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CHARLESTON (S.C.)
POST

Circ.: e. 32,620

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Date: SEP 15 1950

Ex-Russian Officer Says— Reds Plan Surprise Attack

WASHINGTON (AP) — Soviet leaders would not hesitate to launch a surprise nuclear attack on the United States if they thought this nation could be smashed with one stroke, a former Soviet naval officer says.

Capt. Nikolai Fedrovich Artamonov testified Wednesday that Soviet military strategy has been based on the doctrine of a surprise nuclear attack since February 1955.

Artamonov, 32, who was commander of a Soviet destroyer in the Baltic fleet, defected to the United States in June 1959 while stationed at Gdynia, Poland.

His appearance before the House Committee on Un-American Activities, however, provided

the first public disclosure of his presence in this country.

The slim, bespectacled Soviet with a heavy black moustache, spent most of his time telling of his Soviet-style education and of a gradual disillusionment with Soviet leaders.

He said he had been in the United States since shortly after he fled to the West, working with U. S. agencies he did not name.

He said he lives now in New York City, at an undisclosed address, without guards or any form of protection from Communist retaliation.

Despite premier Nikita Khrushchev's repeated pronouncements favoring disarmament, Artamonov said, the Soviet doctrine of

a surprise attack has been official since February 1955. He said it was spelled out in a Soviet military publication available only to high-ranking officers.

He said he had not himself seen any directives ordering preparations for such a surprise assault on this nation.

He said "no senior Soviet officer believes that the United States would attack first."

Under questioning, Artamonov confirmed Western suspicions that the Soviet fishing trawlers frequently seen near U. S. waters are spying, not fishing. He said the vessels always are operated and manned by agents of Soviet naval intelligence.

Press Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON 1, D. C.

PROVIDENCE (R.I.)
BULLETIN

Circ.: e. 142,535

Front Page Edit Page Other Page

Date: SEP 15 1960

Russian Capt. Tells Why He Defected

Washington — (UPI) — As a child, he saw nothing wrong with a government that told children to spy on their parents. In his 20's, he often defended Communist Party policies in discussion with his father and friends.

Yet, at 31, Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov, captain in the Soviet Navy and commander of a destroyer, defected to the United States.

Why?

Capt. Artamonov, a tall, slim Russian with a thick moustache, answered this question yesterday at a congressional hearing.

Dressed in a conservative blue suit, he disclosed to the public for the first time his flight months ago from behind the Iron Curtain.

He said he defected because he finally realized the Soviet government was committing "crimes on an international scale" and was lying to the world and its own people.

It "just didn't make sense," he told the House Committee on un-American activities.

Capt. Artamonov, now living in New York, charged that Soviet fishing trawlers off the American East Coast actually

are elaborate spy ships manned by Soviet intelligence personnel. These ships are even loaded with fish before they leave Russia in an effort to mask their spying mission.

He said Soviet strategy for more than four years has been based on a doctrine of "surprise attack in nuclear warfare." He believes Soviet Premier Khrushchev would launch a surprise attack on the United States if he became convinced Russia could win in one stroke.

Captain Artamonov said the nuclear doctrine was laid down in 1955 in a confidential Soviet

military publication available only to generals and admirals. He did not say how he became aware of the article.

He quoted the article as saying that "sudden attack may result in the rapid collapse of a government." He said he interpreted this to mean the government of the United States.

He asserted that the nuclear doctrine had been restated but not changed during the last four years.

LOS ANGELES (Calif.)
EXAMINER

Circ.: m. 369,537
S. 684,605

Front Edit Other
Page Page Page 2

Date: SEP 15 1960

U. S. Sneak Attack Plan Credited to Nikita

Special Headline Service Special to
The Los Angeles Examiner

WASHINGTON — Soviet Premier Khrushchev, who is coming to America next week to use the United Nations as a sounding board for "peace" and "disarmament," was described by a Soviet defector Wednesday as a man who has secretly set up the machinery for a sneak nuclear attack on the United States.

The defector drew a picture of Khrushchev as someone capable of pulling another Pearl Harbor at any time just as the Japanese bombed Hawaii while their ministers were going through the motions of negotiation in Washington.

The ex-Russian navy officer told a House subcommittee on un-American activities the Kremlin leaders are ready to unleash a nuclear holocaust on the United States the minute they feel they can score a one-stroke knock-out.

"Khrushchev does not wish to wait indefinitely for the United States to become a Socialist state by evolution," the officer said.

"He would like to see it take place in his lifetime."

Speaking was 32-year-old Nikolai Artamonov, former destroyer commander who deserted a brilliant future in the Russian navy to seek asylum in the United States. Artamonov has been living secretly in New York since last year. His defection was revealed for the first time Wednesday.

Artamonov told the subcommittee since 1955, "Soviet strategy has been based on the doctrine of surprise attack in nuclear warfare."

The captain quoted from a classified report from the Soviet defense ministry issued to general officers laying out the basic principles of surprise attack nuclear warfare.

In nuclear attack, the report said, "surprise is one of the decisive factors" and added a "sudden attack in-



Associated Press Wirephoto
CAPT. NIKOLAI
ARTAMONOV

volving nuclear weapons and other uses of modern war could have even greater results than in the last war."

Artamonov said he understood a special force is already set up to carry out a surprise attack if ordered.

Artamonov told the subcommittee Soviet naval intelligence operates a fleet of specially equipped disguised fishing trawlers to work the coastal waters of the United States and gather intelligence.

The fake trawlers daily chart and record such information as location of shore installations, radio and radar frequencies used by the U. S. Navy, structure of American fleet types, types of weapons, anti-submarine warfare, methods of shipping cargo and positions of U. S. air and sea patrols.

15 SEPT 60

Press Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON 1. D. C.

JACKSONVILLE (Fla.)
JOURNAL

Circ.: e. 52,093

Front Page Edit Page Other Page

Date: SEP 15 1960

Defector Warns of A-Attack

WASHINGTON (AP)—Russian leaders would not hesitate to launch a surprise attack on the United States if they thought this nation could be smashed with one stroke, a former Soviet naval officer says.

Capt. Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov, testified yesterday that Soviet military strategy has been based on the doctrine of a surprise nuclear attack since February 1955.

Artamonov, who was commander of a Russian destroyer in the Baltic fleet, defected to the United States in June 1959, while stationed at Gdynia, Poland.

His appearance yesterday before the House Committee on Un-American Activities, however, provided the first public disclosure of his presence in this country.

The 32-year-old Russian, a slim, bespectacled man with a heavy black moustache, spent most of his time telling of his Soviet-style education and of a gradual disillusionment with Soviet leaders.

He said he had been in the United States since shortly after he fled to the West, working with U.S. agencies he did not name.

He said he lives now in New York City, at an undisclosed address, without guards or any form of protection from Communist retaliation.

Despite Premier Nikita Khrushchev's repeated pronouncements favoring disarmament, Artamonov said the Soviet doctrine of a surprise attack has been official since February 1955. He said it was spelled out in the Soviet military publication, "The Only Way to High-Ranking Officers." He said he had not himself seen any directives ordering preparations for such a surprise assault on this nation. But he added...

...of several broad statements which tended to cast the Soviet officer as a defector. He said he had not seen any directives ordering preparations for such a surprise assault on this nation. But he added...

15 SEPT 68

Press Intelligence, Co.
 WASHINGTON I. D. C.

**CHAMPAIGN (Ill.)
 COURIER**

Circ.: e. 30,610
 S. 30,876

Front Page Edit Page Other Page

Date: **SEP 15 1960**



Capt. Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov

Soviet Defector Testifies

Says Reds Would Attack If Strong Enough

Washington, Sept. 15 (AP) — Soviet leaders would not hesitate to launch a surprise nuclear attack on the United States if they thought this nation could be smashed with one stroke, a former Soviet naval officer says.

Capt. Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov testified Wednesday that Soviet military strategy has been based on the doctrine of a surprise nuclear attack since February 1955.

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Press Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON 1, D. C.


WILMINGTON (Del.)
JOURNAL-
EVERY EVENING

Circ.: c. 70,988

Front Edit Other
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Date: SEP 15 1960

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Date: SEP 15 1960



WITNESS—Capt. Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov, defected Russian naval officer, yesterday told the House Un-American Activities Committee in Washington that the Soviet Union has been preparing since 1955 for a surprise nuclear attack against the United States.

Lies Sickened Him. Officer Left Soviet

WASHINGTON, Sept. 15 (AP) — As a child, he saw nothing wrong with a government that told children to spy on their parents. In his 20's, he often defended Communist Party policies in discussions with his father and friends.

Yet, ~~Sept. 31~~, Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov, captain in the Soviet navy and commander of a red banner destroyer, defected to the United States.

Why? Artamonov, a tall, slim Russian with a thick moustache answered this question yesterday at a congressional hearing.

Dressed in a conservative blue suit, he disclosed to the public for the first time his fight 15 months ago from behind the Iron Curtain.

HE SAID he defected because he finally realized the Soviet government was committing "crimes on an international scale" and was lying to the world and its own people. "It just didn't make sense," he told the House Committee on Un-American Activities.

Artamonov, now living in New York, inveighed against the Soviet government in even stronger terms. He charged:

"I believe that the Soviet fishing trawlers off the American east coast are actually elaborate spy ships manned by Soviet intelligence personnel. These ships are even loaded with fish before they leave Russia in an effort to spy their spying mission. ... I like to see it take place in his ..."

four years has been based on a doctrine of ... in nuclear warfare. ... leaves Soviet Premier Khrushchev they would launch a surprise attack on the United States. ... he became convinced Russia could win in one stroke.

ARTAMONOV SAID the nuclear doctrine was laid down in 1955 in a confidential Soviet Military publication available only to generals and admirals. He did not say how he became aware of the article.

He quoted the article as saying that "sudden attack may result in the rapid collapse of a government." He said he interpreted this to mean the government of the United States.

Asserting that the nuclear doctrine had been restated but not changed during the last four years, Artamonov said:

"I believe that the Soviet ... dictatorship would undertake a surprise attack if she felt she could win in one stroke. ... Khrushchev does not wish to wait indefinitely for the United States to become a socialist state by evolution. ... he would like to see it take place in his ..."



WITNESS—Capt. Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov, defected Russian naval officer, yesterday told the House Un-American Activities Committee in Washington that the Soviet Union has been preparing since 1955 for a surprise nuclear attack against the United States.

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Press Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON 1. D. C.

DECATUR (III.)
REVIEW

Circ.: 35,248

Front Edit Other
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Date: SEP 15 1960

Reds Would Attack U.S.

Washington, Sept. 15 (AP).
Soviet leaders would not hesitate to launch a surprise nuclear attack on the United States if they thought this nation could be smashed with one stroke, a former Soviet naval officer says.

Capt. Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov testified Wednesday that Soviet military strategy has been based on the doctrine of a surprise nuclear attack since February 1955.

Artamonov, 34, who was commander of a Soviet destroyer in the Baltic fleet, defected to the United States in June 1959 while stationed at Gdynia, Poland.

His appearance before the House Committee on Un-American Activities, however, provided the first public disclosure of his presence in this country.

He said he had been in the United States since shortly after he fled to the West, working with U. S. agencies he did not name.

He said he lives now in New York City, at an undisclosed address, without guards or any form of protection from Communist retaliation.

Press Intelligence, Inc.

WASHINGTON, D. C.

YOUNGSTOWN (Ohio)
VINDICATOR

Circ.: e. 101,758
S. 146,623

Front Page Edit Page Other Page

Date: SEP 15 1960

Defector Says Red War Plan Is Based on Atom Surprise

(By The Associated Press)
Washington, Sept. 15—Russian leaders would not hesitate to launch a surprise nuclear attack on the United States if they thought this nation could be smashed with one stroke, a former Soviet naval officer says.

Capt. Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov testified Wednesday that Soviet military strategy has been based on the doctrine of a surprise nuclear attack since February 1955.

Artamonov, who was commander of a Russian destroyer in the Baltic Fleet, defected to the United States in June 1959 while stationed at Gdynia, Poland.

His appearance Wednesday before the House Committee on Un-American Activities, however, provided the first public disclosure of his presence in this country.

Became Disillusioned
The 32-year-old Russian, a slim, bespectacled man with a heavy black moustache, spent most of his time telling of his Soviet-style education and of a gradual disillusionment with Soviet leaders.

He said he had been in the United States since shortly



—Associated Press Wirephoto
Capt. Artamonov

after he fled to the West, working with U.S. agencies.

He said he lives now in New York City without guards or any form of protection from Communist retaliation.

Despite Premier Nikita S.

Khrushchev's repeated pronouncements favoring disarmament, Artamonov said, the Soviet doctrine of a surprise attack has been official since February 1955. He said it was spelled out in a Soviet military publication available only to high-ranking officers.

Didn't See Orders

He said he had not himself seen any directives ordering preparations for such a surprise assault on this nation. But he added:

"I know of general, broad statements which tended to prepare the Soviet officer corps for the possibility of being ordered to make a surprise attack."

He said "no senior Soviet of-

Press Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON 1, D. C.

BOSTON (Mass.)
GLOBE

Circ.: m. 190,246
S. 416,486

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SEP 15 1960

Date:



(AP Wirephoto)

WARNS OF RED THREAT
—Capt. Nikolai Artamonov, a
defected Russian naval officer.

15 SEPT 60

Press Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON 1. D. C.

DALLAS (Tex.)
NEWS

Circ.: m. 211,763
S. 222,469

Front Page Edit Page Other Page

Date: SEP 15 1960

Russian Defector Says Reds Trained for Surprise Attack

By JOHN MASHEK
Washington Bureau of The News
WASHINGTON—A young Russian naval captain told the House Un-American Activities Committee Wednesday that Soviet military forces have been trained for surprise nuclear attack since 1953.

Captain Nikolai Artamonov, who gave up a promising navy career in Russia and defected to the West last year, said high ranking Soviet officers have been issued secret orders to implement such an attack.

The 32-year-old captain, an athletic type with square shoulders and robust build, believes Russia would "sunch" a nuclear attack today "if she thought she could win in a single stroke."

Artamonov, who has been given political asylum in the U.S., warned about Premier Khrushchev's upcoming visit to the United Nations. While the Soviet boss will be talking about disarmament, the captain said, it is military fact in Russia that preparation for war has been the concept.

Artamonov produced a Russian

military journal and read from an article, published in 1955, which dwelled on the strength of surprise attack in nuclear warfare. Coincidentally, the defector said implementing instructions were given to officers of general and admiral rank.

"This concept was obviously intended to prepare Soviet officers for the starting of such a war by the Soviet Union," he said through an interpreter. "It was designed as an excuse to be presented that such an aggression was necessary. But no Soviet officer believes that the U.S. will attack first."

Artamonov advised that Khrushchev does not want to wait indefinitely to see his prediction come true that America will become a socialistic state by evolution.

"He would like to see it take place in his lifetime," he said in concluding a prepared statement to the committee.

During a question-answer period, the mustached Russian said Soviet trawlers, disguised as fishing vessels, were picking up in-

telligence information off U.S. coastal waters.

These trawlers, he explained, were a part of the Soviet intelligence squadron with a mission to pick up data such as combat preparedness of the American fleet, types of weapons on ships, methods of cargo shipping and radio frequencies of our vessels.

Artamonov said the trawlers were loaded with fish plus specially trained intelligence men and special equipment to obtain intelligence data.

Dressed in blue business suit with flashy sports shoes, Artamonov discussed the reasons for his defection in detail. They summed up to policies of the Kremlin.

The captain said he did not make the move because of any threats or rewards. In fact, he said he had been given favored treatment and had a bright future in the navy.

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15 SEPT 60

Press Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON 1, D. C.

ENID (Okla.)
NEWS

Circ.: m. 15,094
S. 20,720

Front Page Edit Page Other Page 12

Date: SEP 15 1960

OFFICERS PREPARED

Defector Claims Sneak Attack Soviet Strategy

WASHINGTON (AP)—A Russian Navy captain who defected in disillusionment last year declared Wednesday that since February 1955 Soviet strategy has been based on the doctrine of a nuclear surprise attack on the United States.

Capt. Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov, who crossed to the West in June 1959, came into the open before the House Committee on Un-American activities.

The 32-year-old Russian said a realization that "everything being said in Russia was not true, but based on lies" led him to defect. He didn't say how he escaped to the west.

Speaking mostly in Russian with the aid of an interpreter, the heavily mustached Artamonov said the doctrine of surprise attack was established "in a Soviet military publication which is known only to officers of flag rank.

United States will attack first."

The committee brought Artamonov to its witness chair about a week after the Russians trotted out two defecting American code clerks, Bernon F. Mitchell and William H. Martin. Mitchell and Martin said they went to Russia because they objected to what they said were U.S. spy policies risking world war III.

Questioned by the committee, the bespectacled Artamonov said Russian fishing trawlers often sighted near U.S. waters are operated by Soviet naval intelligence. Russian submarines also hover close to American territorial waters hunting information, he testified.



TESTIFIES — Capt. Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov, a defected Russian naval officer, appears Wednesday as a witness before the House un-American Activities Committee. He testified the Soviet

17 SEPT 60

Press Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON 1, D. C.

SHERMAN (Tex.)
DEMOCRAT

Circ.: e. 13,921
S. 13,965

Front Edit Other
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Date: SEP 15 1960

Defector Says Soviet Strategy Based on Sneak Attack Doctrine

WASHINGTON (AP) — Soviet leaders would not hesitate to launch a surprise nuclear attack on the United States if they thought this nation could be smashed with one stroke, a former Soviet naval officer says.

Capt. Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov testified Wednesday that Soviet military strategy has been based on the doctrine of a surprise nuclear attack since February 1955.

Artamonov, 32, who was commander of a Soviet destroyer in the Baltic fleet, defected to the United States in June 1958 while stationed at Gdynia, Poland.

First Disclosure: His appearance before the House Committee on Un-American Activities, however, provided the first public disclosure of his presence in this country.

The slim, bespectacled Soviet with a heavy black moustache spent most of his time telling of his Soviet-style education and of a gradual disillusionment with Soviet leaders.

He said he had been in the United States since shortly after he fled to the West, working with U. S. agencies he did not name.

He said he lives now in New York City, at an undisclosed address, without guards or any form of protection from Communist retaliation.

Despite Premier Nikita Khrushchev's repeated pronouncements of a "disarmament" Artamonov said the Soviet doctrine of a surprise attack has been official since February 1955. He said it was spelled out in a Soviet military publication available only to high-ranking officers.

Not Afraid U.S. Will Attack

He said he had not himself seen any directives ordering preparations for such a surprise assault on this nation.

But he added: "I know of general, broad statements which tended to prepare the Soviet officer corps for the possibility of being ordered to make a surprise attack."

He said "no senior Soviet officer believes that the United States would attack first."

Under questioning, Artamonov confirmed Western suspicions that the Soviet fishing trawlers frequently seen near U. S. waters are spying, not fishing. He said the vessels always are operated and manned by agents of Soviet naval intelligence.

KNOXVILLE (Tenn.)
NEWS-SENTINEL

Circ.: e. 97,018
S. 135,748

Front Page Edit Page Other Page

Date: SEP 15 1960

Defector Tells of Soviet Plans for Atomic Attack

BY ANDREW TULLY
Scripps-Howard Staff Writer

WASHINGTON, Sept. 15 — The young Soviet naval officer sat in a room in the old House office building and when he was through testifying Nikita Khrushchev had been exposed again as a man who talks disarmament and plots surprise attacks against the West.

Capt. Nikolai Federovich Artamonov, who fled the Soviet Union last year, put it bluntly to the House Committee on Un-American Activities:



—UPI Telephoto

NIKOLAI ARTAMONOV
Before House committee

"Since February, 1955, Soviet strategy has been based on the doctrine of surprise attack in nuclear warfare . . . It has never been changed."

Chief Writes Article

The captain was specific. The surprise attack strategy was contained, he said, in an article in the Russian journal "Military Thought," restricted to generals and admirals. It was written by Marshal Rotmistrov, chief of the Soviet atomic weapons command.

Artamonov emphasized that such an article could not have been written on Rotmistrov's own initiative—that it obviously reflected orders from on high. And the article was intended, he said, "to prepare the Soviet officers for the starting of such a war by the Soviet Union."

A neat and slender man of 32 with a black mustache, the Russian noted wryly that Khrushchev is arriving Monday for the United Nations session. "He says he is going to talk about disarmament," said the captain. "I feel obliged to point out from the information . . . available to me as a Soviet officer and Communist Party member that Soviet military strategy is inconsistent with Khrushchev's pronouncements."

Article Read

That strategy was clarified in a quotation from Marshal Rotmistrov's article read into the record by the youthful defector. "The element of surprise is one of the decisive conditions for achieving success," the marshal wrote. "In some cases a sudden attack with new weapons may result in the rapid collapse of the government" under attack.

Under questioning by committee counsel, Alfred M. Nittle, Capt. Artamonov also provided the first public revelation of the character of those Soviet fishing trawlers which haunt the Atlantic. The crews of those vessels, he said, actually are members of Soviet naval intelligence units, dispatched to gather information on the "combat readiness of American Naval forces, the usual locations of their patrols, and the condition of American anti-submarine defenses."

Artamonov was scornful when Nittle asked him whether the Soviet Union would launch a surprise attack on the West if Communist China went to war with a

from the Soviet Union. Then the Russians would deal the first blow and the Chinese would come in to support the Russians."

As for Khrushchev and his mouthings about peaceful co-existence, Artamonov sought to put K. in perspective. "Khrushchev does not wish to wait indefinitely for the United States to become a socialist state by evolution," he said. "Moreover, he does not believe this will happen. He would like to see it take place in his lifetime."

His testimony came as House Democratic Leader John W. McCormack called on the State Department to make a full report to the United Nations General Assembly on any espionage operations by Soviet trawlers off the East Coast.

Spy Armada Charged

The Massachusetts Democrat said "well over 200" Russian trawlers, sporting a "forest of radar masts and electronic gear," have passed through the Baltic Sea into the Atlantic Ocean since August 1."

He charged the trawler armada had been gathered "for the apparent purpose of spying on NATO naval maneuvers while Khrushchev attends the UN General Assembly meeting in New York starting next Tuesday."

"By all indications, NATO exercise "Swordthrust" will draw a record number of these uninvited Soviet spy ships," McCormack said in a statement.

A considerable number of Russian fishing trawlers have been spotted off the East Coast in recent months. One was seen in the vicinity of an American nuclear submarine which was conducting exercises.

Lives in New York

Artamonov, who said he is now living in New York City, said he defected to the West because of his objection over the foreign policy

American espionage agents. Much of this testimony, Walter said, was secret "because of security requirements."

Artamonov testified just eight days after the Soviets displayed two turncoat U. S. code clerks employed by the National Security Agency who fled to Russia. Walter said, however, that the presence of Artamonov had no connection with the committee's inquiry into the code clerk's defection.

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4—THE WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS, THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 15, 1960

Defector to U. S. Reveals Khrushchev's Strategy

Soviet Plots Sneak Attacks

By ANDREW TULLY
Scripps-Herald Staff Writer

The young Soviet naval officer sat in a room in the Old House Office Building and when he was thru testifying Nikita Khrushchev had been exposed again as a man who talks disarmament and plots surprise attacks against the West.

Capt. Nikolai Federovich Artamonov, who fled the Soviet Union last year, put it bluntly to the House Committee on Un-American Activities:

"Since February, 1955, Soviet strategy has been based on the doctrine of surprise attack in nuclear warfare . . . It has never been changed."

SPECIFIC


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CLARIFIED

That strategy was clarified



NIKOLAI ARTAMONOV

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Mr. Artamonov was scornful when Committee Counsel Alfred M. Nittle asked him whether the Soviet Union would launch a surprise attack on the West if Communist China went to war with a member-nation of the free world.

Brusquely, Mr. Artamonov replied: "I don't think Communist China would start a

war without consulting with and getting approval from the Soviet Union. Then the Russians would deal the first blow and the Chinese would come in to support the Russians."

Press Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON 1, D. C.

**MARLBORO (Mass.)
ENTERPRISE**

Circ.: e. 5,285

Front Page Edit Page Other Page

EP 15 1960

Date:



RUSSIAN TESTIFIES — Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov, 32-year-old Russian Navy captain who defected to the West 15 months ago, testifies before a House subcommittee on un-American Activities in Washington. Artamonov, speaking through an interpreter, said that Soviet military strategy since '55 has been based on "the doctrine of surprise attack in nuclear warfare."

C. S. Monitor
15 Sept 1960

Defector Discounts Soviet Peace Talk

Surprise Attack Held...

By Courtney Sheldon

Staff Correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

A Soviet naval officer came to Washington Sept. 14 with an entirely different story about Soviet intentions than his one-time superior is taking to the United Nations.

Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov told the House un-American Activities Committee:

"Since February, 1955, Soviet strategy has been based on the doctrine of surprise attack in nuclear warfare. This doctrine was established in a Soviet military publication which is known only to officers of flag rank and above.

"Several times over the past four years it has been said again, and it has never been changed."

Mr. Artamonov's defection to the West has been kept secret by United States intelligence authorities for 15 months. He has been interrogated at length, and government officials have passed the word along that they regard his information as accurate.

Countermove Seen

These officials released him to the House committee for public testimony in an obvious countermove to the Soviet propaganda attendant on the arrival of Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev in New York next week.

His testimony was widely reported in the nation's press, but it appears doubtful that it will have the impact that the staged press conference of the Martin-Mitchell team did in Moscow.

For one thing, the United States has not been in the habit of following through decisively in a propaganda way after such disclosures.

By comparison, when Mr. Khrushchev gets a sensational news event favorable to the Communists, he weds himself to it, repeating it over and over again, and needing United States officials.

The United States approach is more dignified. American officials usually decline to pick up these isolated incidents and run down the field with them.

More Persuasive?

There is a desire not to inflame the international scene.

any more than necessary, and there is the hope that relatively quiet presentation of the facts will be more persuasive in the long run.

Washington generally did not find anything in the Artamonov testimony that was not already suspected or verified.

The Navy, for example, had long ago concluded that Soviet fishing vessels laden with electronic gear and operating close to the United States mainland were on espionage missions.

His disclosures on Soviet naval ships came at a time when there is probably more interest here in why two separate Soviet task forces are headed into the Atlantic and the Pacific.

Accepted Interpretation

The accepted interpretation is that they are connected with a forthcoming space exploit, perhaps tied in a propaganda way with Mr. Khrushchev's arrival in New York.

Some of the ships apparently are carrying gear, including helicopters, which presumably would be useful in tracking space craft and perhaps attempting ocean recovery of space capsules.

Since the dawn of the space age, the Soviets have executed a steady progression of space spectacles which have furthered Soviet prestige in natural science and have turned people's attention away from such events as the Artamonov defection.

Mr. Artamonov emphasized that he does not regard himself as having betrayed his country but that the present Soviet leaders have betrayed the Soviet people. He insisted that he would always remain a Russian.

He started off by remarking to the committee that "on Monday Premier Khrushchev arrives in the United States. He says he is going to talk about disarmament. I feel obliged to point out from information which is available to me as a Soviet officer and a Communist Party member that the Soviet military strategy is inconsistent with Khrushchev's

... Strategy

pronouncements on disarmament."

In his view, "The Soviet dictatorship would undertake a surprise attack if she felt that she could win in one stroke."

He added: "Make no mistake—they are power seekers, not political idealists. Khrushchev

does not wish to wait indefinitely for the United States to become a socialist state by evolution. Moreover, he does not expect this to happen. He would like to see it take place in his lifetime."

Mr. Artamonov's rank in the Soviet Navy corresponded to that of a lieutenant commander in the United States Navy. He was captain of a destroyer and regarded, in the Soviet press, as an officer with a bright future.

Thirty-two years of age, he has lived only under Communist rule. United States intelligence officials wish there were many more like him. Information is so difficult to extract from Communist closed societies that efforts to obtain more are unrelenting.

TIME MAGAZINE, WEEK OF 15 MAY 1978

Nation

Double Trouble


Trying to fool the KGB, the U.S. may have fooled itself

One mystery that still haunts U.S. intelligence officials is the disappearance of Double Agent Nicholas Shadrin while on assignment in Vienna more than two years ago. Did he fall into a KGB trap? Or was he betrayed by U.S. intelligence officials?

Born Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov, he was a 30-year-old captain in the Soviet navy when he defected to the U.S. in 1959 with his Polish fiancée Ewa. For nine months American agents questioned him about Soviet naval secrets at life houses in Virginia. Then Artamonov changed his name to Nicholas Shadrin and went to work for the Pentagon as an intelligence analyst. He married Ewa, became a U.S. citizen and settled into a good bourgeois life in McLean, Va. He made no attempt to hide his background as a defector; he testified about it before the House Committee on Un-American Activities in 1960.

In 1966 Shadrin was approached by KGB operatives. At the request of American officials, he signed up as a Soviet agent and began feeding his KGB spymasters FBI-supplied information about U.S. intelligence methods, much of it harmless but true to gain the KGB's confidence. Some of it false and misleading.

On Dec. 20, 1975, while ostensibly on a skiing vacation in Europe with his wife, Shadrin had a prearranged meeting with two KGB officers on the steps of a church in Vienna, then vanished. At Ewa's insistence, the U.S. repeatedly asked the Sovi-



Shadrin on a wild-geese hunt in Maryland

Facts as cold-blooded as a Le Carré plot.

ets for information about Shadrin's fate. Gerald Ford sent an inquiry to Leonid Brezhnev, who replied vaguely that the KGB had not kidnaped Shadrin. U.S. officials told reporters that Shadrin was probably dead or in a Soviet prison. In response to suggestions of U.S. bungling, some officials even suggested that Shadrin had been a Soviet plant, a triple agent, and his disappearance was a clumsy Russian way of bringing him in from the cold.

Now more facts are emerging about the Shadrin case, and they make it seem every bit as complicated and cold-blooded

as a John Le Carré plot. TIME has learned that in 1966 a KGB agent known as Igor was posted as a diplomat to the Soviet embassy in Washington. In an extraordinarily straightforward way, he phoned the home of CIA Director Richard Helms and talked to his then-wife Julia. Igor offered to become a double agent, or, in Le Carré's famous term, a "mole," who would burrow deeply into the Soviet espionage network and pass on secrets to the U.S. Julia turned Igor over to her husband, who in turn passed him on to U.S. counterintelligence operatives.

Igor told the Americans that he could possibly get a higher post within the KGB. He said he would have a better chance of this if he could recruit Shadrin as a Soviet agent. U.S. intelligence officials, though suspicious, decided to help. Thus, even before the KGB got in touch with Shadrin, he had been persuaded by U.S. officials to become a double agent, despite considerable misgivings on his part.

Just why U.S. intelligence officials allowed him to walk into an apparent KGB trap in Vienna nine years later is still a mystery. Ewa, who is now a dentist in McLean, believes, despite official denials, that he was set up and "sacrificed" as part of a larger intelligence operation, presumably involving the mysterious Igor. U.S. officials decline comment, but there is a lingering suspicion in intelligence circles that in going along with Igor's request to help the KGB recruit Shadrin, the U.S. fell for a Soviet plot. Igor could very well have been a triple agent, as some U.S. officials have suspected all along. One American intelligence official speculated wryly that the name Igor could be a play on the Russian word for game.

Press Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON 1, D. C.

FERGUS FALLS (Minn.)
JOURNAL

Circ.: e. 13,221

Front Edit Other
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Date: SEP 15 1955

Defecting Russ Officer Testifies

Plans for Surprise Attack Confirmed



FORMER SOVIET OFFICER TESTIFIES — Capt. Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov, a defected Russian naval officer, appeared yesterday as a witness before the House un-American Activities committee. He testified the Soviet Union has been preparing for a surprise nuclear attack on the United States since 1955.

WASHINGTON (AP)—Soviet leaders would not hesitate to launch a surprise nuclear attack on the United States if they thought this nation could be smashed with one stroke, a former Soviet naval officer says.

Capt. Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov testified Wednesday that Soviet military strategy has been based on the doctrine of a surprise nuclear attack since February 1955.

Artamonov, 32, who was commander of a Soviet destroyer in the Baltic fleet, defected to the United States in June 1959 while stationed at Gdynia, Poland.

His appearance before the House Committee on Un-American Activities, however, provided the first public disclosure of his presence in this country.

The slim, bespectacled Soviet with a heavy black moustache, spent most of his time telling of his Soviet-style education and of a gradual disillusionment with Soviet leaders.

He said he had been in the United States since shortly after he fled to the West, working with U. S. agencies he did not name.

He said he lives now in New York City, at an undisclosed address, without guards or any form of protection from Communist retaliation.

Despite premier Nikita Khrushchev's repeated pronouncements favoring disarmament, Artamonov said, the Soviet doctrine of a surprise attack has been official since February 1955. He said it was spelled out in a Soviet military publication available only to high-ranking officers.

He said he had not himself seen any directives ordering preparations for such a surprise assault on this nation.

But he added: "I know of general, broad statements which tended to prepare the Soviet officer corps for the possibility of being ordered to make a surprise attack."

He said "no senior Soviet officer believes that the United States would attack first."

Under questioning, Artamonov confirmed Western suspicions that the Soviet fishing trawlers frequently seen near U. S. waters are spying, not fishing. He said the vessels always are operated and manned by agents of Soviet naval intelligence.

Press Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON, D. C.

YAKIMA (Wash.)
HERALD

Circ.: m. 16,252
S. 32,451

Front Page Edit Page Other Page

Date: SEP 15 1960

Russian Defector Tells Of Reds' Surprise Attack Plans

WASHINGTON (AP)—A Soviet navy captain who defected in disillusionment last year declared Wednesday that since February, 1955, Soviet strategy has been based on the doctrine of a nuclear surprise attack on the United States.

Capt. Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov, 32, who crossed to the West in June, 1959, came into the open before the House Committee on Un-American Activities.

Based On Lies

He said a realization that "everything being said in Russia was not true, but based on lies" led him to defect. He didn't say how he escaped to the West.

Speaking mostly in Russian with the aid of an interpreter, the heavily mustached Artamonov said the doctrine of surprise attack was established "in a Soviet military publication which is known only to officers of flag rank and above."

Unseen

He conceded he had not actually seen any directives to prepare for a surprise attack on the United States.

"But I know of general, broad statements which tended to prepare the Soviet officer corps for the possibility of being ordered to make a surprise attack," added the slim, dark ex-destroyer skipper.

Not First

Artamonov said, "No senior Soviet officer believes that the United States will attack first."

The Un-American Activities Committee brought Artamonov to its witness chair about a week after the Russians trotted out two defecting American code clerks,

Bernon F. Mitchell and William H. Martin. Mitchell and Martin said they went to the Soviet Union because they objected to what they said were U.S. spy policies risking World War III.

Spy On U.S.

Questioned by the committee, the bespectacled Artamonov said Soviet fishing trawlers often sighted near U.S. waters are operated by Soviet naval intelligence. Soviet submarines also hover close to American territorial waters hunting information, he testified.

What are they seeking? Knowledge about the makeup of the U.S. fleet, weapons used by American warships and antisubmarine measures being taken by the U.S. Navy, the Soviet defector said.

Bitter Words

Although without apparent emotion, he spoke in bitter words of Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev.

"Khrushchev does not wish to wait indefinitely for the United States to become a Socialist state by evolution; moreover he does not believe this will happen," Artamonov asserted.

"He would like to see it take place in his lifetime."

Deal Blow

At another point, the former Soviet navy man told the committee: "If Khrushchev believed the strength of the Soviet Union was overwhelming he would, of course, deal a stunning blow to the West."

However, he also said Khrushchev probably is serious about attempting to achieve agreements through peaceful means, to avoid war.

Defends Self

Later, Artamonov told newsmen—again through an interpreter—that he is living in New York, without any special protection. All he has to defend himself against possible Communist reprisals, he said, are "my own hands."

NEWS

Circ.: e. 285,206

Front Page Edit Page Other Page

Date: SEP 15 1950

Soviet Officer Who Defected Says Reds Plot Nuclear Blitz

Ex Naval Captain Tells House Group U. S. Coasts Are 'Haunted' By Russian Spy Ships

By United Press International

WASHINGTON, Sept. 15—As a child, he saw nothing wrong with a government that told children to spy on their parents. In his 20's, he often defended Communist Party policies in discussions with his father and friends.

But, at 31, Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov, captain in the Soviet Navy and commander of a red-banner destroyer, defected to the United States.

Why?

Capt. Artamonov, a tall, slim Russian with a thick moustache, answered this question Wednesday at a congressional hearing.

He said he defected to the West in June 1959 because he finally realized the Soviet Government was committing "crimes on an international scale" and was lying to the world and its own people.

Fish Carried as Blind

It "just didn't make sense," he told the House Committee on Un-American Activities.

Capt. Artamonov, now living in New York, accused the Soviet Government in even stronger terms. He charged that:

Soviet fishing trawlers off the American East Coast actually are elaborate spy ships manned by Soviet intelligence personnel. These ships are even loaded with fish before they leave Russia in an effort to mask their spying mission.

Soviet strategy for more than four years has been based on a doctrine of "surprise attack in nuclear warfare." He believes Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev would launch a surprise attack on the United States if he became convinced Russia could win in one stroke.

Prepared for Attack Order

Capt. Artamonov said the nuclear doctrine was laid down in 1955 in a confidential Soviet military publication available only to generals and admirals. He did not say how he became aware of the article.

"But I know of general, broad statements which tended to prepare the Soviet officer corps for the possibility of being ordered to make a surprise attack," he said.

"No senior Soviet officer believes that the United States will attack first," he asserted.

He quoted the article as saying that "sudden attack may result in the rapid collapse of a Government." He said he interpreted this to mean the Government of the United States.

Says Policy Still Stands

Asserting that the nuclear doctrine had been restated but not changed during the last four years, Capt. Artamonov said:

"I believe that the Soviet dictatorship would undertake a surprise attack if she felt she could win in one stroke.

Khrushchev does not wish to wait indefinitely for the United State to become a socialist state by evolution; moreover he does

would like to see it take place in his lifetime."

"If Khrushchev believed the strength of the Soviet Union was overwhelming he would, of course, deal a stunning blow to the West."

However, he also said Mr. Khrushchev probably is serious about attempting to achieve agreement through peaceful means, to avoid war.

McCormack Asks Report

Later, Capt. Artamonov told newsmen that he is living in New York, without any special protection.

His statement came as House Democratic Leader McCormack called on the State Department to make a full report to the United Nations General Assembly on any espionage operations by Soviet trawlers off the East Coast.

The Massachusetts Democrat said "well over 200" Russian trawlers, sporting a "forest of radar masts and electronic



CAPT. NIKOLAI ARTAMONOV Testifies Before House Group

gear." have passed through Baltic Sea into the Atlantic Ocean since Aug. 1.

He charged the trawler mada had been gathered the apparent purpose of spy on NATO naval mancu while Premier Khrushchev tends the U. N. General ssembly meeting in New starting next Tuesday."

20377

Press Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON, D. C.

BUFFALO (N.Y.)
NEWS

Circ.: e. 285,206

Front Page Edit Page Other Page

Date: SEP 15 1960

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Capt. Artamonov, now living in New York, accused the Soviet Government in even stronger terms. He charged that:

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The Massachusetts Democrat said "well over 200" Russian trawlers, sporting a "forest of radar masts and electronic



CAPT. NIKOLAI ARTAMONOV
Testifies Before House Group

gear," have passed through the Baltic Sea into the Atlantic Ocean since Aug. 1."

He charged the trawler armada had been gathered "for the apparent purpose of spying on NATO naval maneuvers while Premier Khrushchev attends the U. N. General Assembly meeting in New York starting next Tuesday."

Press Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON, D. C.

BELLEFONTAINE (Ohio)
EXAMINER

Circ.: e. 9,339

Front Edit Other
Page Page Page
SEP 15 1960

Date:
**Defector Says Red Plans Based
On "Surprise Attack" On U. S.**

By David Burnham
WASHINGTON — As a child, he saw nothing wrong with a government that told children to spy on their parents. In his 20's, he often defended Communist Party policies in discussions with his father and friends.

Yet, at 31, Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov, captain in the Soviet navy and commander of a Red banner destroyer, defected to the United States.

Why?
Artamonov, a tall, slim Russian with a thick moustache, answered this question Wednesday at a congressional hearing.

Dressed in a conservative blue suit, he disclosed to the public for the first time his flight 15 months ago from behind the Iron Curtain.

He said he defected because he finally realized the Soviet government was committing "crimes on an international scale" and was lying to the world and its own people.

It "just didn't make sense," he told the House Committee on Un-American Activities.

Artamonov, now living in New York, inveighed against the Soviet government in even stronger terms. He charged:

— Soviet fishing trawlers off the American East Coast actu-

ally are elaborate spy ships manned by Soviet intelligence personnel. These ships are even loaded with fish before they leave Russia in an effort to mask their spying mission.

— Soviet strategy for more than four years has been based on a doctrine of "surprise attack in nuclear warfare." He believes Soviet Premier Khrushchev will launch a surprise attack on the United States if he became convinced Russia could win in one stroke.

Artamonov said the nuclear doctrine was laid down in 1955 in a confidential Soviet military publication.

He quoted the article as saying that "sudden attack may result in the rapid collapse of a government." He said he interpreted this to mean the government of the United States.

Asserting that the nuclear doctrine had been restated but not changed during the last four years Artamonov said:

"I believe that the Soviet dictatorship would undertake a surprise attack if she felt she could win in one stroke . . . Khrushchev does not wish to wait indefinitely for the United States to become a socialist state by evolution. . . he would like to see it take place in his lifetime."

15 SEPT 60

Press Intelligence, Inc.

WASHINGTON 1, D. C.

PAWTUCKET (R.I.)
TIMES

Circ.: e. 38,041

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Front Edit Other
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Date: SEP 15 1960

If Sure Of Victory, Russia Would Attack, Defector Says

WASHINGTON (AP) — Russian leaders would not hesitate to launch a surprise nuclear attack on the United States if they thought this nation could be smashed with one stroke, a former Soviet naval officer says.

Capt. Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov testified yesterday that Soviet military strategy has been based on the doctrine of a surprise nuclear attack since February, 1955.

Defected In 1959

Artamonov, who was commander of a Russian destroyer in the Baltic fleet, defected to the United States in June 1959 while stationed at Gdynia, Poland.

His appearance yesterday before the House committee on un-American activities, however, provided the first public disclosure of his presence in this country.

The 32-year-old Russian spent most of his time telling of his Soviet-style education and of a gradual disillusionment with Soviet leaders.

He said he had been in the United States since shortly after he fled to the West, working with U. S. agencies he did not name.

He said he lives now in New York city, at an undisclosed address, without guards or any form of protection from Communist retaliation.

Despite Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev's repeated pronouncements favoring disarmament, Artamonov said, the Soviet doctrine of a surprise at-

tack has been official since February 1955. He said it was spelled out in a Soviet military publication available only to high-ranking officers.

He said he had not himself seen any directives ordering preparations for such a surprise assault on this nation. But he added:

"I know of general, broad statements which tended to prepare the Soviet officer corps for the possibility of being ordered to make a surprise attack."

He said "no senior Soviet officer believes that the United States would attack first."

Under questioning, Artamonov confirmed Western suspicions that the Soviet fishing trawlers frequently seen near U. S. waters are spying, not fishing. He said the vessels always are operated and manned by agents of Soviet naval intelligence.

Not Motivated By Gain

He said his own defection to the West was not motivated by "foreign intelligence" agents or hope of personal or material gain.

"On the contrary," he said, "I was given favored treatment by the Soviet authorities and had a bright future ahead of me."

He said his final disillusionment came in 1957 when Khrushchev first praised Marshal Georgi Zhukov, the Soviet war hero, and three months later fired him from his post.

Artamonov said the Kremlin leadership is composed of "power seekers, not political idealists."

Press Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON 1. O. B.

MILWAUKEE (Wisc.)
JOURNAL

Circ.: a. 369,418
S. 503,059

Front Page
Edit Page
Other Page

Date: P 15 1959

Russ Plan Attack, Defector Says

Reports It Has Been Soviets' Strategy Since '55; He Was Destroyer Chief

From Press Dispatches
Washington, D. C. — A defected Soviet naval officer testified Wednesday that Soviet Russia had been preparing for a surprise nuclear attack on the United States since 1955.

Capt. Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov, 32, said that despite Soviet Premier Khrushchev's public declarations favoring disarmament, Soviet military forces had been under orders to be ready to touch off an immediate nuclear attack on this country.

Artamonov, commander of a Soviet naval destroyer until he escaped to the west in June, 1959, gave this testimony to the house committee on un-American activities.

"I believe that the Soviet dictatorship would undertake a surprise attack if she felt she could win in one stroke," he said.

Calls Reds Power Seekers
"Make no mistake—they are power seekers, not political idealists.

"Khrushchev does not wish to wait indefinitely for the United States to become a Socialist state by evolution; moreover he does not believe this will happen. He would like to see it take place in his lifetime."

The committee named its witness only Wednesday morning, saying it was the first time he had been identified though he had been in the United States since last year.

Artamonov said:
"Since February, 1955, Soviet strategy has been based on a doctrine of surprise attack in nuclear warfare. This doctrine was established in a Soviet military publication which is known only to officers of flag rank and above. Several times over the last four years it has



Nikolai Artamonov

that such an aggression was necessary. No senior Soviet officer believes that the United States will attack first."

Artamonov said he began to question Soviet policies in his own mind while a student in the higher educational phases of becoming a naval officer.

He said that his illusions on Soviet policies and Khrushchev's personality "were shattered when Khrushchev praised Marshal Zhukov as a war hero and in three months' time fired him."

Says People Disagree

Artamonov said the Russian people have no use for Soviet policies. Instead, he said:

"They are not interested in wasting their energies and talents by solemnizing the dictators of the Kremlin or in enslaving other nationalities for the sake of the very same dictators.

"They are not interested in surrounding themselves with bereavement and tribulation for a concept which is profoundly antidemocratic, and which is bringing misery to them and others, and a concept which no one, especially the leaders of the party themselves, believes."

been said again and it has never been changed.

"This concept was obviously intended to prepare the Soviet officers for the starting of such a war by the Soviet Union. It was designed as an excuse to be presented to the Soviet officers

Press Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON 1, D. C.

DENVER (Colo.)
POST

Circ.: e. 254,519
S. 336,330

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Date: SEP 15 1953



AP Wirephoto

CAPT. NIKOLAI FEDOROVICH ARTAMONOV
"The Soviet government lies to its own people."

RED EX-OFFICER

Defector Reveals Crimes of Soviets

WASHINGTON, Sept. 15.-- (UPI)—As a child, he saw nothing wrong with a government that told children to spy on their parents. In his 20's, he often defended Communist Party policies in discussions with his father and friends.

Yet, at 31, Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov, captain in the Soviet Navy and commander of a Red banner destroyer, defected to the United States.

Why? Artamonov answered this question Wednesday at a congressional hearing. He said he defected 15 months ago because he finally realized the Soviet government was committing "crimes on an international scale" and was lying to the world and its own people.

It "just didn't make sense," he told the House Committee on Un-American Activities. Artamonov charged: Soviet fishing trawlers of the American East Coast actually are elaborate spy ships manned by Soviet intelligence personnel. Soviet strategy for more than four years has been based on a doctrine of "surprise attack in nuclear warfare." Artamonov said the nuclear doctrine was laid down in 1953 in a confidential Soviet military publication available only to generals and admirals. He did not say how he became aware of the article.

15 SEPT 1960

Press Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON 1 D C.

CLARKSVILLE (Tenn.)
LEAF-CHRONICLE

Circ.: e. 8,513

3

Front Page Edit Page Other Page

Date: SEP 15 1960



WASHINGTON—FORMER SOVIET OFFICER TESTIFIES —
Capt. Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov, defected Russian naval officer, appears as a witness before the House unAmerican Activities Committee. He testified the Soviet Union has been preparing for a surprise nuclear attack on the United States since 1955. (AP Wirephoto)

20383

15 SEPT 1960

WASHINGTON I. D. C.

BENTON HARBOR
(Mich.) NEWS-
PALLADIUM

Circ.: e. 22,901

Front Edit Other
Page Page Page
EP 5 1360

If Reds Could K.O. U.S., They'd Attack

Navy Officer Defector Tells Soviet Plans

By RICHARD WESLEY

WASHINGTON (AP) — Soviet leaders would not hesitate to launch a surprise nuclear attack on the United States if they thought this nation could be smashed with one stroke, a former Soviet naval officer says. Capt. Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov testified Wednesday that Soviet military strategy has been based on the doctrine of a surprise nuclear attack since February 1955.

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He said he had been in the United States since shortly after he fled to the West, working with U. S. agencies he did not name.

LIVING IN NEW YORK

He said he lives now in New York City, at an undisclosed address, without guards or any form of protection from Communist retaliation.

Despite Premier Nikita Khrushchev's repeated pronouncements favoring disarmament, Artamonov said, the Soviet doctrine of a surprise attack has been official since February 1955. He said it was spelled out in a Soviet military publication available only to high-ranking officers.



CAPTAIN ARTAMONOV

13 SEP 1950

BENTON HARBOR
(Mich.) NEWS-
PALLADIUM

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Front Page Edit Page Other Page
Page 5 1300

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CAPTAIN ARTAMONOV

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15 SEP 1960

WASHINGTON, D. C.

SHREVEPORT (La.) TIMES

Circ.: m. 85,071
S. 104,524

Front Page Edit Page Other Page

Date: SEP 15 1960



CAPT. N. F. ARTAMONOV

Red Vessels Spy on U.S., Solons Told

WASHINGTON, Sept. 14 (UPI)—A Russian Navy captain who defected to the West testified today that Soviet fishing trawlers operating off the U. S. coast actually are instrument-loaded ships spying on American naval units.

Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov, 32, described as a former commander of a Soviet destroyer, told a congressional hearing the trawlers were manned by Soviet intelligence personnel "concerned with the combat preparation of the U.S. fleet."

Artamonov, who said he defected to the West 15 months ago because of disenchantment with "aggressive" Soviet foreign policy, testified that the Russian vessels did not engage in any legitimate fishing. He said they were loaded with instruments for the Soviet Union to appear legitimate in the event of search by U. S. naval units.

Artamonov told a House Subcommittee on Un-American Activities that the trawlers are laden with gadgets to pick up information on radar frequencies used by the Navy and the location in shore-based "signal systems."

Speaking through an interpreter, he said the ships were collecting information on the composition of the U. S. fleet, its maneuvers and the usual location of its patrols.

Describing the trawlers as the Soviet's chief method of obtaining information about the U. S. Navy, the Russian said the vessels also reported on the usual flight patterns of this country's early war

20385

15 SEPT 1960

Press Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON 1, D. C.

ALBANY (N.Y.)
KNICKERBOCKER NEWS

Circ.: e. 66,735

Front Page Edit Page Other Page

Date SEP 15 1960

Had Enough of Lies and Crimes, Defecting Soviet Officer Tells U. S.

Washington (AP) — As a child, he saw nothing wrong with a government that told children to spy on their parents. In his 20's, he often defended Communist party policies in discussions with his father and friends.

Now, at 31, Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov, captain in the Soviet Navy and commander of a Red Banner destroyer, defected to the United States.



Why?
Mr. Artamonov, a tall, slim Russian with a thick mustache, answered this question yesterday at a Congressional hearing.

Revealed Lies

He said he defected because he finally realized the government was committed to an immoral course.

NIKOLAI ARTAMONOV
Red Probe Witnesses on Stand

It "just doesn't make sense," he told the House

committee on un-American activities.

Mr. Artamonov, now living in New York, inveighed against the Soviet government in even stronger terms. He charged:

'One Stroke' War

—Soviet fishing trawlers off the American east coast actually are elaborate spy ships manned by Soviet intelligence personnel. These ships are even loaded with fish before they leave Russia in an effort to mask their spying mission.

—Soviet strategy for more than four years has been based on a doctrine of "surprise attack in nuclear warfare." He believes Soviet Premier Khrushchev would launch a surprise attack on the United States if he became convinced Russia could win in one stroke.

Press Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON 1. D. C. f

CLEVELAND (Ohio)
PRESS and NEWS

Circ.: 304,074

Front Page Edit Page Other Page

Date: SEP 15 1960

Russian Paints Mr. K as War Plotter

By ANDREW TULLY
Scripps-Howard Writer

WASHINGTON — A young Russian naval officer has exposed Premier Nikita Khrushchev as a man who talks disarmament and plots surprise attacks against the West.

Capt. Nikolai Federovich Artamonov, who fled the Soviet Union last year, put it bluntly to the House Committee on un-American activities:


"Since February, 1955, Soviet strategy has been based on the doctrine of surprise attack in nuclear warfare. . . . It has never been changed."

The captain was specific. The surprise attack strategy was contained, he said, in an article in the Russian journal *Military Thought*, restricted to generals and admirals. It was written by Marshal Rotmistrov, chief of the Soviet

Atomic Weapons Command. Artamonov emphasized that such an article could not have been written on Rotmistrov's own initiative—that it obviously reflected orders from on high. And the article was intended, he said, "to prepare the Soviet officers for the starting of such a war by the Soviet Union."

Under questioning by Committee Counsel Alfred M. Nittle, Artamonov also provided the first public revelation of the character of those Soviet fishing trawlers which haunt the Atlantic.

The crews of those vessels, he said, actually are members of Soviet naval intelligence units, dispatched to gather information on the "combat readiness of American naval forces, the usual locations of their patrols, and the condition of American anti-submarine defenses."



RUSSIAN DEFECTOR
Fedorovich Artamonov told a House subcommittee yesterday that the Soviet Union plans a surprise attack on the U. S.
(UPI Telephoto)

Press Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON, D. C.

EVANSVILLE (Ind.)
PRESS
Circ: a. 44,223

Front Page
Edit Page
Other Page

Date: SEP 15 1960

Russian Defector Says Khrushchev Plotting Surprise Nuclear Attacks

Former Communist Outlines Red Plans

By ANDREW TULLY
Scrappellward Staff Writer

WASHINGTON — The young Soviet naval officer sat in a room in the old House Office Building and when he was through testifying Nikita Khrushchev had been exposed again as a man who talks disarmament and plots surprise attacks against the West.

Capt. Nikolai F. Artamonov, who fled the Soviet Union last year, put it bluntly to the House Committee on Un-American Activities:

"Since February, 1955, Soviet strategy has been based on the doctrine of surprise attack in nuclear warfare... it has never been changed."

The captain was specific. The surprise attack strategy was outlined, he said, in an article in the Russian journal "Military Thought," restricted to generals and admirals. It was written by Marshal Rotmistrov, chief of the Soviet atomic weapons command.

Reflects Orders
Artamonov emphasized that such an article could not have been written on Rotmistrov's own initiative — that it obviously reflected orders from on high. The article was intended, he said, "to prepare the Soviet officers for the stirring of such a war by the Soviet union."

obliged to punt out from the in-formation... available to me as a Soviet officer and Communist Party member that Soviet military strategy is inconsistent with Khrushchev's pronouncements."

That strategy was clarified in a quotation from Marshal Rotmistrov's article read into the record by the youthful defector. "The element of surprise is one of the decisive conditions for achieving success," the marshal wrote. "In some cases a sudden attack with new weapons may result in the rapid collapse of the government" under attack.

Trawlers Pinned

Under questioning by committee counsel Alfred M. Nettle, Captain Artamonov also provided the first public revelation of the character of those Soviet fishing trawlers which haunt the Atlantic. The crews of those vessels, he said, actually are mem-

bers of Soviet naval intelligence units, dispatched to gather information on the "combat readiness of American naval forces, the usual locations of their patrols, and the condition of American anti-submarine defenses."

Artamonov was scornful when Nettle asked him whether the Soviet Union would launch a surprise attack on the West if Communist China went to war with a member-nation of the free world.

Brusquely, Artamonov replied: "I don't think Communist China could start a war without consulting with and getting approval from the Soviet Union. Then the Russians would deal the first blow and the Chinese would come in to support the Russians."

As for Khrushchev and his mouthings about peaceful co-existence, Artamonov sought to put Mr. K. in perspective. "Khrush-



NIKOLAI ARTAMONOV

chev does not wish to war in definitely for the United States to become a socialist state by evolution," he said. "Moreover, he does not believe this will happen. He would like to see it take place in his lifetime."

Soviet Why

WASHINGTON — With a government his 20's, he said, he often defended Communist Party policies in discussion with his father and friends.

Yet, at 31 and commander of a Red Banner destroyer, defected to the United States.

Why? Artamonov, a tall, slim Russian with a thick mustache, answered this question yesterday at a congressional hearing.

Khrushchev Attacks

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NIKOLAI ARTAMONOV

Soviet Naval Officer Tells Why He Defected to U.S.

WASHINGTON — (UPI) — As a child, he saw nothing wrong with a government that told children to spy on their parents. In his 20's, he often defended Communist Party policies in discussion with his father and friends.

Yet, at 31, Nikolai F. Artamonov, captain in the Soviet Navy and commander of a Red Banner destroyer, defected to the United States.

Why? Artamonov, a tall, slim Russian with a thick mustache, answered this question yesterday at a congressional hearing.

He said he defected because he finally realized the Soviet government was committing "crimes on an international scale" and was lying to the world and its own people.

It "just didn't make sense," he told the House Committee on Un-American Activities.

Artamonov is now living in New York.

20388

WASHINGTON, D. C.

SAN FRANCISCO (Calif.)
CHRONICLE

Circ.: m. 259,027
S. 309,084

Front Page
Editor Page
Other Page
Date: SEP 15 1960



A. P. Wierzbicki
NIKOLAI ARTAMONOV
Ex-Soviet skipper

Defector Says Russ Plan for Sneak Attack

WASHINGTON, Sept. 14 (AP) — A Russian navy captain who defected in disillusionment last year declared today that since February 1955 Soviet strategy has been based on the doctrine of a nuclear surprise attack on the United States.

Captain Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov, who in June, 1959, came into the open before the House Committee on Un-American Activities.

The 32-year-old Russian said a realization that "everything being said in Russia was not true, but based on lies" led him to defect. He didn't say how he escaped to the West.

Speaking mostly in Russian with an interpreter, the heavily mustached Artamonov said the doctrine of surprise attack was established Soviet military publication which is known only to officers of flag rank and above.

See Page 14, Col. 1

Russian Defector 'Sneak Attack Plan'

Continued from Page 1

He conceded he had not actually seen any directives to prepare for a surprise attack on the U. S.

"But I know of general, broad statements which tended to prepare the Soviet officer corps for the possibility of being ordered to make a surprise attack," added the slim, dark ex-destroyer skipper.

Artamonov said "no senior Soviet officer believes that the United States will attack first."

The Un-American Activities Committee brought Artamonov to its witness chair about a week after the Russians trotted out two defecting American code clerks, Bernice F. Mitchell and William H. Martin. Mitchell and

Martin said they went to Russia because they objected to what they said were U. S. spy policies risking World War III.

Questioned by the committee, Artamonov said Russian fishing trawlers often sighted near U. S. waters are operated by Soviet naval intelligence. Russian submarines also hover close to American territorial waters hunting information, he testified.

What are they seeking? Knowledge about the makeup of the U. S. fleet, weapons used by American warships and anti-submarine measures being taken by the U. S. Navy, the Russian defector said.

Later, Artamonov told newsmen—again through an interpreter—that he is living in New York, without any special protection. All he has to defend himself against possible Communist reprisals, he said, are "fay own hands."

15 SEPT 1960

Press Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON 1, D. C.

EVANSVILLE (Ind.)
PRESS
circ: e. 44,223

Front Edit Other
Page Page Page

Date: SEP 15 1960

Russian Defector Says Khrushchev Plotting Surprise Nuclear Attacks

Former Communist Outlines Red Plans

By ANDREW TULLY
Script-News Staff Writer

WASHINGTON — The young Soviet naval officer sat in a room in the old House Office Building and when he was through testifying Nikita Khrushchev had been exposed again as a man who talks disarmament and plots surprise attacks against the West. Capt. Nikolai F. Artamonov, who fled the Soviet Union last year, put it bluntly to the House Committee on Un-American Activities:

"Since February, 1955, Soviet strategy has been based on the doctrine of surprise attack in nuclear warfare . . . It has never been changed."

The captain was specific. The surprise attack strategy was continued, he said, in an article in the Russian journal "Military Thought," restricted to generals and admirals. It was written by Marshal Rotmistrov, chief of the Soviet atomic weapons command.

Reflects Orders

Artamonov emphasized that in an article could not have been written on Rotmistrov's own initiative — that it obviously reflected orders from on high. The article was intended, he said, "to prepare the Soviet officers for the waging of such a war by the Soviet union."

A neat and slender man of 32 with a black mustache, the Russian noted wryly that Khrushchev arriving Monday for the United Nations session. "He says he is going to talk about disarmament," said the captain. "I feel

obliged to point out from the information . . . available to me as a Soviet officer and Communist Party member that Soviet military strategy is inconsistent with Khrushchev's pronouncements."

That strategy was clarified in a quotation from Marshal Rotmistrov's article read into the record by the youthful defector. "The element of surprise is one of the decisive conditions for achieving success," the marshal wrote. "In some cases a sudden attack with new weapons may result in the rapid collapse of the government" under attack.

Trawlers Pinned

Under questioning by committee counsel Alfred M. Nittle, Captain Artamonov also provided the first public revelation of the character of those Soviet fishing trawlers which haunt the Atlantic. The crews of those vessels, he said, actually are mem-

bers of Soviet naval intelligence units, dispatched to gather information on the "combat readiness of American naval forces, the usual locations of their patrols, and the condition of American anti-submarine defenses."

Artamonov was scornful when Nittle asked him whether the Soviet Union would launch a surprise attack on the West if Communist China went to war with a member-nation of the free world.

Brusquely, Artamonov replied: "I don't think Communist China would start a war without consulting with and getting approval from the Soviet Union. Then the Russians would deal the first blow and the Chinese would come in to support the Russians."

As for Khrushchev and his mouthings about peaceful co-existence, Artamonov sought to put Mr. K. in perspective. "Khrush-



NIKOLAI ARTAMONOV

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Soviet Na Why He I

WASHINGTON — with a government th his, he often del ston with his father a Yet at 31, Nikola and commander of United States.

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15 SEP 1960

Press Intelligence, Inc.

WASHINGTON 1, D. C.

EVANSVILLE (Ind.)

PRESS

Circ: e. 44, 223

Front Page Other Page Page

Date:

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Former Communist Outlines Red Plans

By ANDREW TULYK
Sensationalist Staff Writer

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Trawlers Planned

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NIKOLAI ARTAMONOV

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Soviet Naval Officer Tells Why He Defected to U.S.

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Why?

Artamonov, a tall, slim Russian with a thick moustache, answered this question yesterday at a congressional hearing. He said he defected because he finally realized the Soviet government was committing "crimes on an international scale" and was lying to the world and its own people.

It "just didn't make sense," he told the House Committee on Un-American Activities.

Artamonov is now living in New York.

Surprise Attack Held Soviet Aim

By FRED S. HOFFMAN

WASHINGTON (AP)—A Russian navy captain who defected in disillusionment last year declared yesterday that since February, 1955, Soviet strategy has been based on the doctrine of a nuclear surprise attack on the United States.

Capt. Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov, who crossed to the West in June, 1959, came into the open before the house committee on un-American Activities.

The 32-year-old Russian said a realization that "everything being said in Russia was not true, but based on lies" led him to defect. He didn't say how he escaped to the West.

SPEAKING mostly in Russian with the aid of an interpreter, the heavily mustached Artamonov said the doctrine of surprise attack was established "in a Soviet military publication which is known only to officers of flag rank and above."

He conceded he had not actually seen any directives to prepare for a surprise attack on the United States.

"But I know of general, broad statements which tended to prepare the Soviet officer corps for the possibility of being ordered to make a surprise attack," added the slim, dark ex-destroyer skipper.

Artamonov said "No senior Soviet officer believes that the United States will attack first."

THE UN-AMERICAN Activities

Press Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON, D. C.

NASHVILLE (Tenn.)
TENNESSEAN

Circ.: m. 122,885
S. 199,950

Front Page Edit Page Other Page
Date: SEP 15 1960

Surprise Attack Held Soviet Aim These Days

(Continued From Page One)

Committee brought Artamonov to its witness chair about a week after the Russians trotted out two defecting American code clerks, Bernon F. Mitchell and William H. Martin. Mitchell and Martin said they went to Russia because they objected to what they said were U.S. spy policies risking World War III.

Questioned by the committee,

the bespectacled Artamonov said Russian fishing trawlers, often sighted near U.S. waters are operated by Soviet naval intelligence. Russian submarines also hover close to American territorial waters hunting information, he testified.

What are they seeking? Knowledge about the makeup of the U.S. fleet, weapons used by American warships and anti-submarine measures being taken by the U.S. navy, the Russian defector said.

Although without apparent emotion, he spoke in bitter words of Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev.

"KHRUSHCHEV does not wish to wait indefinitely for the United States to become a socialist state

by evolution; moreover he does not believe this will happen," Artamonov asserted.

"He would like to see it take place in his lifetime."

At another point, the former Russian navy man told the committee:

"If Khrushchev believed the strength of the Soviet Union was overwhelming he would, of course, deal a stunning blow to the West."

However, he also said Khrushchev probably is serious about attempting to achieve agreements through peaceful means, to avoid war.

Later, Artamonov told newsmen—again through an interpreter—that he is living in New York, without any special protection. All he has to defend himself against possible Communist reprisals, he said, are "my own hands."

(Continued From Page One)

Clifford Avrit later. "I was amazed at the fine quality of the rubber. I thought it was probably from one of those rockets."

CLIFFORD AVRIT decided he'd better call in the authorities. The word went to the Franklin police dispatcher, from there to the Belle Meade police dispatcher, and finally to Newton W. Moore Jr., Davidson County Civil Defense director.

Moore took it to the state adjutant general's office. A conclave of about a dozen officers gathered to examine the object and discuss it.

The consensus was that it was part of a wasted weather balloon, released somewhere by some field artillery unit for weather tracking.



Capt. Nikolai Artamonov. All based on lies.


20391

Press Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON 1, D. C.

LAFAYETTE (Ind.)
JOURNAL and COURIER

Circ.: e. 40,974

Front Page Edit Page Other Page 44
Date: SEP 15 1960



FORMER SOVIET OFFICER TESTIFIES — Capt. Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov, a defected Russian Naval officer, appears as a witness before the House un-American activities committee. He testified the Soviet Union has been preparing for a surprise nuclear attack on the United States since 1955. (AP Wirephoto)

15 SEP 60

Press Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON 1. D. C.

LAWTON (Okla.)
CONSTITUTION

Circ.: e. 13,375
S. 18,808

Front Page SEP 1960
Other Pages

Defector Says Soviets Base Strategy On Surprise Attack

WASHINGTON (AP) — Soviet leaders would not hesitate to launch a surprise nuclear attack on the United States if they thought this nation could be smashed with one stroke, a former Soviet naval officer says.

Capt. Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov testified Wednesday that Soviet military strategy has been based on the doctrine of a surprise nuclear attack since February 1955.

Artamonov, 32, who was commander of a Soviet destroyer in the Baltic fleet, defected to the United States in June 1959 while stationed at Gdynia, Poland.

His appearance before the House Committee on Un-American Activities, however, provided the first public disclosure of his presence in this country.

The slim, bespectacled Soviet with a heavy black moustache, spent most of his time telling of his Soviet-style education and of a gradual disillusionment with Soviet leaders.

He said he had been in the

United States since shortly after he fled to the West, working with U. S. agencies he did not name.

He said he lives now in New York City, at an undisclosed address, without guards or any form of protection from Communist retaliation.

Despite premier Nikita Khrushchev's repeated pronouncements favoring disarmament, Artamonov said, the Soviet doctrine of a surprise attack has been official since February 1955. He said it was spelled out in a Soviet military publication available only to high-ranking officers.

He said he had not himself seen any directives ordering preparations for such a surprise assault on this nation.

But he added: "I know of general, broad statements which tended to prepare the Soviet officer corps for the possibility of being ordered to make a surprise attack."

He said "no senior Soviet officer believes that the United States would attack first."

Press Intelligence, Inc.

WASHINGTON 1. D. C.

TRENTON (N.J.)
TRENTONIAN

Circ.: m. 37,731

2

Front Page Edit Page / Other Page
SEP 15 1960

Russian Defector Brands Red Trawlers 'Spy' Ships

WASHINGTON, Sept. 14 (UPI). A Russian Navy Captain who defected to the west testified today that Soviet fishing trawlers operating off the United States east coast actually are instrument-loaded ships spying on American naval units.

Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov, 32, described as a former com- with fish before leaving the Soviet Union to appear legitimate in the event of search by United States Naval units.

Artamonov told a House Subcommittee on Un-American activities that the trawlers are laden with gadgets to pick up information on radar frequencies used by the Navy and the location of

Press Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON 1. D. C.

TRENTON (N.J.)
TRENTONIAN

Circ.: m. 37,731

Front Page Edit Page /Other Page
SEP 15 1960

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Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov, 32, described as a former commander of a Soviet destroyer, told a congressional hearing the trawlers were manned by Soviet Intelligence personnel "concerned with the combat preparation of the United States fleet."

ARTAMONOV, who said he defected to the west 15 months ago because of disenchantment with "aggressive" Soviet foreign policy, testified that the Russian vessels did not engage in any legitimate fishing. He said they were loaded

with fish before leaving the Soviet Union to appear legitimate in the event of search by United States Naval units.

Artamonov told a House Subcommittee on Un-American activities that the trawlers are laden with gadgets to pick up information on radar frequencies used by the Navy and the location of shore-based "signal systems."

SPEAKING through an interpreter, he said the ships were collecting information on the composition of the United States fleet, its maneuvers and the usual location of its patrols.

Describing the trawlers as the Soviet's chief method of obtaining information about the United States Navy, the Russian said the vessels also reported on the usual flight patterns of this country's early-warning picket planes.

15 SEPT 60

PITTSFIELD (Mass.)
BERKSHIRE EAGLE
Circ.: e. 28,770

Front Page Edit Page Other Page 2
Date: 15

Defector Reports Soviet Raid Plan

WASHINGTON (AP) — Soviet leaders would not hesitate to launch a surprise nuclear attack on the United States if they thought this nation could be smashed with one stroke, a former Soviet naval officer says.

Capt. Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov testified Wednesday that Soviet military strategy has been based on the doctrine of a surprise nuclear attack since February 1955.

Here 15 Months

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Despite Premier Nikita Khrushchev's repeated pronouncements favoring disarmament, Artamonov said, the Soviet doctrine of a surprise attack has been official since February 1955. He said it was spelled out in a Soviet military publication available only to high-ranking officers.

Didn't See Directives

The Russian said a realization that "everything being said in Russia was not true, but based on lies" led him to defect. He didn't say how he escaped to the West.

He conceded he had not actually seen any directives to prepare for a



Associated Press
Capt. Nikolai F. Artamonov

surprise attack on the United States.

"But I know of general, broad statements which tended to prepare the Soviet officer corps for the possibility of being ordered to make a surprise attack," added the allm, dark former destroyer skipper.

Artamonov said "no senior Soviet officer believes that the United States will attack first."

Questioned by the committee, the bespectacled Artamonov said Russian fishing trawlers often sighted near U.S. waters are operated by Soviet naval intelligence. Russian submarines also hover close to American territorial waters hunting information, he testified.

What are they seeking? Knowledge about the make-up of the U.S. fleet, weapons used by American warships and antisubmarine measures being taken by the U.S. Navy, the Russian defector said.

The Will To Hit

Although without apparent emotion, he spoke in bitter words of Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev.

Artamonov told the committee: "If Khrushchev believed the strength of the Soviet Union was overwhelming he would, of course, deal a stunning blow to the West."

15 SEPT 60

Press Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON 1. D. C.

ST. PETERSBURG (Fla.)
TIMES

Circ.: m. 112,029
S. 112,393

Front Page Edit Page Other Page

2A

Date: SEP 15 1960



NIKOLAI ARTAMONOV
... disenchanted.

Defector Says Red Trawlers Spy On U.S.

WASHINGTON (UPI) — A Russian navy captain who defected to the West testified yesterday that Soviet fishing trawlers operating off the U.S. East coast actually are instrument-loaded ships spying on American Naval units.

Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov, 32, described as a former commander of a Soviet destroyer, told a congressional hearing the trawlers were manned by Soviet intelligence personnel concerned with the combat preparation of the U.S. Fleet.

DISENCHANTED
Artamonov, who said he defected to the West 15 months ago because of disenchantment with "aggressive" Soviet foreign policy, testified that the Russian vessels did not engage in any legitimate fishing. He said they were loaded with fish before leaving the Soviet Union to appear legitimate in the event of search by U.S. Naval units.

Artamonov told a House subcommittee on un-American activities that the trawlers are laden with gadgets to pick up information on radar frequencies used by the Navy and the location of shore-based "signal systems."

Speaking through an interpreter, he said the ships were collecting information on the composition of the U.S. fleet, its maneuvers and the usual location of its patrols.

Describing the trawlers as the Soviet's chief method of obtaining information about the U.S. Navy, the Russian said the vessels also reported on the usual flight patterns of this country's early-warning picket planes.

His testimony came as House Democratic leader John W. McCormack called on the State Department to make a full report to the United Nations General Assembly on any espionage activities by Soviet trawlers off the East Coast.

The Massachusetts Democrat said "well over 200" Russian trawlers, sporting a "forest of radar masts and electronic gear" have passed through the Baltic Sea into the Atlantic Ocean since Aug. 1.

He charged the trawler armada had been gathered "for the apparent purpose of spying on NATO naval maneuvers while Premier Nikita Khrushchev attends the U.N. General Assembly meeting in New York starting next Tuesday.

Artamonov, who said he is now living in New York City, said he defected to the West because of disillusion over a foreign policy based on a doctrine of surprise nuclear attack.

He said the nuclear doctrine was laid down in a confidential Soviet military publication in 1955, available only to generals and admirals. He did not say how he became aware of the article.

Artamonov quoted the article as saying that "sudden attack may result in the rapid collapse of a government." He said he interpreted the reference to government to mean the United States.

15 SEP 60

Cross Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON, D. C.

YORK (Pa.)
DISPATCH
Circ.: e. 34,333

Front Page Edit Page Other Page

Date: SEP 15 1960

RUSSIA WOULD STRIKE FIRST NUCLEAR BLOW

Ex-Red Naval Officer Discusses Military Doctrine

WASHINGTON, Sept. 15. AP—Russian leaders would not hesitate to launch a surprise nuclear attack on the United States if they thought this nation could be smashed with one stroke, a former Soviet naval officer says.

Capt. Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov testified that Soviet military strategy has been based on the doctrine of a surprise nuclear attack since February, 1955.

Artamonov, who was commander of a Russian destroyer in the Baltic fleet, defected to the United States in June, 1959, while stationed at Gdynia, Poland.

His appearance before the House Committee on Un-American Activities, however, provided the first public disclosure of his presence in this country.

32 Year Old

The 32-year-old Russian, a slight, bespectacled man, with a heavy black moustache, spent most of his time telling of his Soviet-style education and of a gradual disillusionment with Soviet leaders.

He said he had been in the United States since shortly after he fled to the West, working with U.S. agencies; he did not name them.

He said he lives now in New York City, at an undisclosed address, without guards or any form of protection from Communist retaliation.

Despite Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev's repeated pronouncements favoring disarmament, Artamonov said the Soviet doctrine of a surprise attack has been official since February, 1955. He said it spelled the end of the Soviet military tradition of a "no first use" policy.

Under such a policy, Artamonov confirmed, Western suspicions that the Soviet fishing trawlers frequently seen near U.S. waters are spying, not fishing. He said the vessels, always, are operated and manned by agents of Soviet naval intelligence.

Power Seekers

He said his own defection to the West was not motivated by "foreign intelligence" agents or hope of personal or material gain.

"On the contrary," he said, "I was given favored treatment by the Soviet authorities and had a bright future ahead of me."

He said his own disillusionment came in 1957 when Khrushchev praised Marshal Georgi Zhukov as a Soviet war hero. "I was a hero," he later told him, "but I was not a hero."

Artamonov said the Kremlin's contempt is composed of "power seekers, not political leaders."

15 SEP 1960

Press Intelligence, Inc
WASHINGTON 1. D. C.

TULSA (Okla.)
TRIBUNE

Circ.: e. 74,183

Front Edit Other
Page Page Page 28

Date: SEP 15 1960

Probers Told Reds Eyeing Atomic Attack

WASHINGTON, Sept. 15 (AP)—Soviet leaders would not hesitate to launch a surprise nuclear attack on the United States if the thought this nation could be smashed with one stroke, a former Soviet naval officer says.

Capt. Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov testified Wednesday the Soviet military strategy has been based on the doctrine of a surprise nuclear attack since February 1955.

Artamonov, 32, who was commander of a Soviet destroyer in the Baltic fleet, defected to the United States in June 1959 and is stationed at Gdynia, Poland.

Despite Premier Nikita Khrushchev's repeated pronouncements favoring disarmament, Artamonov said the Soviet doctrine of a surprise attack has been official since February 1955. He said it was spelled out in a Soviet military publication available only to high-ranking officers.

He said he had not himself seen any directives or plans for preparations for such a surprise assault on this nation.

But he added: "I know of general broad statements intended to prepare the Soviet officer corps for the possibility of being ordered to make surprise attack."

He said "no senior Soviet officer believes that the United States would attack first."

Under questioning, Artamonov confirmed Western suspicion that the Soviet fishing trawlers frequently seen near U.S. waters are spying, not fishing. He said the vessels always are operated and manned by agents of Soviet naval intelligence.

15 SEP 60

CHATTANOOGA (Tenn.)
TIMES

Circ.: m. 50,831
S. 79,481

Front Edit Other
Page Page Page 1
Date: SEP 15 1960

PLAN FOR ATTACK ON U.S. ALLEGED

Defector Testifies Soviet Union Started Preparing Atom Assault in '55

ONCE NAVAL OFFICER

Former Destroyer Chief Gives Information to House Committee

WASHINGTON (AP) — Capt. Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov, a defected Soviet naval officer, testified Wednesday that the Soviet Union has been preparing for a surprise nuclear attack on the United States since 1955. The Russian said that despite Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev's public declarations favoring disarmament, Soviet military forces have been under orders to be ready to touch off an immediate nuclear attack on this country.

Artamonov, 22, decorated commander of a Soviet naval destroyer until he escaped to the West in June 1959, gave his testimony to the House Committee on Un-American Activities.

"I believe that the Soviet dictatorship would undertake a surprise attack if she felt she could win in one stroke," he said. "Make no mistake—they are power seekers, not political idealists."

"Khrushchev does not wish to wait indefinitely for the United States to become a Socialist state by evolution; moreover he does not believe this will happen. He would like to see it take place in his lifetime."

The Russian said a realization that "everything being said in Russia was not true, but based on lies" led him to defect. He didn't say how he escaped to the West.

Speaking mostly in Russian with the aid of an interpreter, Artamonov said the doctrine of surprise attack was established "in a Soviet military publication which is known only to officers of flag rank and above."

He conceded he had not actually seen any directives to prepare for a surprise attack on the United States.

"But I know of general, broad statements which tended to prepare the Soviet officer corps for the possibility of being ordered to make a surprise attack," added the slim, dark ex-destroyer skipper.

Artamonov said, "No senior Soviet officer believes that the United States will attack first."

The committee named its witness Wednesday morning, saying it was the first time he had been identified, though he had been in the United States since last year.

20400

Press Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON, D. C.

TULSA (Okla.)
WORLD

Circulation: 95,474
S. 150,615

From: Edit Other
Page Page

SEP 15 1960

Russ Defector Says Reds Plot Sneak Attack on U.S.

WASHINGTON, Sept. 14 (AP)—A Russian Navy captain who disclosed in disillusionment last year that he had defected from the Soviet Union, said today that since January 1959 Soviet strategy has been based on the doctrine of a surprise attack on the United States.

Artamonov said that the doctrine of a surprise attack was established "in a Soviet military publication which is known only to officers of flag rank and above."

He conceded he had not actually seen any directives to prepare for a surprise attack on the United States.

"But I know of general broad statements which tended to prepare the Soviet officers corps for the possibility of being ordered to make a surprise attack," added Artamonov said. "In a Soviet magazine, the senior Soviet officer believes that the United States will attack first."

The un-American activities committee brought Artamonov to its witness chair about a week after the Russians trotted out two detecting American code clerks, Benson J. Mitchell and William H. Martin. Mitchell and Martin said they went to Russia because they objected to what they said were U.S. spy policies risking World War III.

Artamonov said Russian fishing trawlers often sighted near U.S. waters are operated by Soviet naval intelligence. Russian submarines also hover close to American territorial waters hunting information, he testified.

"What are they seeking? Knowledge about the makeup of the U.S. fleet, weapons used by American warships and anti-submarine measures being taken by the U.S. Navy," the Russian defector said.

Although without apparent emotion, he spoke in bitter words of Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev.

"Khrushchev does not wish to wait indefinitely for the United States to become a socialist state by evolution; moreover he does not believe this will happen."

Artamonov asserted, "He would like to see it take place in his lifetime."

At another point, he told the committee:

"If Khrushchev believed the strength of the Soviet Union was overwhelming he would, of course, deal a stunning blow to the West. However, he also said Khrushchev probably is serious about attempting to achieve agreements through peaceful means, to avoid war."

15 OCT 60

Press Intelligence, Inc.

WASHINGTON 1. D. C.

PORT HURON (Mich.)
TIMES-HERALD

Circ.: e. 31,203
S. 31,018

Front Edit Other
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Date: SEP 15 1960

FORMER RUSSIAN OFFICER TESTIFIES

Sovjet Military Strategy Based On Doctrine Of Surprise Attack

leaders would not hesitate to launch a surprise nuclear attack on the United States if they thought this nation could be smashed with one stroke, a former Soviet naval officer says.

Capt. Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov testified Wednesday that Soviet military strategy has been based on the doctrine of a surprise nuclear attack since February 1955.

Despite Premier Nikita Khrushchev's repeated pronouncements favoring disarmament, Artamonov said, the Soviet doctrine of a surprise attack has been official since February 1955. He said it was spelled out in a Soviet military publication available only to high-ranking officers.

Artamonov, 32, who was commander of a Soviet destroyer in the Baltic fleet, defected to the United States in June 1959 while stationed at Gdynia, Poland.

His appearance before the House Committee on Un-American Activities, however, provided the first public disclosure of his presence in this country.

He said he had been in the United States since shortly after he fled to the West, working with agencies he did not name. He said he lives now in New York City, at an undisclosed address, without guards or any form of protection from Communist retaliation.

Press Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON 1, D. C.

MADISON (Wisc.)
STATE JOURNAL

Circ.: m. 49,550
S. 79,013

Front Page Edit Page Other Page
Date: SEP 15 1960

Soviet Attack Plan Revealed

WASHINGTON (AP)—A Russian navy captain, who defected in disillusionment last year, declared Wednesday that since February, 1955, Soviet strategy has been on the doctrine of a nuclear surprise attack on the United States.

Capt. Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov, who crossed to the West in



ARTAMONOV

June 1959, came into the open before the House Committee on Un-American Activities. The 32-year-old Russian said a realization that "everything being said in Russia was not true, but based on lies" led him to defect. He didn't say how he escaped to the West.

Speaking mostly in Russian with the aid of an interpreter, Artamonov said the doctrine of surprise attack was established "in a Soviet military publication which is known only to officers of flag rank and above."

He conceded he had not actually seen any directives to prepare for a surprise attack on the United States.

"But I know of general, broad

statements which tended to prepare the Soviet officer corps for the possibility of being ordered to make a surprise attack," added the slim, ex-destroyer skipper.

Artamonov said "no senior Soviet officer believes that the United States will attack first."

Questioned by the committee, the bespectacled Artamonov said Russian fishing trawlers often sighted near U.S. waters are operated by Soviet naval intelligence. Russian submarines also hover close to American territorial

waters hunting information, he testified.

Bitter Words

What are they seeking? Knowledge about the makeup of the U.S. fleet, weapons used by American warships and anti-submarine measures being taken by the U.S. Navy, the Russian defector said.

Although without apparent emotion, he spoke in bitter words of Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev.

"Khrushchev does not wish to wait indefinitely for the United States to become a socialist state by evolution; moreover, he does not believe this will happen," Artamonov asserted.

"A Stunning Blow" "He would like to see it take

place in his lifetime."

At another point, the former Russian Navy man told the committee:

"If Khrushchev believed strength of the Soviet Union overwhelming, he would, of course, deal a stunning blow to the West."

However, he also said Khrushchev probably is serious about attempting to achieve agreement through peaceful means to avert war.

Later Artamonov told newsmen again through an interpreter that he is living in New York without any special protection. All he has to defend himself against possible Communist reprisals, he said, are his own hands.

Defector Discounts Soviet Peace Talk

Surprise Attack Held...

By Courtney Sheldon
Staff Correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

Washington
A Soviet naval officer came to Washington Sept. 14 with an entirely different story about Soviet intentions than his one-time superior is taking to the United Nations.

Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov told the House un-American Activities Committee:

"Since February, 1955, Soviet strategy has been based on the doctrine of surprise attack in nuclear warfare. This doctrine was established in a Soviet military publication which is known only to officers of flag rank and above.

"Several times over the past four years it has been said again, and it has never been changed."

Mr. Artamonov's defection to the West has been kept secret by United States intelligence authorities for 15 months. He has been interrogated at length, and government officials have passed the word along that they regard his information as accurate.

Countermove Seen

These officials released him to the House committee for public testimony in an obvious countermove to the Soviet propaganda attendant on the arrival of Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev in New York next week.

His testimony was widely reported in the nation's press, but it appears doubtful that it will have the impact that the staged press conference of the Martin-Mitchell team did in Moscow.

For one thing, the United States has not been in the habit of following through decisively in a propaganda way after such disclosures.

By comparison, when Mr. Khrushchev gets a sensational news event favorable to the Communists, he weds himself to it, repeating it over and over again, and needling United States officials.

The United States approach is more dignified. American officials usually decline to pick up these isolated incidents and run down the field with them.

More Persuasive

There is a desire not to inflame the international scene

any more than necessary, and there is the hope that relatively quiet presentation of the facts will be more persuasive in the long run.

Washington generally did not find anything in the Artamonov testimony that was not already suspected or verified.

The Navy, for example, had long ago concluded that Soviet fishing vessels laden with electronic gear and operating close to the United States mainland were on espionage missions.

His disclosures on Soviet naval ships came at a time when there is probably more interest here in why two separate Soviet task forces are headed into the Atlantic and the Pacific.

Accepted Interpretation

The accepted interpretation is that they are connected with a forthcoming space exploit, perhaps tied in a propaganda way with Mr. Khrushchev's arrival in New York.

Some of the things apparently are carrying gear, including helicopters, which presumably would be useful in tracking space craft and perhaps intercepting ocean recovery of space capsules.

Since the dawn of the space age, the Soviets have executed a steady progression of space spectacles which have furthered Soviet prestige in natural science and have turned people's attention away from such events as the Artamonov defection.

Mr. Artamonov emphasized that he does not regard himself as having betrayed his country but that the present Soviet leaders have betrayed the Soviet people. He insisted that he would always remain a Russian.

He started off by remarking to the committee that "on Monday Premier Khrushchev arrives in the United States. He says he is going to talk about disarmament. I feel obliged to point out from information which is available to me as a Soviet officer and a Communist Party member that the Soviet military strategy is inconsistent with Khrushchev's

Strategy

pronouncements on disarmament."

In his view, "The Soviet leadership would undertake a surprise attack if she felt that could win in one stroke."

He added: "Make no mistake—they are power seekers, political idealists. Khrushchev does not wish to wait indefinitely for the United States to become a socialist state by evolution. Moreover, he does not expect this to happen. He would like see it take place in his lifetime."

Mr. Artamonov's rank in the Soviet Navy corresponded that of a lieutenant command in the United States Navy. He was captain of a destroyer and regarded, in the Soviet press, an officer with a bright future.

Thirty-two years of age, he has lived only under Communist rule. United States intelligence officials wish there were more like him. Information is difficult to extract from Communist closed societies that effort to obtain more are unrelent-

RALEIGH (N.C.)
TIMES

Circ.: e. 21,503

Front Page Edit Page Other Page

24

Date: EP 15 1960

Defected Red Says Soviets

WASHINGTON (AP) — Soviet leaders would not hesitate to launch a surprise nuclear attack on the United States if they thought this nation could be smashed with one stroke, a former Soviet naval officer says. He said he lives now in New York City, at an undisclosed address, without guards or any form of protection from Communist retaliation. Despite premier Nikita Khrush-

Capt. Nikolai Fedorovich Arlamonov testified Wednesday that Soviet military strategy has been based on the doctrine of a surprise nuclear attack since February 1955.

Arlamonov, 32, who was commander of a Soviet destroyer in the Baltic fleet, defeated to the United States in June 1959 while stationed at Gdynia, Poland.

His appearance before the House Committee on Un-American Activities, however, provided the first public disclosure of his presence in this country.

The slim, bespectacled Soviet with a heavy black moustache, spent most of his time telling of his Soviet-style education and of



NIKOLAI F. ARTAMONOV

chiev's repeated pronouncements favoring disarmament, Arlamonov said, the Soviet doctrine of a surprise attack has been official since February 1955. He said it was spelled out in a Soviet mili-

But he added: "I know of general, broad statements which tended to prepare the Soviet of fiercer bodies for the possibility of being ordered to make a surprise attack."

He said "no senior Soviet officer believes that the United States would attack first." Under questioning, Arlamonov confirmed Western suspicions that the Soviet fishing trawlers frequently seen near U. S. waters are spying, not fishing. He said the vessels always are operated and manned by agents of Soviet naval intelligence.

Would Launch Surprise Attack on America

20405

Pres. Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON 1. D. C.


NORRISTOWN (Pa.)
TIMES HERALD

Circ.: e. 26,170

Front Edit Other
Page Page Page 1 5 1960

Date

Russian Testifies



Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov, 32-year-old Russian Navy captain who defected to the West 15 months ago, testifies before a House subcommittee on un-American Activities in Washington. Artamonov, speaking through an interpreter, said that Soviet military strategy since 1955 has been based on the doctrine of surprise attack in nuclear warfare. (UPI)

15 SEP 60

Press Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON 1, D. C.

ESCANABA (Mich.)
PRESS

Circ.: e. 10,301

Front Page	Edit Page	Other Page
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Date: SEP 15 1960.

Soviets Build Up For U. S. Attack, Defector Says

WASHINGTON (AP) — Soviet leaders would not hesitate to launch a surprise nuclear attack on the United States if they thought this nation could be smashed with one stroke, a former Soviet naval officer says.

Capt. Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov testified Wednesday that Soviet military strategy has been based on the doctrine of a surprise nuclear attack since February 1955.

Artamonov, 32, who was commander of a Soviet destroyer in the Baltic fleet, defected to the United States in June 1959 while stationed at Gdynia, Poland.

His appearance before the House Committee on Un-American Activities, however, provided the first public disclosure of his presence in this country.

He said he had been in the United States since shortly after he fled to the West, working with U. S. agencies he did not name.

He said he lives now in New York City, at an undisclosed address, without guards or any form of protection from Communist retaliation.

Despite Premier Nikita Khrushchev's repeated pronouncements favoring disarmament, Artamonov said, the Soviet doctrine of a surprise attack has been official since February 1955. He said it was spelled out in a Soviet military publication available only to high-ranking officers.

20407

15 SEP 60

Press Intelligence, Inc.


WASHINGTON 1, D. C.

PHILADELPHIA (Pa.)
NEWS

Circ.: e. 191,666

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Date: SEP 15 1960



RED SAW THE LIGHT:
Former Russian Army Capt. Nikolai Artamanov, 31, told congressional hearing he defected because Soviets were committing "crimes on an international scale." He charged Red fishing trawlers off U.S. East Coast are spy ships, said Soviet strategy since 1955 has been based on doctrine of "surprise attack in nuclear warfare." Unifax

20408

Press Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON 1, D. C.

PONTIAC (Mich.)
PRESS

Circ.: e. 57,900

Front Page Edit Page Other Page 1 5 1960
Date:

Says Defector From the Soviet

Russia Poised for Attack

WASHINGTON (AP) — Soviet leaders would not hesitate to launch a surprise nuclear attack on the United States if they thought this nation could be smashed with one stroke, a former Soviet naval officer says.

Capt. Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov testified Wednesday that Soviet military strategy has been based on the doctrine of a surprise nuclear attack since February 1955.

Artamonov, 52, who was commander of a Soviet destroyer in the Baltic fleet, defected to the United States in June 1955 while stationed at Gdynia, Poland.

His appearance before the House Committee on Un-American Activities, however, provided the first public disclosure of his presence in this country.

The slim, bespectacled Soviet with a heavy black moustache, spent most of his time telling of

his Soviet-style education and of a gradual disillusionment with Soviet leaders.

He said he had been in the United States since shortly after he fled to the West, working with U.S. agencies he did not name.

He said he lives now in New York City, at an undisclosed address, without guards or any form of protection from Communist infiltration.

Despite premier Nikita Khrushchev's repeated pronouncements favoring disarmament, Artamonov said, the Soviet doctrine of a surprise attack has been official since February 1955. He said it was spelled out in a Soviet military publication available only to high-ranking officers.

He said he had not himself seen any directives ordering preparations for such a surprise assault on this nation.

But he added: "I know of general, broad statements which tended to prepare the Soviet officer corps for the possibility of being ordered to make a surprise attack."

He said "no senior Soviet officer believes that the United States would attack first."

Under questioning, Artamonov confirmed Western suspicions that the Soviet fishing trawlers frequently seen near U. S. waters are spying, not fishing. He said the vessels always were operated and manned by agents of Soviet naval intelligence.

15 SEP 60

Press Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON, D. C.

FAIRMONT (W.Va.)
TIMES

Circ.: m. 13,043

Front Edit Other
Page Page Page

Date: 9

RED DEFECTOR SAYS SOVIETS SPY ON U.S.

Ex-Destroyer Officer Tells About Ships Off Coast

WASHINGTON (UPI)—A Russian navy captain who defected to the West testified Wednesday that Soviet fishing trawlers operating off the U.S. East Coast actually are instrument-loaded ships spying on American naval units.

Nikolai Federovich Artamonov, 32, described as a former commander of a Soviet destroyer, told a congressional hearing the trawlers were manned by Soviet intelligence personnel "concerned with the combat preparation of the U.S. fleet."

Artamonov, who said he defected to the West 15 months ago because of disenchantment with "aggressive" Soviet foreign policy, testified that the Russian vessels did not engage in any legitimate fishing. He said they were loaded with fish before leaving the Soviet Union to appear legitimate in the event of search by U.S. naval units.

Artamonov told a House subcommittee on Un-American Activities that the trawlers are laden with gadgets to pick up information on radar frequencies used by the Navy and the location of shore-based "signal systems."

Speaking through an interpreter, he said the ships were collecting information on the composition of the U.S. fleet, its maneuvers and the usual location of its patrols.

Describing the trawlers as the Soviet's chief method of obtaining information about the U.S. Navy, the Russian said the vessels also reported on the usual flight patterns of this country's early-warning picket planes.

His testimony came as House Democratic Leader John W. McCormack called on the State Department to make a full report to the United Nations General Assembly on any espionage operations by Soviet trawlers off the East Coast.

The Massachusetts Democrat said "well over 200" Russian trawlers, sporting a "forest of radar masts and electronic gear" have passed through the Baltic Sea into the Atlantic Ocean since August 1.

"By all indications, NATO exercise 'Sword thrust' will draw a record number of these uninvited Soviet ships," McCormack said in a statement.

A considerable number of Russian fishing trawlers have been spotted off the East Coast in recent months. One was seen in the

(Please turn to page 2)

15 SEP 60

WASHINGTON I. D. C.

BOSTON (Mass.)
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR

Circ.: e. 159,988

Front Page Edit Page Other Page

Date: SEP 15 1960

Defector Hints Red Aim

By Courtney Sheldon
Staff Correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

A Soviet naval officer came to Washington Sept. 14 with an entirely different story about Soviet intentions than his one-time superior is taking to the United Nations.

Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov told the House un-American Activities Committee:

"Since February, 1955, Soviet strategy has been based on the doctrine of surprise attack in nuclear warfare. This doctrine was established in a Soviet military publication which is known only to officers of flag rank and above.

"Several times over the past four years it has been said again, and it has never been changed."

Mr. Artamonov's defection to the West has been kept secret by United States intelligence authorities for 15 months. He has been interrogated at length, and government officials have passed the word along that they regard his information as accurate.

Countermove Seen

These officials released him to the House committee for public testimony in an obvious countermove to the Soviet propaganda attendant on the arrival of Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev in New York next week.

His testimony was widely reported in the nation's press, but it appears doubtful that it will have the impact that the staged press conference of the Martin-Mitchell team did in Moscow.

For one thing, the United States has not been in the habit of following through decisively in a propaganda way after such disclosures.

By comparison, when Mr. Khrushchev gets a sensational news event favorable to the Communists, he weds himself to it, repeating it over and over again, and needling United States officials.

The United States approach is more dignified. American officials usually decline to pick up these isolated incidents and run down the field with them.

More Persuasive?

There is a desire not to inflame the international scene any more than necessary, and there is the hope that relatively quiet presentation of the facts

will be more persuasive in the long run.

Washington generally did not find anything in the Artamonov testimony that was not already suspected or verified.

The Navy, for example, had long ago concluded that Soviet fishing vessels laden with electronic gear and operating close to the United States mainland were on espionage missions.

His disclosures on Soviet naval ships came at a time when there is probably more interest here in why two separate Soviet task forces are headed into the Atlantic and the Pacific.

Accepted Interpretation

The accepted interpretation is that they are connected with a forthcoming space exploit, perhaps tied in a propaganda way with Mr. Khrushchev's arrival in New York.

Some of the ships apparently are carrying gear, including helicopters, which presumably would be useful in tracking space craft and perhaps attempting ocean recovery of space capsules.

Since the dawn of the space age, the Soviets have executed a steady progression of space spectaculars which have furthered Soviet prestige in natural science and have turned people's attention away from

such events as the Artamonov defection.

Mr. Artamonov emphasized that he does not regard himself as having betrayed his country but that the present Soviet leaders have betrayed the Russian people. He insisted that he always remains a Russian.

Press Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON D. C.

ATLANTA (Ga.)
JOURNAL

Circ.: e. 253,470
S. 502,485

Front Page Edit Page Other Page 21

Date: SEP 15 1960

Sneak Soviet Attack Bared By Ex-Red

WASHINGTON, Sept. 15 (AP)—Russian leaders would not hesitate to launch a surprise nuclear attack on the United States if they thought this nation could be smashed with one stroke, a former Soviet naval officer says.

Capt. Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov testified Wednesday that Soviet military strategy has been based on the doctrine of a surprise nuclear attack since February 1955.

Artamonov, who was commander of a Russian destroyer in the Baltic fleet, defected to the United States in June 1959 while stationed at Gdynia, Poland.

HIS APPEARANCE Wednesday before the House Committee on Un-American Activities, however, provided the first public disclosure of his presence in this country.

The 32-year-old Russian, a slim, bespectacled man with a black moustache, spent most of his time telling of his Soviet-style education and of a gradual disillusionment with Soviet leaders.

He said he had been in the United States since shortly after he fled to the West, working with U.S. agencies he did not name.

He said he lives now in New York City, at an undisclosed address, without guards or any form of protection from Communist retaliation.

DESPITE Premier Nikita Khrushchev's repeated pronouncements favoring disarmament, Artamonov said, the Soviet doctrine of a surprise attack has been official since February 1955. He said it was spelled out in a Soviet military publication available only to high-ranking officers.

He said he had not himself seen any directions ordering preparations for such a surprise assault on this nation. But he added:

"I know of general Soviet statements which tended to prepare the Soviet officer corps for the possibility of being ordered to make a surprise attack."
He said "no senior Soviet officer believes that the United States would attack first."

"I know of general Soviet statements which tended to prepare the Soviet officer corps for the possibility of being ordered to make a surprise attack."
He said "no senior Soviet officer believes that the United States would attack first."
UNDER questioning, Artamonov confirmed Western suspicions that the Soviet fishing trawlers frequently seen near U.S. waters are spying, not fishing. He said the vessels always are operated and manned by agents of Soviet naval intelligence.
He said his own deflection to the West was not motivated by foreign intelligence agents or hope of personal or material gain.
On the contrary, he said, he was given favored treatment by the Soviet authorities and had a bright future ahead of me.
He told his final disillusionment came in 1957, when Khrushchev first praised Marshal G. G. Zhukov, the Soviet war hero, and months later fired him from

WASHINGTON I. D. C

MONROE (La.)
NEWS-STAR

Circ.: e. 15,803

Front Page Edit Page Other Page

Date:

SEP 15 1960

Reds Hope For One-Stroke Attack, Defactor Declares

WASHINGTON (AP) — Soviet leaders would not hesitate to launch a surprise nuclear attack on the United States if they thought this nation could be smashed with one stroke, a former Soviet naval officer says.

