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SUBJECT: (Optional)				
Joint EPC/DPC Meeting on End	ergy Sec	urity,	29 April	at 1300
FROM:			EXTENSION	NO.
Deane E. Hoffmann		1		NIC 01881-87
NIO for Economics				28 April 1987
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and	D/			
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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC 01881-87 28 April 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence

FROM:

Deane E. Hoffmann

National Intelligence Officer for Economics

SUBJECT:

Joint EPC/DPC Meeting on Energy Security, 29 April

l. Action. You will be asked to reiterate the points on energy security you made at the EPC/DPC on 14 April. Although you are not formally scheduled to speak, Bill Martin arranged for Carlucci to introduce the discussion on energy security and turn to you to complete the presentation.

- 2. Background. Deputy Secretary Martin called me this morning to be assured that you will attend tomorrow's EPC/DPC with the President and that you will cover the same points as in the previous meeting. Martin told me that one point of your presentation implied that any oil disruption in the 1990s would be brief because of the desire on the part of others to produce. In reviewing your talking points, I altered the language on that section so as not to preclude lengthly disruptions such as occurred as a result of the Iranian Revolution or the Iran-Iraq War.
- 3. You should be aware that Energy Secretary Herrington has seized on the reduction in US drilling rigs relative to those in the USSR as one possible argument for subsidizing US industry. (US drilling crews can drill two to four times faster than Soviet crews using Soviet equipment.) Martin has, so far, been unable to persuade Herrington that the US-Soviet rig count is a red herring.

Deane E. Hoffmann

Attachment: Talking Points

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THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

Executive Registry	
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CABINET AFFAIRS STAFFING MEMORANDUM

Date: April 29, 1987	_		5 Due By:		
Subject: Energy Secur	TCY ISSU				
ALL CABINET MEMBERS Vice President State Treasury Defense Justice Interior	Action Distribution Distribu	FYI 0 00000	CEA CEQ OSTP	Action	FYI 000000
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the President.

RETURN TO:

▼Nancy J. Risque **Cabinet Secretary** 456-2823 (Ground Floor, West Wing) ☐ Associate Director **Office of Cabinet Affairs** 456-2800 (Room 235, OEOB)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 29, 1987

NOTE FOR ECONOMIC POLICY COUNCIL DOMESTIC POLICY COUNCIL

FROM: NANCY J. RISQUE MY

Jim Miller asked that I send the attached materials to you before today's EPC/DPC meeting.



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

April 28, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ECONOMIC AND DOMESTIC POLICY COUNCILS

FROM:

James Miller III

Director

SUBJECT:

Energy Security Issues

Over the past few days, I have had several conversations with Secretary Baker and Secretary Herrington regarding potential offsets for the increased budgetary costs of the two options presented in the EPC/DPC issue paper. Based on subsequent staff analysis, I have prepared the attached table summarizing the production estimates, budgetary costs, and our best estimate of the potential offsets for the two options. (This does not include the option of increasing the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) fill rate through direct Government outlays.)

The table makes three points:

- 1) The full cost of Option 2 can be fully offset in FY 1988, but not over the five-year period.
- Option 1 can be more than fully offset.
- 3) Achievement of the offsets depends heavily upon Secretary Herrington's ability to sell the Great Plains facilities in FY 1988, and most importantly, upon the Administration's ability to develop a viable private financing mechanism for the SPR that will result in no net cost to the Government. This will require relinquishment of some of the current Government controls over SPR drawdown and use.

I look forward to reviewing the issues with you in our meeting with the President.

