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15 May 1958

INDONESIAN OPERATION


Original Concept of Operation

**\*NSC Review Completed\***

1. Operation had its inception in series of bloodless coups by military commanders on outer islands during late 1956 and early 1957. Although these rebellions expressed long-standing resentment felt by outer islands toward Java, they were aimed equally at President Sukarno's espousal of Communist ideas and support.

2. Beginning on 18 March 1957 Department of State approved a series of covert actions to support the dissidents in the outer islands:

These included:



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3. As the situation in Indonesia continued to deteriorate NSC Action No. 1756 of 2 August 1957 convened a special ad hoc committee to study the situation. Represented on this committee were State, Defense, CIA, ICA, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

055636 (Stamp: DEPARTMENT OF STATE, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, SECTION OF SOUTH AND SOUTHWEST ASIAN AFFAIRS) (Stamp: AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON)
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*Impossible to Determine*

4. The interdepartmental committee submitted its report on 3 September 1957.

5. Recommendations of the committee in a Special Report on Indonesia were adopted on 23 September 1957 by NSC, representative of the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Acting Director of the Bureau of the Budget.

6. Recommendations were approved by the President on 25 September 1957.

7. Recommendations:

a. Employ all feasible covert means to strengthen the determination, will, and cohesion of the anti-Communist forces in the outer islands, particularly in Sumatra and Sulawesi, in order through their strength to affect favorably the situation in Java, and to provide a rallying point if the Communists should take over Java.

b. If the situation on Java continues to deteriorate, then move to more forthright means in pursuit of the course of action outlined in a.

c. Utilize such leverage as is available and may be built up by the anti-Communist forces in the outer islands to continue our efforts to try to unify and stimulate into action, singly or in unison, non and anti-Communist elements on Java against the Communists.

~~Intelligence on Indonesia~~

1. Available information on Communist subversion in Indonesia was compiled and a detailed report published on 25 July 1957. (See attached.)


2. In addition extensive consultation was held with [REDACTED] to establish the bona fides of the anti-Communist dissidents and to confirm the extent of Communist infiltration of the Central Government on Java.

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Development of Plans for the Operation

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2. CIA planning has been, and still is, to a considerable extent, conducted on a day to day basis since each operation undertaken within the broad framework of the NSC authorization must be assessed by high levels of the U.S. Government, particularly the Department of State, to weigh the risks involved.

3. Day to day planning of the operation is accomplished by CIA headquarters, in constant consultation with the Department of State and elements of the Department of Defense, frequently on the basis of suggestions and recommendations received from the field.

4. CIA headquarters also conducts contingency planning for logistics support to meet problems occasioned by attrition and "lead time."


Coordination of Operation

1. The Indonesian operation has been, and is, coordinated on a step by step basis with the Department of State. CIA is in daily consultation with State on virtually all aspects of the operation and every operation with an element of risk is cleared with State.

2. Overall coordination is effected through the 5412 group which must approve expenditures for the operation. This group includes high level representatives of State, CIA, and Defense.

3. Working level coordination of the operation with the Department of Defense is effected through liaison with CSC/CSD (General Erskine's office). Liaison is also maintained with ONI, Staff officers of the office of CNO, and other elements of the Defense Department supporting the operation.

4. In addition, periodic briefings are provided the JCS and the National Security Council.



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6. The complexity of the operation and its sensitivity require careful coordination by CIA with State and Defense Department representatives at a number of other field stations. At the present

25X1A time [redacted] is playing a key role in support of the dissident  
25X1A movement in the Celebes. The [redacted] and its field ele-  
ment work closely with [redacted] 25X1A

[redacted] 25X1A NSC

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25X1A 7. Until recently the [redacted] played the  
dominant role in the operation. With the dissident collapse in Sumatra,  
25X1A the bulk of support activity shifted [redacted]

25X1A 8. To a lesser degree [redacted]  
have some coordination and support functions.

25X1A 9. [redacted] and the Ambassador there are  
kept completely informed of all developments and they in turn report  
continuously on political and other developments on Java.

General Conduct of Operation

1. Since the concept of the Indonesian Operation is to support covertly the dissidents to maintain them as a force in being, CIA serves as the executive agent for directing the operation with support from the military services.

2. Existing policy guidance specifies that aid to the dissidents should be on a disavowable basis, it having been recognized by all concerned that because of the scale of the effort required and the necessity for dealing so extensively with the dissidents and others, it could not be conducted as a completely covert operation.

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d. On 15 February 1958 the dissidents formally announced the establishment of a revolutionary government (PRRI).

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N.B. The dissidents took this action [REDACTED]

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
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[REDACTED] until they were better organized to cope with the consequences.

e. Central Government forces began their invasion of Sumatra on 7 March 1958.

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
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This [redacted] has to date successfully prevented a successful invasion of the North Celebes by the Central Government.

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