Capt. Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov testified Wednesday that Soviet military strategy has been based on the doctrine of a surprise nuclear attack since February 1955.

Artamonov, 32, who was commander of a Soviet destroyer in the Baltic fleet, defected to the United States in June 1959 while stationed at Gdynia, Poland.

His appearance before the House Committee on Un-American Activities, however, provided the first public disclosure of his presence in this country.

The slim, bespectacled Soviet with a heavy black moustache, spent most of his time telling of his Soviet-style education and of a gradual disillusionment with Soviet leaders.

He said he had been in the United States since shortly after he fled to the West, working with U. S. agencies he did not name.

He said he lives now in New York City, at an undisclosed address, without guards or any form of protection from Communist retaliation.

Despite premier Nikita Khrushchev's repeated pronouncements favoring disarmament, Artamonov said, the Soviet doctrine of a surprise attack has been official since February 1955. He said it was spelled out in a Soviet military publication available only to high-ranking officers.

He said he had not himself seen any directives ordering preparations for such a surprise assault on this nation.

But he added: "I know of general, broad statements which tended to prepare the Soviet officer corps for the possibility of being ordered to make a surprise attack."

He said "no senior Soviet officer believes that the United States would attack first."

Under questioning, Artamonov confirmed Western suspicions that the Soviet fishing trawlers frequently seen near U. S. waters are spying, not fishing. He said the vessels always are operated and manned by agents of Soviet naval intelligence.



CAPT. NIKOLAI Fedorovich Artamonov who held the rank of captain in the Russian Navy before defecting last year to this country, talks to newsmen after testifying before the House unAmerican Activities Committee. Speaking mostly in Russian with the aid of an interpreter, Artamonov said that despite Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev's statements favoring disarmament, Russian military forces have been under orders to be ready to launch off an immediate nuclear attack on this country. (AP Wirephoto)

Press Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON 1. D. C.

BINGHAMTON (N.Y.)
PRESS

Circ.: e. 69,684
S. 69,662

Front Edit Other
Page Page Page

Date: SEP 15 1960

Russian Defector Testifies

Red Strategy -- Surprise Blow

Washington — (AP) — Russian leaders would not hesitate to launch a surprise nuclear attack on the United States if they thought this nation could be smashed with one stroke, a former Soviet naval officer says.

Capt. Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov testified yesterday that Soviet military strategy has been based on the doctrine of a surprise nuclear attack since February, 1955.

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He said he lives now in New York City, at an undisclosed address, without guards or any form of protection from Communist retaliation.

Despite Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev's repeated pronouncements favoring disarmament, Artamonov said, the Soviet doctrine of a surprise attack has been official since February, 1955. He said it was spelled out in a Soviet military publication available only to high-ranking officers.

He said he had not himself seen any directives ordering



—Associated Press WIREPHOTO

AFTER TESTIMONY — Capt. Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov who held the rank of captain in the Russian Navy before defecting last year to this country, talks to newsmen after testifying before the House Un-American Activities Committee.

preparations for such a surprise assault on this nation. But he added: "I know of general, broad statements which tended to prepare the Soviet officer corps for the possibility of being ordered to make a surprise attack."

SALT LAKE CITY (Utah)
DESERET NEWS &
TELEGRAM

Circ.: e. 88,097

Front Page Edit Page Other Page

Date: SEP 15 1960



NIKOLAI F. ARTAMONOV
... flees to freedom

Ex-Russian Warns U.S. Of Soviet Attack Plans

By DAVID BURNHAM
WASHINGTON (UPI)
As a child, he saw nothing wrong with a government that told children to spy on their parents. In his 20s, he often defended Communist Party policies in discussions with his father and friends.

Yet, at 31, Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov, captain in the Soviet army and commander of a Red banner destroyer, defected to the United States.

Why? Artamonov, a tall, slim Russian with a thick moustache, answered this question Wednesday at a congressional hearing.

Dressed in a conservative blue suit, he disclosed to the public for the first time his flight 15 months ago from behind the Iron Curtain.

He said he defected because he finally realized the Soviet government was committing "crimes on an international scale" and was lying to the world and its own people.

It "just didn't make sense," he told the House Un-American Activities Committee.

Artamonov, now living in New York, inveighed against the Soviet government in even stronger terms. He charged Soviet fishing trawlers off

the American east coast actually are elaborate spy ships manned by Soviet intelligence personnel. These ships are even loaded with fish before they leave Russia in an effort to mask their spying mission.

Soviet strategy for more than four years has been based on a doctrine of surprise attack in nuclear warfare. He believes Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev would launch a surprise attack on the United States if he became convinced Russia could win in one stroke.

Artamonov said the nuclear doctrine was laid down in 1955 in a confidential Soviet military publication available only to generals and admirals. He did not say how he became aware of the article.

He quoted the article as saying the "sudden attack may result in the rapid collapse of a government." He said he interpreted this to mean the government of the United States.

GRAND RAPIDS (Mich.)
PRESS

Circ. e. 124,354
S. 80,678

Front Edit Other
Page Page Page
SEP 15 1960

Date:

Defector Says N-Attack Part of Russian Strategy

Washington — A Russian navy captain who defected in disillusionment last year declared Wednesday that since February 1955 Soviet strategy has been based on the doctrine of a nuclear surprise attack on the United States.

Capt. Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov, who crossed to the west in June, 1959, came into the open before the house committee on un-American activities.

The 32-year-old Russian said a realization that "everything being said in Russia was not true, but based on lies" led him to defect. He didn't say how he escaped to the west.

Speaking mostly in Russian with the aid of an interpreter, the heavily mustached Artamonov said the doctrine of surprise attack was established "in a Soviet military publication which is known only to officers of flag rank and above."

He conceded he had not actually seen any directives to prepare for a surprise attack on the United States.

Broad Statements

"But I know of general, broad statements which tended to prepare the Soviet officer corps for the possibility of being ordered to make a surprise attack," added the slim, dark ex-destroyer skipper.

Artamonov said "no senior Soviet officer believes that the United States will attack first."

Questioned by the committee, the bespectacled Artamonov said Russian fishing trawlers often sighted near United States waters are operated by Soviet naval intelligence. Russian submarines also hover close to American territorial waters hunting information, he testified.

What are they seeking? Knowledge about the makeup of the United States fleet, weapons used by American warships and anti-submarine measures being taken by the United States navy, the Russian defector said.

Although without apparent emotion, he spoke in bitter words of Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev.

"Khrushchev does not wish to wait indefinitely for the United States to become a socialist state by evolution; moreover he does not believe this will happen," Artamonov asserted.

"He would like to see it take place in his lifetime."

At another point, the former Russian navy man told the committee:

"If Khrushchev believed the strength of the Soviet union was overwhelming he would, of course, deal a stunning blow to the west."



RUSSIAN DEFECTS TO WEST—Nikolai F. Artamonov, 32, Russian navy captain who defected to the west 15 months ago, told the house subcommittee on un-American activities Wednesday that Soviet military strategy since 1955 has been based on the doctrine of "surprise attack in nuclear warfare."

AUGUSTA (Me.)
KENNEBEC JOURNAL

Circ.: m. 12,987

Front Page Edit Page Other Page

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Date: SEP 15 1960

News In Brief...

DENVER (AP)—The FBI announced Wednesday that clothing belonging to Adolph Coors III, 44, wealthy industrialist missing since Feb. 9, has been found.

Scott Werner, FBI agent in charge here, also said a quantity of bones found to be of "an adult human being" also were found in the area.

Werner said it has not been determined whether these might be part of the remains of Coors.

The clothing was found in a field in Douglas County about 15 miles south of Denver. A pair of trousers containing money and a pocketknife with the initials "AC III" also were found.

"There was a large quantity of bones in the area," Werner said. "We thought at first these were all bones of deer and other animals, but a pathological examination Wednesday showed some of the bones are the skeletal remains of an adult human being."

Bishop Deported

JOHANNESBURG, South Africa (AP)—The sudden deportation of the Anglican bishop of Johannesburg, the Rt. Rev. Ambrose Reeves, has raised a storm likely to have great political repercussions in this racially troubled nation.

Campaign Charge

WASHINGTON (AP)—The Democratic national chairman charged Wednesday that the malls are being flooded with anti-Catholic literature in a plot to defeat Sen. John F. Kennedy for president.

The chairman, Sen. Henry M. Jackson of Washington, urged that newsmen track down the source.

700-Vote Margin

MONTPELIER, Vt. (AP)—House Speaker F. Ray Keyser Jr., apparent winner of the Republican gubernatorial nomination, said Wednesday that Lt. Gov. Robert S. Babcock is entitled to a recount of votes if he wants one.

Keyser, who held a margin of just over 700 votes on the basis of unofficial returns, said Babcock "is entitled to know with certainty the election outcome, but it is up to him to decide what he wants to do."

Soviet Strategy

WASHINGTON (AP)—A Russian Navy captain who defected in disillusionment last year declared Wednesday that since

February 1955 Soviet strategy has been based on the doctrine of a nuclear surprise attack on the United States.

Capt. Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov, who crossed to the West in June 1959, came into the open before the House Committee on Un-American activities.

FAA Control Center

NEW YORK (AP)—The Federal Aviation Agency Wednesday announced the site for a new \$5 million air route traffic control center will be at Nashua, N. H., which will move the operation from Boston's Logan International Airport.

Counterblow

BERLIN (AP)—West Germany Wednesday ordered its first trade sanctions against the Communists for their squeeze on Berlin. The big Western powers also planned new counterblows.

Atlantic Collision

SHANNON, Ireland (AP)—Two U.S. Air Force B47 jet bombers collided over the Atlantic Wednesday. A huge air-sea rescue began for the three crewmen of one, which spiraled down into the squally sea.

The other bomber struggled 330 miles to a safe landing at Shannon with a battered engine hanging beneath one wing.

O'Connor Winner

BOSTON (AP)—Youngish Mayor Thomas J. O'Connor of Springfield took his stunning 50,000 vote victory over Gov. Foster Furcolo for the Democratic nomination for U.S. senator in stride Wednesday and started right out with his election campaign.

O'Connor, 35, is opposing Sen. Leverett Saltonstall, R-Mass., in November. Saltonstall is 68.

Texas Accident

DALLAS, Tex. (AP)—A four-engine DC-7 airliner swerved out of control at Love Field Wednesday and smashed into the Braniff International Airways hangar. One ground crewman was killed and five others were injured.

Powell Victor

CONCORD, N.H. (P)—New Hampshire Republican leaders moved quickly Wednesday to cement their party after a bitterly fought campaign in which Gov. Wesley Powell won re-nomination over Former Gov. Hugh Gregg by an unofficial 1,173-vote margin.

The 49,141 to 47,968 victory by Powell over Gregg was a triumph for the New Hampshire governor over the Republican old guard with whom he has been feuding. Powell managed Vice President Richard M. Nixon's presidential primary campaign in this state last March.

BAY CITY (Mich.)
TIMES

Circ.: e. 36,201
S. 36,311

Front Edit Other
Page Page Page
1 5 150

Date:

Defectors Reveal Russians Plotting 'Surprise' Attacks

Solons Hear Former Red Navy Officer



CAPT. ARTAMONOV

Khrushchev Seen
Planning Toward
Conquering Blow

WASHINGTON — (AP) Russian leaders would not hesitate to launch a surprise nuclear attack on the United States if they thought this nation could be smashed with one stroke, a former Soviet naval officer says.

Capt. Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov testified yesterday that Soviet military strategy has been based on the doctrine of a surprise nuclear attack since February 1955.

Artamonov, who was commander of a Russian destroyer in the Baltic fleet, defected to the United States in June 1959 while stationed at Gdynia, Poland.

His appearance yesterday before the House committee on Un-American Activities, however, provided the first public disclosure of his presence in this country.

The 32-year-old Russian, a slim, bespectacled man with a heavy black moustache, spent most of his time telling of his Soviet-style education and of a gradual disillusionment with Soviet leaders.

He said he had been in the United States since shortly after he fled to the west, working with U. S. agencies he did not name.

He said he lives now in New York City, at an undisclosed address, without guards or any form of protection from Communist retaliation.

Despite Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev's pronouncements favoring disarmament, Artamonov said, the Soviet doctrine of a surprise attack has been official since February 1955. He said he was in a Soviet

20418

15 SEP 60

JOPLIN (Mo.)

GLOBE

Circ.: m. 30,851
S. 35,133

Front Page
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Other Page

Date: SEP 15 1960



FORMER SOVIET OFFICER TESTIFIES — Capt. Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov, a defected Russian naval officer, appeared Wednesday as a witness before the House un-American Activities Committee. He testified the Soviet Union has been preparing for a surprise nuclear attack on the United States since 1955.—(AP Wirephoto.)

Red Navy Captain Tells Of Soviet War Strategy

WASHINGTON (AP)—A Russian Navy captain who defected in disillusionment last year declared Wednesday that since February 1955 Soviet strategy has been based on the doctrine of a nuclear surprise attack on the United States.

Capt. Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov, who crossed to the West in June 1959, came into the open before the House Committee on Un-American activities.

The 32-year-old Russian said a realization that "everything being said in Russia was not true, but based on lies" led him to defect. He didn't say how he escaped to the west.

Speaking mostly in Russian with the aid of an interpreter, the heavily mustached Artamonov said the doctrine of surprise attack was established "in a Soviet military publication that is known only to officers of flag rank and above."

He conceded he had not actual-

"But I know of general, broad statements that tended to prepare the Soviet officer corps for the possibility of being ordered to make a surprise attack," added the slim, dark ex-destroyer skipper.

Belief About U.S.

Artamonov said: "No senior Soviet officer believes that the United States will attack first."

The committee brought Artamonov to its witness chair about a week after the Russians trotted out two defecting American code clerks, Bernon F. Mitchell and William H. Martin. Mitchell and Martin said they went to Russia because they objected to what they said were U.S. spy policies risking world War III.

Questioned by the committee, the bespectacled Artamonov said Russian fishing trawlers often sighted near U.S. waters are operated by Soviet naval intelligence. Russian submarines also hover close to American terri-

15 SEPT 60

GARY (Ind.)
POST-TRIBUNE

Circ.: e. 54,517
S. 51,450

Front Edit Other
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Date: SEP 15 1960

A 6: THE GARY POST-TRIBUNE: Thursday, Sept. 15, 1960

Says Russ Would Sneak-Attack Us

Soviet Naval Defector Cites Top-Level Military Manual

Washington (AP)—Russian leaders would not hesitate to launch a surprise nuclear attack on the United States if they thought this nation could be smashed with one stroke, a former Soviet naval officer says.
Capt. Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov testified yesterday that Soviet military strategy has been based on the doctrine of a surprise nuclear attack since February 1955.



NIKOLAI ARTAMONOV

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He said he had been in the United States since shortly after he fled to the West, working with U.S. agencies he did not name.

He said he lives now in New York City, at an undisclosed address, without guards or any form of protection from Communist retaliation.

Despite Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev's repeated pronouncement favoring disarmament, Artamonov said, the Soviet doctrine of a surprise attack has been official since February 1955. He said it was spelled out in a Soviet military publication available only to high-ranking officers.

He said he had not himself seen any directives ordering preparations for such a surprise assault on this nation. But he added:

"I know of general broad statements which tended to prepare the Soviet officer corps for the possibility of being ordered to make a surprise attack."

He said he knows Soviet leaders believe that the United States would attack first.

Under questioning, Artamonov confirmed Western suspicion that the Soviet fishing trawlers frequently seen near U. S. waters are spying, not fishing. He said the vessels always are operated and manned by agents of Soviet naval intelligence.

He said his own defection to the West was not motivated by foreign intelligence agents or hope of personal or material gain.

"On the contrary," he said, "I was given favored treatment by the Soviet authorities and had a bright future ahead of me."

He said his final disillusionment came in 1957 when Khrushchev first praised Marshal Georgi Zhukov, the Soviet war hero, and three months later fired him from his post.

Artamonov said the Kremlin leadership is full of "power seekers, not political idealists."

20420

SEPT 6
15 SEP 60

PINE BLUFF (Ark.)
COMMERCIAL

Circ.: e. 16,579
S. 16,892

Front Edit Other
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B

Date: SEP 15 1960

Ex-Soviet Officer Says Reds Are Power Seekers

WASHINGTON (AP) — Russian leaders would not hesitate to launch a surprise nuclear attack on the United States if they thought this nation could be smashed with one stroke, a former Soviet naval officer says. Capt. Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov testified yesterday that Soviet military strategy has been based on the doctrine of a surprise nuclear attack since February 1955.

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He said he had not himself seen any directives ordering preparations for such a surprise assault on this nation. But he added:

"I know of general, broad statements which tended to pre-

pare the Soviet Officer Corps for the possibility of being ordered to make a surprise attack."

He said "no senior Soviet officer believes that the United States would attack first."

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"On the contrary," he said, "I was given favored treatment by the Soviet authorities and had a bright future ahead of me."

He said his final disillusionment came in 1957 when Khrushchev first praised Marshal Georgi Zhukov, the Soviet war hero, and three months later fired him from his post.

Artamonov said the Kremlin leadership is composed of "power seekers, not political idealists."

Press Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON 7, D. C.

SAN BERNARDINO (Calif.)
TELEGRAM

Circ.: e. 16,638

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SEP 15 1960



AFTER TESTIMONY — Capt. Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov who held the rank of captain in the Russian Navy before defecting last year to the U.S., talks to newsmen after testifying before the House unAmerican Activities Committee. Speaking mostly in Russian with the aid of an interpreter, Artamonov said that despite Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev's statements favoring disarmament, Russian military forces have been under orders to be ready to touch off an immediate nuclear attack on the United States. (AP wirephoto)

Pro Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON 1, D. C.

AKRON (O.)
BEACON JOURNAL

Circ.: e. 163,191
S. 172,930

Front Page Edit Page Other Page

Date: SEP 15 1960

'Spies Man Soviet Boats'

WASHINGTON (UPI) -- As a child he saw nothing wrong with a government that told children to spy on their parents. In the 20s, he often defended Communist Party policies in discussions with his father and friends.

Yet, at 31, Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov, captain in the Soviet navy and commander of a destroyer, defected to the United States.


Artamonov, tall and slim, with a thick moustache, told why at a congressional hearing Wednesday.

HE DISCLOSED to the public for the first time his flight 15 months ago from behind the Iron Curtain.

He said he defected because he finally realized the Soviet government was committing "crimes on an international scale" and was lying to the world and its own people.

It "wouldn't make sense," he told the House Committee on American Activities,

Artamonov now lives in Miami, Fla. He said he had been in the Soviet navy for 12 years.



NIKOLAI ARTAMONOV
...revealed Red crimes

loaded with fish before they leave Russia in an effort to mask their spying mission, Artamonov charged.

Soviet strategy for more than four years has been based on a doctrine of "surprise attack in nuclear warfare," he continued and said he believes Soviet Premier Khrushchev would launch a surprise attack on the U. S. if he became convinced Russia could win in one stroke.

the Soviet government in even stronger terms.

Soviet ships that are off the American East Coast are already warships, he said.

Artamonov said he had been in the Soviet navy for 12 years.

CINCINNATI (O.)
POST & TIMES-STAR
Circ.: e. 265,831

Front Page
Edit Page
Other Page

Date: SEP 15 1960

Cincinnati, Thur., Sept. 15, 1960 The Post & Times-Star—3

K Plots Surprise Attack On U.S., Ex-Red Officer Says

BY ANDREW TULLY
Scripps-Howard Staff Writer
WASHINGTON: The young Soviet naval officer sat in a room in the house office building and when he was through testifying Nikita Khrushchev had been exposed again as a man who talks disarmament and plots surprise attacks against the West.
Capt. Nikolai Federovich Artamonov, who fled the Soviet Union last year, put it bluntly to the House Committee on un-American Activities:

"Since February 1955 Soviet strategy has been based on the doctrine of surprise attack in nuclear warfare . . . It has never been changed."

THE CAPTAIN was specific. The surprise attack strategy was contained, he said, in an article in the Russian journal "Military Thought," restricted to generals and admirals. It was written by Marshal Rotmistrov, chief of the Soviet Atomic Weapons Command.

Artamonov emphasized that such an article could not have been written on Rotmistrov's own initiative—that it obviously reflected orders from on high. And the article was intended, he said, "to prepare the Soviet officers for the starting of such a war by the Soviet Union."


A neat and slender man of 32 with a black mustache, the Russian noted wryly that Khrushchev is arriving Monday for the United Nations session. "He says he is going to talk about disarmament," said the captain. "I feel obliged to point out from the in-

formation . . . available to me as a Soviet officer and Communist Party member that Soviet military strategy is inconsistent with Khrushchev's pronouncements."

rapid collapse of the government" under attack.

Under questioning by Alfred M. Nittle, committee counsel, Artamonov also provided the first public revelation of the character of those Soviet fishing trawlers which haunt the Atlantic. The crews of those vessels, he said, actually are

members of Soviet naval intelligence units, dispatched to gather information on the "combat readiness of American naval forces, the usual locations of their patrols, and the condition of American anti-submarine defenses."



CAPT. ARTAMONOV
... tells of Red plans

Pro. Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON 1, D. C.

MEADVILLE (Pa.)
TRIBUNE

Circ.: m. 15,055

Front Page Edit Page Other Page

Date: 5 1960

Soviet Defector Says Strategy of U.S.S.R. Based on U.S. Attack

WASHINGTON (AP)—A Russian Navy captain who defected in disillusionment last year declared Wednesday that since February 1955 Soviet strategy has been based on the doctrine of a nuclear surprise attack on the United States.

Capt. Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov, who crossed to the West in June 1959, came into the open before the House Committee on Un-American activities.

The 32-year-old Russian said a realization that "everything being said in Russia was not true, but based on lies" led him to defect. He didn't say how he escaped to the west.

Speaking mostly in Russian with the aid of an interpreter, the heavily mustached Artamonov said the doctrine of surprise attack was established "in a Soviet military publication which is known only to officers of flag rank and above."

He conceded he had not actually seen any directives to prepare for a surprise attack on the United States.

"But I know of general, broad statements which tended to prepare the Soviet officer corps for the possibility of being ordered to make a surprise attack," added the slim, dark ex-destroyer skipper.

Artamonov said: "No senior Soviet officer believes that the United States will attack first."

The committee brought Artamonov to its witness chair about a week after the Russians trotted out two defecting American code clerks, Bernon F. Mitchell and William H. Martin. Mitchell and Martin said they went to Russia because they objected to what they said were U.S. spy policies risking world War III.

Questioned by the committee, the bespectacled Artamonov said Russian fishing trawlers often sighted near U.S. waters are operated by Soviet naval intelligence. Russian submarines also hover close to American territorial waters hunting information, he testified.

Press Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON 1. D. C.

SAN ANTONIO (Tex.)
LIGHT
Circ.: e. 103,427
S. 127,350
Front Page Edit Page Other Page
Date: SEP 15 1960

San Antonio Light Thursday, Sept. 15, 1960

Red Attack Plans Exposed

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Yet, at 31, Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov, captain in the Soviet navy and commander of a Red banner destroyer, defected to the U. S. Why?
LYING TO WORLD
Artamonov, answered this question Wednesday at a congressional hearing.
Dressed in a conservative blue suit, he disclosed to the public for the first time his flight 15 months ago from behind the Iron Curtain.
He said he defected because he finally realized the Soviet

government was committing "crimes on an international scale" and was lying to the world and its own people.
It "just didn't make sense," he told the house committee on un-American activities.
SPY SHIPS
Artamonov, now living in New York, charged:
● Soviet fishing trawlers off the American east coast actually are elaborate spy ships manned by Soviet intelligence personnel. These ships are even loaded with fish before they leave Russia in an effort to mask their spying mission.
● Soviet strategy for more than four years has been based on a doctrine of "surprise attack in nuclear warfare." He believes Soviet Premier Khrushchev would launch a surprise attack on the U. S.



CAPT. ARTAMONOV
Says Reds plan attack.
if he became convinced Russia could win in one stroke.
Artamonov said the nuclear doctrine was laid down in 1953 in a confidential Soviet military publication available only to generals and admirals.

WASHINGTON 1. D. C.

INDIANAPOLIS (Ind.)
TIMES

Circ.: e. 92,473
S. 105,790

Front Edh Other
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Date: SEP 15 1960

Defector Tells Russian Plans For Surprise Nuclear Attack

By ANDREW TULLY
Scripps-Howard Staff Writer

WASHINGTON, Sept. 15 —

The young Soviet naval officer sat in a room in the old House Office Building and when he was through testifying Nikita Khrushchev had been exposed again as a man who talks disarmament and plots surprise attacks against the West.

Capt. Nikolai Federovich Artamonov, who fled the Soviet Union last year, put it bluntly to the House Committee on Un-American Activities.

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The captain was specific. The surprise attack strategy was contained, he said, in an article in the Russian journal "Military Thought," restricted to generals and admirals. It was written by Marshal Rotmistrov, chief of the Soviet atomic weapons command.

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Artamonov

he said, actually are members of Soviet naval intelligence units, dispatched to gather information on the "combat readiness of American naval forces, the usual locations of their patrols, and the condition of American antisubmarine defenses."

Artamonov was scornful when Nittle asked him whether the Soviet Union would launch a surprise attack on the West if Communist China went to war with a member-nation of the free world.

BRUSQUELY, Artamonov replied: "I don't think Communist China would start a war without consulting with and getting approval from the Soviet Union. Then the Rus-

sians would deal the first blow and the Chinese would come in to support the Russians."

As for Khrushchev and his mouthings about peaceful co-existence, Artamonov sought to put Mr. K. in perspective. "Khrushchev does not wish to wait indefinitely for the United States to become a Socialist state by evolution," Artamonov said. "Moreover, he does not believe this will happen. He would like to see it take place in his lifetime."

tion . . . available to me as a Soviet officer and Communist Party member that Soviet military strategy is inconsistent with Khrushchev's pronouncements."

That strategy was clarified in a quotation from Rotmistrov's article read into the record by the youthful defector. "The element of surprise is one of the decisive conditions for achieving success," the marshal wrote. "In some cases a sudden attack with new weapons may result in the rapid collapse of the government" under attack.

Under questioning by Committee Counsel Alfred M. Nittle, Capt. Artamonov also provided the first public revelation of the character of those Soviet fishing trawlers which haunt the Atlantic.

The crews of those vessels,

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
BELLEFONTAINE (Ohio)
EXAMINER

Circ.: e. 9,339

Front Edit Other
Page Page Page

Date: SEP 16 1960

Bares Red Plan



Nikolai Fedorovich Artomov, 32-year-old Russian navy captain who defected to the United States 15 months ago, is shown as he told the House sub-committee on Un-American Activities that Soviet military strategy since 1955 has been based on the "doctrine of surprise attack in nuclear warfare."

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WASHINGTON 1, D. C.

SAN JOSE (Calif.)
MERCURY

Circ.: m. 68,575
S. 105,294

Front Page SEP 10 1950
Page Page Page

Date:



TESTIFIES—Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov, who held the rank of captain in the Russian Navy before defecting last year to the United States, talks of newsmen Wednesday in Washington after testifying before the House Un-American Activities Committee.

Red Attack Plan Told By Russian

WASHINGTON (AP) — A Russian navy captain who defected in disillusionment last year declared Wednesday that since February, 1955, Soviet doctrine has been based on the doctrine of a nuclear surprise attack on the United States. Capt. Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov, who crossed to the West in June, 1959, came into the office before the House Committee on Un-American Activities. The 33-year-old Russian

Nothing was true. Russia was not true. It based on lies. He didn't say how he escaped to the West.

Speaking mostly in Russian with an interpreter, the heavily mustached Artamonov said the doctrine of surprise attack was established "in a Soviet military publication which is known only to officers of flag rank and above."

He conceded he had not actually seen any directives to prepare for a surprise attack on the United States.

"But I know of general broad statements which tended to prepare the Soviet officer corps for the possibility of being ordered to make a surprise attack," added the slim, dark ex-destroyer skipper.

Artamonov said "no one" (Continued on Page 3, Column 4)

Surprise Red Attack Plan Told

(Continued from Page 1)

For Soviet officer believes that the United States will attack first."

The un-American Activities Committee brought Artamonov to its witness chair about a week after the Russians trotted out two defecting American code clerks, Bernon F. Mitchell and William H. Martin. Mitchell and Martin said they went to Russia because they objected to what they said were U.S. spy policies risking World War III.

Questioned by the committee, the bespectacled Artamonov said Russian fishing trawlers often sighted near U.S. waters are operated by Soviet naval intelligence. Russian submarines also hover close to American territorial waters hunting information, he testified.

What are they seeking? Knowledge about the make up of the U.S. fleet, weapons used by American warships and anti-submarine measures being taken by the U.S. Navy, the Russian defector said.

Although without apparent emotion, he spoke in bitter words of Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev.

"Khrushchev does not wish to wait indefinitely for the United States to become a socialist state by evolution. Moreover, he does not believe this will happen," Artamonov asserted.

He would like to see it take place in his lifetime."

At another point, the former Russian navy man told the committee:

"If Khrushchev believed the strength of the Soviet

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ST. PETERSBURG (Fla.)
TIMES

Circ.: m 112,029
S 112,393

Front Page Ed. Page Other Page

Date: SEP 16 1950

FOREIGN INTRIGUE

Is This The Best That We Can Do?

By ED KOTERBA

WASHINGTON — Congressman Francis Walter, Chairman of the Committee on Un-American Activities, pulled aside his cloak and dagger and produced a genuine, live Communist defector from the U.S.S.R.

This was his answer to the public performance in Moscow starring our two defective National Security Agency officers. But, instead of matching the Soviets' razzle and dazzle, lawmaker Walter's show seemed to sputter and fizzle.

The witness, there in the twilight gloom of the House caucus room, was telling all, all right. But what he told we must assume our intelligence people already knew — and more. And, too, his heart just wasn't in it.

The Red defector is a young man but his measured heavy-brush mustache and matching big black brows give him an appearance beyond his 32 years.

However, he was no code-breaking official nor the equivalent of a U-2 spy. Merely a Captain in the Soviet Navy — and third class at that. What secrets could he tell?

Capt. Mikolai Fedorovich Artamanov defected a year ago, and it took Representative Walter (D-Pa) that long to bring him out into the open to disclose the man's "inside information" on the Soviet threat to us.

In the first place, our arena of inquiry was sadly deficient theatrically. Only two dimly-lit chandeliers in the vast auditorium. The Soviets at the U-2 trial, for example, had 34 chandeliers burning.

And the Captain, though fully cooperative, appeared emotionally, inwardly, awkwardly, mixed up.

He coughed nervously. His eyes avoided his inquisitors, even his interpreter. Yet there was a strange look of calm de-

fiance across his face as the interpreter read his translated message announcing his reason for defecting.

"As an officer, wouldn't I be betraying my own people by running away from them?"

"No, I shall never betray my people. I was, I am, and I shall always remain a Russian — but not a Soviet Russian."

He was, no question, a disillusioned ex-Red. His one "important comment" was startling, indeed. But as his interpreter read it, it came out in tired tones and the audience listened with folded hands and stoic faces.

The Kremlin, he said, holds to a doctrine of surprise atomic attack on the United States.

The look in the collective face of the spectators seemed to say: "So? We already know that."

Surely, Mr. Walter has the means and initiative to do better than that.

16 SEPT 1960

Press Intelligence, Inc.

WASHINGTON 1, D. C.

ALLENTOWN (Pa.)
CHRONICLE

Circ.: e. 21,951

Front Edit Other
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5

Date: SEP 15 1960

Surprise A-Attack on U.S. Red Aim, Defector Says

WASHINGTON (AP) — Soviet leaders would not hesitate to launch a surprise nuclear attack on the United States if they thought this nation could be smashed with one stroke, a former Soviet naval officer says.

Capt. Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov testified Wednesday that Soviet military strategy has been based on the doctrine of a surprise nuclear attack since February 1955.

Artamonov, 32, who was commander of a Soviet destroyer in the Baltic fleet, defected to the United States in June 1959 while stationed at Gdynia, Poland.

Disclosure
His appearance before the House Committee on Un-American Activities, however, provided the first public disclosure of his presence in this country.

The slim, bespectacled Soviet with a heavy black moustache, spent most of his time telling of his Soviet-style education and of a gradual disillusionment with Soviet leaders.

He said he had been in the United States since shortly after he fled to the West, working with U. S. agencies he did not name. He said he lives now in New

York City, at an undisclosed address, without guards or any form of protection from Communist retaliation.

Official Policy

Despite premier Nikita Khrushchev's repeated pronouncements favoring disarmament, Artamonov said, the Soviet doctrine of a surprise attack has been official since February 1955. He said it was spelled out in a Soviet military publication available only to high-ranking officers.

He said he had not himself seen any directives ordering preparations for such a surprise assault on this nation.

16 SEPT 1960

Press Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON 1, D. C.

NEW KENSINGTON (Pa.)
DISPATCH

Circ.: e. 10,649

Front Edit Other
Page Page Page
SEP 16 1960

Date:



AFTER TESTIMONY — Capt. Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov who held the rank of captain in the Russian Navy before defecting last year to this country, talks to newsmen after testifying before the House unAmerican Activities Committee. Speaking mostly in Russian with the aid of an interpreter, Artamonov said that despite Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev's statements favoring disarmament, Russian military forces have been under orders to be ready to touch off an immediate nuclear attack on this country.
(AP Wirephoto)

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**WHEELING (W.Va.)
INTELLIGENCER**

Circ.: m. 21,681

Front Edit Other
Page Page Page

Date: SEP 16 1960



Warns of Attack

Capt. Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov, who held the rank of captain in the Russian Navy before defecting last year to this country, talks to newsmen after testifying before the House Un-American Activities Committee. Speaking mostly in Russian with the aid of an interpreter, Artamonov said that despite Soviet Premier Khrushchev's statements favoring disarmament, Russian military forces have been under orders to be ready to touch off an immediate nuclear attack on this country.
(AP Wirephoto)

SEPT 16, 1960

Press Intelligence, Inc.
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TARENTUM (Pa.)
VALLEY NEWS

Circ.: e. 23,192

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Date: SEP 16 1960



AFTER TESTIMONY — Capt. Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov who held the rank of captain in the Russian Navy before defecting last year to this country, talks to newsmen after testifying before the House unAmerican Activities Committee. Speaking mostly in Russian with the aid of an interpreter, Artamonov said that despite Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev's statements favoring disarmament, Russian military forces have been under orders to be ready to touch off an immediate nuclear attack on this country.
(AP Wirephoto)

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EAST ST. LOUIS (III.)
JOURNAL

Circ.: e 32,642
S 34,524

Front Page East Page Other Page
SEP 16 1960

Date:

Defectors Matched

TESTIMONY of at least two defectors from the Communist bloc has been brought out into the open, presumably as a counter-propaganda blow to the statements of two American intelligence men who have defected to the Soviet Union.

The gist of this testimony is that the Communist bloc long has been planning strategy and preparing its armed forces for a surprise all-out attack on the West. This, of course, should surprise nobody. The West is not likely to receive any advance notice of a Soviet attack unless such information filtered out by means of espionage activity.

A Russian navy captain, Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov, said in open testimony before the House Un-American Activities Committee that the doctrine of surprise attack was established "in a Soviet military publication which is known only to officers of flag rank and above."

The witness testified he had not actually seen any directive for such an attack.

"But I know of general, broad statements which tended to prepare the Soviet officer corps for the possibility of such an order," he said. "No senior Soviet officer believes that the United States will attack first."

Tending to corroborate Captain Artamonov's testimony was that of an East German army officer who fled to the West with documents purporting to show that the East German army was being oriented for attack on West Germany.

Among these were documents earmarked for distribution after the Communists had marched into West Germany. One poster, a "Notice to the Population", admonishes the people to cease all resistance, stating "the war will be over for you in a few days". Another says the East Germans are coming as an army of liberation.

The Soviet defector, called a prize "catch" by Western intelligence men, was identified by Bonn officials as Capt. Guenther Malikowski. He did not appear in public.

Soviet startegists, of course, have prepared an overall war plan just as Pentagon experts have done—and apparently are continually revising. But whatever information the West possesses as to Communist plans and espionage generally has been kept secret—at least until the defection of the U.S. code clerks, Bernon F. Mitchell and William H. Martin, made a counterblow desirable. Both men had objected to U.S. spy policies which, they said, risked another world war.

But release of such testimony is less effective in the wake of the fatal U-2 flight and other East-West spying incidents. Both sides have, in effect, claimed "You're another", leaving neutral bystanders with an attitude of bewilderment or cynical detachment. Perhaps after the proper amount of indignation on both sides, East-West negotiations on such real issues as disarmament can be resumed in earnest.

Press Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON 1, D. C.

INDIANAPOLIS (Ind.)
TIMES

Circ.: e. 92,473
S. 105,790

Front Page Left Page Other Page

SEP 16 1960

RED DEFECTOR

Walter Matches Razzle With Fizzle

By ED KOTERBA

WASHINGTON—Rep. Francis Walter, chairman of the Committee on Un-American Activities, pulled aside his cloak and dagger and produced a genuine, live Communist defector from the USSR.

This was his answer to the public performance in Moscow starring our two defective National Security Agency officers.

But, instead of matching the Soviets' razzle and dazzle, lawmaker Walter's show seemed to sputter and fizzle.

The witness, in the twilight gloom of the House caucus room, was telling all, all right. But what he told we must assume our intelligence people already knew—and more.

And, too, his heart just wasn't in it. The Red defector is a young man but his manicured heavy-brush mustache and matching big black brows give him an appearance beyond his 32 years.

However, he was no code-cracking official nor the equivalent of a U-2 spy.

Merely a captain in the Soviet navy—and third class at that. What secrets could he tell?

Capt. Nikolai Fedorovich Artamanov defected a year ago, and it took Rep. Walter (D. Pa.) that long to bring him out into the open to disclose the man's "inside information" on the Soviet threat to us.

In the first place, our arena of inquiry was sadly deficient theatrically. Only two dimly lit



Koterba

chandeliers in the vast auditorium. The Soviets at the U-2 trial, for example, had 34 chandeliers burning.

Here we had no Kleig lights, no television cameras—and the witness was forced to testify with his back to the audience.

And the captain, though fully co-operative, appeared emotionally, inwardly, awkwardly, mixed up.

He coughed nervously. His eyes avoided his inquisitors, even his interpreter. Yet there was a strange look of calm defiance across his face as the interpreter read his translated message announcing his reason for defecting.

"As an officer, wouldn't I be betraying my own people by running away from them?" Now, Capt. Artamanov twirled the dripping paper cup.

"No, I shall never betray my people. I was, I am, and I shall always remain a Russian—but not a Soviet Russian."

He was, no question, a disillusioned ex-Red.

His one "important comment" was startling, indeed. But as his interpreter read it, it came out in tired tones and the audience listened with folded hands and stoic faces.

The Kremlin, he said, holds to a doctrine of surprise atomic attack on the United States.

The look in the collective face of the spectators seemed to say: "So? We already know that."

There is no question about the serious Communist threat to our very lives. But the vague testimony of a third-class captain defector isn't enough to electrify us out of our lethargy.

Surely, Walter has the means and initiative to do better than that.

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HAVERHILL (Mass.)
GAZETTE

Circ.: e. 10,363

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Date: P 16 9:50



NIKOLAI FEDOROVICH ARTAMONOV, 32-year-old Russian navy captain who defected to the West 15 months ago is shown as he told the House Subcommittee on Un-American Activities that Soviet military strategy since 1955 has been based on "the doctrine of surprise attack in nuclear warfare." (UPI Telephoto)

Press Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON 1, D. C.

BENTON HARBOR
(Mich.) NEWS-
PALLADIUM

Circ.: e. 22,901

Front Edit Other
Page Page Page

SEP 16 1960

Date:

LET HIM HAVE IT, IKE

President Eisenhower will address the United Nations next week Thursday. He will speak before the Russian Premier, Nikita Khrushchev, has a chance to unload his vials of insults and propaganda.

Uninvited, unhonored and unsung, Khrushchev is coming to these shores with hate in his mind and heart. Striking a posture of hypocrisy last May in Paris, he blew up the summit conference, shedding crocodile tears over the U. S. spy plane incident and then denounced, insulted and ridiculed the American President.

He also cancelled the prospective visit of Mr. Eisenhower to Russia, obviously afraid that his own prestige in his own country would suffer if this American apostle of world peace met the Russian rank and file face to face.

Last week in Washington, at a press conference referring to the Khrushchev sly appearance at the U. N. as the head of the Russian delegation, the President said in his contemplated address "I do not intend to debase the United States by being a party of invective and propaganda."

This is the courteous, gentlemanly, quintessence of the very highest quality of international protocol in international and diplomatic relations. And Ike would be out of character if he stooped to personal denunciation.

But this is no friendly visitor who comes before the United Nations with honest intents to serve all mankind. He comes only for making the U. N. the sounding board of Communist propaganda.

Even as the ship he's on is approaching New York harbor, a former Russian naval captain, Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov tells a House investigating committee on un-American activities that Russian military strategy since 1955 has been based on the doctrine of surprise attack in nuclear warfare and adds:

"Khrushchev does not wish to wait indefinitely for the United States to become a Socialist state by revolution; moreover, he does not think this will happen."

Campaigning in Chicago, Henry Cabot Lodge, GOP candidate for Vice-President and our former ambassador to the UN—who knows the Russian attitude better than any man in the country—says:

"The Soviets intend to pursue their course by conspiracy, subversion and midnight treachery. They want to take over the world."

Already Khrushchev is fuming and foaming over the Washington edict that he will be cooped up in Manhattan during his U. N. stay—and this also applies to his Cuban pal, Fidel Castro, who has the effrontery to join hands with his Russian buddy in his impudent fist shaking at Uncle Sam.

The President will be making a grave mistake if he doesn't make it forcefully plain in language the world can understand that this country will not only pursue its efforts for peace, but that there will be no Munich, no appeasement, that if war does come from Russian plotting we have the strength and the determination to meet it—and to win.

Too long and too often we've handled Mr. K. with kid gloves. This Kremlin bully is an artful genius in the art of propaganda. Behind the facade of his smile and quips is a mixture of bluff, hatred, masked cruelty, deception and no respect for solemn agreements and obligations.

He'll be listening to the President of the United States next Thursday. It's Ike's chance to let him understand he can't come waving an olive branch which conceals his missiles and U-boats. We know they are there—and are not cringing.

Press Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON 1, D. C.

SUNBURY (Pa.)
DAILY ITEM

Circ.: e. 20,369

Front Edit Other
Page Page Page 2

Date: SEP 16 1960

Thoughts in Passing.

A RUSSIAN DEFECTOR, Captain Nikolai Fedorovich Artamanov, came to the United States in June, 1959, but that fact became publicly known for the first time Wednesday when the House Committee on un-American Activities announced that he was about to testify in one of its sessions. Later it was disclosed that Artamanov, former commander of a destroyer in the Soviet navy, told the committee the Russian strategy has, since February, 1955, been based on the doctrine of a nuclear surprise attack on the United States.

And the Russian refugee added: "If Khrushchev believed the strength of the Soviet Union was overwhelming, he would, of course, deal a stunning blow to the west."

That latter statement should answer to some extent the ill-advised statements that too frequently are made by Americans about the military weakness of their country. On the other hand, the hush-hush treatment given the defection of Artamanov is in such sharp contrast with the extravaganza recently staged in Moscow when two American traitors were presented on television that one is led to wonder how long the Pentagon will continue to yield to the Soviet advantages that once gone cannot be recaptured.

What the Kremlin has long since known about many aspects of the struggle between communism and freedom cannot properly be labeled "classified information."

Press Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON 1. D. C.

LANSING (Mich.)
STATE JOURNAL
Circ.: e. 64,288
S. 63,334
Front Page Edit Page Other Page
Date: SEP 16 1960



CAPT. ARTAMONOV

Reds Would Blast U.S. First, Defector Says

WASHINGTON, Sept. 16 (AP)—Russian leaders would not hesitate to launch a surprise nuclear attack on the United States if they thought this nation could be smashed with one stroke, a former Soviet naval officer says.
Capt. Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov testified Wednesday that Soviet military strategy has been based on the doctrine of a surprise nuclear attack since February 1955.
Artamonov, who was commander of a Russian destroyer in the Baltic fleet, defected to the United States in June 1959 while stationed at Gdynia, Poland.

FIRST DISCLOSURE
His appearance Wednesday before the house committee on un-American activities, however, provided the first public disclosure on his presence in this country.
The 32-year-old Russian, a slim, bespectacled man with a heavy black moustache, spent

ment, Artamonov said, the Soviet doctrine of a surprise attack has been official since February 1955. He said it was spelled out in a Soviet military publication available only to high-ranking officers.
He said he had not seen any directives ordering preparations for such a surprise assault on this nation. But he added:
"I know of general broad state statements which tend to prepare the Soviet officer corps for the possibility of being ordered to make a surprise attack."
TRAWLERS SPYING
He said, "No senior Soviet officer believes that the United States would attack first."
Under questioning, Artamonov confirmed what is a long suspicion that the Soviet fishing trawlers frequently seen near U.S. waters are spying, not fishing. He said the vessels are operated and manned by agents of Soviet naval intelligence.

16 Sep 60

Press Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON 1 D C

BIRMINGHAM (Ala.)
NEWS

Circ.: e. 184,893
S. 220,915

Front Page Ed. Page Other Page
Date: SEP 16 1960

The USSR Might Attack

One of the great errors some in the United States, for the most part in relative innocence, have committed is to advance the notion that because the A- and H-bombs are capable of such near-total devastation, no nation would begin a war certain to bring such weapons into swift action.

The idea has grown that whatever the Russians intended to "win," they would get without overt military action, using such nuclear tools or not using them.

An assumption has grown that the Russians would just sit back and wait for us to decay, and when we had sufficiently "ripened," they would put us in the hole and bury us.

But statements by two from beyond the Iron Curtain now are available which ought to set the nation thinking in more realistic terms. Capt. Nikolai Artamonov, who defected to the U. S. from the Russian navy last June, has now told the House un-American activities committee that the Soviet Union has prepared its high officers for open attack against the West. He says that this has been policy since 1955.

And Artamonov also says that no high Russian officer believes that the United States would attack first in a war.

This last is important because it affects the power of the United States, by threat of potential attack if we are

gored by the Russians too bloodily, to deter the Soviets from an attack on their own.

In short, you have to make a potential enemy—or an actual enemy which, war or no, Russia is—understand and believe that you might attack in order to give him those second thoughts that might prevent him from seriously considering an attack.

If no high Soviet officer believes we might attack, then our deterrent power is reduced. If not eliminated, and Soviet policy will be based on other considerations.

Further, in West Germany Capt. Guenther Malikowski, who has defected to the West after being a political training officer with the East German army, has produced documents and posters which show that East German forces have been trained for an attack against West Germany. One poster displayed said "The war will be over for you in a few days." It was directed at the West German people, and presumably would be used if the East Germans did attack West Germany.

We must, as a people, realize that Russian attack is entirely possible. The Soviet leaders are not "drifting." They are not patient as some would have our people believe. In short, time is not all necessarily on our side.

16 Sep 60

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ABERDEEN (S.D.)
AMERICAN-NEWS

Circ.: e. 20,625
S. 20,710

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Date: SEP 16 1960



Testifies

Capt. Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov, a defected Russian naval officer appears as a witness before the House unAmerican Activities Committee. He testified the Soviet Union has been preparing for a surprise nuclear attack on the United States since 1955. (AP Wirephoto).

Press Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON 1. D. C.

16 Sep 60

BILLINGS (Mont.)
GAZETTE

Circ.: m. 25,285
S. 37,228

Front Page Edit Page Other Page

Date: SEP 16 1960

THEY DON'T FISH

**Soviet Trawlers Spy
On Navy, Defector Says**

WASHINGTON (UPI)—A Russian navy captain who defected to the West testified Wednesday that Soviet fishing trawlers operating off the U.S. East Coast actually are instrument-loaded ships spying on American naval units.

Nikolai Federovich Artamonov, 32, described as a former commander of a Soviet destroyer, told a congressional hearing the trawlers were manned by Soviet intelligence personnel "concerned with the combat preparation of the U.S. fleet."

Artamonov, who said he defected to the West 15 months ago because of disenchantment with "aggressive" Soviet foreign policy, testified that the Russian vessels did not engage in any legitimate fishing. He said they were loaded with fish before leaving the Soviet Union to appear legitimate in the event of search by U.S. naval units.

Artamonov told a House subcommittee on Un-American Activities that the trawlers are laden with gadgets to pick up information on radar frequencies used by the Navy and the location of shore-based "signal systems."

Speaking through an interpreter, he said the ships were collecting information on the composition of the U.S. fleet, its maneuvers and the usual location of its patrols.

16 Sep 60

Press Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON I. D. C.

FERGUS FALLS (Minn.)
JOURNAL

Circ.: e. 13,221

Front Page Edit Page Other Page

Date: SEP 16 1960

Number of U.S. Traitors Is Small

The two traitors, Martin and Mitchell, who went over to the Reds a short time ago, carried a great deal of valuable information as they had access to America's most important military secrets, and all of the nation's secret codes, but the number of Americans who have gone behind the Iron Curtain is trifling compared with the number of Russian officers who have defected to the United States. The latest reports place the number of officers who have come to this country from Iron Curtain countries, at about 9,000, and they have given, and are giving American military officers important information all of the time. The most disquieting information is that given by Captain Nikolai Artamonov who told the House Committee on Un-American activities Wednesday that the Russians have been under orders to be prepared to stage a nuclear attack on the United States ever since 1953. He said further that Khrushchev would stage an attack on this country at any time if he feels that he could win at one stroke, and that he is not willing to wait indefinitely for this country to go Communist. The Russian dictator apparently feels that even present progress is too slow in this country.

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Press Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON, D. C.

BIRMINGHAM (Ala.)
NEWS

Circ.: *a* 184,893
S 220,915

Front Page Ed. Page Other Page
Date: *SEP* 16 1960

The USSR Might Attack

One of the great errors some in the United States, for the most part in relative innocence, have committed is to advance the notion that because the A- and H-bombs are capable of such near-total devastation, no nation would begin a war certain to bring such weapons into swift action.

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But statements by two from beyond the Iron Curtain now are available which ought to set the nation thinking in more realistic terms. Capt. Nikolai Artamonov, who defected to the U. S. from the Russian navy last June, has now told the House un-American activities committee that the Soviet Union has prepared its high officers for open attack against the West. He says that this has been policy since 1955.

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In short, you have to make a potential enemy—or an actual enemy which, war or no, Russia is—understand and believe that you might attack in order to give him those second thoughts that might prevent him from seriously considering an attack.

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Further, in West Germany Capt. Guenther Mallkowsky, who has defected to the West after being a political training officer with the East German army, has produced documents and photographs which show that East German soldiers have been trained for an attack on West Germany. One poster displayed said "The war will be over for you in a few days." It was directed at the West German people, and presumably would be used if the East Germans did attack West Germany.

We must, as a people, realize that a Russian attack is entirely possible. Soviet leaders are not "patient" as some people believe. In short, they are not patient as some people believe. In short, they are all-occasionally on our...

Sept 60

Press Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON, D. C.

SHAWNEE (OKLA.) NEWS
STAR

circ.: m. 10,896
S. 11,116

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ge Page Page

ate: SEP 16 1960

Shawnee (Okla.) News-Star, Friday, Sept. 16, 1960 7A

All great powers map strategy for war

By J. M. ROBERTS,
(AP News Analyst)

against the United States and West Germany can be taken calmly. The United States, West Germany and NATO are making war

plans against the Communists, too. In present world circumstances, that is routine.

to talk about peaceful coexistence and the refusal of the United States to fall for it, with behind the scenes sound effects of rattling rockets.

The United States, by its program of extreme reconnaissance measures, long ago recognized an extreme danger of surprise attack. Yet there is a great difference between planning for possible wars, which has always been the peacetime preoccupation of military staffs, and the political intent to make war. The latter is not now evident.

There is, of course, always danger of an accidental war at times when the Soviet Union is pressing so hard, as she is now, for advantage in the cold war.

Her planes which turned back from the U.N.-held airfields in the Congo, however, would seem to be a better clue to her actual attitude than the harsh words she is expending over that situation, and the harsh posture she is taking toward West Berlin.

She is not pursuing to the limit policies which could bring her to a physical face-up with the United States in the Congo, nor is she expected to do so regarding Berlin.

Another big battle in the cold war is shaping up—indeed it already has begun in the Security Council—at the United Nations. There Nikita Khrushchev is mobilizing all of his puppets in an attempt to demonstrate the strength of international communism and to embarrass the United States.

This is expected to be one of the greatest demonstrations ever

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Press Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON 1. D. C.

GREENVILLE (S. C.)
NEWS

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Front Page / Edit Page / Other Page

Date: SEP 16 1960

Testimony That Russia Is Making War Plans Is Nothing New; It's Routine; U. S. Is Too

By J. M. ROBERTS

Associated Press News Analyst

The testimony of two defecting military officers that the Communists are making war plans against the United States and West Germany can be taken calmly.

The United States, West Germany and NATO are making war plans against the Communists, too.

In present world circumstances, that is routine.

The United States, by its program of extreme reconnaissance measures, long ago recognized an extreme danger of surprise at

lack. Yet there is a great difference between planning for possible wars, which has always been the peacetime preoccupation of military staffs, and the political intent to make war. The latter is not now evident.

There is, of course, always danger of an accidental war at times when the Soviet Union is pressing so hard, as she is now, for advantage in the cold war.

Her planes which turned back from the U. N.-held airfields in the Congo, however, would seem to be a better clue to her actual attitude than the harsh words she is expending over that situation,

and the harsh posture she is taking toward West Berlin.

She is not pursuing to the limit policies which could bring her to a physical face-up with the United States in the Congo, nor is she expected to do so regarding Berlin.

Indeed, the revolving jail doors in Leopoldville suggest that the situation there has boiled down to something like an even battle between the local figures.

Another big battle in the cold war is shaping up—indeed it already has begun in the Security Council—at the United Nations. There Nikita Khrushchev is mo-

bilizing all of his puppets in an attempt to demonstrate the strength of international communism and to embarrass the United States.

This is expected to be one of the greatest demonstrations ever to talk about peaceful coexistence and the refusal of the United States to fall for it, with behind the scenes sound effects of rattling rockets.

It may be true, as the former Soviet naval officer testified in Washington, that Soviet leaders would attack if they thought they could win with one nuclear stroke. But that's a big, and a saving, if

16 Sep 60

Press Intelligence, Inc.
 WASHINGTON 1 D C

WILMINGTON (Del.)
 NEWS

Circ.: m. 30,216

Front Page Edit Page Other Page

Date: **SEP 16 1960**

ED KOTERBA

Assignment: Washington

This Show Fizzled

WASHINGTON, Sept. 15.— Rep. Francis Walter, chairman of the Committee on Un-American Activities, pulled aside his oak and dazzle and produced genuine, live Communist defector from the USSR.

This was his answer to the public performance in Moscow starting our two defecting National Security Agency officials. But, instead of matching the Soviet's razzle and dazzle, law maker Walter's show seemed to sputter and fizzle.

The witness, there in the august gloom of the House mens' room, was telling all, all right. But what he told we must assume our intelligence people already knew — and name. And, too, his heart just wasn't in it.

The Red defector is a young man out his manicured heavy-lash mustache and marching red black brows gave him an appearance beyond his 32 years.

However, he was no color-walking official nor the equivalent of a U-2 spy. Merely a captain in the Soviet navy and third class at that. What secrets could he tell?

Capt. Nikolai Fedorovich Avramov detected a year ago and took Representative Walter (D Pa.) that long to bring him out into the open to disclose the man's "inside information" on the Soviet "red" to us.

And the captain, though fully cooperative, appeared

cautionally, inwardly, awkwardly, mixed up.

He coughed nervously. His eyes avoided his inquisitors, even his interpreter. Yet there was a strange look of calm defiance across his face as the interpreter, read his translated message announcing his reason for defecting.

"As an officer, wouldn't I be betraying my own people by running away from them? Now, Captain Avramov twirled the dripping paper cup. "No, I shall never betray my people. I was, I am, and I shall always remain a Russian but not a Soviet Russian."

He was, no question, a disillusioned ex-Red. His one "important comment" was stark, indeed. But as his interpreter read it, it came out in faded tones and the audience listened with folded hands and stour faces.

The Kremlin, he said, holds to a doctrine of surprise atomic attack on the United States.

The look in the collective face of the spectators seemed to say, "So? We already know that."

There is no question about the seriousness of the Communist threat to our very lives. But the vague testimony of a third class captain defector isn't enough to elect it as out of our heads.

Sure, Mr. Walter has the means and initiative to do better than that.

16 Sep 60

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WASHINGTON 1, D. C.

BILLINGS (Mont.)
GAZETTE

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Date: 16 1958

Soviet Studies Attack Plan

WASHINGTON (AP) — Soviet leaders would not hesitate to launch a surprise nuclear attack on the United States if they thought this nation could be smashed with one stroke, a former Soviet naval officer says.

Capt. Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov testified Wednesday that Soviet military strategy has been based on the doctrine of a surprise nuclear attack since February 1955.

Artamonov, 32, who was commander of a Soviet destroyer in the Baltic fleet, defected to the United States in June 1959 while stationed at Gdynia, Poland.

His appearance before the House Committee on Un-American Activities, however, provided the first public disclosure of his presence in this country.

He said he had been in the United States since shortly after he fled to the West, working with U. S. agencies he did not name.

He said he lives now in New York City, at an undisclosed address, without guards or any form of protection from Communist retaliation.

Despite Premier Nikita Khrushchev's repeated pronouncements favoring disarmament, Artamonov said, the Soviet doctrine of a surprise attack has been official since February 1955. He said it was spelled out in a Soviet military publication available only to high-ranking officers.

Press Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON 1. D. C.

LEWISTOWN (Pa.)
SENTINEL

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Date: SEP 16 1960



SOVIET DEFECTOR — Nikolai Fedorovich Arizamonov, 32, a defecting Russian navy captain who once skippered a Red destroyer, tells the House Un-American Activities Committee that Soviet military strategy since 1955 has been based on the doctrine of surprise attack in nuclear warfare. He also said Soviet fishing trawlers off the U. S. eastern coast operate under the command of a Soviet Intelligence unit.

16 SEPT 60

Press Intelligence, Inc.
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WILMINGTON (Del.)
NEWS

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Front Page Edit Page Other Page

Date: SEP 16 1960

ED KOTERBA

Assignment: Washington

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The Red defector is a young man but his manicured heavy-brush mustache and matching big black brows give him an appearance beyond his 32 years.

However, he was no code-cracking official nor the equivalent of a U-2 spy. Merely a captain in the Soviet navy — and third class at that. What secrets could he tell?

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N.Y. Herald Tribune
Sep 16 1960

Bonn Says E. Germany Plans War Cites Documents Of a Defector

By Gaston Coblenz
From the Herald Tribune Bureau

BONN, Sept. 15.—West Germany charged today that East Germany is preparing a war of aggression and produced some rather bloodcurdling documents to support the accusation.

At a special press conference, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer's government displayed placards and leaflets said to have been distributed to the 1st East German Motorized Division at Potsdam for use upon capture of the West German city of Kiel and the West German state of Lower Saxony.

This and other material was said to have been brought to West Germany by an East German army captain who defected from the Communist ranks less than a month ago.

Sure It's Authentic

A senior spokesman of Dr. Adenauer's Press Ministry said that the Bonn government is absolutely certain of the authenticity of the documents and of the good faith of the defector, Guenther Alfons-Malikowski, who is thirty-two and was born in the former German city of Danzig.

The dramatic aspect of the documents which the captain was said to have brought to West Germany was that they seemed to be genuine samples of material that would be used by the East German army if it marched into the Bonn republic.

They were displayed to newspaper men by slide projector, and photocopies were made available for closer study.

One of the documents was a placard clearly intended to be posted on building walls in the city of Kiel. It was signed with the words "The City Commandant" and read in part:

"Residents of Kiel! The last nests of resistance in the city have been smashed. The city is in the hands of the troops of the National Peoples Army of the German Democratic Republic (East Germany).

"The army of Germany's first workers' and peasants' state has not come to oppress

the working population as an occupator power.

"We have come to put a final end to Fascism and militarism in Germany. We wish good co-operation with the democratically minded and constructive forces of the city.

"The City Commandatur will place the reorganization of municipal life in the hands of a democratic administration.

"Your active co-operation will help to restore peace, order and security and to make the vestiges of war disappear."

Kiel is a city of 270,000 located on the Baltic coast a short distance across the frontier from East Germany.

Lower Saxony Leaflet

A leaflet addressed to the people of Lower Saxony—which also borders on East Germany—was couched in similar language. It announced that the East German army had arrived as a "liberator."

These and other documents—one of them addressed to "our German brothers" and another addressed "to all"—appeared to indicate that the East German army expects to occupy Kiel and Lower Saxony.

Other divisions besides the 1st Motorized Unit at Potsdam presumably are equipped with similar material for use in other parts of West Germany.

Conversion of Army

Capt. Malkowski has testified to the West German authorities that the material which he brought signifies the conversion of the East German army from a basically defensive to an "aggressive" force.

He reported that the conversion began last spring and is still under way.

The Bonn spokesman said that this development disclosed the true meaning of the violent barrage of aggression charges that have been directed against West Germany by the Soviet Union and East Germany for the last few months.

Sees Smoke Screen

He said that the anti-West German campaign was a smoke screen intended to deflect attention from preparations for aggression on the Communist side.

Asked whether the Bonn government took Capt. Malkowski's material seriously, the spokesman replied, with a flash of irritation:

"Very seriously. For us it is the most serious thing there can be."

It was explained to correspondents that Capt. Malkowski could not appear at the press conference for reasons of security. However, slide portraits of the officer were flashed by a projector onto the wall of the room in which that news conference was held in a wing of the Bonn Parliament building.

One of the pictures showed the captain talking with the

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Press Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON 1, D. C. 13

NEW YORK (N.Y.)
WORLD-TELEGRAM and
SUN

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Front Page
Edit Page
Other Page

Date: SEP 16 1960

By ED KOTERBA

Mr. Walter's Bombshell Is a Dud



WASHINGTON—maker Walter's show seemed to sputter and fizzle.

Congressman Francis Walter, chairman of the Committee on Un-American Activities, pulled aside his cloak and gagger and produced a genuine, live Communist. The witness, there in the twilight gloom of the House caucus room, was telling all all right. But what he told we must assume our intelligence people already knew—and just wasn't in it.

The Red defector is a young man but his manly, cured heavy-brush mustache and matching big black brows give him an appearance beyond his 32 years.

However, he was no code-cracking official nor the equivalent of a U-2 spy. Merely a captain in the Soviet navy—and third class at that. What secrets could he tell?

Ed Koterba, cow starting our two defective National Security Agency officers. But instead of matching the Soviets' razzle and dazzle, law,

Capit. Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov defected a year ago, and it took Rep. Walter that long to bring him out into the open to disclose the man's "inside information" on the Soviet threat to us.

In the first place, our arena of inquiry was sadly deficient theatrically. Only two dimly lit chandeliers in the vast auditorium. The Soviets at the U-2 trial, for example, had 34 chandeliers burning.

Here we had no Kielig lights, no television cameras—and the witness was forced to testify with his back to the audience.

And the captain, though fully co-operative, appeared emotionally, inwardly, awkwardly, mixed up.

He coughed nervously. His eyes avoided his linguists, even his interpreter. Yet there was a strange look of calm defiance across his face as the interpreter read his translated message announcing his reason for defecting.

"As an officer wouldn't I be betraying my own people by running away from them?" Now, Capit. Artamonov twirled the dripping paper cup. "No, I shall never betray my people. I was, I am and I shall always remain a Russian—but not a Soviet Russian."

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Surely, Mr. Walter has the means and initiative to do better than that.

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WASHINGTON 1, D. C. B

NEW YORK (N.Y.)
NEWS

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Front Edit Other
Page Page Page

Date: SEP 16 1960

A WORD OF CAUTION

Now, don't get us wrong: We think it's fine that so many groups and persons around town are planning fitting receptions for Khrushchev and his murdering colleagues during their United Nations visit.



Teddy Gleason

We particularly admire the statement of Teddy Gleason, of the International Longshoremen's Association, that "these bums will have to unload the ship themselves"—meaning the dinky Russian liner Baltika, when she docks at 25th St. and the East River.

Strictly in the proper spirit, too, we think, are the plans for dignified but emphatic demonstrations against the said bums by the numerous patriotic and captive nations organizations banded in American Action.

However, let's on no account have any incidents comparable to the Red-inspired mob violence that kept President Eisenhower out of Tokyo and almost cost Vice President Richard M. Nixon his life in Venezuela.

Such goings-on do not become Americans; and let's not make the job of guarding these creatures' lives any tougher for the police than it has to be. After all, these men are down initially for 60 hours' continuous duty.

On the other hand, let's be under no—

ILLUSIONS

As to the allegedly peaceful purpose of Khrushchev's visit to the UN.

While he twangs his peace lyre, as he is expected to do, let's all keep in mind the testimony of Nikolai Artamonov Wednesday before the House Un-American Activities

No Change in Red Leopards

Committee (the group Jimmy Roosevelt wants to destroy).

Artamonov, a Soviet navy captain who deserted to our side sometime ago, says Khrushchev since 1955 has been planning a nuclear surprise attack on the United States, which he will trigger the moment he feels sure he can win in one stroke.

The Reds, says Artamonov, "are power seekers, not political idealists. Khrushchev does not wish to wait indefinitely for the U. S. to become a Socialist state by evolution. Moreover, he does not believe that will happen."

This story dovetails with the current reports from Bonn of the discovery of detailed plans for a blitz attack by Communist East Germany on West Germany.

Both news items should serve as fresh warnings to us that the Kremlin is out to murder freedom all over the world, with the United States as its major objective.

In a lighter vein, there is the excitement at the White House concerning—

WHOM TO INVITE

—for Presidential visits from among the national leaders coming to the UN's big get-together. There will be many of these besides such known U. S. foes as Khrushchev and Castro and such dubious friends of ours as Tito, Nehru and Nasser.

The problem seems simple to us. Why not wait and see how the various bigwigs behave at the UN palaver, then invite to the White House those who show themselves to be friendly toward us and pointedly snub those who don't? Why put these prized invitations on any other basis?

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NEW YORK (N.Y.)
POST

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Date: SEP 16 1960

THE BIG REVELATION

WASHINGTON, Sept. 15—“Make no mistake,” Capt. Nikolai Artamonov, a defecting Soviet naval officer, told the House Un-American Activities Committee, “the Russian leaders are power seekers, not political idealists.”

And what else is new, Comrade?

16 SEPT 60

Press Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON 1, D. C.

DULUTH (Minn.)
NEWS-TRIBUNE

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Front Page Edit Page Other Page

Date: SEP 16 1960

Red Defector Offers Little Information U. S. Can Use

Apparently to offset the official bungling evidenced in the defection to Russia of two U.S. code clerks, Washington this week put on display a Russian navy captain who defected to the West. It was a poor performance, filled with sound and fury signifying nothing.

In the first place the Russian seemed to offer scant information about anything that might prove of value to us. The highlight of what the House un-American Activities Committee says it learned from Capt. Artamonov was his belief that Russia plans a nuclear attack on the U.S.

Pressed for details, he had little to back up this contention and, frankly, it doesn't make much sense anyway. We suspect he merely said it because he thought it was the right thing to say to Americans. Undoubtedly many Russians think we live in constant fear of war.

Much more interesting, however, was the disclosure that Capt. Artamonov had defected more than a year ago but had been kept under wraps until now. Why? Either because he had revealed secrets that the committee chose not to have repeated in public? Or because our propaganda machine failed to exploit his defection and it now trying to catch up belatedly?

The Russians wasted no time letting the world know they have our code clerks. In a duel for world opinion, shouldn't the U.S. have hastened to spread the word that we have one of their boys?

No matter how we look at it, the whole business seems pretty ridiculous. A defecting Russian doesn't offset the defection of two code clerks. Nor is there any genuine value in trying to match every Russian move with a similar move. Diplomatic chess just isn't played that way.

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Press Intelligence, Inc.

WASHINGTON, D. C.

ELMIRA (N.Y.)
STAR-GAZETTE

Circ.: e 38,662

Front Page Edit Page Other Page

Date: SEP 16 1960

Nothing Secret In Soviet Aims

SOVIET RUSSIA'S plans for a surprise nuclear attack on the United States have been laid in detail before the House Committee on Un-American Activities. This should surprise no one. Neither should Russian spying from what are supposed to be Soviet fishing trawlers operating off the United States East Coast. They're studying combat preparations of the U.S. Fleet.

We have for all this the word of Capt. Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov, a 32-year-old Russian navy captain, who defected to the West.

The timing of Capt. Artamonov's appearance before the committee is unfortunate—for the Red horde soon to descend upon the United Nations.

It bears out what the Russians have been writing boldly on the wall. Unfortunately, Khrushchev's rantings have been taken no more seriously than Hitler's. The German dictator warned the world of his intentions. Khrushchev has done the same thing, his overall objectives being based on Karl Marx's 112-year-old manifesto.

Communists make no secret of their goals.

We shouldn't either. Capt. Artamonov's testimony should help us to convince ourselves that communism plans to run the world after conquering the greatest free power in it—the United States.

Press Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON 1. D. C.

SAVANNAH (Ga.)
PRESS

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Front Page Edit Page Other Page

Date: SEP 1 6 1960

Why We Must Keep Our Guard Up

Nikolai Artamonov, the Russian defector who testified before the House Committee on Un-American Activities on Soviet military designs, told us nothing that we didn't suspect long ago, but it was nevertheless something of a shock to see it spelled out in detail.

The former Russian navy captain told congressmen that all Soviet strategy is directed toward a surprise nuclear attack on the United States. "No senior Soviet officer believes that the United States will attack first," he added, therefore all Red military plans can be laid for launching aggression themselves with little attention to defensive measures.

We might hasten to interject at this point that we realize the propaganda element in Artamonov's testimony and how it may have been timed to go before the public at this time in an effort to offset the remarks made in Moscow by two American traitors.

Nevertheless, Soviet policy since the end of World War II has done nothing but underline the veracity of Artamonov's statements. As we said, it is no surprise.

But at the same time the testimony may serve to reawaken those among us who continue to persist in discounting Russia's aggressive diplomatic moves. "Khrushchev does not wish to wait indefinitely for the United States to become a socialist state by evolution; moreover he does not believe this will happen. He would like to see it take place in his lifetime."

The only way it could take place in his lifetime by remote possibility would be for him to attempt to bring it about by armed force, thus putting another lie to his continued pleas for "co-existence."

The need for America keeping strong to discourage any military designs against it becomes more evident with each event on the rapidly moving world scene.

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WASHINGTON 1. D. C.

MIAMI (Fla.)
HERALD

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Date: SEP 16 1960



—Associated Press Wirephoto

AFTER TESTIFYING before the House Committee on Un-American Activities, Nikolai Federovich, former captain in the Russian navy who defected to the West, talks to newsmen in Washington.

Press Intelligence, Inc.

WASHINGTON 1. D. C.

PETERSBURG (Va.)
PROGRESS-INDEXCirc.: e. 18,154
S. 18,127Front Edit Other
Page Page Page

Date: SEP 16 1960

Who Is Threatening Whom Now?

All of the talk from defectors about the warlike intentions of the United States and the heavy emphasis which Soviet propaganda places upon it, sound pretty silly in comparison with the testimony of a former Russian navy captain before the House un-American activities committee.

According to this source, since



RUSSIAN TESTIFIES — Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov, 32-year-old Russian Navy captain who defected to the West 15 months ago, testifies before a House subcommittee on un-American Activities in Washington. Artamonov, speaking through an interpreter, said that Soviet military strategy since 1955 has been based on "the doctrine of surprise attack in nuclear warfare."

February, 1955, Soviet strategy has been based on the doctrine of a nuclear surprise attack on the United States. Khrushchev, said the captain, who defected as result of his disillusionment

with Russia, does not wish to wait for the United States to become a socialist state by evolution and does not believe it will happen; he would like to be able to deal a stunning blow from overwhelming strength.

The disclosure makes a fitting prelude to Khrushchev's visit to Manhattan. Let him be asked to comment on this report on his intentions.

Yet there is no reason for anyone's blood to run any colder because of the former Russian naval captain's words. The intention can be inferred from everything we know about Soviet Russia. We have been threatened with burial. The only thing which stands in the way is the deterring power of United States military might, the fear of the Red leaders that a sneak attack would bring retaliatory blows which would inflict destruction upon their country.

To date the deterrent has been effective. If any reminder of the importance of keeping it strong is needed, this is it.

For propaganda purposes this is the kind of thing which deserves to be broadcast throughout the world, not merely to counter the effect of the words of defectors from the United States, but to bring the world up to date on Russia's intentions.

The question will be raised on what authority the captain speaks. While he was not in the top rank of Soviet military planners and while he does not claim to have seen the directives for a sneak attack, he was close enough to the top to know what was going on and to appraise the climate of opinion there. His views are far more authoritative than those of defectors who have been holding forth on American belligerence.

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NEW YORK (N.Y.)
NEWS

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Front Page 33
Edit Page
Other Page

Date: SEP 16 1960

Medaris Fires Some New Missiles

By ROBERT CONWAY

Sharply critical of the Eisenhower Administration's defense policies, Maj. Gen. John B. Medaris, retired head of the Army Ballistic Missiles Agency, declared yesterday that the United States must concentrate on anti-missile missiles for protection if we are to survive a nuclear war with Russia.

Medaris also made the following points at a luncheon at the Overseas Press Club, 35 E. 39th St.:

1. "In all honesty the situation has not been helped by having a soldier in the White House who thought in old-fashioned military terms," Medaris said that a "more modern" view would have resulted in our launching a satellite 13 months before the Russians, but that "we sat on the completed plans, letting the Russians beat us with their Sputnik No. 1."

2. There is nothing astonishing about the statement of Nikola Artamonov, defecting Red Army captain, that Russia has plans for a possible nuclear surprise at-

chief need is a "Secretary of Defense who can and will make decisions, instead of setting up more and more committees which negate each other."

Could Have Been First

With regard to the Russian's launching the first Sputnik on Oct. 4, 1957, Medaris said: "Thirteen months before that, the men-

of my command knew they could place a satellite in orbit. For months we begged for the chance to do so. But we couldn't get a decision. Only after 13 months and two Sputniks later were we told to go ahead!"

Medaris has amplified his views in a book, "Countdown for Decision," published by G. P. Putnam's Sons, which will be released Monday.



Maj. Gen. John B. Medaris
Critical of Administration

Lack on the U. S. "We have similar plans because it is the duty of the military to anticipate every possible contingency," Medaris said. "The danger is not in having such plans, but only in the decision to put such plans into effect."

3. Medaris fully expects the Russians to launch a "new scientific surprise of some sort" coincident with Premier Khrushchev's appearance at the UN. This "may be putting a man in outer space."

4. While our retaliatory power is sufficient to discourage the Russians from starting a nuclear war now, we must "go ahead full speed on anti-missile missiles for protection of our 20 major cities and industrial centers. If we can save five cities, we can survive and win."

On the U-2 Episode

5. The "shooting down of the U-2 could have been avoided if plans for developing a reconnaissance satellite hadn't been unnecessarily postponed."

6. The general was critical of Sen. John Kennedy for not "naming some military experts from the armed forces on his advisory committee to plan for possible

20461

ATOM SUBMARINE TESTED FOR SOVIET

Continued From Page 1, Col. 7

Whether the Russians had a nuclear submarine. He declined, for security reasons, to say how many such vessels there were, according to his information. In all such cases, there is a reluctance about letting intelligence authorities know how much information an escaped officer had in his possession, and how much he has been able to relay to spectators in this country.

Invaluable Data Given

But it was apparent from an interview with the former captain, third grade [equivalent to lieutenant commander in the United States Navy] that he has been able to give United States intelligence specialists valuable information about operations of the Soviet Navy and conditions prevailing in it.

Captain Artamonov said he decided to leave his country because he had found communism "a system based on lies." He said he had wanted no part in preserving it or spreading it to other unwilling peoples.

He said he considered Communist leaders completely cynical and bent only on "staying in power and expanding their empire."

His military theory, he said, is based on the principle of surprise attack. Such an attack, he went on, would be successful whenever Moscow decided it had a chance to succeed. He considered Premier Khrushchev's talk about disarmament misleading and designed to confuse the West.

The former Soviet naval officer said the Soviet fleet would play an important part in any move against the West. It is obvious that nuclear submarines able to launch missiles are an essential part of the effort.

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"Sailors would sooner swab the decks, or stand guard duty than go to the political lecture every Monday morning," he said.

Police Control is Tight

But though political opposition was strong and widespread, Captain Artamonov said it was not too grave a threat to the leaders. For one reason, he said, the police control is too tight to permit any effective organization. Moreover, despite the discontent, some doubt that what might replace the present system would be any better.

"Khrushchev could never permit a free press or free discussion," Captain Artamonov said. "If the doors were opened to real contact acts and if outside news came in, the regime would collapse in a month."

The captain said that he still regarded himself as a Russian, one who loved his people and his country. But he left, he said, because he decided it was hopeless to try to work against communism and its masters from inside.

He is now living in New York. He hopes to go to a university and to find work in this country, probably in engineering. He plans to become an American citizen and to do what he can to oppose the men who now rule his country.

Submarines the Key

He described the Soviet submarine fleet as the "shock force" of the Navy and its most important segment. He estimated that the fleet had between 450 and 500 submarines. The Soviet Navy has many trawlers that serve as an integral part of Moscow's military intelligence effort, he said. In the Baltic fleet for example, there is a special trawler squadron.

These vessels are manned by Navy officers and sailors, who wear civilian clothes. The ships are fitted with the most modern technical apparatus—sonar, radar detection instruments, radio equipment, and the like.

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Foreign Officers Trained

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Soviet Said to Have Atom Submarine

By WILLIAM J. JORDEN

Special to The New York Times
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Continued on Page 8, Column 1

NYT 17/9/60

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WASHINGTON 1. D. C.

SEPT 17, 1960

BELLEFONTAINE (Ohio)
EXAMINER

Circ.: e. 9,339

Front Page Edit Page Other Page

Date: SEP 17 1960

Ed Koterba
Assignment
Washington



WASHINGTON — Congress-
man Francis Walter, chairman
of the Committee on Un-Ameri-
can Activities, pulled aside his
cloak and dagger and produced a
genuine, live Communist defec-
tor from the U. S. S. R.

This was his answer to the
public performance in Moscow
starring our two defective Na-
tional Security Agency officers.
But, instead of matching the
Soviets' razzle and dazzle, law-
maker Walter's show seemed to
sputter and fizzle.

The witness, there in the twi-
light gloom of the House caucus
room, was telling all, all right.
But what he told we must as-
sume our intelligence people al-
ready knew — and more. And,
too, his heart just wasn't in it.

The Red defector is a young
man but his manicured, heavy-
brush mustache and matching
big black brows give him an ap-
pearance beyond his 32 years.

However, he was no code-crack-
ing official nor the equivalent of
a U-2 spy. Merely a captain in
the Soviet navy — and third
class at that. What secrets could
he tell?

Capt. Mikolai Fedorovich Ar-
tamanov defected a year ago,
and it took Rep. Walter, (D) Pa.,
that long to bring him out into
the open to disclose the man's
inside information on the So-
viet threat to us.

In the first place, our arena
of inquiry was sadly deficient
theatrically. Only two, dimly-lit
chandeliers in the vast auditori-
um. The Soviets at the U-2 trial
for example, had 34 chandeliers
burning.

Here we had no Klieg lights,
no television cameras — and the
witness was forced to testify
with his back to the audience.

And the captain, though fully
co-operative, appeared emotion-
ally, inwardly, awkwardly, mixed
up.

He coughed nervously. His eyes
avoided his inquisitors, even his
interpreter. Yet, there, was a
strange look of calm defiance
across his face as the interpreter
read his translated message an-
nouncing his reason for defect-
ing.

"As an officer, wouldn't I be
betraying my own people by run-
ning away from them?" Now,
Capt. Artamanov twirled the
dripping paper cup. "No, I shall

never betray my people, I was,
I am, and I shall always remain
a Russian — but not a Soviet
Russian."

He was, no question, a disillusioned ex-Red. His one "important comment" was startling, indeed. But as his interpreter read it, it came out in tired tones and the audience listened with folded hands and stolid faces.

The Kremlin, he said, holds to a doctrine of surprise atomic attack on the United States.

The look in the collective face of the spectators seemed to say: "So? We already know that."

There is no question about the serious Communist threat to our very lives. But the vague testimony of a third-class captain defector isn't enough to electrify us out of our lethargy.

Surely, Mr. Walter has the means and initiative to do better than that.
(Copyright, '60 by U. F. Sva. Inc.)

17 SEPT 1960

Press Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON 1, D. C.

FRAMINGHAM (Mass.)
NEWS

Circ.: e. 13,600

Front Page Edit Page Other Page

3

Date: SEP 17 1960



SOVIET DEFECTOR — Nikolai Federovich Artamonov, 32, a defecting Russian navy captain who once skippered a Red destroyer, tells the House Un-American Activities Committee that Soviet military strategy since 1955 has been based on the doctrine of surprise attack in nuclear warfare. He also said Soviet fishing trawlers off the U.S. eastern coast operate under the command of a Soviet Intelligence unit.

20464

BANGOR (Me.) NEWS

Circ.: m. 71,174
S. 74,423

Front Edit Other
Page Page Page

Date: SEP 17 1960

Defector Claims Reds Have N-Sub

By WILLIAM J. JORDEN
(New York Times News Service)

WASHINGTON, Sept. 16—A former Soviet naval officer who fled to the West last year said today the Soviet Union has a nuclear submarine.

He said he also had reason to think that the Soviet Navy now can launch missiles from submarines. Some Soviet surface ships are fitted out for missile-launching as well, he said.

These disclosures came from Nikolai Federovich Artamonov, ex-commander of a Soviet destroyer in the Baltic fleet. He fled to asylum in the West in June 1959, from the Polish port of Gdynia where his unit was based.

The defector—who once was cited in the Soviet press as a model officer—indicated there was no reason for speculation about whether the Soviets have a nuclear submarine. He declined, for security reasons, to say precisely how he knew or to say how many such vessels there were according to his information.

As in all such cases, there was reluctance about passing on to the Soviet intelligence authorities just how much information the escaped officer had in his possession, and how much he had been able to relay to specialists in this country.

But it was apparent from an interview with the former captain third grade (equivalent to a lieutenant commander in the U. S. Navy) that he had been able to give U. S. intelligence specialists invaluable information about the operations of the Soviet Navy and conditions prevailing inside it.

17 SEPT 60

WASHINGTON 1, D. C.

SPRINGFIELD (Ohio)

SUN

Circ.: m. 17,336

Front Page	Edit Page	Other Page

Date: SEP 17 1960

Why Do Defectors Defect?

On the front page of The Sun a few days ago appeared some testimony before the House Committee on Un-American Activities, voiced by a former captain in the Soviet navy. It was a well-timed reminder that the traffic in defectors runs both ways. All that needs to be added is that the balance overwhelmingly favors the free world.

Why did Capt. Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov defect? His reasons, such as they are, might be called reverse-English on the reasons cited by Mitchell and Martin, the U.S. code clerks, for defecting to the Soviet Union. On both sides the defectors declared that they feared the aggressive designs of their own nation against the other nation.

The reasons do not necessarily cancel each other out. One aspect of the cold war is the confusion and dismay it inflicts on many persons, Soviet as well as Western, who are in some manner associated with military and/or intelligence enterprises. We may find it useful to assume, on the evidence available, that the nervous and emotional stress of those enterprises can at times become intolerable for certain kinds of people, resulting now and again in acts of moral desperation rather than ideological conviction.

Naturally enough the act of desperation, once a defector has defected, is dressed up in ideological costume. This need not be a matter of so-called "brain-washing," either; the defector is more than eager, as a rule, to rationalize his act. He doesn't need persuasion.

But there is one curious feature in the pattern of defections on both sides. It is that in

practically every instance the fugitive is flying from a situation that in the material sense at least is reasonably comfortable and well-paid. Mitchell and Martin, for example, were \$9,000-a-year bureaucrats in the National Security Administration, and Capt. Artamonov had risen to substantial command rank in the Russian destroyer fleet.

Hard luck or a hard life does not appear to inspire abandonment of either the Western nations or the Iron Curtain nations. It is almost as if the psychology of defection might be nourished not by injustice or misery at home, but by privileged status, by a positive surfeit of good things.

The published findings of many sociologists, psychologists, and psychiatrists tend to confirm this. There is a spiritual malaise in the West that comes from a plethora of material blessings. If the Sovietized world with its still widespread austerities produces even more defectors, the fact remains that defections come by and large from the privileged class, which in the USSR and its satellites is comprised principally of bureaucrats and high-ranking military or intelligence officers.

We must distinguish between refugees from communist tyranny and hardship, who are numbered in the hundreds of thousands, and the comparatively few defectors who have on both sides had "the best of everything." What the latter seem to suffer in common is an acute case of the materialistic sickness of our times, which leads them to renounce and betray the very source of their well-being. "The problem," as Gen. MacArthur foresaw so many years ago, "is theological."

20466

17 SEP 60

Press Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON 1, D. C.

DALLAS (Tex.)
NEWS

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S. 222,469

Front Edit Other
Page Page Page 9/1

Date: SEP 17 1960

Defector Says Reds Have N-Sub

(c) 1960. New York Times News Service
WASHINGTON — A former Soviet naval officer who fled to the West last year said Friday the Soviet Union has a nuclear submarine.

He said he also had reason to think that the Soviet navy now can launch missiles from submarines. Some Soviet surface ships are fitted out for missile-launching as well, he said.

These disclosures came from Nikolai Federovich Artamonov, ex-commander of a Soviet destroyer in the Baltic fleet. He fled to asylum in the West in June, 1959, from the Polish port of Gdynia, where his unit was based.

The defector — who once was cited in the Soviet press as a model officer — indicated there was no reason for speculation about whether the Soviets have a nuclear submarine. He declined, for security reasons, to say precisely how he knew or to say how many such vessels there were according to his information.

As in all such cases, there was reluctance about passing on to the Soviet intelligence authorities just how much information the escaped officer had in his possession, and how much he had been able to relay to specialists in this country.

But it was apparent from an interview with the former captain third grade (equivalent to a lieutenant commander in the U.S. Navy) that he had been able to give U.S. intelligence specialists invaluable information about the operations of the Soviet navy and conditions prevailing inside it.

Artamonov said he had decided to leave his country because he found communism "a system based on lies." He said he wanted no part in preserving it or spreading it to other unwilling peoples.

He said he considered Communist leaders completely cynical and bent only on "staying in power and expanding that power."

20467

Press Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON 1, D. C.

NEW YORK (N.Y.)
TIMES

Circ: m. 614,169
S. 1,254,635

Front Page Edit Page Other Page

Date: SEP 17 1960

Soviet Said to Have An Atom Submarine

By WILLIAM J. JORDEN

Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, Sept. 16—A former Soviet naval officer who fled to the West last year said today that the Soviet Union had a nuclear submarine.

He said he had reason to think that the Soviet Navy now also could launch missiles from submarines. Some Soviet surface ships are fitted out for missile-launching, he said.

These disclosures came from Nikolai Federovich Artamonov, former commander of a Soviet destroyer in the Baltic fleet. He fled to the West in June, 1959, from the Polish port of Gdynia, where his unit had been based.

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Continued on Page 2, Column 1

ATOM SUBMARINE LISTED FOR SOVIET

Continued From Page 1, Col. 7

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Invaluable Data Given

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He said he considered Communist leaders completely cynical and bent only on "staying in power and expanding that power."

Soviet military theory, he said, is based on the principle of surprise attack. Such an attack, he went on, would be made whenever Moscow decided that it had a chance to succeed. He considered Premier Khrushchev's talk about disarmament misleading and designed to confuse the West.

The former Soviet naval officer said the Soviet fleet would play an important part in any military move against the West. It was obvious that nuclear submarines able to launch missiles would be an essential part of such an effort.

Submarines the Key

He described the Soviet submarine fleet as the "shock force" of the Navy and its most important segment. He estimated that the fleet had between 450 and 500 submarines.

The Soviet Navy has many trawlers that serve as an integral part of Moscow's military intelligence effort, he said. In the Baltic fleet for example, there is a special trawler squadron.

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Foreign Officers Trained

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20468

17 SEP 60

TUCSON (Ariz.)
STAR

Circ.: m. 34,306
S. 45,533

A3

Front Edits Other
Page Page Page

Date: SEP 17 1960

Former Soviet Naval Officer Says Russians Have Nuclear Submarines

© 1960 New York Times News Service

WASHINGTON, Sept. 16 (AP)—A former Soviet naval officer who fled to the West last year said Friday the Soviet Union has a nuclear submarine.

He said he also had reason to think that the Soviet navy now can launch missiles from submarines. Some Soviet surface ships are fitted out for missile-launching as well, he said.

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He said the Soviet fleet would play an important part in any military move against the West. It was obvious that nuclear submarines, with a missile-launching capability would be an essential part of any effort.

He described the Soviet submarine fleet as the "shock force" of the navy and its most important segment. He estimated the size of that fleet at between 450 and 500 surface craft.

17 Sept 60

Press Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON 1. D. C.

STAMFORD (Conn.)
ADVOCATE

Circ.: e. 25,059

Front Page Edit Page Other Page

SEP 17 1960

Soviet Trawlers

The House Un-American Activities Committee has continued with its splendid work by answering the Khrushchev defector show of two American government men with a little defector show of its own. Representative Walters, chairman of the committee, presented for world viewing a former Soviet navy captain and one-time Soviet destroyer commander. The former officer has been giving the CIA information for several months. His defection has only been made public.

The defector had full knowledge of the activities of submarines and "trawlers" off the American coast. Their purpose, he says, is to track missiles, study American naval weapons, fleet positions and types of weapon carriers. There are over 200 of these spy vessels and they are equipped with a forest of radar nets and electronic gear. They are planning to spy on the naval maneuvers of NATO which will take place later this month. At this same time, Khrushchev will be bombarding the U.N. with the story of his peace-loving motives.

But the defector, who taught Indonesian naval officers in Poland before jumping the Iron Curtain, brought with him much more valuable information than that of the trawlers. He confirmed the justification for the use of the U-2 plane. The Soviet war machine, he said, has been based on the doctrine of a surprise nuclear attack, capable of a knockout blow against which it will not be possible to strike back. He confirmed the only reason why this attack has not taken place. The retaliatory power of the United States is too great to knock out and the counterattack would be devastating.

This expose of Soviet intent is, of course, not new. It is in accord with known and, indeed, announced plans for Communist take-over of the world. It follows the Khrushchev promise to "bury" us, and makes those who pretended to believe his excuses for this statement look like the dupes they are.

It is somewhat encouraging too. With all the loose talk going around about America being a second-rate power, one sometimes almost believes there might be an element of truth in the statements. We can rest assured that as of now no nation is superior to American armed might and the fact that we are not under attack is proof that Khrushchev knows it too.

20470

Press Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON, D. C.

SEATTLE (Wash.)
POST-INTELLIGENCER

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Page Page Page 2
17 1960

Date:

Russian Defector Bares A-Sub

BY WILLIAM J. JORDEN

1960 New York Times News Service

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Press Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON 1. D. C.

CORPUS CHRISTI (Tex.)
CALLER

Circ.: m. 56,831
S. 69,155

Front Edn Other
Page Page Page
SEP 11 1968
Date:

Russian Defector's Views Have Little Significance

It is difficult to believe that the captain of a Soviet destroyer could have knowledge of the strategic plans of the Kremlin. The testimony given the House Committee on Un-American Activities by Capt. Nikolai Fedorovich Artamanov, a Soviet defector, must therefore be received with some reservation.

Artamanov told committee members that since February, 1955, Soviet strategy has been based on the doctrine of a surprise nuclear attack on the United States. This information, he said, was made available only to officers of flag rank or above in the Soviet Navy. He conceded, however, that Nikita S. Khrushchev probably is serious in his attempts to achieve agreements through peaceful means, to avoid war.

Whether or not Artamanov's testimony reflects the true strategy of the Kremlin is of course almost irrelevant to the defense posture of the United States. For at least 12 years our military and high political leaders have appreciated the aggressive nature of the Communist system. The cornerstone of our defense policy rests on the assumption that if war comes we will have little if any warning. If our military policy can be summed up in two words, the "massive retaliation" concept of the late John Foster Dulles expresses it.

Our military leaders have had to assume the burden of preparing for a war that they cannot start. This is a calculated risk which imposes tremendous handicaps on our armed forces. But peaceful Americans cannot countenance an aggressive war. We are left therefore

only with one alternative: To so build up our striking force that the threat of devastating retaliation will deter an attack.

The testimony of Captain Artamanov could hardly have been of any great interest to the Defense Department, it seems.

WASHINGTON 1, D. C.

17 sep 60

MOLINE (III)
DISPATCH

Circ.: e 28,423

Front Page Edit Page Other Page

Date: SEP 17 1960

'In His Lifetime'

An interesting witness appeared this week at an open hearing of the House Committee on Un-American Activities.

He was a Russian naval officer, Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov, who defected to the West and has been in the United States, apparently under wraps, for more than a year.

Artamonov's testimony — his first in public since his flight — was vastly more sensible and informative than the gabble of those two defecting young American secret code clerks who were put on exhibit in Moscow recently.

Having been a high-ranking officer cited for military competence and proficiency in propagandizing Communist Party decisions in the ranks of the Soviet Navy, Artamonov is a man to pay attention to.

★ ★ ★

Here's what he said:

"Since February, 1955, Soviet strategy has been based on the doctrine of surprise attack in nuclear warfare. This doctrine was established in a Soviet military publication which is known only to officers of flag rank and above. Several times over the past four years it has been said again and it has never been changed.

"This concept was obviously intended to prepare the Soviet officers for the starting of such a war by the Soviet Union. It was designed as an excuse to be presented

to the Soviet officers that such an aggression was necessary. No senior Soviet officer believes that the United States will attack first.

"I believe that the Soviet dictatorship would undertake a surprise attack if she felt that she could win in one stroke. Make no mistake — they are power seekers, not political idealists.

★ ★ ★

"Khrushchev does not wish to wait indefinitely for the United States to become a Socialist state by evolution; moreover, he does not believe this will happen.

"He would like to see it happen in his lifetime."

These statements are not a revelation; for years the Western assumption has been that the Soviets are equipped to deliver a surprise attack, and would have no hesitation about doing so if they thought they would escape obliterating retaliation that would make "victory" meaningless.

But Artamonov's statement does lend pointed emphasis to the defense concepts of the United States and its allies. It's additional proof that fear of retaliation is the deterrent — perhaps the only deterrent — that prevents the Soviet dictatorship from attempting a new "Pearl Harbor."

We arm and stay armed to keep the peace. This is a cliché of the political orators, but it is literally true.

17 Sep 60

Press Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON I. D. C.

DETROIT (Mich.)
FREE PRESS
Circ.: m. 456,117
S. 494,506

Front Page Edit Page Other Page

Date: SEP 17 1960

Soviets Score

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

Naval Defector Says Reds Possess Nuclear Sub

New York Times Service

WASHINGTON — A former Soviet naval officer who fled to the West last year said Friday the Soviet Union has a nuclear submarine.

He said he also had reason to think that the Soviet Navy now can launch missiles from submarines. Some Soviet surface ships are fitted out for missile-launching as well, he said.

These disclosures came from Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov, ex-commander of a Soviet destroyer in the Baltic fleet. He fled to asylum in June, 1959, from the Polish port of Gdynia, where his unit was based.

THE DEFECTOR—who once was cited in the Soviet press as a model officer—declined, for security reasons, to say how he knew the Soviets had a nuclear sub, or to say how many such vessels there were according to his information.

As in all such cases, there was reluctance about passing on to the Soviet intelligence authorities just how much the escaped officer knew and how much he had told specialists in this country.

But it was apparent from an interview with Artamonov, who held a rank equivalent to a lieutenant commander in the United States Navy, that he had been able to give United States intelligence specialists invaluable information about the operations of the Soviet Navy.

Artamonov said he had decided to leave his country because he found Communism "a system based on lies."

He said he wanted no part in preserving it or spreading it to other unwilling peoples.

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17 SEPT 60

Press Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON 1. D. C.

BOSTON (Mass.)
HERALD

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S. 293,904

Front Edit Other
Page Page Page

SEP 11 1960
Date:

'Russia Has Nuclear Sub'

Ex-Red Navy Officer
Cites Missile Ships

By WILLIAM J. JORDEN
(The New York Times News Service)

WASHINGTON—A former Soviet naval officer who fled to West last year said Friday that the Soviet Union has a nuclear submarine.

Details Veiled

He said he had reason also to think that the Soviet navy now can launch missiles from submarines. Some Soviet surface ships are fitted out for missile-launching as well, he said.

These disclosures came from Nikolai Frederovich Artamonov, ex-commander of a Soviet destroyer in the Baltic fleet. He fled to

(Continued on Page Three)

'Russia Has Nuclear Sub'

(Continued from First Page)

asylum in the West in June, 1959, from the Polish port of Gdynia, where his unit was based.

The defector—who once was cited in the Soviet press as a model officer—indicated there was no reason for speculation about whether the Soviets have a nuclear submarine. He declined, for security reasons, to say precisely how he knew or to say how many such vessels there were according to his information.

As in all such cases, there was reluctance about passing on to the Soviet intelligence authorities just how much information the escaped officer had in his possession, and how much he had been able to relay to specialists in this country.

But it was apparent from an interview with the former captain third grade (equivalent to a lieutenant commander in the U. S. Navy) that he had been able to give U. S. intelligence specialists invaluable information about the operations of the Soviet navy and conditions prevailing inside it.

REASONS

Artamonov said he had decided to leave his country because he found communism "a system based on lies." He said he wanted no part in preserving it or spreading it to other peoples.

He said he considered Communist leaders completely cynical and bent only on "staying in power and expanding that power."

Artamonov said Soviet military theory was based on the principle of surprise attack. He said such an attack would be made whenever it was decided in Moscow that it had a chance to succeed. He considered Premier Khrushchev's talk about disarmament misleading and designed to confuse the West.

He said the Soviet fleet would play an important role in any military move against the West. It was obvious that nuclear submarines with a missile-launching capability would be an essential part of an effort.

He described the Soviet submarine fleet as the "shock force" of the navy and its most important segment. He estimated the size of that fleet at between 450 and 500 sub-surface craft.

TRAWLERS DO SPYING

The Soviet navy has many trawlers that served as an integral part of Moscow's military intelligence effort, he said. In the Baltic fleet, for example, there is a special trawler squadron. Those who man the vessels are navy officers and sailors although they wear civilian clothes. The ships are fitted out with the most modern technical apparatus—sonar, radar detection instruments, radio equipment, and the like.

"Like all trawlers, they carry fish," he said. "But unlike most, they load the fish on before they leave port. These ships are after a different kind of fish."

He said the trawlers located frequently off the U.S. coasts undoubtedly were on intelligence mission. Since they operate in international waters, he said, there is little that can be done about them except to keep track of them.

He said their purpose was to detect radar installations, take depth soundings and make charts, follow U.S. naval activities if possible, and locate radio stations for possible directional purposes.

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17 SEPT 60

Press Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON 1. D. C.

CLEVELAND (Ohio)
PLAIN DEALER

Circ.: m. 309,264
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Front Edit Other
Page Page Page

Date: SEP 17 1960

Defector Says Reds Have A Sub

© New York Times Service
WASHINGTON: A former Soviet naval officer who fled to the West last year said yesterday the Soviet Union has a nuclear submarine.

He said he also had reason to think that the Soviet Navy now can launch missiles from submarines. Some Soviet surface ships are fitted out for missile-launching as well, he said.

These disclosures came from Nikolai Federovich Artamonov, ex-commander of a Soviet destroyer in the Baltic fleet. He fled to asylum in the West in June, 1959.

The defector, who once was cited in the Soviet press as a model officer, declined for security reasons to say precisely how he knew about the nuclear sub.

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17 SEP 60

NY Times
17 Sept 1960

Soviet Said to Have An Atom Submarine

By WILLIAM J. JORDEN
Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, Sept. 16—A

former Soviet naval officer who fled to the West last year, said today that the Soviet Union had a nuclear submarine.

He said he had reason to think that the Soviet Navy now also could launch missiles from submarines. Some Soviet surface ships are fitted out for missile-launching, he said.

These disclosures came from Nikolai Federovich Artamonov, former commander of a Soviet destroyer in the Baltic fleet. He fled to the West in June, 1959, from the Polish port of Gdynia, where his unit had been based.

