



**Directorate of
Intelligence**

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Worldwide Active Measures and Propaganda Alert



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November 1987

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November 1987*

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21 The Decline of the Peace Movement in West Germany: Implications for Soviet Active Measures in Western Europe [Redacted] 25X1
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The prospective INF agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union will accelerate the decline of the West European peace movement—whose cohesion and influence have deteriorated steadily since INF deployments began in 1983—and further diminish its utility to Moscow as a vehicle to shape public opinion on arms control. [Redacted] 25X1

25 **Calendar of Key Events, 1987-88** [Redacted] 25X1
[Redacted] 25X1

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Preface

This quarterly publication is designed to provide timely updates of ongoing active measures and propaganda campaigns by the USSR and its allies. This issue covers the period 15 August 1987 to 15 November 1987. It is also designed to provide warning of future campaigns. The quarterly is composed of four parts:

- A perspective, which provides a look at recent trends in active measures.
- Brief overviews of both worldwide and regional campaigns.
- Articles containing detailed analyses of trends in the entire political influence arena—active measures, propaganda, and public diplomacy—and speculation on future developments.
- An annotated calendar of key events that we anticipate will figure prominently in campaigns by the Soviets and their allies.

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[Redacted]

Perspective

Financial Constraints to Active Measures:

How Serious Are They? [Redacted]

Over the past year or so, [Redacted] some elements of Moscow's active measures apparatus—notably front groups—are experiencing financial woes. In our view, they stem in particular from Moscow's growing dissatisfaction with the poor performance of traditional front organizations such as the World Peace Council (WPC) and a reordering of its political influence priorities toward greater use of public diplomacy and open "dialogue" with the West. We believe, however, financial constraints have not yet had a significant adverse impact on Moscow's active measures agenda. Moreover, the Soviets almost certainly would continue to provide the necessary funds for campaigns targeting key issues such as arms control. [Redacted]

[Redacted] several Soviet-controlled front groups reportedly have had to pare down their programs, seek alternative sources of funding, and even cancel or postpone major conferences. Likewise, Soviet friendship societies and pro-Soviet Communist parties have been hit by financial problems as well, [Redacted] shortages of operating funds, travel cutbacks, and increased fund-raising efforts. [Redacted]

In some cases, at least, the Soviets themselves have directly or indirectly brought financial pressures to bear on certain organizations responsible for active measures:

- [Redacted] the WPC at a meeting last year in Sofia set up a working group solely for the purpose of discussing "ways and means to promote fund-raising activities of the WPC and national movements."

[Redacted]

- The World Federation of Democratic Youth has issued a plea to its national affiliates to pay their past-due accounts, labeling such dues as "political obligations," [Redacted]. 25X1

In the United States, [Redacted] the Communist Party of the USA and the US-Soviet Friendship Society are resorting to unusual fund-raising tactics—such as consulting with professional fund raisers and securing pledges in the form of living wills—and implementing austerity measures in an effort to counter reductions in Soviet funding. [Redacted] 25X1

External factors also have had an impact. The Finnish Government, for example, rescinded the tax-exempt status of staff employees at the WPC's headquarters in Helsinki for the years 1986-87. As a result of this hard currency tax burden—which Moscow refused to cover—the WPC last spring was forced to cut expenses, particularly those earmarked for international travel and conferences, [Redacted] 25X1

[Redacted] WPC officials had resigned themselves to making fewer trips with smaller delegations. [Redacted] 25X1

While there is little doubt that these financial constraints are real, we believe their impact on Moscow's overall active measures program thus far has been minimal. Any Soviet concern over the performance of the fronts has not yet translated into a decision to scale back their activities significantly. For example, the World Federations of Trade Unions (WFTU)—Moscow's labor front—has financed four major conferences during the past 15 months. And the cost to Moscow has not been insignificant, given that three of those events were held outside the Bloc. [Redacted] 25X1

Even more notable has been the tremendous growth over the past year and a half of activities of the Soviet Peace Committee (SPC)—the USSR's official peace 25X1

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Perspective

propaganda arm. [redacted] the SPC has been particularly active in cultivating Western groups and individuals during its frequent trips abroad and its hosting of numerous delegations to the USSR. While future growth in the SPC's dealings with the West is likely to slow markedly—judging by FBI reporting it too is faced with acute funding and budget problems—we doubt Moscow will impose any reduction in these contacts because of the success the SPC has had in organizing joint activities with foreign peace groups. [redacted]

The Soviets also have compensated for apparent limitations on funding of front activities by staging more propaganda extravaganzas in Moscow itself, where Soviet hard currency expenditures are negligible. Since the beginning of the year, the US Embassy has noted that Moscow hosted an international peace forum in February, the seventh Congress of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War in May, and the World Congress of Women in June. [redacted]

Furthermore, some Soviet organizations responsible for active measures apparently have remained immune to funding difficulties. [redacted]

[redacted] Moreover, the types of active measures activities in which the KGB plays a major role—particularly disinformation campaigns—continue unabated, with a steady stream of known or suspected Soviet forgeries surfacing around the globe and covert press placements running at high speed in well-established outlets such as India. [redacted]

The Soviets are also having some success in their efforts to secure alternative sources of funding. For example, they are now requiring US front groups to pay in-country travel expenses plus room and board for visiting Soviet delegations, according to FBI reporting. We suspect Moscow has also levied similar requirements on front organizations in other countries. [redacted]

These developments suggest that Moscow's political influence apparatus is in little danger of losing significant momentum in the near term as a result of financial constraints. We believe they also demonstrate that, while funding issues are likely to persist, the active measures bureaucracy will manage to cope with them, by either implementing new tactics or getting others to foot the bill. Relying too heavily on the second option, however, may entail some costs for Moscow. As the Soviets shift the funding burden to the Libyans and others, the fronts necessarily become more receptive to political agendas that may at times conflict with Moscow's priorities. This in turn almost certainly would hinder the USSR's ability to maintain the high degree of resource coordination that has long characterized its active measures operations. Thus, we believe the Soviets would not hesitate to underwrite the total cost—no matter how high—of any campaign that targets high priority issues such as arms control. [redacted]

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Worldwide Campaigns
AIDS Disinformation: Changing Directions

Moscow has begun to disassociate itself—at least publicly—from the successful two-year campaign it has orchestrated accusing the United States of manufacturing the AIDS virus. Since August, we have noticed a marked decline in AIDS disinformation attributable to Soviet sources. In addition, disclaimers have begun to appear in Soviet Bloc and Third World media citing “scientific conclusions” that AIDS is naturally occurring. For example:

- In September, an East German scientist publicly disavowed the conclusions of the “Segal Report,” an East German study purporting to prove that the United States manufactured AIDS. The report has been a central part of the Soviet campaign.
- In mid-October, Ghana’s pro-Soviet newspaper *The Echo*—a notorious purveyor of AIDS disinformation in the past—ran an article acknowledging that the United States did not invent AIDS.
- *Izvestiya* reported on 30 October that two Soviet scientists criticized as irresponsible stories in the Soviet media accusing the United States of creating AIDS. Zambian and other Third World newspapers have replayed the story.

