


**Memorandum for:** Bob

DDI- 01524/84  
DDI CHRONO  
7 MAR 84

The attached memorandum is for your signature.  
It transmits the typescript memorandum we have produced for State/ARA at the request of Hugh Montgomery of INR. Although both EURA and ALA were originally given action on this, we agreed that EURA should produce the paper with ALA coordination.



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Mary-Ann

==== **Director,** =====

**E U R A**

**Office of European Analysis  
Directorate of Intelligence**



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Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Hugh Montgomery  
Director of Intelligence and Research  
Department of State

SUBJECT : Intelligence Study of the Internationals

1. In response to your memorandum of 3 February 1984, forwarding a request by Assistant Secretary Motley, we attach herewith a typescript memorandum updating our previous studies on the party internationals. In this paper we have concentrated on the specific questions posed by Ambassador Motley.

[Redacted]

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2. As I noted in my previous memorandum to you, information on the Socialist International is much more plentiful than information on the Christian Democrats, the Liberals, and the International Democratic Union. We have done our best to answer Ambassador Motley's questions about the latter three while specifically noting gaps in information.

[Redacted]

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Robert M. Gates  
Deputy Director for Intelligence

Attachments:  
As stated

[Redacted]

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Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D. C. 20505

## DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

6 March 1984

## The Party Internationals and Latin America

Summary

The four party internationals -- the Socialist, Christian Democratic, and Liberal Internationals and the International Democratic Union -- are West European dominated organizations that serve primarily as channels of communication among member parties. Because many of their leaders have a knack for public relations, the activities of the Internationals sometimes seem more significant than they are. In fact, the Internationals -- each of which combines disparate elements -- have difficulty arriving at common positions that go beyond platitudes. More important, they generally have little influence over positions governments or individual member parties take on any given issue. In essence, Internationals are useful to party leaders as platforms for burnishing their images as statesmen, as means of demonstrating the vigor of their shared political philosophies, and as sources of patronage for selected party functionaries. [redacted]

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This memorandum was prepared by [redacted] the Office of European Analysis. It was requested by Hugh Montgomery, Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State. It was coordinated with the Office of African and Latin American Analysis. Research was completed on 27 February 1984. Questions and comments may be addressed to Chief, European Issues Division, [redacted]

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Governments and political movements in Latin America sometimes woo the Internationals in the belief that these organizations can swing funds their way or influence governments to support them politically. They have usually discovered that the Internationals do not have the money or political clout that they expected. But Latin Americans still value the support of the Internationals because the organizations can direct media attention to the causes of their Latin American proteges, particularly when the latter are threatened by internal or external forces. [redacted]

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The four Internationals differ sharply in their views and levels of activity. The Socialist International (SI) has traditionally been the most active and the most outspoken in criticizing US policies, particularly in Nicaragua and El Salvador. The Christian Democratic International (CDI), which is attempting to become more active in the region, generally supports US objectives. The International Democratic Union (IDU) strongly supports US policies in Central America, and the Liberal International is only mildly critical; but neither grouping has much influence in the region. [redacted]

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The Socialist, Christian Democratic, and Liberal Internationals are attempting to overcome their differences and work out a common statement on Central America. An early draft identifies social and economic problems as the cause of conflict in the region and condemns in general terms external intervention. We believe, however, that the Internationals are unlikely to reach agreement on specifics of the US role in the region or attitudes toward the regimes in El Salvador and Nicaragua. [redacted]

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### The Socialist International

The Socialist International continues to take an interest in Central American developments despite some waning of enthusiasm

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for active involvement over the past year. SI leaders have adopted a more cautious approach because of the negative reaction of many Latin American governments to the Franco-Mexican initiative of 1981 (which the SI supported) and to SI offers to mediate, and because of the divisive effect of Central American issues within the SI itself. Moreover, partly due to argumentation provided by the United States, the SI as a whole has developed a more realistic understanding of the barriers to a settlement in Central America. During the past year, the organization has even reduced the number of "fact-finding" groups sent to the region. Nevertheless, the SI's declarations still show strong disapproval of US policy and a resistance to the idea of breaking completely with leftist forces. This is the case despite a growing concern among West European members about the radical tendencies of some of their Latin American colleagues within the SI, and a more critical attitude among some of the Latin American members toward the Sandinistas, the Salvadoran insurgents, and Grenada's New Jewel Movement. [redacted]

