 1950s and 1960s. We know from hard experience that the clandestine communist services always increase the range and the intensity of their operations during periods of Western relaxation, when the openness and multiplicity of exchanges provide favorable conditions and opportunities for launching intelligence operations against our country.

* This Annex does not address the role of counterintelligence within the Department of Defense.

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It must also prevent leakage of sensitive U.S. information from foreign services to whom American secrets are necessarily confided as a matter of common concern but which in turn have been penetrated by enemy agents. 1/

The value of what might be called an anticipatory defense is not always evident, because when it succeeds, nothing happens. It is like preventive medicine. Its value becomes dramatically clear only when it fails.

The second value of counterintelligence is that it provides information about hostile clandestine intentions and capabilities. This information is the more valuable if our adversaries do not know that we have it.

Finally, the third value of counterintelligence is the large amount of straight intelligence obtained as a by-product of counterintelligence agents in the normal course of their business.

All U.S. Government components have some individual internal responsibility for the security of personnel, records, and physical facilities. Aside from these basic security functions, the overall counterintelligence role in the U.S. Government is shared by several specific intelligence agencies. The conduct of counterintelligence overseas is one of CIA's original functions flowing from the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, and specifically spelled out and developed in a series of National Security Council Intelligence Directives. The FBI has the general responsibility for conduct of counterintelligence operations within the United States based on statutory responsibilities (enforcement of espionage, sabotage, neutrality, and registration acts and related matters) as well as a series of Presidential Directives and Attorney General orders.

1. There may be cited here some of the completed counterintelligence cases which resulted in the identification and suppression of high-level Soviet penetrations of Western intelligence services and which were directly attributable to CIA counterintelligence work: George Blake (UK - 1961), Heinz Felde (West Germany - 1961), Harold Adrian Russel ("Kim") Philby (UK - 1963), George Paques (France - 1964), Giorgio Rinaldi Ghislieri (Italy, Spain - 1967), Yuriy Loginov (South Africa - 1967), Nahit Imre (Turkey - 1968), and Francis Roussilhe (France - 1969).

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Success of U.S. counterintelligence is proportionate to the extent to which it exists as an integrated, unified concept with fullest coordination among the separate agencies. It did not exist as such until World War II; and only small progress was made after that war, despite the National Security Act of 1947. An integrated system first began to take shape in 1958, when the National Security Council moved directly into the problem. Intelligence and counterintelligence directives which established the basic ground rules were formulated and placed in effect. As a result the United States has a set of counterintelligence concepts and precepts that organize our experience and hold us together. Throughout the recent years, interagency coordination and cooperation have become a working reality, becoming more and more effective as the level of coordination continues to rise.

The effectiveness of counterintelligence also requires recognition of its separateness as a function. In CIA and elsewhere, before the mid-1950s, counterintelligence was often identified only with security and the ad hoc exchange of limited amounts of information in liaison. It was sometimes regarded as an adjunct to other specialities, usually espionage. This subordination degraded the function to its lowest level, to such necessary but elementary work as nametracing and operational bookkeeping. But these are only the elementary building blocks of the masonry of counterintelligence. If it is restricted to nothing more than that, American counterintelligence will inevitably degenerate to parochialism and departmentalism. It will not be responsive to a central and vital philosophy. It will tend to yield the initiative to the adversary and to the writing of damage reports after we have been hurt instead of seeking the adversary out and engaging him before he can hurt us.

In summary, the value of counterintelligence as an integral part of national defense requires a continuity of doctrine and an organization of experience, and must be sustained by a full-time, experienced cadre of specialists with continuing emphasis on interagency understanding and coordination.