We believe Moscow’s change of direction stems primarily from the worsening AIDS problem in the USSR, and the US refusal to engage in joint research on the virus as long as the Soviets continue the campaign.

The Soviets probably also feel that the story has circulated so widely that it has reached the point of diminishing returns. We estimate that over the past two years AIDS disinformation has appeared in 80 countries; 200 magazines, newspapers, and radio broadcasts; and 25 languages. Continuing the accusations could even backfire on Moscow because

AIDS-afflicted countries are now more concerned with finding international assistance than in disputes over the disease’s origins.

Moreover, Moscow can rely on its clients and other leftist groups to keep alive the alleged association between the United States and the spread of AIDS. For example:

- North Korea continues to broadcast a steady stream of AIDS-related accusations against the US military presence in South Korea.
- Antinuclear groups in Australia and New Zealand have made AIDS part of their campaigns to block US naval visits to their countries.

While the Soviets have pared back on their accusations that the United States manufactured AIDS, they probably will continue to exploit the issue in a less provocative manner. We expect, for instance, an acceleration of propaganda disparaging US research efforts and priorities. Recent examples of such activity include:

- Cuban accusations this summer that the United States is delaying AIDS research to allow more Africans and Asians to die of the disease—and keeping the cost of AIDS treatment high so that Third World countries cannot afford it.
- A report last March in the Czechoslovakian media calling for the United States to stop funding the Strategic Defense Initiative and divert the money into AIDS research.

In addition, Moscow is likely to step up its claims of making dramatic breakthroughs against AIDS. Over the past year, the Soviets have said they can retard the development of the disease and, in one broadcast, that all Soviet AIDS victims have been cured. If Moscow participates in joint research with the West, Soviet propaganda probably will claim that any progress derives at least in part from Soviet work.

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Worldwide Campaigns

We also expect the Soviets to compensate for the slowdown in AIDS disinformation by intensifying other campaigns with racial overtones such as the one accusing the United States of developing a biological weapon designed to kill individuals selectively on the basis of race. The great success of the AIDS campaign undoubtedly has convinced Moscow that endless repetition of crude, sensationalist disinformation can be highly effective in the Third World. [redacted]

Nicaragua: Selling Peace [redacted]

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
During the past quarter, Sandinista influence activities have focused on the Central American peace plan sponsored by Costa Rican President Arias. Since signing the accord in August, Nicaragua has tried through both overt and covert means to underscore US opposition to the plan and tout its compliance with some of the agreement's terms. The Sandinistas have emphasized the reopening of the independent newspaper *La Prensa* and the appointment of Cardinal Obando y Bravo, a leading Sandinista critic, to the National Reconciliation Commission charged with verifying Managua's compliance with the accord.

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[redacted]

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Nicaragua's covert efforts appear designed to undercut criticism, particularly in Central America, that it failed to comply with the peace plan:



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
Sandinista officials have mounted a full-blown public diplomacy campaign to influence foreign perceptions of the plan. For example:

- President Ortega touted Nicaragua's compliance with the accord in appearances before the UN General Assembly and the Organization of American States, as well as during a visit to Mexico.
- Vice President Ramirez traveled to Canada in October to meet with Canadian nongovernmental organizations that are sympathetic to the Sandinistas, according to US Embassy reporting.

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Worldwide Campaigns



Since the five Central American presidents agreed to the Arias plan last August in Guatemala, the Sandinistas have waged an influence campaign to portray themselves as in compliance with the accord. [redacted]

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- Culture Minister Ernesto Cardenal traveled to Austria in October to stir up sentiment against US Central American policy, according to US Embassy reporting. He appeared with former Austrian Chancellor Kreisky at a Nicaraguan rally that was attended by more than 1,000 people.
- National Directorate member Jaime Wheelock almost certainly mentioned Sandinista compliance during his visits this November to Italy, the Vatican, and Spain. [redacted]

In the coming weeks, Managua probably will intensify its activities as a means of softening any international criticism over how it is complying with key

provisions of the accord. Nicaragua is also likely to try to capitalize on its announced intention to open indirect cease-fire negotiations with the Contras. In considering active measures outlets, the Sandinistas' options include:

- Mobilizing Nicaraguan solidarity groups in Western Europe and Latin America.
- Using their front group, the Anti-Imperialist Tribunal of Our America (TANA), to sponsor conferences and solidarity rallies in Latin America.
- Using ANN's 10 overseas bureaus, five in the West and five in Latin America, to disseminate pro-Sandinista stories. [redacted]

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Worldwide Campaigns

The exact outlets used, as well as the degree of effort exerted, will depend in no small measure on how well Sandinista moves play in the international press.

Managua probably will use its active measures apparatus to prop up weak points and reinforce the most important facets of its compliance campaign. While funding of activities in Western Europe could prove expensive to a cash-tight Managua, we believe the Soviets would be willing to cover key expenses in getting the Sandinista story out to US allies.


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Regional Activities

Western Europe



Soviet Political Influence Activities in the Post-INF Era [redacted]

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The prospect of a US-Soviet treaty on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) and the accompanying improvement in East-West relations presents Soviet active measures planners with a number of opportunities to expand Moscow's influence in Western Europe, a high-priority target. These developments also pose new challenges to Moscow in explaining its large commitment to conventional forces.