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#### Key Players on Latin American Issues

Since their admission to the SI during the late 1970s, Latin American parties such as the Venezuelan Democratic Action, the Dominican Revolutionary Party, and the Jamaican People's National Party have played a key role in shaping SI positions on regional issues. In addition to those parties holding membership, moreover, other parties (including the Sandinistas from Nicaragua) attend SI gatherings as observers. In practice there is little difference between the rights of observers and of members, since both are allowed to participate in meetings.\* [redacted]

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The typical SI declaration on Latin America is a collage of contributions supplied by the regional parties, each of which concentrates on its own narrow interests. There are some leaders, however, whose interests and influence transcend their own countries. These include Jose Francisco Pena Gomez of the Dominican Republic (chairman of the SI's Committee on Latin America and the Caribbean), Carlos Andres Perez of Venezuela, Daniel Oduber of Costa Rica, Michael Manley of Jamaica, and Anselmo Sule of Chile. In addition, the Sandinistas and Guillermo Ungo's National Revolutionary Movement (MNR) continue to influence directly the SI's views of US policy. [redacted]

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Among West European leaders, the most active on Latin American issues has been Spain's Felipe Gonzalez, who has often

\*For lists of SI member parties and of observers frequently present at meetings, see Appendix A.

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attended socialist gatherings in the Western Hemisphere and is on a first name basis with most regional representatives. Gonzalez also chairs the Committee for the Defense of the Nicaraguan Revolution, a body formed in the afterglow of the Sandinista victory that has fallen progressively into disuse. After the Spaniards, the French Socialists and the West German Social Democrats are the most active. SI President Willy Brandt's personal interest in Central America has been sporadic and aimed mostly at papering over divisions within the SI. [redacted]

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### Formulation of Positions

West European socialist leaders, in our view, are painfully aware of the fact that although they are the mainstays of the SI, they have been so preoccupied with other matters that they have been unable to control declarations on Latin America. Despite the disclaimers of Latin American parties, it is these parties that continue to shape resolutions pertaining to the region, largely by writing them in advance at meetings of the SI's Committee on Latin America and the Caribbean, chaired by Pena Gomez. Subsequent meetings of all the SI parties -- which have never been known for their thoroughness or procedural correctness -- allow little time for a West European contribution. Debate about Central America often begins (and sometimes ends) with statements by Sandinista representatives and Salvadoran leftist Guillermo Ungo who recently became one of the many vice presidents of the SI. [redacted]

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The West Europeans have tried to correct these problems by creating a new position at SI headquarters in London to coordinate Latin American matters. Luis Ayala of the Chilean Radical Party has already been appointed to this post, although his duties are still unclear. Since Ayala's party has on occasion displayed sympathy for the revolutionary left in Central America, he seems a doubtful candidate to play a moderating role. West European members have also told US officials frequently in private that they want the SI to stop admitting new members from the Third World -- yet at last year's Congress four parties from Latin American and the Caribbean were admitted, including the Puerto Rican Independence Party. [redacted]

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### Relations Among Leaders

SI member parties still have differences about Central America, but they probably are closer to a consensus now than at any time since 1979. On Nicaragua, for example, none of the West European parties and few of the Latin American parties now take an avidly pro-Sandinista position. Reports from US diplomats in West European capitals indicate that most leaders have abandoned the earlier image of the Sandinistas as "new wave" socialist

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heroes and now see them as exasperating individuals who nevertheless must be dealt with to prevent their further radicalization. A cross-section of SI leaders from Western Europe and Latin America -- including Willy Brandt, Felipe Gonzalez, Carlos Andres Perez, and Daniel Oduber -- now seem to share this analysis. [REDACTED]

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Although the recent announcement by Managua scheduling elections for November has created a positive impression, the honeymoon period of 1979 is unlikely to be recreated completely. [REDACTED]

