





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


# National Intelligence Daily

**Wednesday  
23 September 1987**



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
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**PERSIAN GULF:**

**Situation Report**

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**Iranian Reaction**

Since the Iran Ajr was hit, Iranian leaders have continued to portray themselves as undeterred by the prospect of conflict with the US or international isolation. President Khamenei, speaking at the UN, stressed the success of Iran's Islamic revolution despite opposition from the US and the UN's allegedly weak response to Iraq's invasion in 1980. Khamenei and Assembly Speaker Rafsanjani have both publicly threatened retaliation against the US for the attack and warned implicitly that US interests outside the Gulf are at risk, a point repeated in a Tehran Radio commentary. [Redacted]

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**Comment:** The Iranians' uncompromising rhetoric and their virtual abandonment of any hint of flexibility on accepting UN Resolution 598 suggests an increased willingness to risk UN sanctions. The emotions that are sure to be aroused in Iran over the deaths of Iranians by US fire increase Iran's incentive to strike at US interests. Iranian leaders probably believe they must act soon or lose credibility. [Redacted]

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**Gulf States' Reactions**

~~Kuwaiti and Bahraini officials have expressed strong approval of the US attack on the Iranian minelaying ship Ajr, according to US Embassy reporting. [Redacted] the Kuwaitis were pleased to see the US actively back up its commitment to protect shipping in the Gulf. [Redacted]~~

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**Comment:** ~~While Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have not yet reacted to the incident, their private response is likely to be favorable, given Riyadh's current tough stand toward Tehran and the UAE's concern about Iran's recent mining of its territorial waters.~~ Oman, which prefers to avoid confrontation with Tehran, is likely to refrain from publicly supporting the US attack, believing that the incident has only served to aggravate tensions in the region.

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**Soviet and Iranian Foreign Ministers Meet at UN**



TASS characterized as "frank" talks between Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and Iranian Foreign Minister Velayati at the UN on Monday. Iranian media tried to portray a greater convergence of opinion on bilateral trade and on the issue of UN sanctions as a followup to Resolution 598. TASS mentioned only long-term bilateral development, while decrying the West's exploitation of the "senseless bloodshed" between Iran and Iraq. Shevardnadze said ~~late Monday~~ *on 21 Sept* that the US attack on an Iranian naval ship proved that a naval buildup was risky and restated Moscow's opposition to a US military presence in the Gulf.

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
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**Comment:** The muted Soviet coverage of the Shevardnadze-Velayati meeting may represent a slight tailoring of Moscow's position since an Arab League delegation reportedly protested sharply to Shevardnadze earlier this month Soviet reluctance to press Tehran for a cease-fire. Shevardnadze's comment on the US attack repeats the line Moscow has taken on the Gulf war since early July. The Soviets undoubtedly will continue to focus more on the US and Western naval presence in the Gulf than on Iranian unwillingness to adhere to the UN cease-fire resolution.

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
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
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**NICARAGUA:**

**Cease-Fire Announced**

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***The Sandinistas' announcement of a partial cease-fire is probably intended to encourage rebel field commanders to abandon the struggle and will put the onus on the insurgents for any continued fighting.***




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President Ortega, citing the regime's determination to comply with the Central American peace plan, announced ~~yesterday~~ that Managua would postpone offensive military operations in certain parts of the country. Government troops will be concentrated in specific areas and defend themselves only if attacked.



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Ortega called on the National Reconciliation Commission headed by Cardinal Obando to seek out insurgent field commanders and determine their willingness to abide by a cease-fire and accept government amnesty. Recently formed local peace commissions comprised of prominent citizens, clergy, and relatives of insurgents will also participate in talks with the rebels.




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Simultaneously, Managua announced that the Catholic Church radio station, closed since late 1985, will be allowed to reopen immediately.




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**Comment:** Although no date for the start of the cease-fire was announced, Managua is likely to move ahead quickly. The regime probably calculates that the move will help head off international pressure to negotiate a cease-fire agreement directly with rebel leaders.



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The cease-fire probably will be limited to some isolated, sparsely populated, rural areas in eastern and southern Nicaragua where large numbers of insurgents operate. Withdrawing government troops from such areas would limit the guerrillas' ability to attack better-defended economic and military targets but would not abandon major segments of the population to rebel control.



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The reopening of the radio station follows the regime's decision last weekend to allow *La Prensa* to resume publication and will be welcomed by the church hierarchy. Deterioration of the radio station's equipment over the past 18 months may delay its opening for several weeks.