The handsome and eloquent defector—who once was cited in the Soviet press as a model officer—indicated there was no reason for speculation about whether the Russians had a nuclear submarine. He declined, for security reasons, to say how many such vessels there were, according to his information.

As in all such cases, there was reluctance about letting Soviet intelligence authorities know how much information

Defense Minister of Communist China during a visit by the latter to the Potsdam military garrisons. The picture was cited as proof of the defector's importance as a political officer in the Potsdam division.

President in Berlin

Meanwhile, the Communists fulminated as West German President Heinrich Lübke flew to West Berlin on one of his periodic visits to the harassed city, this time a three-day stay during which he will attend an international medical congress and inspect and industrial exhibition.

The East Germans, who are maneuvering to disrupt West Berlin's links with the free part of Germany, charged that Mr. Lübke's trip was a "provocation" and that it was illegal for him to exercise his office on West Berlin territory.

However, they made no attempt to interfere with his flight to the city on a United States military transport aircraft.

They likewise did not molest his wife, Mrs. Wilhelmina Lübke, who does not like to fly and arrived in West Berlin on a German train that is operated by the Communists during its passage across East Germany.

the escaped officer had in his possession, and how much he had been able to relay to specialists in this country.

Invaluable Data Given

But it was apparent from an interview with the former captain third grade [equivalent to a lieutenant commander in the United States Navy] that he had been able to give United States intelligence specialists invaluable information about the operations of the Soviet Navy and conditions prevailing inside it.

Captain Artamonov said he had decided to leave his country because he had found communism "a system based on lies." He said he had wanted no part in preserving it or spreading it to other unwilling peoples.

He said he considered Communist leaders completely cynical and bent only on "staying in power and expanding that power."

Soviet military theory, he said, is based on the principle of surprise attack. Such an attack, he went on, would be made whenever Moscow decided that it had a chance to succeed. He considered Premier Khrushchev's talk about disarmament misleading and designed to confuse the West.

The former Soviet naval officer said the Soviet fleet would play an important part in any military move against the West. It was obvious that nuclear submarines able to launch missiles would be an essential part of such an effort.

Submarines the Key

He described the Soviet submarine fleet as the "shock force" of the Navy and its most important segment. He estimated that the fleet had between 450 and 500 submarines.

The Soviet Navy has many trawlers that serve as an integral part of Moscow's military intelligence effort, he said. In the Baltic fleet for example, there is a special trawler squadron.

These vessels are manned by Navy officers and sailors, who wear civilian clothes. The ships are fitted with the most modern technical apparatus—sonar, radar detection instruments, radio equipment, and the like.

"Like all trawlers, they carry fish, Captain Artamonov said. "But unlike most, they load the fish on before they leave port. These ships are after a different kind of fish."

He said the trawlers frequently seen off the United States coasts undoubtedly were on intelligence missions. Since they operate in international waters, he said, there is little that can be done about them except to keep track of them.

He said their purpose was to detect radar installations, take depth soundings and make charts, follow United States naval activities if possible, and locate radio stations for possible directional purposes.

Foreign Officers Trained

The Soviet Navy is busily training officers for other countries, Mr. Artamonov said. He

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himself took part in training Indonesian naval officers. Egyptians also were taking training courses, he said.

His personal experiences in Poland, where he was based for a time, contributed to his decision to break with communism, the 33-year-old defector said.

"I saw the discontent of the people with communism and with Soviet control," he said. "I saw conditions improve and

morale go up every time there was some relaxation from controls."

Captain Artamonov said that ideological training in the armed forces was a serious problem for the Communist leaders, particularly in the Navy.

He said the level of resistance was related directly to the education and sophistication of the officers, but that resistance was also strong among enlisted men.

"Sailors would sooner swab the decks, or stand guard duty than go to the political lecture every Monday morning," he said.

Police Control is Tight

But though political opposition was strong and widespread, Captain Artamonov said it was not too grave a threat to the leaders. For one reason, he said, the police control is too tight to permit any effective organization. Moreover, despite the discontent, some doubt that what might replace the present system would be any better.

"Khrushchev could never permit a free press or free discussion," Captain Artamonov said. "If the doors were opened to real contacts and if outside news came in, the regime would collapse in a month."

The captain said that he still regarded himself as a Russian, one who loved his people and his country. But he left, he said, because he decided it was hopeless to try to work against communism and its masters from inside.

He is now living in New York. He hopes to go to a university and to find work in this country, probably in engineering. He plans to become an American citizen and to do what he can to oppose the men who now rule his country.

WASHINGTON 1, D. C.

BUFFALO (N.Y.)
COURIER-EXPRESS

Circ.: m. 163,149
S. 307,254

Front Edit Other
Page Page Page

Date: SEP 17 1960

Defector Says Russ Have A-Sub

By WILLIAM J. JORDEN
The New York Times News Service

WASHINGTON, Sept. 16—A former Soviet naval officer who fled to the West last year said today the Soviet Union has a nuclear submarine.

He said he also had reason to think that the Soviet Navy now can launch missiles from submarines. Some Soviet surface ships are fitted out for missile-launching as well, he said.

These disclosures came from Nikolai Federovich Artamonov, ex-commander of a Soviet destroyer in the Baltic fleet. He fled to asylum in the West in June, 1959, from the Polish port of Gdynia, where his unit was based.

The defector—who once was cited in the Soviet press as a model officer—indicated there was no reason for speculation about whether the Soviets have a nuclear submarine. He declined, for security reasons, to say precisely how he knew or to say how many such vessels there were according to his information.

Reluctant to Tip Reds

As in all such cases, there was reluctance about passing on to the Soviet intelligence authorities just how much information the escaped officer had in his possession, and how much he had been able to relay to specialists in this country.

But it was apparent from an interview with the former captain third grade (equivalent to a lieutenant commander in the U.S. Navy) that he had been able to give U.S. intelligence specialists invaluable information about the operations of the Soviet Navy and conditions prevailing inside it.

Artamonov said he had decided to leave his country because he found communism "a system based on lies." He said he wanted no part in preserving it or spreading it to other unwilling peoples.

Surprise Attack Theory

He said he considered Communist leaders completely cynical and bent only on "staying in power and expanding that power."

Artamonov said Soviet military theory was based on the principle of surprise attack. He said such an attack would be made whenever it was decided in Moscow that it had a chance to succeed. He considered Premier Khrushchev's talk about disarmament misleading and designed to confuse the West.

The Soviet Navy has many trawlers that serve as an integral part of Moscow's military intelligence effort, he said. In the Baltic fleet, for example, there is a special trawler squadron. Those who man the vessels are navy officers and sailors though they wear civilian clothes.

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The ships are fitted out with the most modern technical apparatus—sonar, radar detection instruments, radio equipment, and the like.

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17 SEPT 60

Press Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON 1. D. C.

MIAMI (Fla.)
HERALD
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Date: SEP 17 1960

Russia's Defector

THE UNITED STATES turned the tables on the Soviet Union this week and offered a Russian defector to public view.

The appearance of Capt. Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov before the House Committee on un-American Activities may be presumed to be our answer to the two turncoat code clerks who showed up in Moscow the other day.

Capt. Artamonov, having once commanded a Soviet naval destroyer, clearly outranked the runaway Americans. It is doubtful, however, if he contributed anything more of value to us than our turncoats contributed to Russia.

Just what purpose these exhibitions of defection serve, except at small arms fire in the propaganda war, is hard to discover. Based solely on what was said publicly by the two ex-Americans and the one ex-Russian, we'd say the latest exchange was a standoff.

17 SEPT 60

Press Intelligence, Inc.

WASHINGTON 1, D. C.

HUNTINGTON (W.Va.)
ADVERTISER

Circ.: e 20,899

Front Page
Edit Page
Other Page

SEP 17 1960

Date:

Editorials

**Doubt of U. S. Power Could
Spark Soviet Nuclear Attack**

The vital necessity of maintaining superior United States military power was again made clear by the testimony of a former commander of a Soviet destroyer before the House Committee on Un-American Activities.

Capt. Nikolai Fedorovich Arlamonov testified that Russian military strategy envisioned a successful surprise nuclear attack.

The naval officer who defected to the United States said Soviet leaders would not hesitate to launch a surprise attack on the United States if they thought they could disable this nation with one blow.

Possibly the testimony did not offer anything new to those who have watched Communist activity. But it did point up again the grisly danger of allowing the relative strength of the United States to decline to a point that would allow even a doubt of its ability to strike back with devastating force.

And certainly such a doubt exists now in many quarters.

One high military officer after another has warned that our power is falling below that of the Soviets.

Maj. Gen. John B. Medaris, the Army's top missile expert, retired in a controversy over the lagging missile program. SAC Commanding Gen. LeMay warned that the Air Force has obsolete and obsolescent planes, that it does not have enough people and that plans for correcting the dangerous situation are not adequate.

Others who have sounded warnings of our danger include Air Force Gen. Thomas S. Power, Gen.

Maxwell D. Taylor, retired Army chief of staff, and Adm. Hyman Rickover, who developed the first atomic submarine.

These are in addition to the Gaither Committee's impartial and top secret report which declared "the United States in the gravest danger in its history."

A report of John Hopkins University researchers also declared a decline in military position had left the country facing its greatest peril.

It is hardly possible that all these specialists could be wrong. But even if they are, they undoubtedly made their decision honestly and on the basis of the best information they could get.

Public denial by President Eisenhower and Vice President Nixon that the United States' power is not inferior to Russia's are not sufficient. Naturally they would not admit letting the nation in for such peril.

The vital point is that there is room at least for doubt.

And that itself could encourage the rampaging Russians to launch their surprise nuclear assault.

There should be no room for doubt in the minds of our own military men or anyone else, especially the Russians.

Our only safety lies in launching a program of strengthening our striking power to the point that will definitely deter the Russians and Chinese from attacking — and then keeping it there until the Communists agree to disarmament with adequate guarantees of fulfilling their pledges.

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Press Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON 1. D. C.

DECATUR (Ill.) REVIEW

Circ.: e. 35,248

Front Page Edit Page Other Page 4

Date: SEP 17 1950

Russian Espionage Not News

BROUGHT before the House Un-American Activities Committee to testify in the case of two American spy code clerks who defected to the Soviet Union, a Russian navy captain has given testimony more damning than that given to Russian inquisitors by the ex-code clerks.

Reportedly in this country since the spring of 1959, Captain Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov said that Soviet military strategy is based on nuclear surprise attack and assumes that the United States will not attack first.

Where the spy clerks merely asserted that they were apprehensive about the warlike policy

being pursued by the U.S. and its practice of spying on allies, the Russian officer has charged the Soviet Union with planning to shoot first.

Both witnesses gave what appeared to be inside stories, but their receptions were quite different. The U.S. defectors were received both here and abroad with top press coverage, while the Russian captain received second page treatment in this country, and, it is assumed, considerable less in the Soviet Union.

Apparently United States involvement in espionage is still news, but even "inside" stories about Russia's plan for attack are not surprising.

17 SEPT 60

PROVIDENCE (R. I.) JOURNAL

Circ.: m. 57,908 S. 183,699

Front Page Edit Page Other Page

Date: SEP 17 1960

Defector Says Russia Has Atom Submarine

(N.Y. Times News Service)

Washington—A former Soviet naval officer who fled to the West last year said yesterday that the Soviet Union has a nuclear submarine.

He said he had reason to think that the Soviet navy now can launch missiles from submarines. Some Soviet surface ships are fitted out for missile-launching as well, he said.

These disclosures came from Nikolai Federovich Artamonov, ex-commander of a Soviet destroyer in the Baltic Fleet. He fled to asylum in the West in June, 1959, from the Polish port of Gdynia, where his unit was based.

The defector—who once was cited in the Soviet press as a model officer—indicated there was no reason for speculation about whether the Russians have a nuclear submarine. He declined, for security reasons, to say precisely how he knew or to say how many such vessels there were, according to his information.

As in all such cases, there was reluctance about passing on to the Soviet intelligence authorities just how much information the escaped officer had in his possession, and how much he had been able to relay to specialists in this country.

But it was apparent from an interview with the former captain third grade (equivalent to a lieutenant commander in the U.S. Navy) that he had been able to give U.S. intelligence specialists invaluable information about the operations of the Soviet navy and conditions prevailing inside it.

Captain Artamonov said he had decided to leave his country because he found communism "a system based on lies." He said he wanted no part in preserving it or spreading it to other unwilling peoples.

He said he considered Communist leaders completely cynical and bent only on "staying

in power and expanding that power."

Captain Artamonov said Soviet military theory was based on the principle of surprise attack. He said such an attack would be made whenever it was decided in Moscow that it had a chance to succeed. He considered Premier Khrushchev's talk about disarmament misleading, and designed to confuse the West.

He said the Soviet fleet would play an important part in any military move against the West. It was obvious that nuclear submarines with a missile-launch

Continued on Page 11, Col. 7

Red Atom Sub

Continued From Page One

ing capability would be an essential part of an effort.

He described the Soviet submarine fleet as the "shock force" of the navy and its most important segment. He estimated the size of that fleet at between 450 and 500 subsurface craft.

The Soviet navy has many trawlers that serve as an integral part of Moscow's military intelligence effort, he said. In the Baltic Fleet, for example, there is a special trawler squadron. Those who man the vessels are navy officers and sailors though they wear civilian clothes. The ships are fitted out with the most modern technical apparatus — sonar, radar detection instruments, radio equipment, and the like.

"Like all trawlers, they carry fish," he said. "But unlike most, they load the fish on before they leave port. These ships are after a different kind of fish."

He said the trawlers located frequently off the U.S. coast undoubtedly were on intelligence missions. Since they operate in international waters, he said, there is little that can be done about them except to keep track of them.

He said their purpose is to detect radar installations, take depth soundings and make charts, follow U.S. naval activities if possible, and locate radio stations for possible directional purposes.

Much of Captain Artamonov's information on trawler operations came from a former navigator on his destroyer who had been assigned for a time as navigator on one of the intelligence trawlers.

20482

WASHINGTON 1 & C

18 SEP 1960

COLUMBIA (S.C.) STATE

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S. 93,759

Front Page Edit Page Other Page

Date: SEP 18 1960

AGAINST WEST GERMANY

Refugee Officer Says Reds Planning War

By J. M. ROBERTS

Associated Press News Analyst
The testimony of two defecting military officers that the Communists are making war plans against the United States and West Germany can be taken calmly.

could win with one nuclear stroke. But that's a big, and a saving, if

The United States, West Germany and NATO are making war plans against the Communists, too.

In present world circumstances, that is routine.

The United States, by its program of extreme reconnaissance measures, long ago recognized an extreme danger of surprise attack. Yet there is a great difference between planning for possible wars, which has always been the peacetime preoccupation of military staffs, and the political intent to make war. The latter is not now evident.

There is, of course, always danger of an accidental war at times when the Soviet Union is pressing so hard, as she is now, for advantage in the cold war.

Her planes which turned back from the U. N.-held airfields in the Congo, however, would seem to be a better clue to her actual attitude than the harsh words she is expending over that situation and the harsh posture she is taking toward West Berlin.

She is not pursuing to the limit policies which could bring her to a physical face-up with the United States in the Congo, nor is she expected to do so regarding Berlin.

Indeed, the revolving jail doors in Leopoldville suggest that the situation there has boiled down to something like an even battle between the local figures, into which the Soviet infiltrators have not been either willing or able to throw in any decisive strength for their man. But trying to keep up with that situation will make you dizzy.

Another big battle in the cold war is shaping up—indeed it already has begun in the Security Council—at the United Nations. There Nikita Khrushchev is mobilizing all of his puppets in an attempt to demonstrate the strength of international communism and to embarrass the United States.

This is expected to be one of the greatest demonstrations ever to talk about peaceful coexistence and the refusal of the United States to fall for it, with behind the scenes sound effects of rattling rockets.

It may be true, as the former Soviet naval officer testified in Washington, that Soviet leaders would attack if they thought they

Page 329 10 1950

The Road To War

THIS is the week the leaders of the Communist world hold a summit conference in New York City.

Only Chinese Mao will be absent.

Khrushchev will be there.

And Castro.

And Nasser.

And Tito.

And Kadar.

Arrogantly, insultingly they are invading the heart of the free world to show that while President Eisenhower can be kept out of Moscow and Tokyo they can come en masse to plot the destruction of freedom in freedom's stronghold.

THESE Communists can be expected to rage and rant in the UN.

They will have an opportunity to call for disarmament while secretly plotting to use arms or whatever means are available to achieve their ends.

They will no doubt make a heavy play toward courting the new African nations and again suggesting perhaps that Red China should be in the UN.

Their Asian-African gambit is no mere propaganda show.

When the United Nations was established in 1945, it had 51 members; of these only 15 were African and Asian nations. It is now estimated that by the end of this year, the total membership of the United Nations will be 99 but the African and Asiatic membership will increase to 50. In a word, the African and Asian nations will have a majority.

The shift of power is rapidly moving to give nations with a Soviet affiliation or sympathy a greater vote than they have ever had. It is estimated that by the end of 1962, out of a total member-

ship of 108, the African and Asiatic members will be 58. It could well be that by 1962, the Communists will have an absolute majority in the United Nations.

★ ★ ★

IT IS clear that the Western nations and the United States in particular have been completely out-manuevered by the Communists.

Militarily this is of little importance. The United States is the strongest nation in the world and intends to remain so. If it were not—as Russian defector Nikolai Artamonov testified in Washington last week—the Russians would stage a ruthless nuclear surprise attack upon us.

Diplomatically the continued Communist successes, climaxed by the planned coup in New York this week, are very important. They impress smaller nations, luring them into the Communist orbit.

These little nations can only say: "The United States is strongest but it does not know how to use its strength."

In the eyes of the rest of the world the U.S. is a bumbling giant.

★ ★ ★

A COLD appraisal of this situation points to one conclusion: If the United States continues its inept policies it is taking the world down the road to war.

For, whatever happens in the UN, in the embassies, in the Kremlin, in Cuba or anywhere else, the American people do not intend to be subjugated to the Communist yoke by trickery or force or anything else. Yet that is the precise goal of the Communists.

A final note: If the United States revolutionizes our State Department and comes forward with a clear-cut policy which the whole world understands we are going to pursue and defend with every resource at our command.

We are now involved in so many meaningless alliances, so much giving away of our resources without result, so much kow-towing to the Russians, so much gobbledegook in our statements and fuzziness in our thinking that we do not know ourselves where we are going or what we stand for.

It is in this bog of American indecision that the Communists are picking their bright Red cranberries of success.

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WASHINGTON 1. D. C.

BALTIMORE (Md.)
SUNDAY AMERICAN

Circ.: S. 314,499

Front Page Edit Page Other Page

Date: SEP 18 1960

Defectors Pose Security Problem

WASHINGTON, Sept. 17—(UPI)—The defection to Russia of two National Security Agency employees who had "top secret" clearance left intelligence authorities grappling today for solutions to two big problems.

Congressional investigators who questioned top military intelligence officials behind closed



COMMUNIST defector Nikolai Federovich Artamonov, 32-year-old former Russian Navy captain, warned America that Russia has been planning a sneak nuclear attack since 1955. He left Red cause 15 months ago for asylum in the U. S.

ed doors this week said the questions are:

- How can the United States overcome a new handicap imposed on its efforts to decipher codes used by Soviet Russia in transmitting secret messages? As one investigator put it, "the Russians now know the approaches we use to break codes."

- How can the government insure that no other traitor will be employed and given access to American secrets?

Existing security procedures—requiring full field investigations by military intelligence agents and the use of lie detector tests—were followed in checking the loyalty of the two men before they were hired by NSA three years ago.

As a matter of routine precaution, the two turncoats, Bernon F. Mitchell and William H. Martin, would have been subjected to additional lie detector tests had they remained at their jobs.

The tests are designed to ferret out any pro-Communist sympathies or any other information that might raise doubts about the loyalty or trustworthiness of agency employees.

The Agency's employees in most cases undergo such tests every four years and under Agency regulations the tests must be administered every five years.

THE INQUIRY conducted by a House Armed Services Subcommittee prodded the Defense Department this week into publicly admitting that the defection of Martin and Mitchell had more serious security consequences than it had previously acknowledged.

Congressional testimony made public Thursday by J. Vincent Burke Jr., General Counsel of the Defense Department, said:

"... they (the turncoats) can cause no damage to the security of our own communications. They can, however, assist the Soviets in their efforts to render more secure Soviet communications activities."

The Subcommittee headed by Rep. Paul J. Kilday, (D., Texas), yesterday concluded, at least for the time being, its inquiry into the Martin-Mitchell case.

On Monday the Subcommittee will question behind closed doors officials of the Central Intelligence Agency.

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Front Page
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Date: SEP 18 1960

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Congressional testimony made public Thursday by J. Vincent Burke Jr., General Counsel of the Defense Department, said:

"... they (the turncoats) can cause no damage to the security of our own communications. They can, however, assist the Soviets in their efforts to render more secure Soviet communications activities."

The Subcommittee headed by Rep. Paul J. Kilday, (D., Texas), yesterday concluded, at least for the time being, its inquiry into the Martin-Mitchell case.

On Monday the Subcommittee will question behind closed doors officials of the Central Intelligence Agency.

The purpose is to insure that this Agency's security measures are adequate. Kilday said the Subcommittee had no reason to believe they weren't.

Geheimdienstfehde um Doppelagenten

KGB und CIA beschuldigen sich gegenseitig der Beseitigung von Nicholas Shadrin

Moskau (Reuter)

Der mutmaßliche Doppelagent Nicholas Shadrin ist nach sowjetischer Darstellung vom amerikanischen Geheimdienst CIA und nicht vom sowjetischen KGB in Wien entführt worden. In einem Artikel der Moskauer Wochenzeitung Literaturnaja Gazeta hieß es, aus KGB-Akten ergebe sich, daß Shadrin vor zwei Jahren in die Sowjetunion habe zurückkehren wollen, daran aber von der CIA gehindert worden sei. Die CIA habe Shadrin, der 1959 als Nikolai Fedorowitsch Artomow in die USA desertiert sei, im Dezember 1975 auf dem Weg zu einem Treffen mit einem KGB-Mitarbeiter mit dem Decknamen Orlow abgefangen.

Nach westlicher Darstellung hatte sich Shadrin in Wien im Auftrag der amerikanischen Bundespolizei FBI mit zwei KGB-Agenten vor den Stufen der Votivkirche verabredet. Seither warteten seine amerikanischen Auftraggeber und seine in den USA lebende Frau Blanka vergeblich auf ein Lebenszeichen.

Nach Darstellung der sowjetischen Literaturzeitschrift nahm Shadrin bereits 1966 Kontakt mit einem sowjetischen Konsularbeamten in Washington auf und bot an, Informationen aus seiner CIA-Tätigkeit weiterzugeben. Kontaktmann Shadrins sei von da an Orlow gewesen — ein mittelbarer Hinweis auf eine Doppelagententätigkeit Shadrins.

Orlow habe sich auch in Wien mit Shadrin in Verbindung gesetzt, heißt es in dem Artikel. Zwei Tage später sei er verschwunden. Bei dem Gespräch habe Shadrin Kontaktmann Orlow gebeten, ein förmliches Gesuch um Erlaubnis, in die Sowjetunion zurückkehren zu dürfen, an den Obersten Sowjet weiterzuleiten. Dies habe Orlow zugesagt: „Die Rückkehr war sein Traum. Er wußte, daß er ein toter Mann sein würde, falls die Amerikaner das herausfinden.“ In dem Artikel wird die amerikanische Regierung aufgefordert, das Schicksal Shadrins aufzuheben.

Name Guillaume im Spiel

In Berichten aus Washington hatte es anlässlich des Besuchs von Bundeskanzler Helmut Schmidt in den USA im Juli geheißt, die US-Regierung plane, die Auslieferung Shadrins durch einen Tausch gegen den als DDR-Spion verurteilten ehemaligen Kanzleramtsmitarbeiter Günter Guillaume zu erreichen.

(SAD).

Moskau: Die CIA hat Doppelagent Shadrin beseitigt

Reuter, Moskau

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Lie Welt
19 August 1977
(page 8)

20486

18 SEP 60

Press Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON 1. D. C.

**BILLINGS (Mont.)
GAZETTE**

Circ.: m. 25,285
S. 37,228

Front Edit Other
Page Page Page 16

Date: SEP 18 1960



TELLS STRATEGY —
Nikolai Fedorovich
Artamonov, 32-year-old
Russian navy captain
who defected to the
West 15 months ago,
tells House Subcommit-
tee on Un-American
Activities that Soviet
military strategy since
1955 has been based on
the "doctrine of sur-
prise attack in nuclear
warfare." — NEA tele-
photo.

18 SEP 60

Press Intelligence, Inc.

WASHINGTON 1. D. C.

JACKSON (Mich.)
CITIZEN PATRIOTCirc.: e. 36,617
S. 37,169Front Edit Other
Page Page Page

SEP 18 1960

Date:

Propaganda Opportunity Muffed

Sometimes we wonder if some of the so-called "propaganda victories" scored by the Communists are the result of America's own ineptness at making the most out of what it has.

A case in point certainly appears in the handling of the story of Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov, formerly a captain in the Soviet navy and a dedicated Communist who finally got his fill of the Russian system and sought refuge in America.

Contrasted with the Communists' exploitation of traitors, Bernon F. Mitchell and William Martin, the airing of Artamonov's account was like comparing a rerun of an ancient TV western with a topnotch, prime time spectacular, or the World Series.

The former Russian naval officer had a really significant story to tell; far more so than the collection of claptrap spilled by the one-time security council code clerks in Moscow.

He spoke with authority of the Soviet union's grand strategy of surprise nuclear attack on the United States if less belligerent means of winning the world fails. He verified what has long been suspected, that Soviet fishing trawlers operating off the United States east coast are really elaborate spy ships manned by intelligence agents. That is enough to give you an idea of how important this man and his account are. His story is all the more significant because it has the unmistakable ring of truth.

But, instead of presenting him

to America in a full-fledged press conference, standing beside an attention-commanding figure in the government, Artamonov made his debut on the American scene in a more or less routine hearing of the House un-American activities committee.

We have nothing against that body, but the novelty has worn off its hearings. It just doesn't get attention.

Even the timing was bad. The testimony opened too late for evening papers to get the full story. They did, however, take the "edge" off the story so that it was not entirely fresh for morning editions. The next day, the evening papers had to use what we call "second day" or "follow up" stories while fresh developments in many other news areas were bidding for attention.

Perhaps the press is partly to blame. We don't know. But it must be remembered that news values are determined, to a degree, by novelty.

Defectors from West to East are rare. But they come from behind the iron curtain by the thousands.

Still, we wish that a great deal more attention had been focused on Artamonov and that he could be used to the fullest advantage in the bitter battle of words now raging between East and West in and out of the United Nations.

We fear that the government or the House committee has to bear the blame for what seems to be a failure to make the most of a golden opportunity.

20488

18 SEPT 60

WASHINGTON D. C.

ENID (Okla.)
NEWS

Circ.: m. 15,094
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Page Page Page

Date: SEP 18 1960

Report Of War Plots Can Be Taken Calmly

By The Associated Press

The testimony of two defecting military officers that the Communists are making war plans against the United States and West Germany can be taken calmly.

The United States, West Germany and NATO are making war plans against the Communists, too.

In present world circumstances, that is routine.

The United States, by its program of extreme reconnaissance measures, long ago recognized an extreme danger of surprise attack. Yet there is a great difference between planning for possible wars, which has always been the peacetime preoccupation of military staffs, and the political intent to make war. The latter is not now evident.

There is, of course, always danger of an accidental war at times when the Soviet Union is pressing so hard, as she is now, for advantage in the cold war.

Her planes which turned back from the U. N.-held airfields in the Congo, however, would seem to be a better clue to her actual attitude than the harsh words she is expending over that situation, and the harsh posture she is taking toward West Berlin.

She is not pursuing to the limit policies which could bring her to a physical face-up with the United States in the Congo, nor is she expected to do so regarding Berlin.

Another big battle in the cold war is shaping up—indeed it already has begun in the Security Council—at the United Nations. There Nikita Khrushchev is mobilizing all of his puppets in an attempt to demonstrate the strength of international communism and to embarrass the United States.

This is expected to be one of the greatest demonstrations ever to talk about peaceful coexistence and the refusal of the United States to fall for the Communist scenes sound of rattling rockets.

20489

18 SEPT 60

Pine Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON 1, D. C.

LAKE CHARLES (La.)
AMERICAN PRESS

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Front Page Edit Page Other Page

Date: SEP 1 8 1950

POLITICS TODAY

Flat Performance

By ED KOTERBA

WASHINGTON. — Congressman Francis Walter, chairman of the Committee on Un-American Activities, pulled aside his cloak and dagger and produced a genuine, live Communist defector from the USSR.

This was his answer to the public performance in Moscow starring our two defective National Security Agency officers. But, instead of matching the Soviet's razzle and dazzle, lawmaker Walter's show seemed to sputter and fizzle.

The witness, there in the twilight gloom of the House caucus room, was telling all, all right. But what he told we must assume our intelligence people already knew—and more. And, too, his heart just wasn't in it.

The Red defector is a young man but his manicured heavy-brush mustache and matching big black brows give him an appearance beyond his 32 years.

However, he was no code-cracking official nor the equivalent of a U-2 spy. Merely a captain in the Soviet navy—and third class at that. What secrets could he tell?

Capt. Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov defected a year ago, and it took Rep. Walter (D., Pa.) that long to bring him out into the open to disclose the man's "inside information" on the Soviet threat to us.

In the first place, our arena of inquiry was sadly deficient theatrically. Only two dimly-lit chandeliers in the vast auditorium. The Soviets at the U-2 trial, for example, had 34 chandeliers burning. Here we had no Klieg lights, no

television cameras—and the witness was forced to testify with his back to the audience.

And the captain, though fully cooperative, appeared emotionally inwardly, awkwardly mixed up.

He coughed nervously. His eyes avoided his inquisitors, even his interpreter. Yet there was a strange look of calm defiance across his face as the interpreter read his translated message announcing his reason for defecting.

"As an officer, wouldn't I be betraying my own people by running away from them?" Now, Capt. Artamonov twirled the dripping paper cup. "No, I shall never betray my people. I was, I am, and I shall always remain a Russian—but not a Soviet Russian."

He was, no question, a disillusioned ex-Red. His one "important comment" was startling, indeed. But as his interpreter read it, it came out in tired tones and the audience listened with folded hands and stolid faces.

The Kremlin, he said, holds to a doctrine of surprise atomic attack on the United States.

The look in the collective face of the spectators seemed to say: "So? We already know that."

There is no question about the serious Communist threat to our very lives. But the vague testimony of a third-class captain defector isn't enough to electrify us out of our lethargy.

Surely, Mr. Walter has the than that.

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KGB Drops Clods to Accuse CIA in Double Agent's Disappearance

By Christopher S. Wien

Report Gives Soviet Version of Contacts With Defector

MOSCOW, Aug. 17 (AP) — In a late edition of its espionage magazine, the KGB announced research the Soviet press agency that the CIA was responsible for the disappearance of a Soviet agent double agent, Nicholas Shadrin, in Vienna in late 1975.

Quoted from classified files of the Soviet intelligence apparatus, the weekly Literaturnaya Gazeta reported that the former Soviet naval officer, whose real name was Nikolai Arlanonov, was recruited by U.S. operations after their hearing that he wanted to return to the Soviet Union. Mr. Shadrin was last seen in Vienna on Dec. 24, 1975, as he left for a flight to Moscow. Two Soviet officials, who had in two days earlier.

The article's author, Gennikha Demidov, said that he had also

interviewed at length Igor Orlov, a pseudonym for the KGB operative who admitted meeting Mr. Shadrin first in Washington and finally in Vienna on Dec. 18.

Tragic Ship

"Possibly Arlanonov made some tragic slip after Dec. 18 and the CIA having learned of his forthcoming return to the motherland, realized the same was lost, that this was a scandalous failure and hastened to eliminate Arlanonov and, to cover up its tracks, blamed the other side," the KGB agent was quoted as saying.

"I wouldn't like to think of the worst, but knowing the CIA's inclinations, I find it hard to suspect that he is being held in detention. It is too outrageous for them," Mr. Orlov said. The accuracy of the Literaturnaya

Gazeta article, which filed an entire page, could not be confirmed, and in some respects, only deepened the mystery of what happened to the double agent. The Soviet version, which agreed with Western reports on the basic points, was clearly published with active KGB assistance following widespread speculation in the West that Mr. Shadrin had been kidnapped by the Russians.

Midlife Uncertain

It was not known why the KGB felt suddenly irritated by recent Western publicity about Mr. Shadrin to release his account of events in Literaturnaya Gazeta. As today's article reported, Nikolai Arlanonov had defected to Moscow in 1964 while serving as captain aboard a Soviet destroyer. He wound up in Wash-

ington with his name changed to Nicholas George Shadrin and worked as a consultant on Soviet affairs for the Defense Intelligence Agency.

According to U.S. accounts, the KGB subsequently tried to recruit him as a spy and, after consulting the CIA, he agreed to pretend to cooperate. The Soviet story today said that Mr. Shadrin had approached an official of the Soviet consulate in Washington in May, 1966, and offered his assistance because he felt guilty about having defected.

Mr. Orlov, who was described as now stationed in Moscow, recalled that he was suspicious of Mr. Shadrin's motives when they first talked in Washington. But, after Mr. Shadrin recounted that he was acting as a double agent "on orders" of his American handlers, Mr. Orlov said, the

KGB decided it would be nothing by playing along.

And so my regular meetings with Arlanonov began. While the KGB agent said, "What is the CIA did not pass along any hard secrets, he said, "What is to arrange, we received information date on many people working with American intelligence, especially in those branches that deal with elections from the Soviet Union."

Literaturnaya Gazeta reported that Mr. Shadrin began asking to be allowed to return home, according to his words, returning to his motherland was his dream. Mr. Orlov said, "He realized that he would die if the Americans found out about it."

The KGB agent continued that he promised to help all he could. But Mr. Shadrin never showed up at their next arranged

meeting in Vienna on the 18th. Shadrin, who was the double agent, was seen in Vienna on Dec. 24, 1975, as he left for a flight to Moscow. Two Soviet officials, who had in two days earlier.

The article's author, Gennikha Demidov, said that he had also

Herald Tribune Thursday, 18 Aug 1977

20491

Sanatorien, Schwimmbädern und Sporteinrichtungen. Die amtlichen Sanitätsämter sind in der Regel als „allgemeine Deko-Stellen“ umschriebenen Katastrophen-Einrichtungen sind im Grunde alle öffentlichen Bausachen in der Gegend sowie zahlreiche Tankstellen mit Kfz-Waschanlage — was eine Deko-Kapazität von 2600 Personen je Stunde ergibt.

Für die geschädigten Menschen würde es auch an Ärzten mit hinreichender Strahlenschutz-Erfahrung fehlen, monierten die Kernkraftgegner. In Freiburg (175 000 Einwohner) sind es gerade sieben, von denen bei Testanrufen der Umweltschützer an zwei aufeinanderfolgenden Tagen „lediglich einer erreichbar gewesen“ sei. Drei der Ärzte seien „inzwischen versetzt“ worden.

Die Freiburger Universitätsklinik soll im Notfall 13 Menschen mit „leichten bis mittelschweren“ Strahlenschäden aufnehmen, das Stadtkrankenhaus Heilbronn vier, das Krankenhaus Karlsruhe acht, und in der Freiburger Hautklinik finden noch einmal zehn Personen Betten. Für „schwere Strahlunfälle“ aber, resümierten die Umweltschützer, ist in Baden-Württemberg kein Platz.

Solche detaillierte Kritik fand Freiburgs Regierungspräsident ungerechtfertigt: Hinreichende Vorsorge sei im Katastrophenschutzplan geregelt, und zwar im geheimen Teil des Plans — in dem, wie die Umweltschützer sagen, „bisher noch nicht entwendeten Teil“.

SPIONE

Nummer eins

Um einen eigenen Spion bei den Sowjets auslösen zu können, drängt Washington auf Bonner Beistand: Die Bundesregierung soll das Agentenpaar Guillaume laufenlassen.

Gerade hatte US-Präsident Jimmy Carter sein letztes Gespräch mit Bundeskanzler Helmut Schmidt beendet, die Delegationen den „Cabinet's Room“ des Weißen Hauses verlassen, da verschwanden zwei Herren unauffällig in einem Nebenzimmer: Zbigniew Brzezinski, Sicherheitsberater des amerikanischen Präsidenten, und Manfred Schüler, Staatssekretär im Bonner Bundeskanzleramt, zugleich Aufseher der deutschen Geheimdienste.

Die beiden Spitzenbeamten wollten zum Abschluß der Washington-Visite des Bundeskanzlers am vorletzten Freitag Klarheit in eine mysteriöse Spionageangelegenheit bringen, die seit Monaten Geheimdienstler und Politiker beider Staaten beschäftigt.

Die Amerikaner versuchen seit geraumer Zeit, einen CIA-Mitarbeiter namens Nicholas Shadrin aus der Sowjet-Union zurückzuholen. Der Mann, der

1959 als Nikolai Fedorowitsch Arturine, samt einem Bundel brennender Militärakten in die USA desertiert war, ist seit dem 20. Dezember 1975 verschollen.

Im Auftrag des FBI hatte er sich mit zwei KGB-Agenten auf den Stufen der Wiener Votiv-Kirche verabredet. Seit her warten seine amerikanischen Dienstherren ebenso vergeblich auf ein Lebenszeichen wie seine Frau Blanka, Dentistin in Mc Lean (Virginia).

Was den deutschen Staatssekretär am vorletzten Freitag dazu brachte, Carters Brzezinski auf den Fall Shadrin anzusprechen, war die Sorge, aus dem sowjetisch-amerikanischen Agentenstück könne sehr leicht innenpolitischer Wirbel in Bonn entstehen. Denn, so teilte Schüler dem Amerikaner mit, der Bundesregierung sei aus der DDR zu-



Kanzler-Spion Guillaume
Kein Tauschobjekt?

gespielt worden, die US-Administration habe durch den Washingtoner Anwalt Richard Copaken in Ost-Berlin bereits einen Preis für Shadrin ausgelobt.

Dem Gerücht zufolge sei Bonn bereit, das 1974 geschnappte DDR-Agentenpaar Christel und Günter Guillaume, 1975 verurteilt zu 13 und acht Jahren Gefängnis wegen Spionage im Kanzleramt Willy Brandts, an die DDR auszuliefern.

Den Hintergrund für das dubiose Vierecksgeschäft Moskau—Washington—Bonn—Ost-Berlin hatten just zu Helmut Schmidts US-Besuch einige amerikanische Zeitungen und das Fernsehen geliefert. Blanka Shadrin hatte ausgepackt und US-Präsident Carter der unterlassenen Hilfeleistung für einen US-Bürger bezichtigt.

Ermutigt durch beschwichtigende Zeilen von White-House-Berater Brzezinski („I fully sympathise with your frustration and anxiety“), verlangte Blan-

ka Shadrin von Carter öffentlich er dazu bringen, die Guillaumes gen Osten laufenzulassen.

Es war nicht das erstemal, daß sich Bonn mit dem Fall Shadrin konfrontiert sah. In den letzten Tagen der Amtszeit von US-Präsident Gerald Ford erschien im Bonner Kanzleramt ein amerikanischer Beamter und bat um Hilfe. Ford möchte rasch noch den Fall Shadrin bereinigen, da Frau Blanka sonst mit einem öffentlichen Eklat drohe.

Der Amerikaner wünschte Kontaktvermittlung zu dem einflußreichsten Personen-Makler zwischen Ost und West, dem Ost-Berliner Anwalt Wolfgang Vogel. Der Advokat, der seit 1954 die deutsch-deutschen Gefangenen-Freikäufe regelt, managte auch eine der spektakulärsten Spionen-Tauschaktionen der Nachkriegszeit: 1962 vermittelte er das russisch-amerikanische Wechselgeschäft U-2-Pilot Gary Powers gegen Sowjet-Spion Rudolf Abel.

Das Bonner Kanzleramt half den Amerikanern wie gewünscht. US-Anwalt Copaken traf Wolfgang Vogel. Staatssekretär Schüler: „Damit war der Vorgang für uns abgeschlossen.“

Nicht so für die Amerikaner. Denn Copaken präsentierte Vogel — so konnte Schüler in der vorletzten Woche der US-Presse entnehmen — einen umfangreichen, mit einer Vollmacht des Weißen Hauses versehenen CIA-Katalog mit Namen von östlichen Spionen in westlichen Gefängnissen — alles Personen, die zum Tausch gegen Shadrin angeboten wurden. Vogel entschied sich schnell für die Nummer eins auf der Liste: für die Guillaumes.

Denn den ehemaligen Brandt-Gehilfen und seine Ehegenossin hätte die DDR gern rasch wieder. Mit großer Penetranz versucht der Ost-Berliner Bonn-Botschafter Michael Kohl seit langem, auch über Oppositionskanäle, mit der Bundesregierung ins Geschäft zu kommen — bislang vergeblich.

Zu groß ist die Sorge der Sozialliberalen, Guillaumes Entlassung aus dem Gefängnis Rheinbach bei Bonn könnte vom Wahlvolk mißbilligt werden. „Sie müßten eigentlich wissen, daß dieses nicht läuft“, erklärte Schüler im Weißen Haus seinem Gegenüber Brzezinski, „das macht große innenpolitische Unruhe.“

Pflichtgemäß bestritt der Carter-Intimus: Die US-Administration habe Anwalt Copaken nicht ermächtigt, die beiden Guillaumes in Ost-Berlin zu offerieren. Dies sei, so wiegelte er ab, eine Geschichte zwischen zwei Anwälten.

Schüler blieb skeptisch. Und damit in Washington nur ja kein Zweifel aufkomme, sagte er es dem Amerikaner zum Abschied noch mal ganz deutlich: „Guillaume steht nicht zur Verfügung. Er ist für uns kein Tauschobjekt.“

19 SEPT 60

Press Intelligence, Inc.
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EASTON (Pa.)
EXPRESS

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Front Page Edit Page Other Page

SEP 19 1960

Date:

Perhaps Khrushchev's Presence Is Insurance?

A former Soviet naval officer, Capt. Nikolai Fedorovich Atramanov, told a congressional committee a few days ago that Soviet leaders would not hesitate to launch a surprise atomic attack on the United States if they thought this nation could be smashed in a single blow.

Well, now, instead of carping and shivering in confusion and fright because Mr. Khrushchev is going to be with us for a few days at the United Nations in New York City, perhaps we ought to ask him to make it a practice to commute regularly between Moscow and Gotham.

Teach Patriotism 'at Home'

By MARY BARBER

A handsome Soviet defector has placed Americanism in the hands of womanhood, and hundreds of women applauded his action and attitude.

There was a certain appealing, mysterious cloak-and-dagger aura surrounding the appearance of yesterday's speaker at the luncheon meeting of Los Angeles Women's Division of Freedoms Foundation at Valley Forge.

He arrived bearing the pseudonym of Capt. Nicholas Artamonov and forbidding photographers.

"Children must be taught the goals and responsibilities of freedom and Americanism," he urged.

"And the seat of learning is in the home. The school cannot be a substitute for a family, but all too few people bother to teach patriotism to their children."

Captain Artamonov used restraint in avoiding opportunities given to him for criticism and reproach via questions fired at him by an all-female audience in the Beverly Wilshire Hotel. His repeated complaint, though, was with the passivity and laxity which he feels exists among too many Americans.

"United States citizens like freedom so far

granted that they dare put aside great problems of our day in favor of trivia. I am shocked that so few people vote. And that so many give passive acceptance to the dangers of communism."

He spoke with fervor and arm-waving. "Isn't it terrible to exist and not to live? To co-exist is just as terrible. There is a bland acceptance here of co-existence, whereas it really has the important goal of giving communists time and strength to bury the capitalist system. Passive support can create opportunity for communist action."

The newly-created American spoke with devotion to Americanism, a knowledge of the laws of the land and utter contempt for his homeland's government. Describing his defection from a loyal military and Communist past, he attributed it to many forces and the inevitable questions one asks of himself, "Where is my place? What must I do?"

The speaker commented upon a wide variety of contemporary problems.

Of student upsurges, he said, "This is not a lost or forgotten generation. In many ways it seems to be the best generation, and I don't think there have been student revolts. Students are reacting to a poor education on the bases of Americanism and communism."

Of the Los Angeles riots: "I don't think

they were Communist inspired."

Of the United Nations: "Inefficient, though it is, it must exist. It's our only hope."

Of education: "We must not forbid education of communism. The 'Communist Manifesto' should be read and analyzed intelligently."

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ABILENE (Tex.)
REPORTER NEWS

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Front Page Edit Page Other Page

SEP 1 1960
Assignment: Washington

Defector From Commies Makes a Poor Showing

By ED KOTERBA

WASHINGTON — Congressman Francis Walter, chairman of the Committee on Un-American Activities, pulled aside his cloak and dagger and produced a genuine, live Communist defector from the U.S.S.R.

This was his answer to the public performance in Moscow starring our two defective National Security Agency officers. But, instead of matching the Soviets' razzle and dazzle, lawmaker Walter's show seemed to sputter and fizzle.

The witness, there in the twilight gloom of the House caucus room, was telling all, all right. But what he told we must assume our intelligence people already knew — and more. And, too, his heart just wasn't in it.

The Red defector is a young man but his manedured heavy-brush mustache and matching big black brows give him an appearance beyond his 32 years.

However, he was no code-cracking official nor the equivalent of U-2 spy. Merely a captain in

the Soviet navy — and third class at that. What secrets could he tell?

Capt. Nikolai Fedorovich Artamanov defected a year ago, and it took Rep. Walter (D-Pa.) that long to bring him out into the open to disclose the man's "inside information" on the Soviet threat to us.

In the first place, our arena of inquiry was sadly deficient theatrically. Only two dimly-lit chandeliers in the vast auditorium. The Soviets at the U-2 trial, for example, had 34 chandeliers burning.

Here we had no Klieg lights, no television cameras — and the witness was forced to testify with his back to the audience.

And the captain, though fully cooperative, appeared emotionally, inwardly, awkwardly, mixed up.

He coughed nervously. His eyes avoided his inquisitors, even his interpreter. Yet there was a strange look of calm defiance across his face as the interpreter read his translated message announcing his reason for defecting.

"As an officer, wouldn't I be betraying my own people by running away from them?" Now, Capt. Artamanov twirled the dripping paper cup. "No, I shall never betray my people. I was, I am, and I shall always remain a Russian—but not a Soviet Russian."

He was, no question, a disillusioned ex-Red. His one "important comment" was startling, indeed. But as his interpreter read it, it came out in tired tones and the audience listened with folded hands and stoic faces.

The Kremlin, he said, holds to a doctrine of surprise atomic attack on the United States.

The look in the collective face of the spectators seemed to say: "So? We already know that."

There is no question about the serious Communistic threat to our very lives. But the vague testimony of a third-class captain defector isn't enough to electrify us out of our lethargy.

Surely, Mr. Walter has the means and initiative to do better than that.—(United Feature Syndicate, Inc.)

19 SEP 60

Press Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON, D. C.

**TYLER (Tex.)
TELEGRAPH**

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Front Page	Edit Page	Other Page

Date: SEP 19 1960



AFTER TESTIMONY
Capt. Nikolaj Fedorovich Artamonov, above, who held the rank of captain in the Russian Navy before defecting last year to this country, talks to newsmen at Washington, D.C., after testifying before the House Un-American Activities Committee. Speaking mostly in Russian with the aid of an interpreter, Artamonov said that despite Soviet Premier Nikita Krushchev's statements favoring disarmament, Russian military forces have been under orders to be ready to touch off an immediate nuclear attack on this country. (AP Wirephoto).

Press Intelligence, Inc.
 WASHINGTON 1. D. C.

GREENSBURG (Pa.)
TRIBUNE-REVIEW

Circ.: 17,761

Front Page Ed. Page Other Page

SEP 19 1960

Date:

Live Defector

WASHINGTON — Congressman Francis Walter, chairman of the Committee on Un-American Activities, pulled aside his cloak and dagger and produced a genuine, live Communist defector from the U.S.S.R.



Koterba

This was his answer to the public performance in Moscow starring our two defective National Security Agency officers. But, instead of matching the Soviets' razzle and dazzle, lawmaker Walter's show seemed to sputter and fizzle.

The witness, there in the twilight gloom of the House caucus room, was telling all, all right. But what he told we must assume our intelligence people already knew — and more. And, too, his heart just wasn't in it.

The Red defector is a young man but his manicured heavy-brush mustache and matching big black brows give him an appearance beyond his 32 years. cracking official nor the equivalent

ent of a U-2 spy. Merely a captain in the Soviet navy — and third class at that. What secrets could he tell?

Capt. Nikolai Fedorovich Artamanov defected a year ago, and it took Rep. Walter (D., Pa.) that long to bring him out into the open to disclose the man's "inside information" on the Soviet threat to us.

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And the captain, though fully cooperative, appeared emotionally, inwardly, awkwardly, mixed up.

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OFF THE MAIN STEM

By ED KOTERBA

"As an officer, wouldn't I be betraying my own people by running away from them?" Now, Capt. Artamanov twirled the dripping paper cup. "No, I shall never betray my people. I was, I am, and I shall always remain a Russian — but not a Soviet Russian."

He was, no question, a disillusioned ex-Red. His one "important comment" was startling, indeed. But as his interpreter read it, it came out in tired tones and the audience listened with folded hands and stoic faces.

The Kremlin, he said, holds to a doctrine of surprise atomic attack on the United States.

The look in the collective face of the spectators seemed to say: "So? We already know that."

There is no question about the serious Communist threat to our very lives. But the vague testimony of a third-class captain defector isn't enough to electrify us out of our lethargy.

Surely, Mr. Walter has the means and initiative to do better than that.

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Press Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON 1, D. C.

BLOOMSBURG (Pa.)
PRESS

Circ.: m. 9,950.

Front Page Edit Page Other Page
Date: SEP 19 1960

Washington Scene

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PROVIDENCE (R. I.)
JOURNAL

Circ.: m 57,908
S 183,699

Front Page Edit Page Other Page

Date: SEP 18 1960

The U.S. Must Prepare for Other Perils Than A-War

The testimony of a disillusioned Soviet naval officer that the Kremlin bases its military strategy on a surprise nuclear attack on the United States must be kept in perspective. Otherwise, it could do more harm than good.

Certainly, the young officer's warning before the House Un-American Activities Committee cannot be disregarded, even though he acknowledges he never saw the actual directives alleged to brief top flag officers in the nuclear ambush doctrine.



Artamonov

Accepting his statements at face value, even compensating for the possibility that he reported on the views of extremists among the Soviet military, it is significant, although not astonishing, that Soviet officers talk about surprise attack, and perhaps are being conditioned to implement such a strategy.

A personal statement by an officer who only 15 months ago was in the enemy camp dramatizes the reality of the balance of terror and how near the world lives to the ultimate madness of a nuclear war. And that realization, on the heels of the inconveniences that only a hurricane caused, demonstrates how terribly vulnerable modern civilization is to nuclear disaster, and emphasizes the great gaps in defensive preparation for survival.

But, because the United States already is gripped by a Pearl Har-

bor psychosis, it should be remembered that a nuclear surprise attack is the least likely form that Soviet aggression might take.

As long as the United States maintains an effective and alert deterrent force, capable of exacting heavy reprisal, the Kremlin is not likely to strike. Indeed, whatever else may be said about Soviet policy, the Kremlin consistently has limited the use of its power to those instances where there was a reasonable assurance it would prevail, or, failing, would not bring down excessive damage upon Russia.

Thus, peripheral, nibbling wars and threats of force remain as the more likely military challenges that the Kremlin poses.

Nikolai Artamonov's warning does underline the urgent necessity to improve constantly this nation's second-strike capacity and readiness. But it should not concentrate emphasis on the deterrent arm, at the expense of orthodox highly mobile contingents capable of checking or preventing limited war. Neither, of course, should such an alarm be permitted to lend nourishment to preventive or preemptive war advocates in this country, since, practically or ethically, mass murder and suicide triggered by the United States are intolerable even to contemplate.

Mr. Artamonov deserves all credit and gratitude for his courageous act of conscience in quitting a regime he could not accept and in delivering his warning to the United States. The test now is how Americans react to such disclosures. For unless the nation calmly assesses the whole range of dangers, it may expose itself to the other perils of piecemeal retreat and isolation by renewed pre-occupation with strategic armaments and the possibility of a nuclear Pearl Harbor.

TROY (N.Y.)
RECORD
Circ.: m. 6,908

Front Edit Other
Page Page Page

Date: SEP 19 1960

Current Comment:

Disillusioned Russians
Afford Us a Warning
(Hartford Courant)

The words of all defectors, East or West, must of course be taken with grains of salt or aspirin, as the case may be. If we disclaim the statements of the two National Security Agency clerks who sold out to Russia a fortnight ago, we should by the same token weigh twice the testimony of anyone who comes to us from the opposite camp. Nevertheless, we certainly cannot brush off the warning given by a former Soviet naval officer now escaped to the United States. He has told a Congressional committee on un-American activities that Russia has been preparing a surprise nuclear attack on this country since 1955. And at the same time, something more than a footnote is added to his warning by another Russian defector from East Berlin who states East Germany is preparing to invade West Germany.

In one way, of course, the first statement comes more as confirmation than as news. For the defense agencies of the United States have never ruled out the possibility, and there have been many observers who have consistently maintained the probability of such an attack. However, to have it spelled out specifically that Soviet military forces have been under orders to be ready to touch off an immediate nuclear attack on the United States for five years adds grave weight to speculation. According to the ex-Soviet informant, Premier Khrushchev does not wish to wait indefinitely for the United States to become a socialist state by evolution, as he has frequently predicted it will. Rather, he would like to see the change take place during his lifetime. In short, he would not hesitate to hurry it along with a few bombs, if he thought he could win by doing so.

It is in this "if" that the American answer must lie to any such Russian plans as have been alleged. The obvious corollary is that if the Kremlin is not convinced it can win in one, sudden stroke, it will not attempt it. There is little we can do to keep madmen from insane thoughts. But we can perhaps dissuade them from putting such madness into action by keeping doubt in their mind whether they could win.

WASHINGTON (Pa.)
OBSERVER

Circ.: m. 14,224

Front Edit Other
Page Page Page

3

Date: SEP 19 1960



Assignment: Washington

By ED KOTERBA

ED KOTERBA

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Press Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON 1. D. C.

TIFFIN (O.)
ADVERTISER-TRIBUNE

Circ.: e. 10,381

Front Edit Other
Page Page Page 1960

Date:



BARES RED PLAN—Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov, 32-year-old Russian navy captain who defected to the United States 15 months ago, is shown as he told the House subcommittee on Un-American Activities that Soviet military strategy since 1955 has been based on the "doctrine of surprise attack in nuclear warfare."

19 SEPT 60

Press Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON 1. D. C.

TROY (N.Y.)
RECORD

Circ.: m. 6,908

Front	Edit	Other
Page	Page	Page

Date: SEP 19 1960

Current Comment

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(Hartford Courant)

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19 SEP 60

Press Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON, D. C.

WILMINGTON (N.C.)

STAR

Circ.: m 17,926
S 25,540

Front Page Ed Page Other Page

Date SEP 19 1960

This Business Of Exchanging Traitors

The trotting out of a former Soviet naval officer who defected to the West 15 months ago, as an antidote to the defection of two American code specialists to the Soviets, was timed as perfectly as a Broadway stage show. But was his appearance before the House Committee on Un-American Activities of any real value?

Nikolai Fedorovich Artanmonov told the committee that the Soviets have had a doctrine of "surprise attack in nuclear warfare" against the United States since 1955, and that the only thing that has held them back is the doubt that they could destroy the United States in a single blow without fear of retaliation.

Being a former captain in the Soviet navy, Artanmonov should know what he is talking about, even though he admitted he had not actually seen the directive for the surprise attack, which appeared in a Soviet "military publication" available only to officers of flag rank or above.

His information pertaining to the surprise attack policy, and the additional information that the Soviet trawlers, which have appeared off our coasts intermittently, are, in reality, "spy" ships and not fishing ships, merely confirms what has been suspected for quite a while.

Nevertheless, we should hesitate before we place too much faith in a traitor's revelations. And that is exactly what Artanmonov is — a traitor. Just as much as are those U. S. code experts who defected to the Soviets.

Traitors have never been popular. The name of Benedict Arnold has gone down in history's pages as being synonymous with "traitor." Even the British who, during the Revolutionary War, accepted his services, they looked disdainfully down their noses at him.

And we would like to have explained to us, why Nikolai Fedorovich Artanmonov was kept under wraps for 15 months before being asked to reveal his "startling" information to Congress.

20504

FERGUS FALLS (Minn.)
JOURNAL

Circ.: e. 13,221

Front Page Edin Page Other Page
SEP 19 1950

Date:



Ed Koterba

Assignment: Washington

Russian Defector Told Nothing New

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19- EPT 60

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/23 : CIA-RDP89B00307R000300180001-2
through he is only 34, and his statement has credence since, he says that Premier Khrushchev does not wish to wait for total global victory but wants it during his lifetime.

This particular officer defected, as have many Russians and citizens of satellite nations. But it would be nice to know why they did before they are trotted out for public display.

This is said solely because there have been several Americans up the years (and two of late) who have also defected and it has been stated that they suffer from psychological disorders. It must be recognized that the very word "defection" stems from "defective," a word that means someone who is subnormal in intelligence or who has a deficiency of one kind or another.

This is not to infer by any means that Russians or other brands of Communists who defect did not have good cause. But it is to infer that the terrible news they have to impart is no news at all. After all, we need no Communist to tell us that the Soviet Union is an enemy and wishes to destroy us. For we spend lots and lots of money in obtaining such information, to put it mildly, and preparing for such attacks, to put it gently. If we require the confirmation of defectors, then we are in bad shape. Yet, congressional committees seem to insist on offering up such luscious dishes. The appetite jades on such fare simply because there is no need for such a course.

There are many American GIs in Germany who had defected because they got into money or girl scrapes. They thought their best way out would be to strike a noble pose. There are also many Russians who became traitors to their country of origin because of personal reasons rather than idealistic ones. As a matter of fact, there are several who deserted their wives and children under the guise of nobility because they said they did not like the system under which they lived. This is not at all convincing. For a noble man is not a wife deserter.

The important point is that people who live under Communist domination and leave it are not by any means heroes nor should they be treated as such. If they were heroic, they would stay and fight the tyranny. They do have a right to run, if they wish, but there is no reason to hail them for their flight was selfishly jet-propelled. This, by high school standards, does not comport with chivalry.

Our two code clerks who defected were not at all brave men. They were smug; left a statement in a bank vault and then appeared on Russian television. If they felt keenly about what they said are conditions in this country, then they would have done better as defectives to have tried using courage to follow their convictions. They are living very well, apparently, and unfortunately so are the Communist traitors who had primary and selfish reasons—and nothing more or less than the U.S. traitors.

SAN JOSE (Calif.) NEWS

Circ.: e 47,730

Front Page Ed Page Other Page

Date: SEP 19 1960

The Ground Rules On Defection

A former Soviet naval officer, who has just been taken out of wraps, says that the Soviet Union has been preparing a surprise nuclear attack on the United States since 1955. He is a much decorated man, though he is only 32, and his statement has credence since, he says that Premier Khrushchev does not wish to wait for total global victory but wants it during his lifetime.

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19 SEPT 1960

Press Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON 1, D. C.

BRISTOL (Va.-Tenn.)
HERALD COURIER

Circ.: m 20,255
S 25,563

Front Page Ed. Page Other Page

Date: SEP 19 1960

Another View

Commie Defector Didn't Tell Anything Startling

By Ed Koterba

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KOTERBA

Communications Group Will Attend Seminar

5-26-63 STAT

A seminar for members of the communications media and related organizations will be held here, June 6, 7, and 8.

The Freedoms Foundation is teaming up with leading business, service, and media organizations throughout the United States to bring to the West a comprehensive program on meeting challenges to the American system.

Russian to Speak

Among those on the Freedoms Foundation briefing team who have been invited to address the seminar are Dr. John Broger, office of information and education, Department of Defense; Karl Baarslag, author and expert on communism; Byron Gentry, commander-in-chief, Veterans of Foreign Wars; Jenkin Lloyd Jones, Tulsa editor; Ed Vernard, president, Edison Electric Institute; Eugene Pulliam, publisher; Norman Knight, broadcaster; Adm. Felix Stump (retired), former commander-in-chief in the Pacific; Frank Gard Jameson, former national president of the Navy League.

A senior Russian officer and recent defector to the free world will address the seminar on one of the three

days. His name and time of appearance will be announced later.

A. C. Rubel, chairman of the Western Region of the Freedom group, said that many organizations "approach the challenge to the American system through direct anti-communism activities, but the foundation approaches this with an affirmative and constructive program of understanding and appreciation of those basic values which underlie our free structure."

Rubel also said that free speech and free press are under attack by those "who would destroy these great pillars of strength in our free society and that this seminar is important at this time in order that we may continue to have a free exchange of information in the U.S.A."

"The great issues of our times cannot be settled by more Democrats or more Republicans, but by more good Americans."

Details of the seminar are being handled by Paul Terry, vice president in the western regional office, Freedoms Foundation at Valley Forge, Union Oil Center, Box 7600, Los Angeles, 54. Phone 213-482-9967.

Red Defector Will Speak at Seminar

Nicholas Artimino, a Russian defector of high rank, will appear today at a "Freedom Speaks" seminar sponsored by the Freedoms Foundation.

The seminar will be held in the Union Oil Building auditorium, 461 S Boylston

Los Angeles Times
THURS., JUNE 6, 1963 - Part II

Ave., beginning at 9 a.m. and will continue through Saturday.

Don Belding, chairman of the local executive committee, said this will be Artimino's first public appearance. The seminar, Belding said, is for the communications media but is open to the public upon payment of registration fees and as space permits.

Y SALE OUR ORDERS!

OWN

20508

Press Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON 1, D. C.

ENID (Okla.)
NEWS

Circ.: m. 15,094
S. 20,720

Front Page Edit Page Other Page

Date: SEP 20 1960

PASS THE SALT, PLEASE...

"I believe that the Soviet dictatorship would undertake a surprise attack if she felt she could win in one stroke. . . ."

So spoke Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov, a former Russian navy captain who defected to the West, before a congressional committee.

Meanwhile, in Moscow, the two American defectors Mitchell and Martin denounce the government of the United States.

Defectors are by nature and definition suspect. It would be well to keep a large salt shaker handy in evaluating their remarks.

Girl Tells Value of Freedom

It is through the nation's Constitution that the American system of free enterprise is protected, an attractive 18-year-old oratorical contest winner told a "Freedom Speaks" seminar here today.

Speaking on the final day of the three-day forum sponsored in Union Oil Center Auditorium by the Freedoms Foundation at Valley Forge, Francine Medeiros of Hollister, American Legion contest winner for 1963, said:

"A majority of the Pilgrims left the Old World because they believed each man should be free to reap the benefits of his labor. They came to America to avoid being seized by their governments and forced into conscription — to avoid being thrown into prison for debts they could not pay and to escape religious and political persecution."

A Soviet naval commander who defected to the free world four years ago told a Freedoms Foundation meeting last night that the ultimate objective of Red Russia is war with the west, not ideological coexistence.

SPY SHIP

Preliminaries of such war are already under way, according to Capt. Nicholas Artimimov, former commander of a Russian destroyer, who disclosed that the Soviets now have between 24 and 36 "spy ships" on patrol off the Atlantic coast and at least 12 off the Pacific seaboard.

The "spy ships," disguised as trawlers, but equipped with the most modern of electronic detection devices, are integral units of the four major fleets of the Russian navy, he said.

Never Too Old

LINCOLN, Ill., June 8 (UPD) —Mrs. Julia A. Dean, who applied for a Social Security card yesterday, is 101.

Coexistence Talk Called Soviet Union's Big Lie

Ex-Red Navy Officer Says It's of Great Help to Russia in Drive on Capitalism

Talk of peaceful coexistence is the biggest lie in Russian propaganda, a former Soviet naval officer who defected to the free world four years ago told a Freedoms Foundation of Valley Forge seminar Friday afternoon.

Such talk, said 39-year old Nicholas Artimimov, is a great aid to the Soviets against capitalistic nations.

"Too many persons think that peace and peaceful coexistence are synonymous," Artimimov told seminar members in the Union Oil Building auditorium during the second day of the three-day meeting.

Definitions Cited

"It is time that the true meaning of freedom and responsibility of each American is explained in detail to each citizen," he declared. "I have discovered your children many times don't know the difference between communism and democracy."

Artimimov, a former Soviet destroyer commander, said Russia has four separate fishing fleets scattered around the world. "In each fleet there are from eight to 10 trawlers which are seeking a different kind of fish—espionage," he said.

He warned the United States not to take rumbles of trouble between Russia and Red China seriously.

Business Speaker

Another speaker, Joseph McMillan, director of publications for Robertshaw Controls Co. in Long Beach, said management is spending \$150 million yearly on company publications but few are telling how freedom is being chipped away.

"Employees should be informed in all honesty and

without preaching that despite the propaganda of some politicians, labor leaders and others, that while business has a primary and essential purpose of making a profit for its shareholders, the nature of the effort creates better living standards and more job opportunity," McMillan said.

Rips Paternalism

"We allow freedom to be roadblocked with paternalistic governmental handouts in the guise of security until neither security nor freedom remains."

"I personally believe that we have, by tolerating the welfare state engendered by ambitious politicians, created a situation where no one has self-confidence, self-reliance or self-respect as we once knew it in this country."

Business, he concluded, must utilize the company publications not only to preserve itself, but to save the workers from socialistic controls which ultimately destroy freedom and initiative.

Another speaker, Dr. Kenneth D. Wells, president of the foundation and a former USC professor, warned that while we can't be shot out of the American way of life, we can be talked out of it.

Warns Against Softness

"Whenever barbarians put scaling ladders against the wall they always win if the people on the wall are soft," Dr. Wells declared.

"We can't defeat world communistic socialism with a lower grade of the same. We can't beat it with secularism, pacifism or appeasement. Only true Americanism, where people accept responsibilities as well as rights, and stand fast, can defeat communism."

20510

20 SEPT 60

Press Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON 1, D. C.

BLUEFIELD (W. Va.)
TELEGRAPH

Circ.: m. 27,736
S. 36,363

Front Page Edit Page Other Page
20 1960

Date:

Ed Koterba

Communist Defector Has Few Surprised

WASHINGTON. — Congressman Francis Walter, chairman of the Committee on Un-American Activities, pulled aside his cloak and dagger and produced a genuine, live Communist defector from the U.S.S.R.

This was his answer to the public performance in Moscow starring our two defective National Security Agency officers. But, instead of matching the Soviets' razzle and dazzle, lawmaker Walter's show seemed to sputter and fizzle.

The witness, there in the twilight gloom of the House caucus room, was telling all, all right. But what he told we must assume our intelligence people already knew—and more. And, too, his heart just wasn't in it.

The Red defector is a young man but his mannered heavy-brush mustache and matching big black brows give him an appearance beyond his 32 years.

However, he was no code-cracking official nor the equivalent of a U-2 spy. Merely a captain in the Soviet navy—and third class

at that. What secrets could he tell?

Capt. Mikolai Fedorovich Artamanov defected a year ago, and it took Rep. Walter (D., Pa.) that long to bring him out into the open to disclose the man's "inside information" on the Soviet threat to us.

In the first place, our arena of inquiry was sadly deficient theatrically. Only two dimly-lit chandeliers in the vast auditorium The Soviets at the U-2 trial, for example, had 34 chandeliers burning.

Here we had no Klieg lights, no television cameras—and the witness was forced to testify with his back to the audience.

And the captain, though fully cooperative, appeared emotionally, inwardly, awkwardly, mixed up.

He coughed nervously. His eyes avoided his inquisitors, even his interpreter. Yet there was a strange look of calm defiance across his face as the interpreter read his translated message announcing his reason for defecting.

"As an officer, wouldn't I be betraying my own people by running away from them?" Now, Capt. Artamanov twirled the dripping paper cup. "No, I shall never betray my people. I was I am, and I shall always remain a Russian — But not a Soviet Russian."

He was, no question, a disillusioned ex-Red. His one "important comment" was startling, indeed. But as his interpreter read it, it came out in tired tones and the audience listened with folded hands and stoic faces.

The Kremlin, he said, held to a doctrine of surprise atomic attack on the United States.

The look in the collective face of the spectators seemed to say: "So? We already know that."

There is no question about the serious Communist threat to our very lives. But the vague testimony of a third-class captain defector isn't enough to electrify us out of our lethargy.

Surely, Mr. Walter has the means and initiative to do better than that.

20 SEPT 60

Press Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON 1. D. C.

SALISBURY (N.C.) POST

Circ.: e 17,813,
S 17,894

Front Page Edw Page Other Page

Date: SEP 2 1960

Pass The Salt

"I believe that the Soviet dictatorship would undertake a surprise attack if she felt she could win in one stroke. . . ."

So spoke Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov, a former Russian navy captain who defected to the West, before a congressional committee.

Meanwhile, in Moscow, the two American defectors Mitchell and Martin denounce the government of the United States.

Defectors are by nature and definition suspect. It would be well to keep a large salt shaker handy in evaluating their remarks.

20512

20 SEPT 60

Press Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON 1. D. C.

FAIRMONT (W.Va.)
TIMES

Circ.: n. 13,043

Front Page Edits Page Other Page
SEP 20 1960

**Assignment:
Washington**
By ED KOTERBA

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20 SEPT 60

Press Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON 1, D. C.

BROWNSVILLE (Tex.)
HERALD

Circ.: e. 12,705
S. 11,971

Front Ed Other
Page Page Page

Date: SEP 20 1960

Pass The Salt--

"I believe that the Soviet dictatorship would undertake a surprise attack if she felt she could win in one stroke--"

So spoke Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov, a former Russian navy captain who defected to the West, before a congressional committee.

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20 SEPT 60

Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON 1, D. C.

COLORADO SPRINGS
(73) GAZETTE-
TELEGRAPH

Circ.: e. 27,545
S. 28,959

Front Edit Other
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1960



AFTER TESTIMONY--Capt. Nikolai Federovich Artamonov, who held the rank of captain in the Russian navy before defecting last year to the West, talks to newsmen in Washington after testifying before the House Un-American Activities Committee. Speaking mostly in Russian with the aid of an interpreter, Artamonov said that despite Soviet Premier Khrushchev's statements favoring disarmament, Russian military forces have been under orders to be ready to touch off an immediate nuclear attack on this country. (AP Wirephoto)

20515

21 SEPT 60

Press Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON 1. D. C.

VENTURA (Calif.)
STAR-FREE PRESS

Circ.: e. 21,275

Front Page	Edit Page	Other Page
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Date: SEP 21 1960

Keep the Salt Handy

"I BELIEVE that the Soviet dictatorship would under-
take a surprise attack if she felt she could win in
one stroke..."

So spoke Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov, a former
Russian navy captain who defected to the West, before a
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Meanwhile, in Moscow, the two American defectors
Mitchell and Martin denounce the government of the
United States.

Defectors are by nature and definition suspect. It
would be well to keep a large salt shaker handy in evalu-
ating their remarks.

21 SEP 60

WASHINGTON 1. D. C.

AMARILLO (Tex.)
NEWSCirc.: m. 44,595
S. 68,792Front Page
Edit Page
Other Page

Date: 21 1960

Red Defector Fails . . .
. . . To Impress Audience

—ED KOTERBA

WASHINGTON

— Congressman Francis Walter, chairman of the Committee on Un-American Activities, pulled aside his cloak and dagger and produced a genuine, live Communist defector from the USSR.



KOTERBA

This was his answer to the public performance in Moscow starring our two defective National Security Agency officers. But, instead of matching the Soviets' razzle and dazzle, lawmaker Walter's show seemed to sputter and fizzle.

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Surely, Mr. Walter has the means and initiative to do better than that.

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20517

21 SEPT 60

Press Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON 1. D. C.

SACRAMENTO (Calif.)

BEE

Circ.: e. 150,050

Front	Edit	Other
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Date: SEP 27 1960
Armament Dilemma

Captain Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov, a Russian who defected to the United States, told the house of representatives committee on unAmerican activities that Russia has been preparing for a surprise nuclear attack on this country since 1955.

This assertion will come as no surprise to Americans, even though defectors often are motivated by resentment, frustration and revenge just as they must be by respect for a freer system than that of Russia.

The big question is whether Russian military men are ordered to be ready for a surprise attack on the United States because of apprehension that Washington otherwise will beat Moscow to the punch.

The most alarming part of the captain's testimony is that in which he said Russian Premier Nikita Khrushchev wants to see the United States go Red in his lifetime.

The big dilemma of the United States is that it has to follow two schizophrenic or contradictory policies. It must build its nuclear strength as if the captain were right while it displays diplomatic skill to obtain safe disarmament.

And in building its arms strength, as it must, it has to realize this policy is as much a cause of fear in Russia as of deterrence. And fear or some miscalculation is probably the most likely trigger for a Russian attack.

The puzzle in which both the free and the enslaved worlds find themselves can be solved only by some fresh inventive program which would be a vast improvement over Washington's recent policy—or no policy—of merely reacting to events rather than finding new avenues to possible peace.

21 SEPT 60

Press Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON 1, D. C.

PORTLAND (Me.) EXPRESS

Circ.: e. 30,373

Front Page Ed Page Other Page

Date: SEP 21 1950

Hark To A Red Defector

A Russian recently placed his life in jeopardy to warn the United States that Soviet leaders would not hesitate to launch a surprise nuclear attack on this nation if they thought the one smash would be decisive.

Capt. Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov, a former Soviet destroyer commander, defected to this country in June, 1959. Since that time he has worked with several unnamed U.S. agencies. His whereabouts and identity have been closely guarded secrets.

Captain Artamonov was identified and his defection for the first time was revealed to add impact to his flat and chilling statement that Soviet military strategy since 1955 has been based on the doctrine of a surprise nuclear attack on the United States.

Thus U.S. authorities have taken a calculated gamble, and one which would not have been taken without his consent, on Captain Artamonov's life. The arm of the Russian secret police is long and its

vengeance is pitiless.

The point is, then, that unless the danger of another Pearl Harbor was very real, Captain Artamonov's anonymity would not have been invaded and his life would consequently not have been risked. He would have been granted the asylum he sought when his disillusionment with Soviet leaders and their philosophies dictated his defection. Now he must forever look over his shoulder, for he is better aware than most that he has become legitimate game for Soviet agents.

His warning should be a spur to those who begrudge defense spending, and to those who think that accelerated school programs in the fields of sciences are unnecessary, and to those who scoff at or ignore civil defense activities. This man who isn't an American is only one of the faceless millions who see in the United States, or at least in the West, their only hope of freedom. He is willing to risk his life, or sacrifice it, to keep this hope alive.

21 SEPT 60

Press Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON 1. D. C.

MARION (Ohio)
STAR
Circ.: e. 22,396

Front Page Edit Page Other Page

Date: SEP 21 1960

But Why Is Anyone Surprised?

Testimony by a defected Soviet naval officer before the House Committee on un-American Activities that the Kremlin would launch a surprise nuclear attack if it thought it could win has been a sensation in Washington.

Meanwhile, another sensation has been caused by an East German army officer who fled to West Germany with evidence that the East German army is being drilled for all-out attack on West Germany.

The effect of the two stories is to add to the sense of impending violence that hangs heavily over the spirit of western mankind. But why is anyone surprised?

What is new about testimony by a Russian who has been in this country since last year that the Soviet Union would attack the United States with nuclear weapons, if it thought it could win?

Hasn't that been the supposition of the U.S. Defense Department, the White House, the State Department and Congress since the Soviet Union began to prepare for World War III while everybody else was hastening to disarm after the end of World War II? Isn't that why Americans have been paying

taxes at wartime rates and trying to bolster up the defenses of their allies as well as their own?

And if it hasn't been the supposition of military planners that West Germany would be picked like a plum by military invaders from East Germany, why have the Western Allies maintained large armies of occupation in West Germany? Why are American draftees sent to West Germany for garrison duty?

The American people have a great capacity for being astonished by the obvious. When the U2 incident hit the news last May, it was received as though no American ever had heard of high-altitude reconnaissance or thought of the probability his government would find out as much about the Soviet Union as its agents know about the United States.

The sole purpose of everything that has been done to offset Russian military strength since the end of World War II has been to convince Russian militarists that war would be national suicide. If this hadn't been successful, World War III now would be in full blast and survivors would be living in holes in the ground.

20520

22 SEPT 1960

Press Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON 1. D. C.

SALEM (Bre.)
CAPITAL JOURNAL

Circ.: c. 17,543

Front Page Edit Page Other Pages
SEP 22 1960

Red Defector Warns

To offset the defection of Americans William H. Martin and Bernon F. Mitchell from the top-secret U.S. National Security Agency, comes the defection of Soviet Captain Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov, aged 32, who has commanded a Soviet navy destroyer. He testified last week before the House Un-American Activities Committee, warning that Moscow has a nuclear-raid plan against the United States.

Captain Artamonov said the Soviet fishing trawlers off the U. S. eastern coast were under command of a Soviet intelligence unit. The trawlers and Soviet submarines in the Atlantic study American fleet positions, types of weapons, carriers and anti-submarine tactics.

The Soviet trawlers were also cited by Rep. John W. McCormack of Massachusetts, House minority leader, in a separate statement, asserting that "well over 200 of the fishing vessels, equipped with a forest of radar nests and electronic gear were massing in Atlantic waters to spy on Allied Naval maneuvers."

Artamonov said he was training Indonesian Naval officers at the Polish port of Odynia when he defected to the West in June 1959. He now lives with his wife in New York City without protection. He has been questioned for the past 15 months by U.S. intelligence officers who kept the defection a secret. Last Thursday he gave this warning to the Congressional Committee after briefly summarizing his life story:

"Monday (Premier) Khrushchev arrives in the United States. He says he is going to talk about disarmament. I feel obliged to point out from the information available to me as a Soviet officer and Communist party member that Soviet military strategy is inconsistent with Khrushchev's pronouncements on disarmament."

"Since February, 1955, Soviet strategy has been based on the doctrine of surprise attack in nuclear warfare. This doctrine was established in a Soviet military publication which is known only to officers of flag rank and above. Several times over the past four years it has been said again and again. It has never been changed."

Artamonov believes the Soviet dictatorship "would undertake a surprise attack if it were felt that it could win in one stroke." He adds: "Make no mistake—they are power seekers, not political idealists." —G. P.

20521

029 SEPT 60

Press Intelligence, Inc.
 WASHINGTON 1. D. C.

MARION (Ind.)
 CHRONICLE-TRIBUNE

Circ.: S. 21,452

Front	Eds	Other
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Date SEP 22 1960

Pass the Salt---

"I believe that the Soviet dictatorship would undertake a surprise attack if she felt she could win in one stroke . . ."

So spoke Nikolai Fedorovich Artyamonov, a former Russian navy captain who defected to the West, before a congressional committee.

Meanwhile, in Moscow, the two American defectors Mitchell and Martin denounce the government of the United States.

Defectors are by nature and definition suspect. It would be well to keep a large salt shaker handy in evaluating their remarks.

22 SEPT 60

Press Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON 1, D. C.

ANDERSON (Ind.)
BULLETIN

Circ.: e. 18,609

41

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		SEP 22 1960

Date:

PASS THE SALT

"I believe that the Soviet dictatorship would undertake a surprise attack if she felt she could win in one stroke. . . ."

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20523

22 Sept 60

Press Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON 1. D. C.

SPARTANBURG (S.C.)
HERALD

Circ.: m. 30,554
S. 37,875

Front Edit Other
Page Page Page

24

Date: SEP 22 1960



SOVIET DEFECTOR

Nikolai Federovich Artamonov, 32, a defecting Russian navy captain who once skippered a Red destroyer, tells the House Un-American Activities Committee that Soviet military strategy since 1955 has been based on the doctrine of surprise attack in nuclear warfare. He also said Soviet fishing trawlers off the U. S. eastern coast operate under the command of a Soviet Intelligence unit.

20524

Press Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON 1. D. C.

FRESNO (Calif.)
BEE

Circ.: c. 104,290
s. 123,797

Front Edn Other
Page Page Page

Date: SEP 22 1950

Armament Dilemma

Captain Nikolai Fedorovich Aramony, a Russian who defected to the United States, told the house of representatives committee on unAmerican activities that Russia has been preparing for a surprise nuclear attack on this country since 1955.

This assertion will come as no surprise to Americans, even though defectors often are motivated by resentment, frustration and revenge just as they may be by respect for a freer system than that of Russia.

The big question is whether Russian military men are ordered to be ready for a surprise attack on the United States because of apprehension that Washington otherwise will beat Moscow to the punch.

The most alarming part of the captain's testimony is that in which he said Russian Premier Nikita Khrushchev wants to see the United States go Red in his lifetime.

The big dilemma of the United States is that it has to follow two schizophrenic or contradictory policies. It must build its nuclear strength as if the captain were right while it displays diplomatic skill to obtain safe disarmament.

And in building its arm strength, as it must, it has realize this policy is as much a cause of fear in Russia as of deterrence. And fear or some miscalculation is probably the most likely trigger for a Russian attack.

The puzzle in which both the free and the enslaved worlds find themselves can be solved only by some fresh, inventive program which would be a vast improvement over Washington's recent policy — or no policy — of merely reacting to events rather than finding new avenues to possible peace.

22 SEPT 60

Press Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON 1. D. C.

ASHEVILLE (N.C.)
TIMES

Circ.: e. 24,723

Front Page	Edit Page	Other Page
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Date: SEP 22 1960

Salt Is Needed For Talk Of Defectors

"I BELIEVE that the Soviet Union's Communist dictatorship would undertake a surprise attack on the United States if she could win in one stroke . . ."

So spoke Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov, a former Russian navy captain who defected to the West, before a congressional committee.

Meanwhile, in Moscow, the two American defectors, Mitchell and Martin, denounce the government and policies of the free United States.

Defectors are by nature and definition suspect. It would be well to keep a large salt shaker handy in evaluating any of their remarks.

20526

23 SEPT 60

Press Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON 1, D. C.

BLOOMINGTON (Ill.)
PANTAGRAPH

Circ.: e. 39,881
S. 35,347

Front Edit Other
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SEP 23 1960

Defectors Taste Better With Salt

"I believe that the Soviet dictatorship would undertake a surprise attack if she felt she could win in one stroke. . . ."

So spoke Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov, a former Russian navy captain who defected to the West, before a congressional committee.

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20527

Press Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON 1. D. C.

HARLAN (Ky.)
ENTERPRISE

Circ.: e. 6,257
S. 6,257

Front Edit Other
Page Page Page

Date: SEP 23 1968

Pass The Salt

"I believe that the Soviet dictatorship would undertake a surprise attack if she felt she could win in one stroke . . ."

So spoke Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov, a former Russian navy captain who defected to the West, before a congressional committee.

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23 SEPT 60

Press Intelligence, Inc.
 WASHINGTON 1. D. C.

SPRINGFIELD (Ohio) /
 SUN

Circ.: m. 17,336

Front Page	Edt Page	Other Page
		3 1960

More Warning On Red Aims

For what it's worth, a defector from the Soviet Navy has told the House Un-American activities Committee that Soviet strategy is based on the doctrine of surprise attack in nuclear warfare.

This, he says, has been true since February, 1955, regardless of how much Soviet Premier Khrushchev talks about disarmament; as he is expected to do before the United Nations.

The defection of 42-year-old Nikolai Federovich Artamonov, who held the equivalent of commander in the Russian Navy, has been

kept secret for 15 months while intelligence officers interrogated him. He came over to the West in June, 1959.

He claims to have information that was supposed to be disseminated only to Russian officers of flag rank and above.

The message he's giving us is that the Russians would undertake a surprise attack if they felt they could win in one stroke—that they are power-seekers, no political idealists.

No matter what you may think of defectors, ours or their, it would be safest to keep our guard up at all times.

24 SEP 60

The Washington Daily News Page. 11
Saturday, 24 September 1960

POTOMAC PATTERN

WE HAD a pleasant recent afternoon at a session of the House Un-American Activities committee hearing a Russian defector — but those Soviet experts sitting on either side of us kept us baffled.

One of the experts was Gennadi Shishkin, a personable young man who is chief of the Tass news bureau here. The other was Leon Volkov, also an amiable youth, who is Newsweek's authority on Soviet shenanigans.

As the interpreter translated the remarks of Soviet Naval Capt. Nikolai Artamonov, it was clear that Mr. Shishkin was unhappy. We asked him what the trouble was.

"That interpreter," he said, "he is not translating accurately. He is not complete. For instance, when Capt. Artamonov was asked whether he got special favors as a member of the Communist Party, the interpreter didn't bother to mention that Capt. Artamonov said being a party member meant he had to do a lot of unpaid extra work in his spare time. Also, the interpreter doesn't get all the nuances; the Captain emphasized that party membership meant added responsibility but the interpreter didn't say that."

We turned to Mr. Volkov. "How about it Leon?" we asked. "Shishkin says the interpreter is a bum."

"Nonsense," Mr. Volkov answered. "He's one of the best I've ever heard. He translates everytime Capt. Artamonov clears his throat."

Incidentally, altho Capt. Artamonov has been in New York since he defected more than a year ago, he's still unemployed. His board and room are paid for by the United States government, probably the Central Intelligence Agency, altho that outfit is not saying. His rank, Captain, Third Class, is equivalent to that of a commander in the U. S. Navy.

20530

SEPT 60

NEWSWEEK

The 'INVASION' of MANHATTAN (Special Section: Is It 'Make-or-Break' for the U.N.?)

SEPTEMBER 26, 1960 25c
[INDEX—PAGE 23]



How Important the 'Religious Vote'?

A 50-STATE LISTENING POST SURVEY: CAMPAIGN '60

20531

Pentagon Says Bachelor Friends
Know Nothing Prejudicial to U.S.

—From The New York Herald Tribune, Aug. 6

How much did the two traitors know?

Plenty. They had access to top-secret files in the National Security Agency and often used them.

—From Newsweek, published Sept. 13

Turncoats May Have Copied Other Papers

Secrets Missing, Defector Probe Told

—From The New York Herald Tribune, Sept. 16

DEFECTORS:

The Risk, the Danger

Behind locked doors in the Old House Office Building, the Pentagon tried its best last week to be reassuring about the defection of Bernon F. Mitchell and William H. Martin, the two National Security Agency employes who turned up in Russia.

In offering a stout defense of the government system of security checks, J. Vincent Burke Jr., the Defense Department's bulky, bustling general counsel, testified that, save for an instance in Mitchell's youth, there was no evidence of homosexuality in the traitors at the time of their hiring.

This drew a quick blast from testy Francis E. Walter, chairman of the House Un-American Activities Committee, who declared that the NSA's security procedures have been "very sloppy" and that the agency moreover has a "very serious perversion problem." Why, said Walters, a psychiatrist who had been treating Mitchell told him that he once discussed with worried officials of the NSA the possibility of starting a clinic there, "because perversion was quite a problem and they didn't know what to do about it."

The real crux of the case, though, came when Burke told a subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee how much Mitchell and Martin knew.

Denial: Burke insisted that the two defectors could not help Russia crack U.S. codes. Nor, he maintained, did they know anything about the U-2 flights, prior to the ill-fated sortie of Francis Gary Powers.

But Burke conceded that the traitors could help Russia improve their codes. And he confirmed that they had access to the top-secret files from the day they entered the NSA in 1957 and could call for the files "as needed" (NEWSWEEK, Sept. 19). It was possible, Burke went on, that the defectors may even have taken some briefing notes from the files with

them when they headed for Moscow.

To the Congressional probers, who planned further hearings, Burke's testimony was hardly reassuring. After all, in August, when it was first announced that Mitchell and Martin were missing, the Pentagon said they were minor clerks, with "no access" to information damaging to U.S. security.

The 'Valuable' Russian

Although he wasn't billed as a counterattraction to the Martin-Mitchell case, the Russian defector who was brought out of wraps in Washington last week certainly was calculated to serve that purpose. He was a former naval captain—the onetime commander of a Soviet destroyer—and it was just possible that, from a practical military point of view, he could contribute more hard intelligence to the U.S. than Martin and

Mitchell could to Russia. American intelligence officials, in fact, called him "the most valuable" Soviet defector in more than a decade.

Actually, 32-year-old Capt. Nikolai Federovich Artamonov had been in this country for fifteen months, but his presence had been kept secret until his appearance last week before the House Un-American Activities Committee.

Obviously, the witness—slim, bespectacled, and mustached—was not going to repeat at an open hearing the kind of military information he reportedly has been giving to intelligence agents in long months of questioning. But he made at least two interesting points:

►The great fleet of Russian "fishing trawlers" that roam the world—and specifically the coastal waters of the U.S.—are definitely espionage vessels, loaded with electronic listening and watching devices. They are also loaded with fish, but the fish are put aboard back home as stage props.

►Soviet strategic planning centers on the concept of a knockout nuclear attack on the U.S.—but Russian Premier Nikita Khrushchev obviously would not risk this unless he were sure that the first blow would be a decisive one. As of now, Khrushchev cannot be sure.

Artamonov also declared—though not before the committee—that the Russians have two nuclear submarines capable of launching missiles; however, he added, these are still in the testing stage, and the Soviet Navy, by and large, is still about five years behind the U.S. in this respect.

Another encouraging report from Artamonov has it that there has been growing dissatisfaction in Russian military forces ever since Khrushchev fired Marshal Georgi K. Zhukov in 1957; and it has become increasingly intense, he believes, since the dismissal of 1,250,000 Red military by Khrushchev early this year. Whether or not this is just the customary resentment that fills military men in times of cuts, he did not say.

Artamonov is a graduate of the Russian

Newsweek, September 26, 1960



Associated Press

Artamonov: Measure for measure

NATIONAL AFFAIRS

equivalent of Amapolis and was considered one of the most promising of the younger Russian naval officers. But he shared the discontent that followed Zhukov's dismissal and became increasingly curious about the United States.

In June of last year he made his escape simply by jumping his own ship in a Scandinavian port and asking the nearest U.S. Embassy for asylum. His wife accompanied him, and the two in recent months have been living quietly in New York. One reason Washington kept his presence secret for so long was that until this year his mother was still living in Russia. Since her death, he has no family ties in his homeland.

26 SEPT 60

Newsweek

The 'INVASION' of MANHATTAN

(Special Section: Is It 'Make-or-Break' for the U.N.?)

SEPTEMBER 26, 1960 25c

[INDEX—PAGE 23]



20532

How Important the 'Religious Vote'?
 A 50-STATE LISTENING POST SURVEY: CAMPAIGN '60

Pentagon Says Bachelor Friends Know Nothing Prejudicial to U. S.

—From The New York Herald Tribune, Aug. 6

How much did the two traitors know? Plenty. They had access to top-secret files in the National Security Agency and often used them.

—From Newsweek, published Sept. 13

Turncoats May Have Copied Other Papers Secrets Missing, Defector Probe Told

—From The New York Herald Tribune, Sept. 13

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Behind locked doors in the Old House Office Building, the Pentagon tried its best last week to be reassuring about the defection of Bernon F. Mitchell and William H. Martin, the two National Security Agency employes who turned up in Russia.

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Associated Press

NATIONAL AFFAIRS

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Press Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON 1, D. C.

BATON ROUGE (La.)
ADVOCATE

Circ.: m 37,955
S 58,450

Front Ed Other
Page Page Page

Date: SEP 27 1950

Russia's War Plans

Despite our concern over the desertion of code clerks Mitchell and Martin and others who have gone over to the Russians, we still are ahead in the exchange with the latter, as the long list of Russian and satellite military men and civilian officials who have become fed up with life behind the Iron Curtain and come over to the side of freedom will bear witness. It is a safe guess that we are ahead in information gained as well as numbers granted asylum.

The information brought to us by these fugitives from communism has been useful, instructive, interesting—and, on occasion, a little alarming. There is, for instance, Soviet Navy Capt. Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov, who reports that since 1935 Russian strategy has been based on the doctrine of a surprise nuclear attack on the United States. He has not seen any directives ordering preparation for such an attack, he says, but he knows of "general statements which tended to prepare the Soviet officer corps for the possibility of being ordered to make a surprise attack."

Capt. Artamonov's story probably is true, but it will cause no great astonishment among professional military men. Intensive planning for every possible eventuality and every imaginable course of action is a major activity of the military forces of all nations. Our own Defense Department is constantly developing plans of action for use in every conceivable situation. So are the military strategists of England, France and other countries outside the Iron Curtain.

The Russians undoubtedly have such plans. Our best guarantee against their ever being carried out is maintenance of our ability to retaliate in devastating fashion. Should our defense program ever be allowed to lag to the extent that the Russians feel themselves capable of striking a decisive blow without fear of their own destruction, they might indeed feel tempted to put into execution these or some similar plans.

Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON 1. D. C.

PORT HURON (Mich.)
TIMES-HERALD

Circ.: e. 31,203
S. 31,018

Front Page Edit Page Other Page

Date: 21 1953

Soviet Aim: Surprise Attack

A former Russian Navy commander who defected to the United States has testified before a Congressional committee that the Soviet military doctrine is based on a surprise attack.

Nikolai Federovich Artamonov, who described himself as disillusioned with Communism, also said that Soviet military authorities are unanimous in agreeing that the U.S. will not attack first.

He went on to state publicly what U.S. intelligence has long known and what all but the most naive Americans have guessed—that the Soviet "fishing boats" off our Atlantic coasts are jam-packed with electronic equipment to spy on whatever aspects of U.S. military strength are within eavesdropping range.

Mr. Artamonov's testimony was given before the House Un-American Activities committee even as Premier Khrushchev and his Communist puppets were on their way to the UN in New York, where they presumably will repeat their platitudes about world disarmament and living in peace with other nations.

★ ★ ★

"I feel obliged to point out," said Mr. Artamonov, "from the information available to me as a Soviet officer and Communist party member that Soviet military strategy is inconsistent with Khrushchev's pronouncements on disarmament.

"I believe that the Soviet

dictatorship would undertake a surprise attack if she felt that she could win in one stroke. Make no mistake — they are power-seekers, not political idealists.

"Khrushchev does not want to wait indefinitely for the United States to become a Socialist state by evolution. Moreover, he does not believe this will happen. He would like to see it take place in his lifetime." Mr. Artamonov declared.

★ ★ ★

The frustrating thing about Mr. Artamonov's statements is that Russia, of course, will roundly deny them. And his entire testimony will be dismissed by the Reds as the rantings of a malcontent.

Consequently, we can hold little hope that Mr. Artamonov's words of warning will be felt where they would do the most good — in the councils of the so-called "neutral" nations of the world.

But for Americans generally, his testimony should serve to confirm, if any confirmation is needed, the fact that our national defenses must remain predicated on massive retaliation.

Russia will not attack us if she believes our retaliation would devastate the Soviet Union. By the same token, if our defenses are lowered and our strike-back power weakened, the Soviets would not hesitate to unleash their nuclear doom on us.

20 OCT 60

Press Intelligence, Inc.
 WASHINGTON, D. C.

**SHARON (Pa.)
 HERALD**

Circ.: e. 23,217

Front	Edi	Other
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Date: ~~OCT~~ 20 1960

A Bit of Salt Is Needed on This

"I believe that the Soviet dictatorship would undertake a surprise attack if she felt she could win in one stroke. . . ."

So spoke Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov, a former Russian navy captain who defected to the West, before a congressional committee.

Meanwhile, in Moscow, the two American defectors Mitchell and Martin denounce the government of the United States.

Defectors are by nature and definition suspect. It would be well to keep a large salt shaker handy in evaluating their remarks.

20535

Press Intelligence, Inc.
 WASHINGTON 1, D. C.

**NEW BRUNSWICK (N.J.)
 HOME NEWS**

Circ.: C. 39,920
 S. 37,695

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Date: **NOV 1 1960**

Pass the Salt

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20536

APR 22 1961

PROJECT ACTION

Professor: U.S. Sees Reds Wrong

A professor of political science from Notre Dame university said today the American concept of communism and Communists is generally a mistaken one.

Dr. Gerhart Niemeyer spoke to some 500 Upper Midwest residents gathered at Wold-Chamberlain field for a two-day seminar on American ideals and the dangers of communism—Project Action.

Niemeyer said Americans think of communism as just an economic system, a standard of living or the use of force.

Communists, however, are "impervious to all reasoning based on normal assumptions," Niemeyer said.

If you are not working toward the "Socialist future you are doomed and not worthy to exist," according to the communist mind, Niemeyer said.

The first of two defected Russian officials here for the seminar was to speak to the group.

Nikolai Artamonov, former commander of a Russian destroyer, said in an interview Thursday the West is losing the cold war in economic, political and psychological fronts.

Aleksander Kaznachejev, who fled his post as attache in the Russian embassy at Rangoon, Burma, in June 1959, is to address the group at 8:20 a.m. Saturday.

Kaznachejev said the Russians would like to provoke the United States into armed intervention "as in Laos or Cuba."

The visitors blamed the western press for aiding Russian propaganda on the Cuban invasion.

Kaznachejev said there was too much publicity on this country's role in training and supporting the rebels.

The two-day Project Action group is being provided a meeting room at the naval air station free by the base commander, Capt. Robert T. Kielling.

Naval personnel have also been provided, out of uniform, to assist in parking cars.

Each of the participants in the seminar paid \$7.50 for meals at the base over the two days.

The Twin Cities Citizens Council for American Ideals is sponsoring the meeting with the co-operation of the Chambers of Commerce of Minneapolis and St. Paul and the Minneapolis Council of Civic Clubs.

War Is
E.A. Her Examiner
Aim of
Soviets
Night Curator
P.A.S

War with the West, not ideological coexistence, is the ultimate objective of Red Russia, a Soviet naval commander who defected to the Free World four years ago declared here at a meeting of the Freedoms Foundation.

Preliminaries of such war are already under way, according to Capt. Nicholas Artimimov, former commander of a Russian destroyer, who disclosed that the Soviets now have between 24 and 36 "spy ships" on patrol off the Atlantic coast and at least 12 off the Pacific seaboard.

The 35-year-old former Communist made his revelations at a three-day Freedoms Foundation seminar in the auditorium of the Union Oil Center, ending today.

"Americans frequently make the mistake of confusing the concept of peace with the idea of co-existence between democratic ideals and Communist ideology," he said.

"I heard Khrushchey himself, declare in an address to the Central Committee of the Communist Party, of which I was a member, that there can be no co-existence with the West.

"The objective of world communism is conquest by force and both Russia and China are dedicated to that end."

SPY SHIPS

The "spy ships," disguised as trawlers, but equipped with the most modern of electronic detection devices, are integral units of the four major fleets of the Russian navy, he said.

The trawlers, reported to have been seen off Cape Canaveral and at the site of the nuclear submarine Thresher tragedy, were undoubtedly on detached duty from the main "spy ship" squadron in the Atlantic, Artimimov said.

"They look like fishing boats, but they are after bigger and different kinds of fish," he added.

20538

23 MAR 76

U.S. Is Offering to Exchange Soviet Agent for an American

AP/T 23.3.76

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 22—The State Department has proposed to the Soviet Government that it exchange O. Paskalian, who pleaded guilty last Sept. to a charge of spying for Moscow, for an American intelligence agent now in Soviet custody.

The official said he did not know the identity of the American agent or whether the Soviet Government had responded favorably to the proposal.

Mr. Paskalian, a 36-year-old Armenian, was arrested last June in New York by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and charged with having transmitted a top secret study of the North Atlantic Treaty Organ-

ization to Soviet agents. He was sentenced to 22 years in prison, a term he is now serving at the Federal Penitentiary at Leavenworth, Kansas.

John Corbett, Mr. Paskalian's court-appointed lawyer, said today that he had been telephoned recently by a Washington lawyer, representing the family of the American agent, who wanted to know whether Paskalian would be interested in going back to the Soviet Union in return for the American's freedom.

"I said, if you were doing 22 years in Leavenworth, wouldn't you be interested in going back?" Mr. Corbett recalled, adding that "the last word I had on it was that the Russians would let us know something this week."

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Talks Held On Trading Of 2 Spies

NEW YORK (AP) — Delicate negotiations are under way for a swap between a convicted spy for the Soviet Union and a CIA agent now in Soviet custody, the convicted man's lawyer says.

"I just had the State Department on the phone and I don't think this is the opportune time to say anything more," lawyer John Corbett said yesterday. "These are delicate negotiations that could easily be upset."

In Washington, the State Department said it had no comment.

Corbett's client, Sarkis O. Paskalian, 36, an Armenian-born diamond cutter, pleaded guilty in U.S. District Court in Brooklyn last September to charges of spying for the Soviet Union.

