



**Director of
Central
Intelligence**

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National Intelligence Daily

**Monday
30 November 1987**



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HAITI:



Elections Called Off

The ruling council has dissolved the electoral commission following the commission's postponement of yesterday's presidential and legislative elections, a move that portends further violence and that will seriously complicate any attempt to put the transition to civilian rule back on track. 

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The council's announcement disbanding the commission gave no details of any plan to salvage the current election process. Earlier yesterday, the commission had suspended voting because of widespread violence led by rightists, but it apparently intended to reschedule the election for another date, according to US officials. Bands of armed men attacked voters before the polling was halted, and at least 27 people were killed. The commission on Saturday had called off balloting in several outlying areas because of violence or the failure of voting materials to arrive on time. 

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The Army apparently has done little so far to apprehend armed attackers or to control the escalating violence. US officials report troops from outlying areas have been ordered to return to Port-au-Prince, but few soldiers were on the streets of the capital yesterday afternoon. The military's presence in the provincial city of Gonaives also has been strengthened.  the Army seized ballots and closed polling places in that city—the site of major violence over the weekend—before the commission postponed the voting. 

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Comment: The council's action will be seen by many Haitians as an attempt by the military to scuttle the election process altogether. Further violence between factions favoring and opposing the process could well prevent elections any time soon and severely test the military's ability to establish order. If the security situation continues to deteriorate, indiscriminate violence by rightists and vigilantes will place the lives of US nationals and other foreigners in Haiti at greater risk. 

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WESTERN EUROPE: Criticizing USSR's Persian Gulf Role

The major West European governments blame Moscow for blocking implementation of the UN Security Council's Resolution 598 on a cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq war but are divided over whether to take steps to compel the Soviets to cooperate.

[Redacted]

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[Redacted] most West European leaders believe Moscow is stalling on the UN cease-fire resolution in an effort to cultivate influence with Iran and will continue its delaying tactics unless compelled to cooperate by external pressure. They do not, however, agree on how to change this situation. [Redacted]

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The British want to build broad international support for an arms embargo to force Moscow to cooperate or face diplomatic isolation. The French argue that the US and the UK are not exerting enough direct pressure on the Soviets and should not waste time encouraging Arab pressure on Moscow. [Redacted]

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Foreign Minister Andreotti claims he told the Soviet Ambassador in Rome that Italy will push for enforcement of a cease-fire if Tehran continues to stall, according to the US Embassy. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted] The Embassy reports that the West Germans favor drafting a cease-fire enforcement resolution, but not an arms embargo, as a means of putting Moscow on the spot when it assumes chairmanship of the Security Council tomorrow.

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[Redacted]

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Comment: Differences among themselves make it unlikely that the West Europeans will collectively press Moscow on implementing Resolution 598. The West Germans and Italians remain reluctant to bring the issue to a head, while London fears that the French may be less cooperative in the Security Council if Paris resolves its Embassy dispute with Iran. [Redacted]

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PERSIAN GULF: Iranian Warnings, Iraqi Attacks

The Iranian press reports that, in a speech to war volunteers on Saturday, President Khamenei warned that, in order to confront the US in the Persian Gulf, Tehran will not wait for the US to strike first. Khamenei asserted the US naval presence is not primarily intended to escort ships but "to gain a foothold in the region" and to strike at Iran. He declared that, if Iran believes the US is continuing its "provocative acts" in the Gulf or "endangering" Iranian interests there, Tehran will "certainly strike." Meanwhile, Iraq claimed its aircraft attacked at least four tankers off the Iranian coast this weekend. Baghdad asserted Iraqi aircraft also bombed Iranian hydroelectric plants at two dams in the southwest and strafed Iranian troop positions along the northern front yesterday. [Redacted]

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Comment: Khamenei's warning that Iran may strike first at the US marks an escalation in Tehran's recent public threats and suggests that the Iranian leadership now is more willing to confront US forces in the Gulf. Previous threats by Tehran's leaders have generally been explained as part of Iran's determination to defend itself should the US strike first. Iran is likely to retaliate for any successful Iraqi attacks with additional strikes of its own against Gulf shipping. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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DIA Comment: DIA believes that Khamenei's speech was designed primarily for mobilization week efforts and, additionally, expresses Tehran's continuing concern over US intentions in the Gulf. Rather than an escalation, this speech lacks the vociferous threats of earlier statements while qualifying Iran's intentions as dependent on US actions against Iranian interests. [Redacted]