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Origin and Disposition
of the Huston Plan

Background

By letter dated June 20, 1969, Tom Charles Huston, Staff Assistant to the President, addressed a letter to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, stating that the President had directed that a report on foreign communist support of revolutionary protest movements in the United States be prepared for his study. According to the Huston letter, the President specifically requested that the report draw upon all the sources available to the Intelligence Community, that it be as detailed as possible, and that the word "support" should be liberally construed to include all activities by foreign communists designed to encourage or assist revolutionary protest movements in the United States. The letter stated that on the basis of earlier reports submitted to the President on a more limited aspect of the problem, it was apparent that "present" intelligence collection capabilities in the area were inadequate. Huston stated that the President wanted to know what resources were currently targeted toward monitoring foreign communist support of revolutionary youth activities in the United States, how effective they were, what gaps existed in our (U.S.) intelligence because of either inadequate resources or low priority of attention, and what steps could be taken, if the President directed, to provide the maximum possible coverage of these activities.

The request was also sent to the Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, and the Defense Intelligence Agency seeking contributions relating to this same problem. Pursuant to the request, the FBI and CIA submitted available information on the matter. These responses were handled unilaterally and without coordination between CIA and FBI.

On June 5, 1970, Director Hoover met with President Nixon, at which meeting the President appointed him as chairman of a special intelligence committee to

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coordinate a more effective intelligence-gathering function. 1/ He also instructed that the FBI, CIA, NSA, and DIA were to coordinate their efforts to insure that comprehensive information would be obtained for the President's use which would provide him with a worldwide picture of the efforts of new left and subversive groups in directing dissident activities in the United States. Present at this meeting were CIA Director Richard Helms; Vice Admiral Noel Gayler, NSA; General Donald V. Bennett, DIA; Mr. Tom Charles Huston, White House Staff Assistant; Assistant to the President H.R. Haldeman; Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs John D. Ehrlichman; and Robert H. Finch, Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.

An initial meeting of the Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc) was held in Mr. Hoover's office on June 8, 1970. This meeting was attended by Mr. Helms, Vice Admiral Gayler, General Bennett, and Mr. Huston. Mr. Hoover emphasized the President's keen interest in the problem of intelligence collection and outlined the general objectives to which the Committee was to address itself. He instructed that a working subcommittee composed of representatives of all the member agencies be established and be headed by FBI Assistant Director William C. Sullivan.

The first meeting of the working subcommittee was held on June 9, 1970. At this meeting, Mr. Huston presented the subcommittee with an outline which he stated the President desired the subcommittee to follow in preparing its report. The outline addressed itself mainly to the purpose, procedures, and objectives of the subcommittee's review. The following is quoted from the outline:

1. Hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, Ninety-third Congress, Second Session Pursuant to H. Res. 803, "A Resolution Authorizing and Directing the Committee on the Judiciary to Investigate Whether Sufficient Grounds Exist for the House of Representatives to Exercise Its Constitutional Power to Impeach Richard M. Nixon, President of the United States of America," Book VII, Part 1, pg. 375.

"Purpose:

- (A) To define and assess the existing internal security threat.
- (B) To evaluate the collection procedures and techniques presently employed and to assess their effectiveness.
- (C) To identify gaps in our present collection efforts and recommend steps to close these gaps.
- (D) To review current procedures for inter-community coordination and cooperation and to recommend steps to improve these procedures.
- (E) To evaluate the timeliness of current intelligence data and to recommend procedures to increase both its timeliness and usefulness.
- (F) To assess the priorities presently attached to domestic intelligence collection efforts and to recommend new priorities where appropriate.

"Procedures:

- (A) Although the sub-committee will be officially constituted within the framework of USIB, it will in fact be an independent, ad hoc, interagency working group with a limited mandate.
- (B) Operational details will be the responsibility of the chairman. However, the scope and direction of the review will be determined by the White House member.
- (C) The sub-committee will submit its reports to the White House and not to USIB. Report will be due by July 1, 1970.
- (D) To insure that the President has all the options available for consideration, the WH member may direct detailed

interrogatories to individual agencies in order to ascertain facts relevant to policy evaluation by the President. Information resulting from such interrogatories will, if the contributing agency requests, be treated on a confidential basis and not be considered by the sub-committee as a whole.

