



**Directorate of
Intelligence**

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Worldwide Active Measures and Propaganda Alert

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February 1987

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*DI WAMPA 87-001
February 1987*

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Worldwide Active Measures and Propaganda Alert [Redacted]

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February 1987

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the Directorate of Intelligence. [Redacted]
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Preface

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This quarterly publication is designed to provide timely updates of ongoing active measures and propaganda campaigns by the USSR and its allies. This issue covers the period 15 November 1986 to 1 March 1987. It is also designed to provide warning of future campaigns. The quarterly is composed of four parts:

- A perspective, which provides a look at recent trends in active measures.
- Brief overviews of both worldwide and regional campaigns.
- Articles containing detailed analyses of trends in the entire political influence arena—active measures, propaganda, and public diplomacy—and speculation on future developments.
- An annotated calendar of key events that we anticipate will figure prominently in campaigns by the Soviets and their allies.



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Perspective

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Active Measures and Propaganda Developments in 1986: Implications for the Future

The year 1986 witnessed several important developments in Soviet propaganda and active measures. While these developments have been largely evolutionary, they have significant implications for future Soviet tactics

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television and telecommunications age. The results of these efforts were particularly evident in arms control propaganda targeting Western audiences. Nonetheless, Soviet disinformation aimed primarily at Third World audiences was not markedly different from previous years. For example, major Soviet campaigns alleging US involvement in assassinations, the overthrow of Third World leaders, and the production of the AIDS virus were continuations of disinformation themes that Moscow pushed in previous years.

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Continuing Lackluster Performance by the Fronts

The 1986 balance sheet for Moscow's traditional front group apparatus was unlikely to have been viewed favorably within the party's International Department. As evidenced by the failure of its World Peace Congress in Copenhagen, for example, the World Peace Council continues to have difficulty attracting supporters outside pro-Soviet circles because of its obvious connections to Moscow. Similarly, tight Soviet control and public awareness of that control constrained Soviet efforts to energize the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization.

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It is difficult to assess changes in the "quality" of Soviet disinformation, but we have not seen compelling evidence that these campaigns are becoming more sophisticated. Moscow apparently believes that its traditional disinformation techniques continue to be effective, particularly with Third World audiences. While we could see major changes in the operating style of the KGB's Service A and Soviet press representatives, particularly in Western Europe and Japan, the immediate prospect in the Third World is likely to be a continuation of rather blatant attempts to undermine US credibility that rely heavily on timing, repetition, and fear arousal to achieve their objectives.

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We believe that, while the continuing mediocre performance of the fronts is a matter of concern to Soviet propagandists, this concern is unlikely to result in any decision to scale down their activities significantly. Since most of the cost of the fronts is borne in soft currency and shared among Moscow's allies, the net costs to Moscow are probably not very burdensome. The prospect is rather that the fronts will be denied any sizable infusion of additional resources. In addition, the Soviets will probably attempt more direct contacts with Western peace activists by subsidizing events similar to the international peace forum held in Moscow in February.

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Growing Use of "Openness" as a Propaganda Theme

Over the past year Moscow has increasingly propagandized the changes in Soviet society that are generally described as "openness" (glasnost). As part of this effort, Moscow has given extensive publicity to the release from exile or prison of some Soviet dissidents—such as Andrei Sakharov—and stage managed a series of press conferences for Soviet emigres returning to the Soviet Union. At the same time, Moscow stepped up its disinformation campaign on human rights violations by the US Government, including charges in a recent Soviet book that the CIA perpetrated the Jonestown massacre to prevent Guyanese residents from emigrating to the Soviet Union.

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More Sophisticated Propaganda, But Crude Disinformation Continues

Moscow made major efforts to improve the quality of its propaganda last year by appointing sophisticated observers of the Western scene to key propaganda positions, by stepping up its public diplomacy offensive, and by taking steps to move the Soviet propaganda apparatus from the print and radio era to the

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Perspective

In our view, the KGB's highly publicized efforts to break up demonstrations by Soviet dissidents in Moscow in mid-February illustrate the continuing difficulties Moscow is likely to have in making its openness campaign credible before international audiences. Moreover, loosening of restrictions on public statements by Soviet citizens could help undermine the credibility of Soviet positions on a variety of foreign policy matters. Andrei Sakharov's statements on the existence of Soviet programs comparable to SDI is one example. The reticence of some senior Soviet and East European scientists to endorse Soviet claims that the AIDS virus is a product of US biological warfare experiments is another.

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Implications

These developments suggest that, while Soviet propaganda and active measures continue at high speed, Moscow's programs are by no means invulnerable to US countermeasures. In our view, publicity about the nature of Soviet fronts is likely to continue to make it difficult for Moscow to market its propaganda successfully. Further, calling attention to Soviet manipulation of "dialogue" groups such as International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War is also likely to be effective. While the improvement of Soviet propaganda targeting Western audiences poses a particularly demanding challenge, the continuing relative crudity of Soviet disinformation in the Third World suggests that US success in countering these efforts may depend more on timeliness and persistence than sophistication of effort. With regard to glasnost and Moscow's efforts to advertise it, we believe that the overall propaganda benefits will outweigh the problems that accompany it. Nevertheless, publicity calling attention to examples of openness will serve in part to remind foreign audiences of the essential character of Soviet society.

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Worldwide Campaigns

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Arms Control Remains a Top Priority [redacted]

During the past quarter, Soviet propaganda and active measures planners continued to assign a top priority to influencing arms control issues worldwide. While Western Europe remained the number-one target, the Soviets were also active in Latin America (see "Latin America: Moscow Focuses on Disarmament, Cuba Targets the Caribbean"), East Asia, and India, where Moscow exploited its close ties to New Delhi to secure endorsement of Soviet disarmament policies (see "South Asia: Soviets Tailor Programs to Local Circumstances"). Soviet tactics have emphasized the use of public diplomacy and back channels, continuing a pattern that has been developing over the past year or so. [redacted]

nuclear forces (INF), the Soviets used this method to express optimism about the possibility of such an accord. They have also used it since Reykjavik to suggest that Moscow is willing to compromise on its hard line against SDI. [redacted]

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Intensive Soviet efforts to derail SDI have continued unabated in recent months:

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- The Soviets have repeatedly taken advantage of diplomatic venues to attack SDI. While the bulk of their efforts have focused on the West, they also target selected Third World countries. [redacted]

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During the past few months, the Soviets have devoted considerable resources—through public, diplomatic, and back channels—to marketing their views on post-Reykjavik arms control issues in the West. In what has become standard Soviet practice, Moscow dispatched special envoys in late November and early December throughout Western Europe, and to Canada and Japan to present its version of the latest round of Geneva talks on nuclear and space weapons. Both in their meetings with government officials and in numerous press conferences, the Soviets contrasted Moscow's "reasonableness" and "flexibility" on arms control with Washington's alleged intransigence on key issues such as SDI, according to US Embassy reporting. Norwegian Prime Minister Brundtland and Finnish Foreign Minister Vayrynen heard similar arguments in Moscow in meetings with General Secretary Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, respectively. With few exceptions, however, the Soviets found little support for their positions, according to the Embassy reporting [redacted]

- In what the US Embassy in Freetown believes to be a Soviet placement, the 16-23 January edition of a Sierra Leone newspaper carried a full-page article presenting the Soviet case against SDI.
- Radio Moscow broadcasts to Japan have castigated Tokyo's decision to participate in the SDI program by claiming that it would exacerbate military tension in the region and lead to a deterioration in Soviet-Japanese relations. TASS's Tokyo correspondent stated publicly in late November that Japan's position on SDI caused the postponement of General Secretary Gorbachev's prospective visit.

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Moscow has also continued to make heavy use of back channels to government officials, former government officials, opposition party leaders, journalists, academics, and others to push specific and oftentimes accurate views on the prospects for arms control negotiations. Before Gorbachev's 28 February offer to negotiate a separate agreement on intermediate-range

- In December, the US Embassy in Moscow reported that the Soviets released a new book on SDI entitled *Weaponry in Space: The Dilemma of Security*. Aimed at the technically knowledgeable readers in the West, the book is a more sophisticated attack on SDI than usual, eschewing much of the biased rhetoric typical of Soviet anti-SDI propaganda. [redacted]

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Worldwide Campaigns



Anti-SDI propaganda entitled "No Militarization of Space." This poster was produced by the Soviet-controlled Women's International Democratic Federation.

