

9 November 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: PFIAB Meeting, 11 November 1987
1030 hours, Room 340 OEOB

TAB A Background on the Meeting. Attached is a memo from the Executive Assistant/Executive Director that provides some background on the questions PFIAB would like you to address, an explanation of the Board's agenda for its two-day session, a listing of CIA support to PFIAB during the 10 September-11 November period, and a listing of the Board members and staff.

TAB B Embassy Security: The Audit and Inspection Office. Although PFIAB would like to discuss how you envision specific operations of the Audit and Inspection Office, Bob Gates suggests you limit your comments to the process involved in studying and deciding upon the set-up of this office. Attached are talking points from [redacted] IC Staff, that provide a general description of the process -- these talking points will be a lot more valuable to you if you discuss them and the general subject of the Audit and Inspection function with [redacted] while you are at the Offsite Conference -- I understand the DDCI was planning such a meeting. Also attached for your reference is the Shultz/Webster letter, Anne Armstrong's letter to the President commenting on the Shultz/Webster letter, your response to the Armstrong letter, and the White House letter implementing recommendations from the Shultz/Webster letter.

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4 November 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, DCI/DDCI Executive Staff
FROM: Executive Assistant/EXDIR
SUBJECT: PFIAB Meeting, 11-12 November 1987

1. Gary Schmitt, the Executive Director of the PFIAB Staff, reports that Ambassador Armstrong and the Board would like to hear from the Judge on the status of the intelligence community's "embassy audit" recommended in PFIAB's recent overseas security study. The Board would also like an update

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2. Before the DCI appears, the Board will be hearing from the Naval Investigative Service on the status of its continuing investigation of the marine embassy guard force. After the Judge appears, the Board will hear from Herb Meyer (former Deputy Director, National Intelligence Council) on the NIE process and the "politicization" issue. After that, General Odum will update the Board on NSA activities (though this may evolve into a discussion of intelligence leaks), and Bob Lamb (Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security) will brief them on the rehabilitation of the old embassy building in Moscow. On 12 November, the Board will receive a status report from NASA

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in the wake of the Challenger disaster.

3. Attached is a rundown on things we have done for the PFIAB since the last meeting in September.

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Attachment:
As stated

cc: EA/DCI
EA/DDCI

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5 November 1987

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

Members

The Honorable Anne Armstrong, Chairman
Mr. Leo Cherne, Vice Chairman
Dr. William O. Baker
Dr. W. Glenn Campbell
Dr. John S. Foster, Jr.
The Honorable Jeane J. Kirkpatrick
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
General Bernard A. Schriever, USAF (Ret.)
The Honorable William French Smith
Senator John G. Tower
Dr. Albert D. Wheelon
Dr. James Q. Wilson
Professor Albert J. Wohlstetter

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Dr. Gary J. Schmitt, Executive Director
Dr. Robert L. Butterworth, Deputy Executive Director
Mr. Ryan Malarkey, Assistant Director
Miss Nina Stewart, Assistant Director
Mrs. Gwendolyn I. Watson, Administrative Officer
Mrs. Sandra Van Namee, Administrative Assistant

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WORKING PAPER
DCI/ICS 0972-87/1
6 November 1987

TALKING POINTS FOR DCI USE WITH PFIAB
Status of Foreign Mission Security Office

- o Too soon to be definitive about specifics of what Foreign Mission Security Office (FMSO) is to be and to do.
 - Work started in early October to flesh out concept contained in audit/inspections function paragraphs of joint letter on embassy security from SecState and me to President.
 - CIA Office of Security had already done first-cut at organization and personnel to implement PFIAB's recommended FMSO. Would be a heavy consumer of resources.
 - Colin Powell's Presidential Instruction dated 10/22 is the effective direction to proceed. (Attached) 25X1
- o Two actions in process.
 - Letter to heads of six concerned Congressional Committees in draft with objective of delivery this week (9-13 November). 25X1
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 - Working group preparing options on details of specific tasks for FMSO and its organization, report due Thanksgiving week. 25X1
- o Congressional reaction to what equates to a request for a supplemental will be very important and a bellwether because:
 - While too early to talk about the options, FMSO will:
 - Be expensive, partly because it is to be a new independent unit.
 - Be front-end loaded for same reason.
 - Be very difficult to staff because it needs people with skills already in very short supply. 25X1
- o Clear that FMSO cost and size will be function of the specific detailed tasks assigned to it and the frequency with which these tasks are to be performed.
 - e.g., if required to perform annual inspection on site of embassy plain text processing equipment (PTPE, i.e., Wang word processing system or IBM personal computer) two to three hundred man years per year will be required for that task alone. 25X1
- o Basic question still to be decided with the Congress, consequently, is "How thorough?" Do we cut cloth to fit pattern or cut pattern to fit cloth? 25X1
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SUBJECT: Talking Points for DCI Use With PFIAB