Attachment

ENERGY SECURITY OPTIONS

Summary of Production Effects, Budgetary Costs, and Potential Offsets

Current Administration		illions) Incremental CY 988 thru 1992 Oil and Gas 1992 Production (B/D)
Proposals (Natural Gas Deregulation and Expanded OCS Leasing)	(Already in the bud	dget.) 375,000
Option 1 (Current proposals plus repeal transfer rule and increase net income limitation)	+65	+318 488,000
Option 2 (Option 1 plus G&G expensing and production credit)	+592 +5	5,172* 1,013,000*
Potential Offsets o Lease Arctic Wildlife		
Refuge (ANWR)		-425
o Sale of Great Plains	-233 -1	L,273
Synfuels Plant Total	-360	-450
Iotai	-593 -2	2,148

^{*} This cost could be reduced by approximately \$2 billion through a three-year sunset of both items, resulting in 170,000 B/D of less production.

Note:

All estimates of budget costs are based on oil price forecasts contained in the budget, and are generally consistent with those in the House Budget Resolution and the Senate (Chiles) Resolution. Use of the higher price forecasts contained in the Energy Security Study would result in lower costs. However, higher energy prices would also increase the baseline budget deficit estimates by a larger amount, so the effect would be to increase the deficit overall.

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICER FOR ECONOMICS

National Intelligence Council

29 April 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR

Director, Executive Staff

FROM:

Deane Hoffmann NIO for Economics

Jim -

I called _______ to have him remind Bill Martin that, per agreement with Martin, the ADCI would speak on the possibility of oil supply disruptions. I prepared the attached talking points, however, in case Herrington does ask about the economic impact of disruptions.

Deane Hoffmann

Attachment: As stated 25X1

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29 April 1987

SUPPLEMENT to Talking Points for EPC/DPC Meeting 29 April 1987

In terms of the impact of oil disruptions, it is important to remember that the problems go well beyond the initial economic effects on inflation, growth, and unemployment.

- -- The difficulties we face in our efforts to get Western Europe and Japan to stimulate their economies is rooted in the budget deficits they created in the 1970s in order to counter the deflationary effects of the 1973/74 oil shock.
- -- Also, the soaring levels of debt in the Third World were in large measure created by efforts to ameliorate sluggish growth and cover the cost of oil imports.

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET ATTACHMENT

THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

CABINET AFFAIRS STAFFING MEMORANDUM

Date: April 28, 1987	Number:	317,314	Due By:		
Subject: Joint DPC/EP	C Meetin	gApril 29	/:00 9, 1987- -11:00 a.m	Energy	Security
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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 27, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DOMESTIC AND ECONOMIC POLICY COUNCILS

FROM:

RALPH C. BLEDSOE

Executive Secretary, DPC

EUGENE J. MCALLISTER EM

Executive Secretary, EPC

SUBJECT:

Joint Meeting on April 29, 1987

A joint meeting of the Domestic and Economic Policy Councils will be held on Wednesday, April 29, 1987 at 11:00 a.m. in the Cabinet Room. The President will chair this meeting, in which we will discuss Energy Security.

A paper outlining the issue is attached for your review.

SECRET ATTACHMENT

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DOMESTIC POLICY COUNCIL AND ECONOMIC POLICY COUNCIL JOINT MEETING

Wednesday, April 29, 1987 /300 11:00 a.m.

Cabinet Room

AGENDA

1. Energy Security -- Secretary Herrington

UNCLASSIFIED WITH SECRET ATTACHMENT

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 27, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: THE DOMESTIC POLICY COUNCIL

THE ECONOMIC POLICY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: Energy Security

Last October, you promised to conduct a review of our energy-related national security concerns. Shortly thereafter, Congress included in the Consolidated Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1986 a provision requiring Secretary Herrington to conduct a study of domestic crude oil production and petroleum refining capacity and the effects on oil imports. The legislation also requires that within forty-five days of receiving Secretary Herrington's study, you shall report your views:

concerning the levels at which imports of crude oil and refined petroleum products become a threat to the national security and advise the Congress concerning [your] views of the legislative or administrative action, or both, that will be required to prevent imports of crude oil and refined petroleum products from exceeding those import levels that threaten our national security.

Secretary Herrington issued his report on March 17, 1987. The analysis has been very well received. Among the study's most important conclusions is that the costs of an oil import fee would clearly outweigh the benefits.

