

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP

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Remarks

HS
Executive Secretary
9 Dec '87
Date

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 8, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. DONALD GREGG
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs

MR. MELVYN LEVITSKY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COLONEL WILLIAM M. MATZ
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. L. WAYNE ARNY
Executive Secretary
Office of Management and Budget

MR. H. LAWRENCE SANDALL
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

REAR ADMIRAL JOSEPH C. STRASSER
Executive Assistant to the Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff


MR. RICHARD MEYER
Executive Secretary
Agency for International Development

SUBJECT: Policy Review Group Meeting on Haiti (S)

A Policy Review Group (PRG) meeting is scheduled for Thursday, December 10, 1987, at 3:00 p.m., in the White House Situation Room. (S)

The purpose of the meeting is to review the crisis in Haiti. (S)

Attached for your information is an agenda for the meeting, together with a copy of a Policy Options paper prepared by the Department of State for the PRG's consideration. (S)



Paul Schott Stevens
Executive Secretary

Attachments
Agenda for PRG Meeting
Policy Options Paper

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POLICY REVIEW GROUP MEETING
Thursday, December 10, 1987
White House Situation Room
3:00 - 4:00 p.m.

HAITI

Agenda

- I. Introduction.....John Negroponte
(3 minutes)
- II. Intelligence Update.....CIA
(5 minutes)
- III. Political/Economic Overview.....State/USAID/DoD
and Introduction of Policy (15 minutes)
Option Paper
 - Overview.....State
 - Threat Assessment re Amcits.....State/DoD
and Evacuation Plan
 - Status of Economic and.....USAID/DoD
Military Assistance
 - Introduction of Policy Paper.....State
- IV. General Discussion.....All
(30 minutes)
- V. Summary and Conclusions.....John Negroponte
(3 minutes)

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US STRATEGY TOWARDS HAITI

Policy Objectives:

- To prevent unacceptable levels of spillover from turmoil in Haiti (e.g. uncontrolled migration, exploitation by narcotics traffickers).
- To ensure that outside, inimical powers do not gain foothold; special concern about Cuban, Libyan attempts to establish positions in Haiti.
- To assure safety of American residents in Haiti.
- To forestall egregious human rights abuses, total collapse of law and order leading to massive bloodshed.

Policy Options.

I: Redefinition of USG interests in minimalist sense, pursuit of low key policy of "benign neglect".

Considerations/Discussion:

- With reduction in our assistance levels, there will be a concomitant lessening of direct involvement in Haitian military and economic development. The parlous security situation likely will result in at least a partial pull-out of those assembly and other industries which represent the modest American private investment in Haiti. As security deteriorates, the missionary and other private American presence will slim down. Some unofficial American presence will remain.
- Haiti historically was isolated. Its strategic importance is mostly negative -- denial to hostile forces. The Cubans have played a cautious game and may be reluctant to buy into what appears to be a losing proposition. We have had little indication that the Soviets perceive Haiti to be a plum. Recent disruptions do not appear to have triggered new Cuban or Soviet interest.
- A policy along these lines would put the USG in position freely to criticize human rights violations, and GOH conduct (the "Paraguay option").

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- Perhaps under any of the options, but especially so here, we would have to anticipate a flood of political refugees. Haiti, already vulnerable to narcotics traffickers, could become a safehaven for them.

Evaluation:

This option is feasible only if we can confidently assume a modicum of stability will prevail in Haiti. We do not believe this to be the case, at least in the foreseeable future. Rather, we anticipate growing popular, political frustration and a downward spiral into chaos, likely resulting in continuing bloodshed. Given the proximity of Haiti, the size of the Haitian population in the U.S., the likelihood of increased refugee flows (with an AIDS-related public dimension) and the historic political involvement and interest on the part of American political and ethnic groups, both U.S. foreign policy interests and domestic political imperatives already argue for some strong action. Benign neglect will not work as a long-term policy.

II: Accomodation with CNG in order to restore stability and democratic transition.

Considerations/Discussion:

- Namphy is no longer credible, positive element. USG cannot endorse rigged elections.
- All indications are that Namphy is determined to pursue this course, impervious to our clearly stated objectives. Regala, though admitting to differences in personality and style, voices his loyalty to Namphy, claims that Army is united in its support. There is no clear fracture line within the Haitian military.
- Expansion of CNG may be necessary step if process is to be restored. USG might exert political pressure, but ultimate decision in CNG, Haitian hands.
- Some elements/interest groups which, under constitution, are to be represented on CEP have already taken position that CNG dismissal was illegal. It may not be possible to form a new CEP. Even if that hurdle is overcome, any

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elections organized by Namphy/CNG will be suspect. Furthermore, it is unclear whether respectable candidates would stay in a sham race.

- Our leverage over Namphy/CNG is now palpably limited. In the end, they ignored our advice, proved unreliable in fulfilling their commitments to us and the Haitian electorate and candidates. Our one-time jolt of drastically cutting back our assistance programs has evoked bitterness from Namphy, but no hint that it is enough to make him reconsider his actions.