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The international peace forum held in Moscow, on 14-16 February represented, in our view, the culmination of a number of significant trends in Soviet active measures and propaganda activities:

- It was organized outside Moscow's traditional front group apparatus, with organizations such as the Soviet affiliate of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War and the Soviet Academy of Sciences taking the lead.

- It targeted professionals—scientists, physicians, clergy, and businessmen, for example.
- It emphasized the notion of "dialogue," with a series of eight roundtable discussions on various aspects of nuclear disarmament.
- It showcased the public diplomacy skills of Gorbachev.

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We believe Moscow probably was pleased with the outcome of the forum, especially in light of the debacle surrounding the last major Soviet-sponsored peace conference, held in Copenhagen in October.¹ According to US Embassy reporting, Moscow successfully induced roughly 1,000 people, including many respected Western and nonaligned cultural and professional figures, to attend—probably by picking up all expenses—thereby adding credibility to the event. By holding the proceedings in Moscow, the Soviets were able to control the agenda, precluding the kinds of anti-Soviet demonstrations that marred Copenhagen. In addition, Gorbachev's participation assured substantial international media coverage.

[Redacted]

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In the coming months there is little doubt that arms control issues will continue to figure prominently in Moscow's political influence activities.

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[Redacted]

They also intend to continue promoting Gorbachev's arms control initiatives under the motto "for a world free of weapons; for peace and mankind." In its program of action for 1987, the Soviet-controlled World Peace Council assigned top priority to SDI, [Redacted] Given the relative success of the February peace forum, we expect the Soviets to try to make even greater use of "dialogue" sessions with prominent Western professionals as a means of increasing support for their disarmament proposals.

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Afghanistan: Propagandizing the Ceasefire and National Reconciliation Initiatives

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Moscow and Kabul are conducting a major propaganda and disinformation campaign associated with the Soviet-inspired cease-fire and National Reconciliation initiatives announced in January by Afghan Communist Party boss Najib. This campaign targets not only the Mujahedin insurgents, but also public opinion in Pakistan, other Moslem states, and the West. In our view, the Soviets hope to create the illusion of movement toward peace in Afghanistan as a means of blunting international criticism of their role in the war. They are also using this campaign to increase domestic pressure on Islamabad and better position themselves to blame Pakistan and the United States in the event that UN-sponsored peace negotiations fail.

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Immediately after the initiatives were announced, Afghan and Soviet officials tried to create the impression that they were being accepted by regime opponents:

- The Afghan Government invited Western journalists to Kabul in mid-January to observe the beginning of the National Reconciliation effort to get the Mujahedin to lay down their weapons and participate in a coalition government.
- Two days after the cease-fire took effect, the Afghan Consul in Peshawar, Pakistan, asserted in an interview with a prominent Pakistani newspaper that 50,000 Mujahedin already were supporting Najib and that eight Afghan political parties, previously in opposition, had joined the government.
- In early January the Soviets planted a story in a major Pakistani newspaper claiming that three prominent officials from previous Afghan regimes had given up their self-imposed exile in the West and returned to Kabul, according to the US Embassy in Islamabad. The story received considerable attention in Pakistan until denied by the three Afghans, all still in exile.

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- In February, a regularly scheduled Afghan airline flight from Kabul to New Delhi was delayed while an Afghan Government television crew filmed a "return" of Afghan refugees from India. [redacted]

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reporting, Wakil's criticism of the "negative attitudes" of the United States and its allies toward Kabul's initiatives received substantial favorable press coverage in the Indian media.

- In Denmark, the US Embassy reported that five Soviet front groups, led by the Danish Communist Party, held a public debate in January entitled "How Can the Afghan Conflict Be Solved?"
- At the United Nations, the Soviets have expressed concern that the United States may try to scuttle the Afghan cease-fire, according to the US Mission to the United Nations in New York. [redacted]

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Moscow and Kabul have repeatedly tried to project an image of sincerity in seeking a solution to the Afghan problem. On several occasions, for example, General Secretary Gorbachev has publicly stated that Soviet troops would eventually be withdrawn from the country. State Department reporting indicates that Soviet academics have reinforced this view in meetings with US scholars in Moscow. Soviet officials have even spoken about the possibility of a neutral or non-Communist government in Afghanistan, according to the US Embassy in Moscow. For its part, Kabul has indicated publicly that coalition partners in a new government would be on an "equal footing" with Najib. [redacted]

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The campaign's impact thus far has been mixed. In the West, it generally has been viewed as a propaganda ploy. Participants at the public debate in Denmark, for example, cited the need for a Soviet troop withdrawal, despite predictable attempts by the event's pro-Soviet sponsors to blame the United States for the war. Skepticism is prevalent in the Moslem world as well, as evidenced by the Islamic Conference's stronger-than-usual resolution calling for an end to Moscow's occupation of Afghanistan, although a senior Kuwaiti official in recent talks with the US did assert a new "Soviet flexibility" on Afghanistan. In Pakistan, by comparison, the campaign appears to have had some success in exploiting domestic discontent over the presence of Afghan refugees and fears about the consequences of a Mujahedin defeat. Although most Pakistani media commented critically on the peace initiatives, Islamabad has been seriously reviewing the proposals. [redacted]

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Moscow's efforts to propagandize the cease-fire and National Reconciliation initiatives have extended well beyond Afghanistan and Pakistan:

- In the Middle East, the Soviets were engaged in a diplomatic "blitz" aimed at preventing criticism of the USSR and Afghanistan at the Islamic Summit Conference held in Kuwait at the end of January, according to US Embassy reporting. [redacted]

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In the coming months, we expect Moscow and Kabul to continue portraying the cease-fire and National Reconciliation initiatives as serious proposals. Creating the appearance of movement in its Afghan policy may be intended to buy Moscow time to consolidate

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- Afghan Foreign Minister Wakil used a visit to New Delhi in early February to expound on the National Reconciliation theme. According to US Embassy

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Worldwide Campaigns

the current regime or create rifts between the moderate and hardline leaders of the seven Mujahedin factions. In our view, this tactic will, at a minimum, better position the Soviets to blame the United States and Pakistan if the UN-sponsored talks between the USSR and Pakistan fail. As a means of undermining Islamabad's policy of supporting the Mujahedin, the Soviets are likely to step up their efforts to exploit growing discontent in Pakistan over the refugee presence. Moscow's tactics may include increased bombings in the Northwest Province by Afghan intelligence agents, disinformation about the degree of internal support for the Najib government, and propaganda distorting Islamabad's position in the UN negotiations. [redacted]

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Nicaragua: Exploiting Church-State Relations [redacted] 25X1

In the last few months, the Sandinista regime has been promoting the idea that its relations with the Nicaraguan Catholic Church are improving, despite church officials' views to the contrary. By trumpeting its "willingness" to negotiate with the church, Managua, in our view, hopes to improve its international image, especially in Western Europe, where support for the regime is waning. [redacted]

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Sandinista and Soviet Bloc efforts to manipulate the issue of church-state relations recently focused on the Eucharistic Congress held in Managua on 16-23 November. The congress was sponsored by the Nicaraguan Catholic Church and attended by church leaders from the United States, Western Europe, and Latin America:

- On 15 November President Ortega addressed a conference of "international volunteers" hosted by the pro-Sandinista Evangelical Committee for Development Aid on the role of religion in Nicaragua. US Embassy reporting indicates that the speech, which praised "improved" church-state relations, was subsequently replayed widely in the state-controlled Nicaraguan media, apparently in hopes of influencing the foreign clergy attending the congress.
- On 17 November, TASS ran an article arguing that the congress was proof of the Nicaraguan Government's readiness to establish normal relations with the church.
- On 22 November the Sandinista newspaper *Barri-cada* ran a long editorial on religious freedom in Nicaragua and commented favorably on the renewal of church-state talks, which began in September.


