	13 June 1984 ADDI	CHRUNG
MEMORANDUM FOR:		
THROUGH:	Director of East Asian Analysis Chief, OEA Administrative Staff Chief, China Division, OEA	
FROM:	Chief, Domestic Policy Branch, OEA	STAT
SUBJECT:	Request to Speak and Publish	
upon the attache a volume of conf publication will	est approval to make an oral presentation based doutline. This will eventually be published in Terence presentations. Full approval for be requested when draft is completed. The resentation will be Reform and the People's	
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subsequent paper 4. I Agency employee will append the	f the material in my oral presentation or will be drawn from classified materials. will be identified as an To both my oral presentation and my paper, I standard disclaimer that the views expressed are necessarily those of the Agency or the	STAT
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I have reviewed the attached text, to the best of my knowledge have found it to be unclassified, and approve it for presentation and publication.

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CONCUR:	STAT	•
	<u>, s Jun 1984</u>	
Director of East Asian Analysis	Date	
APPROVED:	STAT	<u>-</u>
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Associate Deputy Director for Intell	ligence Date	
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1 Chief, China Divi 1	STAT	

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- I. The PLA and China's Political Reform -- Is the Military in Opposition?
 - A. The PLA and post-Mao political events
 - 1. Purge of the Left -- the Old Guard's triumphant return.
 - 2. Restoration of Deng Xiaoping -- Army support.
 - 3. Deng vs. Hua Guofeng -- the PLA's reluctant choice
 - 4. The Democracy Movement Reform's inauspicious beginning.
 - 5. Literary reform -- the PLA as a target.
 - 6. Economic reform -- a failure of communication.
 - B. Deng takes command of the Military Commission
 - 1. Soothing troubled generals.
 - 2. Addressing PLA concerns.
 - 3. "Making up the missed lesson"
 - 4. Changing the guard, retiring the commanders.
 - C. The mini-revolt of the Commissars
 - 1. Dogmatists on the firing line.
 - 2. Bai Hua, Zhao Yiya, and spiritual pollution -- case studies of withering PLA influence.
 - a. Wei Guoqing and the General Political Department in retreat.
 - 3. 12th Party Congress -- loyal, if grudging support.
 - D. Returning to the Barracks -- The PLA's retreat from politics.
 - 1. Traditions and bitter lessons.
 - 2. Playing by the rules and winning.
 - 3. The military modernization angle -- new toys for the army.

II. Reform of the PLA

- A. Deng's harsh assessment of 1975 -- "soft, lazy and loose."
 - 1. Mao's army and its weaknesses.
- B. Defense modernization and reform.
 - 1. Vietnam exposes the problems.
 - 2. The modernizers take charge.
 - 3. Changing attitudes. Professionalization becomes a goal.
 - a. Peng Dehuai's rehabilitation
- C. Reforming the "three PLAs"
 - 1. Main forces: subordinating military regions to the General Staff, combined force training, improving logistics, educating the officer corps.
 - 2. Technical Service Arms: Modernization of equipment, instilling pride, promoting the experts, buying foreign arms.
 - 3. Local forces: Reorganize, restructure, retire and retrain.
- D. Performance, Problems and Prospects
 - 1. Toward a younger officer corps
 - a. But the old guard hangs on at the top.
 - 2. Education and promotion -- reopening the military academies.
 - a. But the peasants are grumbling.
 - 3. Commanders vs. commissars -- settling old scores?
 - 4. Loyalty to the party.
 - a. But what about after Deng?

