



**Directorate of
Intelligence**

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Worldwide Active Measures and Propaganda Alert



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August 1987

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Worldwide Active Measures and Propaganda Alert

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This paper was prepared by and coordinated within
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are welcome

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19 East Asia and the Pacific: Spreading Disinformation on the Fiji Coup, Aiding the
Philippine Communists [redacted] [redacted] 25X1
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23 **Articles**

23 Soviet Active Measures Targeting US Foreign Basing and Access Rights [redacted] 25X1
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The Soviet Union has an aggressive propaganda and active measures campaign targeting the US military presence overseas. Using a variety of tools—including worldwide disinformation campaigns, manipulation of local communist parties, orchestration of front group activities, and public diplomacy—Moscow has worked hard to heighten opposition to US bases around the world. [redacted] 25X1

31 Soviet Active Measures in India: A Major Success [redacted] 25X1
[redacted] 25X1

Exploiting its close ties to New Delhi and Indian concerns about US policies in South Asia, the Soviet Union has built up substantial influence capabilities in India. Although Moscow encountered a less receptive political environment during Rajiv Gandhi's first two years in office than existed during his mother's rule, the Soviets have regained their influence in the Congress (I) Party over the past six months and are drawing heavily on their active measures machinery in the country. [redacted] 25X1

35 New Leadership for Key Soviet Front Organizations: Sweeping Clean With Old
Brooms [redacted] 25X1
[redacted] 25X1

The senior Soviet propaganda leadership has been grappling with the question of what role Moscow's traditional front group network should play in the Gorbachev era. Moscow has recently tried to improve the fronts' image by installing leaders more adept at espousing *glasnost* in several of the front coordinating organizations. The intelligence and propaganda backgrounds of these leaders suggest that the fronts' substantive missions will remain unchanged. [redacted] 25X1

41 Disinformation on US Chemical and Biological Weapons 1975-87 [redacted] 25X1
Contractor Study, OGI

The study documented the disinformation campaigns that the Soviet Union and its allies have waged over the past 12 years against US Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW) programs. It found that a major Soviet motive for these efforts was to deflect attention from and refute allegations about its own CBW use, and that changes in CBW disinformation under Gorbachev have been less substantial than those that occurred in 1980 in the wake of the breakdown of US-Soviet CBW talks and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. [redacted] 25X1

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Calendar of Key Events, 1987-1988



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Preface

This quarterly publication is designed to provide timely updates of ongoing active measures and propaganda campaigns by the USSR and its allies. This issue covers the period 15 May 1987 to 15 August 1987. It is also designed to provide warning of future campaigns. The quarterly is composed of four parts:

- A perspective, which provides a look at recent trends in active measures.
- Brief overviews of both worldwide and regional campaigns.
- Articles containing detailed analyses of trends in the entire political influence arena—active measures, propaganda, and public diplomacy—and speculation on future developments.
- An annotated calendar of key events that we anticipate will figure prominently in campaigns by the Soviets and their allies.

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
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
Perspective

XIth WORLD TRADE UNION CONGRESS



MOUNTING DEBT OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

The debt stems their growth, aggravates poverty and perpetuates ills such as famine, illiteracy and endemic diseases.



The increasing disproportion between capital invested in the developing countries and that repatriated by the transnationals is one reason why the debt crisis is getting worse.

A NEW ECONOMIC ORDER IS VITAL

This World Federation of Trade Unions poster illustrates growing Soviet interest in exploiting the debt issue.

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Perspective

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The Debt Issue: Can Moscow and Havana Exploit It?

[Redacted]

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Probable Payoffs

Barring a sharp downturn in Latin America's capacity to service its debt, most regional governments will remain wary of supporting even Cuban or WFTU rhetoric on the debt issue, for fear of affecting their relationships with Western creditors. Nonetheless, we believe that Soviet efforts to increase opposition to the debt are likely to have some payoffs. The antidebt campaign gives Moscow the opportunity to:

- Make contact with a broader range of groups than might otherwise be receptive to Soviet overtures because the problem of foreign debt transcends political ideologies. The debt conference in Brazil, for instance, attracted some moderates as well as leftists and Communists.
- Revive the Latin American operations of WFTU, which some Latin affiliates have criticized as out of touch with the problems confronting workers there.

Soviet Objectives

We believe the Soviets view actions such as Peru's limitation of debt payments to 10 percent of its export earnings and Brazil's decision in February to suspend interest payments on its debt to foreign commercial banks as indicating a favorable political climate for propagandizing on the debt issue.

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[Redacted]

- Intensify its efforts to portray Third World economic problems as the result of US debt practices and those of Western financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF). We expect the Soviets to score propaganda points in international forums such as the United Nations and the Non-aligned Movement.

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Regardless of whether the Soviets actually believe default could have such far-reaching strategic consequences, we have no doubt that Moscow sees the debt campaign as yet another way to build influence in Latin America, especially with regional labor organizations and leftist political parties.

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[Redacted]

Complications Along the Way

Soviet involvement in the antidebt effort poses several risks to Moscow, particularly if its role becomes widely known. Developing countries, long displeased with Moscow's low levels of aid, may resent covert pressure to repudiate debt unmatched by offers of greater Soviet economic assistance. Moreover, public exposure of Soviet participation in the antidebt campaign could lead developing countries indebted to Moscow—which owe more than \$40 billion—to ask

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Perspective

for more liberal terms. Knowledge of Soviet involvement in attempts to generate support for debt repudiation could also hinder Moscow's efforts to improve diplomatic and economic relations with Latin American countries, which probably would perceive the Soviet campaign as interference in their internal affairs. [redacted]

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Even if Soviet participation in Castro's drive for debt repudiation remains hidden, the campaign could complicate Moscow's efforts to build influence in the region. The debt repudiation issue has tremendous appeal to Latin America's ultraleftist parties that typically are the major competitors of local pro-Soviet Communist parties. If, as is likely, the ultraleftist parties seize on the debt repudiation issue, the Communists will risk losing support if they fail to do the same. Yet many of the local Communist parties hesitate to push the civilian governments too hard, fearing—as does Moscow—possible military takeovers. Thus, if they believe the campaign to be destabilizing, local Communists might decide not to support it. [redacted]

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A Clash of Wills?

One factor likely to determine the effectiveness of the antidebt campaign is the degree to which Soviet and Cuban operations mesh. Disagreements on tactics for building Communist influence in the region have been recurrent in the Soviet-Cuban relationship. Castro—who has a deep personal interest in the debt issue and has often been more aggressive than the Soviets would like within the region—may push the issue too indiscriminately for Moscow's taste. [redacted]

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Worldwide Campaigns

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Arms Control: Pushing a Broad Agenda []

Moscow's worldwide campaign to influence public debate on arms control issues continued unabated during the past quarter. While giving particular attention to garnering support for their position on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF), the Soviets also maintained their longstanding attack against the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and lobbied hard for the establishment of nuclear-weapons-free zones (NWFZ) around the globe. In pushing its arms control agenda, Moscow, with assistance from its Bloc allies, employed well-established influence tactics, namely, public diplomacy, backchannel communications, front group activity, and "dialogue" with Western professional groups. The Soviets focused their efforts primarily in the West, but also targeted the United Nations, the Nonaligned Movement (NAM), and the Group of Six² as conduits to the Third World.

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Moscow continued to make heavy use of diplomatic visits as an influence channel. Since mid-May, the USSR has dispatched envoys to Cyprus, Portugal, and Burma and hosted talks in Moscow with senior government officials from West Germany, the United Kingdom, and Zambia. Moscow's Bloc allies were quite active as well. East German leader Honecker met with visiting West German Social Democratic Party Chairman Vogel in May and traveled to the Netherlands in June. In July, Polish head of state Jaruzelski met in Warsaw with West German Social Democrat Bahr while Bulgarian party chief Zhivkov held discussions in Sofia with Greek Prime Minister Papandreou. []

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² The Group of Six is comprised of the leaders of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden, and Tanzania. Since its founding in 1984, the Group has sought to facilitate arms control dialogue between the United States and the Soviet Union, particularly on the issue of verification, by offering to monitor a comprehensive test ban treaty. In contrast to the United States, the USSR has consistently supported the Group's disarmament proposals. []

The results of these efforts were mixed, however. For example, Dutch Prime Minister Lubbers rejected Honecker's proposal for a nuclear-free corridor in Central Europe, according to the US Embassy at The Hague. In contrast, the public communique of the Honecker-Vogel meeting endorsed the Soviet INF proposal. []

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In other public relations schemes:

- General Secretary Gorbachev unveiled a major shift in Soviet INF policy—namely, a willingness to eliminate all INF missiles, including the 100 SS-20 warheads Moscow insisted on retaining in Asia—during a 22 July interview with an Indonesian newspaper. The next day the Soviets made their formal announcement in Geneva and staged a press conference in Moscow to publicize the move.

- East Germany and Czechoslovakia circulated as official UN documents their mid-June proposals for an NWFZ in Central Europe, according to the US Mission to the United Nations in New York.

- Gorbachev exploited the Group of Six's call in May for the rapid conclusion of an INF treaty by circulating as an official UN document the text of his reply, in which he reiterated the Soviet position on INF and called for greater US responsiveness at the negotiations in Geneva. []

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The Soviets also engaged in open "dialogue" sessions with the West, continuing a trend of the *glasnost* era. For example, the Soviet Committee for the Defense of

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Secret**Worldwide Campaigns****SCRAP THE EUROMISSILES**

One of the major goals of the peace movement is close to being realized. The US and Soviet Euromissiles may be scrapped by agreement between the two powers.

The proposal for the removal of medium-range missiles from Europe, advanced by the Soviet Union 28 February, envisages:

- the elimination of all US and Soviet medium-range missiles within the next five years,
- the reduction of Soviet medium-range missiles in the Asian part of the USSR to 100 warheads,
- the maintenance of the same number of medium-range systems in the USA.

As soon as an agreement on this is signed, the Soviet Union would withdraw the missiles it deployed as counter measures to the Pershing-2 and cruise missiles. The Soviet government has also said that it

wants to begin talks to eliminate theatre or short-range missiles.

Initial responses to the proposal have been positive. The US has tabled a draft treaty at the Geneva disarmament talks which has been welcomed by the Soviet side.

It is apparent, though, that certain forces do not want a Euromissile agreement and are trying to link a treaty directly to agreements on short-range systems, conventional forces and even chemical weapons.

Nonetheless, news coming from different places shows how much the new initiative corresponds to the common desire for radical disarmament measures. In this bulletin we present some of the reactions from peace organizations and governments to the new Euromissile situation.

The Reykjavik summit demonstrated that the elimination of nuclear

weapons is a practicable alternative to the arms race and the balance of terror. The meeting was scuttled by Star Wars. Any future agreement on strategic nuclear disarmament will by necessity be closely linked to preventing the weaponization of outer space. The Euromissile proposal, however, has been singled out for separate consideration as an immediately attainable objective.

Joint action in support of a Euromissile agreement is needed to ensure that what has been started cannot be stopped. It is crucial that the work of peace activists in support of this initiative reach out to those beyond the peace movement. The campaigns and actions of the past six years for a nuclear weapon-free Europe are bearing fruit. Increased cooperation by all peace forces can help complete the process of ridding the world of all nuclear weapons.

The World Peace Council published this flier as part of its campaign supporting the Soviet position on INF.