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Among the West European SI parties, the Scandinavians (particularly the Swedes) and the Dutch probably still retain vestiges of the old romantic view of the FSLN. At the other end of the spectrum, the vigor of attacks by the Italian Social Democrats and the Portuguese Socialists against the Sandinistas has diminished somewhat in recent months. Mario Soares' preoccupation with his duties as Prime Minister may help explain this trend. On the other hand, both the Portuguese and the Italian PSDI may believe that they have already made their point. Gonzalez and Willy Brandt currently represent the middle-of-the-road position in the SI on Nicaragua. [REDACTED]

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Last summer, Brandt, Gonzalez, Perez, and Oduber labored mightily over a letter [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] advising the Sandinistas to implement their promises regarding democracy, political pluralism, and non-alignment. The letter was sent to Managua, but it was phrased as advice rather than as an ultimatum. The contents of the letter leaked despite efforts to keep it a secret, and it provoked considerable criticism from other SI parties, which had not been consulted. [REDACTED]

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Later, during the fall, SI leaders became convinced that the United States was about to invade Nicaragua. They called media attention to the "danger" and even warned US officials against military action. The fact that the invasion did not occur prompted some leaders to declare later that they had prevented it. [REDACTED]

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These two episodes during a period when many socialists were becoming more critical of the Sandinistas suggest the probable limits of SI action regarding Nicaragua. They indicate that despite concerns about Managua's policies, the SI is still unlikely to criticize the Sandinistas publicly; indeed, the acrimony surrounding the "ultimatum that never was" -- and the inability of the leaders to agree on a tough message -- may discourage further attempts in the SI context to jawbone the Sandinistas. Private bilateral talks between the FSLN and [REDACTED]

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individual parties rather than the SI seem more likely to produce the kind of tough warnings that proponents of Nicaraguan democracy desire. [redacted]

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The invasion scare, on the other hand, shows that the SI's growing disenchantment with the Sandinistas is not incompatible with a strong aversion to the perceived military pressure applied by the United States against Managua. [redacted]

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On El Salvador, the SI recently has avoided statements supporting a military victory by the insurgents, but almost all members continue to back a "negotiated settlement" that presumably would give some power to the extreme left. There have even been signs recently that the West German SPD has become impatient with Ungo and the MNR for their lack of influence on the FMLN and unwillingness to participate in elections. Italian diplomats have noted that, privately at least, the SPD may now look with some favor on Christian Democrat Jose Napoleon Duarte. The attraction of Duarte for the socialists, however, is that in their view he might be willing to engineer a peace settlement with the extreme left. The SI as a whole would find it difficult if not impossible -- particularly with Ungo still a major figure in the organization -- to abandon him and adopt its earlier villain, Duarte. Moreover, few SI parties seem likely to oppose resolutions calling on the US to cease military aid to the Salvadoran government. Even Mario Soares, the Sandinistas' nemesis within the SI, has told US officials that he opposes the military aspects of US policy in El Salvador. [redacted]

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#### Relations with Communists

During the "Brandt era" (post-1976), meetings between SI officials and Communists to discuss world problems have become routine. SI leaders stress that they are opposed to Communism as a system, but they insist on the pragmatic necessity of dialogue to promote peace. In our judgment, many SI leaders have trouble taking Communism seriously in a Third World context. They especially tend to place Latin American Marxist-Leninists in a different category from the Soviet variety, seeing the former primarily as anti-colonialist nationalists who in the long run will be open to persuasion from more "sophisticated" social democrats like themselves. [redacted]

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Many of the socialists' recent efforts toward a Central American settlement have been focused on Fidel Castro. The discussions Castro has had over the past year with Pena Gomez, Oduber, French government representatives, and delegations of

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West German Social Democrats -- as well as with Felipe Gonzalez in Madrid last month -- support the judgment that most SI members envision Cuba playing a role in a regional settlement. [redacted]

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The willingness to carry on a dialogue with Communists and other extreme left forces, however, does not extend to allowing them membership in the SI. The SI's major faux pas in that direction -- admittance of Grenada's New Jewel Movement -- is a move that is unlikely to be replicated because of the negative fallout that it brought on the organization. In our judgment, it is unlikely that the SI will admit the Sandinistas as members, for example, unless Managua unequivocally changes course toward non-alignment and democracy. [redacted]