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TURKEY: National Assembly Election Results

Early returns point to a victory for Prime Minister Ozal's Motherland Party in Turkey's national election yesterday. With most of the votes counted, Motherland was holding steady at slightly over 36 percent of the ballots cast, while its chief competitor on the right, the Correct Way Party of former Prime Minister Demirel, had just under 20 percent. The Social Democratic Populist Party was polling 24.7 percent of the votes, comfortably ahead of its principal rival on the left, the Democratic Left Party of former Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit. The latter had only about 8.5 percent of the votes. Minor parties split the remaining votes.




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Comment: If these results hold, they should be enough to secure another majority in the National Assembly for Ozal. He will probably face a much stronger parliamentary opposition, however, particularly from the Social Democratic Populists. Their strong finish in the campaign's final weeks is likely to strengthen the hand of party Chairman Inonu and possibly unite most of the left under his party's banner. Indeed, a failure by Ecevit's party to pass the 10-percent barrier could lead to the gradual dissolution of his party and even to the eclipse of his political career.



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


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
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
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
BANGLADESH: Ershad Confronts 72-Hour Strike

The first day of a 72-hour general strike scheduled to begin yesterday was less successful than anticipated by the opposition because of the state of emergency imposed Friday by President Ershad. According to the US Embassy, there was little violence amid heavy rickshaw and pedestrian traffic as 40 to 50 percent of the stores in Dhaka were open for business. This relative calm returned after Ershad ordered the crackdown on opposition activity, including large-scale arrests of leaders, a ban on demonstrations and strikes, and daily curfews in five cities. The Embassy reports that Ershad—after meeting with military leaders—also made a nationally broadcast speech to reiterate his refusal to resign, but he held out the possibilities of midterm elections and a change to a parliamentary form of government.




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Comment: The President's drastic measures to break the strike and end the opposition's stranglehold on the government and the economy seem to be working. Ershad retains the support of the military, but any failure by police and paramilitary units to enforce the state of emergency could provoke military intervention and Ershad's downfall. The President is gambling that many of the opposition leaders—also tired of the dislocation—will be ready to negotiate once order is restored. These talks are unlikely, however, unless he releases Awami League leader Sheikh Hasina and the leader of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, Begum Zia.



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In Brief

East Asia

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— **Vietnamese** resistance fighters captured in **Laos** to stand trial in Vietnam this week, according to US diplomats . . . will be tried as Vietnamese citizens despite foreign passports . . . accusations against US will probably be limited. [Redacted]

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— **Philippine** armed forces chief Ramos ordering expanded operations against Communist rebels who raided US company's plantations on Mindanao recently, according to press . . . company threatening to leave . . . initial military response meager. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Europe

— **Poland's** referendum on political and economic reforms marked by scattered, largely peaceful protests yesterday . . . 68 percent turnout low, but enough to make outcome binding . . . confusing ballot apparently part of regime's effort to manipulate results.

[Redacted]

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Americas

— Death of student in police custody triggered new rioting in Merida, western **Venezuela**, on Thursday, according to US Embassy . . . protests expected throughout country this week, but security forces will contain further violence. [Redacted]

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Oceania

— **Australian** Prime Minister Hawke in **USSR** this week to sign trade agreement . . . wants to preserve share of Soviet grain market, says US Embassy in Canberra . . . Australia's huge trade surplus will continue despite Soviet displeasure. [Redacted]

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Special Analysis**AFGHANISTAN: Insurgents and a Political Settlement**

Most Afghan insurgent leaders believe they are on the way to a military victory and have little interest in the type of negotiated peace Moscow has suggested as face saving—one that would include a substantial role for the current Kabul regime, a leadership post for former King Zahir Shah, and a UN peacekeeping force. Reports that Moscow is ready to shorten its withdrawal timetable and might accede to an interim coalition regime not dominated by the Afghan Communists have not budged the insurgent leadership from its hard line. [redacted]