He was arrested June 27 and charged with obtaining and transmitting top defense documents, including one dealing with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The New York Daily News reported in its editions today that the talks between the State Department and the KGB, the Soviet secret police, involved a "highly placed" CIA agent whose existence the Russian government itself denies. The agent's name and the circumstances surrounding his exposure as a spy have not been disclosed.

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STAT

24 MAR 76

Talk Trade of Seized Spies

By MARCIA KRAMER

State Department officials and Russian secret agents are meeting secretly in East Berlin to negotiate the exchange of an admitted KGB operative and a "highly placed" CIA agent now in Soviet custody, The News learned yesterday.

The swap could take place as early as next week, according to the KGB agent's attorney here.

deal point of the negotiations is Jack O. Paskalian, 33, an Italian-born diamond cutter pleaded guilty last September in Brooklyn Federal Court to charges of spying for Moscow. Russian officials were trying to swap Paskalian for an unidentified undercover agent who had allegedly infiltrated the upper echelons of the Soviet bureaucracy. There was no indication just how long the U.S. agent's cover was in or how long he has been in the Russians. It was reported, however, that the CIA had hired a Washington law firm after the State Department and CIA refused to disclose her husband's whereabouts.

Verify Yank's Arrest
Apparently the wife's lawyers, Milton and Burling, verified the U.S. agent had indeed been arrested. They then looked at a likely candidate for the job. It was hit upon Paskalian, a diamond cutter arrested last June by the FBI on charges of having transmitted a secret study of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to Soviet agents. He was sentenced to a year in jail and is now at Leavenworth Federal Penitentiary.

Paskalian's lawyer, John Corbett, confirmed that he was considered "very mysteriously" late in the night. "I was asked if my client was interested in participating in a swap," Corbett said, at first Paskalian was hesitant because as an American-born wife was opposed to the plan, Corbett refused to give further details about the exchange.


American and Russian agents were meeting in East Berlin. "It's very delicate. Officially, the Russian government denies the existence of the CIA agent. It's the KGB that admits they have him in custody and might be willing to trade," Corbett said. He gave no reason as to why the Russians want Paskalian other than to question him about what he confessed to the FBI.

Another possible motive, sources indicated, was a Russian attempt to free a second Soviet spy, Sahag K. Dedejan, 41, of Rockville, Md., who was indicted with Paskalian on espionage charges. Dedejan, scheduled to go on trial in Maryland next month, was specially charged with obtaining defense material for Paskalian to copy and pass along to the Russians.

Paskalian was to have been the chief government witness and testify that he gave Dedejan \$2,000 for the papers after turning them over to the Russians. If Paskalian is exchanged before testifying, the government's case against Dedejan could go down the drain.

Paskalian was arrested on June 27 by the FBI and later confessed that he photographed secret documents and turned them over to Soviet agents. He also confessed to conspiring with high-level Russians officials to obtain and transmit top-secret defense documents. One of those documents dealt with NATO weaponry needs and capabilities. He was specifically charged with carrying out his spy activities in the United States from January 1973 to the time of his arrest.

Before his arrest he operated a jewelry store at 75 W. 17 St.



ILLEGIB

24 Mar 76

U.S., Soviets Discuss Exchange of 2 Agents

NEW YORK, March 24 (AP)—State Department officials and representatives of the Soviet secret police are trying to negotiate the exchange of a CIA agent held by the Russians for a convicted Soviet spy imprisoned in this country.

The Soviet spy's attorney, John Corbett, disclosed the talks, which are being held in East Berlin, Tuesday but declined to elaborate. "I just had the State Department on the phone and I don't think this is the opportune time to say anything more," he said. "These are delicate negotiations that could easily be upset."

The State Department had no comment.

Corbett's client, Sarkis O. Paskalian, 36, an Armenian-born diamond cutter, pleaded guilty in U.S. District Court in Brooklyn last September to charges of spying for the Soviet Union.

He was arrested June 27 and charged with obtaining and transmitting top defense documents, including one dealing with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

It was not disclosed who the CIA agent is, how he was exposed, or how long he has been in Soviet custody. But The New York Daily News said the CIA operative's wife retained

the Washington law firm of Covington & Burling after the State Department and the CIA refused to tell her where her husband was.

The paper quoted unnamed sources as saying the KGB, the Russian secret police, may have asked for Paskalian to determine why he confessed or possibly to prevent him from testifying at the trial of Sahag K. Dedeyan, 41, of Rockville on charges of failing to report the copying of classified documents.

It was expected that Paskalian, who is serving a 22-year prison sentence, would testify that he gave Dedeyan \$2,000 for secret documents, including one that dealt with NATO's weaponry needs and capabilities.

20543

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WASHINGTON POST 12/3/76

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CIA-KGB spy swap is hinted

By Marcia Kramer
New York News Service

NEW YORK—State Department officials and Russian secret police (KGB) are meeting secretly in East Berlin to negotiate exchanging a KGB agent for a "highly placed" CIA agent in Soviet custody.

The exchange could take place next week, according to the KGB agent's attorney.

The key to the "delicate" negotiations is Sarkis O. Paskalian, 36, an Armenian-born diamond cutter who pleaded guilty in September in U. S. District Court in Brooklyn to charges of spying for Moscow. U. S. officials were reportedly trying to exchange Paskalian for an unidentified undercover agent who had infiltrated the Soviet bureaucracy.

There was no indication of how the agent's cover was blown or how long he had been held by the Soviet Union. It was learned, however, that the CIA agent's wife hired a Washington law firm after the State Department and CIA refused to discuss her husband's whereabouts.

Apparently the wife's lawyers, from the firm of Covington & Burling, verified that the agent had been arrested, then shopped around for a likely candidate for a swap.

They hit upon Paskalian, of Manhattan, who had been arrested last June by the FBI on charges of having transmitted a top-secret study of NATO to Soviet agents. He was sentenced to 22 years in prison and is now at the Leavenworth Federal Penitentiary.

Paskalian's lawyer, John Corbett, confirmed that he had been contacted "very mysteriously, late one night."

"I was asked if my client was interested in participating in a swap," Corbett said, explaining that at first Paskalian was hesitant because he had an American-born wife who was against the trade.

Corbett refused to give further details other than to confirm that American and Russian agents were meeting in East Berlin.

"It's very delicate. Officially, the Russian government denies the existence of the CIA agent. It's the KGB that admits they have him in custody and might be willing to trade," Corbett said. He gave no reason why the Russians want Paskalian other than to grill him about what he confessed to the FBI.

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Dedeyan, scheduled to go on trial in Maryland next month, was specifically charged with obtaining defense data for Paskalian to pass along to the Russians.

Paskalian was to have been the chief government witness, testifying that he gave Dedeyan \$2,050 for the papers after turning them over to the Russians. If Paskalian is exchanged before testifying, the government's case against Dedeyan could fail.

27 MAR 1976

ILLEGIB

THE PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER
27 March 1976

CIA-KGB spy swap is hinted

By Marcia Kramer
New York News Service

NEW YORK—State Department officials and Russian secret police (KGB) are meeting secretly in East Berlin to negotiate exchanging a KGB agent for a "highly placed" CIA agent in Soviet custody.

The exchange could take place next week, according to the KGB agent's attorney.

The key to the "delicate" negotiations is Sarkis O. Paskalian, 36, an Armenian-born diamond cutter who pleaded guilty in September in U. S. District Court in Brooklyn to charges of spying for Moscow. U. S. officials were reportedly trying to exchange Paskalian for an unidentified undercover agent who had infiltrated the Soviet bureaucracy.

There was no indication of how the agent's cover was blown or how long he had been held by the Soviet Union. It was learned, however, that the CIA agent's wife hired a Washington law firm after the State Department and CIA refused to discuss her husband's whereabouts.

Apparently the wife's lawyers, from the firm of Covington & Burling, verified that the agent had been arrested, then shopped around for a likely candidate for a swap.

They hit upon Paskalian, of Manhattan, who had been arrested last June by the FBI on charges of having transmitted a top-secret study of NATO to Soviet agents. He was sentenced to 22 years in prison and is now at the Leavenworth Federal Penitentiary.

Paskalian's lawyer, John Corbett, confirmed that he had been contacted "very mysteriously" late one night.

"I was asked if my client was interested in participating in a swap," Corbett said, explaining that at first Paskalian was hesitant because he had an American-born wife who was against the trade.

Corbett refused to give further details other than to confirm that American and Russian agents were meeting in East Berlin.

"It's very delicate. Officially, the Russian government denies the existence of the CIA agent. It's the KGB that admits they have him in custody and might be willing to trade," Corbett said. He gave no reason why the Russians want Paskalian other than to grill him about what he confessed to the FBI.

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5 NOV 1976

Chairman of the Czechoslovak Society for International Relations Evzen Erban presented on this occasion the committee's Gold Medal to chairman of the Japanese-Czechoslovak economic committee in Tokyo Eiji Suzuki for his contribution to the development of friendship and cooperation with Czechoslovakia.

WFTU SUPPORTS IRANIAN WORKERS' STRUGGLE

LD05000SY Prague CTK in English 1510 GMT 4 Nov 76 LD

[Text] Prague, 4 Nov, CETEKA--The Prague based World Federation of Trade Unions has issued a statement calling on workers all over the world to intensify their actions of solidarity with the Iranian workers' struggle for decent life and human rights.

The statement said the workers' struggle had entered a new phase with the general strike of oil workers. More than half the nation's public work force of one million is now on strike.

The shah's regime called the army to crush the strike but the workers of Iran are determined to continue their struggle despite the bullets and grenades thrown against their peaceful demonstrations, resulting in hundreds of killed and injured, the statement said.

TRIBUNA CARRIES SERIAL ON SHADRIN CASE

AU031358 [Editorial Report AU] Prague TRIBUNA No 43 in Czech on 25 October 1978 on p 23 carries the first installment of a serial by Genrich Borovik, entitled "One Also Shoots Horses; On One Viennese CIA Operation," which deals with the case of Nicholas Shadrin and is based on materials of Soviet "state security." The 3,000-word article opens by quoting several statements from U.S. magazines and newspapers describing Shadrin as a double or even triple agent who disappeared--under mysterious circumstances--on 20 December 1975 after meeting with two Soviet agents near Vienna's Votiv Church. The article goes on to say: "The author of these lines acquainted himself in the Committee of State Security with the materials on this case, about which the Western press has written so much. These materials shed light on the real fate of the man whom the American papers called Nicholas George Shadrin, citizen of the United States."

The author then describes a Washington meeting between 'Shadrin' and an unnamed official of the Soviet Embassy in Washington, which took place in May 1966. Shadrin is said to have approached the Soviet Embassy employee in a supermarket and to have explained that he could not do it in the Soviet Embassy since "my real name is Nikolay Fyodorovich Artamonov. was officer on our--well, in fact--your torpedo boat. I emigrated to Sweden...in 1959."

The next part of the first installment--based on testimony by Ilya Aleksandrovich Popov, a member of Artamonov's crew--describes the circumstances of Artamonov's emigration to Sweden and is followed by two short sections, the first quoting a Swedish newspaper of June 1959 on the incident and the other quoting the indictment on the basis of which a Kaliningrade court sentenced Artamonov "for crimes against the state" in September 1959.

The first installment of Borovik's article concludes by describing another meeting of May 1966 between Artamonov and a Soviet Embassy employee. According to the article, in this interview Artamonov deplored his defection to the West and his ensuing cooperation with the U.S. "espionage service" and said that he wanted to "redeem" his guilt.

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МЕЖДУНАРОДИ

В ИЮЛЕ 1977 года в ведущих газетах и журналах Америки замелькали сенсационные заголовки со словами «агент», «двойной агент» и даже «тройной агент». Все они имели отношение к одному лицу — Николасу Джорджу Шадрину, который был, как уверяли газеты, «двойным агентом» спецслужб США и «тайнословно исчез после встречи с сотрудниками КГБ» в Вене в декабре позапрошлого года. Вот некоторые из сообщений прессы:

«Вечером 20 декабря 1975 года американский гражданин, родившийся в России, Николас Шадрин, оставив жену в гостинице, направился в собор Вотивкирхе, где он должен был встретиться с двумя агентами КГБ. До сегодняшнего дня его судьба и его действительная роль в темном мире шпионажа остаются неизвестными...» («Нью-Йорк»).

«...он был двойным агентом, предоставлявшим американскую разведку и одновременно делавшим вид, что шпионит для Кремля... Его дело... столь же интригующе, как шпионский роман...»

«Дело Шадрина, исчезнувшего в Австрии 18 месяцев назад, явилось предметом многочисленных официальных и неофициальных американско-советских контактов...» («Вашингтон пост»).

В Комитете госбезопасности автора этих строк познакомили с материалами дела, о котором сейчас пишет западная пресса. Эти материалы проливают свет на действительную судьбу человека, которого в американских газетах называют гражданином США Николасом Джорджем Шадринным.

ВАШИНГТОН,

май 1966 года

Была суббота. Сотрудник советского посольства вышел в торговый центр купить, как обычно, продуктов для семьи. В отделенном углу магазина к нему вполголоса обратился на отличном русском языке высокий человек, стоявший рядом.

— Простите, пожалуйста, вы сотрудник советского посольства?

— Да.

— Я часто видел вас здесь, в этом магазине, и по разговору понял, кто вы. Человеку было лет сорок, но он был худощав, подтянут.

— Моя фамилия Шадрин. Николас Джордж Шадрин.

— Слушаю вас, господин Шадрин.

Меня совершенно не

ском порту Гдыня... В воскресенье, 17 июня 1959 года, около 17 часов Артамонов приказал мне приготовить катер к выходу на рыбалку в устье р. Вислы. Вечером он пришел на катер вместе со своей знакомой девушкой по имени Беа и дал команду двигаться в направлении Вислы. Мы прошли пост польских пограничников и вышли в открытое море. Ночью началась гроза. Артамонов два или три раза проверял, как я держу курс, и подменял меня за штурвалом... На рассвете он заявил мне: «Мы заблудились — шли неправильным курсом, так как гроза повлияла на работу наших компасов... Когда мы подошли к берегу, Артамонов в каюте переселся в гражданский костюм темного синего цвета, спустил с катера военноморской флаг и вместе с Беой сошел на берег. Он сказал мне, что сейчас узнает, где мы находимся, съездит за горючим и утром мы пойдем в Гдыню... После отъезда Артамонова к катеру на автомашине прибыли двое штатских. Один произнес слово «полицья» и сделал знак, чтобы я садился в автомашину. Я несколько раз сказал слово «вахта» для того, чтобы он понял, что я захожусь на вахте и не желаю никуда ехать. Тогда вдвоем они скрутили мне руки и втолкнули в автомашину. Меня ввели в дом, где, как оказалось, помещался полицейский участок. Я потребовал, чтобы меня соединили по телефону с советским консульством. Начальник сказал, что сейчас в консульство позвонить нельзя, так как там все спит...

Утром меня отвезли на автомашине в другое полицейское помещение, которое располагалось в центре поселка. Я увидел в коридоре Артамонова... Он сказал мне: «Наверное, ты посидишь в Гдыню один, я тут погорел». Я понял это так, что Артамонов, как офицер, будет задержан на некоторое время, поэтому сказал ему, что если недолго, то я подожду.

Вечером того же дня меня вызвали на допрос, который вел начальник полиции с участием переводчика — высокого старика русского эмигранта в возрасте около 60 лет.

Меня спрашивали, «паставаню ли я на том, что Артамонов заблудился и попал в Швецию случайно. Я сказал, что мы находимся

затнувшийся на три дня допрос. До сих пор еще не дал удовлетворительного объяснения причин своего побега на Запад... Комиссия по делам иностранцев вынесла в четверг решение о предоставлении беженцам права политического убежища...»

КАЛИНИНГРАД,

сентябрь 1959 года

(Из обвинительного заключения)

«...На основании изложенного обвиняется Артамонов Николай Федорович в том, что он, находясь с кораблем на выполнении специального задания в порту Гдыня Польской Народной Республики, изменил Родине и вечером 7 июня 1959 года на корабельном катере бежал в Швецию, где возбудил ходатайство о предоставлении политического убежища, которое ему предоставлено; то есть в совершении преступления, предусмотренного ст. 1 Закона об уголовной ответственности за государственные преступления...»

ВАШИНГТОН,

май 1966 года

Материалы об Артамонове и его фотографии были получены нашим консульством в Вашингтоне через не-

ский представитель Игорь Александрович Орлов — так назовем мы его в этом документальном очерке...»

И. А. ОРЛОВ:

— Из чего мы исходили, пойдя на контакт с Артамоновым-Шадринным в 1966 году?

Тщательное изучение документов — отзывов сослуживцев Артамонова, его друзей, показаний моториста Попова — убедило нас, что предательство Артамонова, его бегство в Швецию с любовницей не были вызваны какими-то серьезными, скажем, идеологическими причинами. У него было немало друзей, жена и сын, которых он любил. После побега в его каюте на корабле нашли неотправленные подарки, приготовленные им для семьи.

Что же с ним произошло? Судя по всему, быстрая карьера вскружила голову этому человеку: ему было досрочно присвоено звание капитана 3-го ранга. У него стали появляться зазнапство, высокомерие, эгоизм, чувство вседозволенности. Появление этих качеств по-непеле отталкивало от него друзей, которые знали его другим. Он начинает искать новых «друзей». Ими оказываются офицеры иностранных флотов, представители которых находились тогда в Гдыне (некоторые

«ЗАГНАНЫ»

Генрих БОРОВИК

ПРИСТА

НЕ ТАК ЛИ?

сколько дней после запроса. Итак, это был не самозванец. Это был гражданин Советского Союза, совершивший тяжчайшее преступление перед Родиной, оказавшийся за границей и просящий встречи с представителем советского консульства. По какому

из них, как выяснилось позже, были связаны с западными разведками. Они осыпали его комплиментами и недвусмысленно намекнули, что человек с его качествами нигде не пропадет. Он уверовал в свою исключительность. Это совпало с

ИЗ СПРАВКИ О КОЗЛОВЕ Н. В.

...родился в 1918 году. В 1943 году добровольно перешел на сторону гитлеровцев. В мае того же года окончил школу пропагандистов под Берлином. Служил начальником штаба 2-го полка 1-й дивизии РОА. После войны находился в лагере для военнопленных Штайнхайм, где принимал участие в издании фашистских документов для служащих РОА. В 1948 году стал секретарем сотрудников американской разведки. Занимался подбором и подготовкой кадров для ЦРУ с целью добрыми на территории Советского Союза. Человек глупо-интересный и беспринципный. Боялся и ненавидит американцев. Скрывает от начальства, что в Советском Союзе у него есть мать, опасаясь, что этот факт может повредить его положению в спецслужбах. К Советскому Союзу относится с ненавистью.

Н. А. ОРЛОВ:

...Николай Козлов регулярно докладывал начальству о последних своих «подвигих». Но Козлов был лишь одним из людей, которые окружали Артамонова. Был там, например, великий Сергей Гордесев, совершенно разложившийся морально субъект, бежавший к американцам из Западной Германии в 1952 году. И русские, и американцы знали, что этот человек был ко всему прямому еще и параноиком.

Артамонов публиковал этих людей и постепенно, как он рассказывал, его омыливал ужас: он становится, если уже не стал, таким же, как они. Но набирать для себя другое отношение он был не болел. И ему приходилось заниматься с такими, как Козлов, Гордесев. Опасность безвозвратно потерять все человеческое, по его словам, возрастала.

В середине 60-х годов Артамонова назначили консультантом РУМО по Советским Вооруженным Силам. Его функция состояла в том, чтобы, читая советские газеты, пользоваться информацией, которую давали ему американцы, анализировать положение в Венгрии-Морском Флоте СССР, готовить доклады начальству и читать лекции на эти темы для офицеров американских ВМС.

Он был довольно обеспеченным человеком, прежде всего на счет Евы (их незаконно сочлели браком, несмотря на то, что он не был разведен со своей женой, живущей в СССР), которая занималась зубобрачебной практикой. Деть у Шадрина их не было.

О жене и сыне он ничего не знал. Только один раз — в сентябре 1965 года — ему удалось через американскую туристку передать родственнице в Ленинград (направить ее в жила Артамонов болелся),

30 декабря 1975 года

В 15 часов 30 минут консульское управление МИД СССР посетил заведующий консульским отделом посольства США в Москве, советник Клиффорд Гросс, который передал записку следующего содержания: «Как стало известно, Николас Джордж Шадрин, являющийся в настоящее время гражданином США, встретился 18 декабря в Вене с двумя советскими официальными лицами... Он снова встретился с ними 20 декабря в Вене, но после этой встречи не вернулся и с этого дня пропал без вести...»

Н. А. ОРЛОВ:

— Я не знаю, в какой степени американцы подозревали Артамонова и когда недоверие к нему стало у них преобладать в оценке «двойной агента». В последнее время его персонифицило чувство благодарности к нам за то, что ему оказали определенное доверие, что вертели у него была перспектива возвращения домой и появилась обоснованная надежда на пересмотр его сурового приговора. Несколько неосторожных фраз, свидетельствующих об изменении психологического состояния Шадрина-Артамонова, — и спецнасти, окружавшие его, могли заподозрить, что «двойной агент» американских спецслужб попал под наше влияние. Мы предвидели такую опасность и предупреждали его об этом. Но я не уверен, что он смог справиться с собой и до конца следовать нашим советам. Возможно, Артамонов допустил какую-нибудь трагическую ошибку оплошность после 18 декабря, и ЦРУ, узнав о его предположении возвращении на Родину, пошло, что игра проиграна, что это скандальный провал, и постеснялось убрать Артамонова, а чтобы замести следы — обвинило в этом другую сторону. Мне не хотелось бы думать о худшем, но, зная методы ЦРУ, мне трудно предположить, что его держат в заключении: слишком опасно для них...

На что рассчитывали американцы, направляли Артамонова на встречу с нами? Ведь они прекрасно понимали, что никакой информации о Советском Союзе во время этих встреч Артамонов не получит. Зачем же вели они эту игру? Во первых, в расчете на дезинформацию, которую, как они полагали, удастся через Артамонова направить нам. Во вторых, на то, что, войдя в наше доверие, Артамонов (хоть и через длительный период времени, но все же вынужден возможности делать какие-то выводы о «работе советской контрразведки». И, в третьих, Артамонов поддерживал у своих хозяев иллюзию, что со временем мы, возможно, вернем ему встречу с советским «поселком» на территории США.

В этой сложной ситуации Артамонов действовал с немалым риском для себя, прекрасно понимая, что при первой же его оплошности американские спецслужбы расправятся с ним. Напряженность и постоянная опасность, в которой он находился, давали о себе знать. В последние годы все больше чувствовалось, что Артамонов устал. Часто говорил о тоске по Родине и семье, вспоминал о службе на флоте.

Когда осенью 1975 года мы узнали, что Артамонов сможет приехать в Австрию, мы условились с ним о встрече в Вене для того, чтобы обговорить вопросы возвращения на Родину. Встречу назначили возле собора Вотивкирхе. Это место находится как раз напротив американского консульства. Артамонов, как он предупредил нас, оставил американцев с

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В 15 часов 30 минут консульское управление МИД СССР посетил заведующий консульским отделом посольства США в Москве, советник Клиффорд Гросс, который передал записку следующего содержания: «Как стало известно, Николас Джордж Шадрин, являющийся в настоящее время гражданином США, встретился 18 декабря в Вене с двумя советскими официальными лицами... Он снова встретился с ними 20 декабря в Вене, но после этой встречи не вернулся и с этого дня пропал без вести...»

Н. А. ОРЛОВ:

— Я не знаю, в какой степени американцы подозревали Артамонова и когда недоверие к нему стало у них преобладать в оценке «двойной агента».

В последнее время его персонифицило чувство благодарности к нам за то, что ему оказали определенное доверие, что вертели у него была перспектива возвращения домой и появилась обоснованная надежда на пересмотр его сурового приговора. Несколько неосторожных фраз, свидетельствующих об изменении психологического состояния Шадрина-Артамонова, — и спецнасти, окружавшие его, могли заподозрить, что «двойной агент» американских спецслужб попал под наше влияние. Мы предвидели такую опасность и предупреждали его об этом. Но я не уверен, что он смог справиться с собой и до конца следовать нашим советам. Возможно, Артамонов допустил какую-нибудь трагическую ошибку оплошность после 18 декабря, и ЦРУ, узнав о его предположении возвращении на Родину, пошло, что игра проиграна, что это скандальный провал, и постеснялось убрать Артамонова, а чтобы замести следы — обвинило в этом другую сторону. Мне не хотелось бы думать о худшем, но, зная методы ЦРУ, мне трудно предположить, что его держат в заключении: слишком опасно для них...

ОТ АВТОРА:

Я не знал Артамонова, поэтому пытался изложить эту историю таким образом, чтобы, по возможности, исключить авторскую субъективность, свести до минимума пересказ «своими словами» трагической судьбы этого человека. В Комитете государственной безопасности меня ознакомили с документами, относящимися к этому делу. Много часов я провел в беседах с Игорем Александровичем Орловым, который сейчас находится в Москве, слушаю его рассказ, но, на мой взгляд, самая существенная часть которого приводится в этом очерке.

Одико в заключении мне хотелось бы подсластить и читателями некоторы-

Так, при подготовке материала, могла бы оказаться информация против Шадрина-Артамонова, которая, по замыслам ее авторов, должна была походить спецслужбам США не только наивно-субъективна, но и банально приобрити. Конечно, это трудно предположить, и вряд ли кто-нибудь, кроме очень узкой группы лиц в американских спецслужбах, может подтвердить его достоверность. Но логика событий невозможно заставляет верить: это было так, или приблизительно так.

Есть тому и косвенные доказательства:

— американские власти в течение 18 месяцев не предавали огласке события, связанных с Шадриным-Артамоновым. А ведь любая возможность раздуть антисоветскую кампанию, особенно в целях шпионажа, всегда используется в США на полную мощность. Государственный департамент США даже выразил сожаление по поводу того, что не удалось избежать публикации материалов по делу Шадрина, несмотря на все принятые им меры;

— Еве Гуре, которую американские спецслужбы вывели из Вены сразу же после 20 декабря 1975 года, было «рекомендовано» никому не рассказывать об исчезновении Шадрина. В американскую прессу эти сведения попали совсем недавно благодаря деятельности адвоката Евы Гуре;

— и наконец, американские спецслужбы давно пребывают в финансовом и интеллектуальном упадке, представляющих для них такую-либо угрозу, причем не только политических противников, но и собственных слуг, которые почему-либо стали неудобными. В эту логическую цепь вмешивается дело Артамонова — разве не известно миру и самим американцам, что ЦРУ и другие спецслужбы США не раз вводили в заблуждение собственную администрацию, не говоря уже о конгрессе? Расследования деятельности ЦРУ, которые проводила не так давно сенатская комиссия Черча, проиллюстрировали это довольно четко.

И последнее, Артамонов совершил самый тяжкий грех перед Родиной — предательство, хотя позже, судя по всему, пытался найти выход из своего положения. Никто никогда не лишил его советского гражданства. От того, что конгресс США обвинил «Николаса Джорджа Шадрина» американским гражданином, Артамонов не перестал быть гражданином СССР. В Советской стране находится его жена и сын. Влесте с ними мы вправе требовать съезда от американских властей: где находится Николай Федорович Артамонов и что с ним стало?

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— Судя по еде, господин Шадрин.
— Мне совершенно необходимо встретиться с кем-нибудь из ваших товарищей и поговорить... прошу вас... Я советский гражданин... — человек был явно возбужден.
— Зовите в советское консульство. Занятые телефонистки.

— Нет, нет, в консульство я не могу... Дело в том, что моя настоящая фамилия Пинский Федорович Артамонов. Вы, наверное, слышали обо мне.
— Пинский Федорович Артамонов? Нет... не признаю.

— Неважно, кажется, был удивлен, услышав этот ответ.

— Я был офицером на флоте, то есть, — на советском флоте. Ушел в Швецию... в 1959 году. Поинтересуетесь? Попробуйте там политическое убеждение. И с тех пор — здесь... Мне нужно поговорить с вашими товарищами... рассказать, как это все случилось... В Ленинграде у меня жена, сын... Прошу вас...
— Хорошо, я сразу в консульство о вашей просьбе. Как вас развезать?
— Я живу здесь недалеко, в Вашингтоне... но покончить мне нельзя.
— Вы не хотите зайти в консульство, вам позволено нельзя, как же вас найти?
— Каждую субботу с пяти вечера до пяти часов или минут и в течение месяца буду ждать банкет человека возле магазина Хехт на бульваре Уилсона, у автомобильной стоянки. Запомните?

— Ну, предположим, запомню. — Встал плечами работник консульства, не исключительный возможности провокации. — Но я ничего не могу обещать вам.

— Я понимаю, но только передайте просьбу, — глаза человека смотрели растерянно, почти моляще.
— Пожалуйста, передайте... Я действительно не могу решить...
Через день, в понедельник, советское консульство в Вашингтоне запросило из Москвы данные об Артамонове Николае Федоровиче, бывший, как он утверждает, советском морском офицере, бегущим в 1959 году в Швецию и получившем там политическое убеждение. Консульство также просило прислать фотографию Артамонова.

ГДЫНЯ, июнь 1959 года

(Из свидетельских показаний Павла Ильи Александровича, 1984 года рождения, проживающего Воронежской области, Грязского, образование 7 классов)
«...Накануне 3го раиша Артамонова Николая Федоровича я знаю с марта 1956 года. С сентября 1958 года наш корабль находился на выполнении задания в поль-

стике и я на том, что Артамонов заблудился и попал в Швецию случайно. Я сказал, что мы пошли на рыбалку и заблудились, так как гроза повлияла на работу компаса. Переводчик ехидно засмеялся и заявил, что не может быть, чтобы гроза могла повлиять на работу компаса... Он взял со стола газету и перевел мне приблизительно следующее: «Советский офицер бросил свою страну и бежал в Швецию». На снимке был изображен наш катер. Я сказала переводчику: «Почему ваши газеты врут, минут исправду?» Он заявил мне: «А может быть, это правда».

...В конце допроса переводчик спросил, не желаю ли я остаться в Швеции. Я заявил, что я советский человек, родился на советской земле и буду жить там, а в Швеции мне делать нечего...

Поскольку на допросе мне несколько раз намекали на то, что Артамонов остается в Швеции, я попросил разрешения повидаться с ним. После допроса меня повели вниз — к камере Артамонова. Разговаривать с ним наедине мне не разрешили.

Артамонов спросил меня: «Ну что, Попов, зачем пришел?» Я сказал, что говорю по телефону с представителем советского консульства, и они приедут в Кальмар к 8 часам вечера. Я думал, что Артамонов обрадуется этому сообщению, однако он, опустив голову, сказал мне: «Зачем мне, Попов, теперь консульство, меня ожидает вот...» При этом он показывал рукой на стену камеры и сразу же руку убрал. Я понял это так, что его ожидает «стенка», то есть расстрел. Сказав Артамонову, что в шведской газете написано, будто он остается в Швеции, я спросил его, правильно ли это. Он опустил голову и ничего не ответил...
Я понял, что со мной ему не о чем говорить. Я спросил Артамонова, что передать начальству после возвращения. Он подумал и сказал: «Передай, что, как только меня отпустят, я вернусь»...

...В воскресенье, 14 июня 1959 года, самолетом прибыл в Москву...

СТОКГОЛЬМ, июнь 1959 года

(Из газет «Далне вкостер» и «Стокгольме тиднинген»)

«...Сообщают, что любовь, вспыхнувшая между 33-летним офицером Красного флота и красивой 22-летней темноволосой девушкой, привела к побегу из Гдыни в воскресенье вечером. Через сутки, в понедельник, около 21 часа они прибыли на Эланд и высадились в южной части острова. Офицер и девушка попросили политического убеждения. По заявлению прорурера, советский офицер, несмотря на

переход за границу и просивший встречи с представителем советского консульства. Но калымто при этом он не мог прийти в консульство и не хотел, чтобы кто-нибудь из советских консульских работников звонил ему домой. Однако существо дела не менялось — к советскому консульству обращался советский гражданин. Поэтому просьбу Артамонова нельзя было оставить без внимания. И через субботу к нему пришел в установленное место представитель советского консульства в Вашингтоне.

«...Наша встреча длилась около получаса. Артамонов заявил мне, что его побег в Швецию был совершен в состоянии полупьяного угара. Увлеченные женщиной, привели его к тяжелейшей ошибке, в которой он теперь глубоко раскаивается. Никаких других серьезных мотивов для побега у него не было. Артамонов сказал, что это совершившее им преступление привело к другому преступлению — для того, чтобы поддерживать свое существование за границей, он согласился сотрудничать с американской разведкой и рассказал ее представителям многое из того, что знал о состоянии Советского Военно-Морского Флота. Он одал себе отчет, что эти преступления заслуживают сурового наказания. Сказал, что все эти годы мысль о предательстве, совершенном против своего народа, против своей семьи, своих близких и друзей, не давала ему покоя. А последнее время она просто не дает ему жить. Сейчас, по его словам, у него появилась возможность, как он считает, принести пользу Родине и тем самым, хотя бы в малой степени, искупить свою тяжелую вину.

На мой вопрос, как он собирается это сделать, Артамонов ответил, что работает сейчас консультантом РУМО* и может сообщить нам некоторые сведения, необходимые Советскому Союзу для обеспечения его безопасности.

В заключение беседы я сказал ему, что доложу в консульстве о содержании нашего разговора. Он поблагодарил и спросил: «Как вы думаете — есть надежда?» «Надежда на что?» — в свою очередь спросил я. «На то, что смогу принести пользу?» Я ответил, что ничего не могу ему на это сказать. Артамонов назвал место, где он будет каждую неделю по пятницам с 17.00 до 17.15 в течение двух месяцев гулять, ожидая встречи с представителем консульства...

СОТРУДНИК КОНСУЛЬСТВА СССР В ВАШИНГТОНЕ...

Через две недели в условленное место на встречу с Артамоновым пришел совет-

* Разведклетчатное учреждение министерства обороны США.

ми он не придет. Он уверовал в свою исключительность. Это совало угарным увлечением. Емю Турой, которая обливала ему, что беременна от него. К побегу он практически не готовился. Для него это был неожиданный, так ему казалось, легкий, сулящий интересные приключения выход из неприятной ситуации личного порядка. Даже шведская контрразведка была не в состоянии понять, что заставило такого человека, как Артамонов, оставить родину, дом, службу и без языка и денег бежать в чужую страну. Шведы даже подозревали, что Артамонов является заброшенным в их страну советским разведчиком.

Все это никак не умаляло преступления, совершеного представителем Артамоновым, но делало виновного осознаннее. Предполагать, что оно было совершено не злобным, долго маскировавшимся врагом Советской власти, а излишне самоуверенным, тщеславным человеком, находившимся в состоянии увлеченности женщиной и прежде всего самим собой.

Но человек, начавший предавать, не мог остановиться. Артамонов согласился сотрудничать с американской разведкой. Его преступление усугублялось. Он наткнулся на маломной плоскости, однако его поиски контактов с советскими людьми мог говорить о том, что где-то в глубине его души еще сохранялось человеческое зерно, которое на каком-то этапе снова давало побег и сделало нравственные муки невыносимыми для него. И он, возможно, решил искупить хотя бы часть своей вины.

Нередно люди, оказавшись по собственной воле заброшенными в капиталистический мир, лишённые уз с родиной, начинают хотеть и пытаются осознать, какая страшная ошибка совершена ими, и всеми силами стараются вернуть себе право служить родине. Некоторые благодарны даже за одну только возможность исподобиться. Это слово звучит странно в устах предателя, но именно его Артамонов не раз употреблял потом в беседах со мной, рассказывая о своих злоключениях на чужбине.

Такова была одна из целей нашей разведки. Одновременно и носитель в мду и другой вариант. Артамонов-Шадрин живет нам. На самом деле он не чувствует никакого раскаяния, а по заданию своих коллег пытается стать так называемым «двойным агентом» для проведения «игры» с нами.

Как ни покажется на первый взгляд странным, но обе версии, о которых мы думали, соглашаясь на контакт с Артамоновым, оказались реальными. На первой же встрече со мной Артамонов рассказал, что искал контактов с советскими людьми по заданию своих американских коллег для проведения «игры» с нами, но что это задание совпало с его искренним желанием хотя бы частично искупить свою вину перед Родиной.

Согласился, что ситуация была не совсем обычной. На поразмыслив и обсудив ее со всех сторон, мы решили контакты с Артамоновым продолжать. Практически мы при этом ничем не рисковали, даже если его задержание и осужденности были чистой провокацией. Никаких сведений, которые оказались бы полезными противнику, он, естественно, получить от нас не мог. Польза же от таких контактов в случае если Артамонов был хотя бы исполнителю искренен, могла оказаться немалой. Во всем этом предстояло разобраться.

НАЯ ЖИЗНЬ

17 августа 1977 г. ЛИТЕРАТУРНАЯ ГАЗЕТА № 33

Так начались мои регулярные встречи с Артамоновым. Вскоре на беседе с ним нам стали известны подробности его жизни за рубежом.

В июле 1959 года, то есть даже через месяц после побоя, и Артамонову предложили американцы и предложили сотрудничать с американской разведкой. За это ему гарантировали переезд в США, финансовую помощь и в дальнейшем постоянную работу. Он согласился. В сентябре его увезли в ФРГ и месяц держали под Франкфуртом-на-Майне в небольшом особняке, принадлежавшем американской разведке. Проверили физическое и психическое состояние, вели идеологическую обработку. Беседы с ним вел предатель Бродский, работавший до войны в Ленинграде и ушедший к гитлеровцам.

Затем Артамонову доставили в США (уже под именем Николая Джорджа Шадрина), поместили в Александрию под Вашингтоном и там начали планомерно и кропотливо вытаскивать из него информацию о наших Вооруженных Силах. Я не спрашивал его, что он рассказывал американцам. Не имело смысла спрашивать. Мы просто считали, что он им открыл все, что знает, а знания — старшего офицера

что он «жив, здоров и скучает по семье».

Вот на фоне всего этого Артамонов, как он рассказывал, все больше и больше склонялся к мысли о необходимости искать выход из условий, в которые он сам себя поставил. Ну, а решение прийти к нам, как ни странно, облегчили сами американцы, дав задание искать контактов с нами.

ИЗ ЗАЯВЛЕНИЯ Н. Ф. АРТАМОНОВА В ВЕРХОВНЫЙ СОВЕТ СССР

«...Годы, истечение с момента совершения тяжчайшего преступления, послужили мне тяжелым уроком... Сознательным, закоренелым врагом Родины я никогда не был. В то же время необходимо полностью признать всю тяжесть преступления и его результаты, ничем не отличающихся от действий настоящих врагов СССР. Никим образом не освобождая себя от ответственности за совершенное, прошу дать возможность искупить свою вину, если я смогу, как-то помочь моей Родине, и затем вернуться домой...»

И. А. ОРЛОВ:

— Это заявление Артамонов передатил мне в одну из наших встреч. Возвращение на Родину, по словам Артамонова, было его мечтой. Он понимал, что если американцы узнают об этом, он погибнет.

этой встрече в известность. Возможно, нас фотографировали. Ни его, ни меня это, понятно, не смущало.

ВЕНА,

18 декабря 1975 года

Орлов и Артамонов встретились возле громадного здания собора, как и было условлено, ровно в восемь вечера.

Артамонов, несмотря на довольно холодную погоду, был без шапки — Орлов вообще никогда не видел его в головном уборе, — без каше, пальто, однако, аккуратно застегнуто на все пуговицы.

Он улыбанулся с радостным облегчением и, подойдя к Орлову, не удержался, обнял его:

— Вырвался я все-таки.. Как и боялся, что мы не встретимся!

Пройдя через площадь, они вошли в одну из улиц, миновали несколько кварталов, свернув в то направление, то налево, и, наконец, остановились у ожидавшей их легковой машины. Их никто не «вел». Покрытые снегом улицы были пустыни. Сев в машину, они сделали несколько контрольных маневров, чтобы отсечь возможный «хвост», и отправились в то место города, где должен был состояться разговор.

«...Артамонов жаловался на усталость. Перенесенная тяжёлая операция тоже даёт о себе знать. Говорил, что его тяготит работа на американскую разведку. Напомнил еще раз о своем заявлении в адрес Верховного Совета СССР. Очень остро поставил вопрос о возвращении на Родину. Я сказал, что решение этого вопроса близится и концы и я, очевидно, смогу сообщить ему об официальном разрешении на одной из наших последующих встреч. Артамонов продолжал торопиться. Я ответил, что постараюсь сделать все возможное. Мы договорились о встрече 20 декабря.

И. ОРЛОВ»

ВЕНА,

20 декабря 1975 года

«...Артамонов не вышел в назначенное время на встречу в условленном месте 20 декабря с.г.

И. ОРЛОВ»

И. А. ОРЛОВ:

— Не было от него сигнала и в последующие дни. Мы уже решили разыскать и использовать наши возможности, но 30 декабря в МИД пришло уведомление из посольства США в Москве...

МОСКВА,

30 декабря 1975 года

ми собственными размышлениями, которые не требуют специальных знаний, а требуют лишь логики.

У меня, как и у Орлова, нет сомнений в том, что «исчезновение» Шадрина-Артамонова — дело рук Центрального разведывательного управления США. Вряд ли это была месть ему — ЦРУ достаточно мощная организация, чтобы позволить себе пренебрежение к эмоциям. Нет, то была необходимая с точки зрения ЦРУ и единственная мера, которая могла спасти и без того малочисленную организацию от очередного скандала. Почти десять лет — начиная с осени 1966 года — ЦРУ, ФБР и РУМО докладывали высшим руководителям американской администрации (вначале — демократической, затем — республиканской) о «блестательной» операции Шадрина против советской контрразведки. И вдруг выясняется, что их «ценнейший агент» выманивает мысль вернуться на Родину. И, не дай бог, в минуту душевного порыва сделает это!

Представьте себе на миг лица руководителей ЦРУ, ФБР и РУМО при мысли, скажем, о том, что, вернувшись в СССР, Артамонов выступит на прессо-конференции, на которой расскажет о том, как все происходило на самом деле! После всех скандалов и разоблачений, которые обрушились на голову ЦРУ и ФБР в последнее время, этот новый позорный для них провал, да еще накануне президентских выборов 1976 года!

...20 декабря 1975 года Артамонов в условленное время, как сообщает американская печать, отправился из гостиницы «Бристоль», где он остановился в Вене, на встречу с Орловым (о предстоящей встрече Артамонов сразу же после предыдущей — 18 декабря, — поставил в известность, опять-таки как сообщает американская печать, своего куратора от ЦРУ). Но на встречу не явился: по пути был похищен спецгруппой ЦРУ или ФБР (уж я не знаю, какое из этих учреждений вырвалось вперед в выполнении последней миссии в отношении «двойного агента»), и американскую администрацию поставили в известность, что Шадрия, ушедший на запланированную встречу с сотрудником КГБ в Вене, «назад не вернулся» и, значит, «похищен советской разведкой».

Так, или приблизительно так, могла выразиться

У ЛОШАДЕЙ ГРЕДЯВАЮТ

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военно-морского флота, переданные прогннику, конечно, представляли для нас ощутимый вред.

Выпорошная Артамонова, его окружили шайкой предателей, которые должны были составлять огненный его козачество. Опекуну к нему был приставлен некто Николай Козлов,

Трудно поверить человеку, который совершил тяжкое преступление против своего народа, и вполне естественно, что полностью мы ему, конечно, доверить не могли. Он чувствовал наше недоверие, глубоко переживая его и старался сделать все возможное, чтобы доказать свою искренность.



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Neues von Herrn G.


Beim Staatsbesuch in Washington ging es zwischen Gastgeber Jimmy Carter und Gast Helmut Schmidt nicht nur um Militär- und Menschenrechtsfragen, sondern auch um Handelsbeziehungen besonderer Art zwischen Ost und West – um den Austausch von Spionen. Der Hintergrund: Sowjetische KGB-Agenten hatten im Dezember 1975 in Wien den amerikanischen CIA-Mitarbeiter russischer Herkunft Nicholas Shadrin in eine Falle gelockt und entführt. Durch einen Ostberliner Anwalt bot Moskau den Amerikanern einen Handel an: Ihr kriegt Shadrin zurück, wenn eure Verbündeten, die Westdeutschen, den DDR-Bürger Günter Guillaume freigeben. Kanzler Schmidt lehnte brüsk ab und ließ Regierungssprecher Bölling mitteilen: »Guillaume bleibt da, wo er ist!«



DDR-Spion
Günter Guillaume
mit Ex-SPD-
Geschäftsführer
Holger Börner
und Ex-Kanzler
Willy Brandt

Günter Guillaume war wieder einmal in den Schlagzeilen und im Gespräch: Die Amerikaner wollen ihn haben, die Sowjets, die DDR-Machthaber und natürlich die Journalisten. Wo ist er eigentlich, der DDR-Top-Agent, der sich in das Vertrauen des ehemaligen Bundeskanzlers Willy Brandt eingeschlichen hatte? Wie lebt der Meisterspion hinter Gittern? Damit das Geheimnis nicht gelüftet wird, hält die Leitung der Justizvollzugsanstalt Rheinbach ihren prominenten Gefangenen versteckt, wenn Journalisten zu Besuch kommen. Dann holt Justizoberinspektor Göbel den Häftling Guillaume aus der Anstaltsschreinerei und schließt ihn in die Zelle 173, Abteilung 4, Flügel A ein. Auch ein Architekt, der Vermessungsarbeiten im Knast nutzen wollte, um heimlich Bilder von Guillaume zu machen, kam nicht zum Schuß – dem STERN dagegen gelang es. Lesen Sie den Bericht »Rote Tulpen aus Ostberlin« auf Seite 12

stern 3



Aus technischen Gründen diesmal auf Seite 13



«In diesem Jahr mußt du mir aber wirklich den lange versprochenen Nerz schenken, Eberhard!»



Sternschnuppen

Schönster Ferienplatz von allen ist für mich nun mal das Meer. Wenn die Sonnenstrahlen prallen, läßt du alle Hüllen fallen, wie die andern ringsumher.

Seelig schließt du die Pupillen, körper- und kulturbewußt, läßt dich vorn und hinten grillen und dankst der Natur im stillen: Da gibt's keine Sinnenlust.

Abends tanzst mit dir dann wieder einer, der dich niemals sah. Legt man dann zum Schlaf sich nieder, sagt er: Jetzt kenn' ich dich wieder, ohne was - vom FKK!

Carola Mohn




Urlaub am Meer

Ein Autofahrer erreicht die Côte d'Azur und wird von einem Streifenwagen gestoppt: «Sie fahren ohne Rücklicht!» «Was?» fragt der Autofahrer, stürzt aus dem Wagen, geht nach hinten und bricht n Tränen aus. «So schlimm ist das doch auch wieder nicht», meint der Polizist verwirrt. «Für Sie nicht», schluchzt der Autofahrer, «aber für mich bedeutet das den Verlust eines Campingwagens, meiner Frau und meiner drei Kinder.»

Am Strand tropft etwas Eis aus der Tüte eines kleinen Jungen direkt auf den dicken Bauch eines schlafenden Kurgastes. Der schreckt auf: «Junge, Junge, die Möwe muß aus Alaska gekommen sein!»

Ein Ehepaar macht Urlaub an der Nordsee. Fragt er: «Freust du dich gar nicht, laß ich so gut tauchen gelernt habe?» Wozu? Du tauchst ja immer wieder auf!»

Playgirl der Woche



«Für die Nordsee hätte ich vielleicht doch was Wärmerees einpacken sollen!»

Fragen Sie Frau Olga


Nach dreizehn Jahren Norderney, bekennt Herr G., zur Zeit dort Gast, sind mir das blöde Einerlei am Strande und der Zwang verhaßt, den Kindern Burgen aufzufüttern. Frau Olgas Ratschlag: Fremde stürmen.

Corinna K. sucht Rat aus Haaren: Das Strandhotel am Mittelmeer, wo wir vor Jahren schon mal waren, steht jetzt fast zu zwei Dritteln leer. Der Dreck vertreibt die Strandurlaubser. Frau Olga hofft, die Bar ist sauber.


Wenn ich mir einmal denk', jetzt schwimmste mal wieder raus zum Zeitvertreib, befürchtet Kuno gleich das Schlimmste und hetzt mir Retter auf den Leib! schreibt Lieselotte W. in Schwand. Frau Olga: Zieh'n Sie sie an Land!

um c
von Agenten geht,
ist Günter Guillaume
im Gespräch. Der
STERN enthüllt, wie
der Kanzler-Spion
unter Gittern lebt, was
er über seine Agen-
tentätigkeit bei Ex-
Kanzler Willy Brandt
denkt, warum er gern
Bundestagsabge-
ordneter geworden
wäre und weshalb er
von der Bonner
DDR-Vertretung
umsorgt wird

ROTE Tulpen aus Ostberlin



Holger in der Straf-
zugsanstalt Rheinsbach
in Bonn. Kanzler-Spion
Günter Guillaume (Pfeil) ist
einer von 500 Häftlingen




Willy Brandt ist viel zu gutmütig für die Politik

Der Agent mit Rut und Willy Brandt 1973 beim Spaziergang im Bonner Kottenforst. Noch heute hält Guillaume große Stücke auf den Kanzler, der ihm vertraute und der seinetwegen zurücktrat. Aber er bereut nichts: »Es hat mich belastet, aber nicht gehemmt oder verunsichert«.




Ihr seid nur die Opfer des Systems

Seinen Rheinbacher Mitgefangenen kommt der DDR-Mann Guillaume gern politisch, doch nur wenige Knastbrüder wollen etwas mit dem Prominenten vom Ministerium für Staatssicherheit zu tun haben



20. Wenn wir
 die im Westen
 wird der meiste
 Kofas für die Sonne
 Prominenten
 Günstig
 Nächstes
 drei Meter
 erhaben
 Wäsche
 durch
 mit
 stehen
 Komme
 Bild
 linke
 das
 treue



stern 07

Ein Bericht von ***

Es muß nicht immer Kaviar sein, doch manchmal gelüftet es den Gefangenen nach ungarischer Salami, oder es mangelt an Oliven für den selbstgemachten Wodka-Martini. Dann gibt er eine diesbezügliche Bestellung auf. Sein Wunsch wird zum Befehl und unverzüglich ausgeführt: Vor dem flaggengeschmückten Gebäude der „Vertretung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik“ in Bonn-Bad Godesberg wirft sich ein Diplomat, meist der 2. Sekretär Martin Schumann, in sein Dienstfahrzeug und steuert durch den zähflüssigen Hauptstadtverkehr ein Spezialitäten-Geschäft in der Godesberger Innenstadt an. Mit einem Päckchen in der Hand verläßt der Einkäufer den Laden. Über die Autobahn Koblenz/Trier setzt er seine Reise fort, nimmt die Abfahrt Meckenheim, fährt über eine Landstraße und stellt seinen Wagen schließlich vor dem größten Gebäude des Eifelstädtchens Rheinbach ab, vor der Strafvollzugsanstalt.

Am Haupteingang übergibt der diplomatische Delikatessen-Lieferant im Auftrage der Regierung der DDR sein Päckchen einem bundesdeutschen Justizwachtmeister. Der reicht es zum alsbaldigen Verzehr an den Endverbraucher weiter, an den Mann in der Einzelzelle 173, Abteilung 4, Flügel A. Türschild: Guillaume, Günter, geboren am 1. 2. 1927 in Berlin.

Der Spion, im Dezember 1975 in Düsseldorf wegen „besonders schweren Landesverrates“ zu 13 Jahren Freiheitsstrafe verurteilt, hat sich — gelernt ist gelernt — seiner ungewohnten Umgebung perfekt angepaßt. Ein struppiger Vollbart verunziert heute das früher stets naßbrasierte Gesicht. Statt Maßanzug und Weste umgibt ein blauer An-

staltsanzug seine um zwölf Kilo schlanker gewordene Figur. FAZ-Leser Günter Guillaume spricht Ganovenjargon und tauscht mit den neuen „Kollegen“ Wildwestromane und Pornohefte aus. Neben seinem Radio stehen jedoch auch Bände linientreuer DDR-Literatur.



Seine Zelle ist zwei mal drei Meter groß. Links neben der Tür steht das offene Spülklosett, daneben hängen Waschbecken und Spiegel. Auf einem kleinen Arbeitstisch steht ein Tauchsieder, mit dem sich der Zelleninsasse allmorgendlich russischen Tee bereitet. Mit Rücksicht auf sein Gallenleiden muß er nicht den im Gefängnisjargon „Negerschnaps“ genannten Anstaltskaffee trinken. Er bekommt auch nicht „Affenfett“ (Margarine) und „Fensterkitt“ (Streichkäse), sondern Markenbutter und Weißbrot. Schon bei kleinsten körperlichen Beschwerden wird er sofort in einem Pkw der Anstalt zu einem Medizinprofessor nach Bonn gefahren. So ist das, wenn man Meisterspion war.


Frühstück gibt's um sechs, um sieben rückt der Gefangene Guillaume zur Arbeit in die Anstaltsschreinerei aus. Aus den Nachbarzellen treten von links ein Mörder und von rechts ein Einbrecher. Der Meisteragent a. D. arbeitet an der sogenannten Zwillingssäge als Handlanger für seine fachlich besser beschlagenen Mitgefangenen Hans und Manfred. Günter Guillaume ist auch für die Entfernung der Sägespäne verantwortlich. Für seine Dienste werden ihm pro Tag 4,88 Mark gutgeschrieben. Die Erzeugnisse der Anstaltsschreinerei, meist Büromöbel, werden pikanterweise auch an Bonner Ministerien und an das Kanzleramt geliefert.

Nach Feierabend, um 15.45 Uhr, darf der Hilfsarbeiter

Der Schreibtätler tischliert heute Büromöbel

In der Gefängnis-schreinerei von Rheinbach ist der Meisteragent wieder nur Handlanger. Er steht an der Zwillingssäge, darf seinen Mitgefangenen die Bretter zureichen und muß um 15.45 Uhr, kurz vor Feierabend, die Späne kehren — für 4,88 Mark den Tag






Guillaume zu einem Mithäftling:

**Wir leben hier
doch wie
die Ratten.**


In seiner Rheinbacher Zelle Nr. 173 im 4. Stock des Flügel A (Pfeil) tröstet sich der Spion mit scharfen Sachen – mit ungarischer Salami, Schnaps vom Schwarzbrenner und schnuckeligen Pornos. Er rechnet fest damit, Anfang 1979 ausgetauscht zu werden



**Stolz a
seinen
Vater**

Regelmäßig
Pierre G
seinem
Berlin-R
und brin
Godesb
mit, wer
Vater im
besucht

si



nensam mit den 47 anderen Leuten aus der Schreier zur Freistunde auf einen vier Gefängnishöfe hinastreten. Einmal in der Woche nimmt er am Handball teil, „wegen der schönen Luft“. Einmal in der Woche sieht er sich von 18.15 Uhr bis 21.50 Uhr das Fernsehprogramm im Gemeinschaftsraum an. Und an jedem Donnerstag geht er in die Gruppe des Anstaltslehrers, um klassische Musik zu hören. Aber Freunde hat er im Knast nicht gefunden. Zu ihm halten nur die mitgefangenen Rademacher, Kunkel und der Jugoslawe Dusan Lukic, wegen eines Eigenmisdeliktes zu vierereinhalb Jahren Haft verdonnert.

Abwechslung in den eintönigen Gefangenenalltag bringt ihm der Ausflug, den Guillaume alle sechs Wochen macht, wenn er seine Frau Christel der Justizvollzugsanstalt Jln-Ossendorf besuchen darf. Aus Sicherheitsgründen wird er auch hierhin in einem Bus der Anstalt und nicht in der „Grünen Minna“ chauffiert. Ganz fürsorgender Ehegatte bringt Günter Guillaume seiner Christel stets Tabak und Kaffee mit.

Guillaume, in der DDR als Verdienter Kundschafter des Volkes“ gefeiert, ist auf dem Höhepunkt seiner Karriere angekommen. Auf den ersten Blick ist er einer von 500 Häftlingen — darunter 77 Leinwandlängliche — in der Strafvollzugsanstalt Rheinbach.

Doch seine Auftraggeber haben ihn nicht im Stich gelassen. Die Regierung der DDR, das Ministerium für Staatssicherheit, sorgt dafür, daß es ihm besser geht als den anderen Mitgefangenen. Mindestens einmal im Monat bekommt Günter Guillaume Besuch von Martin Humann, dem Abgesandten der DDR-Vertretung in Bonn, oder einem Mitglied seiner

„großen Familie“, wie er sagt. Dem Besucher teilt er seine Genußmittelwünsche mit. Und er wird prompt beliefert, sei es mit Salami und Oliven oder mit teuren Tabakwaren und gelben Arbeitshandschuhen. Die Aufmerksamkeiten werden ihm von der Anstaltsleitung diskret nach dem sogenannten Einschluß am Abend zugestellt, damit die anderen Häftlinge nichts davon merken.

Denn die Lebensmittellieferungen verstoßen strenggenommen gegen die Strafvollzugsordnung, wonach Gefangene nur zum Geburtstag, zu Ostern und zu Weihnachten derartige Liebesgaben erhalten dürfen. „Eure politischen Gefangenen“, so beschied Guillaume einen aufmerksam gewordenen Zellennachbarn, „haben in der DDR dieselben Rechte wie ich hier. Das ist ein stillschweigendes Abkommen zwischen den Regierungen.“

Besonders nett zeigte sich Guillaume „große Familie“ am 1. Mai dieses Jahres. Am „Tag der Arbeit“ ließ ihm die DDR-Vertretung einen Strauß von 15 roten Tulpen zukommen.

An diesem Feiertag lud „der Spion, der aus der Kälte kam“, wie Guillaume von seinen Knast-Kollegen genannt wird, ein paar Mithäftlinge zu einer kleinen Feier ein. Es gab selbstgebrannten Schnaps (als Experte hat sich der Mitgefangene Harry Mängel hervorgetan), der in einer der Zellen mit Hilfe eines Tauchsieders destilliert worden war, dazu auf Speck gebratene Spiegeleier, fünf Stück für jeden, und ein paar dicke Zigarren. Um halb vier nachmittags war Günter Guillaume so betrunken, daß er kaum noch aufrecht in seine eigene Zelle zurückgehen konnte.

Am nächsten Tag rief der stellvertretende Dienstaufsichtsleiter, der Amtsinspektor Pesch, den „Oberst der

Wegen der schönen Luft zum Handball

Der Handballer Guillaume macht beim Sportball mit. Er genießt das schöne Wetter auf der Bank in einem der vier Gefängnishöfe der Strafvollzugsanstalt Rheinbach. Nach dem Handballspiel können sich auch die Mitgefangenen erschöpfen.

tern



Nationalen Volksarmee“ zu sich und fragte freundlich: „Na, Herr Guillaume, trinken Sie häufiger soviel Schnaps wie gestern?“ Der Mann aus Zelle 173 wurde mit Ermahnungen, aber ohne Disziplinarstrafe entlassen. „Der Günter, der trinkt jede Woche mindestens einen Liter Selbstgebrannten“, weiß ein Mithäftling zu berichten, „der hat Geld genug, um das zu bezahlen.“

»Auf Ulbricht lasse ich nichts kommen. Das war ein guter Kerl«

Kein Wunder, als DDR-Oberst („Ich muß nur vor einem General strammstehen“) hat Guillaume seit Jahren ein gutes Einkommen: etwa 2300 bis 2500 Mark monatlich, ein Betrag, der in den Jahren seiner Agententätigkeit in der Bundesrepublik zu einer ansehnlichen Summe angewachsen ist. Mit 400 Mark pro Monat unterstützt er seinen Sohn Pierre, der als Volontär beim Ostberliner SED-Zentralorgan „Neues Deutschland“ ein karges Salär bezieht. Guillaume junior, 20 Jahre alt, hat seinen Vater bereits ein paarmal in Rheinbach besucht. Die Gespräche zwischen Vater und Sohn werden jedesmal von Justizoberinspektor Göbel überwacht, den Guillaume in sein Herz geschlossen hat. „Ich könnte keinen besseren Beamten dabei haben, denn er geht oft mal raus, um zu telefonieren.“

Nach den Besuchen des Sohnes erzählte Vater Guillaume: „Er ist stolz darauf, einen so berühmten Vater zu haben. Früher wurde unsere Familie in der DDR geschliffen, weil die Leute drüben glaubten, ich sei republikflüchtig gewesen. Nun wird mein Sohn überall eingeladen. Er war sogar als Ehrengast beim Stadtsowjet in Kiew.“

Der Mann, der Willy Brandts Sturz als Kanzler auf dem Gewissen hat, ist nicht nur stolz auf seinen Sohn, er ist auch stolz auf sich und auf seine Agentenarbeit in der Bundesrepublik. Während der täglichen Freistunde auf dem Gefängnishof, bei geselligen Gelegenheiten in den Gemein-

schaftsräumen, am Arbeitsplatz und bei privaten Feiern in den Zellen, oft vom Alkohol besonders gesprächig gemacht, plaudert er Ansichten und Einsichten aus seinem Doppelleben als DDR-Spion und Kanzlerreferent in Bonn aus.

Guillaume über den früheren DDR-Staatsratsvorsitzenden Walter Ulbricht; „Auf Walter Ulbricht lasse ich nichts kommen. Das war ein guter Kerl. Der hat es richtig gemeint, der hat es richtig gemacht.“

Gefangener X*: „Was hat der Ulbricht denn richtig gemacht?“

Guillaume: „Der hat den Staat drüben gefestigt, der hat konsequent den Klassengegner liquidiert.“

Gefangener Y: „Was ist das denn, ein Klassengegner?“

Guillaume: „Das ist einer, der die Dinge wieder rückwärts drehen will, der seinen Besitz wieder haben und die alten Verhältnisse wieder herstellen will. Und so einer muß eben liquidiert werden.“

Bei einer anderen Gelegenheit kam es zu diesem Dialog:

„Hör mal, Günter, das ist zwar unwahrscheinlich, aber mich würde mal interessieren, was du machen würdest, falls wir uns mal später zufällig in der Ostzone treffen?“

Guillaume: „Euch bewirten natürlich, euch zeigen, wie schön es da ist.“

Gefangener Y: „Oder würdest du uns an die Wand stellen lassen?“

„Guillaume: „Na hör mal, hältst du mich für so primitiv?“

Guillaume über den Staatsratsvorsitzenden Erich Honecker: „Geschwärmt habe ich immer für seine Frau Margot. Ich selbst kenne ich noch als FDJ-Führer. Diese Berufsjugendlichen könnte ich noch nie leiden.“

Guillaume auf die Frage eines Häftlings, ob er während seiner Spionagetätigkeit im Bundeskanzleramt „in den Osten gefunkt“ habe: „Quatsch. Das hat der Verfassungsschutz auch gedacht. Bei mir sind keine Funkgeräte gefunden worden, weil ich nämlich keine hatte.“

Guillaume: „Belastet schon — aber nicht geheimer oder verunsichert.“

Gefangener X: „Aber der Willy Brandt soll doch später sehr darunter gelitten haben,

daß du sein Vertrauer mißbraucht hast.“

Gefangener Y: „Und wie ist das nun gelauten?“

Guillaume: „Das sage ich ganz offen unter euch hier, den Kontakt zu den Leuten aus der DDR, den habe ich selbst gehabt. Ich habe mich getroffen.“

Gefangener Z: „Getroffen hast du dich?“

Guillaume: „Ja, Mann! Besuch!“

Gefangener Z: „Im Amt etwa? Die haben dich im Amt besucht? Als was gaben die sich denn aus?“

Guillaume: „Na, als Besucher natürlich. Ich war der Referent des Bundeskanzlers für Karteiaufgaben. Zu mir konnten schließlich alle demokratischen Mitglieder dieses Landes kommen...“

Den westdeutschen Agentenjägern stellte Guillaume keine guten Zeugnisse aus. Er hält sie für blutige Anfänger, weil sie nie eine Agentin auf ihn angesetzt hätten. „obwohl die doch wußten, daß ich eine Schwäche für Frauen habe.“

Von einem Bonner Anwalt erfuhr Günter Guillaume in der Strafvollzugsanstalt, daß Willy Brandt noch immer „böse“ auf ihn sei. Guillaume antwortete, das beweise nur, daß Willy Brandt „zu gutmütig für die Politik“ sei. Politik sei „schließlich ein hartes Geschäft“ und man könne doch nicht dauernd nachtragend sein, „wenn man über-tölpelt worden ist“.

Im Haushaltsausschuß, sagt Guillaume, erfährt man praktisch alles

Der Gefangene X fragte ihn dazu später: „Hör mal, Günter, was mich interessieren würde, warst doch ein Freund von Willy Brandt, hat dich das alles nicht moralisch belastet?“

Guillaume: „Belastet schon — aber nicht geheimer oder verunsichert.“

Gefangener X: „Aber der Willy Brandt soll doch später sehr darunter gelitten haben,

daß du sein Vertrauer mißbraucht hast.“

Guillaume: „Er hat ja ten darunter, das ist mir klar, er ist ja ein anderer Kerl, viel zu anständig.“

Gefangener X: „Bedrückt dich das heute nicht irgendwie?“

Guillaume: „Nein, kann das nicht bedrücken, habe ja für mein Land gearbeitet.“

Gefangener X: „Mein nicht manchmal, daß du lieber der Freund von Brandt geblieben wärest statt ein DDR-Agent?“

Guillaume: „Nein, nein aber in irgendeiner Ecke ich für meine Person froh, daß alles so gekommen ist.“ Nachdenklich fügte hinzu, sein Traum sei es, eines Tages als Abgänger in den Bundesstaat zu wählen und in den Haarschuß entsandt zu werden. Dort erfahre man „praktisch alles. Man ist über verstärkte Zuwendungen an den heimischen und an Rüstfirmen informiert“.

„Ich werde Vortragsreisen machen bewundert werden“

Gefangener X: „Es wird dich besser ein Ende Schrecken als ein Schnöde Ende?“

Guillaume: „So schlimm der Schrecken ja nun. Als Agent der DDR bin ich sicher noch heute in Brandt meine Funktionen. Aber selbst der tüchtige Referent von Brandt ist nur ein Referent. Zu mir bin ich doch 'ne Nummer größer, da hab' ich den als ‚Verdienter Kundschafter des Volkes‘ und Krieg' Orden. Ich werde später Vortragsreisen machen und bewundert werden... ich jetzt halt nur durch den Tal der Haft hier. Aber werde ich doch durch mich, oder?“

Der DDR-Spion hat Hoffnung nicht aufgegeben, ausgetauscht zu werden, seiner Überzeugung ist seitens Anfang 1979. Auch heute denkt er nicht an Flucht.

Guillaume: „Nicht, soll meine Frau hier ist.“

* Die Namen der Häftlinge sind der Redaktion bekannt.

**Das Verdiente
Kundschafter des
Volkes trägt Bart**

In der DDR hat
Günter Gulläume
eine neue Methode
und sein Gehalt als
Drahtzieher in
Rüben durchmüde
den Mann zu
mit einem Anfall
erliche, zwischen
und...
Soll...
hagen und...
Voll...
...



A12
Thursday, July 11, 1977 THE WASHINGTON POST
" JULY 77

Mystery of the Defector Who Vanished in Vienna

DEFECTOR, From A1

Intelligence agency. His job there was "not important," according to his wife, although she and others referred to Artamonov/Shadrin's "brilliance." Government sources said he did not hold a sensitive position. He was a specialist on the Soviet navy, they say.

Many of his colleagues in government service attest to his reliability and loyalty to his new country. (He became an American citizen, by special act of Congress, in 1963.) Yet in the upper reaches of the intelligence establishment, persons responsible for protecting against Soviet "penetration" of American intelligence agencies—persons for whom suspicion is an instinct as strong as any other—doubts lingered about this defector.

Despite that, in 1966 the FBI turned Shadrin into a double agent, and authorized a series of contacts between him and Soviet agents in the United States, in Montreal and in Vienna. He was on a counterintelligence mission for the FBI when he disappeared in Vienna in December, 1975.

Jack Anderson, the syndicated columnist, learned of Artamonov/Shadrin's disappearance a year ago, and was preparing to write an article about it last July. He was told by a lawyer for Mrs. Shadrin and by "others." Anderson said last night, that if he published the story a man might be killed. Anderson decided not to go ahead. "There's not another reason that I'd have held up that story," he said.

The Washington Post learned of the story last month and began to make inquiries. The Post confirmed from government sources the central elements of Artamonov/Shadrin's defection and ultimate disappearance. Mrs. Shadrin and her lawyer, Richard D. Copaken of the firm of Covington and Burling, at first asked The Post not to publish a story, also on the grounds that Shadrin's life might be endangered, and because there was still some chance that he might be returned to his wife.

Copaken also said, earlier this month, that he felt time was running out in the case, and that he expected to "go public" with it soon.

Unbeknownst to The Post, Copaken took the story to The Wall Street Journal, apparently because he feared that The Post would portray Aramo-

suspensions were difficult to formulate in concrete terms, and they had to be weighed against the enormous interest in Artamonov's knowledge about the Soviet navy which—sources said—fairly erupted from within the American intelligence community as soon as he defected.

"We didn't know much of anything about the Soviet navy then," one source said.

Approach by the KGB

In any case, by no means every American official who interviewed Artamonov shared suspicions about him. Many accepted his defection at face value, as is demonstrated by the decision to put him to work inside the DIA, whatever the sensitivity of his post there.

In the summer of 1966, Mrs. Shadrin said yesterday, two agents of the Soviet Committee for State Security, the KGB, approached Artamonov-Shadrin in Washington. Though he had changed his name, she said, he did not change his appearance. She didn't know how the KGB found him here.

The KGB agents asked him to spy for his motherland. Mrs. Shadrin said that he reported this approach to the FBI, which asked him to accept the KGB's proposition. In other words, the FBI proposed that he become a double agent, feeding doctored "intelligence" back to his Soviet contacts.

Other government sources confirmed that the FBI turned Artamonov/Shadrin into a "double."

Mrs. Shadrin's lawyer, Copaken, said he had been told by government officials that Artamonov/Shadrin agreed to work as a double without pay—he volunteered his services. But this was only after one of his superiors at the DIA told Artamonov/Shadrin that he ought to accept the FBI's proposition, Copaken said. He was originally reluctant, because he had been told he had been sentenced to death in absentia in the U.S.S.R., the lawyer said.

According to Copaken, Artamonov/Shadrin went on missions for the FBI to Montreal in 1971 and Vienna in 1972. In the Austrian capital, the lawyer said, the KGB gave him training in the use of various secret spy-

and loyalty to his new country. (He is a member of the CIA.) In the upper reaches of the intelligence establishment, persons responsible for protecting against Soviet "penetration" of American intelligence agencies—persons for whom suspicion is an instinct as strong as any other—doubts lingered about this defector.

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Unbeknownst to The Post, Copaken took the story to The Wall Street Journal, apparently because he feared that The Post would portray Artamonov/Shadrin as a voluntary re-defector in its account of the affair. The Wall Street Journal prepared an article reportedly for publication today.

A Final Suggestion

Then, yesterday afternoon, a State Department official telephoned Copaken to say that a final suggestion he had made for a possible approach to the Soviets aimed at eliciting at least an acknowledgement that they hold Shadrin might be attempted. Previously Copaken held out little hope that this idea would be taken up by the Carter administration. He called it a long-shot, but declined to describe it.

The Central Intelligence Agency, FBI, Defense Department and White House all declined to comment on the case.

But Mrs. Shadrin said she thought the sudden call from the State Department was a ploy to prevent publication of newspaper stories about the affair, and she was inclined to let the

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'Doctored in Langley'

In all these contacts with the KGB, Copaken said, Artamonov/Shadrin fed material "doctored in Langley" (at Central Intelligence Agency headquarters in suburban Virginia) to the Russians. The FBI regarded this operation as a way of learning more about KGB operations in the United States, Copaken said.

In 1975 the Soviets asked Artamonov/Shadrin to return to Vienna, Copaken said. Until that time the lawyer said, it was his understanding that the FBI never fully informed the CIA (or DIA) of Artamonov/Shadrin's activities as a double agent. But in 1975 the FBI did so to the CIA, according to Copaken, and the CIA objected that it was too dangerous to send a defector like Artamonov/Shadrin to Vienna.

Copaken—who has been working on the case for nearly 18 months and says he has talked to—

FBI, Defense Department and White House declined to comment on the case.

But Mrs. Shadrin said she thought the sudden call from the State Department was a ploy to prevent publication of newspaper stories about the affair, and she was inclined to let the papers go ahead. "It was the end of the road," she said last night. "I decided that the only way to go was through the press."

Mrs. Shadrin says she believes the United States has not done what it could have or should have to try to get her husband back. Her lawyer accuses the government—primarily the Ford administration, but the Carter administration too—of a series of "blunders."

The State Department told The Post that publication of a story now would jeopardize the chances of "our present actions" to help Shadrin, but refused to describe those actions. The Post decided to print the story.

In a more formal statement last night State Department spokesman Hodding Carter III said: "We are not abandoning him [Artamonov/Shadrin] but we are not making every effort to determine his fate and get him back. We don't know if he's alive, and are operating on the assumption that he is."

By Mrs. Shadrin's account, this tale from out of the cold begins in 1958, when a handsome young Soviet naval officer—Artamonov, then 30—came to Poland on an assignment to help his comrades in the Polish navy train sailors from Indonesia. She met him then and they fell in love. They spent eight months together in Poland.

Escape in a Launch

As captain of a destroyer, Artamonov had a 22-foot launch for his personal use, according to Mrs. Shadrin. The two of them decided to use the launch to defect, she said yesterday. "He did it mostly for me," she explained. They took the launch from Poland across the Baltic to Sweden, where they defected. The Swedes turned them over to the United States, which took them both to a "safe house" on the outskirts of Frankfurt, Mrs. Shadrin recounted.

Several sources from the intelligence community said this was all possible, but also somewhat suspicious. One source noted that Mrs. Shadrin placed telephone calls freely to her family right after she arrived in Sweden, "and this wasn't normal in those days, to get right through on the telephone." A serious grounds for suspicion? Yesterday Mrs. Shadrin readily admitted those telephone calls. She laughed at the significance attributed to them by the intelligence community sources.

Sources said government records show that questions were raised by officials who questioned him in Frankfurt about the legitimacy of Artamonov's defection. But—as always—these

activities as a double agent. But in 1975 the FBI decided to go to the CIA, according to Copaken, and the CIA objected that it was too dangerous to send a defector like Artamonov/Shadrin to Vienna.

Copaken—who has been working on the case for nearly 18 months and says he has talked to countless government officials about it—says this is what happened next:

The FBI and CIA argued about how to deal with the Soviet request to Artamonov/Shadrin to come to Vienna. They compromised on this formula: the CIA would prepare phony "intelligence" for him to pass to the Soviets, and would provide an agent to "run" the operation. But it was regarded as an FBI operation, and the CIA station in Vienna would have nothing to do with it.

That agreed, Mr. and Mrs. Shadrin went to Vienna and checked into the Hotel Bristol. On Dec. 18, Artamonov/Shadrin went, as he had been instructed, to the steps of the Votivkirche, a Catholic cathedral on the Ringstrasse in Vienna. There he met a man who invited him into a car, where a second man waited. The trio then drove to a fish restaurant on the outskirts of Vienna. When the meeting ended, the Soviets asked him to return to the same meeting place two days later. They also told him he had been given the rank of lieutenant colonel in the KGB.

No Surveillance

The FBI had insisted that there be no surveillance of Artamonov/Shadrin's contacts with the KGB in Vienna, for fear that the Soviets might spot surveillance and realize he was a double. The FBI didn't realize (this is still Copaken's version) that the U.S. consulate was located on the 7th floor in an office building in clear view of the steps of the Votivkirche—so photo surveillance would have been simple. But there wasn't any, according to the lawyer.

The evening of Dec. 20 Artamonov/Shadrin left his wife in the Bristol and took a cab to the church. No American official of any kind has seen him since.

Still, according to Copaken, a profoundly mysterious aspect of the tale occurred at this point. By late evening Mrs. Shadrin got nervous, and she began to call the CIA agent "running" the operation. The agent was supposed to be in a safe house in Vienna, but wasn't. The agent, according to Copaken, was at a dinner party. (Copaken says he later had a chance to "interrogate" this agent, and that he will "go to my grave" baffled by the agent's role.)

Even the dinner party story didn't entirely explain the agent's absence, Copaken says, because the party ended at midnight at the latest, and Mrs. Shadrin, who was by then calling

See DEFECTOR, A13 Col. 5

Mystery of the Defector: Double Agent Is Gone

DEFECTOR, From A12

repeatedly, didn't make contact until 1:55 a.m.

In any case, Artamonov/Shadrin was gone.

But not without a trace. Artamonov/Shadrin had been debriefed by his CIA control agent after his first meeting on Dec. 18. He named the two KGB agents he had met: Oleg A. Kozlov, who had once served in the Soviet embassy in Washington, and Mikhail I. Kuryshv, once stationed in the Soviet embassy in Vienna.

The United States, through diplomatic channels, queried Moscow, first about Shadrin, then about Artamonov, then about these two KGB agents. The Soviets said they knew nothing about Artamonov/Shadrin, and that the two named agents weren't in Vienna at the time of the disappearance.

Dobrynin's New Story

In early January, 1976, Henry A. Kissinger raised the issue with Anatoly F. Dobrynin, the Soviet ambassador in Washington, according to Copaken, and Dobrynin repeated these denials. On Feb. 7, Assistant Secretary of State Arthur A. Hartman told a Soviet diplomat, "We have a spy case here." A statement Copaken takes as an official U.S. admission that Artamonov/Shadrin was a U.S. agent. On Feb. 16, according to Copaken, Kissinger returned to the question with Dobrynin.

This time, according to the lawyer, Dobrynin had a new story: yes, we met the man in Vienna on Dec. 18, and he said he wanted to return to the Soviet Union. But we never saw him again.

A Basic Problem

Copaken charges that Kissinger opposed any strong action on Shadrin's behalf, while Attorney General Edward H. Levi and CIA Director George Bush favored strong action. The argument, Copaken says he be-

lieves, involved a basic problem: was it more important to help an agent in trouble, or to maintain friendly relations with the Soviets?

Copaken charges that Kissinger indirectly sabotaged one negotiation by authorizing information that came from it to be repeated to the Soviet government through official diplomatic channels. When this happened, a negotiator informed Copaken that he had lost his "mandate," the lawyer says.

Copaken tried other channels. He asked Chester Cooper, a former government official, and Cooper in turn asked Stanley Karnow, a columnist and former foreign correspondent for the Post, to help arrange a meeting with Victor Louis, a KGB operative who acts as a "journalist" in Moscow, and whom Karnow knew.

Copaken and Karnow met Louis in Helsinki, but nothing came of it. Recently in Moscow, according to Copaken, Louis told an American diplomat that he received "an embarrassed silence" when he asked in Moscow about the Artamonov/Shadrin case.

Copaken says he is sure—largely because of what Vogel told him—that Artamonov/Shadrin is alive in Russia.

Copaken is also certain that Kissinger or his associate, William Hyland at the National Security Council, and their colleagues did less than they could have for his client's husband. Copaken urges the United States repeatedly to use cases like the defection of a MIG-25 pilot in Japan or the espionage charge against a Soviet news agency reporter in Tokyo to pressure the Soviets to at least grant U.S. access to Artamonov/Shadrin. Nothing ever happened.

What makes Copaken certain that the man did not return to the U.S.S.R. voluntarily? A lot of circumstantial evidence, he says, plus the fact that the Soviets haven't allowed any American to see him, nor have they trumpeted publicly his intelligence coup, if that's what it was. No, Copaken insists, his man is an involuntary captive.

Or else—Deighton or Le Carre might add—he was one of the best spies ever to make it back in out of the cold.

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EASTERN EDITION

THURSDAY, JULY 14, 1977

Out in the Cold?

U.S. Fears Counterspy Was Seized by Soviets; Agency Bungling Seen

Friends of Russian Defector, Missing in Vienna, Say He Wasn't Safeguarded

Political Problem for Carter?

By JERRY LANDAUER

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

On the evening of Dec. 20, 1975, an American working undercover for the Federal Bureau of Investigation walked to the steps of the Votivkirche in Vienna for a prearranged meeting at the cathedral with Oleg Kozlov and Mikhail Kuryshnev, two agents for the KGB, the Soviet secret police. It was his last stroll on free soil. He has never been seen since.

The disappearance of the American, Nicholas Shadrin, hasn't been publicized or even publicly acknowledged. The Russians won't concede that he was kidnapped—though the U.S. believes he was—especially not from the capital of a neutral nation. And U.S. officials aren't anxious to disclose the bureaucratic bungling that preceded his disappearance and the diplomatic blunders that may be keeping him in captivity.

But Mr. Shadrin's fate could become a prickly political issue soon. Whether for good reason or not, his many admirers in the U.S. intelligence community fear that he is being abandoned by the U.S. — even though the State Department insists it is going its best to get Mr. Shadrin released, if he is still alive.

Now, some of Mr. Shadrin's friends are beginning to speak up about what they feel are the government's half-hearted efforts to retrieve him, and details are seeping out. They raise troublesome questions — especially for an administration espousing human rights for foreigners — about the government's obligation to Americans who risk their lives for the U.S.

Appeal by President Ford

President Ford did appeal for Mr. Shadrin's release in a private letter last December to Soviet party leader Leonid Brezhnev, and before leaving office Mr. Ford met with Mr. Shadrin's wife, Blanka, at the White House. But for reasons of global diplomacy, the Ford administration decided not to make a major push for Mr. Shadrin's return.

In January, outgoing Central Intelligence Agency Director George Bush briefed Jimmy Carter about the Shadrin case, and now National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski is taking charge of it. He doesn't sound particularly hopeful. "I fully sympathize with your frustration and anxiety,"

What's News

14 July 1977

Business and Finance

MAJOR STEELMAKERS' possible price fixing on hot-rolled items, used in making cars, appliances and other consumer products, is being investigated by the Justice Department's Antitrust Division. About 10 firms received requests for data on price increases made from Jan. 1, 1974, up to last Thursday.

(Story on Page 3)

New-car sales in the U.S. increased 15% in early July to 192,805 units, continuing the strong rate of deliveries in recent months.

(Story on Page 2)

General Electric's profit in the second period increased 14% to a record \$271.9 million on a 12% sales rise to a record \$4.33 billion.

(Story on Page 7)

Budget director Lance is confident his personal financial difficulties in divesting his bank stock won't force him to resign.

(Story on Page 22)

Tax sections of Carter's energy bill, including levies on gas-guzzling cars and domestically produced oil, cleared the House Ways and Means panel.

(Story on Page 2)

Talks on future oil pricing actions took on a moderate tone as members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries ended their meeting.

(Story on Page 4)

U.K. units of Texaco and Gulf Oil plan to build a 65,000-barrel-a-day catalytic cracking unit and related refinery facilities in Wales.

(Story on Page 4)

The Amex will make markets in four call options starting Monday—three now are traded primarily on the Chicago board and the fourth is on the Pacific exchange—and plans to add three others.

(Story on Page 5)

Control Data reported a 26% rise in second quarter consolidated

World-Wide

A POWER FAILURE blacked out much of the New York City area.

The blackout that affected the five boroughs and much of the suburbs was apparently caused by electrical storms that damaged power lines north of the city. A spokesman for Con Edison, the utility involved, declined to rule out a problem in the transmission system, however. Initial reports said two power plants were affected: Ravenswood No. 3, an oil-fired facility located in Queens, and Indian Point No. 3, a nuclear plant now owned by the power authority of New York State.

After the Northeast power failure in the fall of 1965, utility officials said it was practically impossible for a recurrence because of improvements instituted after that massive blackout.

The utility began to lose power shortly after 9 p.m. and, despite a series of emergency measures, by 9:34 p.m. the area was blacked out. All commuter trains and subways were halted and evacuation proceedings were under way. Parkways, bridges, theaters and sports arenas were also darkened. Area hospitals were forced to cease operations as well, and the city's main airports closed down. Mayor Beame declared a state of emergency and ordered police and fire personnel on duty.

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
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Staff Reporter of
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meeting at the cathedral with Oleg Kozlov and Mikhail Kurys. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/23 : CIA-RDP89B00307R000300180001-2

The disappearance of the American, Nicholas Shadrin, hasn't been publicized or even publicly acknowledged. The Russians won't concede that he was kidnapped—though the U.S. believes he was—especially not from the capital of a neutral nation. And U.S. officials aren't anxious to disclose the bureaucratic bungling that preceded his disappearance and the diplomatic blunders that may be keeping him in captivity.

But Mr. Shadrin's fate could become a prickly political issue soon. Whether for good reason or not, his many admirers in the U.S. intelligence community fear that he is being abandoned by the U.S.—even though the State Department insists it is doing its best to get Mr. Shadrin released, if he is still alive.

Now, some of Mr. Shadrin's friends are beginning to speak up about what they feel are the government's half-hearted efforts to retrieve him, and details are seeping out. They raise troublesome questions—especially for an administration espousing human rights for foreigners—about the government's obligation to Americans who risk their lives for the U.S.

Appeal by President Ford
President Ford did appeal for Mr. Shadrin's release in a private letter last December to Soviet party leader Leonid Brezhnev, and before leaving office Mr. Ford met with Mr. Shadrin's wife, Blanka, at the White House. But for reasons of global diplomacy, the Ford administration decided not to make a major push for Mr. Shadrin's return.

In January, outgoing Central Intelligence Agency Director George Bush briefed Jimmy Carter about the Shadrin case, and now National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski is taking charge of it. He doesn't sound particularly hopeful. "I fully sympathize with your frustration and anxiety," Mr. Brzezinski told Mrs. Shadrin in a letter dated July 5. "I only wish I could strike a more positive note and offer you immediate reassurance."

As all this high-level attention attests, Nicholas Shadrin wasn't just an ordinary spy. He was a captain in the Soviet navy who fled to the U.S. in 1959. He brought along "a great amount of good, hard intelligence about Soviet military developments," says retired Navy Capt. Thomas L. Dwyer, who coordinated the months-long interrogation of defector Shadrin.

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At the CIA's request, Sen. James Eastland, chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee and a conservative Mississippi Democrat, helped to get through Congress special legislation conferring U.S. citizenship on the one-time Communist Party member. In the House, the Committee on Un-American Activities eagerly put him on the witness stand to denounce Soviet expansionism abroad and repression at home; he testified under his given name, Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov (he chose to use the name Shadrin after his defection).

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The Fateful Mission
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second period increased 14% to a record \$271.9 million on a 12% sales rise to a record \$4.33 billion.

(Story on Page 7)

Budget director Lance is confident his personal financial difficulties in divesting his bank stock won't force him to resign.

(Story on Page 22)

Tax sections of Carter's energy bill, including levies on gas-guzzling cars and domestically produced oil, cleared the House Ways and Means panel.

(Story on Page 2)

Talks on future oil pricing actions took on a moderate tone as members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries ended their meeting.

(Story on Page 6)

U.K. units of Texaco and Gulf Oil plan to build a 65,000-barrel-a-day catalytic cracking unit and related refinery facilities in Wales.

(Story on Page 4)

The Amex will make markets in four call options starting Monday—three now are traded primarily on the Chicago board and the fourth is on the Pacific exchange—and plans to add three others.

(Story on Page 5)

Control Data reported a 26% rise in second quarter consolidated net earnings to \$14.6 million.

(Story on Page 4)

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Food Is That Ec For Shc New York For M They're

By Jc

Staff Reporter of NEW YORK- Fred Sipper's wife says it's prob wood or one of "They're always dark-haired good- Sure, Fred, s your peanut butte But show-biz They want plas maybe even real thing necessary t or an outdoor ca They come to Fre Food Center in m Is the biggest sup around here.

"We provide 9 shot in New York cials," the 43-year Take the Arnold was shot in an t setting. The fancy and shelving were. So was the cateri episode of the so Ditto for the foods in Woody Allen's 2 The Bloomingdale "Fred is the B ness," says Norm of F.B.A., an ind mericals. "He gets special dog dishes

Indeed, Mr. Sip Easter candy in July and phony st black eyes. For s came up with w mops that broke leaned on them.

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"He did great Stewart, the film Stewart plans to for the coming "There'll be scen whipped-cream p where he'll come says.

Mr. Sipper's that he has provi moment's notice s cripts, he has c scenes on a day's a cake decorate Mildred" to a soa was ordered. Suc ness of TV film \$1,000 a minute.

"He understa that's crucial in o Fuhrman, a free- Instant Italian C

"Once I had s to go on camera' to an outdoor Ita Cunningham, a s era "As the Wor and told him I n worth of cheeses other stuff for su to make the shot

A number of asked to provide the TV kiddie sho recalls, "They h the green tops s contacted had g tops. Finally, I pany and had the Conversely, J "New York food "I get calls from brands, such as dairy items, tha To save c

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Mr. Shadrin became edgy, however, perhaps because the Russians said he soon would be promoted to colonel in the KGB and he knew the KGB commonly awards such promotions to marked men as a way of making them feel trusted. So after a CIA officer had debriefed him, next to a running shower in Suite 361 of the Bristol Hotel in Vienna, he told Mrs. Shadrin the names of agents Kozlov and Kuryshev and asked her to write them down. "Something apparently was said or inferred which made him concerned," she recalls.

The acting CIA station chief in Vienna had canceled all leaves and had planned to keep Mr. Shadrin under protective surveillance. "We could have put people on the street or in autos," he says. But the Russian-speaking CIA officer sent from Washington to supervise the mission says the planned surveillance was canceled at the

Please Turn to Page 29, Column 1

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(Story on Page 13)

Markets—

Stocks: Volume 23,160,000 shares. Dow Jones Industrials 902.99, off 0.42; transportation 236.07, off 0.34; utilities 117.65, up 0.22. Bonds: Dow Jones 20 bonds 92.74, up 0.08. Commodities: Dow Jones futures 353.38, up 5.69; spot index 377.63, up 4.75.

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Quebec's separatist government proposed an amended bill requiring widespread use of French that left unchanged controversial sections curtailing public education in English. Requirements for businesses were loosened slightly. A filibuster is planned by the opposition.

San Quentin inmates were confined to their cells under close watch following the worst violence in six years at the California prison. Three prisoners died and four were injured in a racially sparked series of clashes in which knives and clubs were used.

Lawyers for two nurses convicted of poisoning patients at an Ann Harbor, Mich., veterans hospital said they will appeal. The jury, which deliberated for nearly 94 hours, dropped a murder charge, but the two Filipino women face possible life sentences on the poisoning counts.

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14 July 77

Mystery of the Disappearing Agent

By Robert G. Kaiser
Washington Post Staff Writer

A Soviet navy captain who defected to the United States in 1959 and was turned into a double agent by the FBI in 1960 disappeared in Vienna 18 months ago when he was supposed to be meeting Soviet intelligence agents.

The man who disappeared had defected under the name Nikolai F. Artamonov. In the early 1960s he became a consultant to the Defense Intelligence Agency with the name Nicholas G. Shadrin.

Since his disappearance the U. S. government has repeatedly asked the Soviet Union for information about Shadrin, or Artamonov, but without substantial result.

Whatever his name, his case, hitherto unreported anywhere, is a re-

markable Cold War espionage tale with a plot that might have been invented by John Le Carre or Len Deighton. Only it happened.

Shadrin's wife—Dr. Blanka Shadrin, a Polish-born dentist who defected with him in 1959 — said she believes that her husband was kidnaped by two Soviet secret police (KGB) officers on the streets of Vienna while she was waiting for him in a room in that city's elegant Hotel Bristol. The American officials who know the story of Shadrin say they generally believe that this is what happened to him, but not all are certain.

According to well-placed sources, questions were raised about Shadrin — then Artamonov — when he was first interrogated by American officials in 1959 at a reception center for

defectors in Frankfurt, West Germany. At least a few U. S. officials questioned whether he was a legitimate defector or a plant by the Soviet Union.

These doubts were soon rejected, however, and Artamonov was welcomed to the United States as a genuine defector. In 1960 he testified before the House Committee on Un-American Activities, warning that the Soviet Union had a secret plan to launch a surprise nuclear attack against the United States.

Then, after changing his name to Shadrin (though doing nothing to change his physical appearance, according to his wife), he went to work as a "consultant" to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Pentagon's

See DEFECTOR, A12, Col. 1



NIKOLAI F. ARTAMONOV
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Washington Post
14 July 1977

Has Mysteriously Disappeared

By David Espo
Associated Press

A Russian navy captain who became a Cold War defector to the United States disappeared 18 months ago while on a spy mission in Vienna.

A lawyer says he believes Nicholas Shadrin is in a Soviet military prison, despite official and private efforts to arrange his release through a spy trade.

The lawyer, Richard Copaken, said last night he has held five meetings in West Berlin since he was asked by Shadrin's wife to become involved in the case. He didn't identify the participants.

In addition Copaken said that two U.S. secretaries of state have discussed the case with Russian diplomats and that President Gerald R. Ford wrote a letter on the subject late last year to Soviet President Leonid I. Brezhnev.

THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION also has become involved in Shadrin's case. But Copaken said the Ford and Carter administrations are guilty of "serious blunders and missed opportunities." He called his disclosure of Shadrin's plight a "cry of desperation."

Copaken said Shadrin, a destroyer commander in the Russian navy, defected to the United States in June 1959, at least in part because he wanted to marry a Polish woman but was forbidden to do so under Soviet law. The woman defected with him, and they were married after arriving in this country.

The lawyer said Shadrin began providing intelligence information to U.S. agencies after his defection and eventually went to work for the government in an intelligence position.

But in 1966 Shadrin was approached by two agents from the KGB, the Soviet secret police, and was asked to spy for his homeland. Instead, Copaken said, Shadrin went to the FBI and was persuaded to become a double agent, feeding doctored intelligence information to the Russians under the guidance of FBI agents.

SO SECRET WAS his new life, Copaken said, that Shadrin kept it from his wife.

He continued his double-agent role for nine years, until he was sent to Vienna in December 1975 and arranged a meeting with KGB agents there. After one such session he disappeared, and Copaken said he believes Shadrin was taken to a military prison in Russia.

The lawyer said Henry Kissinger, then secretary of state, discussed the disappearance with Anatoly Dobrynin, the Soviet ambassador, but that the Russians had no information to provide.

The Washington lawyer, hired shortly afterward by Mrs. Shadrin, established a private line of communications and held the three meetings in West Berlin last year, he said.

"THERE WAS a cardinal rule laid down in this private channel for plausible deniability" that would enable the Russians to deny that the talks were being held, the lawyer said.

Nevertheless, Copaken said when he suggested that Shadrin be released in exchange for Soviet spy Sarkis Paskalian, the Russians refused the offer.

Instead, he said they hinted broadly that the release of Gunther Guillaume would satisfy them. Guillaume is a Communist spy whose presence at the top level of the West German government led to the downfall of Chancellor Willy Brandt.

Copaken said his negotiations collapsed, however, because a top U.S. official brought up the matter again with the Russians in violation of the ground rules established for the private negotiations.

The Washington Star

Thursday, July 14, 1977

The lawyer said he managed to discuss Shadrin's case with Ford at a White House reception in May 1976. Ford indicated he was well-briefed on the subject, Copaken said.

HE SAID HE suggested that Ford write a letter to Brezhnev about the spy. "I was told there was a very big internal debate within the administration," Copaken said, with Kissinger among aides who opposed the move.

"Eventually the decision was made not to provide the letter," the attorney said.

But months later, after losing the election but before he left office, Ford met with Mrs. Shadrin and finally agreed to send Brezhnev a letter.

Although Copaken said he did not see what Ford wrote, he believed that "by calculation it did not take a hard line that the man had been kidnaped. It was a non-accusatory approach."

Copaken said, "I was informed that the essence of the letter was an appeal to Brezhnev . . . for reuniting this man with his wife."

The Soviets provided no positive response, Copaken said.

AFTER CARTER took office, Copaken said, Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance approached Dobrynin on the subject.

At the same time, "There was a successful effort to reopen the private channel in Berlin. The other side indicated three individuals" it was interested in exchanging for Shadrin, the lawyer said.

Among them was Jorge Montes, the head of the Chilean Communist party, then imprisoned in Chile, Copaken said.

Copaken said he urged Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter's national security assistant, to approach the Chilean government.

But "I couldn't get the Carter administration to move on it at a high level fast enough," Copaken said, and Montes was released in another prisoner exchange.

The Washington Post

THURSDAY, JULY 14, 1977

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Then, after changing his name to Shadrin (though doing nothing to change his physical appearance, according to his wife) he went to work

as a "consultant" to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Pentagon's intelligence agency. His job there was "not important," according to his wife, although she and others referred to Artamonov/Shadrin's "brilliance." Government sources said he did not hold a sensitive position. He was a specialist on the Soviet navy, they say.

Many of his colleagues in government service attest to his reliability and loyalty to his new country. (He became an American citizen, by special act of Congress, in 1965.) Yet in the upper reaches of the intelligence establishment, persons responsible for protecting against Soviet "penetration" of American intelligence agencies—persons for whom suspicion is

an instinct as strong as any other—doubts lingered about this defector.

Despite that, in 1966 the FBI turned Shadrin into a double agent, and authorized a series of contacts between him and Soviet agents in the United States, in Montreal and in Vienna. He was on a counterintelligence mission for the FBI when he disappeared in Vienna in December, 1975.

Jack Anderson, the syndicated columnist, learned of Artamonov/Shadrin's disappearance a year ago, and was preparing to write an article about it last July. He was told by a lawyer for Mrs. Shadrin and by "others," Anderson said last night, that if he published the story a man might be killed. Anderson decided not

See DEFECTOR, A12, Col. 1.

Mystery of the Defector Who Vanished in Vienna

DEFECTOR, From A1

to go ahead. "There's not another reason that I'd have held up that story," he said.

The Washington Post learned of the story last month and began to make inquiries. The Post confirmed from government sources the central elements of Artamonov/Shadrin's defection and ultimate disappearance. Mrs. Shadrin and her lawyer, Richard D. Copaken of the firm of Covington and Burling, at first asked The Post not to publish a story, also on the grounds that Shadrin's life might be endangered, and because there was still some chance that he might be returned to his wife.

Copaken also said, earlier this month, that he felt time was running out in the case, and that he expected to "go public" with it soon.

Unbeknownst to The Post, Copaken took the story to The Wall Street Journal, apparently because he feared that The Post would portray Artamonov/Shadrin as a voluntary re-defector in its account of the affair. The Wall Street Journal prepared an article reportedly for publication today.

A Final Suggestion

Then, yesterday afternoon, a State Department official telephoned Copaken to say that a final suggestion he had made for a possible approach to the Soviets aimed at eliciting at least an acknowledgement that they hold Shadrin might be attempted. Previously Copaken held out little hope that this idea would be taken up by the Carter administration. He called it a long-shot, but declined to describe it.

The Central Intelligence Agency, FBI, Defense Department and White House all decline to comment on the case.

But Mrs. Shadrin said she thought the sudden call from the State Department was a ploy to prevent publication of newspaper stories about the affair, and she was inclined to let the papers go ahead. "It was the end of the road," she said last night. "I decided that the only way to go was through the press."

Mrs. Shadrin says she believes the United States has not done what it could have or should have to try to get her husband back. Her lawyer accuses the government—primarily the Ford administration, but the Carter administration too—of a series of "blunders."

The State Department told The Post that publication of a story now would jeopardize the chances of "our present actions" to help Shadrin, but refused to describe those actions. The Post decided to print the story.

In a more formal statement last abandoning him [Artamonov/Shadrin] have not abandoned him, abandoning him (Artamonov/Shadrin), have not abandoned him, and we are making every effort to determine his fate and get him back. We don't know if he's alive, and are operating on the assumption that he is.

By Mrs. Shadrin's account, this tale from out of the cold begins in 1958, when a handsome young Soviet naval officer—Artamonov, then 30—came to Poland on an assignment to help his

tored "intelligence" back to his Soviet contacts.

Other government sources confirmed that the FBI turned Artamonov/Shadrin into a "double."

Mrs. Shadrin's lawyer, Copaken, said he had been told by government officials that Artamonov/Shadrin agreed to work as a double without pay—he volunteered his services. But this was only after one of his superiors at the DIA told Artamonov/Shadrin that he ought to accept the FBI's proposition, Copaken said. He was originally reluctant, because he had been told he had been sentenced to death in absentia in the U.S.S.R., the lawyer said.

According to Copaken, Artamonov/Shadrin went on missions for the FBI to Montreal in 1971 and Vienna in 1972. In the Austrian capital, the lawyer said, the KGB gave him training in the use of various secret spying devices.

'Doctored in Langley'

In all these contacts with the KGB, Copaken said, Artamonov/Shadrin fed material "doctored in Langley" (at Central Intelligence Agency headquarters in suburban Virginia) to the Russians. The FBI regarded this operation as a way of learning more about KGB operations in the United States, Copaken said.