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### Positions on Elections

As avowed supporters of social democracy, SI members favor free and fair elections, but the simultaneous emergence of the issue in El Salvador and Nicaragua places these parties in a delicate position. We believe that most SI leaders will welcome enthusiastically Managua's recent announcement that it is scheduling elections for November. They will undoubtedly claim that the decision vindicates their attitude toward the Sandinistas of public friendliness and private urgings toward liberalization. Recent statements by a French Socialist Party functionary (to US officials) and by an aide to a prominent West German Social Democrat (in the press) suggest that some parties may be leaning toward providing observers for the Nicaraguan balloting. US diplomats also report that the SI has encouraged a Nicaraguan opposition group to participate in the election. We suspect, however, that the socialists are seeking primarily to bolster the legitimacy of the election rather than to promote the cause of the opposition. [redacted]

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The elections in El Salvador pose a different kind of problem for the SI. The organization criticized the 1982 election, arguing that the influence of a rightwing government and the hostilities in the country prevented a fair result. Under the circumstances, no one in the SI really expected Ungo's party to participate, and the absence of the left reinforced the socialists' impression that the election was meaningless. Although the heavy turnout in El Salvador probably caused a few doubts in SI circles about the organization's position, the argument that the election would not end the war predominated. Most party leaders still maintain that only direct negotiations between the Salvadoran government and the FDR/FMLN can do that. [redacted]

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We suspect that many SI leaders would prefer to present a uniform position supporting elections in both countries, but

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believe they are unable to do so unless Ungo and his associates participate in the Salvadoran balloting. A recent conversation between an Austrian Socialist and a US official indicates that some SI members have urged Ungo and his party to take part.

[redacted] In our view, however, this behind-the-scenes pressure -- though significant in itself -- probably does not foreshadow a new public stance supporting the Salvadoran electoral process. The FDR/FMLN apparently has no intention of letting the SI off the hook, and we doubt that in the final analysis SI leaders will challenge Ungo's old argument that MNR candidates would be murdered if they campaigned. [redacted]

Although the SI almost certainly will refuse to reverse its well-publicized attitudes toward Salvadoran elections, the organization's relatively low profile so far does suggest that its pre-election rhetoric could remain relatively muted this time. Once the election is over, chances are slim that the SI will take a positive position on the process unless Ungo sees a possibility of compromise with the government that ensues. Still, some of the more influential SI leaders might make an effort to abstain from negative comment if the Christian Democrats win and the SI's bete noir, the ARENA party, is excluded from the government. [redacted]

In sum, SI attitudes on the electoral processes in these countries are by no means uniform or free of bias. It seems likely at this point that at least some of the major SI parties will send observers to the Nicaraguan election, while most if not all will refuse to do the same for El Salvador. It is even conceivable, if SI leaders continue to perceive political "progress" in Managua, that they will send observers there under the SI's aegis. We believe that parties contemplating such a dual policy realize their vulnerability to charges of inconsistency. In order to avoid the many possible awkward questions about Salvadoran versus Nicaraguan democracy, civil liberties, pluralism, wartime conditions, etc. they probably will try to let the question of the Salvadoran elections die down before taking positions on Nicaragua. Rather than link the two cases themselves, we believe they will try to treat them as separately and unobtrusively as possible. [redacted]

### Funding

The SI's annual budget of around \$600,000 is made up of contributions from member parties. The biggest contributors traditionally have been the West Germans, the Swedes, and the Austrians. [redacted] this was still true

as of late 1982, and we have no reason to believe the situation has changed. As a result, the SI in many ways still displays a Central European orientation. [redacted]

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The organization has never had the resources to dole out significant financial aid to "fraternal" parties or movements, and it is even less able to do so now. [redacted]

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### Publications

The SI publishes two periodicals, Socialist Affairs and the Socialist International Women Bulletin. The former, which is the SI's main media outlet, appears quarterly. The publication schedule for Socialist International Women Bulletin seems to vary. Both publications devote substantial attention to Latin American affairs through feature articles and news of regional parties. Articles in these publications are not restricted exclusively to the "orthodox" socialist view and some have presented the views of socialists who are critical of groups like the Sandinistas. [redacted]

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### Assistance to Latin American Members