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
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Worldwide Campaigns

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Peace—the most active player in these endeavors—hosted an international meeting of peace movements in Moscow in mid-May, [redacted]



• The WPC sponsored a meeting in the Netherlands 11-15 June that focused on current developments in the West European peace movement and arms control, with particular emphasis on INF, according to US Embassy reporting. 25X1

• [redacted] the WPC disarmament commission met in Tokyo 30-31 July in an attempt to mobilize mass demonstrations against US and Japanese nuclear policies. 25X1

• The Asian Oceania Trade Union Coordination Committee, an affiliate of the Soviet-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions, called for the removal of US bases from the Philippines at its annual conference, held this August in Manila. The Group's Philippine chairman said that the continued existence of the bases makes the country "a laboratory, if not a guinea pig" of the "madness" of the arms race, according to press reporting. [redacted] 25X1

Moscow's front group network recently intensified its involvement in the disarmament offensive, with the World Peace Council (WPC) taking the lead:

In view of Gorbachev's recent policy shift on INF, we expect the bulk of Soviet active measures and propaganda activities related to arms control to be directed in the near term toward that issue. Nonetheless,


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• The WPC held a regional conference of Latin American affiliates in Ecuador 21-23 May. [redacted]

[redacted] 25X1

Moscow has no intention of scaling back its diverse agenda. [redacted] 25X1

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[redacted] 25X1

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• The Christian Peace Conference cosponsored the International Conference on Peace in the Mediterranean, held outside Madrid 1-4 June. [redacted]

[redacted] The WPC and the Soviet-controlled 25X1

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World Federation of Scientific Workers will push for the creation of NWFZs in the South Atlantic and

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Worldwide Campaigns

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Europe at conferences they are sponsoring in October in Argentina and Bulgaria, respectively. [redacted]

**The World Women's Congress:
Is That All There Is? (U)**

The June World Women's Congress in Moscow, while showcasing General Secretary Gorbachev and Zimbabwean Prime Minister Mugabe, provided little indication that Moscow will upgrade the status of the Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF) in its influence operations. The forum attracted 2,300 delegates from 150 countries and 75 nongovernmental organizations, offering Moscow a chance to present its views before women of fairly diverse political orientations. Moscow's limited attention to the international women's movement, however, suggests that WIDF will continue to be cast in the largely supportive role it has played in the past. [redacted]

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Gorbachev set the tone for the meeting with an opening day address that reiterated his plan to eliminate nuclear weapons by the year 2000 and singled out the international women's movement as an important factor in bringing about world peace. Mugabe, attending the Congress in his capacity as chairman of the Nonaligned Movement, used Soviet press interviews to praise Gorbachev's foreign policies and criticize US policy in southern Africa. [redacted]

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Logo of the Moscow World Congress of Women. [redacted]

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Worldwide Campaigns

The Congress pursued a number of anti-US themes. For example:

- Margaret Papandreou, wife of the Greek Prime Minister, advocated denuclearization of the Balkans and elimination of foreign (that is, NATO) bases from the Mediterranean.
- A workshop led by Cuban Vilma Espin—a WIDF vice president—attacked “unpayable foreign debt” and capitalist oppression, according to US representatives in Havana.
- Leaders of WIDF and the Soviet-influenced Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom undertook a signature campaign calling for the peaceful reunification of Korea, undoubtedly a gesture in support of North Korea’s contention that US troops in South Korea are keeping the peninsula divided. [redacted]

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The Congress provided further evidence of Moscow’s desire for greater openness within the fronts. The Soviets portrayed WIDF and the Congress as broad based and open to a variety of viewpoints. For example:

- An Israeli delegation attended the Congress, the first Israeli involvement with WIDF in 25 years.

- [redacted]

- WIDF heavily associated the Congress with the United Nations. Congress literature portrayed the forum as a continuation of the 1985 UN Women’s Conference in Nairobi—even borrowing the Nairobi conference’s theme of “Peace, Equality, and Development” and the “Forward Looking Strategies for Women” agreed on by the UN conferees.

[redacted]

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Nonetheless, WIDF rigidly controlled the conference. It held plenary sessions only on the opening and closing days, limited delegate speeches to three minutes with no time for questions, and did not produce a final document—thus eliminating the chance for opposition. Some delegates were unhappy. For example, the US Embassy in Wellington reports that a New Zealand delegate, though sympathetic to WIDF, was frustrated by the Congress’s restrictions on debate.

[redacted]

In our view, Moscow uses WIDF primarily to cultivate influential women from countries where it has little access such as Israel, Somalia, and Botswana. For example, the Soviets induced many women—including Gladys Masire the wife of the President of Botswana—to participate in the Congress by paying all their expenses. Although WIDF is the third-largest front and is well connected in the United Nations, the Soviets apparently do not view it as an important part of their influence operations. Moscow gives WIDF little press play and usually relegates it to auxiliary activities such as supplying sign carriers, petitioners, and marchers. The Soviet media virtually ignored the Congress once it concluded, suggesting that Moscow will continue giving WIDF and the international women’s movement only periodic attention. [redacted]

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Worldwide Campaigns

The Fall UN General Assembly:

Soviet Gains? [redacted]

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Moscow's foremost objective at the fall UN General Assembly appears to be reducing support for the annual resolution calling for withdrawal of "foreign forces" from Afghanistan. Last year the resolution passed with a record 122 of 159 countries voting against the Soviets. For the past several months, Moscow and Kabul have waged a determined lobbying campaign to erode support for the resolution by getting Afghan leader Najib's National Reconciliation program. [redacted]

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[redacted] the Soviet Bloc will also seek UN endorsement for a proposal of East German leader Honecker and Czechoslovak President Husak for a nuclear-free corridor in Europe that would run 150 kilometers on either side of West Germany's border with East Germany and Czechoslovakia. The idea already has the support of the West German Social Democratic Party. [redacted]

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The Bloc appears ready to use East German Deputy Foreign Minister Peter Floren's role as president of this year's General Assembly to propagandize UN ceremonial occasions. [redacted]

[redacted]

The Bloc's chances for success at the General Assembly may be improved by Moscow's unexpected financial assistance to UN bodies. Over the past 18 months, the Soviets have:

- Agreed to contribute to the Common Fund for Commodities, a UN-administered buffer stock that would seek to increase and stabilize the prices of Third World commodity exports.

- Started funding the UN Interim Force in Lebanon after refusing to do so for the force's first eight years of existence.
- Kept its contributions to the United Nations fairly up to date, a sharp departure from past practice. The Soviets are running a *Save the UN* propaganda campaign to call attention to these contributions as well as the US decision to withhold part of its UN assessment. With the United Nations in deep financial trouble, there is a significant chance that the campaign will persuade some countries to look more favorably on Soviet Bloc initiatives in the General Assembly. [redacted]

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Soviet fortunes will also be boosted if General Secretary Gorbachev addresses the fall UN General Assembly, as a number of Soviet diplomats have indicated to US sources. Gorbachev's public relations skills and the novelty of his visit—a Soviet party boss has not come to the UN since Khrushchev's shoe-pounding 1960 appearance—probably will convey the impression of a growing Soviet commitment to the United Nations. [redacted]

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With Soviet credibility in the United Nations apparently on the rise, we believe Moscow stands a good chance of inducing a few countries to change their vote on the Afghanistan resolution—a development Moscow would undoubtedly portray as growing support for Kabul's reconciliation policy. The Soviets should also be able to prompt the General Assembly into giving serious consideration to the proposal for a nuclear-free corridor in Europe. The General Assembly has passed a number of resolutions calling for nuclear-free zones in other parts of the world. [redacted]

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Regional Activities

Western Europe



Public Diplomacy Dominates But Clandestine Activities on the Rise [redacted] 25X1

In recent months, the Soviets have complemented their ongoing public diplomacy campaign in Western Europe with increased covert activities including intelligence recruitment and the dissemination of disinformation. [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] 25X1

There are also indications that the Soviet Bloc will become more interested in using aggressive disinformation tactics in Western Europe. Moscow—or more likely the East Germans—appear to have been behind two pieces of AIDS disinformation that recently surfaced in West Berlin. One was a bogus leaflet offering free AIDS testing at the US Army hospital, the other a press release forged on Berlin government stationery announcing that the hospital could not treat civilian AIDS patients because it was overflowing with its own. [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] 25X1

This rise in covert activity accompanies continued growth in Soviet public diplomacy by ambassadors and other high-ranking figures as well as lower-level officials who, while attracting less publicity, establish personal contacts with a wider range of individuals and organizations. In Scandinavia and West Germany, Soviet Embassy staffers and visiting officials have inundated politicians, journalists, schools, peace groups, and other organizations with literature and personal visits. [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] 25X1

[redacted] 25X1

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Regional Activities

AUCH SIE SOLLTEN EIN MITGLIED DER INITIATIVE USA - BERLIN WERDEN!

Die Mitgliedschaft in dieser Organisation trägt nicht nur zur Vertiefung der freundschaftlichen Beziehungen der Bürger Westberlins zu den USA bei, aber obendrein verschafft echte persönliche Vorteile:

- EINE BESSERE ÜBERSICHT ÜBER DIE FRAGEN DES GESELLSCHAFTLICHEN UND KULTURELLEN LEBENS DER BÜRGER WESTBERLINS UND DER USA,
- EINE TEILNAHME AN KULTURELLEN MITGLIEDS-VERANSTALTUNGEN,
- DIE MÖGLICHKEIT EINER KOSTENLOSEN ANONYMEN AIDS - UNTERSUCHUNG IN EINEM USA - KRANKENHAUS MIT MODERNSTER AUSSTATTUNG

AUSKUNFT: ☎ 819 4133 und 819 4144

Bürger, die an ärztlichen Untersuchungen, Betreuung und Vorbeugungsmaßnahmen in Zusammenhang mit AIDS interessiert sind, können in dem

US ARMY HOSPITAL
Fabeckstraße 60/62
Berlin 33

die Sprechstunden jeden Dienstag und Donnerstag von 9 bis 12 Uhr in Anspruch nehmen.

Voranmeldung täglich von 9 bis 10 Uhr ☎ 819 4133

Leaflet disseminated in West Berlin claiming that the US Army hospital will provide free AIDS testing for city residents. A later forgery said the hospital would not be able to perform the testing because it was overflowing with US citizens suffering from the disease.

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Regional Activities

Although public diplomacy clearly will remain the focus of Soviet efforts to gain influence over public opinion and government policy in Western Europe, clandestine activities are likely to continue apace in the favorable climate generated by the Gorbachev reforms. For instance, the Soviets and East Germans may help finance a conference this fall in Paris sponsored by the *Friends of Turkey*, an organization supported by the Turkish Communist Party that is seeking to mobilize public opinion against the Turkish Government.

[Redacted]

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Africa



A Full Continent Press [Redacted]

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Moscow is trying to reduce US influence and bolster its own diplomatic and economic initiatives in Africa through manipulation of local labor movements, "people-to-people" contacts arranged by front groups, and media placements. The Soviets are particularly active in pro-Western countries such as Egypt, Kenya, and Lesotho. [Redacted]

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Influencing Labor Movements. Soviet labor organizing efforts—always vigorous—have recently accelerated probably in part because Nigerian Marxist Hassan Sunmonu has become Secretary General of the Organization of African Trade Union Unity (OATUU), the labor arm of the Organization of African Unity. In January, for example, the head of the Soviet-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) met with Sunmonu at the OATUU headquarters in Ghana and, [Redacted] concluded several agreements including one to establish an international labor college in Accra. The college would be funded by WFTU, Libya, and other donors, and probably staffed in part by Hungarians. In other labor activity:

- The Soviets have been working with the Secretary General of the Lesotho Communist Party, Jacob Kena, to gain control of the Lesotho Congress of Free Trade Unions (LCFTU). [Redacted]

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- In Uganda, [Redacted] the East German Federation of Trade Unions tried to strengthen relations with Uganda's National Organization of Trade Unions by offering to sponsor three union delegates to conferences and seminars in 1988 and pay for one representative to visit East Berlin this year. The Ugandans are reacting cautiously because they anticipate East German pressure on them to join WFTU.