[redacted] 25X1

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Worldwide Campaigns

In addition to exploiting the congress, the Sandinistas and their allies have taken steps to influence public opinion on church-state relations in general. For example:

- Cuba's Prensa Latina news service carried an article on 10 January stating that the talks between the Nicaraguan Government and the Catholic Church were being conducted in an atmosphere of moderate optimism and that relations between the two had improved.
- Following an early December visit to Nicaragua by Cardinal Joseph Hoeffner, president of the West German Conference of Bishops, Ortega gave a speech indicating he had told Hoeffner that religion and the revolution were coexisting peacefully and that the church-state dialogue was progressing, according to US Embassy and press reporting. [redacted]



Nicaraguan President Ortega's meeting in December with visiting West German Cardinal Hoeffner received front-page coverage in Barricada, the Sandinista daily. [redacted]

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25X1 In our view, the campaign is paying some dividends for the Sandinistas. [redacted]

25X1 [redacted] the West German Social Democratic Party (SPD) welcomed the Sandinista's renewed dialogue with the church. The SPD believes that its talks with FSLN National Directorate member Bayardo Arce in West Germany last August prompted Managua to act. In addition, George Foulkes, the British Labour Party's deputy foreign affairs spokesman, told US Ambassador Habib in January that the recent signs of improvement in church-state relations provided evidence of a pluralistic system there, according to US Embassy reporting. [redacted]

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disappointed with the Nicaraguan regime and has decided to redistribute its foreign aid in favor of democratic countries. [redacted]

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25X1 At the same time, however, there is evidence that support for the regime continues to erode in other West European circles. According to the US Embassy in Madrid, West European Socialist International (SI) representatives told visiting Sandinista officials in mid-February that SI might withdraw its support unless Nicaragua demonstrated some progress toward accepting political pluralism. Press reports indicate that a French government official, at a 16 February news conference in Costa Rica, stated that Paris is

To help counter this trend, we believe the Sandinistas in the near term will press ahead with their religious propaganda in hopes of demonstrating to foreign audiences the regime's sincerity in seeking a solution to church-state problems. They probably will play up the recent "improvement" in church-state relations as evidence of their flexibility as well as their commitment to political pluralism. For their part, Nicaraguan Catholic Church officials realize that the Sandinistas are manipulating the current dialogue for propaganda purposes. But their concern over a negative public reaction if they broke off the talks—which would provide the regime with an excuse for further crackdowns—is likely to keep church leaders at the negotiating table for the foreseeable future. [redacted]

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Regional Activities

Western Europe



Moscow Targets the Cyprus Settlement Process [redacted]

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While arms control issues remain the USSR's number-one target for active measures and propaganda operations in Western Europe (see "Arms Control Remains a Top Priority"), the Soviets have also made a determined push during the past year to influence political developments in Cyprus. A hiatus in UN efforts to mediate a solution to the Cyprus conflict presented Moscow with an opportunity to intervene—in conjunction with the Cypriot Communist Party (AKEL)—to try to garner support for Gorbachev's January 1986 Cyprus proposal. [redacted]

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The cornerstone of Moscow's campaign has been a sophisticated public diplomacy offensive aimed at influencing political elites in Cyprus. During the past year, senior Soviet officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs visited Nicosia on four separate occasions to promote the Soviet proposal, while Cypriot envoys travelled to Moscow twice, according to press and US Embassy reporting. During a mid-January visit to Cyprus, Soviet special envoy Rodionov pushed President Kyprianou to request the United Nations to hold an international conference on the Cyprus problem—a key element of Gorbachev's proposal [redacted]

[redacted] In addition, the Soviet Embassy in Nicosia has staged numerous press conferences on the issue. Last November, for example, Soviet press attache Chizov contrasted what he depicted as selfless Soviet interest in a Cyprus settlement with a US policy he said was driven by strategic interests "similar to their obsession with Star Wars." [redacted]

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Since last summer, Yuri Folkine, the new Soviet Ambassador to Cyprus, has led the diplomatic push. Younger and more dynamic than his predecessor, Folkine is projecting a radically different Soviet image in Cyprus, according to the US Embassy in Nicosia. He has been strikingly active in public relations, making a favorable impression on both the Cypriots and the diplomatic corps. The Embassy reports that last fall he skillfully promoted the Soviet line at a working lunch with local journalists by refraining from traditional anti-US rhetoric. In a 21 January press conference, Folkine stated that the Soviet proposal had found "broad support" in Cyprus and had become "part of the official position of the Cyprus Government." [redacted]

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Beyond diplomacy, the Soviets and AKEL have tried to manipulate mass public opinion with traditional disinformation tactics. AKEL's official newspaper *Haravghi*, for example, has published numerous allegations aimed at fomenting public opposition against the United States and the presence of British military bases on the island, the removal of which is called for in Gorbachev's Cyprus proposal:

[redacted]

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Regional Activities

[Redacted]

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- In late January and early February, *Haravghi* gave prominent coverage to allegations that the United States was preparing to mount a military action against Lebanon from the British bases. The 3 February issue, for example, charged that the “imperialists” intended to use Cyprus as a “springboard for aggression,” probably against Lebanon. These allegations are similar to ones that surfaced last June within the Cypriot Government. Shortly after the visit of a Soviet delegation, a paper circulated among senior Cypriot officials alleging that Washington had asked London for permission to use one of the British bases in the event of a crisis in the Mediterranean. [Redacted]

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In the near term, we do not foresee any significant change in Soviet strategy. Given the favorable response to their proposal by the Cypriot Government, we expect the Soviets to at least maintain, or perhaps intensify, their public relations campaign. At the same time, Moscow may try to take advantage of the local uproar stirred by *Haravghi*'s reports of US military activity in Cyprus—which included a telephone call in January from the Cypriot Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the US Ambassador—by surfacing a forgery “proving” the allegations. [Redacted]

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Africa

Soviet Gains and Setbacks [Redacted]

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Moscow continues to have success in Africa with its disinformation campaign on AIDS, but its long-term influence-building efforts—including economic and military assistance, cultural agreements, and scholarship offers—appear to be yielding mixed results, with gains in Nigeria, for example, offset by problems in Guinea. [Redacted]

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Soviet-generated half-truths and fabrications about AIDS, coupled with local fear, ignorance, and resentment over perceived attempts by the West to “blame” Africans for the AIDS problem, probably will sustain a successful disinformation campaign in Africa during 1987. Since the African phase of the worldwide campaign began in mid-1986, the press in 15 African countries have repeated charges that the United States is responsible for creating and spreading AIDS. In Tanzania, Nigeria, and Ghana, such stories—which seek to heighten local concern by accentuating racial aspects of the AIDS problem—have run for weeks despite US protests. In Ghana, for example, a January press article described alleged US Government interest in using Africans for human testing of an AIDS vaccine. [Redacted]

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Regional Activities

Nigeria

The Triumph

"The British Chief Medical Officer, also let it known that 246 Britons had died of AIDS by the end of August, 1986. Yet, despite the conclusive evidence suggesting the origin of AIDS in Europe, the Westerners are still trying to convince the world to the contrary".

THE KENYA TIMES

The badge of destruction

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 4, 1986

AIDS: Western bias smacks of racialism

TOPIC

Uganda

Reg. at G.P.O. as For Week Ending:

USA warmongers manufactured AIDS

AIDS is an American made plague

GHANAIAN TIMES

Ghana

Пролетарии всех стран, соединяйтесь!

МОСКОВСКАЯ ПРАВДА



ОРГАН МОСКОВСКОГО ГОРОДСКОГО КОМИТЕТА КПСС И МОССОВЕТА

Газета издается с 18 июля 1918 года

№ 247 (20267)

Вторник, 28 октября 1986 года

28 октября 1986 года

Цена 3 коп.

КУДА ВЕДУТ СЛЕДЫ

Вирус СПИДа создан в лабораториях Пентагона — к такому выводу пришли трое ученых разных стран

"AIDS was created in the laboratories of the Pentagon," PRAVDA, 28 October 1986

Soviet-inspired disinformation about AIDS has made press headlines in 15 African countries since mid-1986.