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
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**PANAMA: Delvalle Considers Resigning**

Panamanian President Delvalle will seriously consider resigning if he and the regime cannot find a solution to the current political crisis, [redacted] Delvalle's family and advisers are telling him that he lacks support from the military, from the ruling-party coalition, and, increasingly, from the business sector. Moreover, he feels under pressure to bring about the removal of Defense Chief Noriega, even as Noriega's political position is improving. [redacted]

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**Comment:** Delvalle has raised the possibility of resigning several times in the past to increase his leverage with Noriega. He probably hopes this tactic will force the military to allow him greater latitude in policymaking. Noriega and the General Staff want the President to stay on, fearing his resignation would embolden the opposition and increase international criticism. In addition, the military is reluctant to allow outspoken Vice President Esquivel to succeed Delvalle. [redacted]

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**BRAZIL: Controversy Over Draft Constitution**



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The latest version of Brazil's draft constitution reflects minor compromise on a few controversial issues, but the process still has a long way to go and bitter debate is likely when the final draft reaches the full Constituent Assembly next month. ~~According to the US Embassy,~~ key provisions include a parliamentary system of government—to be implemented in March 1988—a six-year term for President Sarney, and retention of—with some restrictions—the military's prerogatives to protect law and order. The draft also includes a watered-down but still controversial amnesty provision for military personnel cashiered for political reasons. [redacted]

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**Comment:** The amnesty provision has been tempered to meet major concerns of the armed forces, but military leaders are certain to remain preoccupied over this issue and over the entire constitutional drafting process. The military will continue to lobby Assembly delegates to modify their positions on amnesty. President Sarney has shown weak leadership thus far—in fact, the amendments he proposed earlier have been largely rejected in this version—and is not well positioned to moderate debate in the coming months. ~~If the economic situation deteriorates further, controlling the constitutional process will become even more difficult.~~ [redacted]

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**CUBA: Paris Club Creditors Meet**

The Paris Club of Western creditors will meet tomorrow and Friday to discuss Cuban debt relief. Havana's failure to change economic policies to meet debt repayment schedules has exhausted the patience of official creditors, according to US Embassy reporting. Paris Club chairman Trichet has reportedly said that creditors might have to "reorient their whole thinking on Cuba," suggesting the Club is tiring of one-sided efforts to help Havana meet payments. Cuba last July released data showing increased hard currency deficits and near-zero economic growth in 1986.

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**Comment:** The Paris Club will probably extend no new credits to Cuba because of Havana's refusal to cooperate on economic adjustment. They may compromise on old debt to encourage future repayment, but deteriorating hard currency accounts probably preclude full Cuban payments to creditors this year. Lack of credit will continue to limit Havana's access to Western imports critical to growth, which will, in turn, accelerate Cuba's economic slide.

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**PERU: Unresponsive Oil Policy**

Peru's failure to address the concerns of a major US oil company may prompt the firm to withdraw, according to the US Embassy, a move that would discourage foreign investment in this key industry. The US firm, which produces nearly half of Peru's oil, is entangled in tax disputes, has encountered bureaucratic delays in importing critical supplies and equipment, and faces accusations that it improperly remitted more than \$800 million to its home office. Another US oil firm, whose operations were nationalized in December 1985, has yet to receive any compensation.


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**Comment:** The pullout of the company would be a major blow to an industry that from 1980 to 1985 was Peru's major foreign exchange earner. Since President Garcia took office, oil production has dropped 14 percent, and last year export volume declined by a fifth. Despite complaints by Peru's national oil companies about underfunding and complex import controls, which have delayed deliveries of spare parts, Garcia has paid only lipservice to the industry's problems.

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**COLOMBIA: Leftists Protest Political Murders**

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[Redacted]

Communist labor leaders are organizing nationwide demonstrations tomorrow to protest recent murders of leftwing politicians, union leaders, and educators. Marches are planned in five major cities, and as many as 50,000 people may demonstrate in Bogota, according to the US Embassy. [Redacted] insurgent front organizations hope to use the rallies to promote guerrilla unity. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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**Comment:** The year-old Communist labor confederation, Colombia's largest labor group, has been working with the insurgents to publicize charges that the military and rightwing death squads are involved in the murders of leftists. Similar protests in June attracted large crowds but did not result in major violence. More demonstrations are likely and will probably culminate in a general strike before the end of the year. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