The White House Counsel advises that you are under no constitutional obligation to recommend legislative or administrative action and that you have substantial flexibility in deciding how to report your views. The Domestic and Economic Policy Councils believe it is in your interest to convey your views and policies, because energy security is a very important issue and the Administration has done much to improve that security. The Councils recommend that you convey your views in a May 1, 1987 letter, while not forwarding a specific legislative proposal.

The Councils have reviewed the Department of Energy study and have prepared several policy options for your consideration. These options reflect the tension between competing goals of:
(1) improving national security; (2) preserving the principles established in tax reform; (3) maintaining a free market energy policy; and (4) reducing the Federal budget deficit.

UNCLASSIFIED WITH SECRET ATTACHMENT

NATIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS

The Department of Energy study concludes that by the mid-1990s we may be importing more than half of our oil. This prospect raises national security concerns about a potential supply interruption. The national security community believes such an interruption is a real possibility because of the the potential for political instability in the Middle East and the ever-present Soviet threat to this region.

A supply interruption (or threat thereof) might pose two dangers:

- o Disrupting our economy and economies of our allies who are also highly dependent on imported oil, more specifically Persian Gulf oil; and
- o Impairing our ability to conduct the desired foreign policy.

Although the danger of a supply interruption significantly impairing our ability to mobilize our defense establishment is small, it could cause severe distress to civilian sectors as defense needs are given priority access to available oil supplies. (A fuller description of the national security concerns is attached.)

ADMINISTRATION GOALS

While there is disagreement about specific additional initiatives you might seek, the Councils unanimously recommend that in your letter to the Congress you establish the following broad goals for U.S. energy and oil policy:

The United States should take steps to better protect ourselves from potential oil supply interruptions and increase our energy security. These steps should include:

- increasing our domestic stockpiles, which we can draw down in the event of a supply interruption;
- -- maintaining a strong domestic oil industry;
- -- expanding the availability of domestic oil and gas resources; and
- -- promoting among our allies the importance of increasing their stockpiles.

An additional element of our U.S. "energy security" strategy is to promote the use of alternative economically efficient energy sources. The increased use of coal and the introduction of new types of nuclear reactors are among the most promising alternatives.

PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATION ACTIONS

The Councils believe it is very important to keep the idea of energy security in perspective. You have already taken two extremely important actions to increase our energy security by: (1) fully decontrolling oil prices in 1981; and (2) filling the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) to more than 500 million barrels and committing to a 750 million barrel SPR. Some of the other major steps this Administration has taken to strengthen our energy security and maintain a strong domestic oil industry include:

- o Reestablishing the five-year Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) leasing program and reducing the minimum bid for certain offshore leases.
- o Increasing Federal spending for clean coal to \$2.5 billion over the next five years and reestablishing a Federal coal leasing program.
- o Preserving the favorable treatment of intangible drilling costs in the Tax Reform Act and retaining the full-cost accounting provisions.
- Lifting foreign policy controls on the export of petroleum equipment and technology.
- o Encouraging our allies to build up their stockpiles, which amount to about 350 million barrels (mostly in Germany and Japan).
- o Vetoing standby petroleum price control and allocation legislation in 1982.

These actions, and their effects, should be cited in your letter to Congress. They have substantially increased our energy security and improved our capability to mitigate a future supply disruption of twice the size of historic disruptions, but would not be sufficient to completely mitigate a much larger disruption.

CURRENT ADMINISTRATION PROPOSALS

In addition, the Councils believe your report to the Congress is an excellent opportunity to re-emphasize the importance of a number of initiatives that you have proposed but which have not yet been adopted, including:

o Seeking comprehensive natural gas decontrol, including wellhead price decontrol, and repeal of the Fuel Use Act.

- Repealing the Windfall Profit Tax.
- o Continuing to improve access to OCS and Federal lands.
- o Seeking nuclear licensing reform, reauthorization of the Price Anderson Act, and developing a nuclear waste repository.
- o Continuing to push hard for higher levels of oil stockpiles among our allies, particularly at the ministerial meeting of the International Energy Agency in May and the Venice Summit.