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D/CCISCMO/ICS:  (6 November 1987)

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

President's
Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board

August 31, 1987

Dear Bill:

Enclosed is a copy of a letter I sent to the President on August 28 regarding your proposed changes to enhance security at U.S. overseas missions. I wanted to be sure that you had a chance to read the Board's views directly.

Sincerely,



Anne Armstrong
Chairman

The Honorable William H. Webster
Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D. C. 20505

Enclosure

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Unclassified when Enclosure
is removed.

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ER 4184/2-87

The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D. C. 20505

September 4, 1987

The Honorable Anne Armstrong
Chairman, President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board
Room 340, Old Executive Office Building
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Anne:

Thanks for your letter of August 31st enclosing a copy of your August 28th letter to the President commenting on the August 3rd letter to the President signed by the Secretary of State and myself.

The so-called Shultz/Webster letter followed an NSPG meeting at which I had briefed the President on the Intelligence Community views on security at US overseas missions and at which Secretary Shultz expressed his strong views on correcting security deficiencies without impairment of his departmental responsibilities. It appeared at the close of the discussion that there were basically only two areas in which we were in disagreement, and the Secretary proposed that the two of us undertake to resolve competing interests so far as possible and to report back to the President. In the course of the discussions which followed, components of the Intelligence Community were kept informed of developments.

I will be out of the country when your board meets next week and will therefore be unable to join you. Bob Gates will represent me, but inasmuch as the discussions were between Secretary Shultz and myself I thought I should at least offer you my comments on your letter to the President.

1. State Department Security:

I do not believe that we misrepresented PFIAB's recommendation regarding the independence of the proposed Diplomatic Security Agency. Certainly no misrepresentation was intended. Our letter made clear that PFIAB envisaged a separate agency responsible to the Secretary of State. We proposed instead a senior-level executive position responsible directly to the Secretary of State as Director of Diplomatic Security. This approach had been discussed at the NSPG meeting

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and was not really an issue so long as there were no bureaucratic barriers between the Director of Diplomatic Security and the Secretary. As we were undertaking to resolve differences, no detailed effort was undertaken to define the other requirements and prerogatives of the Office. Secretary Shultz made it very clear that he wanted a strong and effective Office of Diplomatic Security. The details for achieving this within his own department seemed to me to be properly his responsibility.

2. Foreign Mission Security Office:

As you know, we studied the Laird and Schlesinger reports in addition to your own. The proposal for a Foreign Mission Security Office to set physical, technical and personnel security standards originated with PFIAB and was endorsed by the Intelligence Community. Secretary Shultz and I had some frank and trenchant discussions about achieving the goal of an office outside the Department of State which would set standards for security, monitor compliance and deal with noncompliance. Implicit in these discussions was the responsibility of the Secretary to manage the missions for the President. Secretary Shultz recognized the need for an outside agency. Our recommendation sought to, and I believe did, accommodate both legitimate interests. It was agreed that "the head of the unit should be named by and responsible to the DCI, who will report problems and recommendations to the Secretary of State for his action as the person responsible for the management of embassies and missions abroad." The unit would report to the Director of Central Intelligence and would not be a "de facto employee" of the Secretary of State. It seemed entirely reasonable to me, and important to Secretary Shultz, that he be given first opportunity to take corrective action. In the event that no such action were taken, the recommendation clearly permits an appeal to the President. You refer to this as "an unlikely course of action." I prefer to think that it would be more unlikely that the Secretary of State would ignore or reject the recommendations of the Foreign Mission Security Office and I can assure you I would have no hesitation in taking an appeal to the President if I believed his reasons for inaction were unfounded and detrimental to the national security. Certainly in his capacity as Secretary of State he would have an appeal to the President on any requirements made by the DCI should he deem them unreasonable or inimicable to the national interest, if the process was formulated in that manner.