[redacted]

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INF has been the centerpiece of Soviet efforts to influence public debate on arms control issues in Western Europe for the past several months. While we believe an INF accord would accelerate the decline of the peace movement—a Soviet active measures tool—we doubt that it would have a significant adverse impact on Moscow's overall influence program on arms control. ¹ Recent Soviet actions suggest that Moscow's commitment to its arms control program is undiminished. For example, General Secretary Gorbachev broached a number of security proposals aimed at the Nordic countries—including a reiteration of Soviet support for a Nordic nuclear-weapons-free zone—in a speech in Murmansk on 1 October. Moscow subsequently mounted a public relations campaign to garner support for the proposals by dispatching envoys to Sweden and Denmark, lobbying visiting Finnish President Koivisto, and publicizing them in the 14 October edition of *Soviet News*, a publication of the Soviet Embassy in London. [redacted]

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[Large redacted block]

In addition to pushing longstanding arms control themes, Moscow almost certainly would try to exploit the disarmament momentum generated by an INF accord with a variety of active measures and propaganda tactics designed to create divisions between the United States and its allies. In our view, Moscow's opportunities include:

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[redacted]

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Regional Activities

- Influencing what is shaping up to be a heated debate in the INF basing countries—Belgium, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Great Britain—over future uses of the INF bases. The Soviets almost certainly will mount a major public diplomacy campaign to intensify growing local opposition to continuation of the sites. In pushing for the “demilitarization” of the bases, Soviet diplomats and propagandists probably would portray any NATO decision to assign new military missions—particularly nuclear ones—to the bases as a contravention of the spirit of the INF treaty.
- Taking advantage of Gorbachev’s growing popularity to drive wedges between the United States and NATO. In West Germany, where an October poll showed that 76 percent of those interviewed believed they could trust Gorbachev—up from 52 percent in May—the Soviets already have begun intensifying their rhetoric on the concept of a “European house.” [redacted]

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- Enhancing its image as a peacemaker while disparaging that of the United States. We expect to see more Soviet arms control moves that can both signal new substantive positions and be exploited for public relations gains. Recent examples of such efforts include the USSR’s invitations this fall to Westerners to visit the chemical weapons destruction facility at Shikhany and the phased-array radar at Krasnoyarsk. At the same time, Moscow probably will reassign top priority to marketing the view that the US commitment to SDI is the only serious obstacle to deep cuts in strategic nuclear arsenals. [redacted]

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Despite these opportunities, the Soviet political influence apparatus will also face new challenges in the post-INF period. In our view, the Soviets will have to work particularly hard at allaying growing European anxiety over the Warsaw Pact’s superiority in conventional arms. Erich Honecker’s visit to West Germany in September may have signaled the opening of a major public diplomacy campaign by the Bloc on conventional arms. [redacted]

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Africa



Everyone’s Target [redacted]

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During the past few months, the Soviets expanded their “peace” campaign in Africa through dialogue with veterans organizations. At the same time, the Soviet Bloc and Libya were actively trying to undermine US interests in the region by placing disinformation in the press and pushing for greater cultural and intelligence ties. [redacted]

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Regional Activities

As part of its global disarmament agenda, Moscow has stepped up contacts with foreign veterans' groups over the past two years. While this effort is aimed principally at Western veterans of World War II, the Soviets recently targeted Africa, presumably hoping to garner support from veterans of colonial wars as well:

- In August, the Sierra Leone Ex-Servicemen's Association and local Red Cross commemorated Hiroshima with a "Blood for Peace" program and a seminar on nuclear-free zones. According to the US Embassy in Freetown, the Secretary of the Association is a member of the Soviet-controlled World Peace Council.
- A delegation of the Soviet Committee of War Veterans visited Bamako in September to meet with Malian veterans, the Mali-USSR Friendship Association, the Malian Peace Movement, and the Malian affiliate of the Soviet-directed Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization. According to press reporting, the discussion focussed on "strengthening relations of peace-loving peoples."
- A Soviet veterans' group visited Guinea-Bissau, according to a September US Embassy report.

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In Uganda, Moscow and its clients appear to be increasing political influence operations. In our view, they have been particularly encouraged by the apparent ease with which anti-US disinformation can be placed in the Ugandan press:

- In July, Libyan-backed and other radical newspapers began a campaign to block the visit of US citizen Stephan Landrigan by misidentifying him as a "CIA strategist for the invasion of Grenada." According to the US Embassy in Kampala, the Uganda Journalist Association had invited Landrigan to participate in a September seminar on news reporting. The Embassy believes that the Ugandan Government denied Landrigan a visa because of Soviet, Libyan, Cuban, and North Korean pressures on the radical faction of the leadership.
- In what we suspect was a Soviet placement, the 2 September issue of the leftist *Weekly Topic* ran a story on foreign spy networks that recounted alleged USIS efforts to build up teams of "house agents" in every African country. This charge is a favorite Soviet theme throughout Africa, and the *Weekly Topic* is a known conduit for Soviet disinformation.
- We believe Libya was behind a report in the August edition of the *Economy*—a Ugandan monthly—claiming that the CIA was attempting to destabilize Uganda through its alleged involvement in the expulsion that month of Ugandan refugees from southern Sudan. Libya frequently uses press placements to exploit border tensions between Uganda and its neighbors.

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Regional Activities

In addition to surfacing anti-US disinformation, the Soviets and their allies are continuing to build long-term influence through intelligence and cultural channels throughout Africa. For example:

- In Uganda, [redacted]
[redacted]

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[redacted] Moscow is attempting to obtain land in Kampala on which to build a "House of Friendship" for the Uganda-Soviet Friendship and Cultural Society. The Society is also expanding into the countryside with a branch opened in Hoima District in June, according to a press report.

- Moscow and the Kenyan Government signed a new cultural and scientific cooperation plan in early November, according to press reports, that will provide study grants for Kenyan students, and improve Soviet ties to Kenyan youth and women's groups and trade unions.
- A Zimbabwe-Cuba Friendship Association has just been established, according to a 30 October broadcast on Harare Radio.