**USSR: Personnel Reduction in Military Staffs**

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The staffs of all Soviet headquarters at military district level and above will be cut by 15 percent. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] Officers affected by the cuts reportedly will be reassigned to combat units or retired if age 60 or older; new officers assigned to key headquarters billets will be one rank lower than the current incumbents. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] the program would be completed by the end of the year and would affect approximately 700 generals. General Secretary Gorbachev may have revealed this decision during a meeting with senior officers early in the summer, where he questioned the USSR's need for 4,000 general officers. [Redacted]

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**Comment:** If both officers and enlisted personnel are included in this program, the overall cuts may involve tens of thousands of men. Of the reported 700 generals affected, most probably are over age 60 and will be retired. Gorbachev believes that cuts in headquarters staffs are needed as part of his drive to save resources and eliminate unnecessary or unproductive officers. The 15-percent reduction in staffs, however, probably will cause resentment among senior officers, especially coming on the heels of the personnel firings that resulted from the Cessna incident. Many younger officers might see the move as potentially beneficial to their careers. [Redacted]

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
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**SRI LANKA-INDIA: Tigers Reassessing Strategy**



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The press reports that one Tiger leader has resorted to a hunger strike to win support for his group's position and that the Tigers have finally submitted nominees for the interim provincial council to the Indian Government.

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**Comment:** The Tigers apparently recognize that their efforts to dominate rival Tamil groups and intimidate residents of Eastern Province through violence have weakened support for their organization. They may hope that a temporary emphasis on nonviolence will recover lost support and that a show of cooperation with India, particularly through the submission of names for the interim council, will strengthen their position in the future provincial government. Sri Lanka's local Tamil population may feel emboldened by the presence of Indian troops, however, and may respond less than enthusiastically to Tiger efforts.



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


**PHILIPPINES-ASEAN: Summit Venue in Question**

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
Senior officials from several member countries of Association of Southeast Asian Nations have expressed concern about the security situation in the Philippines and may request that the meeting of ASEAN heads of state, scheduled for December in Manila, be postponed or moved, Indonesian Foreign Minister Mochtar reportedly plans to suggest a change of venue at a special meeting of ASEAN foreign ministers in New York this month. President Aquino has publicly pledged full security for visiting ASEAN leaders and claims the armed forces are taking measures to make Manila secure.



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**Comment:** The concerns of the ASEAN leaders are part of the aftermath of the recent coup attempt in the Philippines and the military's failure to capture the rebel military leader, Colonel Honasan. Aquino almost certainly sees the summit as an opportunity to improve the Philippines' international status, show Manila can play an active regional role, and demonstrate the viability of her government. The loss of the summit would be seen as a vote of no confidence from ASEAN neighbors. Unless Aquino can convince them she is firmly in control, she will probably fail to secure the summit.



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
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**ETHIOPIA: New Autonomous Regions Established**

Ethiopia has announced the creation of five autonomous regions— Eritrea, Tigray, and Assab in the north, and Dire Dawa and the Ogaden in the east—that will have limited control over their internal economic and political affairs. Addis Ababa also redrew existing provincial boundaries to create a total of 24 provinces with a view to increasing administrative efficiency.

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**Comment:** President Mengistu probably hopes to undercut local support for insurgents by meeting some of the demands for self-rule by dissidents in Eritrea, Tigray, and the Ogaden. In addition, Addis Ababa may calculate that the granting of a measure of autonomy to ethnic Somalis in the Ogaden—which Mogadishu has long identified as its principal objective in pressing Somalia's claim to the region—will clear the way for resumption of stalled talks on the disputed border. The creation of the regions may marginally erode local support for the regional rebellions, but Eritrean and Tigrean leaders have already rejected the new arrangement. Somalia probably will dismiss the changes as cosmetic and adopt a wait-and-see attitude.



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**SOMALIA: Backpedaling on IMF Reforms**

President Siad has announced plans to reverse key parts of Somalia's IMF reform program by ending the foreign exchange auction and reimposing fixed prices on some food items, according to the US Embassy. The Foreign Minister told US diplomats that the changes are not intended to repudiate reform but to bring it into line with domestic priorities. A member of the Siad family recently charged privately, however, that US pressure for economic liberalization is intended to undermine the President's rule, according to the Embassy.

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**Comment:** Siad probably decided to cancel the auction—which has sharply devalued the Somali shilling—to appease his Marehan clan, whose financial and political interests have been damaged by the IMF reforms. He probably judged that Mogadishu's declining ability to pay for imports, together with reduced US military aid, is eroding vital support from the armed forces. He also may have concluded that returning the economy to government control will improve the standard of living. In breaching IMF guidelines, Somalia risks losing substantial assistance from the US and others, but Siad probably expects to persuade donors to accommodate the changes.