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Regional Activities

Soviet labor activity in Africa has increased since Nigerian Marxist Hassan Sunmonu became Secretary General of the Organization of African Trade Union Unity. [redacted]

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- In the Sudan, our Embassy reported that the WFTU Secretary General visited Khartoum this spring to coordinate Communist strategy for ongoing Sudanese trade union elections. [redacted]

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Solidarity Groups. Moscow is using people-to-people contacts through its network of front groups to augment diplomatic visits by senior Soviet Government officials to the region. Such activity accompanied Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Adami-shin's West Africa tour early this summer and a Supreme Soviet delegation visit to Zaire this July. The Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee (SAASC) and the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace (SCDP) have been very active over the past few months:

- [redacted] SAASC representatives recently visited Guinea, Mozambique, Mauritius, and Egypt where the committee signed a cooperation protocol with its Egyptian counterpart.

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[redacted]

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- Press reports indicate recent meetings between the SCDP and its counterparts in Guinea, Benin, and Mali.
- Delegations from the Egyptian Solidarity Committee and the Mali-USSR Friendship Association visited Moscow this summer, according to press reports.

[redacted]

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The Soviets are also laying the groundwork for the future. The US Embassies in Lusaka and Maseru report that Moscow wants to establish cultural centers in Zambia and Lesotho, and [redacted] the Soviets are completing the Bamako branch of the Pushkin Institute, an adjunct to the Soviet Cultural Center in Mali. [redacted]

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Regional Activities

Media Manipulation. Soviet placement of anti-US disinformation in the African press continues at a brisk pace. For example:

- In Ghana, the press carried replays of Soviet charges that the United States is establishing a military base in Zaire, deploying cruise missiles in Africa, performing AIDS experiments on Africans, developing ethnic weapons to be used against black Africans, and using the CIA and USIA to manipulate the African media.
- In Uganda, Moscow probably was behind reports claiming that the United States and Israel are supporting rebels in northern Uganda.
- In Nigeria, Kenya, and Senegal, a spate of reports blaming the US Government for causing AIDS appeared in July—coincident with the first anniversary of Moscow's African AIDS campaign. [redacted]

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We expect Soviet propaganda efforts to intensify. In the past few months, Moscow has significantly expanded its media network in the region: Tass signed agreements to provide its news service to Nigeria, Djibouti, and Algeria; Ghana joined Intersputnik—the Soviet-sponsored satellite communications organization—and Angola signed a radio-television work protocol with Moscow [redacted]

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Latin America



The Quest for Hearts and Minds (U)

During the past several months, Cuba and the Soviet Union continued to channel money into Latin American influence operations. Havana increased its financial aid to Chilean leftist opposition groups associated with liberation theology while Moscow made plans to fund publications that would play up its policy of *glasnost*. [redacted]


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Havana continued to place a high priority on aiding the Christian Left (IC), a small, left-of-center Chilean opposition party with close ties to followers of liberation theology. The Cubans funded the IC in a couple of ways:

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Havana has designated the IC secretary general to promote Cuban-supported policies in Chile and coordinate Cuban political support to the Chilean left, including the new leftist coalition formed in late June, the United Left (IU).



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the Cuban Communist Party's America Department now employs a former IC official—who previously ran the IC front group Christians for Popular Liberation—in an unknown capacity in Sao Paulo, Brazil.



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Havana also kept up its campaign to influence other adherents of liberation theology. In May, it hosted a meeting of the Latin American and Caribbean affiliate of the Soviet-controlled Christian Peace Conference at which liberation theologians figured prominently. The Cubans also agreed to host a meeting later in the year of the Latin American Church Conference (CLI), a religious group that is setting up a coordinating body to promote liberation theology movements in Latin America.



Havana reportedly is

billing the gathering as a meeting between liberation theologians and Marxists.



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Meanwhile, Moscow apparently is looking to make adjustments in its regional propaganda by adding Gorbachev's policy of *glasnost* and issues of local concern to longstanding themes such as disarmament and US Central American policy. For example:



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- In early June, the Soviets offered the director of a Brazilian publishing company they routinely subsidize, *Editora Revan Limited*, an all-expenses-paid trip to the Soviet Union to research—and, presumably later write about—the political

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changes taking place under *glasnost*. [redacted] 25X1
 The Soviets have recently given the company director—a longtime member of the Brazilian Communist Party—more freedom in choosing the materials that are published at Soviet expense.

- Sources of the US Embassy in La Paz reported that the Soviets are planning to publish a free newspaper in Mexico City geared toward Latin American issues, especially human rights. [redacted] 25X1

Looking ahead, we expect the Cubans to continue using the Chilean IC in their efforts both to promote broader leftist opposition to Pinochet and to penetrate Christian Base Communities, the organizational components of liberation theology. Havana probably will also use the newly formed United Left coalition to increase contacts with Chilean leftists and coordinate their opposition activities.

[redacted]

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Although Castro probably intends to use the influence he builds with those sympathetic to liberation theology to spread revolutionary ideas throughout Latin America, in our view, his efforts will focus for the most part on Chile for the next several years. We believe that the Cubans hope that liberation theology will be a force they can use to mobilize the Chilean people against Pinochet if he is reelected in 1989. If it fails to generate broad opposition to Pinochet, however, Castro may decide to reduce his efforts to use liberation theology to transmit his revolutionary message. [redacted] 25X1

Moscow's plans to manipulate Latin media are intended to complement its current efforts to improve political and economic ties to Latin American countries. Portraying the Soviet Union as undergoing a national renewal and sincerely concerned about Latin American issues such as foreign debt (see Perspective) and human rights, the campaigns are likely to gain momentum as Gorbachev's projected visit to the region draws nearer. [redacted] 25X1

Middle East and South Asia

India and Afghanistan on the Front Burner [redacted] 25X1

In the Middle East and South Asia, Soviet active measures and propaganda continue to focus on India and on the war in Afghanistan. A successful active measures program in India has helped Moscow gain support for some of its key foreign policy initiatives and raise doubts about the intentions of the United States in the region (see "Soviet Active Measures in India: A Major Success"). With regard to Afghanistan, the Soviets and Afghans are stepping up their efforts to use the National Reconciliation initiative to gain legitimacy for the Kabul regime, distract international attention from the Soviet military presence, and shift the blame for continuation of the war onto the Mujahedin, Pakistan, and the United States.

[redacted]

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Despite the nearly complete rejection of National Reconciliation by the population inside Afghanistan, the Afghan refugees and the resistance groups, Moscow and Kabul have succeeded in shifting much of the media attention on the Afghan war from the issue of a timetable for Soviet troop withdrawal to Kabul's National Reconciliation process. As part of this effort, the Afghan Government has greatly overstated the results of National Reconciliation:

- Afghan Foreign Minister Wakil, echoing public claims often made by Soviet and Afghan spokesmen, stated in a July letter to an Islamic group that nearly 60,000 refugees had returned to Afghanistan, 25,000 armed men had laid down their weapons and that the government is in touch with 110 resistance groups "embracing 100,000 people."
- In a letter to UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar, Wakil further asserted that more refugees would return home with "the elimination of obstacles from the Pakistani and Iranian authorities." [redacted]

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Over the past several months, both Kabul and Moscow have made particular efforts to overcome the Kabul regime's diplomatic estrangement from the Islamic world, which has generally supported the Mujahedin:

- At Kabul's initiative, Afghan Premier Keshtmand visited Iraq in early June. An ambassador from a Muslim country, well versed on the Afghan issue, saw the visit as a Soviet-inspired public relations exercise aimed at securing entre for the Kabul regime in the Islamic world, [redacted]
- Soviet officials arranged a special meeting of the Afghan and Algerian foreign ministers at a Nonaligned Movement conference this June in North Korea, [redacted] US Embassy reporting. [redacted]

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Kabul seeks to cultivate the Islamic world by portraying itself as a government protecting Islam. In the first few months of the National Reconciliation campaign, for example, Afghan President Najib claimed in an interview with the East German newspaper *Die Zeit* that Afghanistan has never been a Communist country, and described himself as a son of my Muslim people. In recent months these efforts have been expanded:

- In a letter renewing Kabul's application for readmission to the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), a respected Saudi-based organization with a membership of over 40 Islamic nations, Afghan Foreign Minister Wakil claimed that his government had established Islam as the state religion. The government, he

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Der Spiegel ©

Afghan President Najib has portrayed his government as protective of Islamic values. [redacted]

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noted, had appointed a Minister of Islamic Affairs, renovated mosques, and recently opened an Islamic Research Center. Although Kabul has renovated some mosques, the new Islamic Research Center is essentially a paper organization, according to the US Embassy in Kabul.

- Kabul hosted a Koranic reading contest in late May, inviting participants from several Islamic countries, according to the US Embassy. The contest, which drew a handful of participants from Libya, Syria, Lebanon, and India, as well as several Palestinians, coincided with a regime-sponsored "Conference on Islam and Peace."
- According to the US Embassy in Kabul, a Saudi diplomat recently indicated that the Afghan Government had greatly overstated the number of persons it was sending on the annual hajj pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia this year. To inflate its Islamic credentials, Kabul claimed 7,000 would attend, but the diplomat indicated that only 4,000 will make the trip. [redacted]

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At the same time, the Afghan intelligence service KHAD continues its two-year-old cross-border bombing campaign into Pakistan. Designed to incite Pakistani resentment against the approximately 3 million Afghan refugees and increase domestic pressure on the government to find an end to the war, the focus of the bombing campaign has shifted since this spring from the Northwest Frontier Province to the more populous and influential areas of Pakistan such as Sind and the Punjab. [redacted] some senior Pakistan Government officials are gravely concerned about their inability to provide adequate security and fear that the bombings will continue to build public pressure against Islamabad's support for the Afghan resistance in those politically significant provinces. [redacted]

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Regional Activities

In addition to the bombing campaign, Moscow and Kabul are beginning to use more traditional active measures methods in Pakistan. In late June, with Soviet, Afghan, and North Korean diplomats in attendance, a Pakistani affiliate of the Soviet-controlled Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization met in Karachi and passed resolutions supporting the National Reconciliation initiative and condemning Pakistan policy toward Afghanistan, according to the US Consulate. [redacted]

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Moscow and Kabul's themes have appeared in the regional press and beyond. In Pakistan, the Peshawar *Frontier Post* of 2 August charged the CIA with trying to "subdue the revolution in Afghanistan" and "bully a nation into remaining undeveloped." Outside the region, in an article that the US Embassy believes was written in Moscow, the Harare *Sunday Mail* of 7 June charged that the United States has rebuffed peace initiatives by the Kabul government and demanded that Afghan resistance leaders reject Kabul's peace offer. Similarly, in Mauritius, the Soviets almost certainly placed an article in the *Sunday Star* that cited the Afghan war to support allegations that the United States seeks to divide Islamic states and provoke armed clashes among Muslims. [redacted]

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As a complement to these varied tactics, Kabul is now undertaking a major public diplomacy foray, dispatching five teams of senior diplomats and civil servants to various parts of the world to explain National Reconciliation and to press for support on the annual UN General Assembly resolution on Afghanistan. The Deputy Foreign Minister will travel to Europe, the Afghan Ambassador to India will tour Asian capitals, a third diplomat will travel to Latin America, and two others will cover African capitals. [redacted]

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Pushing these themes, we expect Kabul to make modest progress in the Third World. In making their pitch, Kabul's representatives can point to recent statements of support for National Reconciliation initiatives by two Indian Cabinet ministers. Kabul has tried, thus far unsuccessfully, to open a dialogue with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) on its bogus refugee repatriation program. Planned UNHCR actions such as sending a two or three person UN team to Kabul, were postponed indefinitely in August by strong Western lobbying, temporarily thwarting Kabul's effort to legitimize its refugee program. [redacted]

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Although Moscow and Kabul's near-term goal is to reduce the overwhelming opposition to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan at the fall session of the UN General Assembly, we believe their long-term objective is to increase pressure on the United States, Pakistan, and the Mujahedin to agree to a settlement that preserves the power of the current Kabul regime. [redacted]

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Regional Activities
East Asia and the Pacific**Spreading Disinformation on the Fiji Coup, Aiding the Philippine Communists**

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During the past several months, Moscow tarnished the image of US policy in the South Pacific by mounting a highly successful disinformation campaign linking the CIA to the 14 May military coup in Fiji. The Soviets also set the stage for intensified anti-US activities in the Philippines by agreeing to send money to the country's leading Communist party.