- In Mali, [redacted] the new Cuban ambassador, Alberto Suarez, is according high priority to reviving Cuban influence there. Working through Cuban-Mali friendship and cultural organizations, Suarez is pushing for the creation of a society of former Malian students who have studied in Cuba. [redacted]

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In our view, these efforts are likely to meet with mixed success in the months ahead. While there is little doubt that the Soviets will continue pushing their disarmament campaign in Africa, we believe they will find local veterans groups a largely unreceptive target because of the lack of common historical experiences and because arms control is predominantly an East-West issue. Nonetheless, efforts in this area will help Moscow establish ties to organizations having links to national military forces, even if somewhat tenuous. In other areas, we believe some of the Bloc's longer term active measures operations stand a better chance of succeeding. [redacted]

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[redacted]

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Regional Activities

Latin America



Soviet-Cuban Cooperation on the Rise [redacted]

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In Latin America, the Soviet Union recently activated its front apparatus to assist Cuban efforts to promote liberation theology, a radical Christian doctrine that advocates a restructuring of society using the Marxist concept of class struggle. In other activities, Moscow used public diplomacy to try to give impetus to Cuba's campaign to exploit the debt issue, ² while Havana tried to support Panamanian President Noriega by spreading disinformation about alleged US meddling in Panama. [redacted]

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Working through their traditional religious front, the Prague-based Christian Peace Conference (CPC), the Soviets joined Cuba's recent campaign to build influence with Latin American Christians, especially proponents of liberation theology:

- [redacted] a Chilean group has decided to join the CPC—under the auspices of the newly formed Revolutionary Christians Coordinator—after probable CPC lobbying at a liberation theology conference held last summer in Brazil. At the same conference, Esteban Silva, a radical leader in the Chilean Christian Left party—which the Cubans have been targeting—claimed that a CPC office probably would be set up soon in Chile.

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- [redacted] the CPC's Latin American affiliate sponsored a conference on liberation theology in late August at a Baptist seminary in Havana. The conference selected representatives from Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, and Peru to try to persuade politically moderate bishops in their countries to refrain from criticizing liberation theology in the hopes of gaining more legitimacy for its tenets, [redacted].

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We believe that Soviet involvement in the campaign through its front organization indicates that Moscow is willing to experiment with liberation theology as a tool for building influence in Latin America. Although liberation theology is espoused throughout the region, it is now an effective force for social change only in Brazil. If the CPC does open an office in Chile, we believe it would:

- Help promote the growth of liberation theology there, probably by organizing conferences on the subject.
- Provide another means of expanding Communist ties to Chilean followers.
- Possibly serve as a channel for Soviet and Cuban funding to radical religious and other opposition groups in Chile. [redacted]

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[redacted]

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
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Regional Activities

As part of its campaign to influence followers of liberation theology, Havana has promoted a compilation of interviews between Castro and a Brazilian liberation theologian. [redacted]

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In an effort to bolster the momentum of Cuba's campaign to exploit the debt issue, the Soviets used the occasion of Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's visit to Uruguay in October to demonstrate publicly their concern over the debt crisis in Latin America. In a speech just several days before the Communist- and leftist-sponsored week of continental activities to publicize the debt problem, Shevardnadze said that interest payments on the debt should not exceed a certain level of a country's export earnings, according to the US Embassy in Montevideo. Nonetheless, the week of antidebt events fizzled. The US Embassy in Mexico City

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Regional Activities

reported, for example, that a march through the city on 15 October drew only about 3,000 to 5,000 people, down sharply from the estimated 50,000 to 100,000 demonstrators who participated in a similar protest in 1986. [redacted] 25X1

Although undoubtedly discouraged by the outcome of the week of antidebt activities, Moscow and Havana have shown no signs of retreating on the issue. As such, we expect them to try to exploit the events planned over the next six months by Communist-influenced labor groups in Latin America. These include a labor union seminar that is scheduled to take place in Colombia in May 1988. (See Calendar of Key Events for details.) [redacted] 25X1

Havana also spread disinformation alleging that the United States is maneuvering to oust Panamanian leader Noriega in order to extend its military presence in Panama beyond the year 2000, the expiration date of bilateral treaties governing US basing rights:

- On 24 September the Uruguayan Communist Party daily *La Hora* replayed a Cuban story alleging that the main Panamanian opposition group, the National Civil Crusade, had agreed to rent four military bases to the United States after the year 2000 in exchange for US support to destabilize the Noriega regime.
- We suspect that the Cubans were responsible for the appearance in the 1 October edition of a Caracas weekly of a forged State Department letter allegedly sent to Senator Helms last March indicating that "steps should be taken to bring about the resignation" of Noriega.³ The forged document also claimed that the State Department "shared" Helms' view on the need to extend US troop presence in the Panama Canal area past the year 2000. [redacted] 25X1

Because Havana currently enjoys excellent access in Panama, we expect it to continue supporting Noriega with similar disinformation tactics in the near term. Cuba has considerable commercial interests in the country—with as many as 60 front companies based there—and uses Panama as a place to meet numerous Latin American guerrilla groups. [redacted] 25X1

Middle East




Trying To Establish a Foothold [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] 25X1

³ While we cannot discount the possibility that the forgery is of Panamanian origin, several factors suggest that it is Cuban: its allegations mirror recent Cuban propaganda and disinformation themes; its quality suggests the involvement of a major intelligence service, such as the DGI; in addition, the way it was surfaced fits Havana's modus operandi. [redacted] 25X1

Regional Activities



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In Egypt, the Soviets are trying to rebuild an influence infrastructure decimated by 15 years of badly strained relations. Following a major improvement in ties last March, when Moscow acceded to surprisingly conciliatory terms for repayment of Egypt's longstanding debt, the Soviets have engaged in a flurry of activity with a variety of Egyptian groups. For example:

- A delegation of Egyptian lawyers visited Moscow in August to attend a legal seminar sponsored by the Soviet-Egyptian Friendship Society.
- An Egyptian youth delegation visited Moscow in September to meet with members of the Komsomol to promote future youth exchange visits.
- In a September visit to Cairo, the head of a Soviet writers delegation announced that the USSR would pay hard currency for the rights to the publications of Egyptian writers and that a cooperative agreement between the Soviet and Egyptian writers federations would be signed early next year.
- Soviet and Egyptian officials signed a bilateral agreement in October on radio and television cooperation.

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We believe the Soviets are a long way from exerting significant influence in Egypt. Moscow is still laying the groundwork for an active measures infrastructure and the government is both aware and leery of Soviet influence activities. Nonetheless, the Soviets will remain active in the hope that a better political climate will develop.

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South Asia

No Letup in Pakistan and India

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
During the past several months, the Soviets maintained their intensive efforts to influence the formulation of Pakistani and Indian foreign policy. In Pakistan, both Moscow and Kabul continued trying to orchestrate domestic opposition to Islamabad's support for the Afghan resistance and its close ties to the United States. In India, the Soviets capitalized on an increasingly favorable political climate for anti-US disinformation operations. In our view, they are now poised to exploit Prime Minister Gandhi's increased vulnerability to the leftist and pro-Soviet wing of his party, despite his recent efforts to strike a more balanced policy toward the superpowers.