"Objectives:

- (A) Maximum coordination and cooperation within the intelligence community. The sub-committee may wish to consider the creation of a permanent Domestic Intelligence Operations Board, or some other appropriate mechanism to insure community-wide evaluation of intelligence data.
- (B) Higher priority by all intelligence agencies on internal security collection efforts.
- (C) Maximum use of all special investigative techniques, including increased agent and informant penetration by both the FBI and CIA.
- (D) Clarification of NSA's role in targeting against communication traffic involving U.S. revolutionary leaders and organizations.
- (E) Maximum coverage of the overseas activities of revolutionary leaders and of foreign support of U.S. revolutionary activities.
- (F) Maximum coverage of campus and student-related activities of revolutionary leaders and groups.
- (G) More detailed information about the sources and extent of financial support of revolutionary organizations.

- (H) Clarification of the proper domestic intelligence role of the Armed Services.
- (I) Development of procedures for translating analyzed intelligence information into a format useful for policy formulation."

At a meeting of the working subcommittee held on June 23, 1970, a consensus was reached on a final draft of the report to be issued by the Interagency Committee. This report, which was captioned "Special Report Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc)," 1/ dated June, 1970, and numbering 9 43 pages, was signed and approved by the heads of each member agency at a final meeting of the Committee held in Mr. Hoover's office on June 25, 1970. 2/ The report footnoted several objections by the FBI to certain options contained in the Committee's report. 3/ These objections are enumerated in a later portion of this paper. A copy of the "Special Report" was delivered to Mr. Huston at the White House on June 26, 1970. The "Special Report" was divided into three main sections: Part One, a summarized estimate of the internal security threat; Part Two, a summary of various operational limitations on certain intelligence collection techniques with cited advantages of maintaining such restrictions as well as the advantages of relaxing them; and Part Three, an evaluation of interagency cooperation with suggested measures to improve the coordination of domestic intelligence collection.

During the first week of July, 1970, Huston sent the "Special Report" to H.R. Haldeman with a memorandum entitled "Operational Restraints on Intelligence Collection." In his memorandum, Huston recommended that the President, from among the options discussed by the "Special Report," select, in most areas discussed, the options relaxing the restraints on intelligence collection. 4/

On July 14, 1970, Haldeman sent a memorandum to Huston stating that the President had approved Huston's recommendations for relaxing restraints on

1. Ibid., pp. 384-431.
2. Ibid., pg. 383.
3. Ibid., pg. 433.
4. Ibid., pg. 437.

intelligence collection and requested that a formal decision memorandum be prepared. 1/

In a memorandum dated July 23, 1970, addressed to the Ad Hoc Committee agencies with copies for the President and Mr. Haldeman, 2/ Mr. Huston advised that the President had carefully studied the "Special Report" and had made certain decisions with respect to issues raised therein. The President's decisions called for a relaxation of certain existing restraints on intelligence coverage, including the following: NSCID-6 was to be interpreted to permit NSA to program for coverage of the communications of US citizens, using international facilities; the Intelligence Community was directed to intensify electronic surveillance coverage of individuals and groups in the United States who posed a threat to the internal security; restrictions on legal mail coverage were to be removed and restrictions on covert mail coverage relaxed to permit its use on select targets of priority intelligence; restraints on the use of surreptitious entry were to be removed on certain high-priority targets; the coverage of violence-prone campus and student-related groups was to be increased; CIA coverage of American students traveling or living abroad was to be increased; the restrictions on the use of military undercover agents were to be retained; each member agency was to submit a detailed estimate of manpower and monetary needs required to implement the decisions; and a committee consisting of the directors of representative agencies or appropriate alternates was to be constituted effective August 1, 1970, to provide evaluation of domestic intelligence, prepare periodic domestic intelligence estimates, carry out other objectives specified in the report, and perform such other duties as the President should from time to time assign. The Director of the FBI was appointed to serve as chairman of this committee. An attachment to the memorandum from Mr. Huston captioned "Organization and Operations of the Interagency Group on Domestic Intelligence and Internal Security (IAG)" set forth specific composition, operations, and duties of this new committee. 3/