If all these proposals that are currently on the table were enacted, they could yield additional domestic production of 375,000 barrels per day of oil equivalent by the early 1990s.

ADDITIONAL PROPOSALS

The Domestic and Economic Policy Councils reviewed a number of additional proposals for improving our energy security. These proposals can be divided into three general categories: (1) tax incentives; (2) Federal lands leasing policy; and (3) the SPR.

Tax Incentives

The Councils considered four tax proposals designed to increase U.S. oil production. The first two proposals remove restrictions on the use of percentage depletion by independents. This will reduce early well-abandonment and will stimulate additional drilling activity. The last two proposals are incentives targeted toward exploration and development of new oil and gas reserves and toward helping to maintain the domestic oil and gas exploration infrastructure.

- Repealing the transfer rule to permit use of percentage depletion for proven properties that have changed ownership.
- Increasing the net income limitation on the percentage depletion allowance from 50 percent to 100 percent per property.
- Providing for faster tax-write off of geological and geophysical expenses.
- 4. Providing a non-refundable tax credit for oil exploration and development on new properties which would be fully creditable against the alternative minimum tax.

These proposals are arrayed below according to cost and expected additional production. The additional production would peak in 1992 and decline thereafter.

Tax Change	Five-Year Revenue Loss	Additional Production by 1992
Transfer Rule	\$ 142 million	55,000 b/d
Net Income Limitation	\$ 212 million	58,000 b/d
G&G expensing with \$21-25 barrel phase out with three-year sunset	\$ 1.9 billion \$ 1.1 billion	200,000 b/d 125,000 b/d
Tax Credit for Exploration and Development with \$25 barrel sunse with three-year sunse	t \$ 2.9 billion	325,000 b/d 230,000 b/d

Federal Lands Policy

Federal lands have tremendous potential for new significant oil and gas discoveries. Offshore has a potential of more than 11 billion barrels of recoverable oil. Onshore, the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) alone has a potential of up to 30 billion barrels of oil in place with a recoverable reserves potential of up to 9.2 billion barrels.

On April 20, Secretary Hodel announced that the Department of Interior would forward a report and environmental impact statement to Congress seeking authority for full leasing of ANWR in a manner reflecting wildlife values.

An additional initiative the Administration might take in lands policy that would lead to more exploration and development without any budget costs is reducing the minimum bid requirement for Federal leases from \$150 per acre to \$25 per acre.

The Administration might also eliminate the royalty requirement on new competitive leases, except in the case of ANWR.

Strategic Petroleum Reserve

One of the most important steps we have taken to strengthen our energy security is to commit to building up our strategic petroleum reserve to 750 million barrels. The 1988 budget calls for a SPR fill rate of 35,000 barrels a day, with a budget cost of \$233 million in 1988 and \$1.3 billion over five years. By 1995, the SPR would reach almost 640 million barrels, providing 63-83 days of import protection. The Councils have developed three proposals for accelerating the SPR fill rate.

- Increasing the SPR fill rate to 75,000 barrels per day, 1. resulting in completion of 750 million barrel reserves in 1995. This would provide 18 percent more days of import protection by 1995 than does the 35,000 fill rate. Outlays would be increased by \$304 million in 1988 and \$2.1 billion over 1988-1992.
- Increasing the SPR fill rate to 100,000 barrels per day. 2. This would complete the 750 million barrel reserve by 1993. Outlays would be increased by \$482 million in 1988 and \$3.2 billion over 1988-1992.
- Studying the possibility of providing a special oil-based 3. security that would be sold to investors to finance up to 100,000 barrels per day in the SPR at lower cost than if DOE purchased the oil for SPR.

OPTIONS

The Councils have developed two options based on these proposals. Option 1 has been fashioned to be revenue neutral and avoid reopening basic issues considered in tax reform.