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In Brief

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USSR

[Redacted]

Soviet Foreign Ministry announced two Soviet advisers earlier reported missing in southern **Libya** died during hostilities . . . assigned no blame to **Chad** for deaths . . . first public admission of Soviet casualties in Libya. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Soviet and Chinese Foreign Ministers met at UN for fourth annual discussion . . . TASS account indicated agreement on many international issues, disagreement on **Cambodia** . . . Chinese media reported only the divergence on Cambodia. [Redacted]

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Americas

[Redacted]

Nicaraguan independent newspaper *La Prensa* may have tacitly agreed to exercise restraint in criticizing regime . . . ~~Editor told US Embassy that~~ daily will observe certain limits . . . owners probably fear harassment, another shutdown. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Police in **Rome** arrested three suspects yesterday for attempted murder of **Colombian** Ambassador to **Hungary** last January . . . drug traffickers probably contracted hit team . . . Ambassador, former Justice Minister, active antidrug proponent in UN. [Redacted]

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East Asia

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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Europe

[Redacted]

Hungarian Premier announced financial problems causing withdrawal from the **Soviet** Tengiz oil and gas project . . . Gorbachev reportedly approved Hungarian pullout last July . . . costly participation uneconomical for Budapest. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

UK's Tornado air defense aircraft unlikely to be fully operational until mid-1990, [Redacted] budget constraints delaying purchase of advanced missiles until 1996 . . . radar improved but still below design specifications. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Austrian Chancellor Vranitzky changed mind about meeting opposition leader Walesa during current visit to **Poland** . . . first Western head of government to visit since martial law, probably bowing to pressure from Warsaw. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Greek Prime Minister announced third Cabinet reshuffle in 11 months . . . five ministers out, three prominent leftwingers back in, major posts untouched . . . Papandreou may be mollifying left wing after party divisions over his centrist policies. [Redacted]

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**Possible Politburo Alignment**

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**Gorbachev Supporters**

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Viktor Nikonov <sup>a</sup> <i>Agriculture Secretary</i>	Praised by Gorbachev as agricultural reform coordinator.
Nikolay Ryzhkov <i>Premier</i>	Backs radical economic reform but may prefer slower pace.
Eduard Shevardnadze <i>Foreign Minister</i>	Loyalty extends beyond foreign policy matters.
Nikolay Slyun'kov <sup>a</sup> <i>Economic Secretary</i>	Economic reform specialist; backed by Ryzhkov.
Aleksandr Yakovlev <sup>a</sup> <i>Propaganda Secretary</i>	Handpicked by Gorbachev; leading advocate of drastic reform.
Lev Zaykov <i>Industry Secretary</i>	Promoted rapidly under Gorbachev; backs party reform.

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**Position Unclear**

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Vitaliy Vorotnikov <i>RSFSR Premier</i>	Speeches noncommittal; promoted under Andropov.
Mikhail Solomentsev <i>Party Control Chief</i>	Basically for reform but may have reservations.

---

**Probably Skeptical**

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Geydar Aliyev <i>1st Deputy Premier</i>	Reportedly at odds with Gorbachev and under investigation for corruption.
Viktor Chebrikov <i>KGB Chief</i>	Supported Gorbachev at first but now sees dangers; Gorbachev rumored to want new KGB chief.
Andrey Gromyko <i>President</i>	Gave key support to Gorbachev in 1985. May have strong objections to policies; could be pivotal figure in this group.
Yegor Ligachev <i>Number Two in Party</i>	Supported Gorbachev at first, now alarmed by his policies. Being squeezed out.
Vladimir Shcherbitskiy <i>Ukraine Party Chief</i>	Has begun to back some reforms but might side with opponents in showdown.

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<sup>a</sup> Promoted to full Politburo member at June 1987 plenum.