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The Fiji campaign took shape in the Soviet and Czechoslovak media within days of the overthrow. The campaign accused the United States of precipitating the coup to prevent the leftist government from carrying out its announced policy of restricting port calls of US nuclear ships. Moscow alleged that UN Ambassador and former CIA Deputy Director Vernon Walters helped plan the overthrow during his visit to Fiji in early May, and that CIA officers operating under Peace Corps cover participated in the ouster. Soviet and Czechoslovak media attributed these allegations to foreign sources including the World Peace Council (WPC), the leftist British paper *News on Sunday*, and Gerald O'Brien, a New Zealand Labor Party official with WPC affiliations.

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Moscow gave the campaign worldwide dissemination by placing its allegations in a number of foreign newspapers. For example:

- In India, the pro-Soviet weekly *Link* claimed that the coup was a CIA project and contained lessons for the entire Third World.
- In Zimbabwe, the US Embassy suspects the Soviets were behind a story in the Harare *Daily Mail* that accused the United States of precipitating the overthrow.
- In Papua New Guinea, the leading daily published an anonymous letter—suspected by our Embassy to be a plant—from a US citizen praising US involvement in the ouster.

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The campaign was highly effective with the ousted Fijian leader, Timoci Bavadra, apparently believing the charges. In a mid-June visit to Washington, Bavadra called for a Congressional inquiry into possible US involvement in the coup and stated his “strong suspicion” that Ambassador Walters helped plan his ouster. Moreover, the story was picked up by a number of foreign media without apparent Soviet prompting:

- In India, the mainstream *Times of India* editorialized that the coup appeared to be US-inspired because nothing else would explain the presence of CIA officers in tiny Fiji or the recent Walters visit.
- In Australia, the *Sydney Morning Herald* claimed there was strong circumstantial evidence—including the Walters' visit and a CIA presence in the country—linking the United States to the coup.

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Pacific Islands Monthly ©

In the midst of a Soviet disinformation campaign linking the CIA to the Fiji coup, ousted Fiji leader Timoci Bavadra held a press conference in Washington calling for a Congressional inquiry into possible US involvement in his overthrow.

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- In New Zealand, National News Radio and the *Christchurch Press* speculated on Ambassador Walters' role in the overthrow.

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Having aroused concern about US subversion, the Soviets are well positioned to launch new campaigns in the region. For example, we expect Moscow to portray any pro-Western government in Fiji as a US puppet. Such a campaign probably would have some success in Fiji itself because—according to the US Embassy in Suva—a large part of the population is convinced of US involvement in the coup. It should also play well in India, New Zealand, and Australia where there is strong support for the deposed Bavadra government. In addition, the Soviets are likely to try to play up the “Fiji example” in spreading disinformation about US intentions toward Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands both of which restrict port calls of nuclear ships.

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In the Philippines, Moscow has tentatively agreed to aid the traditionally anti-Soviet Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) by providing money for CPP rallies and propaganda aimed at reducing US influence and removing US military bases.

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Soviet representatives reportedly ruled out military aid for the CPP, which is leading the military insurgency in the Philippines, and said they would continue to recognize and assist the PKP.

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In recent months, there has been growing evidence of cooperation between the Soviet-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) and the CPP's labor front, the KMU.

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[REDACTED] 25X1

We expect the CPP-Soviet relationship to evolve slowly. The CPP is staunchly independent and almost certainly will demand that Soviet assistance have no strings attached. Moreover, Moscow probably will offer the CPP only modest amounts of aid to reduce the chance of provoking a diplomatic crisis with the Philippine Government. [REDACTED]

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Nonetheless, the opening to the CPP should put Moscow in a better position to try to erode US influence in the Philippines. In the next several months, Soviet aid could help the KMU in its ongoing efforts to stir up labor trouble on the US bases and prompt strikes against US-owned businesses. Over the next year, we expect Moscow to encourage its surrogates in the Philippines—the PKP and three small unions affiliated with WFTU—to cooperate with the CPP and the KMU in hopes of intensifying anti-US activities in the country and exerting indirect influence over the CPP. Moscow's surrogates are small but, until recently, were intense rivals of the CPP and the KMU. Although a common front is unlikely in the immediate future, Soviet money may induce the erstwhile rivals to join forces in many activities against the US presence in the country. [REDACTED]

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**Soviet Active Measures
Targeting US Foreign Basing
and Access Rights** [redacted]

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The Soviet Union has an aggressive propaganda and active measures program targeting the US military presence overseas. Using a variety of tools—including worldwide disinformation campaigns, manipulation of local Communist parties, orchestration of front group activities, and public diplomacy—Moscow has worked hard to heighten opposition to US bases around the world. Although Moscow's campaigns against US military installations and port access are worldwide in scope, the Soviets have been most active in NATO countries (Greece and Spain) and East Asia (Japan, the Philippines, and the South Pacific). We believe that, in the future, the Soviets will press hard for the establishment of nuclear-free zones around the world as a way of exploiting powerful antinuclear sentiment in their antibases campaign. Although it is difficult to forecast how successful Moscow will be, Soviet efforts could have a significant impact in creating even more vigorous and organized antinuclear opposition to US facilities in Australia, the Philippines, and Spain.

[redacted]

A Key Soviet Objective

In our view, the reduction of US access to foreign military facilities, especially in Europe and East Asia, is a high-priority Soviet goal. Moscow has also sought to prevent the United States from acquiring additional facilities abroad. The unevenness of the Soviet effort reflects Moscow's prioritization of targets and its ability to exercise influence. Africa and Latin America, for example, are not priority targets because US facilities and access in these regions are limited. In other areas of the world, such as Turkey, Moscow would no doubt like to target US bases, but its efforts are constrained by vigorous government efforts to limit Soviet influence. [redacted]

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Tools of the Trade

Disinformation and Propaganda. The Soviets consider propaganda and disinformation to be an essential part of their campaign against US military installations. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] in an effort to pressure the Greek Government not to renew its military cooperation agreement with the United States, the Soviet Embassy in Athens instructed local *Izvestia* and *Pravda* correspondents last December to submit articles urging that Greece be more insistent that the United States remove all military bases from the country. [redacted]

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Soviet propaganda alleging that the US military presence violates the host nation's sovereignty is common, particularly as part of campaigns against US facilities in NATO countries. In a variant of this theme, Moscow also frequently accuses the United States of blackmailing its allies in order to retain military basing rights. In March 1987, for instance, TASS charged that the United States had pressured the Turkish Government into renewing an agreement on military cooperation—including base rights—by making the agreement a condition for military aid to Turkey, while in Spain Moscow charged that US authorities had reportedly threatened Madrid with a reduction in economic aid if the US F-16 fighter planes and other equipment were removed. [redacted]

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Soviet disinformation against US military installations has employed several themes—including allegations that US military personnel are responsible for

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the spread of AIDS and charges that some military facilities will be used in the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) system. Disinformation has surfaced linking the spread of AIDS to US bases or port calls in the Philippines, Japan, South Korea, Western Europe, Pakistan, and Honduras:

- In March 1986, the Honduran media alleged that US servicemen stationed in Honduras were responsible for the appearance of AIDS among prostitutes there. Moscow, Havana, and Managua quickly picked up and embellished the allegations, according to the US Embassy in Tegucigalpa.
- The TASS correspondent in Manila reported in November 1986 that the Philippine Ministry of Public Health was seriously concerned about the spread of AIDS in the Philippines, citing US military personnel at Subic Bay and Clark Field as the carriers of the virus.
- *Sovietskaya Rossiya* replayed a story in late January from the *Ghanaian Times*—a newspaper that often carries Soviet disinformation—charging that the greatest numbers of AIDS cases in Western Europe were found in areas where American troops were stationed.
- In February, a Ukrainian paper claimed that the Japanese were panicking over the spread of AIDS by US servicemen in Japan and that restaurants, barber shops, and other businesses around the US bases had barred the Americans from entering.
- Moscow Radio Peace and Progress, in a late April broadcast to Iran, reported a Pakistani newspaper story on public warnings by doctors there to avoid associating with American sailors because most of them had AIDS. The report also claimed that Pakistan's first case of the disease had occurred in Karachi, where many US ships visit. [redacted]



Demonstration against US use of the Torrejon Air Base in Spain: Moscow is trying to tap into this type of opposition to the US military presence abroad [redacted]

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In certain countries, primarily in Western Europe, the USSR has exploited controversy about the SDI in an effort to heighten local opposition to US facilities:

- In April 1986, the Portuguese Communist daily newspaper reported—presumably with Moscow's approval—that the Portuguese ecological movement

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would protest the building of a GEODSS satellite tracking station in Portugal on the grounds that it was an integral part of SDI and would contribute to nuclear conflict.

- In March 1987, the Indian press ran an article on Soviet charges that the United States produced SDI components in Diego Garcia.
- Also in March, a TASS broadcast in English repeated the yearlong Soviet claim that the planned modernization of the US radar facility in Thule, Greenland, would be used in the SDI system. Moscow replayed the charge after the Danish Parliament passed a resolution requiring the government to ensure that the Thule facility not be used in SDI rather than prohibiting the upgrade outright.

[redacted]

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Moscow has also surfaced disinformation alleging that the United States is attempting to acquire bases in order to destabilize particular regions:

- In an apparent effort to heighten Greek distrust of the US position in the Greek-Turkish dispute over Cyprus, the KGB probably was responsible for a forgery in late 1985 allegedly from the Air Force Office of the Chief of Staff to Defense Secretary Weinberger urging that the United States push for the creation of an independent state in northern Cyprus under Turkish patronage. According to the document, such a state would allow the United States to use bases there to evacuate US personnel and their families from Europe in case of nuclear war.
- This January the Soviet military publication *Krasnaya Zvezda* cited a Beirut magazine as the source for its claim that the United States and Pakistan had signed a secret agreement allowing the United States to use the Pakistani port of Gwadar as the headquarters for a Rapid Deployment Force division. Allegations of US facilities at Gwadar have

been a staple of Soviet disinformation efforts in South Asia for years and predictably major English-language Indian newspapers replayed the *Krasnaya Zvezda* charges.