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Finally, your letter incorrectly states that the Shultz/Webster letter "effectively upholds the Shultz position regarding the polygraph." Our letter made it very clear that "we have a difference of opinion on the issue of polygraphing" and that "the DCI believes that all personnel assigned to Moscow should be polygraphed."

The recommendations contained in our letter took into account the three principal reports and my earlier memorandum outlining the Intelligence Community perspective, as well as what was said at the NSPG meeting. These responses were necessarily constructed in a short timeframe and do not purport to deal with all engineering aspects of the various studies, including the PFIAB report, in specific detail. For example, the slicing recommendation of PFIAB was accepted by the Community as a desirable secondary approach. I doubt that there is sufficient data to warrant utilization of that technique as the primary method of protection. We all recognize the difficulty of mounting a removal and reconstruction operation in Moscow. This was our best sense of what was doable, but it would not surprise me if the actual detailed planning produced additional or alternative ways to improve technical security.

I appreciate very much your deep concern for a prompt and effective effort to correct the fundamental security problems facing US overseas missions. What is needed now is a program which has the full commitment of the interested departments and agencies and the endorsement and support of the Congress. Time is of the essence.

Sincerely,



William H. Webster

cc: Secretary of State
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

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9 November, 1987

TALKING POINTS FOR THE DIRECTOR

ANGOLA: MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

For the second time in three years UNITA and South African forces have defeated a major Angolan offensive aimed at the insurgents' southeastern stronghold. South Africa's assistance this year was greater than in past years and included the commitment of major ground forces to the fighting.

- Although the fighting continues, seasonal rains have begun, and the terrain will soon become unfavorable for large-scale military operations. Luanda will probably end up with no territorial gains and substantial loss of troops and equipment.

Following two years of extensive preparation, the Angolan government, in early July, launched an offensive aimed at taking the strategic insurgent base at Mavinga and cutting UNITA supply lines from the southeast to insurgent positions elsewhere in the country.

- Angolan government forces advanced along two major fronts: from Cuito Cuanavale toward Mavinga with a force of about 8,000 to 9,000; and from Lucusse to points south with about 3,000 troops.
- UNITA leader Savimbi's strategy was to first lure Luanda into overextending its forces and then to attack isolated government units.
- Soviet military advisers drafted the plans for the offensive and directed operations, probably deployed to at least the brigade level of Angolan units. Cuban forces--which number about 37,500 and are deployed at major government garrisons and economic centers--appear to have, at best, played only a minor role in this year's operations.

After moving approximately fifty miles into UNITA territory along the Cuito Cuanavale front, government operations began to lose momentum in early September. By early November, a combination of UNITA and South African counterattacks along the Lomba River forced Luanda to begin a general retreat.

- UNITA countered the government advance with a force of about 6,000 to 7,000 combat troops, including both conventional and guerrilla forces. Pretoria provided extensive air and artillery support to insurgent operations and has a sizable presence--we estimate as many as 3,000 troops--on the ground as well.

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- UNITA and South African forces virtually destroyed a reinforced Angolan brigade in early October.




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- Government forces that had advanced from Cuito Cuanavale have now retreated back to the vicinity of their starting point and are under attack from both UNITA and South African forces.

On the Lucusse front, the government was equally frustrated. After advancing about 40 miles into UNITA territory, Angolan forces became bogged down in mid-August.

- UNITA contested the advance on this front with a force of about 4,000 to 5,000 men. Insurgent gains appear to be largely attributable to successful interdiction of Angolan supply lines and constant harassment of forward government bases.



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Role of US Assistance

US aid to UNITA played an important role in turning back the government's drive. Insurgent air defenses--especially US supplied Stinger SAMs--helped force the government to curtail the use of its air power, previously one of its greatest comparative advantages over the insurgents.