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Regional Activities

Nigeria continues to be one of Moscow's most important targets for active measures in Africa. During the past several months, the Soviets have coupled cultural, economic, and scholarship incentives with a well-orchestrated anti-US disinformation campaign:



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- In addition to the usual steady stream of anti-US articles appearing almost daily in Nigerian media, an apparently Soviet-supported disinformation campaign is aggressively targeting US officials in Nigeria. According to a US Embassy report in late December 1986, a Nigerian magazine editor received an anonymous letter charging three US officials with responsibility for the mid-October letter-bomb killing of a prominent Nigerian news magazine editor. Several days earlier a long article—falsely attributed to a USIS officer—attacking US military doctrine appeared in the Lagos daily *Vanguard*. This forgery subsequently was delivered to several other Nigerian newspapers, according to US Embassy reporting. [redacted]

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[redacted] Soviet missions overseas have been tasked in recent months with doing more to counter "US propaganda operations abroad." [redacted]

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In Guinea, by contrast, Moscow is experiencing some setbacks in its efforts to maintain influence there. Despite pressure tactics, bribery, and incentives such as scholarships, training, and military support, Guinea is becoming progressively resistant to Bloc educational opportunities inferior to those offered in the West, and to bilateral agreements that have traditionally favored Moscow. For example:

- The Guinean Navy did not sign a new military assistance agreement with Moscow last December despite Soviet offers before the formal negotiations of additional ships, technical advisers, and military training courses, [redacted]

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Regional Activities

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In our view, Conakry's hard line with Moscow is based upon its belated recognition of the Soviet failure to deliver economic relief as well as its apparent gains from attractive Western economic and military assistance programs. Although Moscow almost certainly views these developments unfavorably, its overall influence in Guinea probably is not in jeopardy. The USSR's 500-person official presence—an important asset in conducting active measures—is not at risk, and the Soviets still have considerable economic influence stemming from a recent \$150 million credit to aid the country's fishing and other industries.

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During the coming months, we expect Moscow to enjoy continued propaganda benefits from the AIDS campaign. In addition to surfacing the story elsewhere in Africa, the Soviets may also try to exploit recent AIDS-related incidents that play on fear and racism. Cameroon, for example, closed its border with Nigeria temporarily in December because of an AIDS scare. According to US Embassy and press reporting, British-Kenyan relations have been strained since the January disclosure and subsequent press sensationalism of a British military decision to prohibit troops from using recreational facilities on Kenya's sea coast. The decision was attributed to reports of an AIDS epidemic there. Meanwhile, there are indications that Moscow is seeking to expand its already extensive media influence activities in Africa. According to a Nigerian press report, a new International Institute of Journalism for Africa is to be established there under the auspices of the International Organization of Journalists, a Soviet front. In addition, the US Embassy in Accra reported in February that Soviet financial incentives may have been instrumental in the Ghanaian decision to join Intersputnik—Moscow's satellite telecommunications network.

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Regional Activities

Latin America



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Moscow Focuses on Disarmament, Cuba Targets the Caribbean [redacted]

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Soviet political influence activities in Latin America continued to overshadow Cuban operations as Moscow pushed a heavy agenda of disarmament propaganda and anti-US disinformation in a number of countries. [redacted]

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During the past few months, Moscow broadened the scope of its regional "peace" offensive, in particular intensifying efforts in Peru as well as in Panama, Brazil, and Bolivia. [redacted] Novosti personnel frequently were in the lead:

• [redacted] the Novosti chief in Lima instructed one of his Peruvian employees in November to try to convince the editors of influential, rightwing publications to support the Soviet line on arms control by presenting nuclear disarmament and SDI as apolitical issues that transcend ideology.

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• The Lima Novosti office also organized an arms control roundtable on 18 December with Peruvian media representatives, influential citizens, and scientists, [redacted] In addition to being part of Moscow's worldwide campaign against SDI, the meeting was also intended to lay the groundwork for the creation of a Peruvian nuclear disarmament organization. Although [redacted] the Soviets were pleased with its outcome, the Peruvian media largely ignored the event, [redacted]

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[redacted]

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• In Panama [redacted] the President of the Association of Soviet Jurists was promoting a manifesto—to be signed by famous jurists worldwide—outlawing nuclear war. He asked the Panamanian Communist Party for assistance in identifying a prominent Panamanian jurist who would be willing to cooperate in the effort.

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• In Brazil, the Novosti office in Rio de Janeiro mounted a major campaign late last fall to publicize General Secretary Gorbachev's peace initiatives in the Brazilian media [redacted]. In addition to providing news items, the Novosti correspondent convinced the president of the Rio de Janeiro Writers Union to initiate a campaign calling for a nuclear moratorium that included a written manifesto addressed to the leaders of the

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[redacted]

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Regional Activities

United States and the Soviet Union. The manifesto defended Soviet positions on arms control, and bore the signatures of international literary figures, including two Nobel Prize winners.

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- In Bolivia, the Soviets sponsored a public disarmament forum on 15 January at the Bolivian-Soviet Institute for Culture and Friendship, [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] The meeting, which commemorated the first anniversary of Gorbachev's proposal to eliminate nuclear weapons by the year 2000, was well attended by the Bolivian public and local media representatives.

[redacted]

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In addition to their disarmament campaign, the Soviets also surfaced anti-US disinformation in several countries:

- In November, articles appeared in two Bolivian newspapers charging that two USIS officials were CIA operatives attempting to recruit local journalists to write in favor of a continued US military presence there. The allegations were made by the Communist-dominated Federation of Bolivian Press Workers, an organization that the US Embassy in La Paz believes is a major conduit for inserting Soviet Bloc disinformation into Bolivian newspapers.

- On 18 December, *Critica*, the newspaper controlled by the Defense Forces of Panama, published a news item—provided by Novosti—alleging that the US Department of Defense controlled the US communications media, according to the US Embassy in Panama. The article also claimed that “the Pentagon operates its own journalism school which graduates two thousand propaganda professionals a year.”

- On 4 January, the largest Brazilian daily, *Folha de Sao Paulo*, carried a TASS item alleging that the United States is deliberately exposing female peace demonstrators at the Greenham Common Military Base in Great Britain to radiation. [redacted]

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Cuban efforts focused on the Caribbean, where Havana has been trying to erode Libyan influence among local leftists. [redacted]

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Havana fears that Tripoli might persuade a leftist group there to carry out actions that would provoke a US retaliation and thus threaten Cuban interests. Havana also views the Caribbean Nation Movement (CNM)—a coalition of pro-Libyan leftist groups over which it has little control—as a rival to the Cuban-sponsored Caribbean Anti-Imperialist Consultative Committee, [redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted] Havana was pleased by an article that the head of the PLP wrote later in the month criticizing the Caribbean left's dealings with Libya and recommending closer ties to Cuba. [redacted]

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Regional Activities

25X1 If Gorbachev visits Latin America—perhaps in the latter half of this year—we believe Moscow will be promoting its arms control positions even more intensely. While we expect the Soviets to continue a broad campaign across the region, they probably will pay special attention to the countries on Gorbachev’s itinerary.

[redacted]

25X1 [redacted] In Argentina, the Soviets already are trying to mitigate recent negative press coverage of Soviet domestic and foreign policy by paying co-opted journalists to write pro-Soviet articles,

[redacted] Moscow also is likely to supplement its “peace” rhetoric with more anti-US disinformation tailored to the local scene, at least until Gorbachev’s arrival, in hopes of bolstering local receptivity to the visit.

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[redacted]

In our view, Havana’s efforts to unite Caribbean leftists and bring them under its influence will continue to be hampered by established Libyan inroads there. While the PLP leader’s press article may temporarily cool relations between regional leftists and Libya, Cuba will have to convince the leftists that it is more able to provide assistance than Libya in order to achieve its long-term objectives. Because of limited financial resources, however, Havana will have to rely heavily on the more extensive material assistance it can offer, such as the free printing of leftist propaganda and campaign literature. [redacted]

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Middle East

Moscow Pushes at the Margins [redacted]

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During the last quarter, the Soviets continued to push on several active measures fronts in the Middle East, including Syria, Tunisia, and the Persian Gulf. While not suggestive of any change in Soviet capability in the region, these activities demonstrate Moscow’s knack for capitalizing on available opportunities and reinforcing local predispositions. [redacted]

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The Soviets were particularly active in placing anti-US items in the press of Middle Eastern countries:

- In Syria, the Soviets resurrected allegations from last spring and summer of an impending US and Israeli attack in the region. On 25 January, *Tishrin*, one of the three major Damascus dailies, ran a front page headline (attributed to Novosti) entitled “Moscow: American Forces Ready to Intervene in the Middle East with Six Land Divisions and More Than Six Hundred Tactical Aircraft.” Other Soviet-attributed stories warned of a joint US-Israeli attack on Syria. This theme ran a number of times during the quarter and, [redacted] [redacted] was buttressed by a formal message from the Soviet Communist Party to the ruling Syrian Ba’th Party warning the Syrian Government of the continuing danger of US-Israeli aggression against Syria.