- At the end of March, India's pro-Soviet *Patriot* carried an article accusing the United States of fomenting communal unrest among Tamil populations in India and Sri Lanka in order to create an independent Tamil state that would give the United States access to base facilities at Trincomalee.
- Soviet radio charged in April that joint US-Zaire military maneuvers reflected a US interest in controlling the Kamina Air Force base in southern Zaire and using it to destabilize the region by supporting South Africa and channeling aid to UNITA guerrillas in Angola.

Such allegations serve Soviet interests by raising local suspicion of US intentions—even in limited military maneuvers—and aim to prevent the United States from gaining additional facilities in those or nearby countries. [redacted]

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Communist Parties and Their Fronts. Local Communists and their affiliated fronts, such as labor confederations and peace groups, often spearhead the Soviet attack against US foreign bases. Pro-Soviet Communist parties in Greece, Spain, and the Philippines have been especially active: organizing conferences and demonstrations against US facilities; delivering letters of protest; and working through local labor and peace groups to generate broader opposition to the American military presence. [redacted]

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With the approaching expiration in 1988 of the US-Greek military cooperation agreement permitting US bases in Greece, the Greek Communist Party (KKE) [redacted] has criticized Prime Minister Papandreou's foreign policy

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[redacted]
In 1986 the KKE pushed hard for the removal of the bases, including sponsoring a June conference on atomic weapons and the US bases through its peace front, the Greek Committee for International Detente and Peace (EEDYE). [redacted]

[redacted]

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The Portuguese Communist Party (PCP), which has close ties to the Soviet Embassy in Lisbon, is mobilizing to prevent US F-16 fighters and Air Force personnel from being relocated at Portuguese air bases in the event that the United States loses its rights to base the 401st Tactical Fighter Wing in Spain. [redacted]

[redacted] the PCP's peace front is planning an international peace meeting in late October—probably with the support of the World Peace Council—to oppose future US use of Portuguese facilities. [redacted]

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Moscow is also approaching nonorthodox Communist and other leftist parties in its campaign to reduce US bases overseas. In the last year, for example, the Soviets have expanded ties to the Maoist-oriented Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP). [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] In Japan, the Soviets have been targeting the Japan Socialist Party, pushing it to promote antinuclear peace movements in the country. [redacted]

Soviet-Controlled Fronts. Although the primary thrust of Soviet efforts to remove US bases from countries, such as Greece and Spain, has been through local Communist groups, Moscow has also directed several of its international fronts to target

US bases. The World Peace Council (WPC), for example, sponsored an action week in February for the elimination of "imperialist" military bases. [redacted]

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[redacted]

In the South Pacific, the Soviets have used the Soviet-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) and pro-Soviet groups such as the Pacific Trade Union Community to exploit the antinuclear sentiment of the area's labor movements and to push for the removal of US bases in the Philippines, joint facilities in Australia, and access rights in New Zealand. In the Philippines, moreover, the Soviets recently have made overtures to the radical, Communist Party of the Philippines-associated May First Movement (KMU) labor organization, in an effort to take advantage of the labor group's strong opposition to the American installations there. [redacted]

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[redacted] WFTU's regional affiliate, the Asian Oceania Trade Union Coordination Committee—which has campaigned in New Zealand and the Pacific Islands to deny port access to US ships—is beginning to work with the KMU as well. [redacted]

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Other Tools. In addition to disinformation and the activities of Communist parties and front groups, Moscow has employed other tools of its active measures apparatus against American bases abroad. In the Philippines, for example, the USSR-Philippines Friendship Society chapter at the University of the Philippines actively conducts propaganda activities against the US bases, with the Soviets footing most of the bill. [redacted]

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This poster published by the Soviet-controlled International Union of Students is part of a campaign to forestall possible establishment of US military facilities in the Persian Gulf.

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Secret**Articles****Public and Private Diplomacy**

As a complement to its active measures and propaganda activities against US foreign bases, Moscow has made particular use of public diplomacy:

- In a July 1986 speech in Vladivostok, General Secretary Gorbachev hinted that a reduction in the US military presence in the Philippines would yield a reduction in Soviet basing in the Pacific, probably in an effort to influence the Philippine constitutional commission that at the time was considering the inclusion of a clause prohibiting foreign military bases and nuclear weapons from the country.
- During a trip to India last November, Gorbachev issued a joint statement with Prime Minister Gandhi calling for the dismantling of all foreign military and naval bases in the Indian Ocean and for the prevention of new ones. Reaffirming their support for the 1971 UN declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, the two leaders seconded the UN General Assembly's call for an international conference on the subject no later than 1988.
- In December the Soviets became the first nuclear power to sign the protocols of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, lending public support to regional efforts to restrict the port access of ships—especially American vessels—that might be carrying nuclear weapons. [redacted]

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Moscow has also used private diplomacy to push for the removal of US bases. In early March, the Soviets offered a Spanish delegation visiting Moscow economic and commercial benefits in exchange for Spain's not renewing its bilateral defense agreement with the United States in 1988. [redacted]

[redacted] The Soviets also offered to compensate Spain for any decreased investment Spain would experience as a result of the withdrawal of US forces from its territory. [redacted]

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Outlook

We believe that over the next few years countering the US military presence overseas will remain a top Soviet priority. Since future Soviet campaigns against US basing and military access abroad will necessarily reflect changes in both Moscow's foreign policy priorities and in exploitable opportunities overseas, forecasting particular Soviet tactics and their impact is uncertain. Nonetheless, we can anticipate certain general trends:

- Soviet propaganda and active measures campaigns that emphasize the potential role of military facilities in SDI or some other space-based defense system are likely to have limited impact, no matter how hard this connection is pushed. Moscow has for several years targeted SDI, but the impact of these efforts on government policy has been limited because SDI is neither well understood nor a matter of popular concern. We expect this to continue to be the case at least until SDI or some comparable defense system is deployed.
- As Moscow's AIDS campaign illustrates, the Soviets will certainly not lose any opportunity to call attention to the negative social consequences—real or purported—of hosting US military facilities or allowing the United States access rights. Whether these efforts have any impact depends in part on US handling of these charges, but the typically significant economic and military benefits for the host country of such relationships suggest that these Soviet activities will probably have limited impact.
- Soviet campaigns that play on the nuclear issue have the greatest chance for success. Large and politically significant antinuclear movements now exist in most of Western Europe and in parts of Asia. Moscow will continue to play on the nuclear

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theme in two ways: (1) emphasizing the potential for nuclear accidents on foreign territories; and (2) portraying countries that host US facilities as targets in a nuclear confrontation. Moscow's long-standing efforts to create nuclear-weapons-free zones around the globe received a major shot in the arm from last year's ratification of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty. We expect that, in their efforts to deny US access to military facilities abroad over the next few years, the Soviets will give high priority to active measures in support of nuclear-free zones. [redacted]

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Although it is difficult to determine whether governmental decisions unfavorable to US access rights and basing facilities will result, past Soviet campaigns against the Enhanced Radiation Weapon and Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces suggest that Moscow's efforts can spell the difference between an opposition to US facilities that is unfocused and

unorganized and a cohesive political movement. Exploitation of antinuclear sentiment is most likely to have an impact in creating even more vigorous and organized opposition to US facilities in Australia, the Philippines, and Spain. We expect Moscow to push especially hard in countries that have basing agreements with the United States that are nearing termination. Moreover, Soviet propaganda and active measures efforts will probably raise the political barriers to US acquisition in the future of new facilities and access rights in the Third World. [redacted]

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[redacted]

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Soviet Active Measures in India:

A Major Success [redacted]

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The Soviet Union, exploiting its close diplomatic ties to New Delhi and Indian concerns about US policies in South Asia, has built up substantial influence capabilities in India over the past three decades. While Moscow encountered a less receptive political environment during Rajiv Gandhi's first two years in office than existed during his mother's rule, the Soviets have regained their influence in the Congress (I) Party over the past six months and are drawing heavily on their huge active measures machinery in India. Recent Soviet campaigns have accused the United States of supporting Indian separatist movements and using US-Indian technological cooperation to extract foreign policy concessions from New Delhi. We expect the Soviets to continue targeting officials in the ruling Congress (I) Party and exploiting their wide media access in India. [redacted]

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Funding Political Parties

Moscow provides substantial financial support to the Congress (I) Party, the two Indian Communist parties, and individual politicians of other parties through kickback schemes on trade with the USSR and Soviet military sales, according to US Embassy [redacted]

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[redacted] the Congress (I) Party receives about 5 to 10 percent of its funds from the Soviets and a much smaller portion from Bloc nations. This funding of parties and politicians has helped ensure significant Soviet access to Indian Government and political leaders. [redacted]

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Penetrating the Media

The Soviets, through contacts with and payments to journalists, enjoy wide access to the pages of Indian newspapers, including the mainstream English-language press. [redacted] in 1984

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Moscow overtly and covertly placed more than 160,000 items (original articles and replays) in the Indian press, widely regarded as the freest in the

Third World. The Soviets place material on a daily basis with the Press Trust of India, the largest English-language news wire service in India [redacted] 25X1

The Soviets have also set up their own non-Communist newspaper in India. A KGB officer who defected several years ago recently testified in a British courtroom that he helped set up the *Patriot* newspaper in 1962 as an outlet for Soviet propaganda and disinformation in India. Although known by most in the Indian elite as a pro-Soviet newspaper, today the *Patriot* has the most modern printing equipment and page layout of any paper in India and is a daily source of anti-US articles. [redacted] 25X1

Over the past two years Moscow has used its press capability extensively:

- The Soviets have launched several propaganda campaigns to discredit US and other Western technology and heighten Indian domestic opposition to Gandhi's quest for Western technological cooperation. One of these campaigns included a series of placements aimed at raising suspicions that Secretary Weinberger would use his October 1986 visit to New Delhi to pressure the government into taking pro-US foreign policy positions in exchange for US technology cooperation.
- Before and during General Secretary Gorbachev's visit to India in November 1986, the Soviets launched probably their most massive media campaign ever in India. [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] 25X1

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• This spring and summer the Soviets resurrected their most common disinformation theme of the past decade: that the United States is conspiring to destabilize India by supporting separatist movements and conducting subversive activities. The latest flood of Soviet placements has received wide coverage in the country's mainstream, pro-Soviet, and Communist press. For example, in July 1987 the pro-Soviet paper *Blitz* carried a forgery that claimed former CIA Director Casey wanted to stir up political opposition to Prime Minister Gandhi. A pro-Soviet Congress (I) member of Parliament used the forgery to call for a parliamentary investigation of CIA attempts to destabilize India.

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Sponsoring Front Groups

The Soviets orchestrate the activities of at least a dozen front groups in India—including the Indo-Soviet Cultural Society, the local affiliate of the World Peace Council, and a professional journalists' organization. Most recently the Soviet Embassy worked behind the scenes to sponsor a conference in New Delhi in August on "nonaligned issues." While hiding its Soviet tie in order to attract a broad range of participants, the conference was structured as a showcase for pro-Soviet propaganda, with both Indian Government and international representation.

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Impact

Most Indians are neither ideologically inclined toward Marxism-Leninism nor sympathetic to Moscow's political system. Indian public support for strong ties to Moscow derives in large measure from the substantial economic benefit India receives from its trade and military sales with the Soviets, and from Moscow's support to India during its wars with Pakistan and other national crises.