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The improving combat effectiveness of the insurgents and the growing evidence of the Kabul regime's decline have decreased the already limited interest the resistance had in a negotiated peace. Alliance leader Khalis, in recent statements at the UN and in discussions with US officials, indicated the insurgents were thinking only in terms of military victory. Khalis almost certainly represented the prevailing attitude of the insurgents—especially that of the field commanders—when he indicated that they alone would determine the future political shape of Afghanistan. [redacted]

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Political Power of the Commanders Growing

The statements by Khalis reflect his views and a realization that a peace settlement must satisfy the increasingly influential and hardline field commanders. The major political development in the Afghan insurgency in recent years has been the efforts that the major regional commanders—Masood in the north, Ismail Khan in the west, and, to a lesser extent, commanders loyal to Khalis in the south—have taken to build independent political organizations largely beyond the control of alliance leaders in Peshawar. Their efforts have been spurred by disgust with the party chiefs' failure to build a united political front and by a belief that alliance disunity promotes insurgent divisiveness and military inefficiency inside Afghanistan. [redacted]

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Insisting on a Voice in Any Peace Settlement

Most commanders, [redacted] reject the notion of a peace settlement reached without their participation. They would not tolerate a substantial role for the Kabul regime and a leadership role for Zahir Shah in an interim government—each a condition that most reporting indicates is essential to Moscow's definition of a face-saving withdrawal. The commanders harbor a deep distrust of the UN-sponsored Geneva talks and would also balk

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at the notion of a UN peacekeeping force to oversee the Soviets' departure. Insurgent attacks on such a force probably would not be uncommon. [Redacted]

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The field commanders' growing political influence means that party leaders in Pakistan probably cannot guarantee that their commanders will abide by a peace settlement designed to provide the Soviets a graceful departure. The Pakistanis might coerce several of the party leaders to support arrangements for such a withdrawal, but those leaders would forfeit their standing with the commanders and would lose influence over events inside Afghanistan. Indeed, party chiefs who defied Pakistani pressure to cooperate would ensure their survival as respected, if not necessarily powerful, political leaders.

[Redacted]

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Evading Pakistan's Leverage

The commanders probably believe they can cope with any Pakistani attempts to force their acquiescence in a peace settlement. The insurgents are aware that Islamabad is betting that military pressure will persuade the Soviets to withdraw and probably believe that the Pakistanis will not limit the supplies sustaining that military pressure. Moreover, the regional commanders previously have demonstrated they are capable of fending for themselves. They no doubt estimate that the stockpiling they have already done, along with the large amounts of weaponry they would capture from regime forces in the chaos following a Soviet withdrawal announcement, would keep their forces militarily viable. [Redacted]

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Outlook

Although a settlement imposed on the Afghan insurgents probably would lead some commanders to sit tight and conserve supplies for the inevitable postwar power struggle, most commanders probably would continue harassing attacks on the Soviets as they withdrew. The attacks would increase in intensity if the departing Soviets conducted air or ground operations against the resistance. Because of their distrust of Moscow, their need to maintain credibility among their followers, and the population's thirst for revenge, most commanders probably would not abide by a political settlement that was not an obvious defeat for Moscow and its Afghan clients.

[Redacted]

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INR Comment: INR agrees that virtually no Afghan currently in opposition will accept a settlement that leaves the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan in actual control of the country.

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Many elements of the resistance, however, are likely to accede to the establishment of a transitional regime, with a subsidiary participation by the PDPA, or a role for Zahir Shah. [Redacted]

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It will be almost impossible for major commanders to oppose an agreement that would get rid of the Soviets in a relatively short time frame and, ultimately the PDPA, although some insurgents would certainly attack retreating Soviet forces. Any such settlement will prove irresistible to the civilians, who have suffered most in the war— and whose wishes the guerrillas will find it hard to oppose. [Redacted]

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Resistance hardliners would probably refuse to participate in such an arrangement, and their rejection could well keep more flexible elements of the resistance out of a coalition. The insurgents probably would agree with the Intelligence Community assessment that the Kabul regime will not survive absent Soviet troops (withdrawing under no more than a one-year timetable). [Redacted]

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
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Growing Shia and Fatah Presence in Lebanon