1. Ibid., pg. 445.
2. Ibid., pp. 450, 454.
3. Ibid., pg. 456.

On receipt of the letter from Mr. Huston, the Director, FBI, addressed a letter to the Attorney General dated July 27, 1970, pointing out FBI objections to certain of the decisions reported in the Huston letter. Mr. Hoover objected to relaxation of electronic surveillance policy, the implementation of covert mail coverage, the removal of restrictions on the use of surreptitious entry of embassies to obtain cryptographic materials, the removal of controls and restrictions relating to the coverage of violence-prone campus and student-related groups, and the establishment of a permanent Interagency Committee on Domestic Intelligence. The Director stated that in the "Special Report" he had pointed out his opposition to these aspects of the report and requested of the Attorney General a prompt expression of his views concerning the matter. He noted that no action to implement the instructions contained in Mr. Huston's letter would be taken pending a reply from the Attorney General.

No further action to implement the Huston letter subsequent to the July 27, 1970, letter to the Attorney General was instituted by the Intelligence Community. There is no indication that the Attorney General ever responded to this communication.

On or about July 27, 1970, each agency that had received the memorandum of July 23, 1970, received a telephone call from the White House instructing that the memorandum be returned.

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The Role of Security in CIA

General Statement

The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401-403) established the Central Intelligence Agency and the position of the Director of Central Intelligence and in Section 102(c), (3) specifically charges the DCI with the responsibility for "protecting sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure" In addition, the CIA Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403 a-j), in implementing this provision, exempts the Agency from "the provisions ... of any ... law which requires the publication or disclosure of the organization, functions, names, official titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel employed by the Agency" With this as basic statutory background, it can be seen that the role of Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, as the Head of the Intelligence Community, is to protect the vital intelligence information of the United States. Such a role, therefore, must be dependent upon the establishment and implementation of a strong security program, not only for the Central Intelligence Agency, but also for overseeing such programs for the general Intelligence Community.

The Agency, in particular, has a special responsibility to ensure the loyalty, security consciousness, integrity, and psychological stability of its employees. Soviet and other hostile intelligence services seek to penetrate US intelligence organizations by identifying and exploiting personal vulnerabilities and weaknesses of their personnel. Such penetration can enable the opposition to identify and neutralize our own intelligence operations; learn what we know and what we do not know about opposition capabilities and intentions; gain insights enabling the opposition to confuse and deceive us; and provide vital information regarding US national policy, military capabilities, technology, and intentions, with which Agency and other intelligence personnel often become familiar in the course of their routine work.

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Intelligence personnel not only are an attractive target for the opposition services, but also in many respects represent a particularly accessible one. Unlike members of most Government organizations, intelligence personnel often must carry out their demanding assignments alone, and sometimes in hostile areas. They are thus subject to severe psychological pressures. They are often removed from immediate supervision, or even observation by friendly colleagues. In these circumstances, latent vulnerabilities and instabilities in their character or loyalty may come to the surface and be detected and exploited by an alert opposition. In addition, in many instances, employees of not only the CIA, but also other intelligence services, receive little or no personal or peer recognition for their efforts. By the nature of their work, they are not allowed to talk about it to their family or their friends. Even within an organization, because of the stringent need-to-know requirements, an individual may accomplish significant tasks which he or she can never discuss and which may not be recognized or even known to friends in the Agency. Therefore, although an intelligence officer may receive great personal satisfaction for a job well done and may receive plaudits from a supervisor, he or she may operate throughout his or her whole career in what is, in effect, a vocational vacuum, with people "on the outside" having no knowledge of his or her area of expertise.

The only protection for the Agency against these hazards is a careful and thorough assessment of the individual to ensure the selection of the right person for the job. This is essential not only in the interests of the individual agencies and the Government, but also in that of the individual. Many people, through no fault of their own, are subject to latent weaknesses and vulnerabilities of one sort or another, and we believe it would be a great disservice to them to impose upon them burdens for which they are unfit, perhaps leading to unfortunate personal consequences, as well as to serious security damage to the Government of the United States.