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Nonetheless, by capitalizing on unpopular and misperceived US policies in South Asia, Soviet active measures contributed to a culture of suspicion about the US role in the region and in Indian domestic

matters. [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted] we believe that these attitudes are also prevalent among the more politically attentive segment of the populace who hear such charges frequently from their political leaders and read them in both the Indian and English-language press. [redacted]

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Talk of "destabilization" and the presence in India of a "foreign hand," (veiled references to Pakistan and the United States) is pervasive in the Indian Government. For example, many old-line traditional and pro-Soviet Congress (I) Party politicians use these themes to cast themselves with their constituents and others in the party as staunch nationalists and defenders of the Congress (I) tradition. The deputy director of the Indian internal security service told officials responsible for monitoring dissident activity that the United States is trying to overthrow the Indian Government by fomenting civil unrest.

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[redacted] Even Rajiv Gandhi, who had used the foreign hand theme in speeches this spring, cited the recent Casey forgery as evidence of foreign subversion, probably in an effort to protect his position within the party. [redacted]

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This climate of distrust has created many challenges to the implementation of US policy. For example:

- The US Embassy in New Delhi has often had to rebut Soviet-placed articles in the Indian press.
- One Soviet campaign in 1985 jeopardized, for a time, the Memorandum of Understanding on technology and trade then being negotiated between Washington and New Delhi, according to a senior Embassy officer.
- At least one debate in the Indian Parliament in each of the past three years has focused on whether the United States was trying to destabilize India.

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Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi recently cited a forgery published in a well-known pro-Soviet Indian newspaper as evidence of US attempts to destabilize India. [redacted]

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continue its official contacts with and funding of selected Congress (I) politicians and government officials surrounding Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. As Rajiv Gandhi's previously firm control on the Congress (I) party has gradually diminished, old-line leftist and pro-Soviet Congress (I) politicians are making a resurgence, trying to lead the party back to its traditional socialist and anti-US ideology. [redacted] 25X1

The Soviets will also continue their massive, yet relatively inexpensive propaganda and disinformation campaigns in India. There is no evidence to suggest that New Delhi will change its longstanding policy of turning a blind eye to the Soviets anti-US overt and covert activities in India. [redacted] 25X1

The US Embassy reports a resurgence in anti-US feeling among Indian political leaders over the past few months. Gandhi himself voiced concern about the "strong anti-American attitude building up" in India to US Health and Human Services Secretary Bowen during his visit to New Delhi this spring. Although anti-US sentiment is not solely a product of Soviet active measures, Soviet disinformation about the United States feeds these sentiments, giving them much greater import than they would have otherwise.

[redacted]

[redacted] 25X1

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Outlook

The Soviets substantial active measures capability in India will enable them to continue complicating US policy initiatives in the region and provide them with a credible, nonaligned base for their influence activities in other parts of the Third World. Moscow will

Articles

New Leadership for Key Soviet Front Organizations: Sweeping Clean With Old Brooms

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In an effort to bring its front group network in line with *glasnost* and Gorbachev's sophisticated propaganda style, Moscow has assigned new leaders to several key front organizations within the past year. Although these individuals have already produced visible signs of change in their organizations—both in style and substance—their extensive background in propaganda activities and KGB ties suggest that this “new look” may be largely cosmetic. Moreover, despite the success they are likely to have in marketing Soviet propaganda in the future, we believe the new front leaders also have potential vulnerabilities—particularly in terms of their intelligence ties—that can be exploited by the West.

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Debating the Role of the Fronts

For some time now, the senior Soviet propaganda leadership has been grappling with the question of what role Moscow's traditional front group network should play in the Gorbachev era.

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[Redacted]

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While the Soviets probably will continue to debate the front groups' role, they appear to have decided on the outline of their strategy. Moscow is making a major investment in exploiting a wide variety of groups outside its traditional network of fronts and pro-Soviet Communist parties. Nonetheless, because the fronts continue to provide value in marketing Soviet propaganda, particularly with Third World audiences, the Soviet leadership has been taking steps to get the fronts in tune with Gorbachev's more sophisticated propaganda approach. Thus, for example, we have seen several indications in recent months of front organizations making tentative efforts to emulate

Gorbachev's *glasnost* policy in their own meetings. Similarly, for more than a year now, the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace (SCDP), the World Peace Council's (WPC) parent organization, has been trying to reach out to mainstream peace groups in the West.

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One key element of Moscow's efforts to remake the fronts has been the assignment of new top leadership to the Soviet organizations responsible for managing the front network. Within the past year, new leaders have assumed the top posts in six such organizations: the SCDP, the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, the Union of Education and Science Workers, the Soviet Women's Committee, the Committee of Youth Organizations (CYO), and the Union of Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations With Foreign Countries.

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Clearly, Moscow's goal in the leadership changes is to give these organizations “a new look.” The individuals who have assumed the top leadership posts of the CYO, the SCDP, and the Union of Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations within the past six months all represent in some ways breaks from the past and are leading their organizations in new directions. Sergey Chelnokov, head of the CYO since May, is a prototypical “new generation” propagandist who aggressively pushes *glasnost* with Western visitors. To head the SCDP, the Soviet leadership went outside the organization to pick Genrikh Borovik, a longtime journalist with extensive background in US affairs. Finally, Valentina Nikolayevna-Tereshkova, the new head of the Soviet friendship society apparatus, has glamour status as the first woman in space.

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The change in leadership is more than just a matter of style and background. The CYO under Chelnokov has, for example, pressed for greater openness in the management of the youth fronts. In meetings with

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Western visitors, Friendship Society representatives have pushed a variety of schemes for establishing a greater degree of people-to-people diplomacy. Under Borovik, the SCDP has even offered to finance the travel of a dissident Soviet peace group. [redacted]

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Nonetheless, some elements of this group's background suggest that the new leadership may represent less of a break from the past than first appearances would indicate. The fact that all three are veteran propagandists indicates that the missions of their organizations remain essentially unchanged. Moreover, it is clear that the traditionally close ties of Soviet front organizations to the KGB will persist:

- Chelnokov was formerly the Soviet representative to the International Union of Students (IUS), apparently working on behalf of the KGB during his tenure in Prague.
- Borovik is a veteran KGB collaborator whose dealings with Soviet intelligence have been publicly evident as late as his interview last fall with CIA defector and accused spy Edward Lee Howard.

[redacted]

Sergey Chelnokov and the Committee of Youth Organizations

Chelnokov's appointment tends to confirm reports that the CYO, the major coordinating body for the international activities of Soviet youth organizations, is an up and coming organization with special status under the Gorbachev regime. CYO representatives told US officials early this year that the Committee had the personal support of top Soviet leaders, including Gorbachev himself and Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze. Another Committee official recently noted that the CYO was being used by CPSU International Department Chief Anatoliy Dobrynin to increase direct Soviet contact with groups in the United States. [redacted]



Sergey Chelnokov, a "new generation" propagandist, confidently asserts glasnost is here to stay. [redacted]

Chelnokov, who has surrounded himself with like-minded and equally astute assistants, is an aggressive figure who conveys a sense of personal interest in the success of the Gorbachev program. In conversations with US officials, he has confidently asserted that the trend toward *glasnost* in Soviet life will not be reversed, and that changes in CYO policy will extend down to the various organizations under its control. At a recent World Federation of Democratic Youth conference, delegations dissenting from standing resolutions were listed on the official record. Chelnokov has stated that such manifestations of *glasnost* will continue. [redacted]

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The CYO, ordinarily responsible for dozens of exchanges involving thousands of foreign and Soviet youths each year, is expanding into other spheres of activity. In the past several months, for example, it has been involved with legislative delegations from the United States and Mexico. Dealing directly with foreigners often already sympathetic to Soviet views, the Committee's new approach has great potential for turning the youth organizations into broad human showcases of *glasnost*. [redacted]

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Valentina Tereshkova has parlayed her status as the first woman in space into a propaganda career with peace and women's groups. [redacted]

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Valentina Nikolayevna-Tereshkova and the Union of Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations With Foreign Countries

Unlike Chelnokov and Borovik, Tereshkova is not likely to exercise personal oversight of new directions in friendship work. A symbol of Soviet scientific success, Tereshkova has used her fame to build a successful career in women's and peace groups over the past two decades. Tereshkova's celebrity status almost certainly is viewed by the Soviet leadership as a useful asset in international front organization propagandizing. [redacted]

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Although it is not yet clear whether any one figure in the Friendship Societies' apparatus is expected to take the lead in shepherding new policies, Tereshkova's selection has nonetheless been accompanied by signs of major changes in the Societies that parallel the new directions being undertaken in the other front organizations. In June discussions with US officials, representatives of the USSR-USA Society outlined significant new directions for the near term. Stressing the importance of direct contact with US citizens, they pushed the idea of opening a dialogue with "political conservatives" in the United States. The USSR-USA Society has also expressed an interest in the establishment of "sister state" relationships between US states and Soviet republics or regions. [redacted]

The Friendship Society representatives recently encountered by US officials have proved to be bright and articulate individuals who convey a strong sense of commitment to the current reform program. They exhibit a willingness to practice *glasnost* in discussions of topics such as substance abuse, prostitution, and Stalinism in Soviet society. In one instance, a USSR-USA Society member openly discussed the Katyn forest massacre, a highly sensitive topic in official Soviet historiography. [redacted] 25X1

Genrikh Borovik and the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace

Borovik, a top figure at the Soviet news agency Novosti for over 20 years and a known associate of the KGB, comes to the chairmanship at a time when Moscow had already begun reorienting the committee's work. In addition to direct, bilateral exchanges with foreign delegations, the SCDP has a part in many of Moscow's more ambitious efforts, such as the recent Moscow-Leningrad Peace March that brought dozens of American celebrities to the USSR. [redacted] 25X1

In what appears to be a *glasnost* driven bid for greater legitimacy, the committee under Borovik has made bold, previously inconceivable gestures. After inviting the US Ambassador to address an SCDP-sponsored conference in May, the committee offered in June to fund travel for representatives of the Group of Trust, a dissident Soviet peace organization, to an international peace conference in the United Kingdom. [redacted]

Borovik is a veteran journalist and self-described playwright who over the course of his career has elevated professional anti-Americanism to a fine art. In his work for Novosti, he wrote on anti-US themes ranging from the My Lai massacre to the plight of the homeless in New York City. He was also responsible for a major propaganda campaign in 1985 that portrayed the films *Rambo* and *Red Dawn* as US

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Genrikh Borovik, at microphone, has close ties to the KGB and a history of virulent anti-Americanism. [redacted]

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Government-sponsored attempts to stir up anti-Soviet sentiment. In one of his most recent projects, he introduced and provided commentary for a Soviet screening of the US antinuclear television film *The Day After*. Borovik has been entrusted with some top-priority journalistic projects including an interview with President Reagan at the White House in 1985.

[redacted]

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Borovik's close intelligence ties—coupled with his virulent anti-US propaganda record—make his selection as chairman a curious one. [redacted]

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A Few of the Glasnost Generation

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Valeriy Sergeevich Chibisenkov, *Secretary General, USSR-USA Society*—described by American officials as a “full-fledged” member of the new breed . . . exhibits a willingness to discuss new forms of US-Soviet exchange—pushes the idea of a Soviet dialogue with US conservatives . . . appears to have a good understanding of US society and detailed knowledge of his US counterparts . . . conveys a highly negative view of Stalin and a sense of genuine enthusiasm for the Gorbachev program . . . confident and relaxed in exchanges with US officials . . . served as a cultural affairs officer in Bombay in the early 1970s . . . headed the USSR-Canada Society from 1977 to 1980 . . . personal style and career pattern suggest a possible intelligence affiliation in the past . . . speaks excellent English . . . 44 years old.

Sergey Ivanovich Zimenko, *Deputy Secretary General, USSR-USA Society*—like Chibisenkov a glasnost generation player . . . impressed US officials with his intelligence and openness . . . an engaging conversationalist and fluent English speaker who complements Chibisenkov’s own approach extraordinarily

well . . . appears to have a very bright future . . . intelligence connections unknown, though his adept behavior suggests special preparation . . . 38 years old.

