

~~SALT~~
ASC Contact

Review Staff: 75/3436
13 November 1975

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Paul Walsh on Handling Greg Rushford

Walsh said a 12 November DDO meeting with Rushford had gotten off to a rather acrimonious start. Rushford stated that he had "White House authority" to transmit his 4 November letter and access to a list of all analysts working on SALT.

After some phone calls by Ed Proctor to Rushford it was agreed that CIA will search its records to withdraw and make available to Rushford any memoranda on SALT related subjects other than those on the normal monitoring reports.

Rushford said he wants data on the Soviet "backfire" and will submit a written request in the meantime the data will be pulled together.

With regard to people and interviews, Rushford will be given access to a list of analysts who report on all functional aspects of the SALT monitoring reports. A list of these analysts will be sent to the Review Staff by 9:30 on 13 November.

STATINTL

The subject of a third presence at the interviews was brought up. It was [redacted] suggestion that the Review Staff alert the analysts to Greg Rushford's interest in interviewing them. Each person will be given the option of having a third party with them. If they ask for it a member of the Review Staff will sit in. If they do not want such a third party, the interview will be conducted by Rushford alone.

DD S&T will alert their people
DDI " " " "

[redacted]
Donald P. Gregg

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31 October 1975

REVIEW STAFF
75-3387

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with the Senate Select Committee on 31 October 1975 in Order to Review Paramilitary Operations in Laos and Indonesia

1. On 31 October 1975 Mr. Colby, DCI and Mr. Nelson, DDO, combined to give a presentation on paramilitary operations to the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. In this presentation the paramilitary operation in Indonesia during the period 1957 to 1958, and the Lao paramilitary operation during the period 1961 to 1973 were discussed. Attached is a resume concerning these paramilitary operations which was placed into the Committee Record of this hearing. The 31 October meeting was presided over by Senator Church. Also present during various portions of the presentation were Senators Tower, Schweiker, Hart, Morgan, Mondale and Huddleston.

2. In the course of the discussion on the Indonesian paramilitary operation the Committee asked for a paper from the Agency which would outline what role, if any, was played in the coup of 1965 by those Indonesian officers that were supported by the CIA paramilitary operation which took place from 1957 to 1958. Mr. Colby agreed that the Agency would provide such a paper to the Committee. (ACTION REQUIRED: C/EA [] is tasked to prepare the required paper.)

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4. The CIA participants in the 31 October session, in addition to Messrs Colby and Nelson, were as follows: [redacted] Special Counsel to the DCI; [redacted] Review Staff; [redacted] Chief, Africa Division, and Mr. Ted Shackley, Chief, East Asia Division.

[redacted]

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Theodore G. Shackley
Chief, East Asia Division

Attachment:

Resume of PM Ops

Distribution:

- 2 - C/EA w/att
- 1 - DC/EA w/att
- C/EA [redacted] w/att
- 1 - C/EA [redacted] w/att
- 1 - DDO w/att
- 1 - SA/DDO w/att
- 1 - Review Staff - [redacted]

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PARAMILITARY OPERATIONS

WHAT ARE PARAMILITARY OPERATIONS?

Paramilitary operations involve the provision of covert paramilitary assistance and guidance to conventional or unconventional foreign military forces or organizations. Thus, a paramilitary operation is one which approximates a conventional military operation in its techniques and its requirements for military-type personnel, equipment, and training. As a foreign policy instrument, it implies either the use of force or the prevention of the use of force, and it is employed only in circumstances where other means are inadequate, infeasible, or where the time factor precludes the utilization of other means. A paramilitary operation may involve something as simple and of such short duration as a one-time delivery of arms and ammunition to help a friendly government defend itself; or, it may involve a program of several years' duration designed to provide intensive training in basic guerrilla or counter-guerrilla tactics for an instructor cadre, which can, in turn, pass these skills on to units engaged in combatting an externally supported insurgency or incursion.

Although the terms "covert" and "non-attributable" were frequently used in connection with large paramilitary operations of the past, such operations given their nature and scope are never truly covert. Our paramilitary involvement in Laos became typical of this type of operation as the concept of deniability or nonattributability was no longer applicable once duration and escalation eroded the original cover mechanisms.

PARAMILITARY RESOURCES

A recent review by a CIA/DOD group of paramilitary capabilities concluded that CIA's paramilitary resources are at a minimum or near-minimum level for current and contingency use. There is concern that a continued reduction of our paramilitary program, concurrent with a reduction in DOD's capability to provide support to CIA in this area, could seriously impair the ability of the United States Government to respond with covert paramilitary action in those instances where national needs and policy so dictated.

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Our most critical resource, however, is personnel. To one degree or another, materiel and equipment can be obtained from outside sources (military or commercial) if lead time permits, but the capability to plan, support and conduct covert paramilitary operations can rest only in personnel whose skills have been developed and refined through experience in previous operations. The total number of currently qualified air, ground and maritime paramilitary officers and technicians in CIA is less than [redacted]. However, these officers are extensively cross^{25X1} trained and capable of performing in a wide variety of roles ranging from covert aviation operations to instruction in heavy weapons.

It should be made clear that the capability to conduct paramilitary operations is dependent on the same CIA infrastructure that makes possible the entire range of our other operations overseas. Our paramilitary infrastructure which is much more limited in size than it was two years ago is currently devoted to a large extent to the support of CIA's intelligence collection responsibilities. This support ranges from facilitating the collection efforts of our Chiefs of Station abroad in a number of different areas to the support of developmental techniques and devices which eventually will be utilized against high priority targets. Thus, in summary CIA has the essential infrastructure and the experience to operate in an environment which requires increasing assurance that risk of exposure can be held to an acceptable level and CIA requires a limited paramilitary capability in order to successfully meet its intelligence-gathering responsibilities.

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