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Regional Activities

- The Soviets were able to play this “war scare” theme elsewhere in the Middle East. In Tunisia, for example, the Soviets openly placed a Novosti article on the front page of the major government-owned daily under a headline warning of possible American intervention in Lebanon, Syria, and Iran. According to the US Embassy, the Soviets have seldom before been able to place Novosti materials in this paper, especially on the front page.
- In the Persian Gulf, Moscow took advantage of its growing presence there to market anti-US disinformation. In January a major daily in Qatar carried a Novosti story headlined “The Relationship Between Journalists and the CIA: Hundreds of Them in International Press.” The Soviets also placed articles in the Kuwaiti press alleging US responsibility for AIDS; since the beginning of the year, at least three such stories have appeared. [redacted]

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Despite these successes, Moscow’s media influence capabilities in the Middle East will continue to be limited by government control of most newspapers as well as by the region’s Islamic culture. Indeed, Soviet press placement operations appear to be substantially less successful there than in other regions such as South Asia and parts of Africa. For example, Soviet propaganda is published in the Syrian media only after approval by Damascus. [redacted] Given these constraints, we may see increased Soviet use of entities outside the Middle East to push Soviet propaganda and disinformation in the region. [redacted]

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South Asia



Soviets Tailor Programs to Local Circumstances [redacted]


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Diverse patterns in Soviet active measures in South Asia over the last several months indicate Moscow’s ability to tailor its activities to local circumstances. Moscow stepped up international efforts to pressure the Mujahedin resistance forces and Pakistan on the Afghan war (see “Afghanistan: Propagandizing the Cease-Fire and National Reconciliation Initiatives”). In Bangladesh, and to a lesser extent in Nepal, Moscow’s efforts involved support to opposition groups. By contrast, in India, Moscow used its close ties to New Delhi to trumpet nonaligned support for Soviet arms control proposals and continued its disinformation activities to discredit the United States. [redacted]

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Regional Activities

In Bangladesh, the Soviets renewed efforts to bolster the rapidly growing Bangladesh Communist Party (CPB) and several CPB-controlled front groups:



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- With apparent Soviet approval, the CPB recently passed some Soviet funds to several labor and professional fronts for use in protests against the government's program of denationalizing banks and industries. Because of the largely unorganized nature of Bangladesh politics, these CPB-controlled fronts have often been able to mount public opposition disproportionate to their real strength in the country.

- At its 10th Congress in Bulgaria last fall, the International Organization of Journalists (IOJ), a Soviet front, granted affiliation to a newly formed group of Bangladesh journalists, [redacted] During the meeting, the group accepted an offer from the IOJ and the Union of Soviet Journalists to provide funding and training in exchange for support to Bloc propaganda efforts in Bangladesh. [redacted]

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In Nepal, Moscow is apparently making efforts to influence the labor movement.

[redacted] the World Federation of Trade Unions, the Soviet labor front, funded a two-day labor education seminar. Soviet financing was used to pay attendees a daily per diem more than three times the average daily wage in Nepal, making participation very attractive to local workers. [redacted] the Soviets are willing to spend a significant amount of money for such seminars as well as travel to Bloc countries. In our view, Moscow's primary objective in these activities is to limit Chinese influence in Nepal. [redacted]

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In India, to support Gorbachev's arms control proposals, the Soviets seized on the Delhi Declaration, a joint communique issued by Gorbachev and Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi at the end of the General Secretary's November visit to New Delhi. The communique, which the Soviets pushed very hard, presents general principles for achieving a world without nuclear weapons. Moscow has made reference to the Delhi Declaration repeatedly in its own propaganda and

Secret

Regional Activities


Gorbachev and Gandhi agreed upon the Delhi Declaration during the General Secretary's November visit to New Delhi. [redacted]

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public diplomacy. For example, Moscow highlighted the declaration in its January greetings to the Islamic Summit in Kuwait. Soviet ambassadors to Portugal, the United Kingdom, and Pakistan have also cited it in press conferences. [redacted]

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Following the Gorbachev visit, the Soviets placed in the Indian press a variety of disinformation stories that mostly featured new angles on recurring Soviet themes:

- Soviet officials in New Delhi prepared an article reviewing Soviet arms control proposals during 1986 [redacted]

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[redacted] On 28 December, the *Times of India* headlined this story as "The Year of Soviet Peace Initiatives."

- Pushing once again the theme that the United States is trying to establish military bases in South Asia, a United News Service of India story alleged US construction of 32 airfields in Baluchistan near the Iran and Afghan border. In our view a Soviet placement, the article was carried prominently in major English-language dailies in New Delhi, including the *Statesman*, the *Times of India*, and the *Indian Express*.

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Regional Activities

- The pro-Soviet *Blitz* in Bombay charged in December that the sudden disappearance of an Indian Air Force transport aircraft in March 1986 over the Arabian Sea may have resulted from a collision with a US carrier-based F-14.
- Exploiting the US-Iranian arms deal and the diversion of funds to the Nicaraguan rebels, the two major English-language wire services in India carried Soviet charges that the United States has escalated its aggression against Nicaragua in hopes of extracting itself from the "Irangate" affair; the story appeared in the pro-Soviet *Patriot*. [redacted]

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Over the next several months, we expect little change in Moscow's active measures tactics in South Asia. We may, however, see heightened attention to Bangladesh, where the Soviets could make a special effort to capitalize on their growing inroads into the journalistic community to support anti-US disinformation campaigns.

[redacted]

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East Asia

Courting the Insurgents in the Philippines, Trying To Make Headway in Malaysia [redacted]

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During the past quarter, the Soviet Union continued its effort to gain more influence among ASEAN members. Specifically, it stepped up its overtures toward the traditionally anti-Soviet Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), the leader of the country's military insurgency, and initiated a new campaign to penetrate the Malaysian press. [redacted]

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In the Philippines, Moscow is continuing to explore the possibility of establishing relations with the CPP [redacted]

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- The CPP reversed policy last year and is now willing to accept aid from the Soviet Bloc.
- The Soviet Embassy in Manila is interested in meeting with the leaders of the CPP and the KMU, the CPP's labor front.

[redacted]

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We believe Moscow will have difficulty concealing significant amounts of assistance to the CPP. [redacted]

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[redacted] The Philippine press already has alleged that the Soviet Bloc is providing military assistance to the rebels. [redacted]

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[redacted]

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Regional Activities

In Malaysia, Moscow is trying to develop a political influence capability to complement its renewed political and economic interest in the country. [redacted] 25X1
[redacted] local 25X1
newspapers have little interest in publishing Soviet news items, the Malaysian-Soviet Friendship Society is inactive, and the Soviet Cultural Center has generated scant interest. [redacted] 25X1

Moscow is trying to turn this situation around but has had little success. It recently appointed Yuriy Biryukov, a diplomat with local contacts from a previous posting in Malaysia, to head the Soviet Information Office in Kuala Lumpur. [redacted] 25X1
[redacted] Biryukov helped 20 journalists from Chinese language dailies 25X1
tour the USSR last October with the expectation that they would write some pro-Soviet stories. After the visit, the Information Office published an article that quoted the reporters as being impressed with the availability of information in the Soviet Union. The journalists refuted the article and claimed it deliberately distorted their words. [redacted] 25X1
[redacted] 25X1

We doubt that the Soviets will significantly improve their influence capability in Malaysia, at least over the near term. Widespread popular animosity toward Moscow's Cambodia policy and a general antipathy toward Communism among ethnic Malays make Malaysia an inhospitable environment for Soviet active measures and propaganda. [redacted] 25X1

Looking ahead, we expect Moscow to try to enhance its image among ASEAN members by playing up its support for a Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ), an Indonesian-backed idea that ASEAN heads of state will discuss this December in Manila. It probably will portray SEANWFZ as consistent with Gorbachev's call for an Asian collective security conference. Moscow currently is propagandizing its decision to ratify the Protocols of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty and the US refusal to do likewise. [redacted] 25X1