In 1975 the Soviets asked Artamonov/Shadrin to return to Vienna, Copaken said. Until that time the lawyer said, it was his understanding that the FBI never fully informed the CIA (or DIA) of Artamonov/Shadrin's activities as a double agent. But in 1975 the FBI did go to the CIA, according to Copaken, and the CIA objected that it was too dangerous to send a defector like Artamonov/Shadrin to Vienna.

Copaken—who has been working on the case for nearly 18 months and says he has talked to countless government officials about it—says this is what happened next:

The FBI and CIA argued about how to deal with the Soviet request to Artamonov/Shadrin to come to Vienna. They compromised on this formula: the CIA would prepare phony "intelligence" for him to pass to the Soviets, and would provide an agent to "run" the operation. But it was regarded as an FBI operation, and the CIA station in Vienna would have nothing to do with it.

That agent, Mrs. Shadrin said, went to Vienna and checked into the Hotel Bristol. On Dec. 18, Artamonov/Shadrin went, as he had been instructed, to the steps of the Votivkirche, a Catholic cathedral on the Ringstrasse in Vienna. There he met a man who invited him into a car where a second man waited. The trio then drove to a fish restaurant on the outskirts of Vienna. When the meeting ended, the Soviets asked him to return to the same meeting place two days later. They also told him he had been given the rank of lieutenant colonel in the KGB.

No Surveillance

The FBI had insisted that there be

Mystery of the Defector: Double Agent Is Gone

DEFECTOR, From A12

Dobrynin had a new story: yes, we met the man in Vienna on Dec. 18, and he said he wanted to return to the Soviet Union. But we never saw him again.

Copaken came into the case in February. His first gambit was to establish a channel to Wolfgang Vogel, an East Berlin lawyer who arranged the swap of Col. Rudolph Abel, the alleged Soviet spy in America, for Francis Gary Powers, the U-2 pilot. Copaken met Vogel and asked for help.

Soon afterward Vogel indicated he had "a mandate" to talk further. He got this mandate, he subsequently explained to Copaken, only after appearing directly to Erich Honneker, the East German leader, who in turn appealed personally to Leonid I. Brezhnev, the Soviet leader. Hard to believe, Copaken acknowledges, but he insists that was Vogel's story.

Vogel, Copaken says, told him the Soviets had a problem: they couldn't admit in any open way that they might have kidnaped an American from the streets of a neutral capital (Vienna). Plausible denial was crucial, Copaken understood. Vogel also said that whatever business they did between them had to remain utterly secret, and nothing said through their personal channel could be repeated in any official communications between the United States and the Soviet Union.

A Basic Problem

Copaken charges that Kissinger opposed any strong action on Shadrin's behalf, while Attorney General Edward H. Levi and CIA Director George Bush favored strong action. The argument, Copaken says he believes, involved a basic problem: was it more important to help an agent in trouble, or to maintain friendly relations with the Soviets?

Copaken charges that Kissinger indirectly sabotaged the Vogel channel by authorizing information that came from it to be repeatedly to the Soviet government through official diplomatic channels. When this happened,

Vogel informed Copaken that he had lost his "mandate," the lawyer says.

Copaken tried other channels. He asked Chester Cooper, a former government official, and Cooper in turn asked Stanley Karnow, a columnist and former foreign correspondent for the Post, to help arrange a meeting with Victor Louis, a KGB operative who acts as a "journalist" in Moscow, and whom Karnow knew.

Copaken and Karnow met Louis in Helsinki, but nothing came of it. Recently in Moscow, according to Copaken, Louis told an American diplomat that he received "an embarrassed silence" when he asked in Moscow about the Artamonov Shadrin case.

Copaken says he is sure—largely because of what Vogel told him—that Artamonov/Shadrin is alive in Russia.

Copaken is also certain that Kissinger, his associate, William Hyland at the National Security Council, and their colleagues did less than they could have for his client's husband. Copaken urged the United States repeatedly to use cases like the defection of a MIG-25 pilot in Japan or the espionage charge against a Soviet news agency reporter in Tokyo to pressure the Soviets to at least grant U.S. access to Artamonov/Shadrin. Nothing ever happened.

What makes Copaken certain that the man did not return to the U.S.S.R. voluntarily? A lot of circumstantial evidence, he says, plus the fact that the Soviets haven't allowed any American to see him, nor have they trumpeted publicly his intelligence coup. If that's what it was. No, Copaken insists, his man is an involuntary captive.

Or else—Deighton or La Carré might add—he was one of the best spies ever to make it back in out of the cold.

14 July 1977

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Out in the Cold? U.S. Fears Counterspy Was Seized by Soviets; Agency Bungling Seen

Friends of Russian Defector, Missing in Vienna, Say He Wasn't Safeguarded

Political Problem for Carter?

By JERRY LANDAUER

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

On the evening of Dec. 20, 1975, an American working undercover for the Federal Bureau of Investigation walked to the steps of the Votivkirche in Vienna for a prearranged meeting at the cathedral with Oleg Kozlov and Mikhail Kuryshv, two agents for the KGB, the Soviet secret police. It was his last stroll on free soil. He has never been seen since.

The disappearance of the American, Nicholas Shadrin, hasn't been publicized or even publicly acknowledged. The Russians won't concede that he was kidnapped—though the U.S. believes he was—especially not from the capital of a neutral nation. And U.S. officials aren't anxious to disclose the bureaucratic bungling that preceded his disappearance and the diplomatic blunders that may be keeping him in captivity.

But Mr. Shadrin's fate could become a prickly political issue soon. Whether for good reason or not, his many admirers in the U.S. intelligence community fear that he is being abandoned by the U.S. — even though the State Department insists it is doing its best to get Mr. Shadrin released, if he is still alive.

Now, some of Mr. Shadrin's friends are beginning to speak up about what they feel are the government's half-hearted efforts to retrieve him, and details are seeping out. They raise troublesome questions — especially for an administration espousing human rights for foreigners — about the government's obligation to Americans who risk their lives for the U.S.

by President Ford
 rin's release in a private letter last Decem-
 ber to Soviet party leader Leonid Brezhnev,
 and before leaving office Mr. Ford met with
 Mr. Shadrin's wife, Blanka, at the White
 House. But for reasons of global diplomacy,
 the Ford administration decided not to make
 a major push for Mr. Shadrin's return.

In January, outgoing Central Intelligence
 Agency Director George Bush briefed
 Jimmy Carter about the Shadrin case, and
 now National Security Adviser Zbigniew
 Brzezinski is taking charge of it. He doesn't
 sound particularly hopeful. "I fully sympa-
 thize with your frustration and anxiety,"
 Mr. Brzezinski told Mrs. Shadrin in a letter
 dated July 5. "I only wish I could strike a
 more positive note and offer you immediate
 reassurance."

As all this high-level attention attests, Ni-
 cholas Shadrin wasn't just an ordinary spy.
 He was a captain in the Soviet navy who
 fled to the U.S. in 1959. He brought along "a
 great amount of good, hard intelligence
 about Soviet military developments," says
 retired Navy Capt. Thomas L. Dwyer, who
 coordinated the months-long interrogation of
 defector Shadrin.

Adds William Howe, a civilian then
 working in the Office of Naval Intelligence:
 "His information was extremely valuable.
 Our government had no doubt" that Mr.
 Shadrin wasn't a Soviet agent.

Attention in Congress

At the CIA's request, Sen. James East-
 land, chairman of the Senate Judiciary
 Committee and a conservative Mississippi
 Democrat, helped to get through Congress
 special legislation conferring U.S. citizen-
 ship on the one-time Communist Party
 member. In the House, the Committee on
 Un-American Activities eagerly put him on
 the witness stand to denounce Soviet expan-
 sionism abroad and repression at home; he
 testified under his given name, Nikolai Fe-
 dorovich Artamonov (he chose to use the
 name Shadrin after his defection).

In the early 1960s, Mr. Shadrin began
 working for the Defense Intelligence Agency
 as an analyst of Soviet naval literature ("he
 was an excellent man," a superior recalls),
 and he lectured once a year at the Naval
 War College. The Russians reacted fur-
 rously, trying and convicting him in absten-
 tia on charges of treason. His sentence was
 death.

Nevertheless, starting in 1966 or so, Mr.
 Shadrin heeded his adopted country's call to
 serve without pay as a counterintelligence
 agent acting under FBI direction. At sub-
 stantial risk, he pretended that he desired to
 return to Russia, feigned cooperation with
 the KGB, and slipped to the Russians "mil-
 itary secrets" supplied by the CIA.

Some sideline work for the FBI took him
 on missions abroad, to Canada in 1971 and to
 Europe in 1972, for example. No slip-ups oc-
 curred. "I considered him to be absolutely
 completely on our side," says
 James Weston, an FBI man who controlled
 Mr. Shadrin's counterspy activities for 10

The Fateful Mission

Then came the fateful mission to Vienna
 in December 1975. Mr. Shadrin took his wife
 along (to go skiing, he told her). An initial
 meeting with the two KGB agents on the
 night of Dec. 18 went smoothly.

Mr. Shadrin became edgy, however, per-
 haps because the Russians said he soon
 would be promoted to colonel in the KGB
 and he knew the KGB commonly awards
 such promotions to marked men as a way of
 making them feel trusted. So after a CIA of-
 ficer had debriefed him, next to a running
 shower in Suite 361 of the Bristol Hotel in Vi-
 enna, he told Mrs. Shadrin the names of
 agents Kozlov and Kuryshev and asked her
 to write them down. "Something apparently
 was said or inferred which made him con-
 cerned," she recalls.

The acting CIA station chief in Vienna
 had canceled all leaves and had planned to
 keep Mr. Shadrin under protective surveil-
 lance. "We could have put people on the
 street or in autos," he says. But the Rus-
 sian-speaking CIA officer sent from Wash-
 ington to supervise the mission says the
 planned surveillance was canceled at the

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Out in the Cold? U.S. fears Soviets Kidnapped a Counterspy in Vienna

Continued From First Page

FBI's request out of concern that, if spotted by the KGB, it might be a tip-off that Mr. Shadrin was a U.S. agent. And on the night of Dec. 20, the night Mr. Shadrin disappeared, the CIA official went to dinner at a friend's home in a Vienna suburb and didn't return to the city until after 1 a.m.

By then, Mrs. Shadrin was frantically phoning to report that her husband hadn't come back from his meeting with the KGB. She hasn't seen him since that night, and she blames a bureaucratic snafu by U.S. intelligence agencies for his disappearance.

Some intelligence experts agree. "I don't think they did right by Shadrin," says Lt. Gen. Daniel O. Graham, who retired last year as director of the Defense Department's Defense Intelligence Agency. "Quite obviously the U.S. people who were supposed to keep an eye out lost track of him. They didn't keep him under direct surveillance when they should have, or else I don't think this could have happened," Mr. Graham says.

When news of Mr. Shadrin's presumed kidnapping hit Washington, the bureaucracy scurried for cover. "There are too many agencies involved, and they're all running," William Hyland of the National Security Council told a visitor weeks afterward. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger broached the disappearance with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin; Mr. Dobrynin said his government didn't know anything about the case.

Dissatisfied, Mrs. Shadrin early last year hired Richard Copaken, a 36-year-old partner in the Washington law firm of Covington & Burling. Within a month, Mr. Copaken opened unofficial channels to Moscow through Wolfgang Vogel, an attorney in East Berlin who often acts as a secret conduit for exchanging spies or political prisoners between East and West; among other deals, he handled the celebrated exchange of Soviet spy Rudolf Abel for American U2 pilot Gary Francis Powers in the early 1960s.

To one meeting in East Berlin Mr. Copaken came armed with a CIA-supplied list of prisoners being held by U.S. friends around the world. Mr. Vogel nibbled at two, Jorge Montes, a Communist leader held by Chile, and Gunther Guillaume, whose arrest in Bonn on spy charges precipitated the fall of West German Chancellor Willy Brandt's government in 1975.

Impact on Bonn

Mr. Copaken got word to the Ford administration about a possible exchange with the Russians of Mr. Guillaume for Mr. Shadrin. But administration officials considered Mr. Guillaume too high a price to pay; they believed that even pressing Bonn to release him could trigger serious political repercussions in West Germany.

Last month the Carter administration bungled a possible Montes-Shadrin deal. Instead of a high-level request from the White House asking the Chilean government to nuke Mr. Montes available, the administration assigned the task to an acting assistant secretary of state. Chile said no. Rather than oblige the U.S., it dealt Mr. Montes for the release of 11 political prisoners in Communist East Germany.

"So far the policy of this administration is to incur no significant price to get Shadrin released," Mr. Copaken contends. "The assessment seems to be that the chances of getting him back are slim, so the White House doesn't want to waste political chips."

In the last few days, U.S. officials have assured Mrs. Shadrin that they are intensifying efforts to get her husband released. But the many months of inaction by high-level officials have made her distrustful. "I don't have any confidence in their efforts," she says.

No Bid to See Shadrin

Indeed, the U.S. government hasn't even demanded that American officials be allowed to see Mr. Shadrin in return for giving Moscow access to Soviet defectors. Last year, when Soviet air-force Lt. Viktor Belenko flew a MIG25 from the Soviet Union to Japan and then sought political asylum in

the Russians interview the defector pilot. But the U.S. hasn't sought any reciprocity or even firm assurances that Mr. Shadrin remains alive.

Last fall, another Soviet military pilot, Valentin Zaslavov, fled from the Soviet Union for Iran, also seeking ultimate asylum in the U.S. But the Iranian authorities held the pilot incommunicado, signaling a probable intention to score political points with Moscow by sending him back. Washington missed the signal and didn't make any effort to dissuade the Shah until after the Iranian government had announced its intention to return pilot Zaslavov.

On Oct. 25, 1976, the day before the scheduled return, U.S. Ambassador Richard Helms in Teheran tried to reach the Shah to determine whether the ruler might be willing to hold the Soviet pilot as possible trading bait for Mr. Shadrin. But the American ambassador didn't get through, and higher authorities in Washington didn't try.

Hodding Carter, the State Department spokesman, says "efforts will continue" to retrieve Mr. Shadrin. "We are operating on the assumption that he is still alive, but frankly we don't know," he says.

Mr. Carter says that "official representations" on behalf of Mr. Shadrin "have been carried out at various levels and have conveyed the seriousness of our concern." But he declines to describe the U.S. efforts. "We won't discuss our private communications on the public record," he says. "We don't believe this will serve the purpose of getting Mr. Shadrin back."

"Cases such as this are very sensitive and sometimes drag on a long time," Mr. Carter adds.

Who Disappeared While U.S. Spy

WASHINGTON, July 14 (AP)—A Soviet navy captain who defected to the United States in 1959 disappeared 18 months ago while on a spy mission in Vienna, it has been learned here.

A lawyer trying to win the captain's freedom says he believes that the former officer, Nicholas Shadrin, is in a Soviet military prison. Official and private efforts are reported to have been made to arrange his release through a spy trade.

The lawyer, Richard Copaken, said last night he had held five meetings in West Berlin since he was asked by Captain Shadrin's wife to become involved in the case. He did not identify the participants.

In addition, Mr. Copaken said, two United States Secretaries of State have discussed the case with Soviet diplomats and former President Gerald R. Ford wrote a letter on the subject late last year to Leonid I. Brezhnev, the Soviet leader.

Carter Administration Involved

The Carter Administration has become involved in the case, but Mr. Copaken said that both the Ford and Carter Administrations were guilty of "serious blunders and missed opportunities." He called his disclosure of Captain Shadrin's plight a "cry of desperation."

The State Department said today that Captain Shadrin was acting as a double agent for the United States when he

"We want him back," Hodding Carter 3d, a department spokesman, told reporters. "He's an American citizen whose welfare concerns us."

Mr. Carter confirmed many details wife, Blanka, "has our sympathy and ac- given by Mr. Copaken. The White House, meanwhile, said that Captain Shadrin's tive support." Jody Powell, the White House spokesman, said that the United States would "continue our best efforts" to secure information about the captain, but he refused to discuss the case further.

Mr. Copaken said that the captain, a destroyer commander in the Soviet Navy, had defected to the United States in June 1959, at least in part because he wanted to marry a Polish woman but was for- bidden to do so under Soviet law. The woman defected with him and they were married after arriving in the United States.

The lawyer said that Captain Shadrin had begun providing intelligence informa- tion to American agencies after his defec- tion and eventually went to work for the Government in an intelligence position.

IN 1966, Captain Shadrin was ap- proached by two agents of the Soviet secret police and asked to spy for his homeland, Mr. Copaken said, but instead he went to the Federal Bureau of IN- vestigation and was persuaded to become a double agent, feeding doctored intell- igence information to the Russians under the guidance of F.B.I. agents.


Mr. Copaken said that the captain kept

his new life secret even from his wife and in December 1975 was sent to Vienna, here he arranged a meeting with Soviet agents there. After one such session, he disappeared, the lawyer said and is be- lieved to have been taken to a military prison in the Soviet Union.

Mr. Copaken said that when he had suggested to the Russians in his private talks that Captain Shadrin be released in exchange for a Soviet spy named Sar- kis Zakharian, the Russians refused. In- stead, he said they hinted broadly that the release of Gunther Guillaume would satisfy them. Mr. Guillaume is a Commu- nist spy whose presence at the top-level of the West German Government led to the resignation of Chancellor Willy Brandt.

Mr. Copaken said that the negotiations were dropped, he said, because a top United States official brought up the matter with the Russians and the application of ground rules established for the private negotiations.

STAT



Brezhnev Sent Ford Word on Defector

Friday, July 15, 1977 THE WASHINGTON POST

None of these contacts produced confirmation from the Soviets that they knew the whereabouts of Nikolai F. Artamonov, alias Nicholas G. Shadrin, Shadrin's wife, a McLean, Va., dentist, believes her husband was kidnapped by Soviet KGB (secret police) agents and taken to the USSR.

Last Dec. 3 Ford sent a letter to Brezhnev asking him to take a personal interest in the case to find out where Shadrin was.

Shadrin disappeared in Vienna on Dec. 20, 1975, when he was supposed to be meeting KGB agents in a prearranged contact. At that time Shadrin had been acting as a double agent for the FBI for nine years. He defected in 1959.

Ford also assured Brezhnev that the U.S. government would not publicly comment on the case and would urge Mrs. Shadrin and her husband—if he were returned—not to comment on it. Ford indicated he would do all in his power to help Mrs. Shadrin to reunite with her husband.

On Christmas Eve Brezhnev's answer was conveyed in Washington orally by a Soviet diplomat. The Soviet leader said he had read the entire file of the case. He confirmed that the missing man had been a Soviet citizen and a naval officer. He contended that the man had approached representatives of the Soviet Union in Washington in 1966, asking to be allowed to return home.

(By Mrs. Shadrin's account, her husband was approached by KGB agents in 1936 and asked to spy for his original homeland. He reported this to the FBI, she says, and the bureau asked Shadrin to cooperate, acting as a double agent—a "flycatcher," in the jargon of the trade. Artamonov/Shadrin agreed to do so, his wife says.)

Brezhnev's message to Ford said Artamonov/Shadrin told Soviet representatives in 1968 that he had been forced to work for U.S. intelligence, and that this disturbed him, and he wanted to return home and to see his wife and child. (He had left a wife at the time of his defection; she had a child by a previous marriage, according to Mrs. Shadrin.)

Brezhnev said further that the Soviet Union had agreed to Artamonov/Shadrin's request for a meeting in Vienna in December, 1975. He repeated his desire to return home at that time, Brezhnev said, but then failed to appear for a second meeting two days after.

Mrs. Shadrin and the U.S. government believe that Artamonov/Shadrin was kidnapped on his way to that second meeting. Mrs. Shadrin and her

Present and past government officials said yesterday this charge was unfair. Several pointed to Ford's personal and forceful letter to Brezhnev, which Copaken himself has described to The Washington Post.

Copaken, the lawyer, accused former Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger of willful obstruction of efforts to help Artamonov/Shadrin. Through a spokesman, Kissinger replied yesterday that this version was "an irresponsible distortion of the facts."

"There are few cases in which the United States has so exerted itself as on this one," Kissinger said.

White House press secretary Jody Powell said yesterday that Mrs. Shadrin "has and continues to have the active support of this administration."

Copaken contends that he opened a potentially fruitful channel to the Soviets through Wolfgang Vogel, an East Berlin lawyer who arranged the 1960s' swap of Francis Gary Powers, the U-2 pilot shot down by the Soviets, for Col. Rudolph Abel, allegedly a Soviet master spy who was a U.S. prisoner at the time.

Vogel conveyed the impression that a trade might be made involving Artamonov/Shadrin and Guethar and Christel Guillaume, East German agents serving long sentences in West Germany. The discovery that Guillaume, an intimate adviser of former West German Chancellor Willy Brandt, was a spy helped push Brandt into retirement in 1974.

Vogel also told Copaken, the lawyer, said, that it had required a telephone conversation between Brezhnev and the leader of East Germany, Erich Honneker, before Vogel was authorized to discuss a possible trade with the American lawyer. Copaken says he asked Vogel if this was a sign that Artamonov/Shadrin was alive and in Soviet hands. Vogel confirmed that it was such a sign, according to Copaken.

(Like Brezhnev's, all official Soviet statements on the case have denied knowledge of Artamonov/Shadrin's whereabouts. Several sources in the American intelligence community have speculated that his return to the Soviet Union may have been voluntary—that he was a Soviet agent all along. But other government officials heatedly dispute that view.)

Copaken's relations with the East German Vogel collapsed last year after U.S. officials violated the terms of his understandings with Vogel, Copaken says.

Vogel demanded that no information that passed privately between him and Copaken be repeated in formal communications between the U.S. and Soviet governments. However, Copaken charges, Kissinger and his associate, William Hyland, both used official channels to repeat information

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that came to him from Vogel. Copaken says this may have been deliberate.

It was this that Kissinger described as an "irresponsible distortion" yesterday.

This year the Carter administration asked the West German government to press Vogel to reopen contact with Copaken, he says. Vogel agreed, and in two meetings this year reiterated interest in a trade involving the Guillaumes or Jorge Montes, a Chilean Communist in prison in Chile. These proposals have not borne fruit—because of government bungling or indifference, according to Copaken and Mrs. Shadrin—and Vogel has again broken off relations.

Mrs. Shadrin suggested in an ABC-television interview yesterday that President Carter could discuss the possibility of a trade involving the Guillaumes with West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt during his visit to Washington. She pleaded with Carter to help her husband.

"He's of no use to the United States any more," she told The Post, but she

said a President concerned about human rights should try to help her husband for "humanitarian reasons."

Mrs. Shadrin revealed yesterday that she is receiving her husband's salary from the Defense Intelligence Agency, his former employer at the time of his disappearance. She gets a biweekly check of about \$500, she said.

According to her lawyer, the fact that the government is paying her this money more than 13 months after her husband's disappearance means it is officially believed that he is still alive.

Mrs. Shadrin also revealed that the Justice Department is contributing substantially to her legal costs. Copaken, a partner in the firm of Cornington & Burling, has put hundreds of hours into the case and traveled repeatedly to Europe on her behalf.

"Artamonov/Shadrin never told his wife he was a double agent for the FBI, she said. Instead, he told her he was working secretly with some Soviets who wanted to help the United States.

Brezhnev Sent Ford

By Robert G. Kaiser
Washington Post Staff Writer

The case of the Soviet defector who disappeared in Austria 18 months ago on a counterintelligence mission for the FBI has been the subject of numerous formal and informal Soviet-American contacts, including one direct exchange between President Ford and Soviet leader Leonid I. Brezhnev.

None of these contacts produced confirmation from the Soviets that they knew the whereabouts of Nikolai F. Artamonov, alias Nicholas G. Shadrin. Shadrin's wife, a McLean, Va., dentist, believes her husband was kidnapped by Soviet KGB (secret police) agents and taken to the USSR.

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Shadrin disappeared in Vienna on Dec. 20, 1975, when he was supposed to be meeting KGB agents in a prearranged contact. At that time Shadrin had been acting as a double agent for the FBI for nine years. He defected in 1959.

Ford also assured Brezhnev that the U.S. government would not publicly comment on the case and would urge Mrs. Shadrin and her husband—if he were returned—not to comment on it. Ford indicated he would do all in his power to help Mrs. Shadrin to reunite with her husband.

On Christmas Eve Brezhnev's answer was conveyed in Washington orally by a Soviet diplomat. The Soviet leader said he had read the entire file of the case. He confirmed that the missing man had been a Soviet citizen and a naval officer. He contended that the man had approached representatives of the Soviet Union in Washington in 1966, asking to be allowed to return home.

(By Mrs. Shadrin's account, her husband was approached by KGB agents in 1966 and asked to spy for his original homeland. He reported this to the FBI, she says, and the bureau asked Shadrin to cooperate, acting as a double agent—a "flycatcher," in the jargon of the trade. Artamonov/Shadrin agreed to do so, his wife says.)

Brezhnev's message to Ford said Artamonov/Shadrin told Soviet representatives in 1966 that he had been forced to work for U.S. intelligence, and that this disturbed him, and he wanted to return home and to see his wife and child. (He had left a wife at the time of his defection; she had a child by a previous marriage, according to Mrs. Shadrin.)

Brezhnev said further that the Soviet Union had agreed to Artamonov/Shadrin's request for a meeting in Vienna in December, 1975. He repeated his desire to return home at that time. Brezhnev said, but then failed to appear for a second meeting two days after.

Mrs. Shadrin and the U.S. government believe that Artamonov/Shadrin was kidnapped on his way to that second meeting. Mrs. Shadrin and her

lawyer, Richard D. Copaken, accuse the Ford administration of trying too meekly to retrieve Artamonov/Shadrin, and of bungling many potential opportunities to help.

Present and past government officials said yesterday this charge was unfair. Several pointed to Ford's personal and forceful letter to Brezhnev, which Copaken himself has described to The Washington Post.

Copaken, the lawyer, accused former Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger of willful obstruction of efforts to help Artamonov/Shadrin. Through a spokesman, Kissinger replied yesterday that this version was "an irresponsible distortion of the facts."

"There are few cases in which the United States has so exerted itself as on this one," Kissinger said.

White House press secretary Jody Powell said yesterday that Mrs. Shadrin "has and continues to have the active support of this administration."

Copaken contends that he opened a potentially fruitful channel to the Soviets through Wolfgang Vogel, an East Berlin lawyer who arranged the 1960s' swap of Francis Gary Powers, the U-2 pilot shot down by the Soviets, for Col. Rudolph Abel, allegedly a Soviet master spy who was a U.S. prisoner at the time.

Vogel conveyed the impression that a trade might be made involving Artamonov/Shadrin and Guenther and Christel Guillaume, East German agents serving long sentences in West Germany. The discovery that Guillaume, an intimate adviser of former West German Chancellor Willy Brandt, was a spy helped push Brandt into retirement in 1974.

Vogel also told Copaken, the lawyer said, that it had required a telephone conversation between Brezhnev and the leader of East Germany, Erich Honecker, before Vogel was authorized to discuss a possible trade with the American lawyer. Copaken says he asked Vogel if this was a sign that Artamonov/Shadrin was alive and in Soviet hands. Vogel confirmed that it was such a sign, according to Copaken.

(Like Brezhnev's, all official Soviet statements on the case have denied knowledge of Artamonov/Shadrin's whereabouts. Several sources in the American intelligence community have speculated that his return to the Soviet Union may have been voluntary—that he was a Soviet agent all along. But other government officials heatedly dispute that view.)

Copaken's relations with the East German Vogel collapsed last year after U.S. officials violated the terms of his understandings with Vogel, Copaken says.

Vogel demanded that no information that passed privately between him and Copaken be repeated in formal communications between the U.S. and Soviet governments. However, Copaken charges, Kissinger and his associate, William Hyland, both used official channels to repeat information

Word on Defector

that came to him from Vogel. Copaken says this may have been deliberate.

It was this that Kissinger described as an "irresponsible distortion" yesterday.

This year the Carter administration asked the West German government to press Vogel to reopen contact with Copaken, he says. Vogel agreed, and in two meetings this year reiterated interest in a trade involving the Guillaumes or Jorge Montes, a Chilean Communist in prison in Chile. These proposals have not borne fruit—because of government bungling or indifference, according to Copaken and Mrs. Shadrin—and Vogel has again broken off relations.

Mrs. Shadrin suggested in an ABC television interview yesterday that President Carter could discuss the possibility of a trade involving the Guillaumes with West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt during his visit to Washington. She pleaded with Carter to help her husband.

"He's of no use to the United States any more," she told The Post, but she

said a President concerned about human rights should try to help her husband for "humanitarian reasons."

Mrs. Shadrin revealed yesterday that she is receiving her husband's salary from the Defense Intelligence Agency, his former employer at the time of his disappearance. She gets a biweekly check of about \$668, she said.

According to her lawyer, the fact that the government is paying her this money more than 18 months after her husband's disappearance means it is officially believed that he is still alive.

Mrs. Shadrin also revealed that the Justice Department is contributing substantially to her legal costs. Copaken, a partner in the firm of Copaken & Burling, has put hundreds of hours into the case and traveled repeatedly to Europe on her behalf.

Artamonov/Shadrin never told his wife he was a double agent for the FBI, she said. Instead, he told her he was working secretly with some Soviets who wanted to help the United States.

THE WASHINGTON POST Sunday, July 15, 1977

A Non-Fiction Spy Story With No Ending, Only Loose Ends

By Robert G. Kaiser
Washington Post Staff Writer

Something unique happened in Washington last week: officials of the government joined the relatives of a defector-spy to reveal a mass of detail about a fantastic—but genuine—spy story.

Facts already disclosed and new information hitherto unreported raise more questions than they answer, but that may simply be the difference between the neat world of spy fiction and the messy reality of actual espionage.

The case involves a man named Nikolai F. Artamonov, or Nicholas G. Shadrin, depending on when and where you knew him. His story would satisfy the appetites of any addict of spy fiction—except for one crucial shortcoming.

The spy novelists rarely leave their readers dangling; each spy tale is complete unto itself. The case of Artamonov/Shadrin, however, is anything but complete. It has no ending, only loose ends.

The introductory chapters are easy: In 1959, Artamonov, a tall, handsome and unusually young Soviet naval captain, sped across the Baltic Sea from Poland to Sweden on a small launch, carrying with him a Polish woman who became his wife. He was 30.

He asked to defect, and was interrogated by the Central Intelligence Agency. Some of those who met him then were suspicious of his motives for defection, but later, in Washington, his "bona fides" were accepted. Artamonov became Shadrin, and went to work at the Defense Intelligence Agency.

In 1966 the FBI "turned" Artamonov/Shadrin into a double agent. He had a series of encounters with Soviet secret police (KGB) agents here, in Montreal and in Vienna. During the last such encounter, on Dec. 20, 1975 in Vienna, Artamonov/Shadrin disappeared.

Now a few of the mysteries:

By Artamonov/Shadrin's own account, he was approached in Washington by KGB agents in 1963. They asked him to spy for his original homeland, he later told the FBI, to whom he immediately reported the encounter.

The FBI asked him to play along—to become a "double" agent. After some cajoling, he agreed, and told the KGB agents he would cooperate.

But how had the KGB found him in Washington? Perhaps it wasn't so difficult—he did not have a "deep" cover. More curious is Artamonov/Shadrin's original reaction to that first KGB approach. How would a defector react to such an approach? Wouldn't he tell the Soviet agents to jump in a lake? Wouldn't he be terrified of them?

Somehow, Artamonov had the instinct or inclination not to send those KGB men packing. He left open the possibility that he might work for them, and then went to the FBI. Why?

(Senior officials who have followed the case have no answer to this question, or to many others. The written record is massive, but also inadequate. That recruitment is one of many holes in the story.)

In 1972, Artamonov/Shadrin went to Vienna to meet his KGB contacts. The FBI approved the trip. The Soviet agents took him to a secret hideout in Austria for several days, giving him

training in the use of various espionage devices. He left them with a fancy new radio and other equipment, and returned to Washington.

By that time Artamonov had been "helping" the KGB for six years. He had received new training, instructions and equipment—well placed, one might think, to begin some serious spying.

But as far as the FBI ever knew, the KGB ignored Artamonov/Shadrin for nearly three years after he returned from that trip to Vienna. Artamonov/Shadrin reported no KGB contacts whatsoever until late in 1975, when the Russians asked for a meeting.

That long hiatus is baffling. But not so baffling as Artamonov/Shadrin's next move. Yes, he told the KGB, I can meet with you—how about Vienna, again? Apparently, he proposed the Austrian capital.

Perhaps this was simply an inspired gambit by a clever double agent meant to convey both trust and self-confidence to the KGB.

But was that necessary? Artamonov/Shadrin is described by his wife and her lawyer as a man who was originally reluctant to act as a double agent. Nine years later, he is depicted as a man who voluntarily embraced the enormous risks he was taking by proposing a rendezvous with Soviet intelligence in a remote capital close to the Iron Curtain and far from the American agencies that could protect him. Why?

These are mysteries that suggest something wrong with the official—and family—line that Artamonov/Shadrin was a loyal American citizen (as a result of an act of Congress) only doing his patriotic duty. But one postulates that in fact he wasn't double agent but a triple—a Soviet plant from the outset—then other aspects of the tale challenge that theory.

Artamonov/Shadrin picked a fun time to go back to the Soviet Union, that is the interpretation one would like to put on his disappearance. He had a meeting on Dec. 18 in Vienna with two KGB agents then agreed to see them again on the 20th. Why bother with the second meeting, his intention was to return to the Soviet Union anyway?

Why did he leave medicine that he needed to take on a regular basis, his Vienna hotel room? And his reading glasses? Why had he just ordered a fancy new car in Washington for delivery soon after he was scheduled to return from Austria?

If he was a triple agent, a Soviet plant, then Artamonov/Shadrin is one of the great overachievers of the Cold War—a genuine espionage hero who pulled off an unprecedented coup

(over)



United Press International

Blanka Shadrin; she insists her husband is alive in the Soviet Union.

that is the case, why haven't the Russians produced him in public, put him on television, awarded him the Order of Lenin? A coup of this sort would be a devastating victory in the war of nerves between the CIA and the KGB, but it would only be a victory if it were palpable, undisputable. Most senior CIA officials now believe that Artamonov/Shadrin was an innocent victim, not a triple agent, so if the KGB deserves credit for a coup, it isn't getting that credit.

The Soviets certainly aren't claiming any coups. In a message to then-President Ford, Leonid I. Brezhnev said last December that Artamonov/Shadrin had repeatedly asked to be allowed to return home, beginning in 1968. But, Brezhnev said, he disappeared from Soviet view, too.

Yuli Vorontsov, the smooth and clever minister in the Soviet embassy in Washington until earlier this year, raised the Artamonov/Shadrin case with a Ford Administration official several months after his disappearance. "What have you done with him?" Vorontsov asked the American. "His wife in the Soviet Union is worried about him, she wants information." (Artamonov/Shadrin did leave a wife behind when he defected.)

What was the point of this gambit? Wasn't Vorontsov being too cute?

And where is the man today? There are only theories. Many ranking American officials fear he is dead—

executed deliberately by the Soviets as a traitor, or by accident in some sort of KGB caper. Some officials wonder if he disappeared voluntarily, in despair at the difficulty of his weird life, suspended between two nations and their intelligence agencies.

His wife insists that he is alive in the Soviet Union, though the evidence of this is circumstantial and dubious. It is difficult to see how any Soviet official can now acknowledge that Artamonov/Shadrin is living in the Soviet Union, given Brezhnev's personal assurance that this is not the case.

And what should an ordinary citizen make of this episode? In the end there is little to go on. Much depends on Artamonov/Shadrin himself. What sort of man was he?

Handsome, big, outgoing, charming—those who knew him agree on that much. He knew many people from his intelligence work, from his private life, from his academic pursuits. (He completed a Ph.D. at George Washington University in 1972. His dissertation was called "Development of Soviet Maritime Power.")

According to government officials, his colleagues and friends repeatedly testify to his loyalty to America, his honesty, his reliability. Those who have cast doubts on Shadrin to this reporter are generally professional skeptics, including people whose job it is to be suspicious about Soviet defectors.

But suspicion remains: The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, for example, investigated the case and said it could not thoroughly dispel suspicions about Artamonov/Shadrin's true status.

Perhaps the doubters have an unfair advantage. No matter how persuasive the testimonials of friends and colleagues, no matter how strong the circumstantial evidence, a skeptic can always reply: "Yes, but if he was a brilliant triple agent, then of course he could fool anybody." Just so.

If the American intelligence agencies had handled the case more professionally, there might be many fewer mysteries to resolve. For example, the FBI turned Artamonov/Shadrin into a double agent without consulting the CIA. Rivalries within the American intelligence community are obviously fierce, and the energy spent on them may sometimes exceed the energy devoted to real work.

When Artamonov/Shadrin went to Vienna for his last meetings with the KGB, the FBI would not allow the CIA station in Vienna to provide surveillance of his movements. The FBI apparently did not know that the U.S. consulate in Vienna was ideally located in view of the church steps that the KGB designated as their meeting place with Artamonov/Shadrin. Surveillance would have been easy.

If Artamonov/Shadrin is an innocent victim of the spy game, then so too is his wife, Blanka, a dentist who practices in suburban Virginia.

By her account she never knew her husband was a double agent. He told her, she says, that he was working secretly with some Soviets who wanted to help the United States. Only after he disappeared and she was on a plane back to America did a U.S. official inform her that her husband had been a spy. She went home to McLean, Va., but heard nothing from the government. Finally she hired a lawyer, and began demanding that the government do more for her husband. She is still making these demands.

But the Polish-born Mrs. Shadrin is not immune from the suspicions that surround this case. Some of the professional doubters in the intelligence community even question her bona fides. Why did she telephone Poland from Vienna in December, 1973?

"I always call home when I am in Europe," she replied indignantly Friday, when asked. She seems further at the suggestion that there is anything fishy about her or her missing husband.

But spying is a fishy business, and this is a spy story, no matter how it ends.

Mission to Helsinki: Negotiating on To Find a U.S.

By Stanley Karnow

WE MUST have been a singular sight as we sat on a park bench in Helsinki and talked in hushed tones. Passers-by seemed to glance at us oddly, perhaps wondering what three ample figures in dark business suits, obviously foreigners, were doing there on a lovely autumn morning last year, when honest gentlemen are at work. But we, or at least they, were hard at work, trying to negotiate the complex case of Nicholas Shadrin.

Shadrin, a Russian-born American citizen, had left his wife at their hotel on the evening of Dec. 20, 1975, and walked to Vienna's main cathedral, the Votivkirche. He was a double agent, ostensibly representing U.S. intelligence while pretending to spy for the Kremlin; his purpose that evening was to meet two members of the KGB, the Soviet secret police. He has not been seen since on this side of the Iron Curtain. His case, which became public last week, is as intriguing as any espionage novel.

Efforts to locate him have involved former President Ford, Leonid Brezhnev, Henry Kissinger, Andrei Gromyko and Zbigniew Brzezinski, as well as an array of lesser U.S. and Russian officials.

I was also involved at one stage, conducting a minor but fascinating mission to Victor Louis, the KGB operative who performs various arcane functions for the Kremlin. It was that mission that landed me on the park bench in Helsinki beside Louis and Richard Copaken, a young Washington lawyer who had been hired by Mrs. Blanka Shadrin to find her husband.

Like many reporters, I have known Louis for years. He is presumed to be a "disinformation" specialist for the KGB, but his disclosures have sometimes been solid. In late 1968, for example, he presented me with an exclusive account of his extraordinary visit to Taiwan, which was designed to signal to the Communist Chinese that their Nationalist enemies might be exploring an accom-

modation with the Soviet Union. I have also visited Louis at his country house near Moscow, where a tennis court, a swimming pool and a cellar filled with imports ranging from wine to corn flakes testifies to the inequity of Soviet egalitarianism. He is a large, pleasant rascal whose rather awkward manner masks a certain cunning, and, at the risk of sounding cynical, I think he would allow that our acquaintance is based on mutual usefulness.

So it was that Copaken, who learned of my link to Louis through Chester Cooper, a former government official and friend, requested my assistance. This was the summer of last year, when Copaken's channel to Wolfgang Vogel, the East German intermediary who arranged the trade of Soviet spy Rudolf Abel for U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers, had recently broken down. Could I induce Louis to help?

Copaken is indefatigable, aggressive and humorless, a kind of human computer who carries a pocket calculator in order to figure out currency exchange rates to the third decimal point. I would want him on my side were I in trouble. I agreed to put him in touch with Louis, if I could, but on two conditions. First, he would tell me the full Shadrin story rather than the phony tale he was then peddling of an innocent Russian defector who had chosen freedom but was kidnaped by Soviet operatives while on a skiing trip in Austria. Secondly, he would give me first crack at publishing the complete story when we deemed it could be told without risking the chances for Shadrin's release.

IT IS NO EASY MATTER to telephone Moscow from Nantucket, where I had gone with my family on vacation. But I got through to Louis in early August, and, without revealing Copaken's identity or any other substantive details, asked if he could meet us outside the

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Park Bench Double Agent

Soviet Union. Evidently accustomed to such mystery, Louis replied that he would in principle, and we would set a date in a later talk. A few days afterward, Louis called me from Helsinki, possibly to elude Soviet wire-tappers, and asked if this was going to be "a wild goose chase." I described the initiative as "important," and we fixed a rendezvous, Helsinki on Sept. 9.

Copaken recommended that we arrive in Helsinki a day early in order to get a good night's sleep before the next morning's conversations. As we took off, he extracted from his briefcase a mathematical puzzle that, he explained, was handmade by a wizard in Copenhagen. I persuaded him to put it away and instead fill me in on the Shadrin case from the voluminous files he carried.

AT 10 THE NEXT morning, Louis was standing outside his hotel as we approached. "My room is probably bugged," he said, suggesting that a park might be better, and he steered us to a landscaped area that ran down the middle of a shopping street. We found an empty bench and sat in the sunshine. I explained that I had now finished my job, which was to bring them together, but I would like to listen if they had no objections. They assented, and Copaken recounted the Shadrin story, omitting the double agent part. He also emphasized somewhat grossly that an election campaign was coming in the United States and that the incident, if made public, could take on domestic political dimensions.

Louis had kept silent through most of Copaken's briefing, but now he had some comments and questions. In the first place, he asserted, Copaken had been wasting his time with the Vogel channel, as the Russians were loath to meddle in Germany since former Chancellor Willy Brandt had improved relations with Moscow. Then he went on to voice doubts about the entire Shadrin affair. How do you know Shadrin was kidnaped? How do you know he has not returned to the Soviet Union voluntarily? Have you considered that he might have gone off to Argentina to get away from his wife? Could he have been picked up by the East Germans or Romanians? "They do that sort of thing," Louis added rather disdainfully.

When Copaken implied, in answer to the first query, that U.S. intelligence agents knew Shadrin was meeting with two KGB operatives, I thought I heard Louis' brain click. "It's inconceivable that the CIA would permit a Soviet defector to meet two Russians in Vienna unless something significant was involved," he said. "This is more than a simple affair of abduction."

THE DISCUSSION dragged on through the day, as we strolled across the park and lunched and dined, and although I had felt sure at the start that Louis knew nothing of the case beforehand, it was obvious that he had quickly sized it up. When Copaken contemplated various trading possibilities, Louis referred to the affair of Kim Philby, the British agent who had secretly worked for the Russians and finally retired in Moscow. "Put the shoe on the other foot," he said. "Imagine that Philby is captured by the British in West Berlin, and the Soviet Union demands his return. Would the British give him back? Especially when it's unclear whether he was kidnaped or went over voluntarily?"



Victor Louis

Copaken countered by pointing out that Shadrin was an American citizen, but Louis replied: "He didn't become an American just because of an act of Congress. From our viewpoint, he is still a Soviet citizen. Besides, there are rivalries inside the Kremlin, just as there are in Washington. The Soviet military establishment would oppose Shadrin's release."

During one interval, when Copaken had gone off with his pocket calculator to shop, Louis assumed a tough stance and scolded me: "We don't have to give information to anyone. The United States can't push us around. Remember, the Soviet Union is not Guatemala."

But then his voice switched to a plea. "Is this what brought you all the way from America?" he said. "It's senseless. Abducting people was the sort of thing we did in Stalin's day, but it's not done anymore. If this Shadrin was in fact kidnaped, it's an extraordinary case. And if it's an extraordinary case, there's not much I can do."

But later, over a dinner of crayfish and white wine, Louis surprised me by telling Copaken that he would try to help, and I can only speculate on his motives. First, he delights in the role of broker, since it enhances his reputation as an enigmatic figure with worldwide connections and thus, I would guess, makes him valuable to the KGB. Secondly, and in part for the same reason, he is always interested in self-serving deals. One bargain he essayed was for Copaken to get him authorization to visit Alaska, which is off limits to Russians.

The Victor Louis route, which Copaken pursued for months after, eventually ended in an impasse — as have all the other efforts on Shadrin's behalf. But Louis appears to have fulfilled his promise to try. He raised the Shadrin case in Moscow, but, as he recently confided to an American diplomat there, his inquiry evoked an "embarrassed silence."

Thus the day in Helsinki failed to return a man to his wife. Yet it furnished me with an insight that might serve those who tend to spin conspiratorial theories. The underground of spies and clandestine agents and covert intermediaries is as much of a bungle as any other business, and that is something we should all be thankful for.

Karnow is a Washington-based syndicated columnist.

Wife of Missing Double Agent Hopes for His Return

WASHINGTON, July 16 (UP)—Nicholas and Blanka Shadrin had an unusual marriage.

She spoke to him in Polish, he talked to her in Russian and they understood each other perfectly. Almost.

He was a spy, she says, a double agent for the Federal Bureau of Investigation, for nine of the 16 years they lived together and she did not know it.

Their romance started in Poland and flourished in America, until he disappeared in Vienna 18 months ago while allegedly feeding false information to Soviet secret police.

Mrs. Shadrin is convinced the Russians seized her husband, a naturalized American citizen, as a traitor. She rejects any suggestion his intrigues might have been even more complicated and that he might have been a Soviet triple agent who returned to his homeland at mission's end.

Waiting for His Return

Now, she is doing everything possible to get back the man who gave up his country and a Russian naval career to marry her. "I'm waiting for him," she said in an interview in their suburban McLean, Va., home. "My intuition tells me I think he will come back."

She is sure he did not return to his homeland voluntarily.

"He would be the last person in the United States to go back to Russia," she said. "He had nothing there. He had everything here."

But Mrs. Shadrin has lost patience with the United States Government's discreet efforts to trace her husband, so she is making her story public.

The State Department said that it was doing everything possible, but its officials do not know what happened to Mr. Shadrin.

Mrs. Shadrin last saw her husband Dec. 20, 1975, when he left a Vienna hotel, as she later learned from the F.B.I., for a meeting with two Soviet intelligence agents. Only after his disappearance, she said, did she learn he had been a double agent since 1966.

"I just couldn't understand," she said. "It was out of his character. Why did he do it? He must have thought if something happened, they [the F.B.I.] would be 100 percent behind him."

Mrs. Shadrin, who has no children or other relatives in America, is a dentist.

Defected From Russia

She met Mr. Shadrin—then named Nikolai Artamonov—in 1958 when she was 21 and he was a 30-year-old Soviet Navy captain assigned to Poland. They decided to defect when she finished dental school. In 1959, they headed for Sweden in a 22-foot boat, stayed six weeks and left for America.

Once United States officials were convinced Mr. Artamonov was not a Russian plant, they gave him a job analyzing Soviet naval publications. He changed his name to Shadrin and earned a master's degree in engineering and a doctorate in political science from George Washington University.

After he disappeared, the F.B.I. told Mrs. Shadrin that Soviet agents had asked her husband in 1966 to work for his homeland. He told the F.B.I. and they made him a counterspy.



United Press International
Blanka Shadrin at her home in McLean, Va., on Friday.

She said that she never suspected his real intelligence role.

"He was a brilliant man, absolutely brilliant," she said. "He knew literature, he knew opera, he could sing any song."

4 Aug 77

T R A N S L A T I O N

"Neues von Herrn G."
(News About Mr. G.)

Stern, 4 August 1977, p. 3. para 1.


During the State visit between host Jimmy Carter and guest Helmut Schmidt in Washington, not only military and human rights questions were discussed, but also trade of a special kind between East and West: The exchange of spies. The background: In December 1975, Soviet KGB agents had lured the American CIA employee of Russian descent Nicholas Shadrin into a trap in Vienna and kidnapped him. Through an East Berlin lawyer Moscow offered the Americans a trade: You get Shadrin back if your allies, the West Germans, release Guenter Guillaume. Chancellor Schmidt bluntly refused and informed (West German) Government spokesman Boelling: "Guillaume stays where he is".



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Neues von Herrn G.

Beim Staatsbesuch in Washington ging es zwischen Gastgeber Jimmy Carter und Gast Helmut Schmidt nicht nur um Militär- und Menschenrechtsfragen, sondern auch um Handelsbeziehungen besonderer Art zwischen Ost und West – um den Austausch von Spionen. Der Hintergrund: Sowjetische KGB-Agenten hatten im Dezember 1975 in Wien den amerikanischen CIA-Mitarbeiter russischer Herkunft Nicholas Shadrin in eine Falle gelockt und entführt. Durch einen Ostberliner Anwalt bot Moskau den Amerikanern einen Handel an: Ihr kriegt Shadrin zurück, wenn eure Verbündeten, die Westdeutschen, den DDR-Bürger Günter Guillaume freigeben. Kanzler Schmidt lehnte brüsk ab und ließ Regierungsspre-

cher Bölling mitteilen: »Guillaume bleibt da, wo er ist!«
Günter Guillaume war wieder einmal in den Schlagzeilen und im Gespräch: Die Amerikaner wollen ihn haben, die Sowjets, die DDR-Machthaber und natürlich die Journalisten. Wo ist er eigentlich, der DDR-Top-Agent, der sich in das Vertrauen des ehemaligen Bundeskanzlers Willy Brandt eingeschlichen hatte? Wie lebt der Meisterspion hinter Gittern? Damit das Geheimnis nicht gelüftet wird,



DDR-Spion
Günter Guillaume
alt Ex-SPD-
Geschäftsführer
Volker Bömer
und Ex-Kanzler
Willy Brandt

hält die Leitung der Justizvollzugsanstalt Rheinbach ihren prominenten Gefangenen versteckt, wenn Journalisten zu Besuch kommen. Dann holt Justizoberinspektor Göbel den Häftling Guillaume aus der Anstaltsschreinerei und schließt ihn in die Zelle 173, Abteilung 4, Flügel A ein. Auch ein Architekt, der Vermessungsarbeiten im Knast nutzen wollte, um heimlich Bilder von Guillaume zu machen, kam nicht zum Schuß – dem STERN dagegen gelang es. Lesen Sie den Bericht »Rote Tulpen aus Ostberlin« auf Seite 12

stern 3

17 AUG 77

WIFE OF DOUBLE AGENT DISPUTES SOVIET ACCOUNT

Blanka Shadrin, who is married to a Russian-born double agent, Nicholas Shadrin, said yesterday that she did not believe the explanation given earlier this week by the K.G.B., the Soviet intelligence organization, for the disappearance of her husband in Vienna two years ago.

According to excerpts from K.G.B. documents and an interview with a K.G.B. agent published in the weekly Literaturnaya Gazeta in Moscow, Mr. Shadrin was killed by agents of the Central Intelligence Agency after they learned that he wanted to return home to the Soviet Union.

According to articles previously published in the Western press, Mr. Shadrin had been feeding doctored intelligence to the K.G.B. at the direction of the F.B.I. He disappeared, the accounts have said, after a meeting with two Soviet agents in Vienna, and is said to have been taken to a Russian military prison. Mrs. Shadrin says that she believes these accounts and believes her husband is still alive.

Richard Copaken, a lawyer who is working on the case, has said he has met with Soviet representatives to try to arrange for Mr. Shadrin's release, and that the Russians had indicated that they would exchange the double agent for a Communist spy who figured in the downfall of the West German Chancellor, Willy Brandt.

17 Aug 77

МЕЖДУНАРОДНАЯ ЖИЗНЬ

«ЗАГНАННЫХ ЛОШАДЕЙ

Генрих БОРОВИК

ПРИСТРЕЛИВАЮТ,

НЕ ТАК ЛИ?»

ОБ ОДНОЙ ВЕНСКОЙ ОПЕРАЦИИ ЦРУ

В ИЮЛЕ 1977 года в ведущих газетах и журналах Америки...

«Вечером 20 декабря 1973 года американский гражданин, родившийся в России, Николай Шадрин...»

«...он был двойным агентом, представлявшим американскую разведку и одновременно делавшим вид шпионит для Кремля...»

В Комитете госбезопасности автора этих строк познакомили с материалами дела, о котором сейчас пишет западная пресса...

ВАШИНГТОН,

май 1966 года

Была суббота. Сотрудник советского посольства заехал в торговый центр купить, как обычно, продукты для семьи...

— Простите, пожалуйста, вы сотрудник советского посольства?

— Да. — Я часто видел вас здесь, в этом магазине, и по разговору понял, кто вы. Человеку было лет сорок, но он был худощав, подтянут.

— Моя фамилия Шадрин, Николай Джордж Шадрин.

— Слушаю вас, господин Шадрин. — Мне совершенно необходимо встретиться с кем-нибудь из ваших товарищей и поговорить... прошу вас... Я советский гражданин... человек был явно благонадежен.

— Звоните в советское консульство. Запишите телефон...

— Нет, нет, в консульство я не могу... Дело в том, что моя настоящая фамилия Николай Федорович Артамонов. Вы, наверное, слышали обо мне...

— Николай Федорович Артамонов? Нет... не припомню...

Незнакомец, кажется, был удивлен, услышав этот ответ...

— Я был офицером на нашем, то есть, — он поправился, — на советском эсминце. Ушел в Швецию в 1959 году. Понимаете? Попросил там политического убежища. И с тех пор — здесь... Мне нужно поговорить с вашими товарищами... рассказать, как это все случилось... В Ленинграде у меня жена, сын... Прошу вас...

— Хорошо, я скажу в консульстве о вашей просьбе. Как вас разыскать?

— Я живу здесь недалеко, в Арлингтоне... но позвонить мне нельзя.

— Вы не хотите зайти в консульство, вам позвонить нельзя, как же вас найти?

— Каждую субботу с пяти вечера до пяти часов пяти минут я в течение месяца буду ждать вашего человека возле магазина Хелт на бульваре Уилсона, у автомобильной стоянки. Запомните?

— Ну, предположим, заодно, — пожал плечами работник посольства, не исключавший возможности провокации. — Но я ничего не могу обещать вам.

— Я понимаю, но только передайте просьбу, — глаза человека смотрели растерянно, почти моляще. — Пожалуйста, передайте... Я долго не мог решить...

Через день, в понедельник, советское консульство в Вашингтоне запросило из Москвы данные об Артамонове Николае Федоровиче, бывшем, как он утверждает, советском морском офицере, бывавшем в 1959 году в Швеции и попросившем там политического убежища. Консульство также просило прислать фотографию Артамонова.

ГДЫНЯ,

июнь 1959 года

(Из свидетельских показаний Попова Ильи Александровича, 1934 года рождения, уроженца Воронежской области, русского, образование 7 классов)

Капитана 3-го ранга Артамонова Николая Федоровича я знаю с марта 1956 года. С сентября 1958 года наш корабль находился на выполнении задания в польском порту Гдыня... В воскресенье, 7 июня 1959 года, около 17 часов Артамонов приказал мне приготовить катер к выходу на рыбалку в устье р. Вислы. Вечером он пришел на катер вместе со своей знакомой девушкой по имени Ева и дал команду двигаться в направлении Вислы. Мы прошли порт польских пограничников и вышли в открытое море. Ночью началась гроза. Артамонов два или три раза проверял, как я держу курс, и подменял меня за штурвалом... На рассвете он заявил мне: «Мы заблудились — шли неправильным курсом, так как гроза повлияла на работу наших компасов... Когда мы подошли к берегу, Артамонов в каюте переделался в гражданский костюм темного цвета,

спустил с катера военноморской флаг и вместе с Евой сошел на берег. Он сказал мне, что сейчас узнает, где мы находимся, съездит за горючим и утром мы пойдем в Гдыню... После отъезда Артамонова к катеру на автомашине прибыли двое штатских. Один произнес слово «полиция» и сделал знак, чтобы я селся в автомашину. Я несколько раз сказал слово «вахта» для того, чтобы он понял, что я не желаю никуда ехать. Тогда вдвоем они срутели мне руки и втолкнули в автомашину. Меня ввели в дом, где, как оказалось, помещался полицейский участок. Я потребовал, чтобы меня соединили по телефону с советским консульством. Начальник сказал, что сейчас в консульство позвонить нельзя, так как там все спят...

Утром меня отвезли на автомашине в другое полицейское помещение, которое располагалось в центре поселка. Я увидел в коридоре Артамонова... Он сказал мне: «Наверное, ты поедешь в Гдыню один, я тут погорел». Я понял это так, что Артамонов, как офицер, будет задержан на некоторое время, поэтому сказал ему, что если недогадо, то я подожду.

Вечером того же дня меня вызвали на допрос, который вел начальник полиции с участием переводчика — высокого старика, русского эмигранта в возрасте около 60 лет.

Меня спрашивали, признаю ли я на том, что Артамонов заблудился и попал в Швецию случайно. Я сказал, что мы пошли на рыбалку и я заблудился, так как гроза повлияла на работу компасов. Переводчик ехидно засмеялся и заявил, что не может быть, чтобы гроза могла повлиять на работу компасов... Он взял со стола газету в переводе мне приблизительно следующее: «Советский офицер бросил свою страну и бежал в Швецию». На

снимке был изображен наш катер. Я сказал переводчице: «Почему ваши газеты врут, пишут неправду?» Он заявил мне: «А может быть, это правда».

...В конце допроса переводчик спросил, не желаю ли я остаться в Швеции. Я заявил, что я советский человек, родился на советской земле и буду жить там, а в Швеции мне делать нечего...

Поскольку на допросе мне несколько раз намекали на то, что Артамонов остается в Швеции, я попросил разрешения познакомиться с ним. После допроса меня повели вниз — к камере Артамонова. Разговаривать с ним наедине мне не разрешали.

...Артамонов спросил меня: «Ну что, Попов, зачем пришел?» Я сказал, что поговорил по телефону с представителем советского консульства, и они приедут в Гальмар-к в 8 часов вечера. Я думал, что Артамонов обрадуется этому сообщению, однако он, опустив голову, сказал мне: «Зачем мне, Попов, теперь консульство, меня ожидает вот...» При этом он показал рукой на стенку камеры и сразу же руку убрал. Я понял это так, что его ожидает «стенка», то есть расстрел... Сказав Артамонову, что в шведской газете написано, будто он остается в Швеции, я спросил его, правильно ли это. Он опустил голову и ничего не ответил...

Я понял, что со мной уже не о чем говорить. Я спросил Артамонова, что перелет начался после возвращения. Он подумал и сказал: «Передай, что, как только меня отпустят, я ернусь»...

...В воскресенье, 14 июня 1959 года, я самолетом рыбыв в Москву...

ТОКГОЛЬМ,

июнь 1959 года

(Из газет «Дигге нюхетер» и «Стокгольмс тиднингс») ...Сообщают, что любовь, сплывшая между 33-летним офицером Красного флота и красивой 22-летней темноволосой девушкой, привела к побегу из Гдыни в воскресенье вечером. Через сутки, в понедельник, около 11 часа они прибыли на лодку и высадились в южной части острова. Офицер и девушка попросили политического убежища. По заявлению прокурора, советский офицер, несмотря на достигнувший на три дня до срока, до сих пор еще не дал удовлетворительного объяснения причин своего побега в Запад...

...Конечно по делам иностранцев вынесла в четверг решение о предоставлении женщинам права политического убежища...

САЛИНИНГРАД,

сентябрь 1959 года

(Из обвинительного заключения) ...На основании изложенного обвиняется Артамонов Николай Федорович в том, что он, находясь на корабле в выполнении специального задания в порту Гдыня Польской Народной Республики, изменил Родине и вечером 7 июня 1959 года на корабельном катере бежал в Швецию,

где возбудил ходатайство о предоставлении политического убежища, которое ему предоставлено; то есть в совершении преступления, предусмотренного ст. 1 Закона об уголовной ответственности за государственные преступления...

ВАШИНГТОН,

май 1966 года

Материалы об Артамонове и его фотография были получены нашим консульством в Вашингтоне через несколько дней после запроса. Итак, это был не самозванец. Это был гражданин Советского Союза, совершивший тяжчайшее преступление перед Родиной, оказавшись за границей и просивший встречи с представителем советского консульства. Но каким-то причинам он не мог прийти в консульство и не хотел, чтобы кто-нибудь из советских консульских работников звонил ему домой. Однако существо дела не менялось — к советскому консульству обращался советский гражданин. Поэтому просить Артамонова нельзя было оставить без внимания. И через субботу к нему пришел представитель советского консульства в Вашингтоне.

...Наша встреча длилась около получаса. Артамонов заявил мне, что его побег в Швецию был совершен в состоянии полупьяного угара. Увеличение женской груди вскружило ему голову, привело к тяжчайшей ошибке, в которой он теперь глубоко раскаивается. Никаких других серьезных мотивов для побега у него не было. Артамонов сказал, что это совершенное им преступление привело к другому преступлению — для того, чтобы поддерживать свое существование за границей, он согласился сотрудничать с американской разведкой и рассказал ее представителям многое из того, что знал о состоянии Советского Военно-Морского Флота. Он отдал себе отчет, что эти преступления заслуживают сурового наказания. Сказал, что все эти годы мысль о предательстве, совершенном против своего народа, против своей семьи, своих близких и друзей, не давала ему покоя. А последнее время она просто не дает ему жить. Сейчас, по его словам, у него появилась возможность, как он считает, принести пользу Родине и тем самым, хотя бы в малой степени, искупить свою тяжелую вину.

На мой вопрос, как он собирается это сделать, Артамонов ответил, что работает сейчас консультантом РУМО и может сообщить нам некоторые, как он полагает, ценные сведения, необходимые Советскому Союзу для обеспечения его безопасности.

В заключение беседы я сказал ему, что доложу в консульстве о содержании нашего разговора. Он поблагодарил и спросил: «Как вы думаете — есть надежда?» «Надежда на что?» — в свою очередь спросил я. «На то, что смогу принести пользу?» Я ответил, что ничего не могу ему на это

сказать. Артамонов назвал место, где он будет каждую неделю по пятницам с 17.00 до 17.15 в течение двух месяцев гулять, ожидая встречи с представителем консульства...

СОТРУДНИК
КОНСУЛЬСТВА СССР
В ВАШИНГТОНЕ...

Через две недели в условленном месте на встречу с Артамоновым пришел советский представитель Игорь Александрович Орлов — так назовем мы его в этом документальном очерке.

Н. А. ОРЛОВ:

— Из чего мы исходили, пойдя на контакт с Артамоновым-Шадриним в 1966 году?

Тщательное изучение документов — отзывом сослуживцев Артамонова, его друзей, показаний моториста Попова — убедило нас, что предательство Артамонова, его бегство в Швецию с любовницей не были вызваны какими-то серьезными, скажем, идеологическими причинами. У него было немало друзей, жена и сын, которых он любил. После побега в его каюте на корабле нашли неотправленные подарки, приготовленные им для семьи.

Что же с ним произошло? Судя по всему, быстрая карьера вскружила голову этому человеку: ему было досрочно присвоено звание капитана 3-го ранга. У него стали появляться знакомство, высокомерие, эгоизм, чувство вседозволенности. Появление этих качеств по-новое отталкивало от него друзей, которые звали его другим. Он начинает искать новых «друзей». Имя оказываются офицеры восточных флотов, представители которых находились тогда в Гдыне (некоторые) из них, как выяснилось позже, были связаны с западными разведками). Они осыпали его комплиментами и недвусмысленно намекали, что человек с его качествами нигде не пропадет. Он уверовал в свою исключительность. Это совпало с угарным увлечением Евой Гурой, которая объявила ему, что беременна от него. И побегу он практически не готовился. Для него это был неожиданный, как ему казалось, легкий, сулящий интересные приключения выход из неприятной ситуации личного порядка. Даже шведская контрразведка была не в состоянии понять, что заставило такого человека, как Артамонов, оставить робиню, дом, службу и без языка и денег бежать в чужую страну. Шведы даже подозревали, что Артамонов является заброшенным в их страну советским разведчиком.

Все это никак не умалило преступление, совершенное предателем Артамоновым, но давало какое-то основание полагать, что оно было совершено не злобным, долго накрученным врагом Советского Союза, а излишне самоуверенным, тщеславным человеком, находившимся в состоянии увлеченности женщиной и прежде всего самим собой.

Но человек, начавший предавать, не мог остановиться. Артамонов согласился сотрудничать с американской разведкой. Его преступление усугублялось. Он натиснул по миллиону плоскости. Однако его поиски контактов с советскими людьми мог говорить о том, что где-то в глубине его души еще сохрани-

лось человеческое зерно, которое на какой-то этапе смогло догнать и сделать нравственные мучи невыносимыми для него. И он, возможно, решил искупить хотя бы часть своей вины.

Нередко люди, оказавшиеся по собственной воле заборонными в капиталистическом мире, лишние воле родины, начинают хотеть с опозданием понимать, какая страшная ошибка совершена ими, и всеми силами стараются вернуть себе право служить Родине. Некоторые благодарны даже за одну только возможность исповедаться. Это слово звучит странно в устах предателя, но именно его Артамонов не раз употреблял потом в беседах со мной, рассказывая о своих заключениях на чужбине.

Такова была одна из главных размышлений. Однозначно имелся в виду и другой вариант. Артамонов-Шадрин думает нам. На самом деле он не чувствует никакого раскаяния, а по заданию своего хозяина пытается стать так называемым «двойным агентом» для проведения «игры» с нами.

Как им покажется на первый взгляд странным, но оба варианта, в которых мы двинули, соглашались на контакт с Артамоновым, оказались реальными. На первой же встрече со мной Артамонов рассказал, что искал контактов с советскими людьми по заданию своих американских хозяев для проведения «игры» с нами, но что это задание совпало с его искренним желанием хотя бы частично искупить свою вину перед Родиной.

Согласился, что ситуация была не совсем обычной, но поразмыслив и обсудив ее со всех сторон, мы решили контакты с Артамоновым продолжать. Практически мы при этом ничем не рисковали, даже если его заверения в искренности были чистой простонацией. Никаких сведений, которые оказались бы полезными противнику, он, естественно, получить от нас не мог. Польза же от таких контактов в случае, если Артамонов был хотя бы малопольно искренен, могла оказаться немалой. Во всем этом предстояло разобраться.

Там начались мои регулярные встречи с Артамоновым. Вскоре из бесед с ним нам стали известны подробности его жизни за рубежом.

В июле 1959 года, то есть уже через месяц после побега, к Артамонову явились американцы и предложили сотрудничать с американской разведкой. За это ему гарантировали переезд в США, финансовую помощь и в дальнейшем постоянную работу. Он согласился. В сентябре его увезли в ФРГ и месяц держали под Франкфуртом-на-Майне в небольшом особняке, принадлежавшем американской разведке. Проверили физическое и психическое состояние, вели идеологическую обработку. Беседы с ним вел предатель Бродский, работавший до войны в Ленинграде и ушедший к гитлеровцам.

Затем Артамонова доставили в США (уже под именем Николаса Джорджа Шадрина), поместили в Александрию под Вашингтоном и там начала планомерно и кропотливо вытаскивать из него информацию о наших Вооруженных Силах. Я не спрашивал его, что он рассказал американцам. Не имело смысла спрашивать. Мы просто считали, что он ни открыл все, что знает, а знания старшего офицера военно-морского флота, перелетавшего прогнившую, конечно, представляли для нас ошелмительный вред.

Разведывательное управление Министерства обороны США.

Выплатив Артамонову, его окружили шайкой предателей, которые должны были составлять отныне его компанию. Опекуном к нему был приставлен некто Николай Козлов.

ИЗ СПРАВКИ О КОЗЛОВЕ Н. В.

...Родился в 1918 году. В 1943 году добровольно перешел на сторону гитлеровцев. В мае того же года окончил школу пропагандистов под Берлином. Служил начальником штаба 2-го полка 1-й дивизии РОА. После войны находился в лагере для военнопленных Шлагсаги, где принимал участие в изготовлении фальшивых документов для служащих РОА. В 1948 году стал секретным сотрудником американской разведки. Занимался подбором и подготовкой кадров для ЦРУ с целью захвата на территории Советского Союза. Человек глубоко аморальный и беспринципный. Бонусы и награды американцев. Скрывает от начальства, что в Советском Союзе у него есть мать, опасаясь, что этот факт может повредить его положению в спецслужбе. К Советскому Союзу относится с ненавистью.

И. А. ОРЛОВ:

— Николай Козлов регулярно докладывал начальству о настроениях своего «подопечного». Но Козлов был лишь одним из людей, которые окружали Артамонова. Был там, например, некий Сергей Гордеев, совершенно разложившийся морально субъект, бежавший из американцам из Западной Германии в 1952 году. И русские, и американцы знали, что этот человек был ко всему прочему еще и параноиком. Артамонов наблюдал этих людей и постепенно, как он рассказывал, его охватывал ужас: он становится, если уже не стал, таким же, как они. Но выбирать для себя другое общество он был не вольен. И ему приходилось являться с тачками, как Козлов, Гордеев. Опасность безвозвратно потерять все человеческое, по его словам, возрастала.

В середине 60-х годов Артамонова назначили консультантом РУМО по Советским Вооруженным Силам. Его функция состояла в том, чтобы, читая советские газеты, пользоваться информацией, которую давали ему американцы, анализировать положение в Военно-Морском Флоте СССР, готовить доклады начальству и читать лекции на эти темы для офицеров американских ВМС.

Он был довольно обеспеченным человеком, прежде всего за счет Бвы (их незаконно сочетали браком, несмотря на то, что он не был разведен со своей женой, живущей в СССР), которая занималась субверсией практикой. Детей у Шадриных не было.

О жене и сыне он ничего не знал. Только один раз — в сентябре 1965 года — ему удалось через американскую туристку передать родственнице в Ленинград (направлять ее к жене Артамонов боялся), что он жив, здоров и скучает по семье.

Вот на фоне всего этого Артамонов, как он рассказывал, все больше и больше склонялся к мысли о необходимости искать выход из условий, в которые он сам себя поставил. Ну, а решение прийти к нам, как ни странно, облегчили сами американцы, дав задание искать контактов с нами.

ИЗ ЗАЯВЛЕНИЯ Н. Ф. АРТАМОНОВА В ВЕРХОВНЫЙ СОВЕТ СССР

...Годы, истекшие с момента совершения тяжчайшего преступления, послужили мне тяжелым уроком. Сознательным, закоренелым врагом своей Родины я никогда не был. В то же время необходимо признать и своего преступления и его результаты, ничем не отличающиеся от действий иностранных врагов СССР. Никим образом не освобождая себя от ответственности за совершенное, прошу дать возможность исполнить свою вину, если я смогу, как-то помочь моей Родине, и затем вернуться домой.

И. А. ОРЛОВ:

— Это заявление Артамонов передает мне в одну из наших встреч. Возвращение на Родину, по словам Артамонова, было его мечтой. Он понимал, что если американцы узнают об этом, он погибнет.

Трудно поверить человеку, который совершил тяжкое преступление против своего народа, и вполне естественно, что полностью мы ему, конечно, доверять не могли. Он чувствовал наше недоверие, глубоко переживал его и старался сделать все возможное, чтобы доказать свою искренность.

Американцы не допускали его, конечно, к важным секретам. Но по его информации мы могли судить, куда американцы направляют усилия, чтобы заполнить пробелы в своей осведомленности о наших Вооруженных Силах. Благодаря Артамонову мы получили важные данные о многих людях, работающих в американской разведке, особенно в тех ее разделах, которые имеют отношение к перебежчикам из Советского Союза, о методах работы, об организационной структуре и т. п. Он, конечно, приносил нам и те сведения, которые заранее для него составляли американские хозяева, для того чтобы вести свою «игру» с нами. И мы несколько раз косвенным образом «позволили» американцам прийти к выводу, что сведения, которые Артамонов приносил нам по их инструкциям, мы «принимаем всерьез».

На что рассчитывали американцы, направляя Артамонова на встречи с нами? Ведь они прекрасно понимали, что никакой информации о Советском Союзе во время этих встреч Артамонов не получит. Зачем же вели они эту игру? Во-первых, в расчете на дезинформацию, которую, как они полагали, удастся через Артамонова направить нам. Во-вторых, на то,

что, войдя в наше доверие, Артамонов хоть и через длительный период времени, но все же изыщет возможности делать какие-то выводы о «работе советской контрразведки». И, в-третьих, Артамонов поддерживал у своих хозяев иллюзию, что со временем мы, возможно, получим ему встречи с советским «интеллигентом» на территории США.

В этой сложной ситуации Артамонов действовал с немалым риском для себя, прекрасно понимая, что при первой же его оплошности американские спецслужбы расправятся с ним. Напряженность и постоянная опасность, в которой он находился, давали о себе знать. В последние годы все больше чувствовалось, что Артамонов устал. Часто говорил о тоске по Родине и семье, вспоминал о службе на флоте.

Когда осенью 1975 года мы узнали, что Артамонов может приехать в Австрию, мы условились с ним о встрече в Вене для того, чтобы обговорить вопросы возвращения на Родину. Встречу назначили возле собора Вотивкирхе. Это место находится как раз напротив американского консульства. Артамонов, как он предупредил нас, поставил американцев об этой встрече в известность. Возможно, нас фотографировали. Ни его, ни меня это, понятно, не смущало.

ВЕНА,

18 декабря 1975 года

Орлов и Артамонов встретились возле громадного здания собора, как и было условлено, ровно в восемь вечера.

Артамонов, несмотря на довольно холодную погоду, был без шапки — Орлов вообще никогда не видел его в головном уборе, — без кашне, пальто, однако, аккуратно застегнуто на все пуговицы.

Он улыбнулся с радостным облегчением и, подойдя к Орлову, не удержался, обнял его:

— Вырвался я все-таки... Как я боялся, что мы не встретимся!

Пройдя через площадь, они вошли в одну из улиц, миновали несколько кварталов, сворачивая то направо, то налево; и, наконец, остановились у ожившей их легковой машины. Их никто не «вел». Покрытые снегом улицы были пустыни. Сев в машину, они сделали несколько контрольных маневров, чтобы отсеять возможный «хвост», и отправились в то место города, где должен был состояться разговор.

...Артамонов жаловался на усталость. Перенесенная тяжелая операция тоже дает о себе знать. Говорил, что его тяжело работала на американскую разведку. Напомнил еще раз о своем заявлении в адрес Верховного Совета СССР. Очень остро поставил вопрос о возвращении на Родину. Я сказал, что решение этого вопроса близится к концу и я, очевидно, смогу сообщить ему об официаль-

ном разрешении на одной из наших последующих встреч. Артамонов продолжал говорить, в ответ на что постарались сделать все возможное. Мы договорились о встрече 20 декабря.

И. ОРЛОВ

ВЕНА,

20 декабря 1975 года

...Артамонов не вышел в назначенное время на встречу в условленном месте 20 декабря с. г.

И. ОРЛОВ

И. А. ОРЛОВ:

— Не было от него сигнала и в последующие дни. Мы уже решили разыскать, используя наши возможности, но 30 декабря в МИД пришло уведомление из посольства США в Москве...

МОСКВА,

30 декабря 1975 года

В 15 часов 30 минут консульское управление МИД СССР посетил заведующий консульским отделом посольства США в Москве, советник Клиффорд Гросс, который передал записку следующего содержания: «Как стало известно, Николас Джордж Шадрин, являющийся в настоящее время гражданином США, встретился 18 декабря в Вене с двумя советскими официальными лицами... Он снова встретился с ними 20 декабря в Вене, но после этой встречи не вернулся и с этого дня пропал без вести...»

И. А. ОРЛОВ:

— Я не знаю, в какой степени американцы подозревали Артамонова и когда недоверие к нему стало у них преобладать в оценке «двойного агента».

В последнее время его переполняло чувство благодарности к нам за то, что ему оказали определенное доверие, что впереди у него была перспектива возвращения домой и появилась обоснованная надежда на пересмотр его сурового приговора. Несколько неосторожных фраз, свидетельствующих об изменении психологического состояния Шадрина-Артамонова, — и спецслужбы, окружавшие его, могли заподозрить, что «двойной агент» американских спецслужб попал под наше влияние. Мы предвидели такую опасность и предупреждали его об этом. Но я не уверен, что он смог справиться с собой в до конца следовать нашим советам. Возможно, Артамонов допустил какую-нибудь трагическую для него оплошность после 18 декабря, и ЦРУ, узнав о его предстоящем возвращении на Родину, поняло, что игра проиграна, что это скандальный провал, и поспешило «убрать» Артамонова, а чтобы замести следы — обвинило в этом другую сторону. Мне не хотелось бы думать о худшем, но, зная методы ЦРУ, мне трудно предположить, что его держат и заключенник; слишком опасно для них...

ОТ АВТОРА:

Я не знал Артамонова, поэтому пытался изложить эту историю таким образом, чтобы, по возможности, исключить авторскую субъективность, скести до минимума пересказ «своими сло-

вами» трагической судьбы этого человека. В Комитете государственной безопасности меня ознакомили с документами, относящимися к этому делу. Много часов я провел в беседах с Игорем Александровичем Орловым, который сейчас находится в Москве, слушая его рассказ, небольшой, но, на мой взгляд, самая существенная часть которого приведена в этом очерке.

Однако в заключение мне хотелось бы поделиться с читателями некоторыми собственными размышлениями, которые не требуют специальных знаний, а требуют лишь логики.

У меня, как и у Орлова, нет сомнений в том, что «исчезновение» Шадрина-Артамонова — дело рук Центрального разведывательного управления США. Вряд ли это была мстительная организация, чтобы позволить себе пренебрежение к эмоциям. Нет, то была необходимая с точки зрения ЦРУ и единственная мера, которая могла спасти и без того малочисленную организацию от очередного скандала. Почти десять лет — начиная с весны 1966 года — ЦРУ, ФБР и РУМО докладывали высшим руководителям американской администрации (вначале — демократической, затем — республиканской) о «блистательной» операции Шадрина против советской контрразведки. И вдруг выясняется, что их «ценнейший» агент вына-

шивает мысль вернуться на Родину. И, не дай бог, в минуту душевного порыва делает это!

Представьте себе на минуту лица руководителей ЦРУ, ФБР и РУМО при мысли, скажем, о том, что, вернувшись в СССР, Артамонов выступит на пресс-конференции, на которой расскажет о том, как все происходило на самом деле! После всех скандалов и разоблачений, которые обрушились на голову ЦРУ и ФБР в последнее время, этот новый позорный для них провал, да еще накануне президентских выборов 1976 года!

...20 декабря 1975 года Артамонов в условленное время, как сообщает американская печать, отправился из гостиницы «Бристоль», где он остановился в Вене, на встречу с Орловым (о предстоящей встрече Артамонов сразу же после предвещений — 18 декабря — поставил в известность, опять-таки как сообщает американская печать, своего куратора от ЦРУ). На встречу не явился: по пути был похищен спецгруппой ЦРУ или ФБР (уж я не знаю, какое из этих учреждений вырвалось вперед в выполнении последней миссии в отношении «двойного агента»), и американскую администрацию поставили в известность, что Шадрин, ушедший на запланированную встречу с сотрудником КГБ в Вене, «назад не вернулся» и, значит, «похищен советской разведкой»...

Так, или приблизительно так, могла выглядеть операция против Шадрина-Артамонова, которая, по замыслам ее авторов, должна была позволить спецслужбам США не только невинность соблазна, но и капитал приобрести. Конечно, это только предположение, и вряд ли кто-нибудь, кроме очень узкой группы лиц в американских спецслужбах, может подтвердить его достоверность. Но логика событий неумолимо заставляет верить: это было так, или приблизительно так.

Есть тому и косвенные доказательства:

— американские власти в течение 18 месяцев не предавали огласке событий, связанных с Шадриным-Артамоновым. А ведь любая возможность раздуть анти-советскую кампанию, особенно в целях шпионажи, всегда используется в США на полную мощность. Государственный департамент США даже выразил сожаление по поводу того, что не удалось избежать публикации материалов по делу Шадрина, несмотря на все принятые им меры;

— Еве Гуре, которую американские спецслужбы вывели из Вены сразу же после 20 декабря 1975 года, было «рекомендовано» никому не рассказывать об исчезновении Шадрина. В американскую прессу эти сведения попали совсем недавно благодаря деятельности адвоката Евы Гуре;

— и наконец, американские спецслужбы давно прибегают к физическому унич-

тожению людей, представляющих для них какую-либо угрозу, причем не только политических противников, но и собственных «слуг», которые почему-либо стали неудобными. В эту логическую цепь вписывается и дело Артамонова — разве не известно миру и самим американцам, что ЦРУ и другие спецслужбы США не раз вводили в заблуждение собственную администрацию, не говоря уже о конгрессе? Расследования деятельности ЦРУ, которые провала не так давно сенатская комиссия Верча, проиллюстрировали это довольно четко.

И последнее. Артамонов совершил самый тяжкий грех перед Родиной — предательство, хотя позже, судя по всему, пытался найти выход из своего положения. Ничто никогда не лишает его советского гражданства. Оттого, что конгресс США объявил «Николаса Джорджа Шадрина» американским гражданином, Артамонов не перестал быть гражданином СССР. В Советской стране находится его жена и сын. Вместе с ними мы вправе требовать ответа от американских властей: где находится Николай Федорович Артамонов и что с ним стало?

18 Aug 77

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SOWJETISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT BESCHULDIGT CIA DES MORDES AN SHADRIN

Die drei Versionen vom Ende des Doppelspions

Eigenbericht der „Presse“ von KARL DANNINGER

WIEN. Die Affaire um den vor zwei Jahren in Wien verschwundenen Doppelagenten Nikolai Artamonow, alias Nicholas Shadrin, ist nun von der sowjetischen Wochenschrift „Literaturnaja Gazeta“ wieder aufgegriffen worden. Offenbar als Antwort auf amerikanische Angriffe, wonach Shadrin bei seinem Treffen in Wien von KGB-Beamten verschleppt worden sein soll, läßt die sowjetische Zeitschrift den seinerzeitigen Kontaktmann des Doppelagenten, Igor Orlow, eine Version erzählen, in der die Schuld für Shadrins Verschwinden dem amerikanischen Geheimdienst CIA in die Schuhe geschoben wird. Der neuen Version zufolge hat der CIA seinen ungetreuen Agenten wahrscheinlich getötet.

Der ganzseitige Bericht befaßt sich mit dem Werdegang Artamonows

von seinem Absprung in den Westen, seiner „Verwandlung“ von Artamonow in Shadrin, seiner Tätigkeit für USA und UdSSR bis zu seinem letzten Treffen in Wien im Dezember 1975. Schon beim ersten Zusammentreffen mit Orlow auf den Stufen der Votivkirche am 18. Dezember habe Shadrin — Orlow zufolge — den Wunsch geäußert, zu seiner ersten Frau in die Sowjetunion zurückzukehren. Er sei es satt gewesen, seiner Arbeit als amerikanischer Agent nachzugehen, soll Shadrin gesagt haben. Orlow habe seinem Kontaktmann eine Antwort auf dieses Begehren bei einer weiteren Zusammenkunft am 20. Dezember in Aussicht gestellt. Zu diesem Treffen kam es aber nicht mehr.

Über die Hintergründe des Ausbleibens von Shadrin gehen nun die Meinungen diametral auseinander. Behauptete die zweite Frau des Agenten, eine polnische Ärztin, in einem Brief an Expräsident Ford,

der KGB habe Shadrin verschleppt, so behauptet nun „Literaturnaja Gazeta“, der CIA habe einer Rückkehr Shadrins in seine ehemalige Heimat zuvorkommen wollen und habe den Agenten ermordet.

Im Innenministerium in Wien, wo ein Akt „Shadrin“ vorliegt, neigt man zu der Ansicht, daß Shadrin freiwillig in die UdSSR zurückgekehrt sei. Anhaltspunkte für ein gewaltsam herbeigeführtes Verschwinden lägen nicht vor, heißt es.

Das Verschwinden des als hochqualifiziert eingestuften Spions hat noch in der Ära Ford-Kissinger zu Kontakten zwischen den USA und der Sowjetunion auf höchster politischer Ebene geführt. Aber auch damit konnte das Schicksal Shadrins nach dem 18. Dezember 1975 nicht aufgeklärt werden. „Wir haben ein Recht zu wissen, was mit Shadrin geschehen ist“, meint nun auch der Autor in der „Literaturnaja Gazeta“.

Kurier 18-8-77
Wien: Agentendrama

Sowjets sagen: CIA kille Doppelspion Shadrin

Er ging zu einem „Treff“ vor der Wiener Votivkirche – und kehrte niemals wieder zurück. Er, das ist der frühere Marinekapitän und Sowjet-Staatsbürger Nikolai Artamanow, alias Nicholas Shadrin, tätig im schmutzigen Ost-West-Spionagegeschäft.
Nach langem Schweigen hat nun auch die sowjetische Seite den Fall, der vor ein paar Wochen von den Amerikanern aufgegriffen wurde, zur Kenntnis genommen und verbreitet nun ihre Version.
Demnach sei Shadrin, der ein Doppelagent war, vom amerikanischen Geheimdienst FBI in Wien entführt und später dann von der CIA getötet worden. Das behauptet die neueste Ausgabe der sowjet-

ischen Wochenschrift „Literaturnaja Gazeta“ in einem ganzseitigen Artikel.
Die Frau Shadrins hatte – wie der KURIER seinerzeit berichtete – die Meinung vertreten, ihr Gatte sei nach seiner Entlarfung als Doppelagent vom sowjetischen Geheimdienst KGB in Wien gekidnappt und in die UdSSR verschleppt worden.
Aus amerikanischen Geheimdienst-Kreisen verlautete hingegen, Shadrin sei freiwillig in die Sowjetunion zurückgekehrt, weil er nach wie vor eigentlich Sowjet-Agent gewesen sei.
In der „Literaturnaja Gazeta“ wird die amerikanische Version dieses aufregenden Spionagefalles indirekt bestätigt.

Es heißt nämlich, Shadrin habe seinem sowjetischen Kontaktmann erklärt, er habe es satt, dieser Arbeit nachzugehen und hoffe auf eine Rückkehr in die UdSSR zu seiner ersten Frau. Der CIA, so die sowjetische Zeitschrift, habe aber davon Wind bekommen und habe daher seit neun Jahren tätigen Doppelagenten entführt und dann getötet. Die „Literaturnaja Gazeta“ fordert: „Wir haben ein Recht darauf zu wissen, was aus Shadrin geworden ist.“
Der Artikel enthüllt auch, daß es wegen des „Falles Shadrin“ zu zahlreichen Kontakten sogar auf höchster Ebene zwischen Breschnjew und dem damaligen US-Präsidenten Ford – gekommen sei.

18 Aug 77

THE NEW YORK TIMES, THURSDAY, AUGUST 18, 1977

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K.G.B. Says Spy Who Disappeared Was Murdered to Prevent His Return to U.S.S.R.

By CHRISTOPHER WREN
Special to The New York Times

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20568

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"American special services have long resorted to the physical annihilation of people who pose a threat to them," the weekly added.

20569

18 AUG 77

Agent's Kin Asks Soviet Data on Disappearance

WASHINGTON POST 1987

The wife of a Russian-born American intelligence official who disappeared in Vienna in 1975 said yesterday she will formally ask the Soviet Union to document published suggestions in Moscow that he was abducted or killed by the CIA.

Mrs. Nicholas G. Shadrin, a McLean dentist, said she would seek a meeting with Soviet KGB officials on "neutral" ground to seek amplification of statements published in the Soviet weekly, Literaturnaya Gazeta, blaming the CIA for Shadrin's disappearance.

The gist of the article was that the CIA decided to murder the double-agent Shadrin when it learned that he wanted to return to his Soviet homeland. Mrs. Shadrin and others familiar with the case dispute the Soviet claim that Shadrin had any intention of defecting back to the Soviet Union after his 15-year career in the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency.

Mrs. Shadrin said yesterday that in the light of the unusual public Soviet discussion of its intelligence operations abroad the United States should offer a "very substantial reward" to anyone with information on her husband's whereabouts.

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Reuter

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It had to be said that... in connection. It is too dangerous to them," Mr. Orlov said.

The accuracy of the Literaturnaya Gazeta article, which filled an entire page of the weekly newspaper, could not be confirmed and in some respects only deepened the mystery of what happened to the double agent. The Soviet version, which coincided with Western reports in its basic points, was clearly published with active K.G.B. assistance after widespread speculation in the West that Mr. Shadrin had been kidnapped by the Russians.

It was not clear why the normally secretive K.G.B. felt impelled to make its own account of the Shadrin case public in Literaturnaya Gazeta. The K.G.B.'s denial of responsibility may have been sincere or it may have been calculated to defuse the issue by throwing the blame on the C.I.A. At the least, the article provided Russians with a lively and uncommonly candid look behind the scenes of their own intelligence service.

As today's article reported, Nikolai Artamonov defected to Sweden in 1959 while serving as a captain in the Soviet Navy. He wound up in Washington with his name changed to Nicholas George Shadrin and worked as a consultant on Soviet naval affairs for the Defense Intelligence Agency.

Conflicting Accounts

According to the American accounts, the K.G.B. subsequently tried to recruit him as a spy and, after consulting the C.I.A., he pretended to cooperate. The Literaturnaya Gazeta article said that Mr. Shadrin approached an official of the Soviet consulate in Washington in May 1966 and offered his assistance because he felt guilty about having defected.

Mr. Orlov recalled that he was suspicious of Mr. Shadrin's motives when they first talked in Washington. But after Mr. Shadrin confided that he was acting as a double agent "on orders of his American masters," Mr. Orlov said, the K.G.B. decided it would risk nothing by playing along.

...with the C.I.A. ... major secrets, he said, ... many people working with American intelligence, especially in those branches that deal with defectors from the Soviet Union."

Literaturnaya Gazeta reported that Mr. Shadrin began asking to be allowed to return home. "According to his words, returning to his motherland was his dream," Mr. Orlov said. "He realized that he would die if the Americans found out about it."

The K.G.B. agent contended that he promised to help all he could. But, according to Mr. Orlov, Mr. Shadrin never showed up at their next meeting, which was to be in Vienna on Dec. 20.

According to articles in the Western press, Mr. Shadrin had been feeding doctored intelligence to the K.G.B. under the direction of the F.B.I. He disappeared after meeting with Soviet agents in Vienna and is said to have been taken to a Soviet military prison.

Richard Copaken, a lawyer who is working on the case, has said he has met with Soviet representatives to try to arrange for Mr. Shadrin's release, and that the Russians had indicated that they would exchange the double agent for Gunther Gillaunis, a Communist spy whose presence at the top level of the West German Government led to the downfall of Chancellor Willy Brandt.

Literaturnaya Gazeta noted that Mr. Shadrin had left his wife and son behind in the Soviet Union when he defected. "Together with them," the article said, "we have the right to demand an answer from the American authorities: where is Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov and what became of him?" [According to Western accounts, Mr. Artamonov defected with a Polish woman, whom he married in the United States.]

Agent's Kin Asks Soviet Data on Disappearance

The wife of a Russian-born American intelligence official who disappeared in Vienna in 1975 said yesterday she will formally ask the Soviet Union to document published suggestions in Moscow that he was abducted or killed by the CIA.

Mrs. Nicholas G. Shadrin, a McLean dentist, said she would seek a meeting with Soviet KGB officials on "neutral" ground to seek amplification of statements published in the Soviet weekly, Literaturnaya Gazeta, blaming the CIA for Shadrin's disappearance.

The gist of the article was that the CIA decided to murder the double-agent Shadrin when it learned that he wanted to return to his Soviet homeland. Mrs. Shadrin and others familiar with the case dispute the Soviet claim that Shadrin had any intention of defecting back to the Soviet Union after his 15-year career in the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency.

Mrs. Shadrin said yesterday that in the light of the unusual public Soviet discussion of its intelligence operations abroad the United States should offer a "very substantial reward" to anyone with information on her husband's whereabouts.

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CIA Denies Soviet Report

A spokesman for the Central Intelligence Agency called a Soviet report that it had killed a double agent "crude nonsense," adding: "We have no idea what happened to this man."

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LITERATURNAYA GAZETA REPORTS DETENTION-SHADRIN STORY

LD190947Y Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian 17 Aug 77 p 1-10

[Article by Genrikh Borovik: "They Shoot Horses, Don't They?"]

[Text] In July 1977 leading papers and magazines in America carried sensational headlines using the words "agents," "double agents" and even "triple agent." They all referred to the same person--Nicholas George Shadrin--who, the papers assured us, had been a U.S. special services "double agent" and had "mysteriously disappeared following a meeting with KGB employees" in Vienna in December 2 years previously. Here are some press reports:

"One evening in December 1975 a Russian-born American citizen, Nicholas Shadrin, left his wife in a Vienna hotel and set out for the Votivkirche, where he was to meet two KGB agents. To this day his fate and his true role in the shadowy world of espionage remain unknown..." (NEWSWEEK).

"...He was a double agent representing American intelligence and, at the same time, pretending to spy for the Kremlin...His case...is as intriguing as a spy novel..."

"The case of Shadrin, who disappeared in Austria 18 months ago, was the subject of numerous official and unofficial American-Soviet contacts..." (the Washington POST).

At KGB headquarters the author of these lines was shown materials pertaining to the case the Western press is currently writing about. These materials shed light on the true fate of the man whom the American papers call a U.S. citizen, Nicholas George Shadrin.

Washington, May 1966

It was a Saturday. A Soviet Embassy employee made a routine trip to the shopping center to buy some provisions for the family. In a remote corner of the store he was addressed sotto voce, in excellent Russian, by a tall man standing next to him.

"Excuse me, but are you an employee of the Soviet Embassy?"

"Yes."

"I have often seen you here in this store, and from your conversation I realized what you were."

The man was about 40, thin and well dressed.

"My name is Shadrin. Nicholas George Shadrin."

"I am listening, Mr Shadrin."

"I absolutely must meet one of your comrades and have a talk...I beg you.... I am a Soviet citizen...." The man was clearly upset.

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"Ring the Soviet Consulate. Write down the number...."

"No, no, I can't go to the consulate... The thing is that my real name is Nikolay Fedorovich Artamonov. No doubt you have heard of me...."

"Nikolay Fedorovich Artamonov? No....doesn't ring a bell...."

The stranger appeared surprised at this reply....

"I was an officer on one of our--that is," he corrected himself, "a Soviet destroyer. I fled to Sweden...in 1959. Do you see? I sought political asylum there. And I have been here since then....I must talk with your comrades...and tell them how it all happened.... In Leningrad I have a wife and a son....I beg you...."

"OK, I'll tell the consulate about your request. How can I find you?"

"I live not far from here, in Arlington...but you mustn't phone."

"Don't you want to go to the consulate? If you can't be 'phoned, how will you be contacted?"

"Every Saturday between 1700 and 1705, over a period of a month, I will wait for your man near the Hecht store on Wilson Boulevard, at the parking lot. Have you got that?"

"Right, supposing I remember that," the embassy employee shrugged his shoulders, not ruling out the possibility of provocation. "But I'm not promising anything."

"I understand. But you must convey the request," the man looked anxious, beseeching.

"Please tell them of my request...For a long time I didn't dare..."

The next day, the Soviet Consulate in Washington asked Moscow for some facts about Nikolay Fedorovich Artamonov, allegedly a former Soviet Navy Officer who had fled to Sweden in 1959 and sought political asylum there. The consulate also asked for a photograph of Artamonov.

Gdynia, June 1959

(From the testimony of Ilya Aleksandrovich Popov, born 1934, native of Voronezhskaya Oblast, Russian, education, seventh grade)

...I have known Subcommander Nikolay Fedorovich Artamonov since March 1956. In September 1958 our ship began an assignment in the Polish port of Gdynia...on Sunday 7 June 1959, around 1700, Artamonov ordered me to make a cutter ready for fishing in the estuary of the Wisla. In the evening he arrived at the cutter with a girl he knew called (Yeva) and ordered us to set off toward the Wisla. We passed the Polish border guard post and sailed into the open sea. A thunderstorm blew up in the night. Two or three times Artamonov checked to see that I was holding the right course and took a turn at the wheel....[paragraph continues]

At dawn he told me: "We're lost--we took the wrong course, the storm upset our compasses." As we were approaching shore, Artamonov changed into a dark blue civilian suit in his cabin, lowered the cutter's naval flag and disembarked with Yeva. He told me he now knew where we were; he said he would go off to get some fuel and we would return to Gdynia in the morning.... After Artamonov left two civilians came up in a car. One said "police" and signaled to me to get into the car. Several times I uttered the word "watch" to make him see that I was on watch and didn't want to go anywhere. Then the two of them twisted my arm up my back and put me into the car. They took me to a building--police headquarters, as it turned out. I demanded the right to phone the Soviet Consulate. The chief said I couldn't phone the consulate at that moment because everybody was asleep....

In the morning they took me to another police building in the center of the city. I saw Artamonov in the corridor.... He told me: "Looks like you'll be going back to Gdynia alone; I'm stuck here." I took it that, being an officer, Artamonov would be held for a while, but I told him I would wait if he wasn't going to be long.

....On the evening of the same day I was summoned for questioning by the chief of police through an interpreter--a tall, elderly man, a Russian emigre, about 60.

I was asked whether I still maintained that Artamonov had become lost and ended up in Sweden accidentally. I said that we had gone fishing and became lost, the storm having affected our compasses. The interpreter laughed maliciously and said that the storm couldn't have affected the compasses.... He picked up a newspaper from the table and translated for me something that went roughly as follows: "A Soviet officer has quit his country and fled to Sweden." There was a picture of our cutter. I said to the interpreter: "Why do your papers print lies?" He said: "Perhaps it is the truth."

...At the end of the interrogation the interpreter asked me whether I wanted to stay in Sweden. I told him I was a Soviet person, born on Soviet soil, and would continue to live there; there was nothing for me in Sweden....

It was hinted several times at the interrogation that Artamonov would be staying in Sweden, so I asked permission to see him. After the interrogation I was taken below--to Artamonov's cell. They did not let me talk to him alone.

Artamonov asked me: "Well Popov, why have you come?" I told him I had spoken on the telephone with a representative of the Soviet Consulate and that they would be coming to Kalmar at 2000. I expected Artamonov to be delighted at this news, but he just lowered his head and told me: "What do I need the consulate for now, Popov? It's waiting for me here...." And he pointed at the cell wall. I thought he meant the "wall" was waiting for him, that is, he was going to be shot. I told Artamonov that the Swedish newspaper had said that he would be staying in Sweden, and I asked him whether this was true. He bowed his head and said nothing...

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I realized that he had nothing to say to me. I asked Artamonov what I should tell headquarters when I got back. He pondered and then said: "Call them that as soon as they let me go. I will return...."

...On Sunday 14 June 1959 I flew into Moscow...."

Stockholm, June 1959

(From the papers DAGENS NYHETER and STOCKHOLM TIDNINGEN)

"...It is reported that a love affair between a 33-year-old Red Navy officer and a beautiful 22-year-old dark-haired girl led to their fleeing from Gdynia on Sunday evening. A day later, on Monday, around 2100 they arrived at Oland and landed in the eastern part of the island. The officer and the girl asked for political asylum.... According to a statement by the public prosecutor the Soviet officer, despite 3 days of interrogation, has not yet given a satisfactory explanation of his flight to the West...."

"...The commission on aliens decided on Thursday to grant the refugees political asylum...."

Kaliningrad, September 1959

(From an indictment)

"...On the basis of the facts Nikolay Federovich Artamonov is accused of betraying the motherland while carrying out a special assignment on a ship in the Polish port of Gdynia and of fleeing to Sweden, where he sought political asylum which was granted; that is, of committing a crime as stipulated by Article 1 of the law on criminal responsibility for state crimes...."

Washington, May 1956

Our consulate in Washington received materials pertaining to Artamonov and a photograph a few days following its request. He was not an imposter. He was a citizen of the Soviet Union who had committed a most grave crime against the motherland and who was abroad and seeking a meeting with a Soviet consular representative. For some reason he could not come to the consulate and he did not want any Soviet consular official to ring him at home. However, this did not change the essential nature of the case--a Soviet citizen had appealed to the Soviet Consulate. Therefore, Artamonov's request could not be ignored. And on the Saturday a representative of the Soviet Consulate arrived at the prearranged place in Washington.