Option 2 is designed to increase U.S. oil and gas production up to 1 million barrels per day, to help make up the production lost in the 1986 oil price collapse and to stimulate drilling activity in the troubled oil service sector. The 1 million barrel increment would increase domestic production by about six percent, reduce projected imports by about ten percent, and reduce world dependence on Persian Gulf oil up to five percent. Secretary Herrington believes that a goal of 1 million barrels new production is essential to curb rising imports and preserve domestic oil industry infrastructure.

- Option 1: Supplement current Administration proposals with a revenue neutral program and tax changes of a relatively technical nature. Elements included in this option are:
 - opening up ANWR
 - reducing the minimum bid requirement
 - increasing the net income limitation
 - repealing the transfer rule
 - studying the possibility of private financing for a SPR fill rate of up to 100,000 barrels per day

Advantages

o Does not increase the budget deficit and continues our effective policy of relying on the market.

- o Avoids a major reopening of tax reform while endorsing the changes, which though technical in nature, have nevertheless significantly discouraged marginal production.
- o Focuses pressure on Congress to take the actions that are very important for our energy security and a strong domestic oil industry: natural gas deregulation, opening up ANWR, and repealing the windfall profit tax.
- o A private SPR may have a number of attributes, including reducing Federal costs and incorporating private sector judgments about the possibility of supply interruptions.
- Option 2: Supplement current Administration proposals with additional proposals that may not be revenue neutral (depending in part on the budget savings resulting from the private SPR) but which will lead to significantly more domestic oil and gas production than option 1. This option includes the elements of option 1 with the following additional possibilities:
 - A. Providing for faster tax write-off of G&G expenses;
 - B. Providing a tax credit for oil exploration and development;
 - C. Increasing the SPR fill rate up to 75,000 barrels per day if the private SPR financing is not feasible.

Advantages

- o Provides substantial new U.S. oil production of up to a million barrels per day and offers a credible alternative to the oil import fee.
- o Tax proposals will help sustain the domestic oil industry infrastructure so that it will be able to respond effectively when prices rise in the 1990s.
- o Increasing the SPR fill rate to 75,000 b/d will lead to a 750 million barrel SPR by 1995 when the national security projections show we will be most vulnerable.

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Option 1: Supplement current Administration proposals with a revenue neutral program and only technical tax changes. Elements included in this option are:

- opening up ANWR
- reducing the minimum bid requirement
- increasing the net income limitation
- repealing the transfer rule
- studying the possibility of private financing for a SPR fill rate of up to 100,000 barrels per day.

(The savings estimates for private SPR financing range from zero to \$250 million per year. OMB has concerns about the budget integrity of such a proposal.)

- Option 2: Supplement current Administration proposals with additional proposals that may not be revenue neutral but which will lead to substantially more new domestic oil production than option 1. This option includes the elements of option 1 with the following additional possibilities:
 - A. Providing for faster tax write-off of G&G expenses. (See page 5 for additional estimated production and revenue loss.)
 - i. with \$21 \$25 per barrel phase-out
 - ii. with three year sunset
 - B. Providing a non-refundable tax credit for oil exploration and development. (See page 5 for additional estimated production and revenue loss.)
 - i. with \$25 per barrel sunset
 - ii. with three year sunset
 - C. Increasing the SPR fill rate to 75,000 barrels per day if the private SPR financing is not feasible.

Options 1 and 2 are mutually exclusive. Option 2, sub-options A, B, and C are not mutually exclusive.

EDWIN MEESE III
Chairman Pro Tempore

JAMES A. BAKER, III Chairman Pro Tempore

SEUKEI

23 April 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Distribution

SUBJECT:

Inter-Agency Meeting

TYPE OF MEETING	EPC DPC with the President
DATE	Friday, 29 April 1987
TIME	1300
PLACE	Cabinet Room
CHAIRED BY	President
ATTENDEE(S) (probable)	ADCI
SUBJECT/AGENDA	Energy Security
PAPERS EXPECTED	By COB 23 April
INFO RECEIVED	Per Cabinet Affairs, 1000

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Jates allembert