- The insurgents report that the Angolan and Cuban air forces flew few missions and were not a factor in the fighting. UNITA's improved air defense capability forced government aircraft to fly at higher altitudes, resulting in inaccurate bombing.
- The Chief of Staff of the Angolan Armed Forces recently commented that the refusal of the Angolan Air Force to provide support for ground troops contributed to the failure of the offensive and that Luanda was preparing a commission of inquiry to examine the matter.
- In late October, a UNITA Stinger team downed a MiG fighter, capturing two Cuban airmen, one of whom was Havana's second in command of air and air defense forces in Angola and one of their most competent officers.

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Response to the Defeat

Luanda put two years of work into preparing for this offensive. According to reports from various Angolan officials, the government appeared generally confident that the greatly strengthened Angolan Army would produce a significant victory.

- The government is trying to play down the magnitude of the failure, characterizing the fighting in press reports as a routine sweep operation that would have succeeded had Pretoria not intervened.
- Although President dos Santos is likely to deflect criticism of his role, the defeat will fuel infighting among the fractious Angolan leadership. The search for scapegoats reportedly has already begun.
- Luanda's Cuban and Soviet backers probably will come in for a share of the recriminations. The Cubans, who took little part in the fighting, have been accused by Angolan officers of not providing needed air support to government forces. The Soviets, given their role in planning the ambitious offensive, are likely to share blame for the setback.

Outlook

Although its defeat is not sufficiently threatening to push Luanda toward reconciliation with UNITA, Luanda may try to improve its military prospects by limiting Pretoria's ability to intervene in future fighting.

- The government may show more interest in pursuing a negotiated end to South Africa's occupation of Namibia by trading off a Cuban troop withdrawal.
- Luanda might also consider restricting its operations to regions in Angola sufficiently far from Namibia to make South African intervention more difficult and costly.

Savimbi probably realizes that a battlefield victory in the southeast will not by itself force the government to pursue his goal of political reconciliation and power sharing. He has won some relief from government attack in the southeast for the next few months and is now likely to intensify countrywide guerrilla operations, particularly in northern Angola where the government is most sensitive to military pressure because of the area's large population centers and vital oil facilities.

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STATEMENT OF THE
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
BEFORE THE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE

OCTOBER 8, 1987

INTRODUCTION

MR. CHAIRMAN, MEMBERS OF THE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS, I AM PLEASED TO APPEAR HERE TODAY AND SHARE WITH YOU MY THOUGHTS ON AN IMPORTANT SUBJECT: PERSONS WHO FLEE FROM THE COMMUNIST BLOC TO THE UNITED STATES AND HOW OUR COUNTRY MIGHT BETTER TAKE ADVANTAGE OF ALL THEY HAVE TO OFFER.

LET ME BEGIN BY DISCUSSING BRIEFLY THE ONE AREA TO WHICH I CAN SPEAK OFFICIALLY AS THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE: THE VERY SMALL FRACTION OF THESE PEOPLE WHO ARE OF INTELLIGENCE INTEREST TO THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT. THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, OVER WHICH I AS DIRECTOR PRESIDE, HAS A SYSTEM TO IDENTIFY AND COLLECT INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION AND ADDRESS OTHER INTELLIGENCE CONCERNS WITH RESPECT TO THESE PERSONS. THE SYSTEM IS COMPREHENSIVE, VERY ACTIVE AND HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL. THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF OUR WORK IS, OF COURSE, CLASSIFIED AND CANNOT BE DISCUSSED IN THIS FORUM. I CAN SAY, THOUGH, THAT I AM SATISFIED THE COMMUNITY IS WORKING VERY HARD AND, INDEED, HAS MADE IMPROVEMENTS IN EXISTING EFFORTS.

TODAY, HOWEVER, THE SUBCOMMITTEE FOCUSES NOT ON THESE FEW INDIVIDUALS BUT ON THE LARGER GROUP: THOSE PERSONS NOT OF SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE INTEREST TO THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT. THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE IS NOT OFFICIALLY CHARGED WITH THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR DEALING WITH THIS LARGER GROUP. NONETHELESS, I AM PLEASED TO SHARE MY THOUGHTS ON THE SUBJECT WITH YOU.