"Our meeting lasted about 30 minutes. Artamonov told me that he had been half-drunk when he fled to Sweden. His passion for the women had gone to his head and this had led to the very grave error which he now deeply regretted. He had no other serious reasons for fleeing. Artamonov said this crime had led to another crime--in order to live abroad he agreed to cooperate with American intelligence and told a representative much of what he knew about the state of Soviet Navy. He realized that these crimes merited severe punishment. He said that all these years he had been unable to rest, thinking about the way he had betrayed his people, his family and his friends. [paragraph continues]

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Recently he had been unable to live with the thought--he believed that he was able to do something for the motherland and, in that way, at least to some extent, expiate his grave sin.

"I asked him how he intended to do this. Artamonov said that he was working as a consultant for the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and that he could give us what he thought was valuable information essential to the Soviet Union's security.

"In conclusion I told him I would report the contents of our conversation to the consulate. He thanked me and said: 'What do you think--is there a hope?' 'Of what?' I said. 'That I might be of some use.' I replied that I couldn't say anything about that. Artamonov said where he would be every Saturday between 1700 and 1715 over a two-month period, waiting to meet a consular representative...."

[Signed] An employee of the USSR Consulate in Washington.

Two weeks later Soviet representative Igor Aleksandrovich Orlov--this is the name we will use in this documentary sketch--turned up at the prearranged place to meet Artamonov.

I.A. Orlov:

What was the basis for our agreeing to make contact with Artamonov-Shadrin in 1966?

A careful study of documents--comments by Artamonov's colleagues and friends and the testimony of engineer Popov--convinced us that Artamonov's treachery and his flight to Sweden with his lover were not caused by any serious, say, ideological motives. He had many friends, a wife and a son whom he loved. Following his flight undispatched gifts wrapped for his family were found in the ship's cabin.

What happened to him? By all appearances, his rapid career had gone to his head: He had been promoted to the rank of subcommander third class at an earlier age than usual. He had begun to be affected by conceit, arrogance, egoism, a sense of "anything goes." The emergence of these qualities alienated his friends against their will; they knew him in another way. He began to seek new "friends." They were officers of foreign navies who were in Odynia at the time (some of them, it turned out later, had links with Western intelligence). They paid him compliments and unambiguously hinted that a man with his qualities could go a long way. He came to think of himself as exceptional. This coincided with his intoxication with (Yeva Gura), who told him she was pregnant by him. He had scarcely prepared for the flight. To him it was an unexpected and seemingly easy way out of a nasty personal situation, one promising interesting adventures. Even Swedish counterintelligence was unable to understand what made a man like Artamonov leave his motherland, home and the service and flee to a foreign country without money, unable to speak the language. The Swedes even suspected that Artamonov had been sent to their country as a Soviet agent.

None of this mitigated the crime committed by the traitor Artamonov, but it gave grounds for believing that it had been committed not by a malicious, long-disguised enemy of Soviet power but by an overly self-confident, vainglorious man infatuated with a woman and above all with himself.

Yet once the man had begun to betray, he could not stop. Artamonov agreed to cooperate with American intelligence. His crime became worse. He slid down the slippery slope. However, his quest for contacts with Soviet people might have indicated that deep down there was still a germ of humanity which at some stage began to sprout again and made the moral torment unbearable. And he might have decided to make amends for at least part of his guilt.

Often people who are voluntarily cast into the capitalist world and deprived of links with the motherland begin, albeit belatedly, to realize what a terrible mistake they have made and try their best to retrieve their right to serve the motherland. Some are grateful even for a chance to confess. This word sounds strange on the lips of a traitor, yet Artamonov himself repeatedly used it in later conversations with me when he talked about his misadventures abroad.

This was one train of thought we pursued. There was another possibility: Artamonov-Shadrin could be lying to us. He was in fact no repentant at all and, on instructions from his masters, could be trying to become a so-called "double agent" in order to play a "game" with us.

At first glance it may seem strange, but when we agreed to contact Artamonov both alternatives were real. At his first meeting with me, Artamonov said he was seeking contacts with Soviet people on instructions from his American masters in order to play a "game" with us, but this assignment coincided with his sincere desire to at least go some way toward making amends to the motherland.

You will agree that the situation was somewhat unusual. But, having looked at it and discussed it from all angles, we decided to continue contacts with Artamonov. In practical terms we were not risking anything even if his assurances of sincerity were sheer provocation. Naturally, he was unable to get from us any information which would be useful to an enemy. There could, however, be a lot to gain from the contacts if Artamonov was even half-sincere. All this had to be looked into....

Thus began my regular meetings with Artamonov.

From conversations with him we soon learned the details of his life abroad.

In July 1959, that is, just 1 month after fleeing, Artamonov was approached by Americans who suggested cooperating with U.S. intelligence. For this he was guaranteed transport to the United States, financial assistance and, subsequently, permanent work. He agreed. In September he was taken to the FRG and kept for 1 month in a small detached house belonging to U.S. intelligence near Frankfurt-am-Main. His physical and mental condition was checked, and ideological indoctrination was carried out. Conversations were held with him by the traitor Brodsky, who had worked in Leningrad before the war and gone over to the Hitlerites.

Artamonov was then taken to the United States (now under the name of Nicholas George Shadrin) and given accommodation in Alexandria near Washington, where people began systematically and painstakingly extracting information about our armed forces from him. I did not ask him what he told the Americans. There was no point in asking. We simply believed that he had revealed to them everything he knew, and of course, a senior [as published] naval officer's knowledge would do us palpable harm when handed to the enemy.

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Having dumped Artamonov Gray, they surrounded him with a gang of traitors, the henceforth were to be company for him. One Nikolay Kozlov was appointed his guardian.

From information on N.V. Kozlov:

"...Born in 1918. In 1945 he went over voluntarily to the side of the Hitlerites. In May of the same year he graduated from a school for propagandists near Berlin. Served as chief of staff of the 2d Regiment of the 1st Russian Liberation Army Division. After the war he was in (Silyasgym) prisoner-of-war camp, where he participated in preparing false documents for Russian Liberation Army employees. In 1949 he became a secret employee of U.S. intelligence. Employed in selecting and training cadres for the CIA with a view to getting them into the Soviet Union's territory. A profoundly immoral and unprincipled person. Feared and despises Americans, conceals from the bosses the fact that he has a mother in the Soviet Union, fearing that this fact could damage his position in the special services. Detests the Soviet Union...."

I.A. Orlov:

Nikolay Kozlov reported regularly to his bosses on his "ward's" frame of mind. But Kozlov was just one of the people surrounding Artamonov. There was, for example, one Sergey Gerdoyev, who was morally thoroughly corrupt and who fled to the Americans then West Germany in 1952. Both the Russians and the Americans knew that this individual was, on top of everything else, paranoid.

Artamonov observed these people and was gradually seized with horror, as he put it: He was becoming--if he had not already become--the same as they were. But he was not free to choose a different society for himself. And he had to keep company with such as Kozlov and Gerdoyev. The danger of irretrievably losing everything human was, in his words, growing.

In the mid-sixties Artamonov was appointed DIA consultant on the Soviet Armed Forces. His function was to read Soviet newspapers and make use of the information supplied to him by the Americans to analyze the situation in the USSR Navy, to prepare reports for his bosses and to give lectures on these subjects for U.S. naval officers.

He was quite well off, above all thanks to (Yeva) (They were unlawfully married, despite the fact that he was not divorced from his wife, who was living in the USSR, who had a dental practice.) The Shadrings had no children.

He knew nothing of his wife and son. Only once--in September 1965--did he manage to convey to a female relative in Leningrad through an American lady tourist (Artamonov was afraid to send her to his wife) the fact that he was "alive, well and missing the family."

It was against the background of all this that Artamonov, as he put it, was increasingly coming round to the idea that he had to seek a way out of the conditions under which he placed himself. And, however strange it may seem, the Americans themselves facilitated the decision to come to us by setting him the task of seeking contacts with us.

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From N.V. Artamonov's statement to the USSR Supreme Court:

"...The years after I committed the very grave crime served as a hard lesson for me... I was never a deliberate, inveterate enemy of my motherland. At the same time it is necessary fully to recognize the whole gravity of the crime and its results, which are in no way different from the actions of the USSR's foreign enemies. While in no way freeing myself of responsibility for what I have done, I beg to be given the opportunity to expiate my guilt, to help my motherland in some way if I can, and then to return home...."

I.A. Orlov:

Artamonov handed me this statement at one of our meetings. It was Artamonov's dream, to use his words, to return home. He realized he would die if the Americans found out about this.

It is hard to believe someone who has committed a grave crime against his own people, and it is perfectly natural that we certainly could not trust him completely. He sensed our mistrust, felt it deeply and tried to do everything possible to prove his sincerity.

Of course, the Americans did not give him important secrets. But we were able to judge from his information where the Americans were directing their efforts in order to fill in gaps in their knowledge of our armed forces. Thanks to Artamonov, we received important information on many people working in U.S. intelligence, particularly in those sections dealing with deserters from the Soviet Union, on their work methods, on the organizational structure and so forth. Of course, he also brought us the information which has been compiled for him beforehand by his U.S. bosses so that he could play his "game" with us. And several times we indirectly "allowed" the Americans to come to the conclusion that we were "taking seriously" the information which Artamonov was bringing us on their instructions.

What were the Americans' intentions in sending Artamonov to meet us? For they were perfectly well aware that Artamonov would obtain no information on the Soviet Union during these meetings. So why did they play this game? First, with a view to the misinformation which, as they thought, they could send us through Artamonov. Second, so that Artamonov, by gaining our confidence, could seek out an opportunity--albeit after a long period of time--to draw some conclusions on "the work of Soviet counter-intelligence." And, third, Artamonov was maintaining in his bosses the illusion that with time we might assign him to meetings with a Soviet "secret agent" ["relegal"] on U.S. territory. 7

In this complex situation Artamonov acted at considerable risk to himself, perfectly well aware that the U.S. special services would deal with him on his very first mistake. The strain and the constant danger in which he found himself told on him. In the last years it was increasingly felt that Artamonov was tired. He frequently spoke of missing his motherland and family and remembered his naval service.

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When we learned in the fall of 1975 that Artamonov would be able to come to Austria, we agreed on a meeting with him in Vienna to discuss questions of his return home. The meeting was fixed for a place near the Votivkirche. This place is directly opposite the U.S. Consulate. Artamonov, as he had warned us, had informed the Americans about this meeting. Perhaps we were photographed. Of course, this troubled neither him nor me.

Vienna, 18 December 1975

Orlov and Artamonov met near the huge cathedral building, as agreed, at precisely 2000. ;

Despite the rather cold weather, Artamonov was hatless--Orlov had never seen him in head-gear--and scarfless, although his topcoat was neatly buttoned right up.

He smiled with joyful relief, went up to Orlov and could not restrain himself from embracing him:

"I've escaped at last!... How afraid I was that we wouldn't meet!"

Crossing the square, they turned into one of the streets, went several blocks, turning now right and now left, and finally stopped by a car which was waiting for them. No one "led" [vel] them. The snow-covered streets were deserted. They got into the car, executed several control maneuvers to lose any possible "tail" and headed for the part of the city where the conversation was to take place.

"...Artamonov complained of fatigue. This difficult operation was also tiring. He said his work for U.S. intelligence was a burden to him. He once again mentioned his statement addressed to the USSR Supreme Soviet. He very keenly raised the question of returning home. I said that the solution of this question was drawing to an end and that I would obviously be able to inform him of official permission at one of our subsequent meetings. Artamonov continued to press-me. I replied that I would do everything possible. We agreed to meet on 20 December."

[Signed] I. Orlov

Vienna, 20 December 1975

"...Artamonov did not show up at the appointed time for the meeting in the agreed place on 20 December."

[signed] I. Orlov

I.A. Orlov:

And there was no signals from him on subsequent days. We had already decided to organize a search, using our possibilities, but on 30 December the Foreign Ministry received notification from the U.S. Embassy in Moscow...

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Moscow, 30 December 1975

At 1530 the USSR Foreign Ministry consular administration was visited by Counsellor Clifford Gross, chief of the consular section at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, who handed over the following note: "As has become known, Nicholas George Shadrin, who is now a U.S. citizen, met with two Soviet officials in Vienna on 18 December.... He again met with them in Vienna on 20 December but did not return after this meeting and has been missing since that day...."

I.A. Orlov:

I do not know to what extent the Americans suspected Artamonov or when mistrust of him began to predominate in their assessment of the "double agent."

Latterly he was filled with a sense of gratitude toward us for having definite faith in him and because he now had the prospect of returning home and justified hope that his severe sentence would be reconsidered. A few careless phrases attesting to a change in the mental state of Shadrin-Artamonov, and the specialists surrounding him might have suspected that the "double agent" of the U.S. special services had come under our influence. We had foreseen this danger and warned him of it. But I am not sure that he could have coped and followed our advice to the end. Perhaps Artamonov made some tragic mistake after 18 December and the CIA, learning of his upcoming return home, realized that the game was lost and that it was a scandalous failure, hastened to remove Artamonov and accused the other side to cover the traces. I would not like to think the worst but, knowing the CIA's methods, I find it hard to assume that he is being kept prisoner; it is too dangerous for them....

From the author:

I did not know Artamonov, and so I have tried to set down this story in such a way as to exclude the author's subjectivity as far as possible and to reduce to a minimum the retelling of this man's tragic fate "in my own words." I was familiarized at the KGB with the documents relating to this case. I spent many hours in conversation with Igor Aleksandrovich Orlov, who is now in Moscow, listening to his story, a small--but, in my view, very significant--part of which has been cited in this feature.

In conclusion, however, I would like to share with the readers some of my own thoughts, which do not require special knowledge just logic.

I, like Orlov, have no doubt that the "disappearance" of Shadrin-Artamonov was the handiwork of the CIA. It was hardly revenge against him--the CIA is a powerful enough organization to allow itself to disregard emotions. No, it was an essential--from the CIA's viewpoint--measure and the only one which could save the already dishonorable organization from another scandal. For almost 10 years--starting in the spring of 1966--the CIA, the FBI and the DIA reported to the top leaders of the U.S. administration (first Democratic, then Republican) on Shadrin's "vigilant" operation against Soviet counterintelligence. And it suddenly turns out that their "most valuable agent" is nurturing the idea of returning home. And, God forbid, he will do so at a time of emotion uplift [dashhevny poryv]!

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UNITED STATES

Imagine for a moment the faces of CIA, FBI and DIA leaders at the thought, for example, that on returning to the USSR Artamonov would address a press conference at which he would describe how everything happened in actual fact. After all the scandals and exposures which had recently rained down on the heads of the CIA and the FBI this would be a new, shameful failure for them, and on the eve of the 1976 presidential election, moreover!

...On 20 December 1975, as the U.S. press reports, Artamonov set out at the agreed time from the Hotel Bristol, where he was staying in Vienna, for his meeting with Orlov (immediately after the previous meeting on 13 December Artamonov--once again as the U.S. press reports--had informed his CIA guardian of the upcoming meeting). But he did not turn up for the meeting: He was kidnaped on the way by a special group of the CIA or the FBI (I do not know which of these establishments had come out in front in fulfilling the last mission regarding the "double agent"), and the U.S. administration was informed that Shadrin, who had set out for a preplanned meeting with a KGB employee in Vienna, "did not come back" and had thus been "kidnaped by Soviet intelligence."

This, or something like this, might be a representation of the operation against Shadrin-Artamonov which, according to its authors' plan, was supposed not only to allow U.S. special services to protect their innocence but also to make capital out of it. Of course, this is only supposition, and scarcely anybody, apart from a very limited number of people in the American special services, can confirm its authenticity. But the logic of the events inexorably leads one to believe that this was how it happened, more or less.

There is indirect evidence of this:

--For 18 months the American authorities did not publicize the events connected with Shadrin-Artamonov. Yet the United States always makes the best of an opportunity to fan an anti-Soviet campaign, particularly for the purpose of spy mania. The U.S. State Department even expressed regret at the fact that it had been unable to avoid the publication of the materials on the Shadrin case despite all the measures it had adopted;

--(Yeva Gura), whom the American special services had brought out of Vienna immediately after 20 December 1975, was "recommended" not to talk to anyone about Shadrin's disappearance. The American press got hold of this information only recently, thanks to the activity of (Yeva Gura's) lawyer;

--And, finally, the American special services have for a long time been resorting to killing people who are a threat to them, and not only political enemies but also their own servants who for some reason have become a nuisance. The Artamonov case fits into this train of thought. Are the world and the Americans themselves really not aware that the CIA and other U.S. special services have repeatedly deceived their own administration, not to mention Congress? The recent investigation of the CIA's activity by the Church Senate committee was a fine illustration of this.

Lastly, Artamonov committed the gravest sin against the motherland--treason although later, by all appearances, he tried to find a way out of his predicament. Nobody deprived him of his Soviet citizenship. Artamonov did not cease to be a USSR citizen because U.S. Congress declared "Nicholas George Shadrin" an American citizen. His wife and son are in the Soviet land. We have a right to join them in demanding a reply from the American authorities: Where is Nikolay Fedorovich Artamonov, and what has become of him?

12 SEP 1977

ILLEGIB

PROGRAM: AS IT HAPPENS

AUGUST 19, 1977

HOSTS: Geoff CARRUTHERS - Allen MAITLAND

Subject of program:

The disappearance of double agent Nicholas SHADRIN.

20579

ITLAND

Double agent Nicholas SHADRIN never returned from his last mission, and spy bosses in both Russian and the United States are pointing the accusing finger at each other. The Central Intelligence Agency, co sponser with the F.B.I. of SHADRIN's last rendezvous with the Soviets, accused the K.G.B. of snatching back the Soviet defector and executing him. This week the Soviet newspaper, Lizrarey (ph) Gazette, published another version of the SHADRIN saga. Accordingly, the KGB claims the C.I.A. caused SHADRIN's disappearance and probably murdered him. Nicholas SHADRIN, born Nicoli ATAMONOV, former captain of a Soviet destroyer, defected to the United States with his Police bride, Blanka in 1966. He was persuaded by United States authorities to work for the Defence Intelligence Agency, the C.I.A. and the F.B.I. In December 1975, SHADRIN met two KGB agents in Vienna, ostensibly to pass doctored information to the Soviets provided by the F.B.I. A C.I.A. agent was supposed to monitor the transfer, but never showed. Nicholas SHADRIN has not been seen since that fateful night. Blanka SHADRIN believes her husband is in a Soviet prison camp. She's waiting to talk to us from Washington. In Moscow we have reached Marvel KUZNETSOFF (ph), news analyst for the American section of Radio Moscow.

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ARRUTHERS Mr. KUZNETSOFF, why did the Literary Gazette see fit to publish this story about Nicholas SHADRIN now?

KUZNETSOFF Well I suppose the story that appeared in the United States press, I guess Newsweek is one of the magazines that published a big article about that, July, and I think this is in return to give our side of the story.

ARRUTHERS Okay. What is Moscow's side of the story about SHADRIN's disappearance?

KUZNETSOFF In a nutshell?

ARRUTHERS Yeah, please.

KUZNETSOFF Well I think it is clear that SHADRIN, or Mr. ATAMONOV, his Russian name is ATAMONOV.

ARRUTHERS One and the same.

KUZNETSOFF Yes. He was abducted by a group of C.I.A. or F.B.I. agents on, I give December 18th, 1975, and that he may not be alive at this moment and the responsibility for this act, the CIA or the FBI is responsible for his disappearance and probably murder. That's the ..(word not clear)..of the story as being presented by Literary Gazette.

ARRUTHERS Okay, why would the C.I.A. or the F.B.I., for that matter, want to have SHADRIN murdered?

KUZNETSOFF Well the idea is that after his defection, the act of treason because he was a naval officer, he began to feel someof

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he was still ... (not clear) ... his motherland and he decided to co-operate with the Soviet intelligence agency, kind of paying back on the treason. His environment, his people, C.I.A. people surrounding him, his friends, new friends, began to suspect that he was planning to defect back home ... (not clear) ... back home and that might be the reason for liquidating him.

WARRRUTHERS Oh I see. Mrs. SHADRIN, did you have any indication that your husband wanted to defect back to Russia?

SHADRIN My husband, it was not even once out of million that he would defect. Of course we don't believe Russian story.

WARRRUTHERS Didn't he have a wife and a child back there?

SHADRIN No, he never had a child. This child was his ex wife's child from the previous marriage.

WARRRUTHERS Okay, but he did have a wife.

SHADRIN He was divorced from his wife.

WARRRUTHERS Divorced in Soviet Russia or divorced elsewhere?

SHADRIN No, it was Mexican divorce.

WARRRUTHERS I see. What was Mr. SHADRIN doing in Vienna when he disappeared? Do you know that Mr. KUZNETSKOFF?

KUZNETSOFF Well the reason that was Mr. SHADRIN, or ATAMONOV, according to his plan to disappear from the United States would be most

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appropriate from some other country, Austria.

SHADRIN Why he would take me along to Vienna if he had any intention of going back to Soviet Union?

BRUTHERS Did you hear that?

IZNETSOFF Okay. She says, why would SHADRIN have taken his wife along to Vienna if he had any intention of going back to the Soviet Union?

IZNETSOFF Well as far as I remember there's nothing in the article about his wife being with him in Vienna.

BRUTHERS Okay, you're a news analyst now, right, you follow the American press very carefully. What do you view - how do you view the whole situation having seen, I suppose, both sides of the story.

IZNETSOFF Well I read the story, the American version in Newsweek and actually it blames this country for the disappearance of Mr. SHADRIN, or ATAMONOV. Well our newspaper blames the Americans, United States intelligence for either murdering him or taking him prisoner somewhere. Well, I was not there, I'm a journalist not an intelligence officer, and I come to believe our newspaper.

SHADRIN I don't believe, we don't believe, nobody believes Russian version. I want meet this Igor KARLOFF (ph), alias Arla KOSLOFF (ph) and(not clear).....face to face and let him bring the evidence that C.I.A. killed my husband, and I'll bring mine and I will be willing to submit to lie detector test

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if they do the same. And let's see if they refuse. If they refuse we can assume they are lying. Now if they agree, what a beautiful propoganda for them.

KUZNETSOFF Well I can understand Mrs. SHADRIN's feelings, but I certainly think that Radio Moscow is the right address for taking contest with the KGB. I'd like to repeat I'm a journalist, not an intelligence officer.

ARRUTHERS Thank you Mr. KUZNETSOFF. Thank you Mrs. SHADRIN.

AITLAND Blanka SHADRIN, wife of the missing agent, Nicholas SHADRIN, spoke to us from her home in Washington. Pazel KUZNETSOFF is news analyst for the American section of Radio Moscow. He spoke to us from Moscow.

JM 9-9-77

20 Aug 77

parade

AUGUST 28, 1977

on the cover: **Blanka Shadrin in Front of Her
Wedding Picture in McLean, Va., Home —
Will the Russians Return
The Man She Loves?**

by Jack Anderson

20580

A few weeks ago newspapers revealed the disappearance in Vienna of Nicholas G. Shadrin, a double agent working for the FBI. Shadrin is believed to have been kidnapped by Soviet intelligence agents and taken to Russia. All efforts to obtain his release have been unavailing. The full love story of Shadrin and his wife and her efforts to bring him back to their American home have never been told.

Jack Anderson has known the story for more than a year and held it up for fear that publicity could cost Shadrin his life. But now that some of the details have been published, Anderson can for the first time divulge the whole dramatic story of an unusual romance wrapped in international espionage.

WASHINGTON, D.C.

It began as a love story on Oct. 20, 1958, in a remote seaport in Poland.

A dashing, young Russian naval captain became captivated by the flashing dark eyes of a winsome Polish girl. They ran off together, fleeing by boat across the stormy Baltic Sea to a tiny Swedish fishing village.

It ended as a spy story on Dec. 20, 1975, on the crowded streets of Vienna. The Soviet defector, now an American double agent, held a meeting with two KGB agents on the steps of a Vienna church. Two days later, although he sensed something was wrong, he kept another appointment with the same men. He disappeared without a trace, to the consternation of FBI agents who had carefully set up the meeting but had failed to have him shadowed for his protection.

Blanka Shadrin reminisced about her missing husband Nick in the living room of her comfortable suburban Washington home. She sat erect, her emotions under tight control, with her hands folded primly in her lap.

Room full of memories

In Nick's empty study are his treasured books and hunting trophies. Signs of his presence abound.

It was painful for Blanka to talk about the life they had shared. Her eyes gave her away, as she fought back the tears of remembrance. Suddenly, they spilled over. The voice held steady. Then, for just a moment she lost control. "I know he's coming back," she blurted fiercely. "I know he's coming back. I have amazing intuition."

The spy story she now feels compelled to tell the world began not for politics but for love. It began in her hometown of Gdynia, Poland, where the Russians had come with a destroyer and submarine to conduct a training mission. She met the handsome Russian destroyer captain at a party. His name was then Nikolai F. Artamonov. He became Nicholas G. Shadrin after they

PARADE • AUGUST 26, 1977

Will the Russians Return the Man She Loves?

by Jack Anderson

Blanka Shadrin gazes wistfully at the water of the Chesapeake Bay where she and her husband...

arrived in America.

As Nick was to tell her many times during their idyllic, 17-year marriage, her large, dark eyes cast a spell over him. It was love, he said, at first sight. It was three months, however, before they met again. Then they began to attend concerts and operas together.

He was a gregarious 30, she a shy 21. Blanka was enrolled in medical school and working at the Gdynia hospital. Their love affair, she said, was a tender,

mature experience.

There were formidable obstacles, however, in the way of their happiness. He already had a wife and stepchild in Russia. It would not be difficult to get a divorce; the marriage laws in Russia were lenient. But he held too important a rank and had too bright a naval future to be permitted to marry a foreigner.

As they were swept up in their affair, however, nothing seemed to matter. Nick made up his mind to defect to

Sweden, across the dangerous Baltic, in March of 1959. He worked out the details in his head for two months before he disclosed his intentions to Blanka.

They decided to defect for only one reason: to be together. "His love was too strong," she said simply, "for him ever to go back to Russia."


Nick's rank gave him access to the ship's launch. He also knew the Baltic, he assured Blanka, "like the inside of my pocket." Most important, he knew



Blanka and Nick on their wedding day in the U.S. in 1960. Their love affair took them on a perilous journey by boat from Poland to Sweden, and finally to asylum in America.



"I know he's coming back," says Blanka. "I have amazing intuition." At suburban home in McLean, Va., she awaits Nick's return with his faithful German shepherd, "Treze."



band, Nick, spent many happy hours boating. Nick, a Soviet defector who was an American double agent, disappeared in 1975 on an FBI mission in Vienna.

what areas were covered by Russian and Polish radar.

Nick let it be known he was going fishing and ordered a steward to prepare a basket of food. He brought along a seaman, disciplined to obey his superior officer without question, to help man the launch. It was close to 8 p.m. when he picked up Blanka. She left behind a note advising her mother that she and Nick had decided to attend an international fair in Poznan—a small ruse to deceive the police who would be sure to start checking.

They made their way to a lonely spot on the darkening waterfront. She stepped, trembling, aboard the launch.

Nick nosed the launch away from the pier and steered an erratic course to avoid patrol boats and radar sweeps. The voyage had all the elements of a Hollywood suspense film. About four hours out, high winds began kicking up whitecaps, and flashes of lightning silhouetted them against the sky. One of those blinding flashes could reveal them to a Soviet warship.

Once, Nick froze as he swept his naval binoculars across the darkened horizon and spotted the silhouette of a destroyer. He stared into the darkness and then relaxed. "West German," he said. The flight across the Baltic lasted a harrowing 20 hours. They never opened the food basket. "Our hearts were in our throats the whole time," said Blanka.

Tongues loosened

They finally approached a small Swedish fishing village in the quiet of late morning. Nick and Blanka waved urgently at some Swedish fishermen tending their nets. "Police! Police!" they shouted. "Take us to the police!" The Swedes shrugged, uncomprehendingly. Then Nick, with sudden inspiration, produced a bottle of cognac from the food basket and passed it around.

furt, where Nick was interrogated for three weeks. Then they boarded another CIA plane for Washington's Andrews Air Force Base. They spent the next nine months in a "safe house" in Virginia.

The years that followed, according to Blanka, were routine on the outside but joyous and fulfilling in their devotion to each other. "He is the most intelligent, the most wonderful person I have ever known," she said, the mist again overflowing her eyes.

Devoted to her

As she talked, a portrait took shape of Nicholas Shadrin. He was an ingratiating, gregarious man whom almost everyone liked, a man of furious physical energy and capacity for work, an outdoorsman who loved to hunt and fish. Yet he was also a devoted husband.

By day, Nick was a consultant on Soviet naval matters; at night, he attended a local university and worked toward an engineering master's. He settled finally into a middle-level, low-security job with the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency.

Blanka, meanwhile, studied English and dentistry. She worked for awhile in a dental clinic and then opened her own dental office in their McLean, Va., home. Nick built the office and installed the equipment.

Then the terrible chain of events began. Nick carefully protected Blanka from the knowledge, but in 1966 he was visited by two KGB agents who pressured him to spy on his adopted country.

Nick immediately notified the FBI. After some reflection, the FBI came back with a proposition. Would Nick pretend to accept the KGB offer while he actually spied on the KGB for the FBI? Blanka has since learned that Nick refused for a year to become a double agent because of the tremendous risks.

But the FBI brought pressure on him through the Pentagon. In the end, he could no longer resist the request. So he began cautiously to provide his KGB contacts with documents prepared by the CIA. He appeared to be making progress with the Soviets. They asked him to come to Montreal in 1971 and to Vienna in 1972 for KGB training. The FBI instructed him to play along. He used a pretext to take his beloved Blanka with him on both trips.

Mysterious calls

She was told nothing of his real mission. In retrospect, she can now recall small occurrences that should have alerted her. There were telephone calls from men with grim Russian accents. But her husband knew several Russian emigrés, so she dismissed any suspicions that may have flickered in her mind. One summer night in 1974, she answered the telephone several times, but the caller kept hanging up.

Then came the fateful trip to Vienna in December 1975. The FBI in Washington notified the CIA station chief in Vienna of the preparations to send Nick and Blanka to Vienna, with a skiing trip as their cover. The CIA chief protested that the risk was too great.

The FBI was insistent. The CIA then proposed a counterplan. Let Nick meet with his KGB contacts in Vienna, and the CIA would keep him under surveillance. Too risky, said the FBI. The KGB would discover he was being watched. He would have to go alone.

Blanka knew none of this. She settled with Nick into suite 361 of Vienna's posh Bristol Hotel. They'd stay a few days, Nick said, long enough for them to shop and for him to complete some business with Russian acquaintances.

KGB promises

It is known that on Dec. 18 Nick met on the steps of the Votivkirche church with two KGB agents. He gave their names to the FBI afterward as Oleg Kozlov and Mikhail Kuryshev. He reported that they had praised his work and told him he would be promoted to a lieutenant colonel in the KGB. He said this made him nervous because the KGB was known to give reassuring news to potential victims to lull them into a false sense of security. He said they had also asked for a second meeting at the same location two nights later. Nick's "control officer" told him to keep the appointment.

Blanka sensed that Nick was ill at ease. He instructed her to write down the names of the two men. They talked expectantly about their skiing holiday, to begin Monday morning. He also took her shopping.

At 6:30 Sunday night, Nick finished a cognac in their suite and said he had a final business appointment to keep. He kissed his wife of 17 years and departed. He passed through the lobby, hailed a cab and disappeared.

Who's agent was he?

Some believe he is dead; others suspect he was a secret Soviet agent all along. Blanka believes neither. She is convinced Nick is alive, still in love with her and still loyal to his adopted country. She has his room ready, and she checks up regularly on his boat on the Chesapeake Bay. "I know Nick is coming back, and the boat is waiting for him," she said.

Intelligence sources have confirmed this much: Nick was kidnapped by the KGB in Vienna and dragged across the Czech border. We have seen detailed files on his case; they contain no hint that he has ever betrayed the United States. On the contrary, he played the dangerous espionage game for the FBI against his own inclinations. He fell into Soviet hands, apparently, because his superiors used poor judgment.

continued

This seemed to improve the fishermen's comprehension, and they began to communicate through sign language. They summoned a taxi, which drove them to the police station.

They were greeted with smiles, and they smiled back. For lack of better facilities, they were offered separate jail cells for the night. The next day a Swedish official, fluent in Russian, heard their story and took them to Stockholm or debriefing.

Swedish idyll

It was the beginning of the Swedish summer, and the couple spent the next three months in ecstasy. (Nick advised his geaman, incidentally, to return to Russia.) By early August, it began to dawn on Blanka that the friendly Swedes, nonetheless, were a homogeneous people with tight cultural ties.

"In Europe," Blanka explained, "if you are not a native of the country, you don't really belong. You are considered second-class citizen. So I began telling Nick that we should go to America, where all races blend together."

Nick was now a celebrated figure, one of the most important defectors to save the Soviet Union. He had been sentenced to death in absentia by a Soviet military court. The couple were convinced that KGB agents were on the rowl for him. They decided, therefore, that Blanka would be less conspicuous approaching the U.S. embassy.

She took the Stockholm subway to the embassy and asked to speak to someone who understood Russian. She requested American asylum and was told the embassy would first have to cable Washington for approval. The following day, Nick and Blanka were whisked from the embassy in a American car to a waiting CIA plane (had no markings). The plane was tall, and they sat on uncomfortable wooden benches. It flew them to Frank-



Nick was an avid hunter and fisherman in his spare time from the Pentagon, where he held a middle-level position with the Defense Intelligence Agency.

RUSSIANS CONTINUED

The determined Blanka, meanwhile, spent every available minute appealing to U.S. authorities to seek her husband's release. She hired the prestigious Washington law firm of Covington and Burling. Together they called upon anyone who might help from the President on down.

They made repeated approaches to then-Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. They waylaid then-President Gerald Ford at a White House reception.

But the story was always the same. Back came word from the State Department: "Kissinger believes the situation to be hopeless." Kissinger's assistant, Larry Eagleburger, complained about the FBI and CIA. "They got themselves into this with their harebrained schemes," he fumed. "Now they expect us to pull their chestnuts out of the fire." President Ford's national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft, telephoned Blanka: "You realize we do not have any leverage." His successor, Zbigniew

Brzezinski, told her: "A lot of U.S. citizens got in trouble while abroad. We have many cases like this."


Blanka sat in her living room, absently stroking the ears of Nick's German shepherd, "Trezor."

Nick's case has become both an international incident and an intelligence cause célèbre, meanwhile, with embarrassed intelligence agencies running in all directions and President Carter continuing to maintain a stony silence.

'Return my husband'

"I realize that my husband is no longer of value to American intelligence," Blanka said. "I also realize he has been drained by now of all he knows by the KGB. He has no value to anyone except to me. But he is an American citizen and a human being. President Carter has made speeches about human rights. I ask the President, and I ask the people of the world, to appeal to the Russians to return my husband."

Will the world listen to one lone woman begging for her man?



"The boat is waiting for him," says Blanka, who takes time from her dental practice to check up on Nick's boat, which bears her original Polish name.

FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

PROGRAM CBS Morning News STATION WTOP TV
CBS Network

DATE August 30, 1977 7:00 AM CITY Washington, D. C.

SUBJECT An Interview with Admiral Turner

BRUCE MORTON: Admiral Stansfield Turner is Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. He is also, because of President Carter's reorganization of the intelligence community, a Director who has somewhat more authority than his predecessors did over other intelligence agencies. Admiral Turner is here in our Washington studio this morning with correspondent Fred Graham.

Gentlemen.

FRED GRAHAM: Admiral Turner, the United States Government is preparing to sign a proposed treaty with Panama, which would turn the control of that canal over to the Panamanians by the year 2000. Has the CIA conducted a study as to the safety and advisability of this move?

ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER: That primarily, Fred, is a policy question, and we don't get into policy matters. However, in something like this, it is our responsibility to look at what foreign reaction will be and whether that could be friendly or adverse. And in this case we have looked at that and find that probable reaction of the Latin American countries around Panama would be very favorable.

GRAHAM: Well, now, some of the people who oppose the treaty, though, are afraid that something might happen down the road similar to what happened to the Suez Canal; that the canal, being taken over, would then be used in a discriminatory way or misused. Hasn't the CIA looked into whether that might happen?

ADMIRAL TURNER: No, those are all hypotheses as to policy matters that might or might not happen. We are not here to speculate on those.

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GRAHAM: Now also in the news recently is the question of Soviet -- the Soviet Embassy here in Washington eavesdropping on microwave transmissions used by people using the telephone around Washington and in and out of some of the major cities.

Why hasn't this government used the same sort of microwave bombardment that the Soviets use on our Embassy in Moscow?

ADMIRAL TURNER: There're lots of technical factors involved in this, and there also is the safety of our own people. There's the fact that we are an open and a free society, as opposed to the Soviet Union. But I can assure you that the government has been for some time, and is, doing everything it can to protect the American citizen against this illegal intrusion.

GRAHAM: Such as what?

ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, we are doing things like moving the communications into areas where they cannot be intercepted, and other things that would be inappropriate to discuss in any detail.

GRAHAM: Well, now, of course there's the question as to whether the Russian bombardment of our Embassy in Moscow has harmed the health of any of our people there. Is it that -- are we worried about the Russian personnel here when they may be endangering the health of our people in Moscow? Why should we be worried about that?

ADMIRAL TURNER: We are not persuaded that the bombardment in Moscow is injurious to the health of our people there.

GRAHAM: And so why don't we do it here?

ADMIRAL TURNER: Because there're lots of technical factors involved here, that the equities of the American people are at stake. And it just is a very complex legal and technical issue. But we're looking into every aspect of protecting American rights, and I'm persuaded that we can and will do that very well.

GRAHAM: Can I just straighten that out? Are you afraid that if we bombard the Embassy here, that some of that might go astray and harm the health of innocent Americans living and working around the Russian Embassy here?

ADMIRAL TURNER: I don't think that's a major consideration, no, because the levels of power required are not that great.

GRAHAM: Then I'm not quite sure that I understand why we're not doing it.

But let me go on to another recent intriguing incident in the news to me. Almost unprecedented to my knowledge, in recent

days the CIA counterpart in Russia, the KGB, alleged that perhaps a double agent who disappeared in Vienna in December of 1975 was in fact murdered, perhaps, by the CIA.

ADMIRAL TURNER: That's utter nonsense. Utter nonsense.

GRAHAM: Are you denying that now?

ADMIRAL TURNER: Absolutely.

GRAHAM: Well, what happened to that double agent?

ADMIRAL TURNER: That double agent went to Vienna for a proposed rendezvous that the KGB suggested with two KGB officers. He never returned from that rendezvous. One can hypothesize that he defected on his own voluntarily. One can hypothesize that he was abducted. I think the fact that he was last known to be in the company of two KGB officers is very incriminating.

GRAHAM: Why do you think they did this unusual thing about making a public -- a publication in a magazine over in Russia that the CIA might have done that?

ADMIRAL TURNER: I think they may be taking a cue from us, Fred. We're taking an attitude now in this country of being more open with our intelligence operations, with our intelligence information. We have tried in the last few months to give the American people more of the information that we obtain and which can be put in an unclassified form. We've tried to take the American people into our confidence more so they understand what we are doing. The cameras of your network, CBS, for instance, were the first ones ever to enter the halls of the CIA, with its "60 Minutes" show. I doubt that the KGB is really doing that, but we're certainly trying this.

GRAHAM: But if the KGB in its version of what you're doing is lying, which you just said they are, how do we know you're not going to lie to us?

ADMIRAL TURNER: Because we have all kinds of oversight procedures in this country. We have a free media, for instance, such as this interrogation that you and I are going through today here. And we intend by our forthrightness, by our openness to show the American people that we are honest and that we are conducting our intelligence operations in ways in which they would be proud.

GRAHAM: Why are you doing this?

ADMIRAL TURNER: Because I believe sincerely that the strength of this country rests with an informed electorate. And if the electorate of this country can benefit by having some of the information that we have and which we can, without harming

the national security, share with them, we're going to have a better and a stronger country.

GRAHAM: Very quickly, Admiral Turner, some of the friends of former Director Richard Helms are saying that if he is indicted on charges of perjury and other charges, that it could be devastating to our CIA operation and our allies.

Can you comment on that?

ADMIRAL TURNER: Yes. There's no question that if you prosecute in a case like this, we will have to release certain national security information that will harm the country's interest.

It is my job not to pass judgment on whether that is a worthwhile thing to do or not, but simply to make available to the appropriate authorities what information we would have to release and how important we think it is. From there, a judgment has to be made whether the interests of the country are better served by prosecution, if that were, in fact, the recommendation of the grand jury, or in preserving the information intact.

GRAHAM: Thank you very much, Admiral Stansfield Turner.

ADMIRAL TURNER: Thank you.

MAY 78

BALTIMORE SUN

What Did Shadrin Take with Him in from the Cold?

Washington.

ONE of the most mysterious spy stories circulating around here is that of Nikolai Shadrin, the Soviet naval officer who defected to the

By Stanley Karnow

United States in 1959 and evaporated in Vienna nearly three years ago.

The general assumption is that Shadrin, who had become a double agent, was abducted by the Russians after they learned he was operating for the Central Intelligence Agency while pretending to work for the KGB, the Soviet secret service.

That assumption prompted President Ford to query Leonid Brezhnev, the Soviet Communist party leader, for information on Shadrin, and Henry Kissinger, when secretary of state, also raised the case with Andrei Gromyko, the Russian foreign minister. Both Mr. Ford and Mr. Kissinger drew blanks.

But sources familiar with the affair now submit that Shadrin was really a Communist agent all along, and though some senior CIA officials

had good reason to suspect him, others insisted on pushing through his clearance because he served their own purposes.

As these sources tell it, warnings about Shadrin were issued on at least two separate occasions by the CIA's counterintelligence section, which had interrogated him intensively. But the warnings were either ignored or overruled by the agency's Soviet Bloc department, which desperately needed data and thus wanted to believe that Shadrin could be trusted.

These disclosures suggest that elements inside the CIA are often so anxious to score points that they are willing to court security risks. That the CIA has frequently suffered from an excess of zeal has also been seen in its eagerness to engage in assassination plots and other dubious ventures.

This thesis is disputed by other informants with intimate CIA connections. They assert that Shadrin would never have been cleared by the agency had there been misgivings about him. In their estimation, Shadrin was a genuine defector who was overexposed by the CIA and ended up being trapped by the Russians.

Substantiation for this thesis is contained in the report the other day that Shadrin had been reluctant to accept the double agent assignment, but was persuaded by the CIA to take it in order to bolster the position of a real KGB operative who sought to work secretly on behalf of the United States.

Whatever the truth in all this, it is clear that the Shadrin business is still a focus of enormous controversy, and is likely to remain so until harder evidence is forthcoming—which may be never. In the absence of such evidence, I think it is worthwhile to present a new version of the story, even though it cannot be entirely validated.

Shadrin, whose name was originally Nikolai F. Artamonov, fled from Poland to Sweden in June, 1959, accompanied by a young Polish woman who later became his wife. They were flown by the CIA to West Germany, and were grilled at length by Russian speaking agency interrogators.

Sources here recall that Shadrin failed the lie-detector tests given him at the time. As a result, counterintelligence specialists expressed doubts about his credibility and even cautioned that he might be a Soviet "plant."

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Nevertheless, he was transferred to Washington and not long afterward put to work in the Office of Naval Intelligence as an evaluator of Soviet naval data.

But doubts persisted and in 1964, the sources recollect, Shadrin was again subjected to interrogations and lie-detector tests. Again it was concluded that he was untrustworthy.

Once again, though, that judgment was rejected. Shadrin not only continued at his post, but was soon shifted to the Defense Intelligence Agency, where he translated Russian military literature.

It was in the summer of 1966 that Shadrin became a double agent. The standard version of his metamorphosis is that he was contacted by the KGB with an offer to spy for Moscow, reported the approach to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and was told to play the game. Sources who have monitored him for years, however, have a different account.

They say the KGB, which was really employing Shadrin, was then beginning to worry about his safety. Therefore, the KGB devised the "double agent" ruse with two motives in mind.

First, by volunteering to deceive the KGB by covertly serving U. S. in-

telligence, Shadrin would restore the faith that his CIA mentors had initially placed in him.

Moreover, by revealing the KGB offer to the FBI, which would henceforth make him its protege, he was reinforcing his bureaucratic protection within the American intelligence community and might eventually be able to play one agency off against another.

One major question, of course, is why the KGB went to all this trouble, since Shadrin was never privy to the most classified material. But according to sources who tracked him, it was enough that he mingled with high Pentagon officers and perhaps picked up bits of information. Shadrin's prominent friends included Admiral Rufus L. Taylor, the director of naval intelligence.

In addition, these sources emphasize, the KGB is a bureaucracy whose bosses regard it as quite an achievement to penetrate one of their men deep into the enemy camp, even if he produces little of value.

In his purported pose as double agent, Shadrin went through the motions of encountering his KGB counterparts in Washington and in such cities abroad as Montreal and Vienna. The guess is that, after almost a

decade of shadowy maneuvers, he decided to return home—or "come in from the cold," as spies would put it.

Interestingly enough, it was he rather than the CIA or FBI who proposed to meet the KGB in Vienna in late 1975—the rendezvous from which he vanished. Vienna is only a short drive from the Czechoslovak frontier, and hardly the spot he would have selected had he considered himself in danger of a KGB kidnaping.

The Shadrin mystery has inspired other interpretations, including the official Kremlin theory that he was murdered by the CIA as he attempted to go back to the Soviet Union. In the view of some experts, the Russians made the extraordinary move of publishing their account in order to obfuscate the case.

It is impossible, as I have said, to document the version that Shadrin was secretly representing the KGB. It is equally impossible, however, to verify the tale that he was snatched away by Soviet agents.

Plainly, though, the CIA bungled—either by failing to check out his *bona fides* thoroughly or by failing to prevent his abduction. But then, it hasn't been the first time that the CIA has bungled.

The Shadrin Affair: A Double Agent Double-Crossed

By Tad Szulc

“... Shadrin disappeared after United States intelligence senselessly thrust him into the role of double agent with the KGB ...”

It was through a stunning succession of blunders, carelessness, and inexcusable acts of intelligence greed spanning a sixteen-year period that the United States lost its most valuable Russian military defector. The missing man is believed to be either dead or incarcerated in the Soviet Union.

There are still questions which probably never will be satisfactorily answered, but all indications are that the man known as Nicholas George Shadrin was kidnapped by the Soviets through the fault of American intelligence agencies. There is little reason to believe that he redefected voluntarily, that he was killed by the CIA (as the Russians have insinuated), or that, tired of being a pawn for both sides, he decided to create a new life for himself somewhere in the world.

Shadrin disappeared in Vienna in December 1975, after United States intelligence had senselessly thrust him into the immensely dangerous role of a double agent working with the KGB, the Soviet secret service. He vanished under circumstances that make it clear that he was cruelly used by his superiors as bait for the Russians. Spies, after all, are expendable when they become a problem.

That Shadrin, a gregarious, intelligent, onetime Soviet Baltic-fleet destroyer commander, was recruited by the CIA in 1959, and had not simply fled to the West to marry the woman he loved—as alleged at the time by him and the United States government—was a closely guarded secret, until now, and it sheds wholly new light on his covert relations with the American intelligence establishment.

It explains why he agreed to serve as a double agent under extremely bizarre and controversial conditions, and it may also help to explain the strange behavior, after his disappearance, of two succeeding administrations, their unwillingness to open secret intelligence files on him to his wife and her lawyer in their search for the truth, and the glaring inconsistencies encountered during a private investigation of the Shadrin case.

Defectors are one of the most sensitive subjects in intelligence operations, after all, and neither the administration on the highest level nor senior intelligence officers are prepared to discuss various theories surrounding the Shadrin case. (This reluctance was further enhanced by the defection last month of Arkady N. Shevchenko, the Soviet diplomat who served as undersecretary general of the United Nations in New York. Shevchenko is the greatest diplomatic intelligence prize ever won by the United States.)

At first, Shadrin was worth his weight in gold to the United States. At the time when the Soviet Union launched a major buildup of its navy, the information brought by Shadrin was crucial to the United States Navy. After he outlived his usefulness, however, he was transformed into a double agent to satisfy the insatiable appetite of American intelligence. If it were not for this greed, Shadrin would be living tranquilly in the United States today, like other Soviet defectors.

His name originally was Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov, but on orders, after his arrival in the United States, he changed it to Shadrin—after the hero

of Pushkin's tale *The Captain's Daughter* (his wife's father is a Polish merchant-marine captain). It was a pointless deception, because he testified to Artamonov in an open session of the House Committee on Un-American Activities in September 1960, and the audience included a Soviet diplomat busily taking notes. Afterward, no effort was made to conceal his real identity, and Shadrin was the nearest thing to a public figure in intelligence circles. This was the first major blunder that led to all the others.

Nobody, it seems, wishes to delve into intelligence secrets that could cause considerable embarrassment in the United States. Full disclosure could, for example, highlight the sixteen years of blunders surrounding Shadrin's activities in this country and abroad, methods employed by American intelligence, and conflicts involving the CIA, the FBI, and the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency.

Shadrin was not a run-of-the-mill spy or defector: He had high-level acquaintances and friendships in American intelligence, which made him a vulnerable figure.

One friend was Admiral Rufus L. Taylor, who, as director of naval intelligence, was his boss during the time the Russian ex-officer served as a special consultant to the navy. And Admiral Stansfield Turner, for example, got to know Shadrin sufficiently well to write him “Dear Nick” letters (Shadrin had lectured at the Naval War College). *Mystery men: CIA files yielded these photographs of KGB agents Oleg Kozlov (left) and Mikhail Kuryshov (center), possibly the last men to see Shadrin (right) alive.*

age, in the early 1970s, when Turner was his president).

It is noteworthy that after Shadrin's wife, Dr. Ewa Shadrin, deplored of any effective action by the Ford administration on his behalf and retained Richard D. Cepaken, a partner in the prestigious Washington law firm of Covington & Burling (once Dean Acheson's firm), the White House volunteered payment of the legal fees.

Ewa Shadrin accepted the offer. She is the Polish woman with whom Shadrin fled in 1959 and whom he married a year later in Baltimore. Now she practices dentistry in an office at their house in McLean, Virginia.

The law firm's bills were paid from February 1976 until August 1977, when the *Wall Street Journal* and the *Washington Post* published the first stories about Shadrin's disappearance. Payments have not been resumed yet, though the government says it has the matter under advisement.

Ewa Shadrin still does receive Shadrin's paychecks from the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), where her husband was ostensibly employed while serving as a double agent. She gets \$720 biweekly (after deductions), which adds up to \$18,720 annually.

Interestingly, neither side denies that Shadrin was a double agent. Immediately after his disappearance, CIA and FBI case officers told Ewa Shadrin that Nick, as he is known to his American friends, had been working since 1966 for United States intelligence. She claims he had never told her about it.

On the surface, the question seems to be whose "double" Shadrin really was—the Soviets' or the Americans'—but the truth is far more complicated.

The Shadrin story begins in September 1958, when the destroyer he had commanded for two years was assigned to the Polish naval base Okeswie, across the bay from the port of Gdynia. Under the supervision of an admiral, the Soviet task force was engaged with the Polish navy in the training of Indonesian naval officers and crews in anti-submarine warfare. This was the period of close collaboration between the Sukarno regime and the Soviet Union, which had supplied billions of dollars in arms to Indonesia.

Shadrin was then 30 years old, a brilliant officer with a superb career ahead. Born in Leningrad, he went through Frunze Naval Academy—a special distinction—and took a "com-

manders' course" in 1954. At 28, he was given the command of a destroyer, which he took on official visits to Denmark, Britain, and Malta. Finally came the assignment in Poland, and the word among his fellow officers was that Shadrin was destined to become perhaps the youngest admiral in the Soviet navy.

It was at a party at the Gdynia officers' club in the fall of 1958 that Shadrin first met an attractive Polish medical student, Ewa Góra.

By Ewa's account, Shadrin was a "very amusing man . . . wherever he went, he was the life of the party. . . . He could discuss any subject: His education wasn't just narrow naval education." He loved the theater and often took his friends to concerts. He was especially interested in opera: His mother had been an amateur singer, and Nick knew all the arias by heart.

In every way, it seems, Shadrin was different from other Soviet officers. For example: "Normally, Soviet officers couldn't come ashore when they wanted," Ewa explained. "They had to ask for permission, and it was rarely granted. . . . Nick informed the admiral that he was going to town."

Several times, Ewa says, Shadrin went ashore without telling anybody; on one occasion he was caught and had a dressing down. What emerges, though, is the image of a man who could get away with almost anything, who was more trusted than his fellow officers. This, of course, raises the question of why he received special treatment. CIA experts later wondered whether Shadrin had KGB ties that granted him special privileges. But nobody has come up with a clear answer.

In any event, Shadrin's freedom created the opportunity for CIA emissaries to approach him. This was the period when the CIA was engaging in its first clandestine effort to bring about the overthrow of Sukarno. A by-product of this activity was an attempt to penetrate the Soviet navy: The Office of Naval Intelligence was extremely anxious at the time to gather information on developments in the Soviet navy. It wanted a deep-penetration agent or, if at all possible, a high-ranking defector. Several Indonesian officers among the CIA's contacts—anti-Communist men from wealthy families—had been assigned to be trained in Poland, and Ewa remembers that an officer named Purnomo came on several occasions to the house of a Polish friend when

Shadrin was present and, at least once to her home to see him. Purnomo may have been the CIA's emissary.

One of the most difficult intelligence problems is to establish the motivation of defectors or potential defectors. A Ewa tells the story, Shadrin, estranged from his wife in the Soviet Union, had made up his mind to defect to the West as early as March 1959 as the only way to marry Ewa. Intelligence officers who have read parts of Shadrin's secret file at the CIA—the sections pertaining to his recruitment by the agency—think that while he undoubtedly wanted to marry Ewa, the final incentive was provided by American intelligence. Thus his motives were, indeed, mixed.

According to the CIA file, Shadrin agreed to defect with a cache of documents—copies of the Soviet navy "commander reports" that include current naval operational intelligence—and to serve as an adviser to United States intelligence on Russian navy matters. However, he was to arrange means of defection himself—the CIA couldn't help him there.

In return, Shadrin was guaranteed the new life in America, CIA payment for the completion of Ewa's dental education, his job, and citizenship.

He decided to flee by boat to Sweden on June 7, a Sunday, because there would be little traffic on the Baltic.

Shadrin and Ewa departed at 7:30 P.M. It was a clear and warm evening and the excuse was that they were going fishing. To avoid arousing suspicion he took along 25-year-old Ilya Aleksandrovich Popov, the sailor who always handled the 22-foot motor launch.

Ewa was forbidden by Shadrin to bring anything except for a handbag and a raincoat. They both wore sport clothes, although Shadrin had his uniform in the cabin. A gun was hidden below deck.

The crossing took 24 hours. There was no conversation with Popov, because in the Soviet navy a sailor is not permitted to address an officer without first being spoken to.

They landed Monday evening in a small fishing village on the Swedish island of Oland. Popov thought they were in Poland. The village was deserted, but after a while a few fishermen turned up. Shadrin and Ewa spoke neither Swedish nor English, and they could do was to repeat the word "police." They wanted to be taken to the nearest police station to ask for asylum. The Swedes were unresponsive.

until Shadrin produced a bottle of F. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/23 : CIA-RDP89B00307R000300180001-2
to take them, via ferry, to the town of Kalmar, where Shadrin identified himself to a Russian-speaking interpreter and asked for asylum. Within a day or two, he and Ewa were taken to Stockholm and housed in a jail during their interrogation. (Popov was returned to Poland.) Meanwhile, the Swedish press broke the story of the defection. It caused a minor sensation around the world, but to the CIA, Shadrin's flight was a major intelligence coup.

The next contact was with Captain Sven Rystrom, a Russian-speaking officer who had served as Swedish naval attaché in Moscow. According to Ewa, he warned them not to go to the United States, because "the Americans have the tendency to take advantage of people and then forget them." She adds: "And this is exactly what happened."

Two weeks later, though, when Shadrin and Ewa were released, Ewa presented herself at the American Embassy. A Russian-speaking diplomat received her in his office. Two days later, she says, "we left for West Germany." If Shadrin hadn't been expected, it is highly unlikely that they would have been flown out of Sweden so quickly. Normally, preliminary defector examinations last much longer.

Accompanied by a CIA escort, Shadrin and Ewa were flown from Stockholm to Frankfurt aboard a small aircraft—a CIA "black flight." They sat in a specially constructed concealed cabin. They arrived in Frankfurt on August 1 and were immediately taken to a CIA "safe house" outside the city.

After three weeks of intense interrogation, plus lie-detector and psychological tests, the Inter-Agency Defector Committee (made up of representatives of the CIA, the FBI, the State Department, and military-intelligence services) apparently accepted Shadrin's and Ewa's *bona fides*, and they were flown to Washington (on another CIA black flight) on August 21—again a relatively short time for defectors.

The debriefing process, in three Virginia safe houses, took nine months. Shadrin and Ewa were guarded around the clock by three CIA security officers. They smoked cigars and watched television," Ewa recalls.

Sometimes there were eight or ten intelligence specialists questioning Shadrin about the Soviet navy. There were CIA experts and specialists from the Office of Naval Intelligence in addition to Walter Onoshko, Shadrin's CIA case officer. The CIA interpreter was Walter Popov. Among naval specialists were Captain Thomas L. Dwyer, later coordinator of intelligence operations for the ship *Pueblo*, captured by North

Koreans, and William Howe, a civilian. Naval Intelligence officers who debriefed Shadrin say that he was everything the navy had wanted in the way of a first-rate defector. Not only was he familiar with operational data about Soviet destroyers and anti-submarine warfare, but he also displayed a profound knowledge of the overall workings of the Soviet navy.



The first meeting: Canadian Mounted Police took this CIA-file photograph of Shadrin meeting his KGB contact in Montreal.

On one occasion, Shadrin was taken to Norfolk, Virginia, to participate in anti-submarine-warfare exercises aboard a United States destroyer and, in fact, was given the command of the ship for the operation: A Naval Intelligence officer, impressed, remarked that "if all the Soviet-destroyer skippers are half as good as Nick, we have something to worry about."

On June 1, 1960, Shadrin began working as a consultant for the Naval Scientific and Technical Intelligence Center (STIC), a branch of the Office of Naval Intelligence. His six years with STIC were probably the happiest period in Shadrin's life in the United States. His job was to evaluate Soviet naval data with Naval Intelligence and CIA experts. During this time he worked closely with John Funkhouser, the CIA's leading naval specialist.

With \$10,000 from the CIA (this was part of the original defection deal), the Shadrins made the down payment on a small house in Arlington, Virginia, across the Potomac from Washington, their first real home in the United States. Ewa went to dental school for three years to obtain her license to practice in the United States (this, too, was part of the CIA deal); Shadrin obtained an engineering degree from George Washington University. In his spare time, he worked on building the motorboat he had always wanted.

On September 14, the CIA made the House Committee on Un-American Activities under his real name of Artyamonov. The committee also made a point of stressing Shadrin's importance by saying that he had been "singled out for special attention and commendation in the Soviet press."

Shadrin's service as STIC consultant ended, inexplicably, in June 1966. After several weeks of unemployment—and worry—Shadrin was offered a job as consultant to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). This was the period when Admiral Taylor, Shadrin's old boss as chief of Naval Intelligence, was serving a brief stint as DIA's deputy director before becoming deputy director of the CIA. It was perhaps not purely accidental that Shadrin was hired by the DIA: It appears to have been part of a larger plan U.S. intelligence had for him.

Unfortunately, Shadrin found the DIA job demeaning and boring. In collaboration with small-fry military defectors from Communist countries, he helped translate Soviet military literature into English. For an evaluator of naval intelligence, it was humiliating: Shadrin made no bones about this to his wife and friends, and before long he wanted to do something else. "Something else" turned up almost immediately, when Admiral Taylor proposed that Shadrin become a double agent as bait for the KGB. There are three versions of how Shadrin got involved in espionage.

The "official" version—the one given Ewa Shadrin by the FBI after her husband vanished—was that Shadrin was approached by KGB agents in Washington in the summer of 1966, right after he joined the DIA, with an offer to spy for the Soviet Union. According to this version, Shadrin reported this approach at once to the FBI, which asked him to pretend to accept the KGB proposal and, in effect, act as a double agent.

The second American version is that the reverse occurred. FBI agents, according to this version, had learned that KGB operatives with diplomatic cover were stalking the Old Post Office Building on Pennsylvania Avenue, where Shadrin's defectors' unit and the FBI field office were located. The FBI's surmise was that the Russians were trying to identify the bureau's agents and to approach one or more defectors. Since Shadrin was the most important person in this group, the FBI assumed that he would be the principal target.

On the strength of this suspicion, an assistant director of the FBI asked Admiral Taylor to instruct Shadrin to accept KGB overtures, should they oc-

To the CIA, however, it was a major intelligence coup..."

car. Taylor did so and Shadrin is said to have agreed without any hesitation.

And it was a self-fulfilling prophecy: Ten days later, a Soviet diplomat named Oleg Kozlov (known to be a KGB agent) accosted Shadrin at a bus stop at the corner of Lee Highway and Harrison Street in North Arlington to propose cooperation with the KGB. He is said to have produced photographs of Shadrin's first wife, along with a letter from her asking him to return to the Soviet Union. Still, according to this version, Shadrin agreed. Then he went to the FBI, which told him to establish a permanent contact.

According to the third version, which appeared in Moscow's *Literary Gazette*, Shadrin approached a Soviet Embassy employee at a local supermarket and asked to be returned to Russia. The *Gazette* says that the KGB agreed to help if Shadrin would first perform certain services.

All things considered, the second American version is probably closest to the truth, although Shadrin may have made the initial contact with the Soviets on the FBI's behalf.

Ewa Shadrin was presumably fed the "official" version to dispel any notion that her husband had been recruited for espionage by the Americans. It would look better if Shadrin appeared to be the victim of a KGB approach.

But even if the Americans did not set up Shadrin (though this is the most likely conclusion), it remains an act of utter folly to have engaged a valuable defector, with strong ties inside the intelligence community, in the double-agent business. The truth is that the FBI and the CIA didn't know what they wanted—other than to spot KGB agents—when they activated Shadrin.

To be sure, the FBI was gratified that the first questions the Russians asked Shadrin when they met for lunch at a Washington restaurant concerned the whereabouts of Nosenko, Golitsin, and other KGB defectors in the United States. Still, the operation was a marginal proposition.

Even more interest developed when the Russians wanted to know how the United States obtains intelligence about the Soviet navy. Now the intelligence officers saw a chance to escalate the Shadrin operation. Their notion was to feed disinformation to the Soviets on American intelligence methods. This had to be done with extreme care, because Soviet experts at the other end were certain to spot anything that

looked phony and conclude that Shadrin was a double agent. As an intelligence officer put it, "We gave them soft, but not false, information."

This relationship continued for nearly five years. Shadrin maintained his high visibility, in part because he insisted on leading a normal life, but, in retrospect, Ewa thinks it odd that Nick was the only visible Soviet defector and that he had no special protection. She was never told, of course, that he was a double agent.

The great turning point in Shadrin's double-agent career came in 1971. Late in the summer, his KGB contact asked him to make a trip abroad. No reason was given, and Finland was proposed at first as a meeting site. This, however, was judged too dangerous by the Russians themselves, and they changed their minds, suggesting Montreal instead. FBI and CIA handlers told Shadrin that if the operation were to be maintained, he had no choice but to accept the trip. Thus the irrevocable step was taken and, as one of Shadrin's

CIA friends said later, "Nick was trapped." Had reason prevailed at that time, the operation would have been aborted and the ultimate tragedy might have been averted. But intelligence greed reigned, and the Shadrins flew off to Canada in September.

Shadrin told his wife that the trip would be their vacation, but that in Montreal he had to meet a person who had "worked for the United States for 25 years." This was the FBI cover story. The Shadrins spent a night in Montreal, and Nick spent the evening out meeting his "friend." The next day, they rented a car and drove to Mont Tremblant.

Was it safe for Shadrin to leave the United States on his own? The FBI evidently had some reservations because it asked the intelligence division of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police to provide protective coverage.

The Montreal coverage yielded a long-lens photograph of Shadrin shaking hands with a KGB agent at the door of an out-of-town villa. More impor-

The Shadrin-Nosenko Connection

There are indications that Shadrin was caught up in some manner in the long, silent battle within the intelligence community over the *bona fides* of Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko, the most famous KGB defector to the United States. Although they never met in the United States, Nosenko and Shadrin had been schoolmates at Frunze Naval Academy in Leningrad and Nosenko was later connected with the naval-intelligence branch of the Soviet military-intelligence service, while Shadrin went off to be a destroyer commander with access to operational intelligence. Nosenko fled the Soviet Union in 1964, five years after Shadrin; he was the agent whose testimony had confirmed the belief of the FBI's late director, J. Edgar Hoover, that Lee Harvey Oswald, the assassin of President Kennedy, had no ties with the KGB. This helped to make the FBI's conclusions acceptable to the Warren Commission. The CIA, however, developed subsequent suspicions that Nosenko was a KGB "deep plant" and he remained imprisoned by the agency until 1967, when the still-controversial decision was made, in effect, to clear him.

In charge of clearing Nosenko was Admiral Taylor, the CIA deputy director who had persuaded Shadrin to become a double agent. One of Nosenko's principal defenders was the CIA's Leonard McCoy, who was later Shadrin's case officer, and who, after the disappearance, turned out to be a source of contradictory information about the case. Bruce Solie, the CIA officer who directed Nosenko's re-examination and was his handler following imprisonment, was dispatched to Vienna in 1975 to escort Ewa Shadrin back to Washington when her husband failed to return from the KGB meeting.

What, if anything, is the meaning of these coincidences? Some intelligence officers believe that the clearing of Nosenko, whom the CIA and the FBI had finally decided to trust, suggested that American intelligence was free of Soviet "deep plant" agents. If Nosenko was not a plant, the CIA reasoning went, then it was safe to assume that Shadrin was not one, either. This may have been stretching the point, but the fact remains that Shadrin was activated as a double agent on behalf of the United States at the time the process of rehabilitating Nosenko was under way.

—T.S.

that he would be supplied in Washington with special intelligence equipment.

To the FBI and the CIA, this was sensational news. Smashing an illegal network is the dream of every intelligence service, just as the fear that one may exist is its nightmare.

If the intelligence agencies had any lingering doubt that the KGB had swallowed the Shadrin bait, it was removed early in 1972 when the promised secret equipment was delivered to the Shadrins' house. The equipment consisted of a radio receiver and transmitter (the CIA called it "communications capability"), a cipher code inside a book with hollowed pages, and a notebook with instructions on secret-writing methods.

During 1972, Shadrin received his Ph.D. in international affairs from George Washington University. Then he was instructed by his KGB contact to travel to Vienna to be trained in the use of the secret equipment and, possibly, to meet the "illegal."

Again, the intelligence agencies in Washington were overjoyed. The illegal network seemed to be within grasp, and the Shadrin operation became one of the most closely guarded intelligence secrets. There was no question of Shadrin's not going to Vienna; in fact, the CIA and the FBI claim that he was eager to do it. But there was also no thought of providing protection surveillance for him in Vienna. Intelligence officers say that this matter was not even discussed in FBI-CIA conferences on the subject.

Shadrin's Vienna meeting was scheduled for September 8, and he told his wife that it would be part of a European vacation. Their first stop was Madrid; from there they went on to Munich for the Olympic games. Shadrin mentioned to Ewa that in Vienna he would have an overnight meeting with the same man he had seen in Montreal.

Arriving in Vienna, the Shadrins checked in at the plush Bristol Hotel, across the street from the Opera, and Nick went out in the early evening to keep his appointment. He took a taxi to the Votivkirche, a Vienna landmark church, and met his contact on the steps. Then a car took them to a villa out of the city. Shadrin spent about eighteen hours there with several KGB agents—one of them was Oleg Kozlov, his Washington handler—and technical experts. They trained him in the use of the type of secret equipment he had at home. He returned to the hotel at 4 P.M. the following day. The Shadrins stayed two more days in Vienna, driving around in a rented car, then flew to Athens before returning home.

the FBI and the CIA, but they were delighted that he had undergone the technical training. In intelligence work, patience is the cardinal virtue.

Before leaving Vienna, Shadrin had been told to meet with a contact in Washington on his return, but nobody turned up. And, as it turned out, the KGB broke all contact with Shadrin for more than two years after his return from Vienna. The conventional wisdom was that the Russians were encountering difficulties in implanting an "illegal" in the United States.

It didn't occur to anybody that the KGB might have become suspicious of Shadrin and was rechecking his credentials. Again, prudence would have counseled taking Shadrin out of the operation altogether—but the greed now was too great.

Although the FBI and the CIA maintained close contact with Shadrin during this interval, he was becoming despondent. He hated his translation job at the DIA but had to keep it. He was getting edgy.

Then, in the fall of 1974, Shadrin started receiving mysterious calls at home. On one occasion, a woman speaking in English instructed him to meet somebody in the Arlington area. He was told to appear at once but decided not to do it because he was unable to contact either John Funkhouser, the CIA naval expert, or James Wooten, his FBI handler.

Early in 1975, a Russian-speaking man telephoned Shadrin at home and, trying to disguise his voice, told Shadrin that he would receive a secret-writing letter. When the letter, bearing an Oxon Hill, Maryland, postmark, arrived, Shadrin deciphered it. The writer wanted to know whether and when Shadrin could travel again, where he could attend a meeting with the "illegal," and what his cover would be. The instructions were to reply by invisible-writing letter to a dead-drop address in Berlin. Shadrin answered, proposing Spain, but another letter from Oxon Hill rejected this idea.

At a conference with FBI and CIA officials, it was decided that Shadrin should pick Vienna, "same time, same place." That Vienna was chosen by the agencies has been corroborated by highly placed intelligence sources in Washington; Leonard McCoy, the CIA case officer, insists, however, that it was the KGB that demanded the meeting be held in the Austrian capital. (This is one of the many mysteries surrounding Shadrin's disappearance. It is possible that McCoy has taken this stance to prove the entrapment theory and to remove the blame from the

CIA.) A further exchange of letters

As in 1972, neither the CIA nor the FBI wanted to provide protective surveillance for Shadrin on the ground that the Russians would spot it. And this time the agencies were convinced that Shadrin would at last meet the "illegal." As intelligence officers explained later, they had no reason to think that the KGB was suspicious of Shadrin—although nobody had a valid explanation for the two-year silence.

There was a difference in the 1975 operation, however. Shortly before the Shadrins left for Vienna, the CIA arranged for them to meet a counter-intelligence staff officer who was introduced as "Ann Martin" (though on one occasion she was identified as "Cynthia Martin"). She was brought to the Shadrins' home with the warning that she should be identified as a dental patient if they were interrupted.

Ann Martin was a tall, angular woman in her late forties, with a large mole on her left cheek, and glasses. She spoke Russian and German, and informed the Shadrins that they would meet again in Vienna. Then she gave Shadrin two emergency telephone numbers in Vienna, a daytime number and a night number, where she could be reached by Ewa if anything unusual happened.

The Shadrins arrived in Vienna on December 17 and took Suite 361 at the Bristol. The next evening Shadrin left the hotel to meet his contact at the Votivkirche. Ann Martin stayed with Ewa. When Shadrin returned, shortly before midnight, the CIA woman took him into the bathroom and, with the shower running, debriefed him.

He told her that he had had dinner at a small fish restaurant with the KGB's Oleg Kozlov and Mikhail Ivanovich Kuryshev. There was only small talk, and Shadrin was instructed to come to another evening meeting two days later. Shadrin was also given \$1,000 in cash, although several thousand dollars had been sent to him in Washington by the KGB, and was told to rent a car the following day to become acquainted with the streets of Vienna.

At 6:30 P.M. on December 20, Shadrin left for his second meeting. Again, it did not occur to the CIA handlers that the sudden two-day delay before the presumed encounter with the "illegal" was a danger sign and that Shadrin should be withdrawn at once from the operation. An intelligence officer theorized later that Shadrin may have aroused suspicions at the dinner on December 18, and the KGB needed time for new instructions from Moscow. But the same officer said, "We never anticipated a kidnapping."

"... Prudence would have counseled taking Shadrin out of the operation—but the greed was now too great..."

Ann Martin did not stay with Ewa that evening. She was attending a dinner party, and Ewa was told that in case of trouble she could reach her at her apartment at night. It was never explained why Ann Martin was not available most of the night, and Ewa Shadrin was unable to reach her until 1:55 A.M., when she became acutely concerned about her husband.

Shadrin, of course, was never seen again. But there are further mysteries. Richard Copaken, the lawyer, says that the acting chief of the CIA station in Vienna, who had been informed of the Shadrin meetings with the KGB, had canceled all leaves and prepared surveillance for Shadrin. But Copaken learned later that Ann Martin had ordered the station chief to cancel surveillance, allegedly on FBI orders.

One of the most senior intelligence officers in Washington has said in a private discussion of the Shadrin case that there was no justification for allowing Shadrin to operate in Vienna without protective surveillance. He said that if, indeed, Ann Martin had ordered the local station chief to lift surveillance, the CIA officer should have called headquarters at once to obtain the reversal or confirmation of such a decision. He also said that it was "inexcusable" for the FBI to have been unaware that the Votivkirche is in direct line of sight from the building housing the American Consulate in Vienna. Shadrin could have been observed from consulate windows without arousing Soviet suspicions.

What if the CIA had covered Shadrin? Two years later, intelligence officers admit that at worst the KGB would have "broken surveillance" and kidnapped him anyway. But, they say, the Russians might have been scared away and dropped Shadrin. A life would have been saved.

On December 23, when Ewa prepared to return home alone, Ann Martin took Shadrin's passport away from her on the ground that he would not be traveling with her. Later, the State Department lost the passport. Although she was escorted home by Bruce Solie, a high-ranking CIA official, who instructed her to act as if she didn't know him until they reached Frankfurt, Ewa was not told that her husband was a double agent until she was met at Dulles International Airport by FBI agents. The Austrian police were not notified for weeks of Shadrin's disappearance.

Ewa was instructed not to discuss Shadrin's case with anybody. She told friends that Nick was ill, traveling, or busy working elsewhere. The Ford administration was determined to keep his disappearance secret—possibly forever. Its diplomatic efforts to discover Shadrin's whereabouts were also limited.

Secretary of State Kissinger inquired about Shadrin during a conversation with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin. The ambassador denied all knowledge, but Kissinger did give him the names of the two KGB agents—Kozlov and Kuryshv—with whom Shadrin was known to have been dealing. On January 20 and 22, Kissinger raised the subject with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, who suggested that it be discussed with Dobrynin. On January 29, Kissinger reportedly told Senator John Sparkman, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, that he had "worked and worked and worked" on the Shadrin case, but "there is nothing more" to be done. On February 16, however, Kissinger had another conversation about Shadrin with Dobrynin, who again insisted that "he is not in the Soviet Union." Kissinger replied: "This answer is not sufficient for the United States."

In March, Richard Copaken met twice in Berlin with Wolfgang Vogel, the East German barrister who had arranged the exchange of Soviet super-spy Colonel Abel for downed U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers, to discuss exchanging Shadrin for Communist prisoners in the West. Vogel left the impression that Shadrin was alive in the Soviet Union and might be exchanged at some stage—particularly if Ford wrote directly to Brezhnev. On May 13, Kissinger discussed Shadrin once more with Dobrynin, who asked him not to bring up the subject anymore. In mid-May, Copaken mentioned the Shadrin case to Ford during a White House reception. The president said he was aware of it and that something might be done after the primaries.

After eleven months of trying, Ewa Shadrin obtained a meeting with Ford on November 5 and asked him to write Brezhnev. Ford did so on December 3, but on December 24 Brezhnev sent the oral reply that the Russians didn't have Shadrin, that he had never shown up at the second meeting in Vienna.

Now the ball was with the Carter administration. Secretary of State Vance brought up Shadrin with Do-

brynin, but got the same answer: We don't know where he is. In April 1977, Copaken again met Vogel in Berlin and handed him a letter from Ewa to her husband. Vogel said he would return the letter if it could not be delivered; Copaken says Vogel never returned it.

The State Department informally brought up the Shadrin situation with the Russians on two occasions later in 1977, but President Carter turned down Ewa's request for an appointment, through a letter from National Security Adviser Brzezinski. The current view in the administration is that there is no point in Carter's either writing Brezhnev or seeing Ewa Shadrin, unless new leads develop.



Such a lead did develop last August, when Copaken received a mysterious telephone call from London, followed by suggestions that information about Shadrin might be obtained if \$5,000 were deposited in a Monaco bank account. The call followed the publication in American newspapers of stories about Shadrin's disappearance, but certain credence was given to it because the caller mentioned several key words not in the public domain.

The money was paid and, through a complex procedure involving three Western intelligence services, a man seemingly connected with the caller was found by Copaken aboard a yacht off the south coast of France. He turned out to be a British citizen with strange background and connections, but he provided no information about Shadrin.

Interestingly, however, this episode commanded the instant attention of CIA Director Stansfield Turner, who dispatched the agency's Inspector General John Waller to France, held three meetings with Ewa Shadrin and Copaken late last year, and helped to arrange the sending of an FBI lie-detector team to Europe to interview the Briton.

But in March 1978, the CIA advised Copaken through Waller that it no longer wished to maintain any contact with Ewa Shadrin and her lawyer. The reason given was that Shadrin was an FBI problem. Elsewhere in the administration, the attitude was that since the "European lead" turned into a dead end, nothing further could be done.

The administration may be right. The Russians are clearly not about to discover that they have Shadrin after all. But, if nothing else, the United States government must assume some responsibility for the fate of the defector it recruited, then abandoned.



The Shadrin Affair: A Double Agent Double-Crossed

By Tad Szulc

"... Shadrin disappeared after United States intelligence senselessly thrust him into the role of double agent with the KGB ..."

It was through a stunning succession of blunders, carelessness, and inexcusable acts of intelligence greed spanning a sixteen-year period that the United States lost its most valuable Russian military defector. The missing man is believed to be either dead or incarcerated in the Soviet Union.

There are still questions which probably never will be satisfactorily answered, but all indications are that the man known as Nicholas George Shadrin was kidnapped by the Soviets through the fault of American intelligence agencies. There is little reason to believe that he redefected voluntarily, that he was killed by the CIA (as the Russians have insinuated), or that, tired of being a pawn for both sides, he decided to create a new life for himself somewhere in the world.

Shadrin disappeared in Vienna in December 1975, after United States intelligence had senselessly thrust him into the immensely dangerous role of a double agent working with the KGB, the Soviet secret service. He vanished under circumstances that make it clear that he was cruelly used by his superiors as bait for the Russians. Spies, after all, are expendable when they become a problem.

That Shadrin, a gregarious, intelligent, onetime Soviet Baltic-fleet destroyer commander, was recruited by the CIA in 1959, and had not simply fled to the West to marry the woman he loved—as alleged at the time by him and the United States government—was a closely guarded secret, until now, and it sheds wholly new light on his covert relations with the American intelligence establishment.

It explains why he agreed to serve as a double agent under extremely bizarre and controversial conditions, and it may also help to explain the strange behavior, after his disappearance, of two succeeding administrations, their unwillingness to open secret intelligence files on him to his wife and her lawyer in their search for the truth, and the glaring inconsistencies encountered during a private investigation of the Shadrin case.

Defectors are one of the most sensitive subjects in intelligence operations, after all, and neither the administration on the highest level nor senior intelligence officers are prepared to discuss various theories surrounding the Shadrin case. (This reluctance was further enhanced by the defection last month of Arkady N. Shevchenko, the Soviet diplomat who served as undersecretary general of the United Nations in New York. Shevchenko is the greatest diplomatic intelligence prize ever won by the United States.)

At first, Shadrin was worth his weight in gold to the United States. At the time when the Soviet Union launched a major buildup of its navy, the information brought by Shadrin was crucial to the United States Navy. After he outlived his usefulness, however, he was transformed into a double agent to satisfy the insatiable appetite of American intelligence. If it were not for this greed, Shadrin would be living tranquilly in the United States today, like other Soviet defectors.

His name originally was Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov, but on orders, after his arrival in the United States, he changed it to Shadrin—after the hero

of Pushkin's tale *The Captain's Daughter* (his wife's father is a Polish merchant-marine captain). It was a pointless deception, because he testified as Artamonov in an open session of the House Committee on Un-American Activities in September 1960, and the audience included a Soviet diplomat busily taking notes. Afterward, no effort was made to conceal his real identity, and Shadrin was the nearest thing to a public figure in intelligence circles. This was the first major blunder and led to all the others.

Nobody, it seems, wishes to delve into intelligence secrets that could cause considerable embarrassment to the United States. Full disclosure could, for example, highlight the sixteen years of blunders surrounding Shadrin's activities in this country and abroad, methods employed by American intelligence, and conflicts involving the CIA, the FBI, and the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency.

Shadrin was not a run-of-the-mill spy or defector: He had high-level acquaintances and friendships in American intelligence, which made him a vulnerable figure.

One friend was Admiral Rufus L. Taylor, who, as director of naval intelligence, was his boss during the time the Russian ex-officer served as a special consultant to the navy. And Admiral Stansfield Turner, for example, got to know Shadrin sufficiently well to write him "Dear Nick" letters (Shadrin had lectured at the Naval War Col-

Mystery men: CIA files yielded these photographs of KGB agents Oleg Kozlov (left) and Mikhail Kuryshv (center), possibly the last men to see Shadrin (right) alive.

in the early 1970s, when Turner was his president.

It is noteworthy that after Shadrin's wife, Dr. Ewa Shadrin, despaired of any effective action by the Ford administration on his behalf and retained Richard D. Copaken, a partner in the prestigious Washington law firm of Covington & Burling (once Dean Acheson's firm), the White House volunteered payment of the legal fees.

Ewa Shadrin accepted the offer. She is the Polish woman with whom Shadrin fled in 1959 and whom he married a year later in Baltimore. Now she practices dentistry in an office at their house in McLean, Virginia.

The law firm's bills were paid from February 1976 until August 1977, when the *Wall Street Journal* and the *Washington Post* published the first stories about Shadrin's disappearance. Payments have not been resumed yet, though the government says it has the matter under advisement.

Ewa Shadrin still does receive Shadrin's paychecks from the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), where her husband was ostensibly employed while serving as a double agent. She gets \$720 biweekly (after deductions), which adds up to \$18,720 annually.

Interestingly, neither side denies that Shadrin was a double agent. Immediately after his disappearance, CIA and FBI case officers told Ewa Shadrin that Nick, as he is known to his American friends, had been working since 1966 for United States intelligence. She claims he had never told her about it.

On the surface, the question seems to be whose "double" Shadrin really was—the Soviets' or the Americans'—but the truth is far more complicated.

The Shadrin story begins in September 1958, when the destroyer he had commanded for two years was assigned to the Polish naval base Okywiec, across the bay from the port of Gdynia. Under the supervision of an admiral, the Soviet task force was engaged with the Polish navy in the training of Indonesian naval officers and crews in anti-submarine warfare. This was the period of close collaboration between the Sukarno regime and the Soviet Union, which had supplied billions of dollars in arms to Indonesia.

Shadrin was then 30 years old, a brilliant officer with a superb career ahead. Born in Leningrad, he went through Frunze Naval Academy—a special distinction—and took a "com-

manders' course" in 1954. At 28, he was given the command of a destroyer, which he took on official visits to Denmark, Britain, and Malta. Then came the assignment in Poland, and the word among his fellow officers was that Shadrin was destined to become perhaps the youngest admiral in the Soviet navy.

It was at a party at the German officers' club in the fall of 1958 that Shadrin first met an attractive Polish medical student, Ewa Gera.

By Ewa's account, Shadrin was a "very amusing man . . . wherever he went, he was the life of the party. . . . He could discuss any subject. His education wasn't just narrow naval education." He loved the theater and often took his friends to concerts. He was especially interested in opera: His mother had been an amateur singer, and Nick knew all the arias by heart.

In every way, it seems, Shadrin was different from other Soviet officers. For example: "Normally, Soviet officers couldn't come ashore when they wanted," Ewa explained. "They had to ask for permission, and it was rarely granted. . . . Nick informed the admiral that he was going to town."

Several times, Ewa says, Shadrin went ashore without telling anybody; on one occasion he was caught and had a dressing down. What emerges, though, is the image of a man who could get away with almost anything, who was more trusted than his fellow officers. This, of course, raises the question of why he received special treatment. CIA experts later wondered whether Shadrin had KGB ties that granted him special privileges. But nobody has come up with a clear answer.

In any event, Shadrin's freedom created the opportunity for CIA emissaries to approach him. This was the period when the CIA was engaging in its first clandestine effort to bring about the overthrow of Sukarno. A by-product of this activity was an attempt to penetrate the Soviet navy. The Office of Naval Intelligence was extremely anxious at the time to gather information on developments in the Soviet navy. It wanted a deep-penetration agent or, if at all possible, a high-ranking defector. Several Indonesian officers among the CIA's contacts—anti-Communist men from wealthy families—had been assigned to be trained in Poland, and Ewa remembers that an officer named Purnomo came on several occasions to the house of a Polish friend when

Shadrin was present and, at least once, that some time in 1958 that they had been the CIA's emissary.

One of the most difficult intelligence problems is to establish the motivations of defectors or potential defectors. As Ewa tells the story, Shadrin, estranged from his wife in the Soviet Union, had made up his mind to defect to the West as early as March 1959 as the only way to marry Ewa. Intelligence officers who have read parts of Shadrin's secret files at the CIA—the sections pertaining to his recruitment by the agency—think that while he undoubtedly wanted to marry Ewa, the final incentive was provided by American intelligence. Thus his motives were, indeed, mixed.

According to the CIA file, Shadrin agreed to defect with a cache of documents—copies of the Soviet navy's "commander reports" that included current naval operational intelligence—and to serve as an adviser to United States intelligence on Russian naval matters. However, he was to arrange means of defection himself—the CIA couldn't help him there.

In return, Shadrin was guaranteed the new life in America, CIA payment for the completion of Ewa's dental education, his job, and citizenship.

He decided to flee by boat to Sweden on June 7, a Sunday, because there would be little traffic on the Baltic.

Shadrin and Ewa departed at 7:30 P.M. It was a clear and warm evening, and the excuse was that they were going fishing. To avoid arousing suspicion he took along 25-year-old Ilya Aleksandrovich Popov, the sailor who always handled the 22-foot motor launch.

Ewa was forbidden by Shadrin to bring anything except for a handbag and a raincoat. They both wore sports clothes, although Shadrin had his uniform in the cabin. A gun was hidden below deck.

The crossing took 24 hours. There was no conversation with Popov, because in the Soviet navy a sailor is not permitted to address an officer without first being spoken to.

They landed Monday evening in a small fishing village on the Swedish island of Oland. Popov thought they were in Poland. The village was deserted, but after a while a few fishermen turned up. Shadrin and Ewa spoke neither Swedish nor English, and all they could do was to repeat the word "police." They wanted to be taken to the nearest police station to ask for asylum. The Swedes were unresponsive.

in Sweden for asylum. Within a day or two, he and Ewa were taken to Stockholm and held in a jail during their interrogation. (Percey was returned to Poland.) Meanwhile, the Swedish press broke the story of the defector. It caused a minor sensation around the world, but to the CIA, Shadrin's flight was a major intelligence coup.

The next contact was with Captain Sven Rystrom, a Russian-speaking officer who had served as Swedish naval attaché in Moscow. According to Ewa, he warned them not to go to the United States, because "the Americans have the tendency to take advantage of people and then forget them." She adds: "And this is exactly what happened."

Two weeks later, though, when Shadrin and Ewa were released, Ewa presented herself at the American Embassy. A Russian-speaking diplomat received her in his office. Two days later, she says, "we left for West Germany." If Shadrin hadn't been expected, it is highly unlikely that they would have been flown out of Sweden so quickly. Normally, preliminary defector examinations last much longer.


Accompanied by a CIA escort, Shadrin and Ewa were flown from Stockholm to Frankfurt aboard a small aircraft—a CIA "black flight." They sat in a specially constructed concealed cabin. They arrived in Frankfurt on August 1 and were immediately taken to a CIA "safe house" outside the city.

After three weeks of intense interrogation, plus lie-detector and psychological tests, the Inter-Agency Defector Committee (made up of representatives of the CIA, the FBI, the State Department, and military-intelligence services) apparently accepted Shadrin's and Ewa's *bona fides*, and they were flown to Washington (on another CIA black flight) on August 21—again a relatively short time for defectors.

The debriefing process, in three Virginia safe houses, took nine months. Shadrin and Ewa were guarded around the clock by three CIA security officers. "They smoked cigars and watched television," Ewa recalls.

Sometimes there were eight or ten intelligence specialists questioning Shadrin about the Soviet navy. There were CIA experts and specialists from the Office of Naval Intelligence in addition to Walter Onoshko, Shadrin's CIA case officer. The CIA interpreter was Walter Sidov. Among naval specialists were Captain Thomas L. Dwyer, later coordinator of intelligence operations for the ship *Pueblo*, captured by North

of a first rate defector. Shadrin was familiar with the Soviet navy and the Soviet destroyer fleet, and he knew the warfare, but he also had a certain amount of knowledge of the internal workings of the Soviet navy.



The first meeting: Captain Mironov took this CIA-file photograph at Shadrin's meeting his KGB contact in Moscow.

On one occasion, Shadrin was taken to Norfolk, Virginia, to participate in anti-submarine-warfare exercises aboard a United States destroyer and, in fact, was given the command of the ship for the operation. A Naval Intelligence officer, impressed, remarked that "if all the Soviet-destroyer suspects are half as good as Nick, we have something to worry about."

On June 1, 1960, Shadrin began working as a consultant for the Naval Scientific and Technical Intelligence Center (STIC), a branch of the Office of Naval Intelligence. His six years with STIC were probably the happiest period in Shadrin's life in the United States. His job was to evaluate Soviet naval data with Naval Intelligence and CIA experts. During this time he worked closely with Tom Finkbeiner, the CIA's leading naval specialist.

With \$10,000 from the CIA, his wife was part of the original defector deal. The Shadrins made the down payment on a small house in Arlington, Virginia, across the Potomac from Washington, their first real home in the United States. Ewa went to dental school for three years to establish her own dental practice in the United States. Her job was part of the CIA deal. Shadrin retained an engineering degree from George Washington University. In his spare time, he worked on building the motorboat he had always wanted.

Shadrin's service as STIC consultant ended, inexplicably, in June 1966. After several weeks of unemployment—and worry—Shadrin was offered a job as consultant to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). This was the period when Admiral Taylor, Shadrin's old boss as chief of Naval Intelligence, was serving a brief stint as DIA's deputy director before becoming deputy director of the CIA. It was perhaps not purely accidental that Shadrin was hired by the DIA. It appears to have been part of a larger plan U.S. intelligence had for him.

Unfortunately, Shadrin found the DIA job demeaning and boring. In collaboration with small-fry military defectors from Communist countries, he helped translate Soviet military literature into English. For an evaluator of naval intelligence, it was humiliating: Shadrin made no bones about this to his wife and friends, and before long he wanted to do something else.

"Something else" turned up almost immediately, when Admiral Taylor proposed that Shadrin become a double agent as bait for the KGB. There are three versions of how Shadrin got involved in espionage.

The "official" version—the one given Ewa Shadrin by the FBI after her husband vanished—was that Shadrin was approached by KGB agents in Washington in the summer of 1966, right after he joined the DIA, with an offer to spy for the Soviet Union. According to this version, Shadrin reported this approach at once to the FBI, which asked him to pretend to accept the KGB proposal and, in effect, act as a double agent.

The second American version is that the reverse occurred. FBI agents, according to this version, had learned that KGB operatives with diplomatic cover were stalking the Old Post Office Building on Pennsylvania Avenue, where Shadrin's defectors' unit and the FBI field office were located. The FBI's surmise was that the Russians were trying to identify the bureau's agents and to approach one or more defectors. Since Shadrin was the most important person in this group, the FBI assumed that he would be the principal target.

On the strength of this suspicion, an assistant director of the FBI asked Admiral Taylor to instruct Shadrin to accept KGB overtures, should they oc-

which agreed with any variation.

Another version of the double-agent story was a so-called prophetic one. It was that Soviet intelligence operative Greg Kozlov, known to be a KGB agent, contacted Shadrin at a bus stop at the corner of Cedar Highway and Harrison Street in North Arlington to propose cooperation with the KGB. He is said to have produced photographs of Shadrin's first wife, along with a letter from her asking him to return to the Soviet Union. Still, according to this version, Shadrin agreed. Then he went to the FBI, which told him to establish a permanent contact.

According to the third version, which appeared in Moscow's *Literary Gazette*, Shadrin approached a Soviet Embassy employee at a local supermarket and asked to be returned to Russia. The *Gazette* says that the KGB agreed to help if Shadrin would first perform certain services.

All things considered, the second American version is probably closest to the truth, although Shadrin may have made the initial contact with the Soviets on the FBI's behalf.

Ewa Shadrin was presumably fed the "official" version to dispel any notion that her husband had been recruited for espionage by the Americans. It would look better if Shadrin appeared to be the victim of a KGB approach.

But even if the Americans did not set up Shadrin (though this is the most likely conclusion), it remains an act of utter folly to have engaged a valuable defector, with strong ties inside the intelligence community, in the double-agent business. The truth is that the FBI and the CIA didn't know what they wanted—other than to spot KGB agents—when they activated Shadrin.

To be sure, the FBI was gratified that the first questions the Russians asked Shadrin when they met for lunch at a Washington restaurant concerned the whereabouts of Nosenko, Golitsin, and other KGB defectors in the United States. Still, the operation was a marginal proposition.

Even more interest developed when the Russians wanted to know how the United States obtains intelligence about the Soviet navy. Now the intelligence officers saw a chance to escalate the Shadrin operation. Their notion was to feed disinformation to the Soviets on American intelligence methods. This had to be done with extreme care, because Soviet experts at the other end were certain to spot anything that

was a double agent. Soviet intelligence officer put it like this: "We know you, but not for sure."

The relationship continued for only five years. Shadrin was not a high-visibility, in-your-face agent; he insisted on leading a normal life, but, in retrospect, Ewa Shadrin said that Nick was the only person she knew of who had no special protection. She was never told, of course, that he was a double agent.

The great turning point in Shadrin's double-agent career came in 1971. Late in the summer, his KGB contact asked him to make a trip abroad. No reason was given, and Finland was proposed at first as a meeting site. This, however, was judged too dangerous by the Russians themselves, and they changed their minds, suggesting Montreal instead. FBI and CIA handlers told Shadrin that if the operation were to be maintained, he had no choice but to accept the trip. Thus the irrevocable step was taken and, as one of Shadrin's

contacts put it, "an operation was set up, the operation would have been carried out, the mission would have been completed. But intelligence would have been alerted. But intelligence would have been alerted, and the Shadrins flew to Canada in September."

Shadrin told his wife that the trip would be their vacation, but that in Montreal he had to meet a person who had "worked for the United States for 25 years." This was the FBI cover story. The Shadrins spent a night in Montreal, and Nick spent the evening out meeting his "friend." The next day, they rented a car and drove to Mont Tremblant.

Was it safe for Shadrin to leave the United States on his own? The FBI evidently had some reservations because it asked the intelligence division of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police to provide protective coverage.

The Montreal coverage yielded a long-lens photograph of Shadrin shaking hands with a KGB agent at the door of an out-of-town villa. More impor-

The Shadrin-Nosenko Connection

There are indications that Shadrin was caught up in some manner in the long, silent battle within the intelligence community over the *bona fides* of Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko, the most famous KGB defector to the United States. Although they never met in the United States, Nosenko and Shadrin had been schoolmates at Franze Naval Academy in Leningrad and Nosenko was later connected with the naval-intelligence branch of the Soviet military-intelligence service, while Shadrin went off to be a destroyer commander with access to operational intelligence. Nosenko fled the Soviet Union in 1964, five years after Shadrin; he was the agent whose testimony had confirmed the belief of the FBI's late director, J. Edgar Hoover, that Lee Harvey Oswald, the assassin of President Kennedy, had no ties with the KGB. This helped to make the FBI's conclusions acceptable to the Warren Commission. The CIA, however, developed subsequent suspicions that Nosenko was a KGB "deep plant" and he remained imprisoned by the agency until 1967, when the still-controversial decision was made, in effect, to clear him.

In charge of clearing Nosenko was Admiral Taylor, the CIA deputy director who had persuaded Shadrin to become a double agent. One of Nosenko's principal defenders was the CIA's Leonard McCoy, who was later Shadrin's case officer, and who, after the disappearance, turned out to be a source of contradictory information about the case. Bruce Solie, the CIA officer who directed Nosenko's re-examination and was his handler following imprisonment, was dispatched to Vienna in 1975 to escort Ewa Shadrin back to Washington when her husband failed to return from the KGB meeting.

What, if anything, is the meaning of these coincidences? Some intelligence officers believe that the clearing of Nosenko, whom the CIA and the FBI had finally decided to trust, suggested that American intelligence was free of Soviet "deep plant" agents. If Nosenko was not a plant, the CIA reasoning went, then it was safe to assume that Shadrin was not one, either. This may have been stretching the point, but the fact remains that Shadrin was activated as a double agent on behalf of the United States at the time the process of rehabilitating Nosenko was under way.

—T.S.

...the fear that one may...
...the intelligence agencies had any...
...the Shadrin bait, it was re-...
...secret equipment was delivered to...
...Shadrin's house. The equipment...
...of a radio receiver and trans-...
...mitter (the CIA called it "communica-...
...tions capability"), a cipher code inside...
...book with hollowed pages, and a...
...notebook with instructions on secret-...
...writing methods.

During 1972, Shadrin received his Ph.D. in international affairs from George Washington University. Then he was instructed by his KGB contact to travel to Vienna to be trained in the use of the secret equipment and, possibly, to meet the "illegal."

Again, the intelligence agencies in Washington were overjoyed. The illegal network seemed to be within grasp, and the Shadrin operation became one of the most closely guarded intelligence secrets. There was no question of Shadrin's not going to Vienna; in fact, the CIA and the FBI claim that he was eager to do it. But there was also no thought of providing protection surveillance for him in Vienna. Intelligence officers say that this matter was not even discussed in FBI-CIA conferences on the subject.

Shadrin's Vienna meeting was scheduled for September 8, and he told his wife that it would be part of a European vacation. Their first stop was Madrid; from there they went on to Munich for the Olympic games. Shadrin mentioned to Ewa that in Vienna he would have an overnight meeting with the same man he had seen in Montreal.

Arriving in Vienna, the Shadrins checked in at the plush Bristol Hotel, across the street from the Opera, and Nick went out in the early evening to keep his appointment. He took a taxi to the Votivkirche, a Vienna landmark church, and met his contact on the steps. Then a car took them to a villa out of the city. Shadrin spent about eighteen hours there with several KGB agents—one of them was Oleg Kozlov, his Washington handler—and technical experts. They trained him in the use of the type of secret equipment he had at home. He returned to the hotel at 4 p.m. the following day. The Shadrins stayed two more days in Vienna, driving around in a rented car, then flew to Athens before returning home.

...been told to meet with a contact in...
...Washington on his return to the...
...of an American...
...KGB broke all contact with Shadrin...
...for more than two years after his...
...return from Vienna. The conventional...
...wisdom was that the Russians were...
...encountering difficulties in mounting...
...an "illegal" in the United States.

It didn't occur to anybody that the KGB might have become suspicious of Shadrin and was rechecking his credentials. Again, prudence would have counseled taking Shadrin out of the operation altogether—but the greed now was too great.

Although the FBI and the CIA maintained close contact with Shadrin during this interval, he was becoming dependent. He hated his translation job at the DIA but had to keep it. He was getting edgy.

Then, in the fall of 1974, Shadrin started receiving mysterious calls at home. On one occasion, a woman speaking in English instructed him to meet somebody in the Arlington area. He was told to appear at once but decided not to do it because he was unable to contact either John Funkhouser, the CIA naval expert, or James Wooten, his FBI handler.

Early in 1975, a Russian-speaking man telephoned Shadrin at home and, trying to disguise his voice, told Shadrin that he would receive a secret-writing letter. When the letter, bearing an Oxon Hill, Maryland, postmark, arrived, Shadrin deciphered it. The writer wanted to know whether and when Shadrin could travel again, where he could attend a meeting with the "illegal," and what his cover would be. The instructions were to reply by invisible-writing letter to a dead-drop address in Berlin. Shadrin answered, proposing Spain, but another letter from Oxon Hill rejected this idea.