The SI as such does little or nothing in the way of training or subsidizing travel for Latin American member parties. We believe that current budget allocations are used almost exclusively for necessities such as running SI headquarters, paying the small staff, organizing meetings, and publishing SI periodicals. [redacted]

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SI leaders are quick to point out that organizations affiliated with individual West European parties that do fund travel and training-- such as the West German SPD's Friedrich Ebert Foundation -- have no direct connection with the SI. We suspect, however, that in some cases advice from party leaders who participate in the SI would have some influence with the foundations if those leaders decided to weigh in for or against specific projects. [redacted]

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### The Christian Democratic International

The Christian Democratic International has traditionally been less active than the SI.\* The CDI has long stressed the

\*Before November 1982, the CDI was known as the World Union

similar religious and political traditions of its European and Latin American member parties as well as their commitment to democracy and development. In general, however, the organization has avoided taking controversial stands on issues. Instead, it usually has been content to issue broad statements of principle in order to offset SI propaganda. [redacted]

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The Italian and West German Christian Democratic parties are the most important West European members. The CDI is based in Rome and was headed by Italian Christian Democrats until 1982. The member parties finance the CDI, according to an academic study, with the West Germans providing the largest share of funding. The US Embassy in Brussels reports that CDU/CSU financial aid to Latin American member parties gives the West Germans substantial influence in the CDI, particularly in personnel decisions, and Chancellor Kohl has taken an interest in CDI activities. [redacted]

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The most active Latin American members are the Venezuelan, Salvadoran, and Chilean parties. The Latin American subsidiary of the CDI, the Christian Democratic Organization of America, is based in Caracas, and its Secretary General is Aristides Calvani of Venezuela.\* Napoleon Duarte, the Salvadoran Christian Democratic chairman, maintains close contacts with his West European and South American counterparts, according to various US diplomatic reports. For the Chilean party, the International is a source of moral support in its opposition to the Pinochet regime. [redacted]

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In November 1982, the organization elected exiled Chilean Christian Democrat Andres Zaldivar as president. Zaldivar has been attempting to reinvigorate the CDI and to focus its attention on Latin America, particularly on Chile, El Salvador, and Nicaragua. According to various US Embassy reports, Zaldivar has also promoted contacts with the Socialist and Liberal Internationals, and has consulted closely with the United States. [redacted]

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### Functions

Like the Socialist International, the CDI acts primarily as a channel of communication among its member parties. At annual or biannual congresses, party leaders exchange views on various East-West and Third World issues. The CDI occasionally organizes special conferences on specific topics, often in cooperation with other Christian Democratic or right-of-center groupings. The

\*For a list of Latin American member parties, see Appendix B.

small permanent staffs of the CDI secretariat in Rome and of regional affiliates in Brussels and Caracas act as points of contact for the national party bureaucracies. They also publish the Christian Democratic International Bulletin and the quarterly Panorama DC. [redacted]

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The CDI also encourages consultations among West European Christian Democratic parties outside the CDI. Members of the Christian Democratic faction of the European Parliament cooperate routinely on a wide range of issues, including EC foreign policy. Its members undertake occasional fact-finding missions to Third World trouble spots, such as a tour last September to Costa Rica, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Cuba. [redacted]

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Equally important are bilateral contacts among the Christian Democratic parties. The Dutch, Belgian, and West German Christian Democrats, for example, routinely discuss foreign policy issues on a party-to-party basis. Contacts between the West German and Italian Christian Democrats have traditionally been weak [redacted]

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### Policies

During 1983, the CDI sponsored or co-sponsored several international conferences on Latin America to call attention to its views. CDI statements supported basic US objectives, but Latin American parties were generally more reluctant than their West European counterparts specifically to condemn Soviet and Cuban interference. [redacted]

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Last April, the CDI and the European People's Party sponsored a conference on Central America in Brussels. The West European and Latin American participants resolved to intensify cooperation by:

- establishing a permanent contact group on Latin America headed by Mario Pedini of Italy;

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- setting up a foundation in Western Europe to support Latin American Christian Democratic parties;
- proposing a common peace plan for Central America to all democratic parties in Western Europe; and
- consulting closely with the United States. [redacted]