THE INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED

I WILL REFER TO THIS LARGER CATEGORY OF PERSONS AS "RESETTLEMENT CASES", RATHER THAN AS "DEFECTORS," DUE TO THE FACT THAT FOR US IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY THE WORD "DEFECTOR" IS A TERM WITH A VERY LIMITED, SPECIFIC MEANING.

RESETTLEMENT CASES HAVE CHOSEN TO COME HERE OF THEIR OWN FREE WILL AND INITIATIVE, JUST AS HAVE SO MANY MILLIONS OF IMMIGRANTS THROUGHOUT OUR HISTORY. BEING HUMAN, THEIR MOTIVATIONS, AMBITIONS AND CAPABILITIES VARY WIDELY. THERE ARE, HOWEVER, TWO CHARACTERISTICS WHICH ALL SEEM TO SHARE. ON THE ONE HAND, THEY ARE DISSATISFIED WITH THE RESTRICTIVE SOCIETIES FROM WHICH THEY HAVE COME AND LOOK FORWARD TO ENJOYING THE LIBERTIES WE TAKE FOR GRANTED. ON THE OTHER HAND, THEY HAVE TO DEAL WITH THE DIFFICULTIES OF READJUSTMENT TO LIFE IN A NEW SOCIETY IN WHICH THE MORES, CUSTOMS, LANGUAGE, RULES AND REGULATIONS ARE DIFFERENT FROM THOSE TO WHICH THEY ARE ACCUSTOMED.

THE LATTER POINT MAY SEEM APPARENT BUT I THINK IT DESERVES SOME EMPHASIS. AMERICANS WHO HAVE CHANGED THEIR RESIDENCES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES ARE AWARE OF THE SIMPLE FRUSTRATIONS INVOLVED: DIFFERENT SYSTEMS OF TRASH COLLECTION; DIFFERENT WAYS OF CALCULATING STATE INCOME TAXES; VARIANCES IN WHETHER RENTALS NORMALLY INCLUDE REFRIGERATORS AND STOVES, AND SO ON. THIS IN OUR OWN COUNTRY. THINK HOW DIFFICULT IT IS FOR INDIVIDUALS AND FAMILIES WHO ARE ATTEMPTING TO BUILD A NEW LIFE UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH ALL THE RULES HAVE CHANGED AND THE LANGUAGE IS DIFFICULT TO SPEAK AND UNDERSTAND. ALSO, I NOTE THAT ON OCCASION THOSE WHO COME HERE HAVE UNREALISTIC EXPECTATIONS AND PLANS THAT SIMPLY DO NOT MATERIALIZE.

THE GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIZES ROUTINELY AND TO A VERY MODEST EXTENT THE INITIAL RESETTLEMENT EXPENSES OF MANY RESETTLEMENT CASES. THESE FUNDS ARE DISTRIBUTED BY THE GOVERNMENT TO THE VOLUNTARY AGENCY WHICH SPONSORED THE INDIVIDUAL. BEYOND THIS ASSISTANCE, WHICH COVERS ONLY THE FIRST WEEKS FOLLOWING ARRIVAL IN THE UNITED STATES, THERE IS NO ORGANIZED SYSTEM THROUGH WHICH THE GOVERNMENT OFFERS ASSISTANCE TO SUCH INDIVIDUALS.

FOR HELPING TO SMOOTH THE TRANSITION AND ADJUSTMENT FOR SO MANY OF THE RESETTLEMENT CASES AND THEIR FAMILIES, MUCH CREDIT AND PRAISE IS DUE TO THE VOLUNTARY AGENCIES WHO ASSUME THE OVERWHELMING TASK OF RESETTLING MANY THOUSANDS OF THESE INDIVIDUALS EACH YEAR. I UNDERSTAND THAT THE SUBCOMMITTEE WILL HEAR FROM SOME OF THEIR REPRESENTATIVES TOMORROW.

GIVEN THE RELATIVELY LIMITED RESOURCES AVAILABLE TO THEM, THEY ACCOMPLISH A GREAT DEAL.

