

~~SECRET~~

25X1
25X1



Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
27 May 1987

UNITA Ability to Sabotage Angolan Oil Production

Summary

UNITA has developed a limited but improving military capability in Angola's oil producing northwest over the last two years despite logistic problems and a lack of ethnic support in the area. The insurgents appear unlikely to attack the Cuban- and Angolan-defended oil facilities, however, due to the risk of losing highly trained troops and concern over possible negative repercussions in the event of Western, particularly US, casualties. In the near term, the intensity of insurgent activity in the northwest is likely to remain relatively low, consisting mainly of small-scale attacks against infrastructure targets, including lightly defended oil assets with little or no Western presence.



25X1


* * *

This typescript was prepared by [redacted] Africa Division, Office of African and Latin American Analysis with contributions from [redacted] the Office of Imagery Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Africa Division, ALA [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1



~~SECRET~~

25X1
25X1

Improving UNITA Capabilities in the North

In the last two years, UNITA has intensified its efforts to disrupt the Angolan economy and has improved its operational capabilities in the northwestern oil producing areas. We estimate that UNITA maintains a force of 6,000 men in the northwest provinces, while [redacted]

25X1

in Cabinda Province, there currently are three groups of commandos totalling 235 men. In early 1986, UNITA infiltrated 200 of its most experienced and best trained commandos into Cabinda Province to establish a permanent presence in the area,

25X1

[redacted] The commandos, armed with light weapons and explosives, were tasked with conducting small unit raids against lightly defended targets, conducting reconnaissance operations, and political proselytizing to establish a base of support with the local population.

25X1

[redacted] members of this unit destroyed the power transformer at Malongo, ambushed government convoys, and were probably responsible for the bombing of the Cabinda airport terminal building and the mortar attack on an oil facility last year. [redacted]

25X1

Senior UNITA officials approved a new strategy in late 1986 designed to reorient the insurgents away from conventional engagements against government forces [redacted]

25X1

[redacted] The plan emphasized expanding guerrilla activity in the north, targeting oil, mining, and coffee producing areas and their lines of transportation. UNITA intelligence officials stated last February that the insurgents were reorganizing and strengthening their Northern Front Command --operating about 100 miles north of Luanda--to about 2,600 men including two battalions and four subordinate commands [redacted]

25X1

25X1

[redacted] Savimbi has picked experienced commanders from his southeastern units and personally trained them to lead guerrilla detachments in the northern theater. Savimbi commented on 18 May that recent guerrilla operations by the new northern units had surpassed his expectations and that there were a larger number of operations in the north than he would have thought possible,

25X1

[redacted] that Savimbi has authorized his local commander to mount attacks at his discretion throughout Cabinda with the sole restriction that he not target the oil facilities. [redacted]

25X1

The implementation of UNITA's strategy in the north depends in part on the use of Zairian territory. [redacted]

25X1

[redacted] UNITA has about 2,000 supporters among Angolan expatriates living in Zaire's Shaba Province. UNITA activity in Shaba consists of organizing political backing, fund raising, and

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

logistic and intelligence support for insurgents operating near the border. A South African military aircraft transported approximately 45 UNITA soldiers as well as small arms, ammunition and other equipment in early March to Kinshasa, [Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted] the troops and supplies would be infiltrated by ground into Cabinda Province and elsewhere in northwestern Angola. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

[Redacted] suggests that the insurgents still lack a solid base of ethnic support in Cabinda and ~~northwestern Angola~~*. Savimbi is aware of the problem and has tasked UNITA Party Leader Puna, a native Cabindan, with cultivating popular support for the insurgents in the exclave, [Redacted]

[Redacted] UNITA does not appear to have close ties to the small Front for the Liberation of Cabinda (FLEC) that opposes Luanda's rule, and demands independence for Cabinda. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

UNITA operations in the northwest also are hampered by supply difficulties. In addition to moving some troops by way of Zaire, the insurgents have moved men and materiel on the ground from UNITA's southeastern stronghold, but the distance and threat of government interdiction makes the route unreliable. [Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted] that Angolan forces have recently detected several resupply flights to UNITA--probably South African--in the northern provinces and [Redacted] that the South African Defense Force supplied UNITA by sea in late 1986. UNITA's ability to sustain or increase operations in the northwest will largely remain a function of reliable logistics. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

Strengthened Government Defenses

Luanda has responded to increased UNITA activity by strengthening defenses at various oil facilities. Cuban troops have increased security around the Chevron Gulf oil terminal at Malongo and elsewhere in Cabinda, [Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted] UNITA leader Savimbi stated in mid-1986, that the insurgents will not target oil installations in Cabinda because of improved defenses around the facilities. Improvements since January 1986 include:

25X1

- Additional site security at Malongo, including an outer perimeter fence, free fire zone, and mine field as well as the augmentation of the Cuban security unit responsible for

* UNITA is backed by the largest of Angola's ethnolinguistic groups, the Ovimbundu, who are located in the central and southern part of the country. Cabinda and the rest of the northwest are dominated by the Bakongo. [Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

[redacted]
defending the terminal from company to battalion size since August 1986. [redacted]

25X1
25X1

[redacted] it is possible that additional security improvements have occurred.