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Regional Activities

In Pakistan, there was a continuation of terrorist bombings [redacted] 25X1
 [redacted] as well as Soviet propaganda alleging that the 25X1
 United States is preventing Islamabad from negotiating a settlement in Afghani-
 stan. In our view, these activities are fueling opposition to the government's
 support for the Afghan resistance and exacerbating resentment toward the
 refugees. For example, we believe they were factors in promoting intense debates
 in the National Assembly this September on restricting the movement of refugees
 outside the camps. Moreover, the bombings and the propaganda almost certainly
 are contributing to discontent in the military. [redacted] 25X1
 mid-level officers view US-Pakistani ties as very good, but are increasingly
 resentful about the perceived US pressure on the government to continue
 supporting the Afghan resistance, particularly given the high number of Pakistani
 lives lost as a result of the bombings. [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] the Soviets are trying to 25X1
 unify leftist parties—probably to create a pro-Soviet lobby in Pakistan to pressure
 Islamabad into accepting Soviet terms for an Afghan reconciliation government.
 Soviet and Afghan officials are cultivating opposition leaders and have enticed
 several prominent ones to visit Moscow or Kabul. They include Maulana Kausar
 Niazi, a prominent senator; Fakhar Imam, former speaker of the National
 Assembly and currently the head of the Parliamentary Opposition Group; and
 retired Air Marshal Asghar Khan, the leader of the small opposition party Tehrik-
 i-Istiqlal. [redacted] 25X1



Retired Air Marshall Asghar Khan, the leader of a small Pakistani opposition party, traveled to Kabul in August at the invitation of the Soviets and the Afghans. When Khan subsequently made some pro-Soviet remarks, there was a strong negative reaction from members of his party. [redacted]

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The trips have yielded mixed propaganda results for Moscow and Kabul. On the positive side, for example, Khan publicly asserted upon his return from Kabul that his party could resolve the Afghan problem through direct talks with the Afghan regime. Within a few weeks, however, Khan's trip provoked a strong negative reaction in Pakistan. In the Punjab, Pakistan's most influential province, Tehrik party officeholders and activists began leaving the party in large numbers, according to the US Consulate in Lahore. Moreover, Benazir Bhutto, Pakistan's leading opposition figure, told the US Ambassador in late October that she had no intention of accepting an Afghan invitation to visit Kabul. [redacted] 25X1

Regional Activities

The Soviets have also been targeting Pakistani journalists. For example, local TASS correspondent Y. N. Aleksandrov has established a close relationship with the management of the *The Muslim*, a daily newspaper that frequently criticizes Islamabad's Afghan policy and periodically carries Soviet disinformation. [redacted] Aleksandrov has used the paper to develop friendships with Pakistani journalists. [redacted] Soviets plan to invite prominent Pakistani journalists to Moscow. [redacted]

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In India, the Soviets launched a propaganda offensive during August and September depicting the United States as having dangerous designs toward India and the rest of the world. [redacted] One of the more successful campaigns targeted Indo-US efforts to improve technological cooperation. Soviet-placed stories charged that a new Indo-US vaccine program to combat communicable diseases would put India at risk by providing US scientists and intelligence officials with sensitive immunological data on the Indian population. Despite Indian Government denial of the charges and support for the effort, the vaccine program and the US motives for it have become domestic political issues. [redacted]

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In another major propaganda success, the Soviets also organized a conference this August in New Delhi on "Nonalignment and World Peace" that was extremely critical of US policies in the Third World. The Soviets provided financial and material assistance, attracted substantial Indian Government funds and support, and induced senior Indian officials to address the meeting. [redacted] the Soviets prepared many of the 30 or so academic papers presented under Indian authorship and distributed to attendees. Through their Indian contacts, the Soviets also arranged for Prime Minister Gandhi to inaugurate the conference, an event that received widespread publicity. [redacted]

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In the coming months we expect few if any Pakistani opposition leaders to travel to Kabul because of the adverse reaction to Asghar Khan's visit. There has been no similar reaction to trips to Moscow, however, and we believe that, while opposition politicians may think twice about accepting Soviet invitations, some will still do so. In India, the high level of Soviet active measures and propaganda activities is likely to persist because Soviet successes and US policy toward Pakistan have raised anti-US sentiment to a very high level. During the next few months, Gandhi almost certainly will have little political maneuvering room within his Congress-I Party to resist more than modestly Soviet influence efforts. [redacted]

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East Asia and the Pacific

Soviet Setbacks [redacted]

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Moscow's active measures program in East Asia experienced significant setbacks during the past quarter. In Japan, the leading leftist labor federation decided to merge with moderate unions and leave behind its pro-Soviet faction. Meanwhile, a major front group meeting in the Philippines misfired and the Thai Government

Regional Activities

launched a successful covert press campaign against the Soviets. Nonetheless, we believe Moscow stands a good chance of buying some influence in the Philippines by establishing an aid relationship with the country's most radical labor federation. [redacted]

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Moscow will soon lose one of its chief influence conduits in Japan, the General Council of Trade Unions (SOHYO). The US Embassy in Tokyo reports that SOHYO, which embraces most of the country's leftist public-sector unions, will oust its pro-Soviet faction in the coming months and merge by 1990 with the moderate Confederation of Private Sector Unions. The pro-Soviet faction, led by longtime Soviet surrogate Akira Iwai, appears ready to join with independent Communist unions and establish a separate labor federation. The Embassy predicts that such a federation will be at most a marginal player in domestic labor affairs. [redacted]

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In the Philippines, Moscow was unable to stir up sentiment against the US military bases with a conference this August in Manila sponsored by the Asian Oceania Trade Union Coordinating Committee (AOTUCC), an affiliate of the Soviet-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU). Despite representation from 16 countries and sizable Soviet financial and logistic support, the conference was a propaganda failure:

- The Philippine press virtually ignored the meeting, prompting some delegates to complain they had wasted their time [redacted]
- The US Embassy in Manila reports that Philippine delegates blocked passage of a resolution condemning the US bases in the country because they considered the issue a domestic matter.
- Senior Philippine officials, including Speaker of the House Mitra and Labor Secretary Drilon, refused invitations to address the conference [redacted]

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Moreover, the conference did little to help Moscow draw closer to the May First Movement (KMU), a Communist-dominated labor federation that is trying to destabilize the Philippine economy and eliminate the US military bases. [redacted]

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
[redacted] KMU Chairman Crispin Beltran wants to affiliate with WFTU, and, with senior KMU officials attending the meeting, [redacted]