Libya



Looking for Support on Chad [redacted] 25X1

During the past several months, Libya, embroiled in heavy fighting in Chad, has employed a variety of propaganda and active measures techniques to support its immediate and long-term foreign policy objectives there of securing Libyan control of northern Chad and overthrowing the Habre government. These include covertly supporting Chadian opposition groups overseas, organizing propaganda activities abroad in support of the Libyan intervention, pressuring African countries to adopt neutrality on the Chad issue, and encouraging foreign media and politicians to condemn French involvement in Chad:

[redacted] 25X1

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Regional Activities



Libyan troops in Chad. [redacted]

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- 25X1 • In Malaysia, representatives of the Libyan World Center for Anti-Imperialism, the Libyan People's Bureau, and the Libyan Arab Cultural Society met early this month to discuss actions that would support Libyan efforts in Chad, [redacted] As a result of the meeting, the Libyan Arab Cultural Center will organize a pro-Libyan media campaign and invite Malaysian students and academicians to the center for briefings on Libya's position regarding Chad.
- According to US Embassy reporting, the French Ambassador to Togo told a US diplomat that, following a 17 January meeting between Togolese President Eyadema and a visiting Libyan envoy, the Libyan People's Bureau there was instructed to shut down its covert activities. The French Ambassador believes that Eyadema and the Libyan envoy came to an understanding whereby Libya forswears meddling in Togo in return for Togolese neutrality on the Chadian issue.
- 25X1 • In early January, Tripoli issued instructions to Libyan People's Bureaus abroad to initiate a propaganda offensive against France's alleged aggression in Chad, [redacted] The bureaus were to use all available media outlets, including television, newspapers, and radio, in this campaign.

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Regional Activities

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In view of evidence suggesting that Libya is preparing to mount a major military offensive in Chad, we believe Tripoli probably will step up its Chadian campaign in hopes of stemming foreign criticism of its actions. At the same time, however, we doubt that such an effort would have much success. Nigeria, for example, already is angry with Libya for misrepresenting its alleged support of Tripoli's aims in Chad, according to the US Embassy in Lagos. Following Libyan press reports in January that falsely quoted Nigerian President Babangida as having both accepted Libya's role in Chad and condemned France's imperialist intervention, the Nigerian Government on 6 February publicly called for the removal of Libyan troops from Chad. In addition, a government-owned Nigerian newspaper, which has been fervently pro-Qadhafi in the past, published an editorial on 11 February that strongly criticized Qadhafi's policy toward Chad.

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Secret

Articles

**Soviet Active Measures Against the CIA:
Playing on Third World Fears (C NF)**

The Soviet Union conducts a major active measures program to exploit Third World fear of alleged CIA-sponsored subversion. The program employs propaganda and covert operations involving agents of influence, forgeries, press placements, and lists of alleged CIA officers and agents. [redacted]

[redacted] we feel many in the Third World find anti-CIA disinformation credible because they already believe the West is trying to stir up political unrest in their countries and perceive US capabilities as virtually unlimited. We know that in at least one country, India, the program has influenced government policy. Moreover, US Embassy reporting indicates that the lists of alleged CIA officers and agents have intimidated and cast suspicion on many people. Nonetheless, Third World audiences have on occasion responded with indifference, skepticism, and anger to anti-CIA campaigns. [redacted]

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The Apparatus

[redacted] we believe the KGB has primary responsibility for the anti-CIA program. [redacted]

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[redacted] The Propaganda Department of the CPSU participates in the overt portions of anti-CIA campaigns through its control of Soviet news agencies, Radio Moscow, the information sections of Soviet embassies, and Soviet publications distributed abroad. [redacted]

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Covert Action

The KGB uses forgeries, press placements, and agents of influence to intensify Third World fear of alleged CIA subversion. [redacted]

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[redacted]

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We believe the KGB disseminates names of alleged CIA officers and agents through the Soviet press, books written by foreign authors, and anonymous mailings to government officials, political parties, and journalists. It undoubtedly hopes the lists will disrupt US intelligence operations, cast suspicion on US diplomats, and discredit journalists and government officials it deems pro-United States or anti-Soviet. One anonymous mailing that has appeared sporadically over the past decade is *CIA Insider: News of Facts From the Agency's Files*. Last year, it surfaced in India, Pakistan, Peru, Guyana, and several African countries. The Libyan state news agency recently used it to publicize names of supposed CIA agents in Egypt. [redacted]

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Propaganda

[redacted] Moscow prompts the writing and subsidizes the sale of anti-CIA books by Third World authors. [redacted]

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
[redacted] one such book is the *Devil and His Dart: How the CIA is Plotting in the Third World* by Indian journalist Kunhanadan Nair. The US Embassy in New Delhi reports that Nair, who is an East European correspondent for the pro-Soviet Indian publication *Blitz*, often writes disinformation about the CIA. The book claims that the CIA:

- Was directly or indirectly responsible for the deaths of 11 nonaligned leaders and tried to kill nine others, including former Nonaligned Movement (NAM) chairman Rajiv Gandhi. 25X1
- Seeks to destabilize developing countries by supporting separatist movements.
- Uses its agents to sow discord within the NAM. 25X1

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Secret

Articles



EDWARD G. GRIFFIN, the Central Intelligence Agency operative who guided Prof. Robert L. Hardgrave of Texas University in the preparation of the State Department study on the likely political situation in the event of "the Death of Mrs. Gandhi"—completed just eight weeks before her assassination—has been awarded a top CIA decoration

Griffin (born July 30, 1926), who joined the US State Department in 1957 and undertook special espionage assignments, received the CIA's highest award for "distinguished services" along with a bonus of 10,000 dollars, according to the source. Griffin oversaw the Professor's study entitled "India Under Pressure: Prospects for Political Succession in India Upon the Death of Mrs. Gandhi".

The book has received considerable international attention—almost certainly with Soviet help:

- In Ghana, the *Daily Graphic*, one of two national daily newspapers, said the book proved that the United States is implacably hostile toward the NAM and uses the CIA to destabilize developing countries.
- In Bangladesh, the pro-Soviet newspaper *Sangbad* underscored the book's contention that the CIA has spent over 30 years trying to subvert developing countries that pursue nonalignment.

- In India, the *Navbharat Times*, the most widely read Hindi language daily in the country, used the book as the basis for its speculation on CIA involvement in the October 1986 assassination attempt against Prime Minister Gandhi.

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Articles

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Moscow also gives foreign dissemination to the anti-CIA writings of its own authors. [redacted]

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[redacted] Soviet embassies in developing countries place Soviet press stories in local newspapers and subsidize the sale of Soviet books in local stores. Some Soviet anti-CIA publications target an educated readership. For example, the authors of a 1984 book entitled *The CIA in Latin America* attempt to support their arguments with citations from US Congressional hearings and the memoirs of retired CIA employees. Others try to appeal to the unsophisticated. In 1982, the Soviet weekly *Literary Gazette* published an article—later replayed extensively in India—claiming that the CIA was involved in the development of “killer mosquitos” in Pakistan for use in germ warfare in South Asia.

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[redacted]

Program Effectiveness

[redacted] we believe the program reinforces anxiety in developing countries about alleged US subversion. In our judgment, many in the Third World find anti-CIA disinformation credible because they already believe the West is trying to stir up political unrest in their countries and perceive US capabilities as virtually unlimited. [redacted]

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[redacted]

The lists of alleged CIA officers and agents have intimidated and cast suspicion on many people. For example, the US Embassy in Kinshasa reports that an editor of a Zairean newspaper who was a contact of USIS feared that the government’s security service would interrogate him after his name appeared on a list of CIA agents. The US Embassy in Harare

reported that the Zimbabwean Government threatened to fire the editor of the *Harare Daily Herald* after he was listed. According to the US Embassy in Accra, the Ghanaian Under Secretary of Information believed that the government would perform a thorough investigation of people on a list of alleged agents. One of the Embassy’s press contacts thought the list could incite zealots in the government to apprehend some people. [redacted]

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Nonetheless, Third World audiences have responded with indifference, skepticism, and even anger to some anti-CIA campaigns. For example, the US Embassy in Islamabad reports that the editor of a leftist, pro-Iranian newspaper in Pakistan received a copy of *CIA Insider* last year, recognized it as a Soviet ploy, and did not publish any information from it. [redacted]