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Vladimir Nikolayevich Orel, *First Deputy Chairman, Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace*—a relatively young, ambitious figure who is reported to have a future under Gorbachev . . . may have been passed over in favor of Borovik for chairmanship . . .

appeared to be in charge Soviet efforts to reduce the power of World Peace Council President Romesh Chandra . . . has a much less public role than Borovik . . .

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worked in you organizations and Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the 1960s and early 1970s . . . apparently worked in Central Committee apparatus from 1973 to 1977 . . . emerged in 1982 as a peace committee figure . . . pattern tends to confirm intelligence identification . . . 53 years old.

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believe Borovik’s selection may reflect Gorbachev’s patronage debts to senior KGB leadership.³ Despite his suspect background, we believe Borovik has the talent, flexibility, and understanding of the West to make Moscow’s official peace propaganda organization less heavyhanded.

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³ A protege of former General Secretary and KGB Chairman Yuri Andropov, Gorbachev came to power at least partially through the maneuvering of present KGB chief Viktor Chebrikov.

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Challenges and Vulnerabilities

Moscow believes that a first-hand, positive presentation of *glasnost* and the Gorbachev reforms will help it effectively market its foreign policy. The ascension of new leadership to the Soviet organizations responsible for managing Moscow’s front apparatus leads us to expect that this approach will have some success. Often more sophisticated than their predecessors and

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in tune with the Gorbachev style, they are much more likely to try out new propaganda methods. This more open approach is likely to be very effective in disarming Western critics of Soviet peace propaganda efforts and in cultivating those already sympathetic to Moscow's arms control agenda. [redacted]

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But the new leaders and their organizations also have potential weaknesses that may be vulnerable to Western exploitation:

- In the near term, the intelligence ties of leaders such as Borovik and Chelnokov, as well as those of some of their subordinates, are vulnerable to exposure, particularly in light of Gorbachev's claims of openness.
- Because the replacement of middle-level officials is inherently more difficult than the appointment of dynamic personnel at the top, implementation of new propaganda tactics is likely to be complicated

by bureaucratic resistance. The resulting inconsistencies in policy may, for example, raise questions about the credibility of Soviet moves toward meaningful dialogue with Western groups.

- As the novelty of their new approaches wears off and *glasnost* itself is no longer the predominant issue, front representatives will be left with only the substance of Soviet policies with which to proselytize. In the absence of major breakthroughs in Gorbachev's reform effort, these policies are likely to be substantially less appealing than the concept of reform itself. [redacted]

[redacted]

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**Disinformation on US
Chemical and Biological
Weapons 1975-87**

A recent contractor study documented the disinformation campaign that the Soviet Union and its allies have waged over the past 12 years against US Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW) programs. The study found that:

- A major Soviet motive in these disinformation efforts was to deflect attention from and refute allegations about their own CBW use.
- Changes in Soviet CBW disinformation under Gorbachev have been less substantial than those that occurred in 1980 in the wake of the breakdown of US-Soviet CBW talks and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
- The Soviets are much more sophisticated in presenting CBW disinformation than their Third World clients.
- The Soviets are persistent in pushing CBW disinformation, even the most unbelievable stories, in the apparent belief that repetition will pay off in the long run.

For the future, the study suggests that the level of Soviet CBW disinformation will be sensitive to Western publicity about Soviet CBW programs. More generally, major impasses in US-Soviet arms control negotiations could result in even more active Soviet disinformation efforts.

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Scope of the Study

A government contractor recently completed a detailed analysis of Soviet Bloc disinformation about US chemical and biological weapons programs. The analysis, which covered almost 450 separate media reports

* This article draws on a study by an external contractor who relied exclusively on unclassified sources. The study was not coordinated within this Agency; however, this article has been coordinated.

from 1 March 1975 to 28 February 1987, examined Bloc disinformation with regard to its content, intended purposes and audiences, and thematic style. The contractor's assessment reviewed overall trends in Soviet Bloc CBW disinformation, compared Soviet disinformation "style" with that of other significant disinformation players such as Afghanistan, Cuba, Nicaragua, and North Korea, and examined in detail several specific anti-US CBW disinformation campaigns. Although the material analyzed cannot be regarded as a random sample of CBW disinformation because collection was restricted to items available in English translation, we believe the analysis provides a number of insights about Soviet CBW disinformation tactics and Soviet disinformation strategy more generally.

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**The Defensive Character of Much
Soviet CBW Disinformation**

Much Soviet disinformation about US CBW programs is defensive in nature—intended to refute Western charges of Soviet CBW use or deflect attention from such charges by alleging US activities of a purportedly similar nature. Clearly one key target of this sort of disinformation is the domestic Soviet population. A large proportion of Soviet CBW disinformation—almost 40 percent—appeared in Russian.

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The content of specific Soviet CBW allegations, whether intended for foreign or domestic audience, focuses on areas of the world where Soviet Bloc use of CBW has been an issue. For example, Soviet CBW disinformation gives particular attention to Afghanistan; since 1980, Afghanistan is referenced in almost 60 percent of the items. Most frequently the Soviet charge is that the United States has supplied lethal CBW to the Afghan insurgents, but the Soviets have also emphasized the charge that the United States is deliberately fabricating evidence of Soviet use of CBW in Afghanistan.

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Victims of the 1984 Bhopal Disaster: Moscow alleges that the plant was involved in CBW research [redacted]

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The largely defensive character of Soviet CBW disinformation is also reflected in Moscow's allegations about direct US use of CBW in combat situations. According to the contractor's analysis, such charges are included in about two-thirds of all disinformation items. While Moscow makes these charges with regard to every area of the Third World, Soviet allegations highlight Southeast Asia, another area where Soviet use of CBW has been an issue. [redacted]

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Packaging Disinformation:**Soviets Better Than Their Allies**

Detailed analysis of the content of Soviet CBW disinformation suggests that the Soviets often rely on crude attempts to attribute evil motivation to the United States by alleging use of CBW on innocent populations, inhuman experimentation (including the withholding of medical assistance in order to observe the effects of chemical or biological agents), and the development of CBW as a means of achieving military superiority. Nonetheless, the items are written with considerable care to give them an aura of credibility. While there have been some changes in the style of Soviet disinformation over the past 12 years, several characteristics have remained essentially the same:

- More than half the time the Soviets cite Communist sources for the specific disinformation charges but, to give their reports some credibility, they cite US sources almost 60 percent of the time in the background discussion.
- Soviet sourcing for disinformation allegations tends to be either nonexistent (43 percent)—preventing any attempt to check the sources—or highly specific (46 percent), implying the ability to check on the source.
- The typical Soviet disinformation item is supported by references to two other sources, with journalists being the most frequently cited type of source. [redacted]

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The non-Soviet disinformation practitioners—principally, Afghanistan, Cuba, Nicaragua, and North Korea—tend as a group to be less careful in their sourcing. They rarely cite any specific sources for their disinformation and are less likely to cite US sources as part of the accompanying background discussion. This tendency probably reflects both their

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***Wild Horse Deaths: Vintage Soviet
Disinformation Tactics***

On 31 July 1976 TASS ran a story in English under the headline Mustangs Die En Masse: Near Chemical Arms Test Center that illustrates several characteristic features of Soviet CBW disinformation. The story reported that about 40 corpses have been found over the last four days. TASS cites unnamed environmental experts as saying the deaths were caused by the disposal in the desert of toxic materials used in chemical weapons tests. The piece also quotes [redacted] a government expert, as stating that he had seen nothing like these events over "his years of work with horses." While reporting that officials at the test range had denied any link to chemical weapons tests, the piece cited allegations that 6,000 sheep were poisoned with nerve gas in a 1968 incident. [redacted]

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The story is notable in several respects:

- TASS distorts the dates of the events to make it seem like current reporting. The first report of the story appeared in The New York Times on 2 July 1976, more than three weeks before the implied time frame of the TASS report.

- The New York Times, among other sources, had already documented the allegation's falseness well before the TASS piece appeared. For example, the corpses were found on Dugway Proving Grounds, and hence they could not have been killed by toxic materials dumped outside the facility. Moreover, the Army and the Bureau of Land Management issued a report indicating that a team of researchers had concluded that the animals died from exhaustion, lack of water for some period, and a subsequent gorging on water.

- The TASS piece appears to be based directly on Western press reporting, specifically a 26 July article in The New York Times, but nowhere in the article is there any mention of the possibility that the deaths were related to the disposal of toxic materials. [redacted]

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Although never the topic of a concerted campaign, the charge that these horses died as a result of CBW activity at Dugway continues to appear periodically as a reference in more recent disinformation focusing on other targets [redacted]

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assessment of the sophistication of the Third World audiences that they frequently target and their relative lack of access to Western source material that they could use to strengthen their documentation. [redacted]

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The Modest Impact of the Gorbachev Regime

The contractor's analysis suggests that, while some changes have occurred in Soviet CBW disinformation since Gorbachev assumed office, these changes have not been particularly dramatic. In fact, the most significant breakpoint in disinformation activity occurred not in 1985 when Gorbachev became General

Secretary, but in 1980 in the aftermath of the breakdown of the four-year-old US-Soviet negotiations for banning the production, development, and stockpiling of chemical weapons and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Although caution needs to be exercised in interpreting frequency figures given the sample used, the contractor's analysis indicates that these two events triggered a significant increase in the volume of Soviet CBW disinformation. Moreover, the types of

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Articles

CBW Disinformation Targeting Latin America

CBW disinformation targeting Latin America provides some insight into how Moscow and its allies conduct their disinformation campaigns in areas of the world where direct Soviet media access is relatively limited. The basic messages remain the same, but the sources and alleged locales of CBW activity are adapted to the region. These Spanish-language charges, like Soviet disinformation elsewhere, center on US use of CBW and US supply of CBW to others, but direct Soviet involvement in publicizing these allegations has been limited. The Cubans and, to a lesser extent, the Nicaraguans have generally taken the lead. In Spanish-language materials, El Salvador, Cuba, Nicaragua, Honduras, and Grenada have been cited most frequently as locales for alleged US activity that is reportedly responsible for the outbreak of a wide variety of diseases.

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During the Gorbachev period, there has been a marked shift in CBW disinformation tactics in the region. Fewer allegations are appearing and almost all of them are sourced to private groups in non-Communist countries such as the Mexican press and regional labor unions. Nonetheless, there is little reason, particularly in light of continuing Cuban-US tensions and military conflict in Central America, to believe that these allegations will cease. Whenever outbreaks of disease—whether human, animal, or crop—occur in Latin America, there is a good chance that Moscow and its regional allies will try to exploit such circumstances with CBW disinformation.

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CBW allegations Moscow made after 1980 shifted—with, for example, substantially greater attention to allegations of direct US combat use.

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The impact of the Gorbachev regime on CBW disinformation appears to have been more limited. The contractor's statistics suggest that the number of

allegations has declined somewhat during Gorbachev's reign, but that the level continues to be substantially higher than that evident in the late 1970s. In addition, some of the developments evident in the Gorbachev era have been continuations of long-term trends. For example, Soviet CBW disinformation has over the years become more subtle in its presentation, with the disinformation angle being given less prominent attention in individual items, and this pattern has continued over the past two years.