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Moscow probably hoped for substantial progress on the issue. [redacted]

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Regional Activities

Despite extensive preparations, the WFTU-connected Asian Oceania Trade Union Coordinating Committee failed to generate significant anti-US propaganda at its meeting last August in Manila. [redacted]



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[redacted] the Soviets were operating freely in the country and Gorbachev's *glasnost* policy was gathering public support. The government subsequently provided the press with off-the-record briefings on Soviet intelligence activities and deported a Briton and a West German for working as Soviet agents. The expulsions generated considerable anti-Soviet press coverage. For example, the *Bangkok Post*, the largest English language daily, editorialized that the incidents damaged Gorbachev's credibility and underscored the Kremlin's unreliability and insincerity. [redacted]

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Looking ahead, we expect Moscow's active measures apparatus in Japan, which has been quite effective, to suffer considerable damage from the split in SOHYO and the federation's eventual demise. The Soviets have used SOHYO to influence Japan's mainstream unionists and through them the country's antinuclear movement. A fringe Communist federation will be a poor substitute. [redacted]

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Moscow is also likely to encounter increased resistance to its ongoing efforts to penetrate Thai labor groups and political parties. The success of the covert press campaign probably will make Bangkok more inclined to use countermeasures in the future. Thai national security officials apparently have a fairly low threshold for recommending such action since we believe they exaggerated Soviet activities in the country to prompt Prime Minister Prem into approving the press campaign. [redacted]

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Regional Activities

In the Philippines, on the other hand, we believe there is a good chance Moscow will help underwrite KMU activities against the Aquino government and the US bases. According to the US Embassy in Manila, a KMU-Soviet aid relationship already has begun to crystallize and we believe each side has an incentive to expand it. The KMU almost certainly is tempted by the prospect of Soviet financial aid. With no dues structure, the KMU relies heavily on foreign contributions, which have been increasingly difficult to attract since President Aquino replaced Marcos in February 1986. The Soviets probably are eager to acquire an influence channel in the Philippines as negotiations on the US military bases draw near. Moscow's current surrogates in the country—a weak Moscow-line Communist party and three small labor unions—show no signs of becoming significant players in Philippine politics.


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Major West European Peace Groups



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The Decline of the Peace Movement in West Germany: Implications for Soviet Active Measures in Western Europe

The prospective agreement between the United States and Soviet Union to eliminate intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF), while providing Moscow with new influence opportunities in Western Europe,¹ will also accelerate the decline of the West European peace movement—an active measures vehicle the Soviets previously used extensively and with considerable success in shaping public opinion on arms control issues. While Moscow has compensated somewhat for this loss by adopting new and increasingly sophisticated influence tactics,² prospects for the peace movement—whose cohesion and influence have deteriorated steadily since INF deployments began in 1983—are less bright. With no strong unifying issue such as INF likely to emerge in Western Europe any time soon, we believe factionalism within the peace movement—already a serious problem—will intensify. Nonetheless, Moscow and the West European Communist parties have shown that they can still mobilize sizable anti-US demonstrations on issues of direct concern to West Europeans, such as the US bombing of Libya in April 1986. This is particularly true in West Germany, where the German Communist Party (DKP) and the Socialist Unity Party of West Berlin (SEW) penetrated the peace movement more thoroughly than their comrades in other countries.

The Peace Movement: A Key Soviet Target During the INF Debate

During the early 1980s, the primary goal of Soviet active measures in Western Europe was to prevent planned deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles. To that end, Moscow directed its front groups and West European Communist parties to engage in a

[Redacted]

¹ During the past few years, but particularly since General Secretary Gorbachev's rise to power, the Soviets have dramatically increased their use of public diplomacy, renewed ties to independent Communist parties in Western Europe, and initiated direct "dialogue" with Western professional groups and noncommunist peace activists.



European peace activists, demonstrating here against a US military base in West Germany, have steadily lost influence since INF deployment began in 1983.

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wide variety of covert and overt activities designed to exploit indigenous opposition to INF, which coalesced in the peace movement. In our view, the Soviets recognized that, even if the peace movement itself was unable to keep the new US missiles out of the basing countries—West Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands—it could prove to be an important instrument of political influence nonetheless. In the Soviet view, the peace movement provided a means for spreading favorable views of Soviet policy and forced Western governments to rethink their attitude toward the USSR. Moreover, Soviet organizational and financial support for peace demonstrations enlarged the scope of protest activities, making it more difficult for West European governments to accept the new US missiles. While ultimately unsuccessful in blocking INF deployment, Moscow's penetration of the peace movement enabled it to partially deflect public attention away from Soviet deployment of hundreds of SS-20s.

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Communist Penetration of the West German Peace Movement

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Moscow's influence over the West European peace movement varied from country to country, but a review of US Embassy reporting

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[redacted] shows it was particularly successful in penetrating peace groups in West Germany. Although West German opposition to INF comprised a coalition of diverse religious, political, and environmental organizations, the pro-Moscow DKP and SEW exercised disproportionate influence within the peace movement and exploited it to promote Soviet views. Indeed, although members of these parties did not constitute a majority of anti-INF activists, they achieved substantial success in penetrating the movement's loosely organized structure because:

- On instructions from Moscow and East Berlin, they based their cooperation with other peace groups on the principle of minimal consensus; that is, solely on opposition to the stationing of US missiles, setting aside potentially divisive issues and compromising whenever necessary in order to preserve unity, [redacted]

- They possessed superior organizational skills. For example, the Krefeld Appeal, a DKP-backed petition calling on the West German Government to withdraw support for INF deployment, drew over 2 million signatures. [redacted] A similar petition sponsored by the Social Democratic Party (SPD) paled in comparison with only 100,000 signatures. [redacted]

INF Deployment Undermines the Peace Movement

The 1983 decision by the Bundestag to accept deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles in West Germany eliminated the basis for cooperation within the peace movement there. Since then, its cohesion and influence have deteriorated steadily, substantially reducing its value to Moscow as an active measures tool. [redacted] in 1984, only about 800 people participated in an SEW-sponsored demonstration on "Liberation Day" (V-E Day), compared with 60,000 participants on the same date two years earlier. The SEW leadership attributed the fiasco to the party's diminished ability to cooperate with other leftwing groups in West Berlin. [redacted]