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
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**Special Analysis**

**USSR:**

**Politburo Polemics Intensify**

**General Secretary Gorbachev strengthened his hold on the Politburo at the June plenum, but it appears that his reform agenda is alienating a still-powerful Politburo minority increasingly skeptical of aspects of his program. Party secretary Ligachev and KGB chief Chebrikov, taking advantage of Gorbachev's absence on vacation, have launched an attack on abuses of openness—glasnost—that appears to be a direct challenge to key Gorbachev policies. Unless the party leader can silence these dissenting voices—either through accommodation or a showdown—their outspokenness will encourage those in the lower ranks of the party who are resisting Gorbachev's policies.**



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**Comment:** Public differences between Gorbachev and his de facto party deputy, Yegor Ligachev, became increasingly evident about the time of the June plenum. At the plenum, Gorbachev promoted three allies to full Politburo membership, diluting the influence of Ligachev, who has been acting as a spokesman for party conservatives. Despite the promotion of Aleksandr Yakovlev and Viktor Nikonov to oversee ideology and agriculture, respectively, Ligachev continues to be active in these fields, sending messages that appear to conflict with those of Gorbachev's allies. This has been most evident in the ideological sphere, where Ligachev has differed openly with Gorbachev and Yakovlev over the limits of *glasnost*.




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For the first time, these concerns of Ligachev's are being openly supported by another Politburo member. He and Chebrikov are now suggesting that Gorbachev's policies are producing unacceptable consequences. there are other contentious issues in the Politburo, such as economic reform and arms control. In his latest remarks Ligachev stressed that the media should be guided by the speeches of Gorbachev and "other leaders"—rather than just the party leader, as is the norm. Speeches last week by Ligachev and Chebrikov laid out their concerns about Gorbachev's program.




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Their principal theme is that *glasnost* is getting out of control. Ligachev lashed out at editors who on their own authority print only one side of a story. He called for the practice to be "stamped out," hinting strongly at the need to impose tighter controls on the media.




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Both leaders also argued that *glasnost* is being used by enemies to subvert Soviet society and stir up minority nationalities; they specifically pointed to recent demonstrations in the Baltic republics.

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Ligachev claimed that reactionary forces are forming a "united front" to "wreck our policy." Chebrikov, implicitly criticizing the release of political prisoners who then aid the West, argued in effect that human rights concessions do not work. [redacted]

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Both men were sharply critical of current efforts to reinterpret Soviet history, particularly the reopening of the Stalin question and efforts to discredit the Brezhnev era. Ligachev has defended the economic gains made during the Brezhnev years and noted that military parity with the West was achieved then. Gorbachev and his allies have been encouraging the historical critics, apparently hoping that by thoroughly discrediting the past they will help pave the way for major reforms. [redacted]

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Both leaders implicitly defended the current system of collective agriculture. Gorbachev has announced agriculture will be the subject of a forthcoming plenum and hinted that he wants fundamental changes in the current system. A debate is raging in the Soviet press over the merits of collectivization, and the remarks of Ligachev and Chebrikov decisively reject the line being advanced by reformers that it was a mistake. [redacted]

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### **Prospects**

The changes at the June plenum appear to have ensured Gorbachev a slim working majority on most issues. If he were in serious political trouble, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze would probably not have been able to take the initiatives that led to basic agreement with the US on an arms control package. [redacted]

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The sharpening of Ligachev's rhetoric and his apparent alliance with Chebrikov, however, suggest that differences within the Politburo may be approaching a critical point. Gorbachev's support is weaker in the party Central Committee, where a majority of members attained their positions under Brezhnev and many members feel threatened by Gorbachev's reforms. [redacted] many military officers see the reforms as eroding their influence on policy and even their control over subordinates. A disaffected Politburo minority might try to bring its case to the Central Committee. [redacted]

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The current assault on Gorbachev's policies may stem more from desperation than strength. There have been persistent rumors in Moscow over the past year that Gorbachev plans to move Chebrikov and Ligachev to less influential posts. Perhaps to set the stage,

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Gorbachev reportedly established recently special groups headed by supporters to monitor the KGB and control the course of *glasnost*.



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
Even under a policy of *glasnost*, the airing of top-level dissenting views is not in Gorbachev's interest, and he will want to move to silence them.



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**INR Comment:** INR believes this analysis overstates both the intensity of disagreement within the Politburo and its effect on leadership cohesion. The differences identified here would in the past have been signs of a serious challenge to a party leader, but the latitude for public debate among leaders may be broader in the Gorbachev era of *glasnost*.



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The differences appear to center on how to implement reforms that all agree are essential. Ligachev and Chebrikov do reflect uneasiness among segments of the party over the trend of events in the cultural field, and Gorbachev and Ligachev do differ in tone and emphasis. Gorbachev himself, however, has warned that limits must be placed on *glasnost*, called for "more discipline, more order," and condemned a "disrespectful attitude" toward the achievements of the Stalin era. Gorbachev, in sum, has encouraged the airing of divergent views, and is not necessarily threatened when they appear.



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


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