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The conference also adopted a resolution supporting democracy and non-interference in Central America. According to the US Embassy in Brussels and press accounts, the resolution

- urged the Salvadoran government to promote social reforms and political participation by all non-violent groups;
- demanded free elections and the restoration of religious and civil liberties in Nicaragua;
- condemned the imposition of a Soviet-Cuban supported military dictatorship in Suriname and suggested ending EC economic aid. [redacted]

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Last August, CDI member parties organized a conference on Central America in San Jose. The meeting's final document, entitled "The Manifesto of San Jose," condemned dictatorial repression and external military interference. The loosely-worded statement called for free elections in El Salvador, Guatemala, Panama, and Nicaragua. To promote discussion of these goals, it established a "Democratic Encounter of Central America and Panama" with a secretariat based in Costa Rica and national affiliates. [redacted]

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The CDI's congress in Santiago last December emphasized support for democracy in Latin America. The final declaration criticized the Chilean dictatorship and welcomed the return to democratic rule in Argentina and Bolivia. At a press conference sponsored by the International, West German CDU Secretary General Geissler called upon the Chilean authorities to hold free elections, release political prisoners, and end the use of torture. [redacted]

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### The International Democratic Union

The IDU, which is the youngest of the four internationals, unites conservative parties from 19 countries in Western Europe, North America, and the Pacific region. It contains right-of-center Christian Democratic parties such as the West German CDU/CSU, but the Italian, Dutch, and Belgian Christian Democrats have not joined the IDU because they consider it too conservative. According to press reports, both Spanish member parties -- the Popular Alliance and the Popular Democratic Party -- are urging the IDU to expand to Latin America, where it now has no affiliates. The organization has already been striving to establish ties to the region and to publicize its views on Latin American issues, especially in Western Europe. [redacted]

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The IDU strongly supports basic US goals in Central America. A statement issued shortly after its founding in June 1983

- criticized Soviet and Cuban activities in Central America;
- endorsed the Contadora process;
- welcomed the democratic and social progress in El Salvador; and
- called for ending economic aid to Nicaragua pending the introduction of democracy.

In conversations with US officials, IDU Chairman Alois Mock of Austria has suggested greater efforts by the United States to present its views on Central America to the West European public. Mock and IDU Executive Secretary Scott Hamilton of the British Conservative Party toured Central America in early February and endorsed the conclusions of the Kissinger Commission, according to the US Embassy in Bogota. [redacted]

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The IDU is attempting to increase its profile in Latin America. In February, the organization helped the West German Christian Democratic Konrad Adenauer Foundation organize a conference in Bogota on trade and finance. The conference dealt informally with Central America and heard addresses on the subject by Ambassador Stone and Colombian Foreign Minister Lloreda. According to the US Embassy in Bogota, the IDU is hoping to establish a Latin American affiliate that would compete directly with the CDI for the allegiance of the region's Christian Democratic parties. [redacted]

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The IDU Executive Committee issued a resolution on Central America at a mid-February meeting in Madrid. The conservative leaders endorsed US policy in the region and offered to send observers to monitor elections in El Salvador and Nicaragua, according to the US Embassy. The IDU also proposed a public debate on Central America with representatives of the Socialist International. At present, we have no information on IDU financing and publications. [redacted]

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### The Liberal International

The Liberal International -- probably the least influential of the transnational groupings -- is primarily a debating forum for such issues as European integration, human rights, and North-South economic matters. Although the LI is essentially a European organization, it has acquired members from other parts of the world. In Latin America, the Panamanian and Nicaraguan liberal parties enjoy full membership status. However, some European liberal leaders -- especially the International Secretary of the Dutch Liberal Party -- have doubts about the Nicaraguan Liberal Party's commitment to democratic principles and its independence from the Sandinistas. Political parties and individuals from Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay attend the LI's annual congresses and special conferences as observers. While they do not vote on the organization's resolutions, they undoubtedly help shape the LI's policy positions. [redacted]

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The organization has stressed the need for strengthening democratic systems and protecting human rights in Latin America. The LI has supported elections in El Salvador, but it remains skeptical about the Salvadoran government's ability to bring leftist insurgents into the electoral process. [redacted]

