

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Retirement Statistics on CIA Retirement and Disability System (CIARDS) for the General Accounting Office (GAO)

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1. [redacted] Office of Legislative Liaison, contacted me on 24 October to ask whether we would provide some retirement statistics on CIARDS to Mr. Tom Eickmayer, who is working on a GAO study on retirement options. Presumably this information will be used by the Senate in its overall study of retirement systems. The information requested is the average age and years of service for those CIARDS employees who elected optional retirement in fiscal year or calendar year 1983. Mr. Eickmayer has already received information from other agencies including the Air Traffic Controllers and the State Department.


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2. Because the information on CIARDS is available in the annual CIARDS report to the Congress, and [redacted] our consultant, does not see any harm in releasing this information, the Deputy Director of Personnel, [redacted] approved my giving this information to [redacted] for passage to Mr. Eickmayer for CIARDS in fiscal year 1983. The information is as follows: average Federal service 29.3 years, average age 52.8.

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cc: A-C/RD

*Cynthia
Retrieved from
Amazon Singh Plan I*

The DDI Analyst

Question: What makes him "unique"?

Answer: What other analyst, in or out of government,
 does what they do?

- There are no old analysts in the DI.
The analytical function in CIA is a wearing one. Day in and day out the analyst must be highly charged, and creative. Over time creativity and energy goes. There is a great deal of stress on older analysts being forced to learn new ADP techniques, to task and use new sophisticated collection systems.
You do not find creative, productive line analyst much beyond age forty. At that point you have to find them other jobs.

- One Agency Concepts
There is a need for the DI analyst to see themselves as a member of a unique team. The more you make that impossible the more you will lose them. We must psychologically strengthen that sense of uniqueness.

- We must hire people for a career.
It takes deep immersion over a period of time in substantive issues to develop the highly skilled DI analyst. The DDI is a young and inexperienced directorate at this time and this hurts. We don't want people coming in and out every five years--DDI analysts are not like academics. They must learn the intelligence business, complicated collection systems, writing techniques. Any retirement system which increases mobility would be detrimental to us.

- No one does what DDI does in esoteric areas--we are unique in our production of intelligence in such areas of Soviet rocketry, economics and crop production; terrorism, narcotics, etc.
Our job is a much more complicated and substantive analytical problem.

- We can't compete salary wise for the good people we need so our retirement system and benefits must be good. We must attract widely diverse talents--technical, emigrees, skilled writers, etc.

- Responsibility for Final Product

It is quite common for a GS-11/12 to brief a cabinet level or higher executive, brief the Hill, etc. The impact of our young analyst certainly makes us unique in Washington circles.

- Overseas Service of DI analyst

DI analyst overseas must be ^{paid}~~payed~~ and treated as equals to others serving overseas.