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Special Analysis

**LEBANON-
ARAB STATES:**

PLO Ties to Lebanon's Hizballah

The pro-Arafat Fatah element of the PLO has developed an extensive tactical alliance with the Iranian-backed Hizballah movement in Lebanon over the past several years. This may give Hizballah access to Fatah's well-established international networks, facilitating efforts by fundamentalist Shias to establish their own terrorist network outside the Middle East. [Redacted]

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The links between Fatah and Hizballah stem from personal relationships formed in the 1970s, before the Hizballah movement emerged as a force in Lebanon, and have remained one of the most durable alliances in Lebanon. Several Lebanese Shias who later became prominent Hizballah leaders were at that time either members of Fatah or had ties to senior Fatah officials, including Arafat. Prominent Hizballah terrorist leaders Imad Mughniyah and Mustafa Shihadi reportedly were once members of Force 17, Fatah's elite security force. In addition, Hizballah spiritual leader Shaykh Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah has allegedly maintained a personal relationship with Arafat since the early 1970s. [Redacted]

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Organizational Links

The Fatah-Hizballah relationship has grown substantially since 1983 but is still largely tactical and primarily focused on common objectives in Lebanon. Fatah has provided money, weapons, and materiel to Hizballah in exchange for help in reinfiltrating Palestinian guerrillas and rebuilding a power base in Lebanon. Hizballah has also supplied logistic support to Fatah fighters to help defend against Amal attacks on Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon. [Redacted]

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This cooperation serves the interests of both groups in countering Amal and Syrian intervention while also obstructing Israel's efforts to secure its northern border. [Redacted] the two groups have cooperated in attacks against Syrian forces in Beirut as well as Israeli targets in southern Lebanon. In addition, the two groups reportedly support dissident elements inside Syria and may be planning joint operations there. [Redacted]

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In the past two years, Fatah officials have used their ties to Hizballah to help arrange the release of at least one, and possibly two, foreign hostages held by the fundamentalists. Arafat recognizes the political

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benefits the PLO can derive from successful intercession and probably hopes it will help to win Western recognition. Fatah's influence over Hizballah on hostage matters is very limited, however, and to date has been effective only with hostages of secondary importance to Hizballah. [redacted]

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Implications

The infusion of several thousand Syrian troops into West Beirut, which began in February, is likely to encourage more active cooperation between Hizballah and Fatah units, particularly if Syrian forces move against the Palestinian refugee camps or take on the Hizballah forces in Beirut's southern suburbs. Such moves by the Syrians would undoubtedly provoke Fatah and Hizballah to join forces against the Syrians in Lebanon and could lead to joint operations inside Syria or against Syrian targets outside the Middle East. [redacted]

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The Fatah-Hizballah relationship presents a serious threat to Israeli interests. Their cooperation in southern Lebanon probably will result in more sophisticated, effective attacks against Israeli troops and the Army of South Lebanon. [redacted]

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The alliance could spill over into Western Europe as well, although Fatah is less likely to cooperate with Hizballah in conducting terrorist operations there. Hizballah has been trying to extend its terrorist operations to Western Europe since at least January, when three Hizballah terrorists, including suspected hijacker Muhammad Hammadi, were arrested trying to smuggle explosives through Frankfurt, West Germany, and Milan, Italy. Hizballah apparently has had little success in establishing an operational base in Western Europe, however, and may try to gain access to Fatah's extensive logistic network to support its own operations. Any increased Hizballah capability to conduct operations presents a serious threat to US interests abroad, but any joint Fatah-Hizballah operations outside Lebanon would probably—at Fatah's behest—be limited to Syrian or Israeli targets. [redacted]

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Whatever their current mutual interests, Fatah and Hizballah have divergent, long-term objectives in Lebanon, and these differences are likely to strain their relationship if the situation in Lebanon stabilizes. Palestinian efforts to reestablish a presence in Lebanon as a base for confronting Israel will conflict with Hizballah's desires to assume political control and establish an Iranian-style Islamic republic. Advances in the Middle East peace process, particularly if there were any evidence of Fatah negotiations with Israel, would almost certainly sharply curtail Hizballah's ties to Fatah and might lead Hizballah to add its current ally to its list of terrorist targets. [redacted]

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