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While the LI generally is favorably disposed toward the US, it has criticized recent US policy in Central America. The organization believes that social and economic imbalances are the principal causes of the Central American turmoil and that US military initiatives aggravate the conflict by furthering East-West tensions in the region. The LI maintains that Western development aid is the most appropriate means for encouraging stable democracies and countering the expansion of Soviet influence. [redacted]

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The LI is funded by member parties and organizations. We have no information about the size of members' financial contributions, but we believe that the West German Free Democratic Party (FDP) is the largest contributor and exerts the greatest influence over the organization's policies. The



Friedrich Naumann Foundation, which is closely connected to the FDP, also has given financial aid to political parties, newspapers, and trade unions in Latin America committed to liberal democratic ideals. [redacted]

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The LI's major publications are Liberal International News/Bulletin, Spires of Liberty, and Experiment in Internationalism. Discussions of Third World issues generally are thoughtful and reflect sincere concern for the problems of developing countries. [redacted]

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#### Cooperation Among the Internationals

Since early 1983, CDI President Zaldivar has been pushing for cooperation among the Socialist, Christian Democratic, and Liberal Internationals. Zaldivar has apparently not approached the IDU, which is directly competing with the CDI for influence in both Latin America and Western Europe. [redacted]


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On 9 January, working-level representatives of the three Internationals met in Brussels to draft a joint communique on El Salvador and Chile which was to have been issued in the names of the organizations' presidents at a follow-up conference in Rome later that month. The Rome meeting was postponed, however,


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We believe that the three Internationals will be unable to agree on more than a broad outline of an approach to Latin America. Socialist international President Brandt, fearing further conflict in his already divided organization, is not likely to agree to a stronger statement on Communist activities in the Central American region, and Chancellor Kohl does not appear to be willing to alter his priorities. If the SI and LI do not join the CDI in issuing a stronger declaration on Central America, the CDI may make one on its own. 

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## APPENDIX A

SI Member Parties from the Western Hemisphere

Barbados	Labor Party
Chile	New Democratic Party
	Radical Party
Costa Rica	National Liberation Party
Curacao	New Antilles Movement*
Dominican Republic	Dominican Revolutionary Party
Ecuador	Democratic Left Party
El Salvador	National Revolutionary Movement
Grenada	New Jewel Movement
Guatemala	Democratic Socialist Party
Guyana	Working People's Alliance*
Jamaica	People's National Party
Paraguay	Febrerista Revolutionary Party
Peru	APRA Party*
Puerto Rico	Independence Party*
St. Lucia	Progressive Labor Party*
Venezuela	Democratic Action

\*Parties with "consultative status."

Observers from the Western Hemisphere  
at the SI's Congress in April 1983

Bolivia	Revolutionary Movement of the Left National Revolutionary Movement of the Left
Brazil	Brazilian Democratic Movement Party Democratic Workers' Party
Dominica	United Dominica Labor Party
El Salvador	Democratic Revolutionary Front
Guatemala	National Revolutionary Unity
Haiti	Democratic Movement for the Liberation of Haiti Democratic Rally of Haitian National Progressives (RDNP) Union of Patriotic and Democratic Haitian Forces (FOPADA)
Mexico	Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI)
Nicaragua	Sandinista National Liberation Front
Peru	Revolutionary Socialist Party
Uruguay	Democratic Convergence Socialist Party

## APPENDIX B

Christian Democratic Organization of America

Argentina	Christian Democratic Federation
Bolivia	Christian Democratic Party
Chile (illegal)	Christian Democratic Party
Colombia	Christian Social Democratic Party
Costa Rica	Christian Democratic Party
Cuba (illegal)	Christian Democratic Movement of Cuba
Dominican Republic	Social Christian Revolutionary Party
El Salvador	Christian Democratic Party
Ecuador	Popular Democracy
Guatemala	Christian Democracy of Guatemala
Mexico	Democratic Community Party
Nicaragua	Social Christian Party
Panama	Christian Democratic Civic Movement
Peru	Christian Democratic Party
Paraguay	Christian Democratic Party
Puerto Rico	Christian Democratic Front
Uruguay	Christian Democratic Party
Venezuela	Social Christian Party (COPEI)