At a conference with FBI and CIA officials, it was decided that Shadrin should pick Vienna, "same time, same place." That Vienna was chosen by the agencies has been corroborated by highly placed intelligence sources in Washington: Leonard McCoy, the CIA case officer, insists, however, that it was the KGB that demanded the meeting be held in the Austrian capital. (This is one of the many mysteries surrounding Shadrin's disappearance. It is possible that McCoy has taken this stance to prove the entrapment theory and to remove the blame from the

...that Shadrin would at last meet the...
...As intelligence officers ex-...
...later, they had no reason to...
...think that the KGB was suspicious of...
...Shadrin—although nobody had a valid...
...explanation for his three-year silence.

There was a difference in the 1975 operation, however. Shortly before the Shadrins left for Vienna, the CIA arranged for them to meet a counter-intelligence staff officer who was introduced as "Ann Martin" (though on one occasion she was identified as "Cynthia Martin"). She was brought to the Shadrins' home with the warning that she should be identified as a dental patient if they were interrupted.

Ann Martin was a tall, angular woman in her late forties, with a large mole on her left cheek, and glasses. She spoke Russian and German, and informed the Shadrins that they would meet again in Vienna. Then she gave Shadrin two emergency telephone numbers in Vienna, a daytime number and a night number, where she could be reached by Ewa if anything unusual happened.

The Shadrins arrived in Vienna on December 17 and took Suite 361 at the Bristol. The next evening Shadrin left the hotel to meet his contact at the Votivkirche. Ann Martin stayed with Ewa. When Shadrin returned, shortly before midnight, the CIA woman took him into the bathroom and, with the shower running, debriefed him.

He told her that he had had dinner at a small fish restaurant with the KGB's Oleg Kozlov and Mikhail Ivanovich Kuryshev. There was only small talk, and Shadrin was instructed to come to another evening meeting two days later. Shadrin was also given \$1,000 in cash, although several thousand dollars had been sent to him in Washington by the KGB, and was told to rent a car the following day to become acquainted with the streets of Vienna.

At 6:30 p.m. on December 20, Shadrin left for his second meeting. Again, it did not occur to the CIA handlers that the sudden two-day delay before the presumed encounter with the "illegal" was a danger sign and that Shadrin should be withdrawn at once from the operation. An intelligence officer theorized later that Shadrin may have aroused suspicions at the dinner on December 18, and the KGB needed time for new instructions from Moscow. But the same officer said, "We never anticipated a kidnapping."

Ann Martin did not stay with Ewa that evening. She was attending a dinner party, and Ewa was told that in case of trouble she could reach her at her apartment apartment. It was never explained why Ann Martin was not available most of the night, and Ewa Shadrin was unable to reach her until 1:55 a.m., when she became acutely concerned about her husband.

Shadrin, of course, was never seen again. But there are further mysteries. Richard Copaken, the lawyer, says that the acting chief of the CIA station in Vienna, who had been informed of the Shadrin meetings with the KGB, had canceled all leaves and prepared surveillance for Shadrin. But Copaken learned later that Ann Martin had ordered the station chief to cancel surveillance, allegedly on FBI orders.

One of the most senior intelligence officers in Washington has said in a private discussion of the Shadrin case that there was no justification for allowing Shadrin to operate in Vienna without protective surveillance. He said that if, indeed, Ann Martin had ordered the local station chief to lift surveillance, the CIA officer should have called headquarters at once to obtain the reversal or confirmation of such a decision. He also said that it was "inexcusable" for the FBI to have been unaware that the Votivkirche is in direct line of sight from the building housing the American Consulate in Vienna. Shadrin could have been observed from consulate windows without arousing Soviet suspicions.

What if the CIA had covered Shadrin? Two years later, intelligence officers admit that at worst the KGB would have "broken surveillance" and kidnapped him anyway. But, they say, the Russians might have been scared away and dropped Shadrin. A life would have been saved.

On December 25, when Ewa prepared to return home alone, Ann Martin took Shadrin's passport away from her on the ground that he would not be traveling with her. Later, the State Department lost the passport. Although she was escorted home by Bruce Solie, a high-ranking CIA official, who instructed her to act as if she didn't know him until they reached Frankfurt, Ewa was not told that her husband was a double agent until she was met at Dulles International Airport by FBI agents. The Austrian police were not notified for weeks of Shadrin's disappearance.

Ewa was in Vienna for a few days before she was taken to East Berlin. She had to work in a factory, and her busy work schedule made it difficult for administration officials to arrange his disappearance. It was a delicate operation. His diplomatic status as a Soviet Shadrin's whereabouts were being tracked.

Secretary of State Carter learned about Shadrin during a conversation with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin. The ambassador denied all knowledge, but he later did give him the names of two KGB agents—Kozlov and Kabanov—with whom Shadrin was known to have been dealing. On January 21 and 22, Kissinger raised the subject with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, who suggested that it be discussed with Dobrynin. On February 19, Kissinger reportedly told Senator John Sparkman, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, that he had "worked and worked and worked" on the Shadrin case, but "there is nothing more" to be done. On February 16, however, Kissinger had another conversation about Shadrin with Dobrynin, who again insisted that he is not in the Soviet Union. Kissinger replied: "This answer is not sufficient for the United States."

In March, Richard Copaken met twice in Berlin with Wolfgang Vogel, the East German farmer who had arranged the exchange of Soviet super-spy Colonel Abel for downed U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers, to discuss exchanging Shadrin for Communist prisoners in the West. Vogel left the impression that Shadrin was alive in the Soviet Union and might be exchanged at some stage—particularly if Ford wrote directly to Brezhnev. On May 15, Kissinger discussed Shadrin once more with Dobrynin, who asked him not to bring up the subject anymore. In mid-May, Copaken mentioned the Shadrin case to Ford during a White House reception. The president said he was aware of it and that something might be done after the holidays.

After eleven months of trying, Ewa Shadrin obtained a meeting with Ford on November 12 and asked him to write Brezhnev. Ford wrote on December 5, but on December 12, Brezhnev sent the oral reply that the Russians didn't have Shadrin, that he had never shown up at the second meeting in Vienna.

Now the ball is with the Carter administration. Secretary of State Vance brought up the case with Do-

ctor on that point during the week. We did a few weeks ago, in April 1977, when the name of Ewa Shadrin had been mentioned. I had a letter from Ewa to her husband, Vogel, and he would return the letter if it could not be delivered; Copaken says Vogel never returned it.

The State Department informally brought up the Shadrin situation with the Russians on two occasions later in 1977, but President Carter turned down Ewa's request for an appointment, through a letter from National Security Adviser Brzezinski. The current view in the administration is that there is no point in Carter's either writing Brezhnev or seeing Ewa Shadrin, unless new leads develop.

Such a lead did develop last August, when Copaken received a mysterious telephone call from London, followed by suggestions that information about Shadrin might be obtained if \$3,000 were deposited in a Monaco bank account. The call followed the publication in American newspapers of stories about Shadrin's disappearance, but certain credence was given to it because the caller mentioned several key words not in the public domain.

The money was paid and, through a complex procedure involving three Western intelligence services, a man seemingly connected with the caller was found by Copaken aboard a yacht off the south coast of France. He turned out to be a British citizen with strange background and connections, but he provided no information about Shadrin.

Interestingly, however, this episode commanded the instant attention of CIA Director Stansfield Turner, who dispatched the agency's Inspector General John Waller to France, held three meetings with Ewa Shadrin and Copaken late last year, and helped to arrange the sending of an FBI lie-detector team to Europe to interview the Briton.

But in March 1978, the CIA advised Copaken through Waller that "it no longer wished to maintain any contact with Ewa Shadrin and her lawyer. The reason given was that Shadrin was an FBI problem. Elsewhere in the administration, the attitude was that since the "European lead" turned into a dead end, nothing further could be done.

The administration may be right. The Russians are clearly not about to discover that they have Shadrin after all. But, if nothing else, the United States government must assume some responsibility for the fate of the defector it recruited, then abandoned.

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The Shadrin Affair: A Double Agent Double-Crossed

By Tad Szulc

"... Shadrin disappeared after United States intelligence senselessly thrust him into the role of double agent with the KGB ..."

It was through a stunning succession of blunders, carelessness, and inexcusable acts of intelligence greed spanning a sixteen-year period that the United States lost its most valuable Russian military defector. The missing man is believed to be either dead or incarcerated in the Soviet Union.

There are still questions which probably never will be satisfactorily answered, but all indications are that the man known as Nicholas George Shadrin was kidnapped by the Soviets through the fault of American intelligence agencies. There is little reason to believe that he reddefected voluntarily, that he was killed by the CIA (as the Russians have insinuated), or that, tired of being a pawn for both sides, he decided to create a new life for himself somewhere in the world.

Shadrin disappeared in Vienna in December 1975, after United States intelligence had senselessly thrust him into the immensely dangerous role of a double agent working with the KGB, the Soviet secret service. He vanished under circumstances that make it clear that he was cruelly used by his superiors as bait for the Russians. Spies, after all, are expendable when they become a problem.

That Shadrin, a gregarious, intelligent, onetime Soviet Baltic-fleet destroyer commander, was recruited by the CIA in 1959, and had not simply fled to the West to marry the woman he loved—as alleged at the time by him and the United States government—was a closely guarded secret, until now, and it sheds wholly new light on his covert relations with the American intelligence establishment.

It explains why he agreed to serve as a double agent under extremely bizarre and controversial conditions, and it may also help to explain the strange behavior, after his disappearance, of two succeeding administrations, their unwillingness to open secret intelligence files on him to his wife and her lawyer in their search for the truth, and the glaring inconsistencies encountered during a private investigation of the Shadrin case.

Defectors are one of the most sensitive subjects in intelligence operations, after all, and neither the administration on the highest level nor senior intelligence officers are prepared to discuss various theories surrounding the Shadrin case. (This reluctance was further enhanced by the defection last month of Arkady N. Shevchenko, the Soviet diplomat who served as undersecretary general of the United Nations in New York. Shevchenko is the greatest diplomatic intelligence prize ever won by the United States.)

At first, Shadrin was worth his weight in gold to the United States. At the time when the Soviet Union launched a major buildup of its navy, the information brought by Shadrin was crucial to the United States Navy. After he outlived his usefulness, however, he was transformed into a double agent to satisfy the insatiable appetite of American intelligence. If it were not for this greed, Shadrin would be living tranquilly in the United States today, like other Soviet defectors.

His name originally was Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov, but on orders, after his arrival in the United States, he changed it to Shadrin—after the hero

of Pushkin's tale *The Captain's Daughter* (his wife's father is a Polish merchant-marine captain). It was a point less deception, because he testified as Artamonov in an open session of the House Committee on Un-American Activities in September 1960, and the audience included a Soviet diploma busily taking notes. Afterward, no effort was made to conceal his real identity, and Shadrin was the nearest thing to a public figure in intelligence circles. This was the first major blunder led to all the others.

Nobody, it seems, wishes to delve into intelligence secrets that could cause considerable embarrassment to the United States. Full disclosure could, for example, highlight the sixteen year of blunders surrounding Shadrin's activities in this country and broad methods employed by American intelligence, and conflicts involving the CIA, the FBI, and the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency.

Shadrin was not a run-of-the-mill spy or defector: He had high-level acquaintances and friendships in American intelligence, which made him a vulnerable figure.

One friend was Admiral Rufus L. Taylor, who, as director of naval intelligence, was his boss during the time the Russian ex-officer served as a special consultant to the navy. And Admiral Stansfield Turner, for example, got to know Shadrin sufficiently well to write him "Dear Nick" letters (Shadrin had lectured at the Naval War College

Mystery men: CIA files yielded these photographs of KGB agents Oleg Kozlov (left) and Mikhail Kuryshin (center), possibly the last men to see Shadrin (right) alive.

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plus a job and citizenship, for his defection..."

lege, in the early 1970s, when Turner was its president).

It is noteworthy that after Shadrin's wife, Dr. Ewa Shadrin, despaired of any effective action by the Ford administration on his behalf and retained Richard D. Copaken, a partner in the prestigious Washington law firm of Covington & Burling (once Dean Acheson's firm), the White House volunteered payment of the legal fees.

Ewa Shadrin accepted the offer. She is the Polish woman with whom Shadrin fled in 1959 and whom he married a year later in Baltimore. Now she practices dentistry in an office at their house in McLean, Virginia.

The law firm's bills were paid from February 1976 until August 1977, when the *Wall Street Journal* and the *Washington Post* published the first stories about Shadrin's disappearance. Payments have not been resumed yet, though the government says it has the matter under advisement.

Ewa Shadrin still does receive Shadrin's paychecks from the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), where her husband was ostensibly employed while serving as a double agent. She gets \$720 biweekly (after deductions), which adds up to \$18,720 annually.

Interestingly, neither side denies that Shadrin was a double agent. Immediately after his disappearance, CIA and FBI case officers told Ewa Shadrin that Nick, as he is known to his American friends, had been working since 1966 for United States intelligence. She claims he had never told her about it.

On the surface, the question seems to be whose "double" Shadrin really was—the Soviets' or the Americans'—but the truth is far more complicated.

The Shadrin story begins in September 1958, when the destroyer he had commanded for two years was assigned to the Polish naval base Oksywie, across the bay from the port of Gdynia. Under the supervision of an admiral, the Soviet task force was engaged with the Polish navy in the training of Indonesian naval officers and crews in anti-submarine warfare. This was the period of close collaboration between the Sukarno regime and the Soviet Union, which had supplied billions of dollars in arms to Indonesia.

Shadrin was then 30 years old, a brilliant officer with a superb career ahead. Born in Leningrad, he went through Frunze Naval Academy—a special distinction—and took a "com-

manders' course" in 1954. At 28, he was given the command of a destroyer, which he took on official visits to Denmark, Britain, and Malta. Finally came the assignment in Poland, and the word among his fellow officers was that Shadrin was destined to become perhaps the youngest admiral in the Soviet navy.

It was at a party at the Gdynia officers' club in the fall of 1958 that Shadrin first met an attractive Polish medical student, Ewa Góra.

By Ewa's account, Shadrin was a "very amusing man . . . wherever he went, he was the life of the party. . . . He could discuss any subject: His education wasn't just narrow naval education." He loved the theater and often took his friends to concerts. He was especially interested in opera: His mother had been an amateur singer, and Nick knew all the arias by heart.

In every way, it seems, Shadrin was different from other Soviet officers. For example: "Normally, Soviet officers couldn't come ashore when they wanted," Ewa explained. "They had to ask for permission, and it was rarely granted. . . . Nick informed the admiral that he was going to town."

Several times, Ewa says, Shadrin went ashore without telling anybody; on one occasion he was caught and had a dressing down. What emerges, though, is the image of a man who could get away with almost anything, who was more trusted than his fellow officers. This, of course, raises the question of why he received special treatment. CIA experts later wondered whether Shadrin had KGB ties that granted him special privileges. But nobody has come up with a clear answer.

In any event, Shadrin's freedom created the opportunity for CIA emissaries to approach him. This was the period when the CIA was engaging in its first clandestine effort to bring about the overthrow of Sukarno. A by-product of this activity was an attempt to penetrate the Soviet navy: The Office of Naval Intelligence was extremely anxious at the time to gather information on developments in the Soviet navy. It wanted a deep-penetration agent or, if at all possible, a high-ranking defector. Several Indonesian officers among the CIA's contacts—anti-Communist men from wealthy families—had been assigned to be trained in Poland, and Ewa remembers that an officer named Purnomo came on several occasions to the house of a Polish friend when

Shadrin was present and, at least once to her home to see him. Purnomo may have been the CIA's emissary.

One of the most difficult intelligence problems is to establish the motivation of defectors or potential defectors. As Ewa tells the story, Shadrin, estranged from his wife in the Soviet Union, had made up his mind to defect to the West as early as March 1959 as the only way to marry Ewa. Intelligence officers who have read parts of Shadrin's secret file at the CIA—the sections pertaining to his recruitment by the agency—think that while he undoubtedly wanted to marry Ewa, the final incentive was provided by American intelligence. The motives were, indeed, mixed.

According to the CIA file, Shadrin agreed to defect with a cache of documents—copies of the Soviet navy "commander reports" that include current naval operational intelligence—and to serve as an adviser to United States intelligence on Russian naval matters. However, he was to arrange means of defection himself—the CIA couldn't help him there.

In return, Shadrin was guaranteed the new life in America, CIA payment for the completion of Ewa's dental education, his job, and citizenship.

He decided to flee by boat to Sweden on June 7, a Sunday, because there would be little traffic on the Baltic.

Shadrin and Ewa departed at 7:30 P.M. It was a clear and warm evening, and the excuse was that they were going fishing. To avoid arousing suspicion he took along 25-year-old Ilya Aleksandrovich Popov, the sailor who always handled the 22-foot motor launch. Ewa was forbidden by Shadrin to bring anything except for a handbag and a raincoat. They both wore sport clothes, although Shadrin had his uniform in the cabin. A gun was hidden below deck.

The crossing took 24 hours. There was no conversation with Popov, because in the Soviet navy a sailor is not permitted to address an officer without first being spoken to.

They landed Monday evening in a small fishing village on the Swedish island of Oland. Popov thought they were in Poland. The village was deserted, but after a while a few fishermen turned up. Shadrin and Ewa spoke neither Swedish nor English, and all they could do was to repeat the word "police." They wanted to be taken to the nearest police station to ask for asylum. The Swedes were unresponsi-

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Shadrin presented himself to take them, via the CIA, to Kalaar, where Shadrin identified himself to a Russian-speaking interpreter and asked for asylum. Within a day or two, he and Ewa were taken to Stockholm and housed in a jail during their interrogation. (Popov was returned to Poland.) Meanwhile, the Swedish press broke the story of the defection. It caused a minor sensation around the world, but to the CIA, Shadrin's flight was a major intelligence coup.

The next contact was with Captain Sven Rystrom, a Russian-speaking officer who had served as Swedish naval attaché in Moscow. According to Ewa, he warned them not to go to the United States, because "the Americans have the tendency to take advantage of people and then forget them." She adds: "And this is exactly what happened."

Two weeks later, though, when Shadrin and Ewa were released, Ewa presented herself at the American Embassy. A Russian-speaking diplomat received her in his office. Two days later, she says, "we left for West Germany." If Shadrin hadn't been expected, it is highly unlikely that they would have been flown out of Sweden so quickly. Normally, preliminary defector examinations last much longer.

Accompanied by a CIA escort, Shadrin and Ewa were flown from Stockholm to Frankfurt aboard a small aircraft—a CIA "black flight." They sat in a specially constructed concealed cabin. They arrived in Frankfurt on August 1 and were immediately taken to a CIA "safe house" outside the city.

After three weeks of intense interrogation, plus lie-detector and psychological tests, the Inter-Agency Defector Committee (made up of representatives of the CIA, the FBI, the State Department, and military-intelligence services) apparently accepted Shadrin's and Ewa's *bona fides*, and they were flown to Washington (on another CIA black flight) on August 21—again a relatively short time for defectors.

The debriefing process, in three Virginia safe houses, took nine months. Shadrin and Ewa were guarded around the clock by three CIA security officers. "They smoked cigars and watched television," Ewa recalls.

Sometimes there were eight or ten intelligence specialists questioning Shadrin about the Soviet navy. There were CIA experts and specialists from the Office of Naval Intelligence in addition to Walter Onoshko, Shadrin's CIA case officer. The CIA interpreter was Walter Sidov. Among naval specialists were Captain Thomas L. Dwyer, later coordinator of intelligence operations for the ship *Pueblo*, captured by North

Shadrin says that he was familiar with operational data about Soviet destroyers and anti-submarine warfare, but he also displayed a profound knowledge of the overall workings of the Soviet navy.



The first meeting: Canadian Mounted Police took this CIA-file photograph of Shadrin meeting his KGB contact in Montreal.

On one occasion, Shadrin was taken to Norfolk, Virginia, to participate in anti-submarine-warfare exercises aboard a United States destroyer and, in fact, was given the command of the ship for the operation. A Naval Intelligence officer, impressed, remarked that "if all the Soviet-destroyer skippers are half as good as Nick, we have something to worry about."

On June 1, 1950, Shadrin began working as a consultant for the Naval Scientific and Technical Intelligence Center (STIC), a branch of the Office of Naval Intelligence. His six years with STIC were probably the happiest period in Shadrin's life in the United States. His job was to evaluate Soviet naval data with Naval Intelligence and CIA experts. During this time he worked closely with John Funkhouser, the CIA's leading naval specialist.

With \$10,000 from the CIA (this was part of the original defection deal), the Shadrins made the down payment on a small house in Arlington, Virginia, across the Potomac from Washington, their first real home in the United States. Ewa went to dental school for three years to obtain her license to practice in the United States (this, too, was part of the CIA deal); Shadrin obtained an engineering degree from George Washington University. In his spare time, he worked on building the motorboat he had always wanted.

activities in terms of morale of Admiral Taylor. The command made a point of stressing Shadrin's importance by saying that he had been "singled out for special attention and commendation in the Soviet press."

Shadrin's service as STIC consultant ended, inexplicably, in June 1956. After several weeks of unemployment—and worry—Shadrin was offered a job as consultant to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). This was the period when Admiral Taylor, Shadrin's old boss as chief of Naval Intelligence, was serving a brief stint as DIA's deputy director before becoming deputy director of the CIA. It was perhaps not purely accidental that Shadrin was hired by the DIA: It appears to have been part of a larger plan U.S. intelligence had for him.

Unfortunately, Shadrin found the DIA job demeaning and boring. In collaboration with small fry military defectors from Communist countries, he helped translate Soviet military literature into English. For an evaluator of naval intelligence, it was humiliating: Shadrin made no bones about this to his wife and friends, and before long he wanted to do something else.

"Something else" turned up almost immediately, when Admiral Taylor proposed that Shadrin become a double agent as bait for the KGB. There are three versions of how Shadrin got involved in espionage.

The "official" version—the one given Ewa Shadrin by the FBI after her husband vanished—was that Shadrin was approached by KGB agents in Washington in the summer of 1956 right after he joined the DIA, with an offer to spy for the Soviet Union. According to this version, Shadrin reported this approach at once to the FBI, which asked him to pretend to accept the KGB proposal and, in effect, act as a double agent.

The second American version is the reverse occurred. FBI agents, according to this version, had learned that KGB operatives with diplomatic cover were stalking the Old Post Office Building on Pennsylvania Avenue where Shadrin's defectors' unit and the FBI field office were located. The FBI surmise was that the Russians were trying to identify the bureau's agents and to approach one or more defectors. Since Shadrin was the most important person in this group, the FBI assumed that he would be the principal target.

On the strength of this suspicion, assistant director of the FBI asked Admiral Taylor to instruct Shadrin to accept KGB overtures, should they

To the CIA, however, it was a major intelligence coup..."

cur. Taylor did so and Shadrin is said to have agreed without any hesitation.

And it was a self-fulfilling prophecy: Ten days later, a Soviet diplomat named Oleg Kozlov (known to be a KGB agent) accosted Shadrin at a bus stop at the corner of Lee Highway and Harrison Street in North Arlington to propose cooperation with the KGB. He is said to have produced photographs of Shadrin's first wife, along with a letter from her asking him to return to the Soviet Union. Still, according to this version, Shadrin agreed. Then he went to the FBI, which told him to establish a permanent contact.

According to the third version, which appeared in Moscow's *Literary Gazette*, Shadrin approached a Soviet Embassy employee at a local supermarket and asked to be returned to Russia. The *Gazette* says that the KGB agreed to help if Shadrin would first perform certain services.

All things considered, the second American version is probably closest to the truth, although Shadrin may have made the initial contact with the Soviets on the FBI's behalf.

Ewa Shadrin was presumably fed the "official" version to dispel any notion that her husband had been recruited for espionage by the Americans. It would look better if Shadrin appeared to be the victim of a KGB approach.

But even if the Americans did not set up Shadrin (though this is the most likely conclusion), it remains an act of utter folly to have engaged a valuable defector, with strong ties inside the intelligence community, in the double-agent business. The truth is that the FBI and the CIA didn't know what they wanted—other than to spot KGB agents—when they activated Shadrin.

To be sure, the FBI was gratified that the first questions the Russians asked Shadrin when they met for lunch at a Washington restaurant concerned the whereabouts of Nosenko, Golitsin, and other KGB defectors in the United States. Still, the operation was a marginal proposition.

Even more interest developed when the Russians wanted to know how the United States obtains intelligence about the Soviet navy. Now the intelligence officers saw a chance to escalate the Shadrin operation. Their notion was to feed disinformation to the Soviets on American intelligence methods. This had to be done with extreme care, because Soviet experts at the other end were certain to spot anything that

looked phony and conclude that Shadrin was a double agent. As an intelligence officer put it, "We gave them soft, but not false, information."

This relationship continued for nearly five years. Shadrin maintained his high visibility, in part because he insisted on leading a normal life, but, in retrospect, Ewa thinks it odd that Nick was the only visible Soviet defector and that he had no special protection. She was never told, of course, that he was a double agent.

The great turning point in Shadrin's double-agent career came in 1971. Late in the summer, his KGB contact asked him to make a trip abroad. No reason was given, and Finland was proposed at first as a meeting site. This, however, was judged too dangerous by the Russians themselves, and they changed their minds, suggesting Montreal instead. FBI and CIA handlers told Shadrin that if the operation were to be maintained, he had no choice but to accept the trip. Thus the irrevocable step was taken and, as one of Shadrin's

CIA friends said later, "Nick was trapped." Had reason prevailed at that time, the operation would have been aborted and the ultimate tragedy might have been averted. But intelligence greed reigned, and the Shadrins flew off to Canada in September.

Shadrin told his wife that the trip would be their vacation, but that in Montreal he had to meet a person who had "worked for the United States for 25 years." This was the FBI cover story. The Shadrins spent a night in Montreal, and Nick spent the evening out meeting his "friend." The next day, they rented a car and drove to Mont Tremblant.

Was it safe for Shadrin to leave the United States on his own? The FBI evidently had some reservations because it asked the intelligence division of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police to provide protective coverage.

The Montreal coverage yielded a long-lens photograph of Shadrin shaking hands with a KGB agent at the door of an out-of-town villa. More impor-

The Shadrin-Nosenko Connection

There are indications that Shadrin was caught up in some manner in the long, silent battle within the intelligence community over the *bona fides* of Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko, the most famous KGB defector to the United States. Although they never met in the United States, Nosenko and Shadrin had been schoolmates at Frunze Naval Academy in Leningrad and Nosenko was later connected with the naval-intelligence branch of the Soviet military-intelligence service, while Shadrin went off to be a destroyer commander with access to operational intelligence. Nosenko fled the Soviet Union in 1964, five years after Shadrin; he was the agent whose testimony had confirmed the belief of the FBI's late director, J. Edgar Hoover, that Lee Harvey Oswald, the assassin of President Kennedy, had no ties with the KGB. This helped to make the FBI's conclusions acceptable to the Warren Commission. The CIA, however, developed subsequent suspicions that Nosenko was a KGB "deep plant" and he remained imprisoned by the agency until 1967, when the still-controversial decision was made, in effect, to clear him.

In charge of clearing Nosenko was Admiral Taylor, the CIA deputy director who had persuaded Shadrin to become a double agent. One of Nosenko's principal defenders was the CIA's Leonard McCoy, who was later Shadrin's case officer, and who, after the disappearance, turned out to be a source of contradictory information about the case. Bruce Solie, the CIA officer who directed Nosenko's re-examination and was his handler following imprisonment, was dispatched to Vienna in 1975 to escort Ewa Shadrin back to Washington when her husband failed to return from the KGB meeting.

What, if anything, is the meaning of these coincidences? Some intelligence officers believe that the clearing of Nosenko, whom the CIA and the FBI had finally decided to trust, suggested that American intelligence was free of Soviet "deep plant" agents. If Nosenko was not a plant, the CIA reasoning went, then it was safe to assume that Shadrin was not one, either. This may have been stretching the point, but the fact remains that Shadrin was activated as a double agent on behalf of the United States at the time the process of rehabilitating Nosenko was under way.

—T.S.

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Shadrin was told that he would be supplied with special intelligence equipment. To the FBI and the CIA, this was sensational news. Smashing an illegal network is the dream of every intelligence service, just as the fear that one may exist is its nightmare.

If the intelligence agencies had any lingering doubt that the KGB had swallowed the Shadrin bait, it was removed early in 1972 when the promised secret equipment was delivered to the Shadrins' house. The equipment consisted of a radio receiver and transmitter (the CIA called it "communications capability"), a cipher code inside a book with hollowed pages, and a notebook with instructions on secret-writing methods.

During 1972, Shadrin received his Ph.D. in international affairs from George Washington University. Then he was instructed by his KGB contact to travel to Vienna to be trained in the use of the secret equipment and, possibly, to meet the "illegal."

Again, the intelligence agencies in Washington were overjoyed. The illegal network seemed to be within grasp, and the Shadrin operation became one of the most closely guarded intelligence secrets. There was no question of Shadrin's not going to Vienna; in fact, the CIA and the FBI claim that he was eager to do it. But there was also no thought of providing protection surveillance for him in Vienna. Intelligence officers say that this matter was not even discussed in FBI-CIA conferences on the subject.

Shadrin's Vienna meeting was scheduled for September 8, and he told his wife that it would be part of a European vacation. Their first stop was Madrid; from there they went on to Munich for the Olympic games. Shadrin mentioned to Ewa that in Vienna he would have an overnight meeting with the same man he had seen in Montreal.

Arriving in Vienna, the Shadrins checked in at the plush Bristol Hotel, across the street from the Opera, and Nick went out in the early evening to keep his appointment. He took a taxi to the Votivkirche, a Vienna landmark church, and met his contact on the steps. Then a car took them to a villa out of the city. Shadrin spent about eighteen hours there with several KGB agents—one of them was Oleg Kozlov, his Washington handler—and technical experts. They trained him in the use of the type of secret equipment he had at home. He returned to the hotel at 4 P.M. the following day. The Shadrins stayed two more days in Vienna, driving around in a rented car, then flew to Athens before returning home.

Shadrin had not had any technical training. In intelligence work, patience is the cardinal virtue.

Before leaving Vienna, Shadrin had been told to meet with a contact in Washington on his return, but nobody turned up. And, as it turned out, the KGB broke all contact with Shadrin for more than two years after his return from Vienna. The conventional wisdom was that the Russians were encountering difficulties in implanting an "illegal" in the United States.

It didn't occur to anybody that the KGB might have become suspicious of Shadrin and was rechecking his credentials. Again, prudence would have counseled taking Shadrin out of the operation altogether—but the greed now was too great.

Although the FBI and the CIA maintained close contact with Shadrin during this interval, he was becoming despondent. He hated his translation job at the DIA but had to keep it. He was getting edgy.

Then, in the fall of 1974, Shadrin started receiving mysterious calls at home. On one occasion, a woman speaking in English instructed him to meet somebody in the Arlington area. He was told to appear at once but decided not to do it because he was unable to contact either John Funkhouser, the CIA naval expert, or James Wooten, his FBI handler.

Early in 1975, a Russian-speaking man telephoned Shadrin at home and, trying to disguise his voice, told Shadrin that he would receive a secret-writing letter. When the letter, bearing an Oxon Hill, Maryland, postmark, arrived, Shadrin deciphered it. The writer wanted to know whether and when Shadrin could travel again, where he could attend a meeting with the "illegal," and what his cover would be. The instructions were to reply by invisible-writing letter to a dead-drop address in Berlin. Shadrin answered, proposing Spain, but another letter from Oxon Hill rejected this idea.

At a conference with FBI and CIA officials, it was decided that Shadrin should pick Vienna, "same time, same place." That Vienna was chosen by the agencies has been corroborated by highly placed intelligence sources in Washington; Leonard McCoy, the CIA case officer, insists, however, that it was the KGB that demanded the meeting be held in the Austrian capital. (This is one of the many mysteries surrounding Shadrin's disappearance. It is possible that McCoy has taken this stance to prove the entrapment theory and to remove the blame from the

the CIA nor the FBI wanted to provide protective surveillance for Shadrin on the ground that the Russians would spot it. And this time the agencies were convinced that Shadrin would at last meet the "illegal." As intelligence officers explained later, they had no reason to think that the KGB was suspicious of Shadrin—although nobody had a valid explanation for the two-year silence.

There was a difference in the 1975 operation, however. Shortly before the Shadrins left for Vienna, the CIA arranged for them to meet a counter-intelligence staff officer who was introduced as "Ann Martin" (though on one occasion she was identified as "Cynthia Martin"). She was brought to the Shadrins' home with the warning that she should be identified as a dental patient if they were interrupted.

Ann Martin was a tall, angular woman in her late forties, with a large mole on her left cheek, and glasses. She spoke Russian and German, and informed the Shadrins that they would meet again in Vienna. Then she gave Shadrin two emergency telephone numbers in Vienna, a daytime number and a night number, where she could be reached by Ewa if anything unusual happened.

The Shadrins arrived in Vienna on December 17 and took Suite 361 at the Bristol. The next evening Shadrin left the hotel to meet his contact at the Votivkirche. Ann Martin stayed with Ewa. When Shadrin returned, shortly before midnight, the CIA woman took him into the bathroom and, with the shower running, debriefed him.

He told her that he had had dinner at a small fish restaurant with the KGB's Oleg Kozlov and Mikhail Ivanovich Kuryshev. There was only small talk, and Shadrin was instructed to come to another evening meeting two days later. Shadrin was also given \$1,000 in cash, although several thousand dollars had been sent to him in Washington by the KGB, and was told to rent a car the following day to become acquainted with the streets of Vienna.

At 6:30 P.M. on December 20, Shadrin left for his second meeting. Again, it did not occur to the CIA handlers that the sudden two-day delay before the presumed encounter with the "illegal" was a danger sign and that Shadrin should be withdrawn at once from the operation. An intelligence officer theorized later that Shadrin may have aroused suspicions at the dinner on December 18, and the KGB needed time for new instructions from Moscow. But the same officer said, "We never anticipated a kidnapping."

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Ann Martin did not stay with Ewa that evening. She was attending a dinner party, and Ewa was told that in case of trouble she could reach her at her apartment at night. It was never explained why Ann Martin was not available most of the night, and Ewa Shadrin was unable to reach her until 1:55 A.M., when she became acutely concerned about her husband.

Shadrin, of course, was never seen again. But there are further mysteries. Richard Copaken, the lawyer, says that the acting chief of the CIA station in Vienna, who had been informed of the Shadrin meetings with the KGB, had canceled all leaves and prepared surveillance for Shadrin. But Copaken learned later that Ann Martin had ordered the station chief to cancel surveillance, allegedly on FBI orders.

One of the most senior intelligence officers in Washington has said in a private discussion of the Shadrin case that there was no justification for allowing Shadrin to operate in Vienna without protective surveillance. He said that if, indeed, Ann Martin had ordered the local station chief to lift surveillance, the CIA officer should have called headquarters at once to obtain the reversal or confirmation of such a decision. He also said that it was “inexcusable” for the FBI to have been unaware that the Votivkirche is in direct line of sight from the building housing the American Consulate in Vienna. Shadrin could have been observed from consulate windows without arousing Soviet suspicions.

What if the CIA had covered Shadrin? Two years later, intelligence officers admit that at worst the KGB would have “broken surveillance” and kidnapped him anyway. But, they say, the Russians might have been scared away and dropped Shadrin. A life would have been saved.

On December 23, when Ewa prepared to return home alone, Ann Martin took Shadrin's passport away from her on the ground that he would not be traveling with her. Later, the State Department lost the passport. Although she was escorted home by Bruce Solie, a high-ranking CIA official, who instructed her to act as if she didn't know him until they reached Frankfurt, Ewa was not told that her husband was a double agent until she was met at Dulles International Airport by FBI agents. The Austrian police were not notified for weeks of Shadrin's disappearance.

Ewa was instructed not to discuss Shadrin's case with anybody. She told friends that Nick was ill, traveling, or busy working elsewhere. The Ford administration was determined to keep his disappearance secret—possibly forever. Its diplomatic efforts to discover Shadrin's whereabouts were also limited.

Secretary of State Kissinger inquired about Shadrin during a conversation with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin. The ambassador denied all knowledge, but Kissinger did give him the names of the two KGB agents—Kozlov and Kuryshev—with whom Shadrin was known to have been dealing. On January 20 and 22, Kissinger raised the subject with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, who suggested that it be discussed with Dobrynin. On January 29, Kissinger reportedly told Senator John Sparkman, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, that he had “worked and worked and worked” on the Shadrin case, but “there is nothing more” to be done. On February 16, however, Kissinger had another conversation about Shadrin with Dobrynin, who again insisted that “he is not in the Soviet Union.” Kissinger replied: “This answer is not sufficient for the United States.”

In March, Richard Copaken met twice in Berlin with Wolfgang Vogel, the East German barrister who had arranged the exchange of Soviet super-spy Colonel Abel for downed U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers, to discuss exchanging Shadrin for Communist prisoners in the West. Vogel left the impression that Shadrin was alive in the Soviet Union and might be exchanged at some stage—particularly if Ford wrote directly to Brezhnev. On May 13, Kissinger discussed Shadrin once more with Dobrynin, who asked him not to bring up the subject anymore. In mid-May, Copaken mentioned the Shadrin case to Ford during a White House reception. The president said he was aware of it and that something might be done after the primaries.

After eleven months of trying, Ewa Shadrin obtained a meeting with Ford on November 5 and asked him to write Brezhnev. Ford did so on December 3, but on December 24 Brezhnev sent the oral reply that the Russians didn't have Shadrin, that he had never shown up at the second meeting in Vienna.

Now the ball was with the Carter administration. Secretary of State Vance brought up Shadrin with Do-

brynin, but got the same answer: We don't know where he is. In April 1977, Copaken again met Vogel in Berlin and handed him a letter from Ewa to her husband. Vogel said he would return the letter if it could not be delivered; Copaken says Vogel never returned it.

The State Department informally brought up the Shadrin situation with the Russians on two occasions later in 1977, but President Carter turned down Ewa's request for an appointment, through a letter from National Security Adviser Brzezinski. The current view in the administration is that there is no point in Carter's either writing Brezhnev or seeing Ewa Shadrin, unless new leads develop.

Such a lead did develop last August, when Copaken received a mysterious telephone call from London, followed by suggestions that information about Shadrin might be obtained if \$3,000 were deposited in a Monaco bank account. The call followed the publication in American newspapers of stories about Shadrin's disappearance, but certain credence was given to it because the caller mentioned several key words not in the public domain.

The money was paid and, through a complex procedure involving three Western intelligence services, a man seemingly connected with the caller was found by Copaken aboard a yacht off the south coast of France. He turned out to be a British citizen with strange background and connections, but he provided no information about Shadrin.

Interestingly, however, this episode commanded the instant attention of CIA Director Stansfield Turner, who dispatched the agency's Inspector General John Waller to France, held three meetings with Ewa Shadrin and Copaken late last year, and helped to arrange the sending of an FBI lie-detector team to Europe to interview the Briton.

But in March 1978, the CIA advised Copaken through Waller that it no longer wished to maintain any contact with Ewa Shadrin and her lawyer. The reason given was that Shadrin was an FBI problem. Elsewhere in the administration, the attitude was that since the “European lead” turned into a dead end, nothing further could be done.

The administration may be right. The Russians are clearly not about to discover that they have Shadrin after all. But, if nothing else, the United States government must assume some responsibility for the fate of the defector it recruited, then abandoned.

WASHINGTON STAR 14 MAY 1978

DID U.S. FALL INTO KGB TRAP ON A DOUBLE A

From Time Magazine

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
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See SFY, A-14

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Igor offered to become a double agent, or in Le Carré's famous term a "mole," who would burrow deeply into the Soviet espionage network and pass on secrets to the United States. Mrs. Helms turned Igor over to her husband, who in turn passed him on to U.S. counterintelligence operatives.

Igor told the Americans that he could possibly get a higher post within the KGB. He said he would have a better chance of this if he could recruit Shadrin as a Soviet agent. U.S. intelligence officials, though suspicious, decided to help.

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14 MAY 78

THE WASHINGTON POST
14 May 1978ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-5

'66 Call Seen Link in Double Agent Case

A mysterious Soviet diplomat named Igor who volunteered his services to the Central Intelligence Agency in a phone call to the home of Richard M. Helms may hold the key to the disappearance of a Soviet defector named Nicholas G. Shadrin, Time magazine reported yesterday.

The Washington Post revealed the first details of Shadrin's disappearance last year. His real name was Nikolai Artamonov, and he defected to Sweden, then to the United States in 1959. He said he was a Soviet naval officer on temporary duty in Poland at the time. He went to work for the U.S. government in Washington.

In 1966 Shadrin became a "double agent" for the Federal Bureau of Investigation, pretending to go to work for the KGB (Soviet secret police) in Washington (or so the FBI thought) while actually working for U.S. intelligence. In December 1975, on a secret mission to Vienna to meet his KGB contacts, Shadrin disappeared.

According to Time's account, U.S. officials encouraged Shadrin to become a double agent in 1966 "despite considerable misgivings on his part," to help the KGB agent named Igor who had volunteered to work inside the KGB for the United States.

According to Time, sometime in 1966 Igor telephoned the home of Helms and talked with his wife. (Time gives no date for this call. In June 1966, Helms was promoted from director of covert operations to CIA director.) Igor said he wanted to work for U.S. intelligence.

Mrs. Helms "turned Igor over to her husband, who in turn passed him on to U.S. counterintelligence operatives."

"Igor told the Americans that he could possibly get a higher post within the KGB," Time's report continues. "He said he would have a better chance of this if he could recruit Shadrin as a double agent."

If this version is correct, it would fill a vast hole in previously available accounts of Shadrin's career and dis-

appearance. Shadrin was a Soviet defector allegedly sentenced to death by a Soviet court in absentia, who once testified to a congressional committee here that the Soviet Union had secret plans for a sneak attack against the United States. The hole in the story was, why would a man with that history agree to work for Soviet intelligence in 1966?

(Reached by telephone last night, Helms confirmed that a Soviet official had once called his residence and talked with his former wife. Helms said he passed this on to the "relevant officials," and "I never much followed it after that."

("There's no reason why it couldn't have been Igor," Helms added, but he said he did not recall that name.)

According to Shadrin's wife, Blanka Ewa Shadrin, a dentist living in McLean who defected from Poland with her husband in 1959, she knew nothing about her husband's double-agent role until 1975, when he disappeared in Vienna. She could offer no explanation for his previous behavior.

Some sources in the intelligence community have suggested that Shadrin actually was a Soviet plant from the beginning, in 1959. Other sources felt he was a patriotic American (Congress granted him citizenship in the 1960s) prepared to take great risks for his new homeland.

Time's report suggests that the actual phony agent may have been the mysterious Igor. "There is a lingering suspicion in intelligence circles that in going along with Igor's request to recruit Shadrin," Time says, "the U.S. fell for a Soviet plot."

The magazine quotes one U.S. intelligence official as speculating that there might be a connection between the name Igor and the Russian word for a game, "igra."

Time gives no indication of what Igor's relations have been with U.S. intelligence since 1966.

Shadrin disappeared in December 1975. He had had one meeting with two KGB agents, and was last seen setting out for a second rendezvous.

The most common assumption within the U.S. intelligence community has been that the Soviets kidnaped and perhaps killed him. Mrs. Shadrin has held out hope that he is still alive and might somehow be swapped.

President Ford wrote to Soviet leader Leonid I. Brezhnev late in 1976 asking about Shadrin. Brezhnev replied in a message passed on to the White House by a Soviet diplomat here. The message was that Shadrin never showed up for the second meeting in Vienna and the Soviets had no idea of his whereabouts.

Last August, after The Post and The Wall Street Journal published reports about Shadrin's disappearance, a Soviet newspaper published an unusual, long account of the case that suggested the CIA had done away with him.

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14 MAY 78

The Washington Star
14 May 1978

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NICHOLAS SHADRIN
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Mrs. Helms "turned Igor over to her husband, who in turn passed him on to U.S. counterintelligence operatives."

"Igor told the Americans that he could possibly get a higher post within the KGB," Time's report continues. "He said he would have a better chance of this if he could recruit Shadrin as a double agent."

If this version is correct, it would fill a vast hole in previously available accounts of Shadrin's career and disappearance. Shadrin was a Soviet defector allegedly sentenced to death by a Soviet court in absentia, who once testified to a congressional committee here that the Soviet Union had secret plans for a sneak attack against the United States. The hole in the story was, why would a man with that his-

tory agree to work for Soviet intelligence in 1966?

(Reached by telephone last night, Helms confirmed that a Soviet official had once called his residence and talked with his former wife. Helms said he passed this on to the "relevant officials," and "I never much followed it after that."

("There's no reason why it couldn't have been Igor," Helms added, but he said he did not recall that name.)

According to Shadrin's wife, Blanka Ewa Shadrin, a dentist living in McLean who defected from Poland with her husband in 1959, she knew nothing about her husband's double-agent role until 1975, when he disappeared in Vienna. She could offer no explanation for his previous behavior.

Some sources in the intelligence community have suggested that Shadrin actually was a Soviet plant from the beginning, in 1959. Other sources felt he was a patriotic American (Congress granted him citizenship in the 1960s) prepared to take great risks for his new homeland.

Time's report suggests that the actual phony agent may have been the mysterious Igor. "There is a lingering suspicion in intelligence circles that in going along with Igor's request to

recruit Shadrin," Time says, "the U.S. fell for a Soviet plot."

The magazine quotes one U.S. intelligence official as speculating that there might be a connection between the name Igor and the Russian word for a game, "igra."

Time gives no indication of what Igor's relations have been with U.S. intelligence since 1966.

Shadrin disappeared in December 1975. He had had one meeting with two KGB agents, and was last seen setting out for a second rendezvous.

The most common assumption within the U.S. intelligence community has been that the Soviets kidnaped and perhaps killed him. Mrs. Shadrin has held out hope that he is still alive and might somehow be swapped.

President Ford wrote to Soviet leader Leonid I. Brezhnev late in 1976 asking about Shadrin. Brezhnev replied in a message passed on to the White House by a Soviet diplomat here. The message was that Shadrin never showed up for the second meeting in Vienna and the Soviets had no idea of his whereabouts.

Last August, after The Post and The Wall Street Journal published re-



NICHOLAS G. SHADRIN
... Soviet defector missing since 1975

ports about Shadrin's disappearance, a Soviet newspaper published an unusual, long account of the case that suggested the CIA had done away with him.

MAY 78

What Did Shadrin Take with Him in from the Cold?

Washington.

ONE of the most mysterious spy stories circulating around here is that of Nikolai Shadrin, the Soviet naval officer who defected to the

By Stanley Karnow

United States in 1959 and evaporated in Vienna nearly three years ago.

The general assumption is that Shadrin, who had become a double agent, was abducted by the Russians after they learned he was operating for the Central Intelligence Agency while pretending to work for the KGB, the Soviet secret service.

That assumption prompted President Ford to query Leonid Brezhnev, the Soviet Communist party leader, for information on Shadrin, and Henry Kissinger, when secretary of state, also raised the case with Andrei Gromyko, the Russian foreign minister. Both Mr. Ford and Mr. Kissinger drew blanks.

But sources familiar with the affair now submit that Shadrin was really a Communist agent all along, and though some senior CIA officials had good reason to suspect him, others insisted on pushing through his clearance because he served their own purposes.

As these sources tell it, warnings about Shadrin were issued on at least two separate occasions by the CIA's counterintelligence section, which had interrogated him intensively. But the warnings were either ignored or overruled by the agency's Soviet Bloc department, which desperately needed data and thus wanted to believe that Shadrin could be trusted.

These disclosures suggest that elements inside the CIA are often so anxious to score points that they are willing to court security risks. That the CIA has frequently suffered from an excess of zeal has also been seen in its eagerness to engage in assassination plots and other dubious ventures.

This thesis is disputed by other informants with intimate CIA connections. They assert that Shadrin would never have been cleared by the agency had there been misgivings about him. In their estimation, Shadrin was a genuine defector who was overexposed by the CIA and ended up being trapped by the Russians.

Substantiation for this thesis is contained in the report the other day that Shadrin had been reluctant to accept the double agent assignment, but was persuaded by the CIA to take it in order to bolster the position of a real KGB operative who sought to work secretly on behalf of the United States.

Whatever the truth in all this, it is clear that the Shadrin business is still a focus of enormous controversy, and is likely to remain so until harder evidence is forthcoming—which may be never. In the absence of such evidence, I think it is worthwhile to present a new version of the story, even though it cannot be entirely validated.

Shadrin, whose name was originally Nikolai F. Artamonov, fled from Poland to Sweden in June, 1959, accompanied by a young Polish woman who later became his wife. They were flown by the CIA to West Germany, and were grilled at length by Russian-speaking agency interrogators.

Sources here recall that Shadrin failed the lie-detector tests given him at the time. As a result, counterintelligence specialists expressed doubts about his credibility and even cautioned that he might be a Soviet "plant."

Nevertheless, he was transferred to Washington and not long afterward put to work in the Office of Naval Intelligence as an evaluator of Soviet naval data.

But doubts persisted and in 1964, the sources recollect, Shadrin was again subjected to interrogations and lie-detector tests. Again it was concluded that he was untrustworthy.

Once again, though, that judgment was rejected. Shadrin not only continued at his post, but was soon shifted to the Defense Intelligence Agency, where he translated Russian military literature.

It was in the summer of 1966 that Shadrin became a double agent. The standard version of his metamorphosis is that he was contacted by the KGB with an offer to spy for Moscow, reported the approach to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and was told to play the game. Sources who have monitored him for years, however, have a different account.

They say the KGB, which was really employing Shadrin, was then beginning to worry about his safety. Therefore, the KGB devised the "double agent" ruse with two motives in mind.

First, by volunteering to deceive the KGB by covertly serving U. S. intelligence, Shadrin would restore the faith that his CIA mentors had initially placed in him.

Moreover, by revealing the KGB offer to the FBI, which would henceforth make him its protege, he was reinforcing his bureaucratic protection within the American intelligence community and might eventually be able to play one agency off against another.

One major question, of course, is why the KGB went to all this trouble, since Shadrin was never privy to the most classified material. But according to sources who tracked him, it was enough that he mingled with high Pentagon officers and perhaps picked up bits of information. Shadrin's prominent friends included Admiral Rufus L. Taylor, the director of naval intelligence.

CONTINUED

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In addition, these sources emphasize the KGB is a bureaucracy whose bosses regard it as quite an achievement to penetrate one of their men deep into the enemy camp, even if he produces little of value.

In his purported pose as double agent, Shadrin went through the motions of encountering his KGB counterparts in Washington and in such cities abroad as Montreal and Vienna. The guess is that, after almost a decade of shadowy maneuvers, he decided to return home—or "come in from the cold," as spies would put it.

Interestingly enough, it was rather than the CIA or FBI who proposed to meet the KGB in Vienna in late 1975—the rendezvous from which he vanished. Vienna is only a short drive from the Czechoslovak frontier, and hardly the spot he would have selected had he considered himself in danger of a KGB kidnaping.

The Shadrin mystery has inspired other interpretations, including the official Kremlin theory that he was murdered by the CIA as he attempted to go back to the Soviet Union. In the view of some experts, the Russians made the extraordinary move of publishing their account in order to obfuscate the case.

It is impossible, as I have said, to document the version that Shadrin was secretly representing the KGB. It is equally impossible, however, to verify the tale that he was snatched away by Soviet agents.

Plainly, though, the CIA bungled—either by failing to check out his *bona fides* thoroughly or by failing to prevent his abduction. But then, it hasn't been the first time that the CIA has bungled.

25 MAY 78

THE NEW YORK TIMES, THURSDAY, MAY 25, 1978

Wife of Soviet Defector Says the C.I.A. May Have

By NICHOLAS M. HORROCK

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 24—The wife of a Soviet defector has asked President Carter and the Senate Intelligence Committee to investigate disclosures that have led her to suspect that her husband's life may have been needlessly sacrificed by the Central Intelligence Agency in a counterintelligence operation.

In letters prepared by her lawyer and sent to Senator Birch Bayh, the Indiana Democrat who heads the intelligence committee, and President Carter, Eva Shadrin, the defector's wife, said that in the two and a half years since her husband disappeared in Vienna she had received information that contradicted official versions of the case given her by the C.I.A., the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the White House.

Mrs. Shadrin says that she has recently received information that indicates the C.I.A. may have used her husband to help solidify the position of a Soviet agent in the Soviet intelligence service despite the fact it strongly suspected the Russian was an agent provocateur.

If this is true, she said in an interview, this would have been a needless and cynical use of her husband's life. Mrs. Shadrin, who has been trying to find out what happened to her husband since his disappearance, told officials of both the C.I.A. and F.B.I. about the information through her lawyer in April. She was advised that the two agencies had told her all they could under national security regulations and that they did not know what had happened to Mr. Shadrin.

In her letter to Mr. Carter, she renewed her appeal for an audience and entreated him to help her find her husband or the truth about his fate.

The request for an investigation has brought renewed attention here to the murky world of defectors and double agents.

Nicholas G. Shadrin is the American name of Nikolai F. Artamanov, commander of a Soviet Navy destroyer who defected to the United States in 1959. Mr. Shadrin disappeared in Vienna on Dec. 20, 1975, ostensibly while on the way to meet with Soviet intelligence agents.

Contradictions Are Noted

Mrs. Shadrin, who accompanied her husband on the Vienna trip, said she was told later by the F.B.I., the C.I.A. and the White House that at the time of his disappearance her husband was serving as a "double agent" for the F.B.I. and the C.I.A.

Caused His Death

She said that the agencies had told her that he had become a double agent in 1966 after he reported that members of the K.G.B., the Soviet intelligence service, had tried to recruit him while he was living here and working as a consultant for the Defense Intelligence Agency.

But Mrs. Shadrin and her lawyer, Richard D. Copaken, said that new information, in press reports and from sources they had interviewed, sharply contradicted this version.

Mrs. Shadrin said that she believed that her husband might have been sacrificed to aid the C.I.A. in its dealings with a Soviet official named Igor, who first approached the agency by calling the home of its director in May, 1966 and offering his services to penetrate the K.G.B. He held out the promise that he could be the C.I.A.'s man in the higher echelons of the Soviet intelligence service.

Part of the story of Igor was published two weeks ago in Time magazine and independently confirmed by The New York Times.

According to former intelligence officers, one of the tidbits Igor offered to get the relationship under way was the charge that a longtime Soviet operative for the C.I.A. code-named Sasha was in fact a K.G.B. plant. By this time Sasha



United Press International
Eva Shadrin

had been brought back from foreign assignment and was living in Virginia under the name Alexander Orlov.

Igor told his C.I.A. contacts that to prove his value to his superiors and to obtain a permanent assignment at the Soviet Embassy here, he needed to recruit Mr. Shadrin as a double agent.

Mrs. Shadrin and her lawyer said they believed that this was the real reason that in June 1966 Adm. Rufus W. Taylor, then Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, urged Mr. Shadrin to take on the risky assignment. They charged that the next nine years, during which Mr. Shadrin kept in contact with Soviet agents at the instruction of the C.I.A. and F.B.I., were a waste because the American authorities had strong suspicions that Igor was a K.G.B. plant.

The Times has confirmed independently that C.I.A. and F.B.I. officials were deeply skeptical of Igor's "bona fides," the information by which they seek to verify the legitimacy of defectors and penetration agents.

If the American intelligence services doubted Igor, Mrs. Shadrin said in an interview, they should never have allowed her husband to come under Soviet control on two trips to Vienna, one in 1972 and the other in 1975 when he disappeared.

Several present and former intelligence officers told The Times that the publication of Igor's name and the details of his case endangered "his life and others," as one source put it, and was detrimental to United States security.

Yet the Russians themselves seem aware of many of the contradictions in the Shadrin story. On Aug. 17, 1977, in response to the first press report here about Mr. Shadrin's plight, a well-known Soviet journalist, Genrikh Borovik, published the Soviet side of the story in an article in Literaturnaya Gazeta, a weekly newspaper.

The article was unusual in that it is rare for Soviet publications to discuss their intelligence operations or refer to K.G.B. files. Mr. Borovik uses as the pseudonym for the K.G.B. agent in the article the name Igor Aleksandrovich Orlov.

This seems to couple the Igor of the telephone call with the named used by the agent called Sasha, since Sasha is a short form for Aleksandr.

C.I.A. Complicity Suggested

The article suggests that instead of Soviet agents capturing Mr. Shadrin, the C.I.A. may have had complicity in his disappearance to avoid the embarrassment of his returning to the Soviet Union and publicly denouncing C.I.A. methods. Mrs. Shadrin said that the Igor matter

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was not the only contradiction she had found between her own investigations and the official information given her. She said that when she accompanied Mr. Shadrin in his flight from Poland in 1958, she believed that his defection was an impromptu act to permit them to marry and live in the West.

She said she had now received information that her husband was in fact recruited for the C.I.A. by Indonesian Navy officers who were being trained by Mr. Shadrin and others at the Polish port of Gdynia.

In her letter to the Senate committee, she said this factor placed a whole new complexion on her husband's decision in 1966 to work as a double agent and suggested that he had little choice but to take on the assignment.

There is no firm indication of Mr. Shadrin's fate since his disappearance. The C.I.A. has said it believes that he was killed or kidnapped by the K.G.B. The

Borovik article in effect charges that the C.I.A. killed him.

The only indication that he may be alive and in Soviet hands came last year when Wolfgang Vogel, the East German lawyer who has negotiated the exchange of prisoners between East and West, entered preliminary discussions about an exchange involving Mr. Shadrin. According to Mrs. Shadrin's lawyer, Mr. Vogel did not affirmatively state that Mr. Shadrin was alive or in Soviet hands.

The Senate Committee on Intelligence may be the only source from which Mrs. Shadrin can receive accurate information about how the case was handled. Spokesmen for the F.B.I. and the C.I.A. have refused to make any public comment on the ground that the case involves too many sensitive national security matters. The committee, however, has the power to command reports and evidence from the intelligence services for study in secret by its members.



Flynn's close friendship with Walter James Flynn

Chief Central Liaison Officer in the Flynn Affair

Laura Strike Perth end of Flynn's attempted PLO trade deal

SAM HAMMAMI London-based PLO chief

NICOLAS SHADRIN Soviet naval attaché turned CIA spy; Real name Nikolai Artambnov; Disappeared in Vienna

EVA SHADRIN Lt. Colonel's wife

OLEG ROZDOBY Soviet diplomat and KGB agent

ANN MARTIN CIA agent also known as Cynthia Martin

MICHAEL IVANOVICH KURYSHEV KGB agent

RICHARD COFARBY Shadrin family lawyer



Nicks and Eva Shadrin wedding photo



Michael Ivanovich Kuryshév



Oleg Rozdobý

STRIKE

A friend and partner

By GEOFF EASDOWN

THE phone was ringing in the Strike house at No. 6 Purdom Rd., Wembley Downs, a plush suburb on the north-east fringes of Perth.

Laure Strike picked up the receiver to be told it was an international call, never a charge, from a man named Flynn in Monaco.

Strike, who had done well from aerial map-making, and who by then was dabbling in a series of difficult business ventures, had not heard from Flynn for at least eight years.

To Strike the name Flynn is just another alias used by the man who has popped in and out of his life several times in the past 25 years.

Strike, 43, is married and a father of three.

He has involved himself in many business ventures over the years. The last was a plan to distribute Tasmannian processed long-life milk in Western Australia and South-east Asia. It was not a success, and financially he is still recovering.

The Monaco call came through in March 1976. It was to start a new, and at times, incredible chapter in the Flynn-Strike friendship.

Three months after he picked the receiver down, Strike found himself with Flynn in the offices in London of a Palestine Liberation Organisation chief who was embroiled in the violent world of Middle East politics.

The PLO man was said

Hammami whose small office was just off Cromwell Rd., London.

Strike knew, like so many other would be salesmen from the West, that through Hammami, entry could be gained to the overflowing coffers of Libya.

Strike had had a deal to offer Hammami and Flynn arranged a meeting about June 3, 1976.

Strike was trying to unload his fleet of five Dodge 4-wheel drive wagons and a stock of \$100,000 of spare parts.

He said he would let it all go for \$50,000. The vehicles, bought in the early '70s, were no longer of any use to Strike. He had obtained them for a series of expeditions in search of Lasseter's lost gold reef in the Gibson Desert.

Flynn, who owed Strike for his recent cash advances, offered to arrange the Hammami meeting.

Strike remembers it well. "Hammami told me that although Libya had a representative in London, he was close to him and was acting as his advisor."

"I think we went about the deal the wrong way. Hammami clarified the situation.

"He said, 'You must build in for us a price.' That is he got a cut out of whatever price I set."

The negotiations were protracted. Flynn had met Hammami a number of times before Strike arrived in London.

Later Flynn was to go to Libya to try to seal their plans.

Hammami had said: "Yes, we want the Dodge power wagons (4-wheel drive vehicles ideal for civilian or military use in rugged areas) and we want many more."

To Strike and Flynn there appeared to be no end to the spin-offs.

"Hammami told us that Libya was starved of a lot of things.

"We had the expertise and the ability to get those things."

In the end, Strike was not able to supply any of the goods that Libya needed. This was because he knew the Australian government would refuse export permits.

Strike said his shopping list for Libya included tank transporters, Rolls-Royce engines, farming equipment, pre-fab buildings and live sheep.

THE PRICE

An order for tank transporters was for 80 initially Strike said. These were needed to shift the big Russian T-54 tanks, used by the Libyan army. The Russians sold them the tanks but not the transporters.

"There were only two places to get them — Israel and Hanoi, Strike told me."

"The Israelis gave me a good price.

"But they wanted to know the country to which their transporters would be sent."

"The price the Israeli

Strike said he also approached the Australian Embassy in Hanoi, asking if an official could see what war surplus stocks were left behind in Vietnam by the Americans.

"They referred me back to the Australian Government. I was told to call the Department of Trade. I did it this way because I wanted export permits."

These negotiations, which began with Strike's visit to London, continued through a holiday tour the Strikes took to the U.S. four months later at Flynn's expense.

It was during this trip that Flynn took Strike to a Santa Monica factory which specialised in the manufacture of electronic detection gear. The name of the company was CEPEC.

Strike said Flynn was impressed with what he saw. "I know he was going to offer this stuff to the British police force. It was really top class."

At the end of the U.S. trip Flynn left them to go on to Libya, again to negotiate over Strike's power wagons.

Strike said he was in Singapore when the British High Commission there rang his hotel.

"They told me that Flynn was having a lot of trouble getting a phone call out of Libya because only three lines were available. They offered their Telex machine.

"Flynn went to Zurich and got in touch with me again. The deal never came off. The people who were

coming down to Singapore from Hongkong to meet us never turned up.

When Flynn came back into Laure Strike's life with that initial phone call in March of 1976, he said bluntly:

"I am not making any excuses for not having called you," Flynn said.

It had been eight years since Strike had heard of the man he and his wife, Beverley, referred to only as Joe.

And if Strike ever knew his real name, he will not say. Pressed on this point during our meetings in Perth, he would only add:

"We can't talk about it... aliases are continuous, right... many names were mentioned."

"What he did in business never affected us in the least."

TO Queensland that same man was Walter James Flynn, whose hotel and property interests crashed in 1975 with debts in excess of \$1 million.

This was an episode in Flynn's life, of which Strike says he knew nothing.

Strike said that during the 1976 phone call from Monaco, Flynn told him:

"I have never felt so low

I never felt so low in my life

my life. I've been to a priest but that is not the answer. I just feel like knocking myself off."

Flynn was vague as he was so often with Strike, but, as the conversation continued the man in Perth learned that Flynn needed 5000 francs (about \$1000).

There was nowhere else to turn, so Strike agreed to have the money transferred by his Perth bank that day.

Strike said there were more calls and more money. Between \$8000 and \$7000 over the next few months was transferred in cash and air fares, he said.

Strike told me: "I didn't ask him any questions because I didn't want to complicate my existence."

He recalled that, during a chance first meeting in 1956, Flynn told him that he was freelance photographer down from Queensland for the Melbourne Olympics.

Strike said "We have totally different personalities. His birthday is January 26 and mine is January 29. According to the stars we should

be similar, but initially all we would do was cash all the time."

"Someone once said: 'For friends, you must be the worst enemies in the world'."

Strike said it was Flynn who eventually convinced him to move to the West. It began first as a fishing holiday for the two of them on Rottnest Island, three years after their first meeting.

The trip was for 10 days and Strike said he returned to Melbourne with his mind made up that he would go back to Perth.

One thing Strike makes clear from those days, Flynn was not using Flynn as a surname.

Asked what his surname was Mrs Strike replied: "To us it was just Joe." Her husband, interjecting "We can't talk about... aliases are continuous, right?"

Strike is not even certain of his friend's true nationality.

"Like Prince Philip, he had a true international accent," he said.

Not long before Flynn

showed up in Brisbane in the '60s he was to make one more visit to the Strike home.

He came out in a cab with a teddy for their eldest daughter, Kim.

Said Mrs Strike: "But he went away without having come in."

"However, Laurie bumped into him by accident and he told us of having driven out in the cab."

"He said: 'They're still here in Perth. They're happy... I will leave them alone.'"

With that strange remark he disappeared. The Strikes said they did not know who Flynn was referring to as being "happy."

They were not to hear from Flynn again until that phone call... years later -- from Monaco.

In between times, he had made and lost more than \$1 million in Queensland. After the Monaco call, Strike said he raised the money Flynn sought.

"Some was cash, some was from my son's bank, some came from my cheque account

at work and my own cheque account. Diner's Club and American Express were also used.

"After the first call, he rang back and said he had received the money and would need some more until he could get on his feet."

Strike remembers well Flynn telling him: "Maybe you could send me little bills and pieces from time to time. I won't ask you for any more than I need."

Strike figured that Flynn needed about \$100 a week to survive. Rather than send \$100 each week, he forwarded amounts of up to \$500 every few weeks.

Strike would cable: "Let's know when you have gone through that... don't blow it... nurse it."

And as Mrs Strike remembered: "I used to think we were giving him more than we got ourselves."

This lasted at that time for about three months. Then Flynn called again.

Strike said he told them: "You can either have the

money back, or you and Bev can have a trip to the U.S."

The Strikes took the holiday in August 1976. They had a month there with all expenses paid. They stopped at the best hotels from Acapulco, Mexico, to Los Angeles, California.

The Strikes left for the U.S. on August 7, 1976 and returned home on September 3.

Mrs Strike recalled: "We simply had a ball. It was simply a holiday." Flynn wanted to do everything for them.

She recalled how Flynn got annoyed one night when she offered to cook them a meal -- one of the places where they stayed.

BY NOVEMBER

1976, Flynn was broke again. He rang Strike -- this time, from Jakarta. Strike said that once more he picked up the bill for an air fare.

Flynn spent two days with Strike and his family in Perth. He flew on to Adelaide, and is then known to have come on to Melbourne.

Flynn stayed in Melbourne until March 1977. Then, using a false passport he caught on an Air New Zealand plane from Tullamarine on March 11.

The flight, TE-836, was bound for the West Coast of the U.S. The night before he told his wife Strike. Strike was to hear nothing more for the next three-and-a-half months.

On July 11, 1977 and then several days later, Flynn was back home from Nice. Once more the calls to his Perth number were reverse charged to warrant money.

Strike recalled Flynn told him: "I'm getting a FBI... I don't want a lot of people and quiet to do... I want to be pretty close to you."

Strike recalled Flynn told him: "I'm getting a FBI... I don't want a lot of people and quiet to do... I want to be pretty close to you."

Strike recalled Flynn told him: "I'm getting a FBI... I don't want a lot of people and quiet to do... I want to be pretty close to you."

"I am staying on my friend's boat and he is coming back soon, then I will have to leave."

"I should be finished in eight or nine weeks."

[That story obviously concerned Nicholas Shadrin, although Strike said he was not aware of the CIA spy's involvement with Flynn until he received a letter from his friend this month.]

In those phone calls Flynn asked for \$90 a week on which to live. This time, Strike told him he didn't have any more to send.

But after the first call, Strike said he raised \$900 and sent it. After the second, he put together another \$300.

That was the last Strike was to hear of him until The Herald phoned his Perth number last month.

Then he heard of Flynn's arrest and imprisonment in London.

The Herald heard of Strike's association with Flynn from a notebook seized by Scotland Yard.

LETTER

Strike's name, address, and telephone number were scrawled across one of the pages. So was that of Said Hammami -- the man who Strike remembers as "a quiet-spoken gentleman with all the manners of the officer class."

But Strike did not know that Hammami was dead.

On July 18 this year, Strike received a letter from Flynn written in Brixton Prison.

In that letter Flynn mentioned another meeting he was to have with Hammami on January 4 this year the same day the Arab was assassinated in his London cell.

The letter adds: "I have been in prison for six months and it looks like it will be eight months before I see a judge."

"My solicitor has told me that it is pure aggravation to make me talk. The police are being leared on by Uncle Sam. My solicitor told me that I won't do a prison sentence, but what does he think I'm doing now."

"I am still locked up. It's a joke, but it will be all worth it. You know me, with any luck I will be out before Christmas."

And just as a rider for anyone reading his mail, he added a tantalising paragraph about Shadrin.

"The FBI don't believe I have told them everything... they are right. I am not talking until the whole mess is over and I am free."



WHERE IS SHADRIN?

SHADRIN

Does Flynn hold the key?

From JOHN HAMILTON in Washington

It began as a love story on October 20, 1958, in a remote fishing village in Poland. It ended as a spy story on December 20, 1975, on the crowded streets of Vienna.

And the key figure in the drama was a Soviet naval captain named Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov, who came to be known as Nicholas George Shadrin after his defection to the West.

Shadrin had a meeting with two KGB men on the steps of a Vienna church, and then disappeared.

Today, Ewa Shadrin believes her husband is still alive, possibly in Australia.

She also believes that the clues to his whereabouts may lie with Walter James Flynn who is in a London jail awaiting trial on charges of fraud, deception and falsifying a passport.

In September 1958 the handsome captain brought the destroyer he had commanded for two years to the Polish naval base Ok-sywie, across the bay from the port of Gdynia.

A Soviet task force was engaged with the Polish Navy in the training of Indonesian naval officers and crews in anti-submarine warfare. This was the period of close collaboration between the Soekarno regime and the Soviet Union, which had supplied

billions of dollars in arms to Indonesia.

Shadrin was then 30 years old, an officer with a superb career ahead. Born in Leningrad, he went through Frunze Naval Academy — a special distinction — and took a "commanders' course" in 1954.

At 28, he was given the command of a destroyer, which he took on official visits to Denmark, Britain and Malta. Finally came the assignment in Poland, and the word among his fellow officers was that Shadrin was destined to become the youngest admiral in the Soviet Navy.

PARTY

It was at a party at the Gdynia Officers' Club in 1958 that Shadrin first met Ewa Gora, a Polish medical student.

According to Ewa, Shadrin was a "very amusing man . . . wherever he went, he was the life of the party. He could discuss any subject, his education wasn't just narrow naval education."

In every way, it seemed Shadrin was different from other Soviet officers. For example: "Normally, Soviet officers couldn't come ashore when they wanted," Ewa explained. "They had to ask for permission, and it was rarely granted . . . Nick informed

the admiral that he was going to town."

Shadrin's freedom created the opportunity for CIA emissaries to approach him. This was the period when the CIA was engaging in its first clandestine effort to bring about the overthrow of Soekarno.

A by-product of this activity was an attempt to penetrate the Soviet Navy. The Office of Naval Intelligence was anxious at the time to gather information of developments in the Soviet Navy. It wanted a deep-penetration agent or, if at all possible, a high-ranking defector.

Why did Shadrin defect? According to Ewa, Shadrin, estranged from his wife in the Soviet Union, had made up his mind to defect to the West as early as March 1958, as the only way to marry Ewa.

Intelligence officers who have read parts of Shadrin's secret files at the CIA, think that while he undoubtedly wanted to marry Ewa, the final incentive was provided by American intelligence.

According to the CIA file, Shadrin agreed to defect with a cache of documents — copies of the "Soviet Navy's commander report" that included current naval operational intelligence — and to serve as an adviser to U.S. intelligence on Russian Naval matters. However, he was to arrange means of defection himself — the CIA couldn't help him there.

In return, Shadrin was guaranteed the new life in the U.S., CIA payment for the completion of Ewa's medical education, his job, and citizenship.

He decided to flee by boat to Sweden on June 7. Shadrin and Ewa left at 7:30 p.m. and the crossing took 24 hours.

VILLAGE

They landed in a small fishing village on the Swedish island of Oland. The village was deserted, but after a while a few fishermen turned up.

The couple wanted to be taken to the nearest police station to ask for asylum.

Later, accompanied by a CIA escort, they were flown from Stockholm to Frankfurt aboard a small aircraft — a CIA "black flight." They arrived in Frankfurt on August 1 and were immediately taken to a CIA "safe house" outside the city.

After three weeks of intense interrogation, plus lie-detector and psychological tests, the interagency defector committee (made up of representatives of the CIA, the FBI, the State Department, and military-intelligence services) apparently accepted Shadrin's and Ewa's "bona fides," and they were flown to Washington on August 21.

The debriefing process, in three Virginia safe houses, took nine months and Shadrin and Ewa were guarded around the clock by three CIA security officers.

On June 1, 1960, Shadrin began working as a consultant for the Naval Scientific and Technical Intelligence Centre (STIC), a branch of the office of naval intelligence. His six years with STIC were probably the happiest period in Shadrin's life in the U.S. His job was to evaluate Soviet naval data

with naval intelligence and CIA experts.

On September 14, Shadrin went before the house committee on un-American activities under his real name of Artamonov. The committee made a point of stressing Shadrin's importance by saying that he had been "singled out for special attention and commendation in the Soviet press."

SHADRIN'S service as STIC consultant ended in June 1966.

He was then offered a job as consultant to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). This was the period when Admiral Taylor, Shadrin's old boss as Chief of Naval Intelligence, was serving a brief stint as DIA's deputy director before becoming deputy director of the CIA.

"Something else" turned up almost immediately — when Admiral Taylor proposed that Shadrin become a double agent as bait for the KGB.

There are three versions of how Shadrin got involved in espionage.

The "official" version—the one given Ewa Shadrin by the FBI after her husband vanished — was that Shadrin was approached by KGB agents in Washington in the summer of 1966, after he joined the DIA, with an offer to spy for the Soviet Union.

According to this version, Shadrin reported this approach at once to the FBI, which asked him to pretend to accept the KGB proposal and, in effect, act as a double agent.

The second American version is that the reverse occurred. FBI agents, according to this version, had learned that KGB operatives with diplomatic cover were stalking the old post office building on Pennsylvania Avenue, where Shadrin's defectors' unit and the FBI field office were located.

The FBI's surmise was that the Russians were trying to identify the bureau's agents and to approach one or more defectors.

Since Shadrin was the most important person in this group, the FBI assumed that he would be the principal target.

On the strength of this suspicion, an assistant director of the FBI asked Admiral Taylor to instruct Shadrin to accept any KGB advances. Taylor did so and Shadrin is said to have agreed without any hesitation.

Ten days later, a Soviet diplomat named Oleg Kozlov (known to be a KGB agent) accosted Shadrin at a bus stop at the corner of Lee Highway and Harrison St. in North Arlington to propose cooperation with the KGB. He is said to have produced photographs of Shadrin's wife, along with a letter from her asking him to return to the Soviet Union.

Still, according to this version, Shadrin refused. Instead, he went to the FBI, which told him to establish a permanent contact.

...to the time that Shadrin appeared in Soviet Embassy... at a local supermarket... and... to be returned to the Soviet Union. The KGB was said to have agreed to help if Shadrin would perform certain services.

The FBI was notified that the FBI questions the FBI-

Shadrin when they met for lunch at a Washington restaurant concerning the whereabouts of Kozlov, Goltsm and other KGB defectors in the U.S.

Even more interest developed when the Russians wanted to know how the U.S. obtained intelligence about the Soviet Navy. The intelligence officers saw a chance to escalate the Shadrin operation. Their notion was to feed disinformation to the Soviets on American intelligence methods.

Was it safe for Shadrin to leave the U.S. on his own? The FBI evidently had some reservations because it asked the intelligence division of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police to provide protective coverage.

The Montreal coverage yielded a long-lens photograph of Shadrin shaking hands with a KGB agent at the door of an out-of-town villa.

Shadrin was told that he would soon be working with an "illegal" and that he would be supplied in Washington with special intelligence equipment.

If the intelligence agencies had any lingering doubt that the KGB had swallowed the Shadrin bait, it was removed early in 1972 when the promised secret equipment was delivered to Shadrin's house. The equipment consisted of a radio receiver and transmitter, the CIA called it "communications capability," a cipher code inside a book with hollowed pages, and a notebook with instructions on secret-writing methods.

'ILLEGAL'

During 1972, Shadrin received his Ph.D. in international affairs from George Washington University. Then he was instructed by his KGB contact to travel to Vienna to be trained in the use of the secret equipment and possibly to meet the "illegal."

Again, the intelligence agencies in Washington were involved. The illegal network seemed to be within grasp, and the Shadrin operation became one of the most closely-guarded intelligence secrets.

Shadrin's Vienna meeting was scheduled for September 8, and he told his wife that it would be part of a European vacation. Their first stop was Munich, from there they were on to Munich for the Olympic Games. Shadrin mentioned to Ewa that in Vienna he would have an overnight meeting with the same man he had seen in Montreal.

In Vienna, the Shadrins checked in at the plush Buxton Hotel, and Nick went out in the evening to keep his appointment. He took a taxi to the Volkstheater, a Vienna municipal church, and met his contact on the steps. They then took them to a villa out of the city.

Ewa spent the night with several KGB contacts - one of them was the Kozlov. His Washington network and technical expertise.

They showed him in the middle of the line of secret equipment he had in his suitcase. He returned to the hotel at 11:00 the following day. The Shadrins stayed two more nights in Vienna, then flew to...

THE great turning point in Shadrin's double-agent career came when his KGB contact asked him to make a trip abroad.

No reason was given, and Finland was proposed at first as a meeting site. This, however, was judged too dangerous by the Russians themselves, and they changed their minds, suggesting Montreal instead.

FBI and CIA handlers told Shadrin that if the operation were to be maintained, he had no choice but to accept the trip. So the Shadrins flew off to Canada in September.

Shadrin told his wife that the trip would be their vacation, but that in Montreal he had to meet a person who had "worked for the U.S. for 25 years." This was the FBI cover story.

The Shadrins spent a night in Montreal, and Nick spent the evening out meeting his "friend."

Early in 1975, a Russian-speaking man telephoned Shadrin at home and, trying to disguise his voice, told Shadrin that he would receive a "secret-writing letter." When the letter, bearing an Oxon Hill, Maryland, postmark arrived, Shadrin deciphered it.

The writer wanted to know whether and when Shadrin could travel again, where he could attend a meeting with the "illegal," and what his cover would be.

The instructions were to reply by a "secret-writing letter" to a dead-drop address in Berlin. Shadrin replied, proposing Spain, but another letter from Oxon Hill rejected this idea.

At a conference with FBI and CIA officials, it was decided that Shadrin should pick Vienna, "same time, same place."

A further exchange of letters set December 18 as the meeting date.

Shortly before the Shadrins left for Vienna, the CIA arranged for them to meet a counter-intelligence staff officer who was introduced as "Ann Martin" (though on one occasion she was identified as "Cynthia Martin").

She was brought to the Shadrins home with the warning that she should be identified as a dental patient if they were interrupted.

The Shadrins arrived in Vienna on December 17 and took suite 361 at the Bristol. The next evening Shadrin left the hotel to meet his contact at the Volkstheater. Ann Martin stayed with Ewa. When Shadrin returned, shortly before midnight, the CIA woman took him into the bathroom and, with the shower running, debriefed him.

He told her that he had had dinner at a small fish restaurant with the KGB's Oleg Fedor and Mikhail Ivanovich Kuryshov. There was only small talk, and Shadrin was instructed to come to another evening meeting two days later.

Shadrin was also given \$1000, although several thous-

and dollars had been sent to him in Washington by the KGB, and was told to rent a car the following day to become acquainted with the streets of Vienna.

At 6:30 pm on December 20, Shadrin left for his second meeting. He was never seen again.

Ewa was not told that her husband was a double agent until she was met at Dulles International Airport by FBI agents. The Austrian police were not notified for weeks of Shadrin's disappearance.

Ewa was instructed not to discuss Shadrin's case with anybody. She told friends that Nick was ill, traveling, or busy working elsewhere. The Ford administration was determined to keep his disappearance secret - possibly forever. Its diplomatic efforts to discover Shadrin's whereabouts were also limited.

MEETING

In February, Ewa Shadrin, despairing of any effective action by the Ford administration, went to the prestigious Washington law firm of Covington and Burling and there met Richard D. Copaken, a partner in the firm, who agreed to take the case. The White House volunteered payment of the legal fees.

Copaken acted fast. In March he went to Berlin where he met twice with Wolfgang Vogel, the East German barrister who had arranged the exchange of Russian superspy Colonel Abel for the downed U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers.

Copaken proposed to Vogel that another swap could be arranged - Shadrin for Russians held by the West.

THE current view of the Carter administration is that there is no point in the President either writing to Brezhnev or seeing Ewa Shadrin, unless new leads develop.

After 11 months of trying, Ewa Shadrin was granted a meeting with President Ford on November 5 and she asked him to write to the Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev. Ford did so on December 3, but on December 24 Brezhnev replied that the Russians didn't have Shadrin.

The next move was with the Carter administration. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance brought up the Shadrin affair with the Soviet ambassador, Anatoly Dobrynin, but got the same reply: We don't know where he is.

Fed up with the apparent indifference of the Carter administration, Copaken decided to go public with the Shadrin story. Papers like the Wall Street Journal and magazines like Newsweek carried the stories in July last year.

Copaken hoped to stir up public opinion enough to get Congressional pressure to bear on the case. Then on August 5 last year a new and mysterious element entered the Shadrin case.

It began with a phone ringing in Richard Copaken's office in Connecticut Av. in Washington.

That phone call led him to Flynn.

STAT

PAGE 7

Final part of a Herald series

A man called Flynn

The man Australia knew as Walter James Flynn has made and lost a fortune in Queensland . . . In the bad times, he has leaned for support on a friend in Perth,

Laurie Strike. Together they were to negotiate trade deals with Libya through a PLO agent in London. Suddenly Flynn emerges in

world international espionage, claiming knowledge of the whereabouts of Soviet naval defector, Nicholas Shadrin. Shadrin served with U.S. intelli-

gence after his defection, but on CIA instructions returned to work for the KGB and then vanished in Vienna in 1975.

Mystery man selling bugs' to the world

"I WAS a handy man to know. I travelled on an Australian passport all over the world."

From STEPHEN FOLEY in London

These are the words of Joe Flynn as he sits out his seventh month in Brixton prison, London, awaiting trial on a charge of having dishonestly obtained \$US1250 from the lawyer and the wife of a Russian-American spy who vanished in Vienna 2½ years ago.

I have had several meetings with Flynn, the "Goldfinger" who has landed in an international espionage affair less than three years after the crash of his multi-million-dollar Queensland property dealings.

Flynn makes no secret of his involvement with the twilight world of his dealings with Americans operating in Australia, or his frequent "business" trips abroad.

He claims it lies at the root of his present incarceration.

When drawn on these allegations he is guarded.

... I had good contacts and my background was unknown," he said.

He has been accused, he says, of espionage — of working for the KGB, Russia's sinister secret state security police.

He has been accused, he also says, of acting for the Israeli in a similar capacity.

Flynn denies them, and attributes some to the organisation his counsel accused of "manipulation" in a London court on June 7.

litical allegations" brought by the United States intelligence agencies.

He named the FBI and CIA.

"It is my contention," he added, "that they will not turn up to press the charges when the time comes."

Before his arrest in London, Flynn's haven was a yacht named "Rhodes Island" at Beaulieu-sur-Mer, a Mediterranean sunspot.

When he fled Australia in March, 1977, Flynn had flown to Europe, behind him, lay a crashed business empire, with debts exceeding \$1 million, a broken marriage . . . and another spent identity.

In those heady days, when he bought, sold and prospered on Queensland's Gold Coast during the property boom of the early seventies, he was known as Walter James Flynn, big shot, millionaire, free-spender, a man with the M.C. touch, who lived and celebrated with champagne and glitter.

He would sponsor golf tournaments, with lavish prizes.

"None of your cheap and nasty drinking games," he says.

... I gave my friends.

...the 1972 election, that was to overturn 23 years of Liberal dominance in Australian politics.

Flynn had embarked on a sponsorship drive some time earlier to support the Liberal-Country Parties, he says.

Others, from a distance, considered the repercussions

of a Labor administration. Flynn was living at Isle of Capri, Queensland, at the time.

Flynn claims he was approached to bug the home of a high-ranking ALP official, prior to the 1972 elections.

The job, he alleges, was instigated by an Australian, with American affiliations, who had previously done sensitive work for the CIA.

Flynn had access to highly-sophisticated bugging equipment, of a standard similar to that used by the Watergate "plumbers."

And he said he knew how to use it, for the Gold Coast job, he was instructed to fly over the Barrier Reef, bound for Fraser Island for briefing.

Flynn says he took along a selector as security. He got his instructions as they flew over the Barrier Reef, bound for the island.

The conspirators, Flynn alleges, had advance knowledge of extensive renovations to their victim's home.

The outside wall paneling would be exposed, he was told.

"It made it very easy to walk up to the house and plant a bug in the wall that

would pick up everything in the house," he told me.

But the plan failed, he said. "I came up from my boat to the house.

"The deal was, there would be nobody at home — but there was. The man's mother.

"I dropped it — in any case, I didn't have the bug on me," Flynn said.

FLYNN says his Australian link with the Americans was an American living in Australia.

They were introduced in 1970-71, Flynn says, by an Australian with high-placed political connections.

From this encounter, Flynn was engaged to do errands, though he pointedly declines to give details.

"I was a courier, that's all," he said. Over the years he would perform "favors", and so-called "errands", but always for remuneration.

Off-handedly, he recalls the days he flew to Papua New Guinea on "business deals". The American offered him an assignment.

"I was asked to take some pictures of the Queensland coast... the mining deposits, that sort of thing. I was given a camera, took some film and handed it over. It was simple."

Flynn claims he never discovered the American's masters, except the American was based in Canberra, and used his contacts from there.

His meetings with the American were scattered, Flynn said.

They met again in late 1972-early 1974, at a time when Flynn's business empire was in financial straits.

The American came up from Canberra, staying at Flynn's house for the week-end.

Flynn recalls how they discussed a rescue attempt for the failing hotel. They talked about getting a loan through the Federal National City Bank in New York, a massive New York State institution.

But nothing happened, said Flynn. He went broke.

In September, 1975, however, Flynn flew to Los Angeles for a 21-day "prospecting" visit. Flynn was looking to his American "associates" to set up business deals.

One of his enterprises, harking back many years, involved the electronic surveillance industry.

Flynn, rather earnestly, calls himself a "salesman".

But his "wares" opened doors, few people would enter.

They included lie detectors, infra-red "night-seeing" devices and highly-sophisticated bugging equipment, Flynn said.

"I made a lot of money from it... it was a good living," Flynn told me.

FLYNN says his stock-in-trade was portable lie detectors, and a bugging device which — he claims — was aptly-made for the older, pre-automatic telephone systems.

It was a "drop-in" device, he said, the kind suitable for Cuban and Third World exchanges.

Flynn's world was populated by all manner of "spooks" — genuine agents, men like himself, the manufacturers and distributors as well as buyers of modern, highly-specialised electronic detection-surveillance gear.

He would career around the world on slippery schemes, making "missions" for weeks, maybe months at a time, that took him to every corner of the globe.

His passports, the ones now in police possession, are franked on nearly every page.

Scotland Yard confiscated a pile of brochures and sales literature when Flynn was arrested earlier this year.

Flynn's other hardware was not exclusively electronic.

He sold aeroplane parts (he is an experienced flyer) and while he denies personally handling them, Flynn told me he had "arranged papers" for arms sales.

Much of this activity led inevitably to the Middle East.

Said Hammami the PLO representative killed by an assassin's bullet in his London office on January 4, this year is linked to Flynn.

Hammami's name and phone number were among countless contacts in Flynn's "little black book."

Joe Flynn claims he knew Hammami well. They met in London more than three years ago, when Flynn made frequent trips out of Australia, he said.

He told me his PLO friend acted as a "recommendation" when Flynn needed introductions to his Middle East clients, or needed accreditation.

Hammami, Flynn claims, had bought electronic surveillance equipment from him in the past for his Middle East masters.

Once Flynn required a visa for entry to Libya, a renowned haven for wanted terrorists.

Normally, it can take five days to obtain a visa. With Hammami's help, Flynn claims he got his papers rubber-stamped in an afternoon.

During an earlier conversation, Flynn made reference to a "deal" in which two CIA agents, planted in Libya could be exposed.

"Twenty thousand dollars was being discussed," said Flynn.

At Christmas last year, Flynn was in London — involved in the hunt for Nick Shadrin.

A lawyer from America and an FBI official were present.

"I was given a ticket, writ-

...the Vienna case, Scotland Yard maintain he does not date. Flynn says he does.

Flynn says he had known Mueller for almost 20 years. Flynn was in the RAF then — but under a different name, he says.

"It was Edward Youell." In Vienna, Flynn was desperate to find Mueller. He checked into the \$60-a-night Bristol Hotel opposite the Opera house and spent four days in Vienna, combing the German's old haunts, mostly restaurants and bars. "It's an annual — he goes there every year," Flynn said.

On Christmas Eve, however, Flynn received word to meet with a CIA representative.

The rendezvous was kept, he says, and took place in a room at the Hilton Hotel.

As a precaution, Flynn had taken a "shadow" as security.

We have since learned this man was a British journalist who flew with Flynn to Vienna, and stayed at the same hotel.

In court Flynn's counsel has claimed he received three threats against his life.

The first took place in Virefranche, on the Gate d'Azur. It came over the phone.

The second happened in Vienna, at the Hilton, he said.

Flynn was warned: "Tell us what you know about Shadrin. If you don't tell us, you won't tell anyone else."

Hammami's name was then mentioned, Flynn says.

The third, thought to have been made in London is not known.

When he returned to London, following the fruitless search for Mueller, Flynn rang Hammami.

Flynn recalls this conversation.

Hammami: I've had a call from an American man.

Flynn: What did he want?

Hammami: He asked if I knew a man named Eric Mueller.

Flynn: What did you tell him?

Hammami: I said I don't talk to strange men on the telephone.

Two days later, Hammami was dead.



JUST WHO IS HE?

TWENTY five years ago, Flynn says, he was in the RAF under the name of Edward Youell.

Some months ago, during an early remand hearing Scotland Yard told Bow Street magistrate, Mr Evelyn Russell, they thought Flynn was really Barry Edward Gray, an Englishman by birth.

Flynn had also been known as Barry Edward Youell they said.

The Herald has found a birth certificate at the London registry for a man named Barry Edward Gray. He was born in Camberwell, south-East London, on January 24, 1924. His parents Robert and Marie Maud Gray (nee Preston) give different addresses.

Flynn, however, will not concede his true identity — if, in fact, he knows. Was he Barry Edward Gray, as Scotland Yard has alleged?

"I did not say that," was all he would say.

Police Ministry records reveal a man named Barrington Edward Youell, the same age as Flynn claims to be — now 44 — served in the RAF from 1951-1955.

Other details are classified, the Ministry says.

Flynn, who gave service years corresponding with Youell's record, says he was based outside Cologne, Germany.

Flynn further claimed he was involved with U States Intelligence a time and through a associations. In 1960s years, he had performed small tasks for Jax.

Once, in January, Flynn says he was a \$2000 in U.S. bills on steps of the American bassy in Melbourne caused the money bank in Collins St.; sibly the New South Bank he claims.

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I LIVED HIGH WITH THE SPY LINK MAN

By GEOFF EASDOWN

Vivienne Margaret Flynn today talked of the man she called her husband . . .

The man who now sits in a London jail on charges arising from the disappearance of master spy Nicholas Shadrin.

To Vivienne, Walter James Flynn — he also used the christian names William Joseph — was a real estate salesman of exceptional talents, a person without a past.

Still living in Brisbane where for three and a half years they shared the good life, she told how, to her, Flynn was a man who had grown up an orphan . . . but an orphan who had acquired a lot of class.

Together they would dine at Brisbane's best restaurants. Flynn talked of exotic places, his travels in Spain, his years selling property in San Francisco.

He gave her presents of expensive jewellery, an Omega gold watch and a huge diamond ring.

And when Flynn tired of eating out at his regular haunts, he opened his own restaurant.

Chez Maximes, with its red velvet wallpaper and antique furnishings, was then better than anything Brisbane had seen.

In the same manner that he opened the restaurant, he was to leave the woman whom in public he called his wife and find someone new.



Walter James Flynn . . . also known as William Joseph Flynn.

Then relationships had waned, and while he came fishing in northern Queensland, he met and formed an attachment to another whose beauty is still talked about.

Even so, Vivienne Flynn will long remember the man she knew as Joe Flynn.

A divorcee with two sons, she tells of having met the real estate salesman at a party in Brisbane about 10 years ago.

It was 1968, Flynn had just come to Brisbane and he was working for Arnhem, real estate, his first job in that city.

"I thought he was a refreshing change," she said. "A nice guy, pleasant company . . . as time went on I learned that he was a good salesman."

But never would Flynn discuss with her his past.

"When I think about it now, I think he would avoid the subject," she said.

"I didn't think that was strange because he had told me that he was an orphan — and I thought that was the way he would feel.

"He would have nothing to discuss.

"However, at times he would talk about his travels overseas — the food

and the wines that he had drunk.

"That was very nice Joe — because he used to enjoy dining out. We ate out quite a lot, dining around the better restaurants of Brisbane.

"He talked about Spain and America. How he had sold real estate there. I believe he said that he had been in San Francisco."

There were often calls from overseas to the home they shared . . . she thought some were from America.

Mrs Flynn remembered that he was not only good to her, but also to her two sons from a previous marriage. That meant a lot to her.

They never talked about getting married.

DIVORCED

"I have been divorced and I didn't want to go through a marriage again," she said.

That would have suited Flynn. While he could fool the bureaucracy of the State on most things, he would have been unable to provide the documentation necessary to satisfy the registrar of marriages.

But still he was good to her. She remembers a \$15,000 diamond ring he

bought for her birthday. Next year she got a gold Omega.

Some records from King George Square Jewellers, Wallace Bishops, where he always bought jewelry, showed that the first of four pieces of this style was bought on October 30, 1972.

Mrs Flynn said it was about this time that she received the watch as a present.

But as they tired of one another and Flynn took up with another woman, described by all who knew her as the striking blonde, Vivienne gave him back his expensive trinkets.

"I had never gone out with anyone for anything in my life. I gave a million times more than I got," she said.

She recalled that the pieces were "absolutely delightful."

"I am told that he was later to sell the ring in Brisbane — and I know that he bought her the same sort of gifts.

"The ring, the watch and other pieces too."

While Flynn enjoyed the company of beautiful women, he liked flashy cars, too.

There were Ford Thunderbirds, Lincolns, and a yellow Oldsmobile.

Vivienne remembers well their last date together, in October 1975. He had phoned her and they arranged to meet for lunch.

Earlier that month, she had gone to her bank and borrowed \$9000. It had to be borrowed, she had nothing in her account.

She gave it to him on the understanding that it was to be repaid.

KISS

"We had lunch at the metropolitan Hotel in the city — and then he kissed me goodbye," she said.

"He said he was going to America . . . there was good real estate there. That was it, and he was off.

And then as the months rolled by and the postmen never came with his cheque, Vivienne Flynn had to take a second job to repay the money.

"I never got it back, and I heard later that he lost it at Vegas."

A man called Flynn

The man Australia knew as Walter James Flynn has made and lost a fortune in Queensland.

In the bad times, he has leaned for support on a friend in Perth, Laurie Strike. Together they were to negotiate trade deals with

Libya through a PLO agent in London.

Suddenly Flynn emerges in world international espionage, claiming knowledge of the whereabouts of Soviet naval defector, Nicholas Shadrin.

Shadrin served with U.S.

intelligence after his defection, but on CIA instructions returned to work for the KGB, and then vanished in Vienna in 1975.

His wife, and a Washington lawyer, Richard Copaken, are still looking for him . . .

The trail leads to the South of France

I HE white telephone in the Washington office of Richard Copaken rang shortly after 10 a.m. on August 5 last year.

It was long distance. It was a man's voice. He said he was calling from London.

He had some news about Nick Shadrin.

The caller would not identify himself. But, he said, to prove that he was genuine he would pass on some information that would prove his bona fides.

Richard Copaken today refuses to describe exactly what the caller told him except to say: "There were several items — one was a piece of classified information 17 years old that was known only to a handful of the intelligence community. The other items were of sentimental significance to Mr and Mrs Shadrin, and could only have been known by them and conceivably a small number of people in the U.S. intelligence community — and maybe the KGB."

Copaken says "the mathematical odds of the items checking out and being right must be one in ten million. But they did check out."

After giving the items of information, the mysterious caller said that Nick Shadrin was alive, he had been given false papers in Zurich, Switzerland on Boxing Day, December 26, 1975 — just five days after he disappeared without a trace in Vienna.

The caller warned Copaken not to get in touch with the CIA. The caller then said that he could provide Copaken with a code to get in touch with a man called "Agnew." The caller said that "Agnew" could get in touch with Nick Shadrin.

But, the caller warned, the code he would give might be only a partial code and "Agnew" might or might not respond. The caller told Copaken to place the following message in the international edition of the Herald Tribune: "Harry wants German bank notes of 17th century origin." There followed a telephone number. The mystery caller then rang off.

"At that stage we were in regular contact with the CIA," says Copaken, "and after considerable soul searching Mrs. Shadrin and I decided to tell the CIA about the call."

The person they decided to tell was Leonard McCoy, the CIA's chief of counter-intelligence. Before taking this top job with the agency, McCoy had been the case officer handling the Shadrin affair. And there is one of the unanswered mysteries in the case

Early in Copaken's dealings with the CIA a CIA officer had, almost out of the blue, speculated that Shadrin might be living a new life in . . . Australia.

And Leonard McCoy, chief of counter-intelligence for the CIA, told Copaken when the lawyer contacted him, that he was just leaving the U.S. on a visit to Australia for what was described as a "routine" liaison meeting with security officials.

McCoy came back to Copaken and said the CIA could find out nothing about the caller. He advised going nothing and not to put an advertisement in the Herald Tribune.

McCoy said that if it was a fraud scheme, the con man would get greedy and make another approach. If there was a silence, however, the approach might be genuine.

In the discussions with McCoy, the subject of Australia came up again. Mrs.

with his intelligence job he had told her he would like to emigrate.

To this day Mrs Shadrin thinks that Australia and the Australian way of life would suit her husband and that indeed he might be living a new life in Australia, provided with a new identity by the "right authorities" (i.e. the CIA acting in concert with ASIO).

After talking with McCoy, lawyer Copaken decided to accept the CIA's advice and lie low.

On August 15, 1977, the Russians published their version of the Shadrin affair in an unprecedented article in a Soviet magazine.

THERE was silence for a month then on September 15, Copaken decided to place the "Harry" message in the Herald-Tribune.

At 11:21 a.m. Washington time on the same day the phone rang again in Copaken's office.

The caller said: "Hallo, Harry."

Copaken said: "This is Richard Copaken and I must talk with you."

There was a click and the caller hung up. The call had taken just 20 seconds.

On September 16 at 9:58 a.m. the phone rang again in the lawyer's office.

"Hallo Harry," said the voice.

"I must talk to you," said Copaken.

"OK, I'll talk to you — but not from this phone, I'll ring from a pay phone," said the voice.

At 10:18 a.m. the phone rang again in Washington.

It was a collect call that lasted 22 minutes. Copaken later traced it to a public phone in St. Jean-Cap-Ferrat in the south of France.



Nicholas Shadrin and his wife.

had filled in an official slip with a clerk at the post office to make the collect call. The clerk kept the slip of paper. Later the handwriting on the slip would be identified as the same writing as that of the man called Walter James Flynn.

The caller told Copaken that Shadrin was alive. He said that "Agnew" claimed to have met Shadrin in Zurich and had provided him with new identity papers. Shadrin, said the caller, was safe, alive and well in a Western country.

The caller said he would be

in touch with Shadrin. Then he rang off.

On September 19 at 10 a.m. another phone call, lasting 25 minutes, came from a French village that rounded like Beaulieu-sur-Mer.

The caller said he had been in touch with Shadrin by telegram and that Shadrin had called him back by phone. Shadrin had told him he very much wanted to get in touch with his wife and that he wanted to return to the U.S.

But, said the caller, Shadrin was very afraid of what the CIA might do to him. He thought there might be less danger to him if there was

From JOHN HAMILTON in Washington

some way of speaking out publicly on his return to the U.S.

The caller then said he was "Agnew" and that he was passing the messages on as a favor to Shadrin. He said that Shadrin had told him that he would look after a "fee" for "Agnew" some time in the future, but that in the meantime Copaken could look after his "out-of-pocket expenses."