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Since Gorbachev assumed power, there have also been some changes in the specific types of allegations made that suggest a more sophisticated strategy. While Soviet disinformation still cites alleged US use of CBW in combat more than half the time, Moscow is now giving greater attention to such areas as basic CBW research, CBW funding decisions, and to alleged CBW-related accidents. It is possible that these shifts reflect a better appreciation of how to manipulate the weapons procurement process in democracies and are intended to try to create public pressure early enough in the weapons production cycle to alter significantly Western programs.

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Nonetheless, under Gorbachev, Soviet disinformation specialists continue to be unwilling to let even a less than compelling disinformation story die. The contractor's report documents Moscow's efforts in 1983-85 to market allegations that US CBW experiments in Brazil resulted in the death of several thousand Amazon Indians. The Soviets found the story to be a hard sell and, after a flurry of items in the fall of 1984 and a few scattered reports through mid-1985, the theme was apparently dropped. This summer, however, as part of Moscow's current disinformation push on human rights, the Soviet-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions revived the charge in a complaint to the United Nations Human Rights Commission.

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Implications

This assessment of past Soviet CBW disinformation practice suggests a number of lessons for the future. The defensive character of much Soviet CBW disinformation suggests that the Soviets could react strongly to future Western publicity about Soviet CBW programs and that disinformation would probably be a key component of that response. The fact that much Soviet CBW disinformation is currently targeted toward the USSR's domestic populace indicates that allegations about Soviet CBW carried by Western radiobroadcasts—for example, VOA and Radio Liberty—could provoke particularly strong reactions.

[Redacted]

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Soviet sophistication in presentation of disinformation compared with that evident among Moscow's Third World allies suggests that Moscow may in the future need to devote greater resources to assisting its clients' efforts or risk undermining its own credibility. With regard to Afghanistan, for example, the Afghans themselves have since early 1986 assumed a larger share of the burden of disseminating CBW disinformation, but these efforts have been less well supported

by background and "evidence." Until remedial measures are taken, the lower quality of Soviet client disinformation may provide a means to attack the credibility of the more sophisticated Soviet product.

[Redacted]

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Beyond the specific issue of CBW disinformation, the contractor's finding of a major shift in disinformation activities resulting from the breakdown in US-Soviet negotiations on CBW suggests that the state of arms control talks is a critical factor in determining overall Soviet disinformation strategy. Although one needs to be cautious in generalizing from this one case, the clear implication is that future breakdowns in arms control negotiations with the Soviets could lead to major surges in Soviet disinformation activity

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Calendar of Key Events, 1987-88 25X1

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1987

September

International Union of Students (IUS) International Youth Conference on Peace and Development, Harare, Zimbabwe. Organized by the National Student Association of Zimbabwe—an IUS affiliate—this conference almost certainly will focus attention on US policies in southern Africa. 25X1

1-9 September

Olaf Palme Peace March for a Nuclear-Free Corridor. This event is sponsored by the official East German and Czechoslovakian peace committees as well as the Austrian "Peace Movement" and the West German "German Peace Association/Opponents of Military Service," both Communist-influenced organizations. It is intended to dramatize the proposals for a Central European nuclear-weapons-free zone promoted by East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and the West German Social Democratic Party. The march will open with a memorial to Palme in Stockholm on 30 August and end with a blockade of the Pershing II missile base in Mutlangen, West Germany. 25X1

3-5 September

Round Table Conference on Current Problems of International Humanitarian Law, and Red Cross and Red Crescent Symposium, San Remo, Italy. At a June conference in Moscow, one of the sponsors of this symposium—the International Institute for Humanitarian Law—presented Soviet leader Gorbachev with a human rights award for his "outstanding contribution to strengthening peace and ensuring human rights" (see box). The Soviets—probably recognizing this as an opportunity to elicit Western support for their human rights record—almost certainly will be well represented at the meeting, which will focus on refugee issues. 25X1



Jean-Pierre Hocke, a Swiss national, became the first UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to visit the Soviet Union when he attended an International Institute for Humanitarian Law seminar there this June. While in Moscow, Hocke spoke with Soviet First Deputy Minister Vorontsov about Afghan refugees. He did not confer with the major Western donors to UNHCR before traveling to Moscow and, according to the US Mission in Geneva, he is vague about possible followup discussions with the Soviets. Hocke favors UN endorsement of the Afghan Government's effort to repatriate Afghan refugees from Iran and Pakistan, a move that would effectively give UN recognition to Kabul's National Reconciliation program. Soviet propagandists have already linked his name to the seminar and the human rights award to Gorbachev in articles that appeared in TASS and Izvestiya on 7 June. 25X1

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Calendar of Key Events, 1987-88

25X1

7-11 September

International Conference on the Question of Palestine, Vienna. The International Coordinating Committee on Palestine, a newly formed, Geneva-based affiliate of the WPC, is sponsoring this meeting that will culminate a series of regional seminars on the 40th anniversary of the UN partition of Palestine. Soviet propagandists will use the conference to show Moscow's solidarity and support for the Palestine Liberation Organization.

25X1

14-18 September

International Seminar on Health as a Factor of Peace and Development, Moscow. The Soviets probably will use this seminar, sponsored by the Soviet Red Cross and the Geneva-based League of Red Cross Societies (LRCS), to claim that substantial financial resources for development and health programs would become available if the West accepted Moscow's disarmament proposals and abandoned costly defense projects like the Strategic Defense Initiative. LRCS cosponsorship would bolster Moscow's claim of broad-based support for this idea

25X1

15 September

Opening of the 42nd UN General Assembly, New York. See text for details.

25X1

22 September

Sixth anniversary of the founding of the Anti-Imperialist Tribunal of Our America (TANA), Managua. TANA, a front founded by Cuba and Nicaragua in 1981 and a de facto regional affiliate of the Soviet-controlled International Association of Democratic Lawyers, devotes itself to propaganda activities against US Latin American policy. TANA almost certainly will use the occasion to intensify its anti-US rhetoric on issues such as the Iran-Contra affair.

25X1

28-30 September

Special Meeting of Nongovernmental Organizations (NGO) in Conjunction With the UN Special Committee on Disarmament, Geneva. This meeting—with the theme “A world without nuclear weapons and violence and for nuclear-weapon-free zones”—is sponsored by the Geneva-based Special NGO Committee on Disarmament. Women's International League for Peace and Freedom President Edith Ballantyne is chairman of this committee, and World Peace Council President Romesh Chandra is vice chairman, ensuring that the meeting's agenda will have a pro-Soviet bias. Frustrated by their lack of influence in UN conferences, front groups with UN consultative status often organize parallel NGO meetings such as this—held in UN facilities—to give the appearance that their pro-Soviet views are part of the official conference record.

25X1

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Calendar of Key Events, 1987-88

25X1

October

Third National Youth Festival, Colombia. Although officially organized by the Colombian National Youth Coordinating Group, this meeting is actually sponsored by the Soviet-controlled World Federation of Democratic Youth, [redacted] 25X1
[redacted] The Colombian Communist Party's youth group reportedly is trying to make the meeting a preparatory event for the 13th World Festival of Youth and Students to be held in North Korea in 1989. [redacted] 25X1

25X1

11-17 October

Week of Activities To Publicize the Debt Problem, Latin America. Designated by delegates to a WFTU-funded trade union conference on the debt problem held last May in Brazil, this observance probably will feature trade union demonstrations against International Monetary Fund policies and foreign debt payments, and possibly include work stoppages organized by Communist-influenced labor groups. We expect Moscow and Havana to give high media visibility to these events as part of their campaign to exploit the debt issue (see Perspective for more details). [redacted] 25X1



Propaganda like this cartoon linking US arms spending to Third World debt repayment will be common in pro-Soviet publications during a week of protest on the Latin American debt problem.

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Calendar of Key Events, 1987-88

25X1

25 October

Peace demonstrations in Brussels and at the US military base in Florennes, Belgium. "Florennade," a coalition of militant Belgian peace groups, is planning a major demonstration at the US base in Florennes to culminate an eight-month campaign against the storage of cruise missiles there. A similar demonstration is planned for Brussels on the same day. Florennades, which was founded in 1983 and apparently receives support from the Soviet Bloc, has played a major role in previous blockades and infiltrations of the base.

25X1

26-28 October

World Peace Council meeting on the proposed South Atlantic Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone, Buenos Aires, Argentina.

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25X1

Argentine President Alfonsin has decided not to address the meeting, despite pressure to do so from his Disarmament Ambassador Aldo Tessio.

25X1

25X1

28 October-1 November

International Peace Meeting, Lisbon. Organized by the Portuguese Council for Peace and Cooperation with the support of the World Peace Council, the meeting's agenda includes nuclear waste and the future of the US airbase in Portugal.

25X1

its real purpose is to oppose transfer of the US Air Force 401st Fighter Wing from Torrejon, Spain, to a base in Portugal in the event that US base negotiations with Spain fail.

25X1

7 November

70th Anniversary of the October Revolution. Past activities indicate that Moscow and its allies will place articles in the press of selected Third World countries, emphasizing the historic significance of the Bolshevik Revolution and highlighting the positive aspects of Moscow's ties to the Third World. Soviet front organizations will play a major role by hosting a series of conferences commemorating the revolution. Gorbachev has proposed a conference of Communist and progressive parties that would run concurrently with the October Revolution festivities.

25X1

13-15 November

Third European Regional Symposium of the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW), Prague. Although IPPNW has worked hard in the past year to expand its base in the Third World, Europeans still account for the majority of its members. The Prague venue of the upcoming symposium suggests that the Moscow-influenced organization may endorse proposals for a Central European Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone and recent Soviet arms control initiatives. IPPNW is also likely to reiterate its opposition to the Strategic Defense Initiative and its support for a worldwide nuclear test ban and the diversion of arms spending into development aid.

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Calendar of Key Events, 1987-88			25X1
23-26 November	Meeting of Latin American economists on debt, Havana. This will be the first of several conferences Moscow has asked the Cubans to hold in order to exploit the debt issue.		25X1
1988			
21-22 January	Third Group of Six Summit, Stockholm.		25X1
25X1	the heads of state of the Group of Six—Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Tanzania, and Sweden—will focus on arms control issues at this meeting, probably offering group assistance in verifying a nuclear test moratorium. Moscow considers the Six one of the most important groups it must influence to gain Third World acceptance of its disarmament proposals.		25X1
25X1	As such, the Soviets almost certainly will try to exploit their close ties to India and Greece to manipulate the summit agenda for propaganda advantage.		25X1
February	Nonaligned Movement Foreign Ministers' Conference, Cyprus (tentative). Moscow's keen interest in influencing the NAM		25X1
25X1	almost certainly will benefit from warming diplomatic relations with Nicosia, which will play a key role in preparing the meeting's agenda and final communique. Moscow probably has two primary objectives for this meeting: to obtain NAM endorsement for its disarmament proposals, and to weaken members' support for the resolution calling for the "withdrawal of foreign troops" from Afghanistan. They also will closely monitor the selection of the 1989 NAM chairmanship, for which Argentina, Indonesia, Nicaragua, and Peru are leading contenders.		25X1
	Moscow favors Peru's candidacy and views it as an opportunity to impel Lima to take increasingly anti-US foreign policy positions.		25X1
To be announced	UN meeting on an Indian Ocean Zone of Peace (IOZP), Colombo. Sri Lanka is pressing Western members of the UN Indian Ocean Ad Hoc Committee to agree on a meeting date. The Soviet IOZP campaign calls for the region to become a nuclear-free zone, removal of the US military base in Diego Garcia, and the closing of Voice of America and West German broadcast facilities in Sri Lanka.		
25X1	the Moscow-line Communist Party of Sri Lanka has made support for the IOZP a top priority.		25X1

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