Moscow and the West German Communists have tried hard to find a new cause to revitalize the anti-INF alliance. [redacted] the Soviets have repeatedly urged the SEW to revive the peace movement in West Berlin by publicizing opposition to the US Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and, since early 1986, support for Gorbachev's series of disarmament initiatives. The SEW obliged by:

- Circulating a petition to make West Berlin a nuclear-free zone and presenting it to the US and Soviet negotiating teams at Geneva in February 1986.
- Proposing a series of seminars emphasizing the "social costs of the nuclear arms race" in fall 1986.
- Playing up Gorbachev's arms control proposals at local demonstrations, such as those held last January to commemorate the 1919 murder of German Communists Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg. [redacted]

These issues have met with little response, however, and the DKP and SEW are finding it increasingly difficult to take advantage of new opportunities, as illustrated by the debate surrounding President Reagan's visit to West Berlin last June. [redacted] the SEW sought to exploit the anti-US demonstrations sponsored by a coalition of leftwing groups to display West Berlin's opposition to SDI and US disarmament policies. Cooperation among the various peace organizations, however, failed to materialize for several reasons:

- The possibility of rioting by apolitical rowdies overshadowed planning for the events to the point where SEW leaders reminded party members to participate only in peaceful demonstrations and to leave immediately if disruption occurred. [redacted]
- The threat of violence also led the Social Democratic Party (SPD) in West Berlin to withdraw its support from the most important of the demonstrations—to the annoyance of the SEW, which, [redacted] had counted on SPD participation to swell the ranks of the demonstrators and confer legitimacy on the event.

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- In the week prior to the President's visit, an editorial in the leftwing newspaper *die tageszeitung* triggered an intense debate by asking whether it was appropriate to demonstrate against him at all; the newspaper pointed out that Reagan had responded more fully to Gorbachev's disarmament proposals than West German Chancellor Kohl. The primary demonstration actually focused very little on Reagan administration policies; participants distributed flyers on a range of issues from Nicaragua to the West German census. [redacted]

The Impact of an INF Agreement

The prospect of an INF agreement has further damaged the fragile cohesion of the West German peace movement. Defense attache reporting indicates that activists believe that implementation of the so-called global double zero option will cripple their coalition by completely eliminating its *raison d'etre*. Such fear probably contributed to a dispute this summer between the peace movement's Coordinating Committee and the SPD and Greens. Press reports indicate that the Committee—which, according to military reporting, is communist influenced—urged the two parties to introduce resolutions in the Bundestag calling for the revocation of the 1983 deployment decision. The SPD refused; the Greens agreed, but only after bitterly debating whether such a step was appropriate when major reductions in both East and West appeared imminent. Subsequently, several members of the Coordinating Committee argued in an open letter to *die tageszeitung* that nothing could be more dangerous than the illusion that implementation of the double zero option would end the arms race in Europe. [redacted]

Outlook

We believe that reservations about the future of the peace movement are justified not only for West Germany, but also for all of Western Europe. The pending INF accord will indeed remove the last vestige of its rallying cry, and no issue—not even SDI—has emerged to replace it. Despite a concerted campaign against the program for the past few years, the Soviets have been unable to translate widespread anti-SDI sentiment in Western Europe into an active

protest movement because SDI is neither well understood nor a matter of popular concern. We do not foresee any change in this situation at least until SDI or some comparable defense system is deployed. Without a strong unifying cause, we expect factionalism within the peace movement to intensify and the groups that compose it to continue to drift apart.

[redacted]

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Moreover, some organizations have adopted goals that run counter to Soviet interests in Western Europe. In the Netherlands, for example, the Interchurch Peace Council has begun to focus on improving contacts with Eastern Europe while Pax Christi made Afghanistan its top priority, according to diplomatic reporting. In addition, [redacted] Belgian peace activists have formed a new organization intended to attract disaffected members of the Belgian Union for the Defense of Peace—an affiliate of the Soviet-controlled World Peace Council. [redacted]

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At the same time, the original anti-INF coalition will remain susceptible to Soviet and Communist Party manipulation, particularly on issues and events that directly affect West European interests. US Embassy reporting indicates, for example, that the SEW and DKP organized large anti-US demonstrations on short notice after the US bombing of Libya in April 1986. Although the response to the incident was quickly overshadowed by the Chernobyl' disaster, it showed that the Communist parties retain the capability to generate public outcries against US foreign policy. [redacted]

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Calendar of Key Events, 1987-88

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Anti-US Human Rights Organizations

Commission for the Defense of Human Rights in Central America (CODEHUCA). CODEHUCA is a Honduras-based organization managed by a former member of the Honduran Communist Party with ties to the revolutionary left in El Salvador, Cuba, and Nicaragua. The US Embassy in Honduras reports that it has a strong, anti-US bias and criticizes human rights abuses in democratic governments in Latin America while ignoring abuses in Cuba and Nicaragua.

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Defense for Children International (DCI). DCI is a Geneva-based organization that has consultative status in the UN. An August 1987 Izvestiya article cited statements from DCI staff members as lending credence to allegations that the United States purchases children from Third World countries to sell their organs. The US Embassy in Geneva reports that the organization refuses to disassociate itself from the story despite three US protests. DCI's Secretary General—Per Tegmo—claims that the group is considering publishing reports from its Latin American offices that US servicemen sexually abuse minors in the countries where they are stationed.

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International Institute for Humanitarian Law (IIHL). In June, this group presented Soviet leader Gorbachev with a human rights award for his "outstanding contribution to strengthening peace and ensuring human rights." IIHL is based in San Remo, Italy, and has consultative status in the UN.