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Hence, we have, over the years, with the best professional advice available, devised a system of medical, psychological, and security checks designed to identify potential problems in these fields before they can cause serious damage. In a sense, these tests may be compared with the assessments employed in the selection of jet pilots and astronauts -- too much is at stake to take chances with avoidable human error or weakness.

In the past there have been a number of cases where sensitive agencies of both the US Government and other Free World governments suffered damage precisely because latent human weakness of individuals in key positions was detected and exploited by an opposition service. Our procedures for ensuring the security and suitability of its personnel have been developed over the years on the basis of the Agency's specialized knowledge of the aims and methods of our opposition services, the importance and sensitivity of the Agency's responsibilities, the best available professional advice, and the cumulative practical experience of a number of years of Agency management.

Discussion


It must be stated, however, that Security in the broader sense includes the overseeing not only of the attributes of its employees from what we describe as a Personnel Security standpoint, but also from Physical and Technical penetration of our installations. The implantation of an audio device in a United States Government facility where sensitive conversations are held can cause extensive damage from a security standpoint. Similarly, any opposition service would leap at the chance to have unrestricted access to a safe or file cabinet where classified information is stored.

Therefore, the Director of Central Intelligence also has the responsibility to effect appropriate programs guarding against technical or physical penetration. This is accomplished in the United States through the efforts of the Office of Security of the Agency, which is responsible for the maintenance of adequate physical security standards in terms of safekeeping equipment, alarm systems,

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perimeter protection, and the like. Our Office of Security also is responsible for maintaining a counteraudio program for our installations in the United States and abroad. In the foreign field, this is done with the full knowledge and assistance of appropriate State Department security personnel. In these days of extensive use of computers, the Office of Security monitors the operation of Agency compartmented computer systems to ensure that they meet the right standards of security.



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
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Assuming that security approval is recommended, the next step for the applicant is to undergo the polygraph examination. Every applicant is polygraphed by a professional polygraph examiner working for the Office of Security. If derogatory information is developed during the polygraph, the polygraph examiner writes a report of his interview. The examiner does not make any judgments as to the contents of the information, other than to comment whether or not, in his professional opinion, the applicant has displayed reactions on the polygraph indicative of deception to the questions asked. The polygraph report is then appraised and adjudicated in the same manner as that of the field investigation.

Polygraph reports, because of their sensitivity, are kept on file in the polygraph office and are closely controlled. They are not made a part of the applicant's security file. At this point, it might be well to comment that all security files of the Agency are kept on a closely controlled basis by the Office of Security and are available only to Office of Security personnel with a legitimate need to know about the information and, in some rare instances, to very senior officials of the Agency. Upon the completion of polygraph interview and after adjudication, the applicant is then allowed to enter on duty.

As part of the on-going process of security cognizance over employees of the Agency, when an employee of the Agency changes his status -- i.e., is transferred overseas or is considered for additional access to information other than Top Secret -- his Security File is reviewed by a Security Officer.

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In addition, employees are reinvestigated at five-year intervals.

One of the key functions of the Office of Security is its role in assisting those employees who have problems or those employees who get into trouble. The Office of Security maintains a Security Duty Office staffed 24 hours a day and a staff of Security Officers ready to respond at any hour of the day to assist employees who either are in difficulty or need immediate assistance. This assistance to employees is coordinated as cases dictate with the Office of Medical Services and/or the Office of Personnel. This assistance ranges from helping an employee with a very personal problem, such as a child of the employee getting into difficulty with the police, drugs, etc., to assisting employees who have severe problems. Each time, of course, this is done with a view toward ascertaining what is the best course of action for the employee to take to resolve his problem. Many of these cases are referred to the Office of Medical Services for specialized assistance.