These, said the caller, would be considerable as he would have to fly from Europe to the U.S. with another individual who would provide "security."

The caller said that a meeting would be set up in Buffalo, New York, at which Mrs. Shadrin would be able to speak with her husband who would call her from another country.

For the first time the name Flynn came up.

The caller told Copaken to arrange payment of \$U.S.-3000 to A. W. Flynn to be transmitted to a bank in the principality of Monaco. This payment would cover hotel and travel expenses. At 10.28 a.m. on September 20, another phone call to Washington came from the same French village.

The caller asked whether the money had been transmitted to Monaco. (It had.) The caller then told Copaken he would receive a call over the weekend at his Washington home. This call would tell him the name of the hotel in Buffalo to go to for the Shadrin reunion.

No call came at the weekend.

Something had gone wrong, said the caller. He had gone to the U.S. consulate in Bonn to get a visa to go to America and had been warned not to go to Buffalo. This meant that somebody had tipped off

the CIA. The caller was clearly agitated. He would get back in touch.

The phone went dead. The caller did not call back.

Copaken and Mrs. Shadrin went back to the CIA with their story. The CIA's director, Admiral Stansfield Turner, promised top level help from the agency.

He dispatched the agency's Inspector-General, John Waller, and another CIA man to France to help track down the caller.

On October 21, Copaken and Mrs. Shadrin arrived in Monaco.

They discovered that the \$3000 had been picked up on September 21 by a person who signed for the money in the name of Flynn, produced an Australian passport as proof of identity, and gave the name of a yacht moored at Antibes as his address.

The yacht address proved to be false.

Copaken and Mrs. Shadrin, helped by the CIA and the French security forces, travelled to Paris where they called on the American Ambassador.

The American Ambassador in turn contacted the Australian Ambassador who soon tracked down the Australian passport issued in the name of W. J. Flynn.

Why, said the Ambassador, the subject of the passport and the mysterious W. J. Flynn had been the subject of a special report in the Melbourne Herald of September 16, 1977 — a report which gave rise to a question about the missing property trovon in the Australian parliament.

The report — by Geoffrey Easdown — was based on information gathered by Easdown at about the same time that Copaken received his first mysterious phone call.

Lie test: 'He flunked it ... his story fell apart'

At 10.48 a.m. on Monday September 26 there was a 2½ minute direct dial call to Copaken's office. The caller said he was ringing from Europe.

He was on a small yacht at Beaulieu sur-Mer. Also on board the yacht was the — unnamed — sister of an Englishman — again unnamed — who is said to be in jail in the Soviet Union on charges of espionage.

Flynn was known to the French authorities as quite a well-known gambler who frequented the local casino and the casino in Nice.

Mrs. Shadrin and Copaken, who had returned to the U.S. from Paris after meeting with the American Ambassador, then flew back to France again.

At the end of November they met the man called Flynn on board the yacht at Beaulieu-sur-Mer.

Copaken says Flynn was "very cool" about the whole affair. He said he had just

been a messenger, told to collect the \$3000 from the bank in Monaco using his passport. He said he had handed the money over to "Agnew" who had disappeared.

Flynn arranged to meet Copaken and Mrs. Shadrin for lunch in Villefranche. Half way through the lunch there was a phone call.

"Flynn came back ashen and shaken," recalls Copaken. "He said that a caller had just told him 'No luck for you if you lie to Mrs. Shadrin'. Flynn said the call had been set up by the French police with the CIA to frighten him."

Flynn then handed over a "little black book" to Copaken. It contained innumerable names and addresses of people around the world. It included the name of Mr. Hatman, the PLO representative in London who was subsequently shot dead on January 4 this year.

It also contained the name of a man called Laurie Strike in Perth, Western Australia. The number given was Perth 41-1230. Flynn later told Copaken he had called Strike on June 20 and July 9 and got no answer — but had spoken

to Strike on July 11 and July 16 from the south of France. It was another mysterious piece in the jigsaw.

After considerable discussion, Flynn reluctantly agreed to Copaken's suggestion that he take a polygraph lie detector test. It would cost about \$300 to fly Flynn to England for the test.

Copaken and Mrs. Shadrin again flew back to the U.S.

After more negotiating a reporter put up the \$300 needed to get Flynn to go to London and the FBI agreed to conduct a lie detector test in that city.

Copaken and Mrs. Shadrin embarked on their third trans-Atlantic flight and, on December 11, met Flynn in the restaurant Bella Vista in Cromwell Place, near the West London air terminal and Heathrow. It was a restaurant where Flynn appeared to be a regular.

This time Flynn told Copaken a new story.

He said that "Agnew" was really a man called Eric Mueller. He had first met Mueller 23 years previously in Germany when he, Flynn, was serving with the Royal Air Force.

Mueller was then already known as a forger, a man who could make false leave passes if he was provided with the right forms.

He described their relationship at length. He said that Mueller had provided Ronald Biggs with false papers to help the great train robber escape. Mueller had also visited Flynn in Australia.

He said he had taken Mueller to the races in Brisbane and to the Manley yacht club as his guest in 1973 or 1974.

Flynn described Mueller's physical appearance in detail.

Two days later on December 13, Flynn took the FBI's lie detector test.

"He flunked it," says Copaken. "Myself and the FBI then interviewed him for five hours and, as far as I was concerned, his story fell apart."

Copaken and Mrs Shadrin flew back to America, crestfallen. Then, two weeks later, Flynn rang Copaken in Washington. He suggested that

Copaken should fly to Vienna and meet him at the Bristol Hotel at Christmas, when he could provide more information about the Shadrin missing double agent.

Copaken refused. After more negotiating, Copaken came up with a new plan.

He flew back to London and on January 15 this year met Copaken in a hotel. There in the presence of Harry Longmuir, a reporter for the London Daily Mail, who had been following the case, Copaken handed Flynn \$U.S.1250 — money provided by the FBI.

"The deal was this," said Copaken. "\$1250 down and a further \$1250 if Flynn could provide the answers to three questions.

"Question one — give me the true identity of the man who made the first call to me.

"Question two — tell me where Shadrin was when 'Agnew', alias Mueller, sent him a telegram.

"Question three — who was Mueller's banker?"

Flynn came back with some new replies.

He said that Shadrin had been in Rio de Janeiro when the telegram had been sent.

He said that the first telephone call had been made by a man called Black who was a British diplomat who had served in a number of posts including Moscow and who was now in New Guinea.

Flynn also gave the name of a Monaco banker.

Copaken flew to Monaco again. He met the banker who indeed did know an Eric Mueller. But this Mueller was a Dane with a clothing business in the principality.

"At this point we all decided that Flynn was a liar. We decided to go to Scotland Yard," said Copaken.

Scotland Yard was briefed on the case — and then Flynn rang again. He said that for \$300 he would provide a complete set of documents that Mueller had provided for Shadrin, including a Brazilian driver's licence and a photograph of Shadrin taken after the December 20 disappearance.

Arrangements were made. Scotland Yard arrested Flynn as he went to the London bank to pick up the \$300. The date was February 1 this year.

5 Aug 78

SATURDAY SUNDAY

The Herald



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MELBOURNE, SATURDAY, AUGUST 5, 1978 42 PAGES 10c*

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NICHOLAS SHADRIN . . . the master spy who vanished.

Nicholas Shadrin, the CIA master spy who became a KGB agent to feed fake information to the Russians, could be living in Australia.

This is the greatest hope of his wife Ewa, who has not given up looking for him since he vanished in Vienna 2 1/2 years ago.

Her worst fears are that the KGB took him by force into the Soviet Union to face the death sentence recorded against him after he defected in 1958.

The Australian connection in the Shadrin affair is a man named Flynn.

NO TRIA

Flynn has been held in a London jail for without trial.

Police are gathering evidence to add to their allegations that his claims of inside knowledge of Shadrin are phony.

Flynn is the "Goldfinger" whose multi-million-dollar property dealings on Queensland's Gold Coast ended with more than \$1 million debts in 1975.

Under the name William Joseph Flynn — he also used the christian names Walter James — in Australia — he is being held on a charge of having dishonestly obtained \$U.S.1250 from Mrs Shadrin's lawyer by claiming to have information about Shadrin's whereabouts.

Against a backdrop of investigations by Scotland Yard, Australian police, French intelligence, the FBI, the CIA — and probably also the Soviet KGB — Flynn sits in Brixton prison still

months away from facing a judge.

September 4 has been set as the date for his committal hearing — preliminary proceedings to decide whether there is enough evidence to put him on trial.

He was arrested on February 1 and has been constantly remanded since.

Flynn has been linked with a series of phone calls to Mrs Shadrin's lawyer.

One of these calls set Mrs Shadrin and the lawyer on a trans-Atlantic flight from the U.S. to Europe to a meeting with Flynn on board a yacht in the south of France.

They believed they were on a genuine trail to Shadrin because the man who phoned Mrs Shadrin's lawyer spoke of items which could have been known only by the Shadrins.

Conceivably they could also have been known by a small number of people in the U.S. intelligence community ... and the KGB.

Flynn's Australian background was significant to Mrs Shadrin and her lawyer.

New life

A CIA officer had earlier told a former intelligence officer that Shadrin might be living a new life in Australia.

And after those key phone calls, the CIA's chief of counter intelligence, Leonard McCoy, visited Australia for a "routine" meeting with liaison officials.

Before leaving the U.S. McCoy advised the lawyer to delay any action about the phone calls.

Another Australian link is contained in a letter written to the President of the United States, Jimmy Carter, by the Shadrin lawyer.

In it, he names a former top Western counter-intelligence chief, now retired and living in Australia, whose organisation was responsible for shadowing the spy at one of his meetings with KGB agents.

William Joseph Flynn, the fallen "Goldfinger," claims to have had a connection with the CIA from the early 1950s, when he was serving with the RAF in Germany.

He claims to have been paid by the CIA for doing jobs in Australia — including a \$2000 pay off in Melbourne.

A woman who lived

with Flynn for 2½ years on the Gold Coast, said he received many phone calls from the U.S.

The essence of the Scotland Yard case against Flynn is that he is a "Walter Mitty" con man.

But detectives admit they do not know his ability.

He is a man of many aliases, a man without a known beginning.

The people he was closest to say he told them he was an orphan.

Flynn is a name he "borrowed" from a NSW railways conductor to create an identity for a passport.

Meetings

Three Herald journalists have built a dossier on Flynn over recent months.

The Flynn trail took MILLROUPE-based reporter Geoff Eastdown to Sydney, Brisbane and Perth.

The Herald's WASHINGTON correspondent, John Hamilton, has had several meetings with Mrs Shadrin and her lawyer and has studied thick files on the Shadrin mystery in search of a Flynn (and Australian) connection.

Stephen Foley, of the Herald's LONDON bureau, has interviewed Flynn in Brixton prison and has attended all of the court hearings at which Flynn has been remanded.

Flynn, seller of military equipment to Libya.

Flynn, pal of PLO agent, Said Hammami, who was shot dead in his London office ...

Gambling

Flynn, a known figure in the French gambling casino circuit ...

Flynn the property dealer.

Flynn, the writer, the man with contacts in all corners of the world ...

These are faces that emerge in a series of articles by the three Herald men.

A man who first met Flynn at the Melbourne Olympics in 1956 tells about "My friend Joe" in the first instalment.

That meeting changed the course of his life for La Je Strike, now of Perth.

● Mystery of a man called Flynn — the start of an exciting series, today on Page 25.



after tomorrow. — Page 14.

Washington Star
9 August 1978

A casualty of espionage, a lonely wife wonders if her husband is alive

By Ruth Dean
Washington Star Staff Writer

"It's like living with a nightmare," says Blanka Ewa Shadrin, her tear-filled eyes the only outward sign of emotion as she relates the two-and-a-half year chain of events which have turned her life inside out.

On Dec. 20, 1975 her husband, Nicholas George Shadrin — ostensibly on an intelligence assignment for the United States — disappeared in Vienna. He left their hotel room to attend a mysterious meeting and never returned. Ewa Shadrin says he was kidnapped by Soviet agents and that a "CIA cover-up" is at work to keep the facts from her.

"Of course I'm very much frustrated, very much tormented. It's ruined my life," she says, reaching out with a reassuring pat on the head to her 150-pound German shepherd, Trezor.

"It's like a constant nightmare. Mostly it's not knowing what happened, because if you know something you can always cope with the situation. But being uncertain, day after day after day for such a long time . . ." Her voice trails off.

Ewa Shadrin's frustration is nearly total, a small, lonely person who's personal life has become caught up in a far larger world of international espionage. Almost from the day Nick Shadrin vanished, she reports, there has been only a wall of silence to answer her requests of officials both East and West for information as to what happened to him.

EWA SHADRIN has her ups and downs, "mostly downs now," she says. But "I've always been an optimist." Giving into depression "is not productive," she says. "There is always something to be done." That something includes nightly sessions with friends assisting her letter writing campaign — to the White House, to members of Congress, to the Central Intelligence Agency, to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, to the State Department, to the Soviet Embassy, to anyone who'll listen, or read, her entreaties for news of her husband's whereabouts.



—Washington Star Photographer Wilford Vols

Ewa Shadrin today and in happier times

See SPY, C-3

The doggedness of her efforts and those of her lawyer, Richard D. Copaken of the Washington firm of Covington and Burling, is finally getting her somewhere, she feels.

Just this morning, she and Copaken were to appear at the White House to testify before the Intelligence Oversight Board, which is reviewing her husband's case at the instruction of President Carter. She hopes it eventually may lead to a personal session with the President to whom she's already made three requests for a meeting.

The IOB inquiry is in response to a letter sent Carter by Copaken charging that the government has not only failed to give satisfactory answers in the case but has deliberately misled Shadrin's wife. The IOB members are former U.N. Ambassador William Scranton, former Tennessee Sen. Albert Gore and Washington attorney Thomas Farmer.

"MY REAL HOPE is that the IOB will find out what happened, and establish whether my husband is in Soviet hands and if he is, that something will be done about this. After all, we have those two Soviet spies who were apprehended in May, and I think if they're thinking of exchanging them, my husband should be given first consideration over other people who are Soviet citizens. After all, my husband is an American citizen. This is what is so disturbing to me — that in all this talk about exchange, my husband is ignored."

Despite the new lines of care in her face, Ewa Shadrin is still much the olive-complexioned beauty with dark, flashing eyes who first captivated a young Soviet destroyer captain in her hometown of Gdynia, a port city on Poland's Baltic coast. It was 1959 and the daughter of a Polish merchant marine captain was then 21, her new love 32. For Capt. Nikolai E. Kovich Artamonov, it was love at first sight. By their second meeting, she was in love with him.

They discussed marriage, but there were obstacles. He was estranged from a wife in the Soviet Union and in the process of seeking a divorce. For Ewa, going home with him was out of the question. "I couldn't go to Russia. For a Pole, that would like being in the middle of

In their case, elopement meant defection — a hair-raising midnight escape in a motor launch across the Baltic to Sweden.

Ewa's father, who ferried cargoes to England and the United States in World War II, had filled young Ewa with tales of America, "the melting pot that welcomed all races, where no one was a second class citizen." It was this memory that prompted her to urge her fiance to seek U.S. asylum rather than stay in Sweden.

Almost before they realized what was happening, the young couple was quickly sped to the United States under the watchful eye of Navy intelligence and the CIA. They underwent nine months of closely surveyed debriefing. Shadrin obtained a Mexican divorce from his Soviet wife, and the couple married in 1960. They have no children.

In return for information about the Soviet navy, Artamonov was promised U.S. citizenship for himself and his wife, a new name — Nicholas George Shadrin — down payment on a house, dental education for Ewa, who had already put in three year study of medicine in Poland, and a job with Navy intelligence. It seemed, for the young couple, a dream come true.

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ON JUNE 1, 1960, Shadrin began work as an evaluator of Soviet naval data for a branch of Naval Intelligence. With \$10,000 from the original defection deal with the CIA, the Shadrins put a down payment on a home in Arlington. Ewa began three years of dental study at Howard toward obtaining her license to practice in the United States. Nick got an engineering degree from George Washington University.

Then without explanation his job was terminated, soon followed by an equally unexplained job offer to work as a consultant with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) where his old boss, Admiral Rufus Taylor, was deputy director.

In the summer of 1966, according to the official version given Ewa Shadrin by the FBI after her husband's disappearance, Shadrin was approached by a KGB agent to spy for the Soviet Union. He reported this to the FBI, which in turn asked him to accept the proposal. Thus was set in motion the dangerous double agent role which through a succession of meetings with KGB agents led to that fateful week in Vienna in December,

1975 and a series of events his wife is still trying to unravel.

When Shadrin told his wife he'd have to interrupt their 1975 "skiing vacation" for a few days in Vienna "to meet a couple of men," she thought they were "some Soviet defectors who had been working with the United States for the last 25 years." Actually, he was seeing two KGB agents who'd contacted him in Washington, Oleg Kozlov and Mikhail Kuryshev. On the evening of Dec. 18, he met his contact on the steps of a church and was taken to the agents at a country spot outside Vienna.

Coming back at midnight, he was debriefed by a CIA counter-intelligence agent, Ann Martin, who had stayed with Ewa Shadrin in his absence. A second meeting was scheduled for Dec. 20, also in the evening.

When he left to meet the contact on the church steps, it was the last Ewa saw of him.

Martin had a dinner engagement and when a frantic Ewa finally reached her at 2 a.m., the woman coolly told her "to wait" and didn't call Washington until 10 a.m. Months later, Ewa said she learned that Martin had canceled, on FBI orders, an order for surveillance of Shadrin that had been issued by the acting chief of the CIA station in Vienna.

MRS. SHADRIN says her husband never told her about his secret activities. In fact, she didn't know he was working as a double agent with the KGB until she returned home from Vienna. An FBI agent accompanying her from the airport told her.

"I felt something strange happening. No one would talk to me. If they were interested in what happened to my husband, you'd think they'd talk to me, talk to the people he worked with. But later I learned everyone who had contact with Nick was not to get within 30 paces of me — literally." That's when she engaged Conaken as her attorney.

For over a year, they quietly pursued several courses, which included appeals to two presidents, two secretaries of state, and three meetings with an unofficial diplomatic source in East Berlin. But a year ago, Conaken went public and disclosed Shadrin's disappearance as a "cry of desperation" because he said the Ford and Carter administrations were guilty of "serious failures and missed opportunities."

Ewa accuses former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger of "pulling the rug out from under" their conferences with Wolfgang Vogel, an East German lawyer who has negotiated exchange of prisoners between East and West. Kissinger, she says, divulged the confidence to Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin when he discussed the case with him. Dobrynin denied the Soviets had Shadrin, and subsequently refused to discuss the subject.

WHEN SHE SPOKE with Carter's foreign policy advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, she said he told her: "A lot of U.S. citizens are in trouble and the president can't see each one of them." She told him he couldn't be familiar with her husband's case or he wouldn't have said that to her. Later to his aides, she said, "he denied that he even said that to me."

Ewa now talks knowingly about spies and their machinations but in the early days she knew little about the shadow world of double and triple agents, "safe houses" and eventual betrayal. Her husband, her dental practice, their home in Arlington, and their circle of friends including several from the intelligence community, were all that occupied her heart and thoughts.

Eleven years ago, they bought their present home in McLean, an imposing brick colonial with two-story white pillared front ("big enough to house my dental clinic downstairs which Nick built for me himself.") She now tends its sweeping lawn and neat flower beds on weekends.

CIA and FBI press spokesmen refused to discuss any aspects of the case with The Washington Star.

Today, Ewa Shadrin's highest hope is pinned on a face-to-face meeting with President Carter because she "knows he wouldn't lie to me."

MRS. SHADRIN is also hopeful of obtaining more information from a source abroad, a Briton arrested last spring for extorting \$3,000 from her with the promise he had some information to give her about the case. She has been called to testify at a pre-trial hearing in London next month. The man was caught in several lies on a polygraph test given him by the FBI and Scotland Yard, but she still feels he "knows something" — the "bait" he offered included some facts known only to her husband, the CIA and the KGB. She wants to find out who "fed" him the information.

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14 AUGUST 1978

Periscope

INQUIRY INTO A SPY CASE

The President's three-man Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) is investigating the mysterious case of Nicholas Shadrin, a former Russian naval officer who defected in 1959, eventually became an American citizen as well as a U.S. double agent and disappeared while on a CIA mission in Vienna in 1975. The IOB members are former U.N. ambassador and Pennsylvania Gov. William Scranton, former Tennessee Sen. Albert Gore and Washington attorney Thomas Farmer. Their inquiry is under way in response to a letter to President Carter from Richard Copaken, a lawyer representing Shadrin's wife, Ewa. Copaken and Mrs. Shadrin say that the U.S. Government has not only failed to provide a satisfactory explanation of Shadrin's fate, but has deliberately misled them.

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NICHOLAS SHADRIN
... vanished in Vienna

Bizarre Twist in Missing Spy Case

WP
9/25/78

Briton Accused of Duping Wife of Soviet Defector

By Greg Walter

Special to The Washington Post

LONDON—At 10:58 on the morning of Aug. 5, 1977, the telephone rang in the Covington & Burling law offices of Richard D. Copaken in Washington.

"I've just returned from Germany," said an apparently British voice on the other end of the line. "and I understand you are looking for Nicky Artamonov."

That call from a man who identified himself only as "Benson" launched a bizarre six-month odyssey for Copaken and for the wife of Nikolai Artamonov, also known as Nicholas George Shadrin, a Soviet defector who disappeared on an intelligence mission in Vienna on Dec. 20, 1975.

In the end, that search—inspired by what appears to be an intricate web of lies woven by a master con artist—

would prove both heartbreaking and expensive for Blanka Ewa Shadrin, who, according to Copaken, has spent life savings totaling \$122,000 in search of her husband.

Strands of that web surfaced in a south London courtroom earlier this month where 44-year-old William Joseph Flynn was charged with obtaining money by deception and ordered held without bail for a trial to be staged sometime early next year.

In that morning telephone call in August 1977, "Benson" admitted that he was using a phony name for his own protection. But—according to a memorandum written later by Copaken—the caller had learned of the lawyer's search for Shadrin through an article the previous month in the international edition of Newsweek.

Identifying himself as a former

British agent anxious to help find Shadrin, "Benson" suggested that Copaken place the following advertisement in the International Herald Tribune:

"Harry wants bank notes of 17th century origin" followed by the number of an unlisted telephone Copaken was to have installed in his office.

There was a "50-50 chance," said Benson, that a man named "Agnew" would see the advertisement and respond.

"Agnew" was a "mercenary character" said Benson, distastefully, but could help locate Shadrin since he had supplied the missing agent with false documents in Zurich six days after Shadrin disappeared in Vienna.

Benson warned Copaken that Agnew would probably hang up since Benson could not provide Copaken

See FLYNN, A3, Col. 1

Bizarre Twist in Missing Spy Case

FLYNN, From A1

with the rest of the coded phrase that would assure Agnew that the advertisement was not a Central Intelligence Agency trap.

"If he believes you are with the CIA he will have nothing further to do with you," Benson warned. However, to prove his bona fides, Copaken was to tell Agnew that "the man that gave you his name is the same man he once gave a bottle of vodka to with a little plant growing out of it some years ago."

Something in that telephone call, according to Copaken, "was of riveting significance" to the Shadrin case. Although it does not appear to surface in Copaken's memorandum of the conversation, Benson made allusions "to things that could have been known only to Mr. and Mrs. Shadrin and to the CIA," according to Copaken, who will not further elaborate.

Copaken's relations with the CIA since taking on the Shadrin case six weeks after the defector's disappearance have been tenuous at best. Aggressive—and some say even abrasive—Copaken had placed himself squarely on the backs of CIA officials. Typically, he ignored their ad-

Defector's Background

Nikolai Artamonov, also known as Nicholas George Shadrin, defected to the West in 1959 in Sweden. At the time he said he was a Soviet naval commander, a story at first doubted by U.S. intelligence officials, but later accepted as true.

Artamonov/Shadrin eventually went to work for the Defense Intelligence Agency in Washington. In 1966, apparently at the instigation of the Central Intelligence Agency and apparently unbeknownst to Artamonov/Shadrin himself, a deal was made "offering" him to a KGB officer named Igor who had volunteered to work for U.S. intelligence.

Igor reportedly said he wanted to use Artamonov/Shadrin as a double agent to impress his bosses in Moscow.

The CIA wanted to help Igor make a good impression, so permitted him to approach Artamonov/Shadrin.

Artamonov/Shadrin may never have realized that he had been set up for the role of double agent, and he began a secret life that lasted for nearly 10 years. He had a number of contacts with Soviet agents in this country, in Canada and Austria. In December 1975, while on a mission to meet the KGB again in Vienna, he disappeared.

living in a Western country. Agnew would contact Shadrin and get back to Copaken.

Four days later, Agnew called again this time from Buffalo, New York.

they be delivered to Agnew in another part of Buffalo. The call to Shadrin would be made from there.

Agnew would need \$2,000 for expen-

senger for Agnew. If Copaken would pay his way to London he would gladly take a lie detector test to prove it.

"Sometimes," he told Copaken, "you need a small key to open a small lock. A large key won't work."

To help prove that he was that small key, Flynn proceeded to lay out a spy's treasure of documents for Copaken to examine, among them a small black memo book.

On the first page was the unlisted London telephone number of Palestine Liberation Organization leader Said Hammami—629-0732. A month later, Hammami was shot dead in his office.

Scotland Yard sources have since confirmed the authenticity of a number of other international terrorists listed in Joe Flynn's little black book.

Flynn, indeed, appeared to Copaken to be a man of many parts—most of them "scary as hell."

But Flynn had an admission to make. He had learned that "Agnew" and "Benson" were phony names. The real Agnew, Flynn claimed, was a superspy named Erik Muller, famed in the Bondian world of international

rang.
"Hello, Harry," said a voice on the other end. Copaken says he hurriedly tried to identify himself through the sprig-laden bottle of vodka. The phone went dead.

"I thought I'd blown it," says Copaken.

But if in fact this was a fraud, it had a master's touch. At 9:58 the next morning Copaken's white telephone rang again, this time with a call from St. Jean-Cap Ferrat in the South of France.

On the line was the elusive Agnew, who confirmed that he had supplied Shadrin with travel documents, that Shadrin was "alive, safe and well" and

his wife, but feared reprisal from the CIA. He had asked Agnew to arrange for him to be able to speak with his wife by telephone.

Agnew had decided that the call was to be placed from a Buffalo, N.Y., hotel. The following weekend, after Agnew called Copaken at home with a one-word code—the name of the hotel—Copaken and Mrs. Shadrin were to leave Washington, go to any other city in the United States, and then fly to Buffalo.

Once in Buffalo, Copaken would receive a call from a Mr. Putz—Agnew's bodyguard. Putz would meet them and search them for weapons and hidden tape recorders. Only then would



United Press International

Blanka Ewa Shadrin, wife of missing defector, at her suburban Virginia home.

"Benson" (Benson) had been mistaken about the bottle of vodka. It had been Shadrin who had given Agnew the vodka.

Copaken wired the \$3,000 as instructed. "I was suspicious," he says. "But Benson's information was incredibly accurate. I reasoned that the mathematical probability of his coming up with that story was about 1 in 120 million."

One week later, on Sept. 26, Copaken's special phone rang again. This time it was a furious Agnew demanding to know why Copaken had blown his cover. The Buffalo operation had to be scrubbed. Agnew would get back to him.

Six weeks later, when no further calls had come, Copaken decided that he had been swindled. He was, nonetheless, haunted by Benson's flawless knowledge of "deeply personal" information known only to the Shadrins and to the CIA.

Could Benson and Agnew be one and the same person? If so, could Benson/Agnew be a CIA-inspired version to get the aggressive Copaken off the back of the CIA?

On Nov. 6, Copaken and Mrs. Shadrin flew to Monaco. There they discovered that the \$3,000 had been picked up by "W. Flynn" who identified himself to authorities through an Australian passport issued in August 1975. He had given his local address as the yacht "Kasmit" anchored at Antibes.

No such yacht existed in the records of the Antibes harbor police. "W. Flynn," it developed, had obtained his passport illegally by furnishing

but apparently no amount of documents or carefully devised explanations as to the mysterious Agnew and Benson could help Flynn stand up to the electronic probing of the lie detector in London.

On Dec. 13 he failed it "conclusively" in the words of the polygraph expert who administered it.

A discouraged Copaken flew home with an even more discouraged Mrs. Shadrin.

But the irrepressible Flynn was not to be discouraged. Two weeks after failing his test ("I even lied about my name," he later boasted to Copaken) he called Copaken again: if the lawyer would only fly to Vienna at Christmastime he would meet Erik Muller and Muller would produce Shadrin. Flynn needed \$2,500 to help — but he would waive the money if only Copaken would help get him an American green landing card.

Copaken was not buying. Still, the awful possibility that he was closing the door on any chance of finding Shadrin gnawed at him, he says.

Copaken decided that he would try one final test: if Flynn could provide the answers to three questions he would pay the money:

- The true identity of Benson?
- Shadrin's whereabouts when "Agnew" (now alias Muller) contacted him about the Buffalo rendezvous?
- Ways to find Muller?

At a London meeting three weeks later, Flynn provided answers: "Benson" was a man named Michael Smallwood Thomas Blick; Shadrin had been reached in Rio de Janeiro; Muller could be reached through

records belonging to a Melbourne train conductor.

Why should Australian passport officials be suspicious—"W. J. Flynn," after all, was well known in Australia as a multimillionaire land developer, Gold Coast playboy, and, incredibly, the owner of a luxurious yacht aptly named "The Goldfinger."

The Flynn who stood in a London dock two weeks ago was, in fact, the man the Australian press had once dubbed "Goldfinger" before he mysteriously disappeared on the phony passport, leaving behind a trail of allegedly unpaid debts totaling a reported million dollars.

Copaken could have known none of those details when, with the help of the French police, he finally tracked Flynn to another yacht called the "Rodi's Island" anchored at Beaulieu sur Mer. On board with Flynn was a woman identified later as Karen Steadman whose brother had recently been convicted of selling Royal Air Force secrets to the Soviets.

Did Flynn indeed have contacts in the murky world of the international spy trade network?

For the moment, Flynn admitted to Copaken only that he had been a mes-

balance to be paid when and if the story checked out.

It never did: Blick turned out to be a British diplomat serving in Papua New Guinea; Erik Muller — who testified in London that he had never met Flynn in his life — is an international businessman and escort to the crown princess of Denmark during her frequent visits to Monaco.

And Shadrin's whereabouts are still a mystery.

The final act in this drama may be played out in the Old Bailey court in London. Meanwhile Flynn faces 10 years in prison and is being held without bond.

Scotland Yard sources have identified him as Barry Edward Gray, 43, born, they say, in a London slum. But another source says even Scotland Yard is not sure of all this.

Nor are observers of the trial certain Flynn will be convicted. Quite the opposite. They feel that the crown will not be able to persuade the British jury that Flynn is anything but the victim of another CIA plot. They expect acquittal, followed by a bidding war for the rights to Flynn's story.

Says one British journalist: "He'll be a bloody millionaire."

a lonely wife wonders if her husband is alive

By Ruth Dean

Washington Staff Writer

"It's like living with a nightmare," says Blanka Ewa Shadrin, her tear-filled eyes the only outward sign of emotion as she relates the two-and-a-half year chain of events which have turned her life inside out.

On Dec. 29, 1975 her husband, Nicholas George Shadrin — ostensibly on an intelligence assignment for the United States — disappeared in Vienna. He left their hotel room to attend a mysterious meeting and never returned. Ewa Shadrin says he was kidnapped by Soviet agents and that a "CIA cover-up" is at work to keep the facts from her.

"Of course I'm very much frustrated, very much tormented. It's ruined my life," she says, reaching out with reassuring pat on the head to her 150-pound German shepherd, Trezor.

"It's like a constant nightmare. Mostly it's not knowing what happened, because if you know something you can always cope with the situation. But being uncertain, day after day after day for such a long time . . ." Her voice trails off.

Ewa Shadrin's frustration is nearly total, a small, lonely person who's personal life has become caught up in a far larger world of international espionage. Almost the day Nick Shadrin vanished, she reports, there has been only a wall of silence to answer her requests of officials both East and West for information as to what happened to him.

EWA SHADRIN has her ups and downs. "mostly downs now," she says. But "I've always been an optimist." Giving into depression "is not productive," she says. "There is always something to be done." That something includes nightly sessions with friends assisting her letter writing campaign — to the White House, to members of Congress, to the Central Intelligence Agency, to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, to the State Department, to the Soviet Embassy, to anyone who'll listen, or read, her entreaties for news of her husband's whereabouts.

those of her lawyer, Richard D. Copaken, who is now in Sweden. Just this morning, she and Copaken were to appear at the White House to testify before the Intelligence Oversight Board, which is reviewing her husband's case at the instruction of President Carter. She hopes it eventually may lead to a personal session with the President to whom she's already made three requests for a meeting.

The IOB inquiry is in response to a letter sent Carter by Copaken charging that the government has not only failed to give satisfactory answers in the case but has deliberately misled Shadrin's wife. The IOB members are former U.N. Ambassador William Scranton, former Tennessee Sen. Albert Gore and Washington attorney Thomas Farmer.

"MY REAL HOPE is that the IOB will find out what happened, and establish whether my husband is in Soviet hands and if he is, that something will be done about this. After all, we have those two Soviet spies who were apprehended in May, and I think if they're thinking of exchanging them, my husband should be given first consideration over other people who are Soviet citizens. After all, my husband is an American citizen. This is what is so disturbing to me — that in all this talk about exchange, my husband is ignored."

Despite the new lines of care in her face, Ewa Shadrin is still much the olive-complexioned beauty with dark, flashing eyes who first captivated a young Soviet destroyer captain in her hometown of Gdynia, a port city on Poland's Baltic coast. It was 1959 and the daughter of a Polish merchant marine captain was then 21, her new love 32. For Capt. Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov, it was love at first sight. By their second meeting, she was in love with him.

They discussed marriage, but there were obstacles. He was estranged from a wife in the Soviet Union and in the process of seeking a divorce. For Ewa, going home with him was out of the question. "I couldn't go to Russia. For a Pole, that would like being in the middle of hell," she says firmly. They decided to elope.

Ewa's father, who ferried her to England and the United States during World War II, had filled her with tales of America, "the great pot that welcomed all races, no one was a second class citizen, was this memory that prompted to urge her fiance to seek U.S. citizenship rather than stay in Sweden. Almost before they realized what was happening, the young couple quickly sped to the United States under the watchful eye of Navy intelligence and the CIA. They underwent nine months of closely supervised briefing. Shadrin obtained a divorce from his Soviet wife, the couple married in 1960. They have three children.

In return for information about the Soviet navy, Artamonov promised U.S. citizenship for himself and his wife, a new name — Paul George Shadrin — down payment on a house, dental education for the son who had already put in three years of study of medicine in Poland, a job with Navy intelligence. It seemed, for the young couple, that the dream had come true.

ON JUNE 1, 1960, Shadrin worked as an evaluator of Soviet data for a branch of Naval Intelligence. With \$10,000 from the defection deal with the CIA, the Shadrins put a down payment on a home in Arlington. Ewa began years of dental study at Howard University. She was toward obtaining her license in dentistry in the United States. Nic had an engineering degree from Washington University.

Then without explanation the job offer was terminated, soon followed by an equally unexplained job offer as a consultant with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) was terminated. The old boss, Admiral Rufus Taylor, was the deputy director.

In the summer of 1966, according to the official version given Ewa Shadrin by the FBI after her husband's disappearance, Shadrin was approached by a KGB agent to return to the Soviet Union. He reported to the FBI, which in turn asked him to accept the proposal. Thus was born the dangerous double role which through a series of meetings with KGB agents led to a fateful week in Vienna in December 1975.

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still trying to unravel.

When Shadrin told his wife he'd have to interrupt their 1975 "skiing vacation" for a few days in Vienna "to meet a couple of men," she thought they were "some Soviet defectors who had been working with the United States for the last 25 years." Actually, he was seeing two KGB agents who'd contacted him in Washington, Oleg Kozlov and Mikhail Kuryshv. On the evening of Dec. 18, he met his contact on the steps of a church and was taken to the agents at a country spot outside Vienna.

Coming back at midnight, he was debriefed by a CIA counter-intelligence agent, Ann Martin, who had stayed with Ewa Shadrin in his absence. A second meeting was scheduled for Dec. 20, also in the evening.

When he left to meet the contact on the church steps, it was the last Ewa saw of him.

Martin had a dinner engagement and when a frantic Ewa finally reached her at 2 a.m., the woman coolly told her "to wait" and didn't call Washington until 10 a.m. Months later, Ewa said she learned that Martin had canceled, on FBI orders, an order for surveillance of Shadrin that had been issued by the acting chief of the CIA station in Vienna.

MRS. SHADRIN says her husband never told her about his secret activities. In fact, she didn't know he was working as a double agent with the KGB until she returned home from Vienna. An FBI agent accompanying her from the airport told her.

"I felt something strange happening. No one would talk to me. If they were interested in what happened to my husband, you'd think they'd talk to me, talk to the people he worked with. But later I learned everyone who had contact with Nick was not to get within 30 paces of me — literally." That's when she engaged Copaken as her attorney.

For over a year, they quietly pursued several courses, which included appeals to two presidents, two secretaries of state, and three meetings with an unofficial diplomatic source in East Berlin. But a year ago, Copaken went public and disclosed Shadrin's disappearance as a "cry of desperation" because he said the Ford and Carter administrations were guilty of "serious blunders and missed opportunities."

State merely assumed that "putting the run out from under" their conferences with Wolfgang Vogel, an East German lawyer who has negotiated exchange of prisoners between East and West. Kissinger, she says, divulged the confidence to Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin when he discussed the case with him. Dobrynin denied the Soviets had Shadrin, and subsequently refused to discuss the subject.

WHEN SHE SPOKE with Carter's foreign policy advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, she said he told her: "A lot of U.S. citizens are in trouble and the president can't see each one of them." She told him he couldn't be familiar with her husband's case or he wouldn't have said that to her. Later to his aides, she said, "he denied that he even said that to me."

Ewa now talks knowingly about spies and their machinations but in the early days she knew little about the shadow world of double and triple agents, "safe houses" and eventual betrayal. Her husband, her dental practice, their home in Arlington, and their circle of friends including several from the intelligence community, were all that occupied her heart and thoughts.

Eleven years ago, they bought their present home in McLean, an imposing brick colonial with two-story white pillared front ("big enough to house my dental clinic downstairs which Nick built for me himself.") She now tends its sweeping lawn and neat flower beds on weekends.

CIA and FBI press spokesmen refused to discuss any aspects of the case with The Washington Star.

Today, Ewa Shadrin's highest hope is pinned on a face-to-face meeting with President Carter because she "knows he wouldn't lie to me."

MRS. SHADRIN is also hopeful of obtaining more information from a source abroad, a Briton arrested last spring for extorting \$30,000 from her with the promise he had some information to give her about the case. She has been called to testify at a pre-trial hearing in London next month. The man was caught in several lies on a polygraph test given him by the FBI and Scotland Yard, but she still feels he "knows something" — the "bait" he offered included some facts known only to her husband, the CIA and the KGB. She wants to find out who "fed" him the information.

Once It Was a Funeral in Berlin, and Our Man in Havana, But Now the Espionage Capital of the World Is Washington, DC

I SPY, YOU SPY

By Tad Szulc

The bloated body of a senior Central Intelligence Agency official, supposedly retired but until his death enjoying full access to vital defense information, was retrieved last month from the Chesapeake Bay. There was a bullet in his head and his body was weighted down with 75 pounds of scuba diver's belt ballast. His boat had been found a few days earlier, sails still fully set, and with top-secret CIA documents aboard. Suicide? Or was John A. Paisley the most recent victim of Washington's escalating espionage war?

The city is the proud capital of the "Free World," but it is also acquiring the dubious honor of being the world's espionage center. Forget West Berlin, forget Hong Kong: Today much of the deadly serious business of espionage is transacted in Washington.

The city's government buildings, foreign embassies, newspaper offices, hotels, private dwellings, exclusive restaurants, shabby bars, and quiet public libraries are the scenes of endless and sometimes lethal intelligence games. This is the unseen world of Washington, a shadow play of spies and counterspies.

A special and new dimension in this play is the intense controversy now raging within the CIA and other intelligence agencies over their own internal security. There are also parallel disagreements about American ability to penetrate the KGB, the Soviet secret service.

Traces of this controversy appear in public only occasionally—most recently during congressional investigations into the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. In September several retired

CIA officials, including former director Richard Helms, testified about the CIA's handling of Yuri I. Nosenko, a senior KGB defector who claimed that Lee Harvey Oswald had no ties to the KGB. After Nosenko spent almost three years in solitary confinement at Langley and another CIA facility in Virginia, undergoing the kind of psychological torture Americans normally associate with the Russians, he finally convinced the CIA of his truthfulness. According to intelligence-community veterans, the CIA needed assurance of Nosenko's reliability because he was the only source available to the US to corroborate the statement by "Fedora," a mysterious Soviet agent reporting to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in New York, that Oswald was not under Russian control. It was on the basis of Fedora's information that J. Edgar Hoover, then the FBI director, convinced the Warren Commission late in 1963 that Oswald had acted alone.

To this day, however, there are serious doubts about Nosenko among some pres-

ent and former CIA officials, including the near-legendary James Jesus Angleton, former head of counterintelligence. These doubts raise the possibility that Oswald was a Soviet agent when he shot Kennedy, a possibility that Helms himself finally conceded in his recent congressional testimony: "No person familiar with the facts finds Nosenko's statements about Oswald to be credible," said Helms. "Therefore, this tends to sour ... the other opinions he maintained. I don't know how one resolves this bone in the throat."

Perhaps even more to the point, doubts about Nosenko raise doubts about the CIA's ability in general to distinguish between genuine defectors and KGB "plants." Anatoly I. Golitsyn, a defector code-named "Stone" by the CIA, always has suspected Nosenko of being a double agent. Both men are now ostensibly connected with the CIA—Nosenko is a well-paid consultant, while Golitsyn lives in the Washington area under a cover supplied by the Agency—but only one of them can be right.

The Agency's role in the Oswald case was called into further question two months ago, when the House Committee on Assassinations learned that as early as February 24, 1964, an internal CIA memorandum acknowledged that 37 documents that should have been in the file on Oswald were in fact missing. No explanation was ever offered.

Or consider the case of Nicholas George Shadrin. Once a commander in the Soviet navy, Shadrin defected to the West in 1959 and eventually became a consultant to the Office of Naval Intelligence here. Then, in 1956, Richard

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Igor, a KGB agent working in Washington under a Soviet diplomatic cover. Igor had volunteered to work for the CIA, but he needed Shadrin. He proposed to turn Shadrin into a double agent, making himself appear to be the recruiter. He claimed that if he succeeded in seeming to have recruited Shadrin, his own standing in the KGB would increase, which would in turn make him more useful to the CIA. The CIA evidently agreed, for Shadrin was to spend the next nine years as a double agent, working with the KGB under joint CIA-FBI control. A few days before Christmas in 1975, he flew to Vienna for a meeting with KGB operatives, and disappeared. His wife, Ewa, an Arlington dentist, has spent her life savings in search of him.

Shadrin's fate is one of the greatest mysteries of American intelligence operations and remains one of the most sensitive matters within the United States government. While the official assumption is that he was probably captured by the Russians and may well be dead, new though uncorroborated information suggests that he may be alive in Perth, Australia, living under a deep cover. It also has been alleged by former government officials that White House investigations of Shadrin's disappearance have been sabotaged by the CIA, which may have doctored the relevant secret files. Finally, there may be a connection between Shadrin and Richard Welch, the CIA station chief in Athens who was assassinated on December 23, 1975, three days after Shadrin vanished. Informants in Washington claim that the KGB had asked Shadrin to pass on to the CIA a tip that Welch was marked by assassination by a Greek or Arab group. It is unknown whether Shadrin had time to convey this information to the CIA; the Agency simply won't discuss the Shadrin mystery. Meanwhile, and inexplicably, the Justice Department has taken over the handling of the Shadrin case.

It is also worth pointing out that the CIA's counterintelligence staff withheld knowledge of Igor's original recruitment of Shadrin from the Agency's Soviet Russia Division, out of fear that the latter might be penetrated by the KGB. By the same token, the Soviet Russia Division and the China Division of the CIA's clandestine services were never kept informed of each other's secret activities—up to this time—because of penetration concerns.

The bitter and still unresolved arguments over these cases revolve largely around the use of double agents by the CIA and the KGB. This issue is the object of a highly classified investigation that has been under way for months on

The level of tension in the present intelligence battle is unprecedented. But in the classical sense, espionage in Washington is no novelty; it goes on as it always has, only becoming more sophisticated. Thus American operations aimed at foreign countries have been run from Washington ever since the United States seriously entered the intelligence business during World War II. Similarly, the Nazis and then the Soviets considered Washington a natural target.

Until recently, the espionage game was reasonably discreet, with everyone concerned devoted to the maintenance of a low profile. Secrecy would be lifted only when, for example, a Soviet KGB agent recruited an American official, usually a lowly employee, to buy classified information. Then the operation would be blown, the traitor arrested, and the Soviet operative—often someone with a diplomatic cover—expelled. The same thing happened in Moscow with CIA officers attached to the embassy.

But as a rule, mutual spying triggered no scandals. Both sides knew that espionage cannot be eradicated; therefore, certain rules developed in the game. One of the rules is "I won't hit you if you don't hit me." This is why assassinations of professional intelligence officers—as distinguished from informers, double agents who become triple agents, and so on—are a rarity. If in fact the KGB did try to warn the CIA through Shadrin in 1975 that Athens station chief Welch was in danger, it was under this "gentlemen's agreement." When the Soviets shot down Gary Francis Powers's CIA U-2 airplane in 1960, the political outcry that followed on Premier Khrushchev's part reflected his annoyance that the Americans had broken the rules.

Those were the good old days in spying, although some very special cases were "graveyard," as the spooks put it—never to be talked about or opened to public debate.

For some time now, however, espionage in its increasingly sophisticated and occasionally brutal dimensions has become a growth industry in Washington, with a cast of thousands of visible and invisible operatives working for scores of governments—starting with our own.

First, there are the CIA operations centered at Langley under the stewardship of a director of Central Intelligence, currently Admiral Stansfield Turner. The CIA is undergoing a controversial reorganization, and much of its former paramilitary role overseas has been taken over by the Pentagon. It still involves itself in the politics of other countries, however, and although such activities are supposed to be limited and conducted

only with the knowledge of congressional oversight committees, there are reasons to believe that CIA supplied funds were used against the French Communist party during the French election campaign earlier this year. At home the CIA's counterintelligence staff is charged with protecting American secrets, among other things.

Besides the CIA, the US intelligence community includes the super-secret National Security Agency headquartered in Fort Meade, Maryland; it is in charge of satellite observations, electronic monitoring of worldwide military communications and other communications of interest, and the making and breaking of codes. Also included are the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency, the Air Force's National Reconnaissance Office for its part in the spy-in-the-sky satellite program, and the FBI in its counterintelligence role.

Aside from subversive operations abroad, the intelligence community's principal responsibility is the collection of foreign intelligence, both overtly and covertly. The government cannot make major policy decisions without this flow of intelligence, whether it pertains to Soviet or Chinese strategic developments, foreign political trends, Soviet grain crops, or the projected world petroleum supply.

To obtain all this data, the Washington-directed espionage machine must depend on electronic means as well as on human agents. During the Watergate investigations, for example, it developed that the National Security Agency and the Army, Navy, and Air Force units associated with it had been intercepting secret diplomatic traffic between foreign embassies in Washington and their home offices. Not to be outdone, the Russians are believed to have found ways of breaking into the US government's domestic microwave transmissions.

Of course, however sophisticated electronic espionage may become, human agents—collectively called HUMINT—will continue to dominate intelligence gathering, for satellites and decoding computers cannot make judgments about whether others' intentions are hostile or not, nor can they produce counterintelligence on enemy agents.

It takes human agents to infiltrate foreign governments and intelligence services and to guard against penetration by "unfriendly." This is the most vital and secret function of the American intelligence community. At Langley and elsewhere, plans are continuously made to insert American agents—or American-controlled foreign nationals—into foreign governments at every level. The CIA's counterintelligence

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such "plants" are beyond suspicion, that they are not deliberately implanted double agents, particularly in the case of the Soviet Union. Nobody can be one-hundred-percent certain that every "plant" or "mole" is not reporting back to the KGB and, in turn, infiltrating his or her American sponsor agency.

Then there are the situations in which electronic spying blends into espionage by human agents. Every form of spying complements another form. Thus a 23-year-old former CIA employee named William T. Kampiles was arrested and indicted last August for selling to the Russians a top-secret manual that described the workings of a vital United States satellite, a satellite that photographs Soviet nuclear missile emplacements as part of verification procedures under the 1972 Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement.

There are administration officials who believe that this act of espionage has compromised United States strategic verification techniques, a major blow against American defenses. What hasn't been explained, however, is how a junior CIA official had unlimited access to such a top-secret document. It may have been an inexcusable security breakdown, but some intelligence people have been mumbling about a KGB penetration. Other sensitive materials are also believed to be missing, and President Carter personally took the CIA to task for these problems. It was at that time that counterintelligence staff chief Hugh Tovar was replaced by David Blee.

Satellite surveillance systems were also the subject of the documents found on the grounded sloop of the late John A. Paisley, the retired CIA official whose body was recovered from the Chesapeake on October 1. The 55-year-old Paisley was one of the Agency's leading experts in overhead surveillance, having been involved in the U-2 program years ago. At the time of his retirement in 1974, he was deputy director of the CIA's Office of Strategic Research, but he had stayed on as a consultant. Some of the documents on his boat had been taken from the Agency only two weeks earlier. What was he doing with them? And what brought about his death? Was it a case of enemy penetration? The CIA wasn't talking, and within days of the discovery of Paisley's body, the Senate Intelligence Committee opened its own investigation.

In Washington, the chief espionage threat comes from the Soviet Union. Soviet espionage occurs in both overt and covert forms. Most of the overt work is conducted by the KGB "Rezident" section of the Soviet Embassy on Sixteenth Street, Northwest, though the section

The identity of the "Rezident," the Soviet counterpart of a CIA station chief abroad, is usually known to the United States government, just as the Agency representative in Moscow is known to the Kremlin. This is one of the rules of the intelligence game. It is assumed that a large percentage of the 135 members of the Soviet Embassy—18 of them are military attachés—who enjoy diplomatic immunity are active KGB operators. So are scores of support personnel—drivers, household personnel, secretaries, and so on—who do not have diplomatic status. The same goes for the large Soviet Mission to the United Nations and the Soviet Consulate General in New York. In any event, every Soviet citizen in the United States is considered to be under KGB control and thus a potential espionage agent. The 35 Soviet news correspondents in the United States—13 stationed in Washington—also fulfill intelligence functions.

The KGB in Washington has a distinct advantage over the CIA in Moscow when it comes to the collection of overt intelligence, which when properly analyzed can be just as vital to the Soviet perception of American activities as information obtained through clandestine means.

This is so primarily because the United States is an open society and because Washington is a treasure-trove of information available to anyone for the asking. Obviously, American press, radio, and television reports which Soviet diplomats follow with religious dedication are a major source of general knowledge. Conversations with Soviet diplomats demonstrate how extraordinarily well informed they are about American society—although some experts here worry about how well they understand it and report it back home.

The Soviets supplement their reading of the general press with study of specialized journals ranging from military and technical publications on everything from nuclear science to applied chemistry to such magazines as *Aviation Week*, which often provides new insights into research and development of weapons and delivery systems.

It turns out, too, that the Soviet government and Eastern European governments are among the best clients of the Government Printing Office. They purchase hundreds of thousands of dollars annually worth of booklets and pamphlets on every subject imaginable, for direct shipment to their capitals. Ninety percent of the kinds of information the Soviets acquire openly in Washington would be state secrets in Moscow.

Soviet diplomats attend congressional hearings in which they have special interest, and study the *Congressional Record* and committees' hearings' prints for hidden gems of knowledge. And Soviet correspondents, especially newsmen from Tass, the Soviet news agency, complement the diplomatic effort in the acquisition of data on everything pertaining to the United States.

For one thing, Tass correspondents file tens of thousands of words daily back to Moscow, but only a tiny fraction of this material finds its way into Soviet newspapers. The bulk goes into four special Tass bulletins intended for the leadership and arranged according to security classifications. Each bulletin has a special color. The violet bulletin provides news that can be printed at the discretion of Communist party authorities. The white bulletin is confidential and used only for reference; it goes to editors-in-chief, managing editors, and commentators. The red bulletin, stamped SECRET, contains what a Georgetown University study on "Soviet Information Networks" calls "dangerous news." It is factual, but it may contradict the material in the violet bulletin; it is delivered by an armed guard. The fourth bulletin, which has no special color, is reserved only for Politburo members and other top party leaders. It is known as the "special bulletin" and it contains "anti-Soviet" material and highly secret factual information. This same kind of reporting system is also used by Eastern European news agencies for their governments.

Every foreign embassy in every foreign capital engages in the "social" collection of political intelligence, and the Soviets are no exception. This is a very

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sophisticated form of political espionage. It is common, for instance, for Soviet diplomats to invite Washington correspondents for lunch to pump them for information and interpretation of political events. Chances are that they will learn precious little that is new beyond what can be learned in the daily press, but there could be accidental exceptions. Besides, this system has the self-serving quality of allowing the diplomat, a KGB agent or not, to write in his report: "Famous columnist _____ told me today that. . . ." Interestingly, the Soviets have a definite penchant for entertaining their American guests at the most famous and expensive French restaurants in Washington. Newsmen usually agree to these lunch sessions because they expect to hear, in return, the current Soviet line on a given topic. But this relationship has dangers: During the Nixon administration, for example, several well-known Washington correspondents were tailed by the FBI after a Soviet or Eastern European lunch, had their phones tapped, and were accused in internal Bureau papers of having contacts with "foreign intelligence."

Dinners and cocktail parties are also used by Soviet diplomats to extract political intelligence from newsmen, government officials, congressmen, and fellow diplomats. It is virtually impossible to have a purely social conversation with a Soviet diplomat at a Washington cocktail party: The man seems to have an agenda and, drink in hand, he corners a more or less prominent American to go down his list of questions. "What do you think of the Begin-Sadat summit at Camp David? What is your government's thinking about Rhodesia? Do you think the Senate will approve a SALT treaty?"—and so on and on into the night.

These extensive overt activities notwithstanding, the Soviets still go in heavily for classical espionage. Buying secrets from workers in defense industries, military installations, or even intelligence agencies could be the province of the network run by the KGB "Rezident" at the embassy, or of an "illegal" network like the one operated in the 1950s by Colonel Rudolph Abel, who was subsequently caught by the FBI.

It doesn't follow that the official KGB "Rezident" is aware of the activities by the "illegal" network: In fact, chances are that he is not. The more compartmentalized the espionage effort, the safer it is. The FBI and the CIA's counterintelligence staff can monitor embassy-based KGB agents fairly well—though not always. It is "illegal" networks that worry them the most; even if one is compromised, it is impossible to know whether there are others still functioning.

It is because of this that American counterespionage has to rely on double agents, never knowing whether they might in reality be dealing with triple agents. The Shadrin case is a good example. Nobody knows whether Igor's approach to Helms was KGB bait to trap Shadrin, or whether the Soviets really planned to fit him into an "illegal" apparatus as promised. But the stakes were so high—likewise the CIA's and the FBI's greed—that he was strongly encouraged to fly from his Washington home to Vienna for the KGB encounter. It may have cost him his life.

Meanwhile, Washington's intelligence battles are no longer confined to the United States and the Soviet Union and their respective allies. The city is now fertile ground for direct activities by "friendly" intelligence services—Israelis, assorted Arabs, South Koreans, Iranians, South Africans, Chileans, and Filipinos being the obvious examples—serving their special interests.

Espionage in Washington by "unfriendly" and "friendly" alike has reached such a point that the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence announced last June that it will "specifically report on both the magnitude of the Soviet threat as the adequacy of the US response" and that it is "concerned" about the "intelligence activities" of "some friendly countries here." This is significant because until early 1978, the committee concentrated only on the control and reorganization of American intelligence agencies in terms of the rights of American citizens—nothing else.

Activity in Washington by "friendly" intelligence services is a relatively new phenomenon, but one that is causing

growing concern. Allied services have always been present in the capital in a liaison capacity. There is a joint Anglo-American intelligence group operating at the British Embassy. The United States regularly exchanges intelligence information with its North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies. None of this causes any problems. Entering an elegant hotel restaurant on Massachusetts Avenue one evening, James Angleton remarked offhandedly to a friend that "this is where the French intelligence hangs out." It was routine.

Israel, too, is highly active in intelligence gathering, but again, it is—for the most part—a cooperative venture. It was through a connection with Angleton's counterintelligence staff that Israel received in the 1960s the special technology it needed to develop nuclear weapons.

What worries Washington is the kind of activity that the South Korean CIA (KCIA) and the Chilean DINA have made famous and the fact that, until recently, the US government has done nothing about it. Thus the Senate committee already has produced a special report on the operations of the KCIA in the United States, including the alleged bribing of congressmen, noting with some amazement that the US government never set as an intelligence priority the question of whether "friendly" foreign intelligence services were conducting activities directed at officials or other residents of the United States.

Shortly afterwards, the Justice Department was able to come up with hard evidence that the bombing assassination on Washington's Embassy Row in September 1976 of former Chilean foreign minister Orlando Letelier and an American associate was the work of DINA, the intelligence agency of Chile's military dictatorship. Letelier was the chief of the junta opposition abroad. DINA's boss, an army general, had been a close friend of the CIA station chief in Santiago when the leftist Allende regime was overthrown in 1973. There is no suggestion that the CIA had any involvement in the Letelier murder, but DINA's crimes illustrated how "friendly" services took it

CONTINUED

In the case of the KCIA, its operations—aside from its efforts in the Congress—concentrated on the enemies of the Seoul regime in the United States. Exiled South Koreans, many of them naturalized American citizens, were for years subject to blackmail and strong-arming by KCIA thugs, often working under the cover of consular officials. Pressures were put on South Korean businessmen, for example, not to advertise in American publications run by anti-Seoul activists. If nothing else, the KCIA had been systematically violating the civil rights of American citizens of Korean origin and legal US residents.

The Chilean DINA and military intelligence services of half a dozen Latin American dictatorships have been monitoring Washington activities of exiled foes of their regimes, sometimes with the aid of United States agencies. And Iran's SAVAK, dealing with thousands of anti-Shah students in the United States, has excelled in this form of espionage.

In most of the years involving operation violation of United States law, the lame excuse provided by officials is that "we are dealing with friendly governments." The clincher is that if the United States interferes with their intelligence capers in Washington, they may retaliate by closing down CIA operations in their countries.

In short, Washington has become the world's leading intelligence and espionage battlefield. Everybody seems to be playing this game with fewer and fewer constraints. No place in the world is so richly endowed with knowledge and information, and nowhere is it so accessible. The "unfriendlies" use it as one of the principal arenas for the East-West conflict, and the United States reciprocates in kind. The "friendlies" feel free to settle their scores with opponents exiled in Washington. The spying is pervasive and unceasing. And all signs are that there is more to come in increasingly sophisticated ways. Espionage in Washington is the latest growth industry. □

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Did U.S. Sacrifice Double Agent? Wife Asks

By Tom Wurtli
Journal Staff Writer

A 37-year-old Northern Virginia woman will file a lawsuit next month in a long-shot effort to get the FBI to tell her what happened to her Soviet-born, double agent husband who vanished more than three years ago while on a dangerous assignment in Austria.

"It's not likely that anything new will turn up," Dr. Shadrin said this week in an interview at her home in McLean. "But I must grasp at straws. And Flynn apparently does have some information about Nick."

Dr. Shadrin, a dentist who practices in her home, has been trying to find out what happened to Nicholas since the night of Dec. 20, 1975, when he vanished in Vienna while on his way to a meeting with Soviet Intelligence (KGB) agents.

But she has received nothing but silence or unpolite replies from the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the White House and the Soviets. Today, she's convinced that much of the

information given her is misleading or just plain false.

Dr. Shadrin's lawyer, 37-year-old Richard D. Copaken of the prestigious Covington and Burling firm in Washington, will fly with her to London in March. It was Copaken who was first contacted by Flynn or his associates in August 1977, more than 19 months after Shadrin's disappearance but, significantly, only a month after the story first broke in the press.

The Australian, who is now in London's Grim Brixton prison, apparently indicated to Copaken that he had definite knowledge of the counterespionage whereabouts. But despite lengthy negotiations and payment of thousands of dollars, Flynn produced nothing. Although Flynn may turn out to be merely a


confidence man, both Dr. Shadrin and her lawyer are convinced that he has some knowledge of the missing double agent. They note that in the first phone call to Copaken, Flynn or his associates revealed certain information which was known only to Dr. Shadrin, her husband and the lawyer.

"Where did he find out this information?" Eva Shadrin asked. "Perhaps this will come out at the trial."

The chances for a real break seem small, considering Flynn's background. Scotland Yard says the man has numerous aliases, and they aren't certain of his real name. His passport proved false and he reportedly left Australia owing more than \$1 million.

See DOUBLE AGENT, Page A6

Dr. Shadrin



Staff photo by Jim Tingstrum

Dr. Blanka Ewa Shadrin stands in the snow with her German shepherd, Trezor, in front of her McLean home.

Double Agent

From Page A1

But long shots are about all Dr. Shadrin has left now unless the top-level U.S. Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) comes up with some answers. That three-member panel agreed to review the case after extensive investigation by Copaken turned up hard evidence that the true facts about Shadrin's work as a double agent and his disappearance have not been made known.

The IOB probe began last April and reportedly is all but complete. The findings go to President Carter, who, Copaken hopes, will then meet with Dr. Shadrin.

Ewa Shadrin has worked unceasingly to crack the wall of official silence on her husband's case. She has met with many high authorities, including former President Ford. She has learned that former State Department chief Kissinger worked on the case, as did ex-CIA boss George Bush and other key U.S. intelligence figures.

But the results have been negative. And Dr. Shadrin now believes that her husband may have been deliberately sacrificed by top U.S. intelligence authorities who were trying to gain some strategic advantage in their never-ending, espionage war with the Soviets.

The almost unbelievable story began in Gdynia, Poland, 20 years ago when a dashing and brilliant Russian naval

officer whose name was then Nikolai Artamonov met a pretty Polish medical student, Ewa Gora. The pair fell in love and Artamonov, 20 years old and estranged from his wife in Russia, decided to defect to the west. Apparently, he had been contacted earlier by the CIA, although officials do not agree on this point.

Artamonov and his bride crossed the Baltic Sea to Sweden in a small boat and, after lengthy questioning, were accepted by the U.S. The naval officer was given a job with naval intelligence and a new name, too. His extensive knowledge of Soviet navy matters made him a valuable intelligence find.

Ewa Shadrin went to dental school on money provided by the U.S. government, and the couple bought a small home in Arlington. Later, after she graduated and was licensed to practice in Virginia, the Shadrins bought their present home in McLean. Nick personally installed the necessary equipment for her dental office.

It was about this time, 1966, that the FBI reportedly suggested that Nick become a so-called double agent if approaches were ever made to him by the Soviets. Oddly enough, just 10 days after the FBI "suggestion," a known KGB agent stopped Shadrin at a bus stop at Lee Highway and Harrison Street in Arlington and proposed such an arrangement.

Shadrin had serious misgivings about getting involved in such a dangerous business, his wife said, but felt pressured by both the CIA and the FBI. He finally agreed to work for the Russians.

For the next nine years, Shadrin carried out orders for the Soviet KGB and the U.S. government as he worked in a dental office in Arlington. He was ordered to Vienna by the Soviets, supposedly to provide very important secret agent

once and was asked to meet them again on Dec. 20. He left the Bristol Hotel at 6:30 p.m. on that date and hasn't been seen or heard from since.

Attorney Copaken, in a letter to President Carter, a copy of which was shown the *Journal* by Dr. Shadrin, said he believes his client has been "the victim of a disinformation campaign by agencies of the U.S. government since the disappearance of her husband."

He noted that U.S. officials tried to create the impression that KGB agents were responsible for Shadrin's double agent status. Actually, the lawyer stated, evidence shows it was our intelligence people who pressured him to assume the counterspy role.

Copaken also alluded to alleged lack of protection provided Shadrin on his dangerous Vienna mission. "Protective surveillance" was apparently ordered by U.S. intelligence officials, then canceled at the last minute by the FBI. The lawyer called this "gross negligence or wanton recklessness."

Dr. Shadrin's long battle for the truth has been costly. Her legal fees alone total more than \$200,000. The U.S. government originally agreed to pay for legal counsel after Nick's disappearance. But after the first story on the affair appeared in the press in July 1977, the payments stopped.

Rep. Joseph Fisher (D-10th Dist.) is preparing a bill that would instruct the government to pay Dr. Shadrin's legal expense.

Nick Shadrin still alive? If not, what happened to him and who is responsible?

Perhaps some clues as to the true story of his disappearance may emerge in a diary south London court next month. Or the Intelligence Oversight Board may shed some light

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By Tom Wuri
Journal Staff Writer

A 41-year-old Northern Virginia woman will fly to London next month in a long-shot effort to find out what happened to her Soviet-born, double agent husband who vanished more than three years ago while on a dangerous mission in Austria.

The latest chapter in a bizarre tale of international espionage involving the U.S. and the Soviet Union will unfold March 12 when Dr. Blanka Ewa Shadrin testifies as a prosecution witness in the trial of Australian Walter Flynn. Flynn is accused of obtaining several thousand dollars from Dr. Shadrin after promising to locate her missing husband, Nicholas.

"It's not likely that anything new will turn up," Dr. Shadrin said this week in an interview at her home in McLean. "but I must grasp at straws. And Flynn apparently does have some information about Nick."

Dr. Shadrin, a dentist who practices in her home, has been trying to find out what happened to Nicholas since the night of Dec. 20, 1975, when he vanished in Vienna while on his way to a meeting with Soviet intelligence (KGB) agents.

But she has received nothing but silence or unresponsive replies from the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the White House and the Soviets. Today, she's convinced that much of the information given her is misleading or just plain false.

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The Australian, who is now in London's grim Brixton prison, apparently indicated to Copaken that he had definite knowledge of the counterspy's whereabouts. But despite lengthy negotiations and payment of thousands of dollars, Flynn produced nothing.

Although Flynn may turn out to be merely a confidence man, both Dr. Shadrin and her lawyer are convinced that he has some knowledge of the missing double agent. They note that in the first phone call to Copaken, Flynn or his associates revealed certain information which was known only to Dr. Shadrin, her husband and the lawyer.

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For the next nine years, Shadrin carried out orders for the Soviet KGB and kept the U.S. informed as to what he was doing. In 1975 he was ordered to Vienna by the Soviets, supposedly to meet a very important secret agent who would be operating in the U.S.

Nicholas and Ewa Shadrin flew to Vienna on Dec. 17 for what she thought was a skiing trip with some business, too. Shadrin met with KGB agents once and was asked to meet them again on Dec. 20. He left the Bristol Hotel at 6:30 p.m. on that date and hasn't been seen or heard from since.

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Is Nick Shadrin still alive? If not, what happened to him and who is responsible?

Perhaps some clues as to the true story of his disappearance may emerge in a dingy south London courtroom next month. Or the Intelligence Oversight Board may shed some light on the mystery.

If not, the answers sought so long by Ewa Shadrin may be buried forever.

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Article appeared
on page A-26

THE WASHINGTON POST
30 March 1979

Around the World



London Trial

LONDON—A 45-year-old Briton was sentenced to 18 months in jail for having swindled the wife of a missing CIA double-agent by leading her to believe he would put her in touch with her husband, Nicholas George Shadrin.

William Joseph Flynn, a former millionaire land speculator in Australia, had been charged with swindling Eva Shadrin, of McLean, Va., after he initiated a series of telephone calls to her lawyer in 1977.

Flynn received less than \$3,000 from Mrs. Shadrin and from the FBI, which provided cash payments in an effort to check Flynn's claim that Shadrin was "alive and well and living in a Western country."

Shadrin disappeared in Vienna, Austria, on Dec. 20, 1975, after having established contact with Soviet intelligence agents, under the supervision of the CIA.

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last we have the
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ent missing," the
re remarked -

reg Walter
to The Inspector

NDON — The case involving
am Joseph Flynn, a British con
convicted here last week of
ting the wife of a missing CIA
t, often sounded like a James
d fiction.

at this case was real, and before
n its course, both the defense
a key prosecution witness had
her impugned the reputation of

ynn, 45, was sentenced to 18
ths in prison for having cheated
Shadrin of McLean, Va., of \$1.
part of the payment she made
information he supplied about
husband, Nicholas George Shad-
a Russian defector who became
ounterspy for the agency and who
steriously disappeared late in
5.

he agency's image was not en-
nced when Richard D. Copaken,
s. Shadrin's Washington lawyer,
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empt to find the missing agent.
'At best," Copaken said at Flynn's
al, "the CIA was being entirely
different, at worst, downright
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He testified that at one point he
ieved that Flynn was perhaps
rt of some complicated "CIA dis-
ormation campaign" meant to
islead Mrs. Shadrin in her search
r her husband.

The trial was no less bizarre than
e whole affair.

The Shadrins — he, the onetime
ptain of a Soviet naval vessel, and
a student he fell in love
and — defected in 1959 at
e invitation of the CIA. He had a
ccession of government jobs in
ashington and eventually became
double agent, operating as a Soviet
y while the FBI and CIA kept in
lose contact with him.

Five days before Christmas in 1975,
Shadrin disappeared. He had gone to
Vienna for a rendezvous with agents
of the Soviet secret police, the KGB.

The disappearance was disclosed
in July 1977 by the Wall Street Jour-
nal, and Shadrin's story briefly be-
came a central topic of the American
news media.

On Aug. 5, 1976, Copaken received
a telephone call in his office from a
man who called himself "Benson"
and offered help in locating the
missing agent.

"Benson" told Copaken to place an
ad in the International Herald Tri-
bune, published in Paris, that would
say that "Harry wants bank notes of
17th Century origin" and would list
an unpublished phone number. The
caller said that someone named "Ag-
new" might see the ad and call the
number. If so, Copaken was instruct-
ed to assure "Agnew" that the mes-
sage was valid by telling him that
"the man who gave you his name is
the same man he (Shadrin) once
gave a bottle of vodka to with a little
plant growing out of it."

There was an implication that "Ag-
new" had seen Shadrin in Zurich,
Switzerland, less than a week after
Shadrin's disappearance.

Copaken, who was scarcely naive,
took the bait, he later said, because
of three references in caller's over-
ture.

"The mathematical chances of
(his) coming up with the informa-
tion he gave me as Benson in that
first telephone call are just about
one in 120 million," Copaken said.

He testified that the three key
items were the use of the name Ben-
son, a reference to vodka and the use
of the nickname Nicky in speaking
of the missing Shadrin.

Mrs. Shadrin said in an interview
that Copaken had read too much into
the call — though she and her hus-
band had once known someone
named Benson, and Shadrin had
favored a brand of vodka that con-
tained a twig — but that she had
agreed to hite pursuit of the lead
because "I would never be able to
sleep at night if I did not try every
way to find my husband."

The prosecutor in Knightsbridge
Crown Court here pictured that
opening phone call as the gambit
that led to a whole succession of
mysterious encounters involving
Copaken and Flynn. From various
parts of Europe, "Agnew" kept
stringing Copaken along with tidbits
about Shadrin's being alive and well,
of Shadrin's being anxious to return
to his wife, of Shadrin's fearing CIA
retribution. Naturally, "Agnew"

needed expense money to pay for the
clusive Shadrin, Mrs. Shadrin pro-
vided it.

After six weeks of all that, Cop-
aken had had enough. With consider-
able persistence and some luck, he
was able to trace Flynn to Saint-Jean-
Cap-Ferrat on the French Riviera. As
the con man kept playing his game,
Copaken brought the FBI in on the
matter. In February 1978, as he
cashed a bank draft in London,
Flynn was detained by Scotland
Yard.

Flynn's defense counsel, Desmond
DeSilva, a stately and sometimes
theatrical gentleman from Sri Lan-
ka, managed at the trial here to
make the sounds, "Eff-Bee-Dye" and
"See-Eye-Yayyyyyy," sound like epi-
thets of a distasteful sort.

DeSilva stressed the almost fiction-
al nature of the world his client
inhabited and strongly suggested
that Flynn had merely been "an
unwitting tool of the See-Eye-
Yayyyyyy."

1 APR 79

age 4

Con man's tale 'beats' Le Carré'

by GREG WALTER and JACK CROSSLEY

TO SCOTLAND YARD it was a simple case of a con man cheating a woman of money.

But during a gruelling three-week trial at Knightsbridge Crown Court, London, the jury listened to evidence of agonising complexity which unravelled a real-life spy story involving the CIA, the KGB, the FBI, double agents, triple agents, a couple of US Presidents and Mr Brezhnev.

It is best to begin as far back as 1959, when Nicholas Shadrin, commander of a Russian destroyer, defected to the West with his girl friend, Eva. He was considered a prize catch by the CIA and was made a consultant to the US Navy. He married Eva and they settled happily into bourgeois Washington.

In 1966 a double agent named Igor, who was feeding KGB secrets to the US, told the CIA he would get promotion (and access to bigger and better secrets) if he could recruit Shadrin into the KGB.

The CIA persuaded a reluctant Shadrin to offer his services to the KGB, and for nine years the Americans provided him with enough classified information to keep the KGB happy. In December, 1975, Shadrin's KGB masters ordered him to Vienna and he has not been seen since.

Eva Shadrin accuses the CIA of throwing her husband to the wolves after he had ceased to be useful to them. She says the CIA and FBI should have kept Nicholas under more careful surveillance and prevented the KGB from kidnapping him.

The story might have ended there if Mrs Shadrin had not been determined to find out what happened to her husband. She hired a Washington lawyer, Richard D. Copaken, and they got both the Ford and Carter Administrations to press the Russians for information. Ford asked Brezhnev, who denied accusations of a Soviet kidnapping.

US officials said Shadrin was probably dead in a Soviet prison and when the story leaked into the American press in June, 1977,

there were allegations of CIA and FBI bungling. It was even suggested Shadrin might have been a Soviet plant all along—a triple agent, in fact—and his disappearance was a clumsy Russian way of bringing him in from the cold.

When the story broke, a globe-trotting confidence trickster, Joseph Flynn recognised an opportunity of making a fast buck.

Flynn is a London-born entrepreneur who made and spent a fortune in Australia selling holiday homes. He was known as 'Goldfinger' there, because of his penchant for collecting gold, Lincoln Continentals and beautiful women. He cruised around in his yacht, 'The Goldfinger.'

Fantasy tale

But by August, 1977, Flynn was reduced to skipping yachts. He made a transatlantic phone call to Copaken and concocted a fantasy tale of his knowledge of espionage networks, claiming he had information which would help to locate Shadrin.

Copaken arranged for Flynn to pick up \$3,000 in Monaco and told the CIA. The CIA told the FBI and the FBI told the French secret police.

Flynn was picked up by the French and stuck to his story. He agreed to go to London and take an FBI lie-detector test, held in a bedroom of the Intercontinental Hotel. He failed the test but per-

suaded the FBI to pay his return air fare, London to Vienna, in a phoney attempt to trace Shadrin. Flynn spent the Christmas holiday enjoying Vienna's bars and restaurants, receiving \$100-a-day expenses from the FBI.

Eventually, Flynn says, an impatient FBI agent roughed him up a little and accused him of being a KGB spy. Flynn fled to London and rang Copaken for more money. Copaken sent him about 2,000 dollars in instalments and told Scotland Yard.

Det. Inspector Wally Whyte recognised a con man when he saw one and did the simple thing. 'I nicked him,' he said.

Flynn spent 14 months in custody awaiting trial, and during the three-week hearing (costing some £100,000) Copaken said the CIA's attitude to the search had been 'at best entirely indifferent. At worst, downright deceitful.'

When a beautiful witness was called to give evidence, Judge Phelan remarked: 'Ah, the femme fatale.'

There was room for humour as the murky, and sometimes farcical, world of secret agents was exposed in the court room. But Judge Phelan underlined the reality at the end of the trial when he told Flynn: 'You have preyed most callously upon the desolation of that desperate woman.'

Flynn, 45, was jailed for 18 months.

10 JUN 79

Top-secret notebook found on Paisley's boat

By Tom Nugent and Steve Parks

Staff Correspondents

Washington—A CIA "red-line" telephone notebook—containing top-secret numbers of American spies—was among the effects left by John Arthur Paisley, the high-ranking intelligence officer who allegedly committed suicide last September.

Maryland State Police and Mr. Paisley's wife say that the notebook contained numbers and names in his own handwriting. The book bore a strip of red tape along its outside left edge—a CIA marking which indicates that it must never leave agency headquarters and must be kept in a safe.

The notebook contained top-secret telephone numbers which connected with American intelligence-gathering operatives, according to Central Intelligence Agency sources who have examined it and Senate Intelligence Committee investigators who also learned that the notebook was found among Mr. Paisley's possessions.

The notebook was discovered in a briefcase full of papers, recovered from Mr. Paisley's boat, the 34-foot sloop Brillig, a few days after a body said to be Mr. Paisley's was found floating in the Chesapeake Bay last October 1.

The Maryland State Police confirmed that they looked at the red-line book, but pointed out that the briefcase in which it was contained already had been handled by several people by the time they arrived on the scene to investigate the circumstances surrounding the discovery of the body. The first people to board the boat were two United States coast guardsmen, who had been called to the scene of the abandoned Brillig, and representatives of

the CIA, who were notified by the Coast Guard.

The State Police, therefore, while confirming that they found the phone book in the briefcase, do not dismiss the possibility that it might have been planted there.

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• Mr. Paisley regularly interrogated both dissident emigrants and political defectors from the Soviet Union—questioning, among others, a former KGB agent, Yuri Nosenko, and Capt. Nicholas Shadrin, a defector from the Soviet Navy—in an effort to locate possible Soviet intelligence operatives within the ranks of dissidents or to sniff out double agents among the defectors.

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Several other agency sources have confirmed the questioning of both Mr. Nosenko and Captain Shadrin. In addition, Eva Shadrin, the wife of the Soviet naval officer (he disappeared while walking through a public square in Vienna in 1975) said Wednesday that her husband in recent years had moored his sailboat at tiny Solomons Island, Md., on the Chesapeake Bay.

John Paisley also moored his sailboat—the Brillig—at Solomons. It was from this mooring, owned by Col. Norman Wilson, said to be the last man to communicate with Mr. Paisley, that he set sail last September 24 on the voyage that ended in his disappearance and alleged suicide.

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CONTINUED

...in the ...
...place in ...
...by agents for the ...
...part ...
...CIA ...
...to become a ...
...to provide information to the Soviet Union on the subject of the U.S. negotiating position at the talks. Mr. Paisley immediately reported the contact to his superiors in the CIA, and was advised to "take the pitch," according to sources.

Mr. Paisley, sources said, subsequently fed information to the KGB about the United States fallback position in the SALT negotiations and about how the U.S. intended to "cheat" on SALT. It is not known whether Mr. Paisley fed the Russians accurate information or "disinformation," as deliberate misinformation is known in the intelligence world.

Mr. Paisley apparently was involved, about five years ago, in an extraordinarily complicated, agency-wide search for a well-entranced Soviet double-agent, or "mole," who had penetrated the highest levels of the CIA command.

That search, which reportedly culminated in a byzantine operation called "Kitty Hawk" focused on secret communications in which both the CIA and the KGB regularly contacted Captain Shadrin, Mr. Nosenko, and two other KGB defectors—a spy named Klimov (his name was later changed to Anatoly Golitsyn) and another, known as "Igor," whose last name is believed to have been Kubkov.

While the complicated series of counterintelligence maneuvers that produced Kitty Hawk has not yet been made clear, it is known that Captain Shadrin, who had defected to the West from the Soviet Union in 1959, was approached by KGB operatives, reportedly in 1966, and asked to "double"—to begin supplying the Russians with intelligence information.

Captain Shadrin reported the contact to his superior, Adm. Rufus Taylor, of the naval intelligence section of the Defense Intelligence Agency. Admiral Taylor, who died a few weeks before Mr. Paisley's disappearance last year, conferred with James Jesus Angleton, then head of the CIA's Counter-Intelligence Division. Mr. Angleton advised Admiral Taylor to persuade the Russian defector to take the pitch.

Captain Shadrin did. According to sources, he began feeding the Russians disinformation from a variety of CIA sources. It is believed, however, that one of these sources might have been the "mole"—and that the disinformation which he was providing might have been coded, thus re-establishing a link which had been broken by National Security Agency de-coders in the early 1970's.

From 1972 to 1974, a study was done within the CIA on who the mole might be. A report was put on the desk of the then-director of central intelligence, William Colby.

...of ...
...Mr. Paisley's ...
...the nature of the work he was doing for the agency in recent years. These include:

• The first document the U.S. Coast Guard found after boarding the *Enlil* last September 25. According to Mrs. Paisley, it was a badge marked "Washington Post Agent No. [followed by a three-digit number]". The Coast Guard immediately called the Post, and was told that the newspaper did not have an "agent" named Mr. Paisley on its payroll.

Some agency sources believe that Mr. Paisley—in his role as deputy chief of the CIA Office of Strategic Research—may have been charged with collecting and collating the disinformation which was provided to the Russians and fed back by the U.S. during operation Kitty Hawk. These sources also suggest that Mr. Paisley might have been analyzing the wording of the information provided by the CIA sources—in order to unravel the code, and thus unearth the mole.

"Paisley may have gotten caught in the middle," suggests one intelligence source. "Maybe he learned who the mole was. Or maybe he stumbled across some piece of information which might have led to the mole—and which made him an instant liability."

There is some other evidence to suggest that Mr. Paisley was deeply involved in counterintelligence work—and perhaps in a search for a mole—at the time of his death.

Mrs. Paisley reports that James Angleton asked her to meet him in a bar, a few months after her husband's death. "He came in wearing a black trenchcoat, a hat pulled down low over his eyes, and carrying a newspaper under his arm," she says.

"He walked past my table, circled the entire bar, sat down at a table and then beckoned me over.

"He said he had only two questions to ask me. He wanted to know which CIA operatives John had known during his time at the Imperial War College in London, for one thing."

Mrs. Paisley refuses to permit Mr. Angleton's second question to be printed, claiming that it is "too sensitive."

According to agency sources, Mr. Paisley had several meetings—as late as last August, about a month before his disappearance—with the current director of central intelligence, Adm. Starsfield Turner. Admiral Turner consistently has minimized Mr. Paisley's role within the agency since the body, identified as Mr. Paisley's, first surfaced.

Investigators at the U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee, who have refused to accept an earlier FBI finding which characterized Mr. Paisley's death as an apparent suicide, have confirmed that their continuing investigation focuses on certain counterintelligence activities in which they believe Mr. Paisley to have been involved.

10 JUN 79

Top-secret notebook found on Paisley's boat

By TOM NUGENT and STEVE PARKS
Sun Staff Correspondents

Washington—A CIA "red-line" telephone notebook—containing top-secret numbers of American spies—was among the effects left by John Arthur Paisley, the high-ranking intelligence officer who allegedly committed suicide last September.

Maryland State Police and Mr. Paisley's wife say that the notebook contained numbers and names in his own handwriting. The book bore a strip of red tape along its outside left edge—a CIA marking which indicates that it must never leave agency headquarters and must be kept in a safe.

The notebook contained top-secret telephone numbers which connected with American intelligence-gathering operatives, according to Central Intelligence Agency sources who have examined it and Senate Intelligence Committee investigators who also learned that the notebook was found among Mr. Paisley's possessions.

The notebook was discovered in a briefcase full of papers, recovered from Mr. Paisley's boat, the 34-foot sloop Brillig, a few days after a body said to be Mr. Paisley's was found floating in the Chesapeake Bay last October 1.

The Maryland State Police confirmed that they looked at the red-line book, but pointed out that the briefcase in which it was contained already had been handled by several people by the time they arrived on the scene to investigate the circumstances surrounding the discovery of the body. The first people to board the boat were two United States coast guardsmen, who had been called to the scene of the abandoned Brillig, and representatives of

the CIA, who were notified by the Coast Guard.

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Spy Wars

Experts Fear That U.S. Loses Espionage Battle With the Soviet Union

They Say Russians Penetrate CIA Security; New Reins Could Further Hurt U.S.

Moles in a Hall of Mirrors

By DAVID BENATIS

Special Contributor of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
WASHINGTON - The Central Intelligence Agency's station chief in Kathmandu, Nepal, some years ago asked to invite his local counterpart in Soviet military intelligence over to the house for dinner.

It wasn't idle socializing. The CIA officer was trying to recruit the Soviet official to spy for the U.S. The Russian, a military officer named Pecherov, happily accepted the invitation. For Mr. Pecherov was also going to recruit the CIA's man. In the end, the Kathmandu affair proved to be a stalemate.

Every day, around the world, such espionage games are being played out between U.S. and Soviet intelligence services. These spying operations can become crucial when a U.S.-Soviet crisis arises, such as the current contention over Soviet troops in Cuba. But even when relations are calm, both sides are quietly working to place "moles," penetration agents, within the opposing spy service, and to pry loose the other side's most vital secrets.

What concerns many U.S. intelligence experts is growing evidence that the Russians have been winning this covert war. They cite examples of an aggressive Soviet espionage effort that over the years has compromised U.S. spy-satellite technology, penetrated CIA security and subverted the agency's operations. These experts contend that CIA controls on U.S. counterintelligence, which have been discussed by Congress, could further weaken U.S. defenses against Soviet spies.

"I'm worried that the thread will keep unraveling until there isn't any sweater left," says former CIA director Richard Helms.

Dangers of Soviet Intelligence

Current CIA officials won't discuss the Soviet spy threat in any detail, but former intelligence officials describe a series of cases that, in their view, illustrate the dangers of Soviet intelligence to U.S. security.

A Soviet mole, code-named Sasna, once paraded his way into the CIA's "Soviet Desk" division, these intelligence officials say. The existence of such a mole was mentioned by several Soviet defectors, but investigators here could never make a final determination about his identity. One prime suspect is a former Russian-born agent for the CIA who was based in Berlin during the 1950s and who helped train U.S. spies who were sent into the Soviet Union. The man was later photographed entering the Soviet embassy here. But he was never formally charged by the U.S., and he now lives in Virginia as an American citizen.

Soviet spies have recently obtained some of the most precious U.S. secrets—including details about America's methods of verifying Soviet compliance with the strategic arms-limitation treaty—by bribing disaffected young Americans. Last year, a young man who had worked briefly for the CIA was convicted for selling the Russians a manual describing a top-secret U.S. spy-satellite system, known as the Kibitz. And in 1977, a former employe of TRW Inc. was convicted for selling the Russians information about classified TRW projects. Intelligence officials fear he may have revealed U.S. systems for monitoring Soviet missile development.

CIA operations within the Soviet Union in recent years have been hamstrung by blown covers and by Soviet deception. In July 1977, the Russians grabbed a CIA officer named Martha Peterson as she was planting a cache of equipment for a CIA agent in Moscow. Several prominent intelligence experts wonder whether the Russians were tipped off about Miss Peterson's mission by a mole within the CIA. These former intelligence officials also believe that during 1975 and 1976, the CIA was duped into recruiting as an agent a supposedly dissident Soviet doctor, named Sanya Lipavsky, who was actually under Soviet control.

Soviet spies have infiltrated the United Nations Secretariat, according to Soviet defector Arkady N. Shevchenko. Mr. Shevchenko, who was a prominent Soviet diplomat at the UN until he defected last year, told a British interviewer recently that the UN has become "the most important base of all Soviet intelligence operations in the world." He contends, for example, that a Soviet special assistant to UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim is a Soviet mole and that the chief of personnel at the UN's offices in Geneva is also a "high level" Soviet intelligence officer.

The Russians also may have placed an agent within the Federal Bureau of Investigation, according to the late William S. Ryan, who served for many years as chief FBI counterintelligence. In a recently published book written before he died, Mr. Ryan said that when he left the bureau in 1971, he was convinced that a "Russian spy in the FBI's New York office had blown cover of a major FBI counterintelligence operation."

These and other examples, intelligence experts say, attest to the skill of the principal Soviet spy service, the KGB. Says R. Helms, the former CIA director: "You can say what you like about the Russians; their agricultural system doesn't work, that they're too bureaucratic. But there's one country in the world that understands intelligence better. The KGB is a damned good organization."

The KGB's recent success stories leave some U.S. intelligence people to wonder whether the CIA and the FBI are equal to the challenge. Both U.S. agencies have been battered by public criticism in the last several years for past misdeeds, and morale especially at the CIA—is sagging. What more, many intelligence officials fear, is the public's aversion to the agencies' use of dirty tricks and secret snooping could lead Congress to enact a new legislative charter for U.S. intelligence that would place excessively severe limits on FBI and CIA activities. (Such counterintelligence legislation would supplement the FBI's new charter.)

These officials maintain that such criticized methods as wiretaps and mail openings may be necessary to crack certain spy operations. They cite as an example what the FBI believes is a KGB network of so-called illegal agents that may be operating within the U.S., handling such sensitive intelligence chores as recruiting informers to work inside U.S. defense contractors. Unlike "legal" KGB officers, who typically are in the U.S. under Soviet diplomatic cover, these "illegal" agents usually hold passports from various countries.

Critics of the FBI contend that the agency didn't have much luck combating such "illegals" even when it could bug offices and open mail of suspects.

The spy war is further complicated by what former intelligence officers contend: a pattern of Soviet "disinformation"—planted by the KGB to confuse and demoralize U.S. intelligence. The CIA, of course, tries similar ploys, with some success. A CIA official even boasted, years ago, of the agency's ability to plant stories around the world and play the press like a "mighty Wurlitzer."

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...of a larger, sinister puzzle. In the case of the Soviet mole Sasha, for nearly 10 years, the man suspected of spying for the Russians under this name has been living in a Virginia suburb of Washington, neatly managing a small business with his wife. By his own account, he was one of the CIA's "best men in operations" while he was a contract agent, handling some of the Agency's most sensitive spy missions from his base in West Berlin.

Was this man actually a Soviet agent? He denies the allegation. And the FBI, despite months of interrogation, has never been able to reach a final conclusion. The case file on him remains open; one former intelligence official says sardonically that he doubts the case will be resolved "until the KGB has a freedom-of-information act." Meanwhile, any judgments about Sasha's true identity must hinge on the interpretation of a strange series of interlocking cases.

The existence of a Soviet mole with the code name Sasha was first mentioned in 1962 by a KGB defector named Anatoli Golitsin. Mr. Golitsin had heard tales from his former colleagues in the KGB about Sasha's exploits, and he thought this Sasha had worked as a contract agent for the CIA in West Germany. But he wasn't sure of the man's identity.

Suspicious of a Plant

Two years later, Sasha was mentioned by another KGB defector, named Yuri Nosenko, but Mr. Nosenko's information about Sasha pointed in an entirely different direction, away from any relationship with the CIA. Mr. Nosenko's version came to be doubted by CIA officials, after analyzing many of his statements, suspected that he was a Soviet plant.

Then, in 1966, a third KGB official, who called himself Igor, contacted the CIA while he was on temporary assignment in Washington—offering to serve as a CIA mole within the KGB. According to one account, Igor did more than simply identify Sasha as the former contract agent living in Virginia: He said that because this man was a prized "ideological" agent (as opposed to a crass mercenary one), the KGB hoped to arrange his defection from the U.S. to Russia.

Igor even helped provide hard evidence. He told his interrogators that if the FBI checked its records of surveillance at the Soviet embassy in Washington, it would find a photograph of Sasha entering the embassy by the back door. The FBI checked its files, and sure enough, there was a photo of the former agent who is living in Virginia. (The suspected Sasha concedes in an interview that he had visited the embassy, but he says his purpose there was innocent.)

The Russians never brought Sasha back home, and Igor never convinced some CIA officials that his offer to spy for the U.S. was genuine. Although the CIA maintained contact with him when he returned to Moscow, the Agency felt he should be treated with extreme caution.

(Despite these suspicions, the U.S. al-

ways identified him as a U.S. ... Mr. Stone was furious. This was ... in a series of stories that this ... been planning about him for nearly ... and it threatened to endanger hi ... and destroy his effectiveness in ... Mr. Stone discussed the matter with ... and Helms, then director of the CIA's ... destine service.

Hall of Mirrors

As these spy tales suggest, the world of intelligence sometimes resembles a hall of mirrors, where it is impossible to tell image from reality.

One intelligence expert says that it wasn't until 1968, for example, that U.S. officials had conclusive evidence that a Russian based in Istanbul who headed a supposedly anti-Soviet network during World War II—and passed voluminous military information to the German high command—was actually a KGB agent. If so, the Russians apparently were willing to jeopardize thousands of their soldiers to preserve the credibility of this agent—so that he could plant false information at a crucial moment.

The suspicion about Soviet intelligence activities can sometimes get out of hand, however. Some former CIA officials contend that happened during the 1950s, when a search for Soviet moles within the CIA nearly paralyzed the agency's own intelligence-gathering operations.

The web of internal suspicion had become so tight at the agency by the late 1960s, one CIA official remembers, that direct permission was required from the head of the agency's clandestine service simply to arrange a letter drop for an agent in Moscow. "We were so convinced that everything was controlled by the KGB that we never had the heart to start anything," this official recalls. The Russians, he says, were viewed as "10 feet tall" and "too smart for us."

Former CIA Director William Colby argues that excessive counterintelligence worries were hindering the CIA's effectiveness. "Every director was doubted, every potential agent was doubted," he remembers.

Despite all the intrigue and suspicions, there apparently are certain rules to be followed in the spy business. Howard "Rocky" Stone, the CIA officer who tried to recruit his Soviet counterpart in Katmandu, discovered that such rules can be enforced when necessary. While he was stationed in Nepal, Mr. Stone took a vacation with his wife to Bombay, India, to attend a Catholic Eucharistic conference. When he arrived in Bombay, he found his name plastered across the cover of an Indian magazine called Blitz,

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...и коллектив, обслуживающий паровозы на Кузбшевской железной дороге. В 1954 году коллектив выполнил до 154 тысяч километров, превысив норму больше чем в три раза. За год проведена 81 техническая работа.

В 1954 году исполнилось четыре года работы на паровозе «Л-1215». За это время сэкономлено для государства около полутора миллиона рублей.

Отряды отмечают, что высокие эксплуатационные показатели достигли в 1953 году многие паровозные бригады нашего лесо Киселев. За год паровозники лесо провели около трех тысяч километров поездок.

Передовые приемки работы широко рас-

...подъемного пробора паровозов; наоборот, она перевыполняется. Возле него тяжеловесных поездов приобрело массовый характер.

Вместе со всем коллективом Кузбшевской магистрали мы будем бороться за досрочное выполнение пятилетнего плана, за дальнейшее ускорение и удешевление перевозок, за быстрое продвижение грузов стрелкам, промышленности, сельскому хозяйству, товаров народного потребления — для населения.

И. П. ТАРАСЕНКО,
старший машинист паровоза «Л-1215», лесо Киселев.

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
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STAT

ADD 1 DEFECTION (001-100)

HE SAID THE RUSSIAN DEFLECTOR LEFT HIS WEST IN JUNE, 1959, WHILE TRAINING INDONESIAN MILITARY PERSONNEL IN THE OPERATION OF HIS DESTROYER AT GDYNIA, POLAND.

IN HIS STATEMENT ARTAMONOV SAID THAT HE FELT OBLIGED TO POINT OUT IN ADVANCE OF SOVIET PREMIER NIKITA S. KHRUSHCHEV'S APPEARANCE BEFORE THE UNITED NATIONS THAT SOVIET MILITARY STRATEGY IS INCONSISTENT WITH KHRUSHCHEV'S PRONOUNCEMENT ON DISARMAMENT.

"HE (KHRUSHCHEV) SAID HE WAS GOING TO TALK ABOUT DISARMAMENT," ARTAMONOV SAID.

HOWEVER, ARTAMONOV SAID, SOVIET STRATEGY SINCE FEBRUARY, 1955, HAS BEEN BASED ON THE DOCTRINE OF SURPRISE ATTACK IN NUCLEAR WARFARE.

"THIS DOCTRINE WAS ESTABLISHED IN A SOVIET MILITARY PUBLICATION WHICH IS KNOWN ONLY TO OFFICERS OF CLAS RANK AND ABOVE," THE FORMER SOVIET OFFICER SAID. "SEVERAL TIMES OVER THE PAST FOUR YEARS IT HAS BEEN SAID AGAIN AND IT HAS NEVER BEEN CHANGED."

HE SAID THE DOCTRINE WAS OBVIOUSLY PRESENTED TO THE HIGH RANKING SOVIET OFFICERS TO PREPARE THEM "FOR THE STARTING OF SUCH A WAR BY THE SOVIET UNION. . . . SENIOR SOVIET OFFICER BELIEVES THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL ATTACK FIRST." ARTAMONOV ADDED THAT KHRUSHCHEV DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT THE UNITED STATES THROUGH EVOLUTION WILL BECOME A SOCIALIST STATE.

IN WARNING AGAINST THE SOVIET DICTATORSHIP, THE WITNESS SAID, "MAKE NO MISTAKE THEY ARE NOT SEEKERS, NOT POLITICAL IDEALISTS."

ALTHOUGH ARTAMONOV'S RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS DEMONSTRATED THAT HE HAS SOME KNOWLEDGE OF RUSSIAN, HE HAD SET FORTH HIS VIEWS IN A PREPARED STATEMENT WHICH WAS READ BY AN INTERPRETER. ARTAMONOV SAID THAT HE DEFECTED BECAUSE HE PERSONALLY CONCLUDED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT'S INTERNATIONAL POLITICS WERE AGAINST THE INTEREST OF "MY PEOPLE."

ARTAMONOV, WHO WAS BORN IN 1928 LONG AFTER THE COMMUNIST REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA, DESCRIBED HIMSELF AS A 100 PER CENT SOVIET CITIZEN OF THE "NEW GENERATION." TO USE WORDS HE CALLED "SOVIET POLITICAL -AGITATION -PROPOGANDA," ARTAMONOV SAID HE WAS ENFEEBLED BY "CAPITALIST BIRTHMARKS."

BEFORE PRESENTING ARTAMONOV AT A PUBLIC HEARING THE SUBCOMMITTEE QUESTIONED HIM BEHIND CLOSED DOORS. WALTER SAID THAT MUCH OF THIS (ARTAMONOV) MUST BE KEPT SECRET BECAUSE OF SECURITY REQUIREMENTS.

ARTAMONOV HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN INTERVIEWED BY AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS.

"HE DID NOT COME TO THE UNITED STATES," ARTAMONOV SAID IN HIS STATEMENT. "BECAUSE OF A FEW CONNECTIONS WITH FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE-- NONE."

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"NOR DID I MAKE THIS MOVE BECAUSE OF THREATS OF REPERCUSSION FOR SOMETHING I HAD DONE--

"ON THE CONTRARY, I HAD GIVEN FAVORED TREATMENT BY THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES AND HAD A BRIGHT FUTURE AHEAD OF ME--HAVING BEEN PUBLICLY DESCRIBED AS ONE OF THE BRILLIANT YOUNG CAREER OFFICERS OF THE SOVIET NAVY.

MY DEFECTION WAS ALSO NOT PROMPTED BY THE PROSPECT OF GREATER MATERIAL GAIN OR SECURITY OR AN EASY LIFE FOR I GAVE UP WHAT PROMISED TO BE A SUCCESSFUL CAREER IN THE SOVIET UNION TO COME HERE."

WALTER IN THAT CONNECTION SAID THE SOVIET MILITARY NEWSPAPER, RED STAR AND THE NEWSPAPER, SOVIET NAVY, HAD CARRIED ARTICLES CITING ARTAMONOV FOR OUTSTANDING PERFORMANCE AND LEADERSHIP BEFORE HIS DEFECTION.

ARTAMONOV SAID THAT HE BEGAN TO HAVE HIS FIRST DOUBTS ABOUT THE SOVIET SYSTEM AT THE CLOSE OF WORLD WAR II WHEN HE WAS ATTENDING A HIGHER NAVAL SCHOOL. NEVERTHELESS, HE SAID THAT HE STILL OFTEN ACTED AS DEFENDER OF PARTY POLICES IN ARGUMENTS WITH HIS FATHER AND FRIENDS. HE SAID THAT THE REVOLUTION IN HUNGARY AND THE UNREST IN POLAND CONVINCED HIM THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT'S FOREIGN POLICY WAS "AGGRESSIVE" AND ITS POLICY STATEMENTS "UNTRUE."

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