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Calendar of Key Events, 1987-88		25X1
4-6 December 1987	<p>Tenth National Congress of the Greek Committee for International Detente and Peace (EEDYE), Athens. [redacted] one of the workshops at this meeting will focus on the elimination of US bases in Greece, reflecting the priority that the EEDYE—the peace front of the Moscow-line Greek Communist Party (KKE)—places on this issue. [redacted] EEDYE's secretary general has asked local committees throughout Greece to promote antibase demonstrations to create the impression that the activities are initiated locally. [redacted]</p>	25X1 25X1 25X1
10 December 1987	<p>United Nations Human Rights Day. As part of its campaign to defend the Bloc record on human rights and reshape the debate on what constitutes human rights violations, Moscow probably will make a significant effort to influence this year's commemoration. The US Embassy in Moscow reports, for example, that a newly formed Moscow-based group—the Glasnost Press Club—is planning to host an international seminar on human rights problems for nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and private individuals, probably to coincide with Human Rights Day. Agenda items for this meeting include the problems of the homeless, the right to work, and regional conflicts. In addition to internationally respected organizations like the Helsinki Watch, Moscow probably will invite groups with pro-Soviet or anti-US biases such as the Commission for the Defense of Human Rights in Central America, Defense for Children International, and the International Institute for Humanitarian Law (see inset). [redacted]</p>	25X1
December 1987	<p>Executive Committee Meeting of the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY), Pyongyang, North Korea. Although this Soviet front undoubtedly will follow Soviet policies, [redacted] friction is developing between supporters of Gorbachev's reform policies and conservatives who fear an ideological softening. A similar controversy developed in a meeting preparatory to the November 1987 congress of the International Union of Students, when Arab and African radicals criticized Soviet-supported draft resolutions for being too moderate. [redacted]</p>	25X1 25X1
21-22 January 1988	<p>Third Group of Six Summit, Stockholm. [redacted] the Group of Six—the leaders of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Tanzania, and Sweden—will continue to encourage superpower arms control agreements, especially on a nuclear test ban and preventing the militarization of outer space. The Group's agenda is tilted toward Soviet positions, and Moscow has won propaganda benefits by expressing general agreement with the Group's proposals. [redacted] the Soviets are eager to use the Six to influence world public opinion, and we expect them to exploit their close ties to India to manipulate the summit. [redacted]</p>	25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1

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Calendar of Key Events, 1987-88		25X1
18-21 February 1988	<p>Twelfth Congress of the Spanish Communist Party (PCE), Spain. Despite generational conflict within the PCE, [redacted] the main theme of this congress will be reunification of the splintered Spanish Communist movement. [redacted] the Soviets and their East Bloc allies may fund some of the PCE's multimillion dollar deficit on the condition that reunification efforts are speeded up. We believe Moscow hopes reunification will consolidate its influence over Spanish Communists. [redacted]</p>	25X1 25X1 25X1
March 1988	<p>Fifth Consultative Meeting of the All-European Youth and Student Cooperation. This conference is sponsored by the International Union of Socialist Youth (IUSY), the student affiliate of the Socialist International (SI). Although the SI is dominated by Western socialist parties, IUSY pursues policies closely identified with the Soviet-controlled World Federation of Democratic Youth. We expect the meeting to mirror Soviet positions on issues such as nuclear and chemical free zones in Europe. [redacted]</p>	25X1
May 1988	<p>Seminar of Latin American Labor Organizations to Discuss the Foreign Debt, Colombia. [redacted] various Communist-influenced labor groups are behind this meeting, which is part of the Soviet and Cuban campaign to exploit the debt issue. While the Communist-dominated Colombian Unitary Central of Workers probably will officially sponsor the event, we expect seminar organizers to use financial incentives to induce non-Communists to participate. Communist unions successfully employed such tactics at similar debt conferences last May in Brazil. [redacted]</p>	25X1 25X1
August 1988	<p>Nonaligned Movement (NAM) Foreign Ministers' Conference, Cyprus. Moscow's keen interest in influencing the NAM ' almost certainly will benefit from warming diplomatic relations with Nicosia, which will play a key role in preparing the meeting's agenda and communique. Moscow probably has two primary objectives for the conference: obtaining NAM endorsement for its arms control proposals and weakening members' support for the resolution calling for the "withdrawal of foreign troops" from Afghanistan. The Soviets will also closely monitor the selection of the 1989 NAM chairman. With Argentina, Indonesia, Nicaragua and Peru the leading contenders, [redacted] Moscow favors Peru probably in the expectation that the chairmanship would prompt Lima into adopting increasingly anti-US policies. [redacted]</p>	25X1 25X1 25X1
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
Calendar of Key Events, 1987-88

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The Soviets have paid increasing attention to the Third World debt issue. They are involved in a labor union seminar on Latin American debt scheduled for next May and a conference on African debt, sponsored by the OATUU, that will probably be held next year.



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24-26 October 1988

30th Anniversary of the Founding of the Christian Peace Conference (CPC). Although the Soviet-controlled CPC has traditionally maintained a low profile to avoid identification with Moscow, the Soviets may decide to use it more aggressively next year as part of its elaborate celebration of the millenium of

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Calendar of Key Events, 1987-88

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Christianity in Russia. We expect the CPC to become much more active in disseminating propaganda on religious freedom in the USSR and in advocating a larger role for the Russian Orthodox Church in the World Council of Churches.

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To Be Announced

Seventh Congress of the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO), Libya. At the quadrennial meeting of Moscow's major propaganda voice in the Third World, AAPSO will present its agenda for the coming year. We believe the Congress—AAPSO's highest organ—will accord highest priority to promoting Soviet positions on Middle East peace initiatives and Third World debt. It also will look for new ways to contribute to Moscow's longstanding campaign of exploiting apartheid. For its part, Libya—which we suspect will partly finance the event—undoubtedly will use the meeting as a forum to attack US policies in the Middle East and Africa.

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To Be Announced

Organization of African Trade Union Unity (OATUU) Conference on African Debt, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. [redacted] Secretary General Hassan Sunmonu has acknowledged that this meeting of the labor wing of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) will be sponsored by the Soviet-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU). Sunmonu wants to bill the conference as an OATUU-WFTU event but is running into resistance from OATUU moderates. The conference is likely to produce a major factional dispute between radicals led by Sunmonu and a moderate coalition that became increasingly concerned several months ago when Sunmonu ignored a proposal to invite the IMF and World Bank to address the meeting.

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To Be Announced

UN Meeting on an Indian Ocean Zone of Peace (IOZP), Colombo. Sri Lanka is pressing Western members of the UN Indian Ocean Ad Hoc Committee to agree on a meeting date. The Soviet IOZP campaign calls for creation of a nuclear-free zone in the region, removal of the US military base on Diego Garcia, and the closing of Voice of America and West German broadcast facilities in Sri Lanka.

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To Be Announced

Scheduled Deployment of Cruise Missiles, the Netherlands. If the United States and the Soviet Union sign an INF accord in 1987, the Dutch Government will be under intense domestic pressure to cancel deployment of ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) in 1988, even temporarily while the treaty is being ratified. In addition, The Hague may decide not to resume the NATO nuclear tasks it dropped in exchange for agreeing to base GLCMs. The Soviets almost certainly will attempt to influence the outcome of any debate over these issues.

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