- Doubling the size of the Cuban military installation located near Cabinda City, indicating the addition of a second battalion there by March 1987.
- Installation of the first SA-3 site in Cabinda to augment air defenses over the oil terminal, Cabinda Airfield, and Cabinda Port by January 1987. The site represents a significant improvement over hand-held SA-7 SAMs and anti-aircraft artillery in the area. [redacted]

25X1

Prospects for Insurgent Attacks

Despite improved UNITA capabilities in the oil producing areas, several factors work against UNITA attempting large-scale insurgent attacks on many of the oil facilities. Although UNITA has warned foreigners to leave, Savimbi appears reluctant to risk adverse political reaction to Western casualties. He probably realizes that UNITA's effort to win increased Western recognition and aid would be damaged by operations that could be portrayed as terrorist attacks against Western civilians. Nevertheless, if Savimbi became convinced that the West was abandoning UNITA in favor of Luanda, the likelihood of insurgent attacks against Western assets would greatly increase. [redacted]

25X1

Savimbi recently publicly castigated the French oil firm, Elf-Aquitaine for taking political actions against UNITA and threatened the safety of French technicians, according to press reports. In the same speech, Savimbi stated that the Portuguese and American presence in Angola was exempted from attack for historical and political reasons. Should UNITA decide to strike the oil facilities, the insurgents probably would target facilities with little or no US presence and take great care to avoid American casualties. [redacted]

25X1
25X1

[redacted] the UNITA bombing of the Cabinda airport was carefully planned to destroy the terminal building without harming the property of Chevron-Gulf. [redacted]

25X1

Even if the political dimension was removed, UNITA probably would refrain from spectacular attacks against oil assets because of its reluctance to risk heavy casualties against such hard targets. UNITA's current strategy calls for wide-scale small unit operations directed at lightly defended targets and the insurgents have spent several years establishing a permanent base of operations in the oil producing areas. The loss of highly trained commandos would be a blow to UNITA's capabilities and

25X1

25X1
25X1

[REDACTED]

captured insurgents could compromise information on the carefully developed infrastructure. As a result, UNITA military operations near the oil facilities are likely to continue to focus primarily on disrupting supply lines and ambushing government patrols rather than attacking the oil facilities themselves. [REDACTED]

25X1

Should the current military situation or level of support for Savimbi change dramatically and UNITA decide to attack oil assets, the insurgent's would presumably focus their efforts against onshore facilities. With the exception of an estimated 30,000 barrels per day that comes from various onshore wells in the northwest, Angola's 300,000 b/p/d oil production comes from offshore wells. UNITA has no known maritime operating capability and no established control of the coastline, thus the vast bulk of Angolan production appears to be beyond the reach of UNITA attack for the near term. UNITA probably would target lightly defended support facilities outside of Cabinda, such as those located in Soyo and Ambriz, rather than risk an assault on more heavily defended targets such as the Malongo terminal in Cabinda. Even if UNITA were able to strike key oil facilities, the impact on Luanda probably would be limited. The Iran-Iraq conflict illustrates the extreme difficulty entailed in crippling oil production, even when oil facilities are attacked on a regular basis. UNITA and South Africa have made limited attempts to disrupt Angolan oil facilities in the past, none of which have resulted in a significant drop in production. [REDACTED]

25X1

Angolan oil facilities will remain vulnerable to attack by South Africa. The South African military, through the use of amphibious units infiltrated by submarines or other craft, are capable of striking Angola's offshore and onshore facilities.. Pretoria is aware of Luanda's critical dependency upon oil production and could undertake operations against the facilities in an effort to bolster UNITA's campaign against economic targets. In May 1985, Angola announced that it had foiled a South African commando raid against the tank farm at the Malongo facility. Pretoria later admitted publicly that it had lost contact with a reconnaissance group operating in northern Angola. Senior South African military advisers view UNITA attacks on oil facilities in Cabinda as essential to guerrilla operations in northern Angola. Pretoria, however, probably would encourage UNITA attacks rather than risk direct involvement. [REDACTED]


25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1


SOVIET/WARSAW PACT MILITARY
DELIVERIES TO ANGOLA, 1982-86




Angola: Commodity Production and Price Trends

COFFEE

Production
Thousand metric tons




Prices
US \$ per pound




DIAMONDS

Production
Thousand carats




Prices
US \$ per carat



PETROLEUM

Production
Thousand b/d



Prices
US \$ per barrel