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[redacted] many educated Indians avoid heavily discounted, pro-Soviet books by Indian authors because they assume the books are Soviet sponsored. Last year the Ghanaian weeklies *Voice* and *Free Press* denounced a list of supposed CIA agents that was circulating in the country. [redacted]

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One recent campaign backfired. According to US Embassy reporting, the Soviets circulated a vitriolic anti-CIA pamphlet entitled *Crimes Against Africa* in Uganda last year even though President Museveni had made clear that he wanted to keep his country out of superpower politics. The US Embassy briefed the Foreign Ministry on the publication and contrasted US developmental assistance for Uganda with Soviet expenditures on disinformation. [redacted]

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[redacted]

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Secret

Articles

Soviet Religious Propaganda: Gearing Up for the Millenium of Russian Orthodoxy [redacted]

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Soviet propaganda organs are preparing a major international campaign for the upcoming Millenium in 1988 of the establishment of Christianity in Russia. The goals of this campaign are twofold: to create the appearance that Christians in both the East and the West are united in their support of Soviet disarmament initiatives, and to foster the impression that Christians and other religious adherents in the Soviet Union are able to live in and contribute to a Communist society without discrimination or conflict of allegiances. While the Millenium campaign is unlikely to have an appreciable impact on the arms control views of Christian communities in the West—Moscow's principal target—the openness of many of the invitees to Soviet "peace" initiatives will ensure a steady, yearlong stream of pro-Soviet propaganda abroad.

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Celebrating the Millenium of Russian Orthodoxy (1988-1988)

Moscow's plans to manipulate the 1988 celebration of the Millenium of Christianity in Russia for propaganda advantage have been under way for some time. The Russian Orthodox Church, for example, has invited hundreds of Western and Third World clergymen and other dignitaries to attend three major conferences in the USSR on various aspects of the Millenium and Russian Orthodoxy. The first conference took place in Kiev in June 1986 and dealt with historical aspects of ancient Russia's conversion to Christianity in 988. A second conference on religious dogma is planned for the summer of 1987 in Moscow. Finally, the actual celebration of the Millenium is scheduled to take place in the summer of 1988 in Moscow and other specially selected sites in the country. [redacted]

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To ensure that foreign visitors will come away from the celebration with a favorable impression, the Soviets have designated specific religious sites in major cities as ecclesiastical "showcases" for Millenium activity. US Embassy reporting indicates that these "showcases" have recently been remodeled—and

Russian Orthodoxy: Still the State Church

Despite unrelenting state repression, the Russian Orthodox Church (the Moscow Patriarchate) continues to maintain a sizable following in Soviet society. The spiritual and administrative head is its presiding bishop, the Patriarch of Moscow. Upon the demise of the last pre-Revolutionary Patriarch, Stalin was planning to have the office abolished, but the German invasion left Stalin in need of ways to rally the Soviet people to the war effort. As part of Stalin's appeal to Russian nationalism, the church was revived, but in a tamer, "Leninized" reincarnation. [redacted]

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The Soviet leadership is now less coercive in its dealings with the Russian Orthodox hierarchy, but the parameters of "permissible" domestic religious activity have changed very little under succeeding Soviet leaders. Moreover, the extent to which the church is exploited for propaganda purposes has steadily increased. This religious policy has been described as "no politics at home, nothing but politics abroad." [redacted]

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Because Soviet mechanisms of control within the Russian Orthodox Church and other religious bodies are so pervasive and ingrained, they are often not readily apparent to Western observers. Thus, the natural penchant for projecting one's own experiences onto another society works to Moscow's advantage. Western visitors to the Soviet Union observe open, functioning churches and assume that behind this ostensible evidence of religious freedom lies a church-state dynamic similar to that in their own societies. [redacted]

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sometimes completely reconstructed—for the purpose of hosting visiting clerics. The Soviet state, for example, is restoring the ancient Danilov Monastery in south-central Moscow for use as the church's downtown administrative headquarters. [redacted]

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
Articles

The Soviet Religious Propaganda Apparatus

General guidelines and specific directives regarding Soviet foreign policy positions and corresponding propaganda activities are coordinated within the International Department (ID) of the CPSU Central Committee. Within the ID is a section responsible for "mass organizations" and their international activities. The Council for Religious Affairs (CRA), a subordinate body of the Council of Ministers, is responsible for maintaining overall control of church-state relations in the USSR. [redacted]

We believe that guidance regarding religious propaganda flows from the ID to the CRA, and thence to specific religious organizations and persons. Nonetheless, several other foreign policy components—such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), various institutes of the Academy of Sciences, and the KGB's Service A (Active Measures)—can be involved in these activities. Domestically, the regional heads of the local Committees on Religious Affairs control the actions and statements of clergymen through networks of informants that infiltrate the various religious communities. [redacted]

The Russian Orthodox Church is integrated financially as well as structurally into the Soviet foreign propaganda apparatus. Regular, sizable contributions of funds from the church's still ample coffers to the official Soviet Peace Fund is a longstanding aspect of the "gentlemen's agreement" between church and state in the USSR. This fund is controlled by the Soviet Peace Committee, which coordinates the activities of all Soviet front organizations. Nonetheless, the major Soviet-controlled religious front, the Christian Peace Conference (CPC), will play only a peripheral role in the Millenium campaign. The actual celebration will take place in the Soviet Union, hosted by the Russian Orthodox Church in conjunction with the MFA and the ID. The role of the CPC most likely will be limited to conveying invitations to religious leaders in Western Europe and the Third World and replaying the Soviet-generated propaganda afterward. [redacted]



The Danilov Monastery in Moscow undergoing restoration before the Millenium celebrations. [redacted]

Soviet propagandists plan to use such church "showcases" to convey an atmosphere of religious tolerance to visiting clerics. [redacted] the Soviet clergymen assigned to meet with foreign guests have been carefully chosen on the basis of their reputations as reliable purveyors of official Soviet propaganda formulations. Western and Third World clerics visiting the Danilov Monastery will be lodged on the grounds in a hotel built by Moscow specifically for the Millenium; they will therefore have limited opportunity to learn about the church's real role in atheistic Soviet society. [redacted]

To burnish its image of religious tolerance, Moscow has recently accorded the church and its officials greater prominence and publicity. In 1986, for example, two articles featuring the Russian Orthodox Church appeared in *Soviet Life*, a glossy publication distributed overseas. Both articles give the impression that Russian Orthodox clergymen—and, by implication, all religious leaders—are widely respected members of Soviet society. Similarly, Patriarch Pimen has been accorded a place of unprecedented prominence in the recent anti-SDI and nuclear weapons test moratorium campaigns. In June 1986, a lengthy "open letter" to President Reagan attributed to the Patriarch was given front-page coverage by *Izvestiya* and broadcast worldwide through the TASS wire service. [redacted]

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***Patriarch Pimen of Moscow and All Russia
(Izvekov, Sergei Mikhailovich)***



Primate of the Russian Orthodox Church . . . born 10 August 1910 . . . permanent member of the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church since 1961 . . . under his leadership the Church has played an increasingly active role in supporting Soviet policies—sent widely publicized “personal” letters to President Reagan in March 1983 and June 1986 calling for a nuclear moratorium and endorsing the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan . . . won several awards for his “patriotic activities in the defense of peace” . . . member of the Soviet Peace Committee and the World Peace Council . . . promoted within the Russian Orthodox hierarchy in the late 1950s and early 1960s, during Khrushchev’s antireligious crack-down

[Redacted]

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Another aspect of Moscow’s campaign to show its religious tolerance is the recent relaxation of regulations regarding clerical activity in Soviet society. These liberalizations of Soviet law on religion, published in the January 1986 issue of the *Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate*, significantly extend the scope of legally sanctioned religious activity to include, for example, allowing clergy to visit believers in hospitals and prisons. A foreign Orthodox clergyman resident

in Moscow told the US Embassy that the new guidelines are merely more window dressing in anticipation of the Millenium celebration and will have no perceptible effect on the actual life of the church in Soviet society. [Redacted]

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The Millenium will be commemorated beyond Soviet borders as well. The Russian Orthodox Church is planning a “Goodwill Cruise” of church clergy and lay leaders to other Orthodox patriarchates in the Mediterranean Sea. According to the Embassy source cited above, a ship with as many as 200 people will embark on a voyage, possibly in May 1987, to Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, Syria, Cyprus, and Turkey. Church planners are also exploring the possibilities of visiting Jerusalem and of an audience with Pope John Paul II in the Vatican. [Redacted]