BEYOND THESE, THERE IS ALSO A ROLE FOR INDIVIDUAL AMERICANS TO PLAY HERE. ANY OF US MAY, AT SOME POINT, HAVE OCCASION TO ENCOUNTER THESE PERSONS IN A WIDE VARIETY OF SETTINGS...AS NEIGHBORS, AS COLLEAGUES IN THE WORKPLACE OR AS FELLOW MEMBERS OF RELIGIOUS CONGREGATIONS. IN SUCH INSTANCES, WE SHOULD TAKE THE INITIATIVE AND OFFER ASSISTANCE, SUGGESTIONS AND GUIDANCE ON DEALING WITH AMERICAN LIFE. WHILE THIS MAY SEEM A SMALL THING, IT CAN MEAN A GREAT DEAL TO A PERSON COMING FROM A CLOSED, HIGHLY STRUCTURED, REPRESSIVE SYSTEM TO ONE WHOSE OPENNESS, BREADTH AND FREEDOM OFFER A SENSE OF LIBERATION BUT ALSO A SOMETIMES BEWILDERING RANGE OF CHOICES.

WHAT THESE INDIVIDUALS HAVE TO OFFER

LOOKING BEYOND THE EARLY STAGES OF RESETTLEMENT, THESE INDIVIDUALS HAVE A POTENTIAL TO CONTRIBUTE TO OUR SOCIETY IN A VARIETY OF WAYS. THEY POSSESS A PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING OF THEIR FORMER CULTURES AND POLITICAL SYSTEMS WHICH THEY COULD PROVIDE TO INTERESTED PARTIES WERE THE EFFORT MADE TO REACH OUT TO THEM. SOME POSSESS UNIQUE LANGUAGE SKILLS, A POINT WHICH I BELIEVE GENERAL ODOM MAY ADDRESS IN MORE DETAIL IN HIS TESTIMONY. POTENTIAL RECIPIENTS OF THESE BENEFITS INCLUDE: ACADEMIC INSTITUTIONS, SCHOLARS, CIVIC GROUPS, UNIVERSITY AND HIGH SCHOOL CLASSES AND, IN CERTAIN CASES, GOVERNMENT.

SOMETIMES, HOWEVER, THERE IS A PROBLEM IN MATCHING THESE INDIVIDUALS WITH POTENTIAL RECIPIENTS. AGAIN, THE VOLUNTARY AGENCIES PERFORM AN IMPORTANT SERVICE HERE. THESE AGENCIES, HOWEVER, CANNOT BE EVERYWHERE AND IN TOUCH WITH ALL PEOPLE AT ONCE. INDIVIDUAL INITIATIVE BY THE POTENTIAL RECIPIENTS TO SEEK OUT SUCH PEOPLE AND OFFER THEM THE OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE THEIR PERSONAL CONTRIBUTIONS WOULD SIMULTANEOUSLY PROVIDE THEM WITH A SENSE OF SATISFACTION AND ENRICH OUR SOCIETY. THIS IS OBVIOUSLY AN AREA ON WHICH THE SUBCOMMITTEE MAY WISH TO FOCUS. I NOTE THAT THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, AS THE PRIMARY UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AGENCIES RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS FROM OVERSEAS TO THIS COUNTRY, HAVE IMPORTANT ROLES TO PLAY HERE AND I WOULD ASSUME THE SUBCOMMITTEE PLANS ON CONSULTING THEM.

IN THESE BRIEF OPENING REMARKS I HAVE BEEN ABLE TO TOUCH ONLY IN THE MOST GENERAL TERMS ON THIS IMPORTANT TOPIC. THE PROBLEMS AND OPPORTUNITIES ARE AS VARIED AND INDIVIDUAL AS YOU MIGHT EXPECT WITH PERSONS OF WIDELY DIFFERING AGES, EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUNDS, EXPERIENCE AND FAMILY CIRCUMSTANCES. AT THIS POINT, I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE MORE APPROPRIATE TO CONCLUDE MY GENERAL COMMENTS AND RESPOND TO SPECIFIC QUESTIONS WHICH MAY BE OF PARTICULAR INTEREST TO YOU.

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