Personnel Security, as outlined above, cannot be dealt with as a separate entity but must be considered in the total picture of this Agency. Personnel Security, employee morale, and the Agency image are all inseparably bound together. CIA does not strive for total security as this would impose impossible limitations on the efficiency of this Organization. Instead, the Personnel Security Program of this Agency attempts to create a sense of security responsibility in the employees and this sense of security responsibility, or trust, is the element which allows the Personnel Security Program to be as effective as it is.

At this time, it should be pointed out that, in addition to the regular staff applicants for the Agency, investigations are conducted regarding a number of other people who have a relationship with the Agency. These include individuals affiliated with the Agency on a contract basis, persons who are consultants to the Agency, military personnel assigned to the Agency, and many people who perform services for the Agency. In this latter category are included individuals such as: Federal Protective Service

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Officers who guard Agency installations; persons who work in the cafeteria at Langley; persons who perform char force and maintenance duties; barbers who work in the barbershop at Langley; individuals employed by the C&P Telephone Company who work on Agency telephones and telephone lines; and individuals who work in the Agency Credit Union. With the exception of individuals who work in the cafeterias and who do not have access to the Agency Headquarters Building proper, most of these individuals are fully investigated and polygraphed. All of their cases are handled and adjudicated in exactly the same manner and with the same check and balance system as those of staff employees of the Agency.

Up to this point, we have discussed individuals having some sort of actual relationship with the Agency in terms of being assigned to Agency installations or being employees of the Agency. There is another large category of individuals who are investigated and cleared by the Agency who have access to sensitive Agency and Intelligence Community information, but who, except in a few cases, do not work in Agency installations. These individuals are in the private sector and are employed by companies having access to Agency information and Agency classified contracts. For the most part, these individuals accomplish their tasks, working in their own company area. For example, individuals working for such companies as [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and many other companies have access to sensitive information. In many cases, these individuals have access to information which individual staff employees of the Agency do not receive. This is particularly true of individuals working for companies having sensitive classified contracts in the overhead reconnaissance field. Security requirements in this field stem from DCID 1/14, the Directive of Central Intelligence Directive which established uniform personnel security standards for individuals having access to compartmented information. This Directive clearly established the personnel security standards and minimum investigative criteria to be met by all US Government civilian and military personnel, Government consultants, and employees of Government contractors who require access to sensitive compartmented information or to information which reveals the manner, methods, and operational details by which sensitive compartmented information is collected.

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Therefore, it is the responsibility of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, also as the Head of the Intelligence Community, to ensure that sensitive compartmented information is adequately protected. The investigations of individuals in the private sector who are to have access to compartmented information, and who will be involved in Agency classified contracts, are conducted in a similar manner to those done on applicants for Agency employment.

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The case, with the exception of the polygraph, is processed similarly to that of an applicant. There are some substantial differences because we do not place great emphasis upon certain suitability factors in an investigation of this kind. By that we do not wish to imply that we are any less concerned about the individual's suitability. Minor things such as the fact that he is a poor supervisor in the company, is given to temper tantrums, does not get along well with his fellow workers, and the like are reported by the investigator, but during evaluation of the case they are not stressed as to the individual's "clearability." The great stress in the case of an Industrial Contractor is upon his loyalty and upon "pure" security factors.


A few employees in the private sector are also polygraphed. These are employees of a given company who work full time in our Headquarters Building at Langley. Since these individuals have full access to the building and in almost all cases have access to sensitive compartmented information, it is our belief that they should meet the same standards as staff employees of the Agency. The polygraph interviews of these individuals are voluntary and are closely controlled. Before the individual is selected to work in the building, company management has been briefed and made aware of the polygraph requirement, as has the individual. Prior to the polygraph test itself, the individual is interviewed by an Agency Security Officer who again points out that the polygraph interview is voluntary and furnishes the individual a general idea of the areas

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that will be covered. The areas that are covered are loyalty to the United States, contact with foreign nationals or a foreign intelligence service, and use of drugs. Under no circumstances is the individual questioned regarding company secrets or industrial espionage and no inquiries are made into his private sex life. After the actual polygraph interview, the individual is again interviewed by a Security Officer and, if the examiner finds that the interview was favorable, a badge to enter the Headquarters Building is issued. If a problem does exist, the individual is told that it will have to be adjudicated by higher authority. All companies who participate in this program are aware that the employment of an individual does not rest upon his being cleared or not cleared by the Agency, and it has been agreed that the turn down of an individual has no bearing upon his continued employment with a given company.