Evaluation:

Namphy and the present CNG have lost all credibility with Haitian populace -- and abroad, including in the U.S. They are unbending, determined, apparently united. Most importantly, the Army remains the only institution with both a national security role and some capability to carry out those responsibilities.

We cannot embrace the course now being pursued by Namphy/CNG. But prospects for persuading them to change course are minimal. Elections acceptable here or internationally will not materialize. USG acceptance of sham elections would undercut our policy in Panama, Nicaragua, and Chile. Accommodation is not an acceptable or realistic option.

III Flexible confrontation/multilateral diplomacy to induce acceptable change in CNG policies or, if unsuccessful, evoke removal of Namphy, Regala, or both.

Considerations/Discussion:

- A policy of calibrated confrontation would be the logical extension of the tough message we sent through suspension of military and non-humanitarian economic assistance. It would build on our unequivocal private and public condemnation of the CNG's failure to ensure a secure environment for the election.

- Likewise, this policy would serve our domestic political interests and objectives. It would dovetail with growing media and congressional enthusiasm for a tougher line.

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- Importantly, under this policy line the Administration could continue to press our fundamental determination not to accept less than a transition to meaningful democracy in Haiti.

- Prospects for effecting changes in the CNG (either in composition or policies) are more problematic. By definition, the Army is in position to veto any changes. Even presuming that splits develop and that some in the military might be willing to move against Namphy/Regala, the follow-on leaders would inevitably come from ranks of military. Among those in the wings are highly objectionable, even dangerous, individuals (e.g. Dessalines commander Col. Paul). Additionally, the army has become increasingly unpopular, suspect among the Haitian population. It would be difficult to persuade Haitians that a new military figure would be any more democratic, reliable than Namphy/Regala.

- The army is and will remain the political makeweight. We will have to deal with it and its leaders. Confrontation might have a moderating influence on Namphy/CNG, or could evoke even harsher, repressive measures. We cannot discount the possibility that Namphy/CNG might conclude that they have nothing to lose by proclaiming themselves a permanent government. This would be a quick reversion towards dictatorship.

- Internationally, we perceive some trend to a similar confrontational posture. The OAS meets 12/7 to debate (and probably pass) a resolution of condemnation, calling for restoration of the electoral process, and opposing intervention.

- PM Seaga is working to put together a delegation of "concerned Caribbean leaders." He hopes that delegation can go to Haiti 12/10 to tell Namphy that the CNG's course is unacceptable, will not work, and carries the risk of outside intervention. From discussions with Washington ambassadors and government leaders in the context of the Miami Conference, we are hearing the message that PM Compton, as head of CARICOM, should lead any delegation to Haiti (which, in their view, can only take place at the invitation of Namphy). We are encouraging a Caribbean initiative, whether Seaga's or by CARICOM. An appropriate delegation should be armed with specific proposals as to how the Caribbeans could be helpful in getting the electoral process back on track.

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- Our actions on assistance will have the effect of making it almost impossible for Haiti to meet IMF and IBRD requirements; we might stiffen this by opposing IMF/IBRD proposals for Haiti. We are seeking to coordinate positions with other major bilateral donors, notably France and Canada.

Evaluation:

For all its faults, this option offers us greater flexibility and potential influence over the course of Haitian developments than either of the other options. It is consistent with our present position that progress towards democracy is a sine qua non for progress in Haiti.

A policy of confrontation can be graduated, nuanced, and has many possible diplomatic and economic facets. We can increase pressure or ease up to reflect the situation in and response from Haiti. Opposition to the CNG's actions have been indecisive, inchoate thus far. However, we believe it unlikely that the Haitian people passively will accept Namphy/CNG actions. Should they do so, we could be reduced to Option I. Contrarily, should Namphy and the CNG unexpectedly reverse course and credibly restore the electoral process, we could shift to Option II.

A U.S. policy of confrontation may be ineffective at a given level and may stimulate a harsh CNG crackdown on the Haitian populace. It should be recognized, therefore, that confrontation implies the possibility of escalation to the level of direct U.S. military involvement, both to achieve our policy goals and to quell violence perhaps arising in response to our actions. Initial diplomatic consultations indicate some sympathy for a strong policy. However, there is no perceived desire to undertake multilateral military actions.

There are a variety of economic, diplomatic, political, intelligence and military measures which could be considered under this option. All would have to be weighed carefully. At this time we recommend against actions which would create more hardship within the Haitian population. Illustrative measures include:

- Restricting Haiti's access to CBI, GSP, OPIC or Eximbank programs, discouraging trade and investment with Haiti, further cutbacks in our bilateral assistance and discouragement of multilateral assistance.

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-- A show of force through regional military exercises and overflights, closer cooperation with the Dominican Republic (which is trying to close its border with Haiti).

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A carefully calibrated, imaginatively implemented policy of confrontation/multilateral diplomatic effort is the preferred course of action.

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