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The question may well be asked why is it necessary for the Agency to maintain its own investigative staff when investigations would just as well be conducted by some other investigative arm of the Government. From the middle 1940s until December 1947, the FBI conducted investigations for the Agency and its predecessor, CIG, on staff employee applicants. They discontinued these investigations because of additional responsibilities placed upon them. They resumed conducting our applicant investigations in December 1948 and continued until December 1950. However, it should be noted that as a result of the unique requirements for covert investigations it was necessary for the Agency to maintain its own investigative capability even during the period the FBI conducted our overt investigations. Since 1951, we have been conducting all overt and covert investigations for the Agency without any major compromise of our cover. It is, of course, more cost effective for us to do the entire investigative task since we must be staffed to conduct the covert investigations which no other Federal investigative service can do for us. Additionally, since investigations are controlled by desk officers in our Office of Security from beginning to end, this, we feel, gives us a more viable end product.

It should be noted that it is not only the Agency involved in the sensitive overhead reconnaissance programs, but that all members of the Intelligence Community are also involved.

CIA is not the only Agency that is involved in the sensitive overhead reconnaissance program; all members of the Intelligence Community are also involved. The investigations conducted by the Agency and by the Defense Investigative Service (DIS), the investigative arm of the Defense Department, are used by other members of the Intelligence Community

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in adjudicating clearances for individuals working on these sensitive projects.

The field of contract security is an extensive one in itself, and in terms of security, several types of contracts exist. The contract itself may be classified and the work unclassified. The contract may be unclassified and the work classified, or both the contract and the work may be classified. Moreover, within the compartmented systems field, there are several levels at which an individual may be cleared. The individual may be aware only that the project on which he is working is US Government sponsored, or he may be made aware of CIA sponsorship in the contract. In the overhead reconnaissance area, individuals working on contracts may have access only to a small part of the contract and may be working on only, for example, one electronic system of a space vehicle, or he or she may have access to the complete idea and the completed vehicle. In addition, we delineate between an individual's access to the security system controlling knowledge of the craft and access to the information derived from use of the craft, or take. It can be seen, therefore, that the overhead reconnaissance program is a highly complex, highly sensitive area in which we attempt to maintain maximum compartmentation, maximum security, and maximum, for want of a better word, covertness.

Despite our efforts to maintain security, we have historically been plagued with leaks. The Office of Security's role in the area of unauthorized leaks of classified intelligence through the news media stems from the Director's responsibility under the National Security Act of 1947 to protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. In addressing a particular leak, he may turn either to the mechanism of the United States Intelligence Board or to internal CIA assets. The purpose of the action taken can be either to ascertain the source of the leak or to prepare a damage assessment in order to ascertain its effect upon the continuing viability of the sources or methods compromised as a result of the news leak. The mechanism used by the United States Intelligence Board was established through its Security Committee by DCID 1/11 on 24 March 1959, as a result of a memorandum in September 1958 from Mr. Gordon

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Gray, then Special Assistant to the President. This memorandum concerned procedures to be followed in reporting unauthorized intelligence disclosures. Mr. Gray drew the attention of the then DCI to paragraph 5, 1, f, of NSCID No. 1, dated 15 September 1958, which stated that the DCI shall "call upon the departments and agencies, as appropriate, to investigate within their department or agency any unauthorized disclosures of intelligence sources or methods A report of these investigations, including corrective measures taken or recommended within the departments and agencies involved, shall be transmitted to the Director of Central Intelligence for review and such further action as may be appropriate, including reports to the National Security Council or the President."

Since its establishment, the Security Committee has been tasked by various Directors of the Agency to address leaks of intelligence into the news media. Most of these actions dealt with the preparation of damage assessments; a few attempted to identify the source of the leaks through such devices as questionnaires submitted to all recipients of the basic intelligence document(s) to develop further investigative leads. Other investigative tactics may have been employed by the Security Committee Member departments and agencies, however, these are not reflected in Committee records. [redacted], revised 23 August 1974, established a standing Security Committee of the USIB to support the DCI's statutory responsibilities by providing for effective and consistent community security policies for the protection of intelligence and of intelligence sources and methods and ensuring the timeliness and economy in the handling of compartmented information. The Committee is charged with the responsibility of ensuring that appropriate investigations are made of any unauthorized disclosure or compromise of intelligence or of intelligence sources and methods and that the results of such investigations, along with appropriate recommendations, are provided to the Director of Central Intelligence. However, the leakage of classified intelligence through the news media has continued, unabated, despite the efforts of the Security Committee.

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It might be of value and interest to look at some of these leaks as to type and damage. In September 1971, at the request of the White House, the

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DDI and the Office of Security of the Agency conducted a comprehensive survey of intelligence leaks during the 1953-71 period. This study was taken from files of the Intelligence Community available at CIA which reflected official concern about specific leaks and which recorded the initiation, conduct, and outcome of security investigations and other actions triggered by disclosures in the public press. The files and the study reflect only those leaks believed to be serious enough at the time to be formally considered by the Intelligence Community. The data base was small in a number of items, but was highly selective and thoroughly analyzed. All investigations undertaken were of serious disclosures and were conducted only when it had been determined that a unique and major leak had occurred. It was usually possible at the time of the disclosure to determine whether a leak was a deliberate Administration disclosure. In such cases, no investigation was undertaken, and all "official" or "authorized" leaks were excluded. However, the study did show that almost all of the leaks originated with US Government officials in Washington, D.C.

Furthermore, it was evident that the primary intelligence sources behind information being leaked were overhead reconnaissance and signal intelligence. Because these sources can be hampered or frustrated by passive countermeasures, all items based on them created a serious risk to our intelligence data base for the future.

An examination of appropriate files showed a total of 104 suspected unauthorized disclosures of classified intelligence matters officially considered from 1953 to mid-1971. There may have been two or three times as many newspaper and magazine articles which covered or included the material in these leaks, but these 104 items were determined to be the initial appearance of specific classified intelligence information in the public domain. The "peak" years during this period were 1959 when 15 leaks appeared, 1963 with 13, 1964 with 11, 1969 with 10, and 1971, when 11 leaks had appeared by mid-year. During this period, the Washington Post printed 28 leaks; the New York Times, 23; the Northern Virginia Sun, 13; and the Washington Star, 11. The others were divided among 18 other publications ranging from 6

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in Newsweek and 1 in Time to such publications as 1 in Aerospace Daily and 1 in Stag Magazine.

Other serious leaks have occurred since 1971, with an extremely serious one occurring in an article in the Washington Post in February 1972 describing much of the capability and operational details of a program approved for development by the President during the summer of 1971. In a letter to the President, Mr. Richard Helms, then DCI, commented that he was relatively certain that such a reporter could not have come up with so sophisticated an article simply by putting together bits and pieces of information accumulated from various inadvertent disclosures. Mr. Helms expressed his belief that the complete substance had to be provided by someone with a good understanding of the whole system.

Since 1960, various memoranda have been issued by Presidents Eisenhower, Johnson, and Nixon expressing concern over the passage of classified information to individuals not authorized or entitled to receive it. The United States Intelligence Board has continued to express deep concern over unauthorized disclosures, but, as previously mentioned, unauthorized disclosures continue to occur. As an example, some of the types of disclosures occurring over the past 10 years include the following:

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