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Outlook

In our view, Moscow’s overall goal is to attract as many prominent Western clergymen as possible as a means of legitimizing the inevitable barrage of propaganda that will accompany the religious aspects of the Millenium celebration. A convincing show by the Russian Orthodox Church that Soviet society is tolerant of religious belief and genuinely committed to achieving nuclear disarmament could have an important impact on visiting clerics, many of whom are being invited because of previous expressions of openness to Soviet “peace” initiatives. Consequently, a real prospect exists that a substantial number of the attendees will return home as active supporters of Soviet arms control proposals. Nonetheless, we doubt that this would result in a significant shift in views on SDI, US nuclear weapons testing programs, or other Western strategic force modernization programs among West European and North American Christians, Moscow’s primary target audiences. [Redacted]

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25X1 **Soviet Economic Active Measures:
Targeting Multilateral Organizations** [redacted]

25X1 While most Soviet active measures are directed toward political objectives, Moscow in recent years has accorded a higher priority to using them to support its economic policies. [redacted]

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25X1 [redacted] Although we are aware of only a few Soviet economic influence operations since then, we expect Moscow to push a more intensive agenda in the future as a result of General Secretary Gorbachev's activist foreign economic policy. In our view, multilateral economic organizations will be among Moscow's principal targets. The USSR laid some groundwork last year, when Soviet emissaries contacted a number of such organizations—including the World Bank and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)—in an attempt to develop closer relations with them. [redacted]

25X1 **Background**
Soviet active measures planners generally have accorded little priority to covert operations aimed at influencing economic issues. Since the late 1970s, [redacted] the KGB has attempted only a few such programs, including an effort to weaken the dollar by driving up the price of gold in world markets and a campaign against the US embargo of grain shipments to the USSR. In the early 1980s, for example, KGB officers were tasked to advise their contacts that the embargo proved ineffective and only made US firms unattractive as trade partners. [redacted] Gorbachev's more activist foreign economic policy, however, is likely to lead to greater demand for economic active measures in the future. [redacted]

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Multilateral Organizations: High-Priority Targets
In a concerted effort last year, Soviet emissaries expressed an interest in developing closer relations with a number of multilateral economic organizations. [redacted]

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organizations. The Soviets have already stated that they would like to explore membership in both the IMF and the World Bank, according to World Bank documentation. In making the required capital contribution to the IMF or the World Bank, Moscow would be entitled to an executive director position on the board of each organization, thus having an opportunity to influence management decisions. It also would have direct access to confidential financial and economic data that Soviet state bank and trading companies could use to better manage Soviet hard currency reserves. In addition, a Soviet executive director's inside knowledge of the World Bank's debt renegotiations with developing countries would give Moscow valuable information on their economic vulnerabilities, especially those of intelligence interest. Finally, such membership would allow the KGB greater access to important economic decisionmakers. [redacted]

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The Soviets probably have GATT membership in mind as well, given the fact that Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania are members, and that Bulgaria and China are applicants. [redacted]

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[redacted] Once it became a member, Moscow would be better positioned to view and possibly take advantage of the trade conflicts between the United States, Japan, and the EC. In addition, the Soviets probably would conduct influence operations designed to protect the image of the Soviet economy. Judging by past practice, they would attempt to control the organization's published information about the Soviet economy by submitting incomplete or misleading information or by attempting to censor what it prints about the Soviet Union. [redacted]

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Implications: Soviet Opportunities and Constraints

With a more activist foreign economic policy, we expect to see more evidence of Soviet economic active measures in the future. Moscow's tactics may include disinformation designed to enhance the "openness" image of the Soviet economy, take advantage of conditions in international commodity markets, challenge the credibility of US trade policies, or weaken US economic influence in the Third World while promoting Soviet trade interests there. [redacted]

In our view, an important ingredient to Moscow's success in implementing economic active measures is membership in one or more multilateral economic

We believe Moscow is likely to move slowly in its efforts to exploit multilateral economic organizations for active measures purposes. Exposure of KGB manipulation would severely damage Moscow's credibility in these organizations and raise questions about

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the intent of Gorbachev's new foreign economic policy. Moreover, World Bank and GATT demands for detailed, reliable economic information from their members are in direct conflict with Moscow's desire to distort Soviet economic statistics to its advantage.

[Redacted]

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Calendar of Key Events, 1987

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23-27 March

UN Regional Conference for the World Disarmament Campaign, Beijing. Moscow recently formed a working group—headed by Deputy Foreign Minister Petrovsky—as a means of better exploiting UN disarmament conferences to its advantage. As a result, we expect the Soviets to pay particular attention to this meeting, the Disarmament for Development Conference in New York in August (see below), and the Third UN Special Session on Disarmament scheduled for mid-1988. Petrovsky's expected presence in Beijing reflects the importance Moscow attaches to attaining UN support for its arms control proposals. Yasushi Akashi, a pro-Soviet UN disarmament official, probably will try to tilt the conference communiqué in Moscow's favor. Although China recently has developed ties to foreign peace groups, it probably will distance itself from any Soviet call for a comprehensive test ban treaty to protect its own nuclear testing program.

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April

Latin American Peace Movement Meeting, Quito, Ecuador. Sponsored by the Ecuadorean Peace Committee, which is affiliated with the Soviet-controlled World Peace Council (WPC) and the Moscow-line Communist Party of Ecuador, this meeting will probably link disarmament to Third World economic development and urge Latin governments to divert military expenditures to social programs. The meeting almost certainly will endorse Soviet disarmament proposals in light of Gorbachev's expected visit to Latin America this year.

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6-10 April

Working Group Meeting of the Christian Peace Conference (CPC), West Germany. As the Soviets prepare to celebrate the Millennium of the Russian Orthodox Church, the CPC—a Soviet front—will probably be looking for ways to convince Western Christian leaders that there is freedom of religion in the USSR and that the Russian Church should have a larger role in the World Council of Churches.

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21-26 April

Week of Solidarity With Afghanistan. Given Moscow's recent push on Afghanistan (see "Afghanistan: Propagandizing the Cease-Fire and National Reconciliation Initiatives"), we believe that this WPC-sponsored event may get more attention than Soviet fronts typically give to such "solidarity weeks." Thus, we could see a fairly heavy slate of front activities—meetings, demonstrations, and letter-writing campaigns, for example—in support of the unilateral cease-fire and the National Reconciliation Program.

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Calendar of Key Events, 1987

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Soviet disarmament initiatives will top the agenda at the World Congress of Women in Moscow in June.

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Calendar of Key Events, 1987		25X1
May	<p>General Assembly Meeting of the Organization of International Radio and Television (OIRT), Havana. The meeting of this Soviet front group will focus on problems relating to the Intervision News Exchange Network—an OIRT subsidiary—and Intersputnik, the network of Soviet communications satellites. Results of a February meeting in Moscow indicate that improving Soviet Bloc and client state propaganda on “socialist countries’ foreign policy initiatives” is likely to be a high priority, with particular attention to preparations for the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution. [redacted]</p>	25X1
	<p>European Regional Conference on Action Against Apartheid, Geneva or Vienna. Sponsored by the UN Special Committee Against Apartheid (SCAA), this conference is intended to mobilize West Europeans to pressure their governments to apply or stiffen sanctions against South Africa, [redacted]. Orchestrated by Joseph Garba, the pro-Soviet chairman of the SCAA, with support from Soviet fronts, the event almost certainly will be one of several regional meetings leading up to an international conference on sanctions against South Africa. Last June, for example, Garba, the WPC, and the Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organization—another Soviet front—stage-managed such a forum in Paris to Soviet advantage. [redacted]</p>	25X1
		25X1
29 May-1 June	<p>Seventh Congress of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW), Moscow. Following tours by IPPNW leaders to the Middle East and Latin America over the past year and a successful regional meeting in New Zealand in February, there are signs that this Soviet-influenced organization is moving to give more attention to local and regional nuclear issues. The Philippine affiliate, for example, is pushing for “an enforceable nuclear-weapon-free constitutional policy.” While the meeting will certainly praise Soviet arms control proposals, it is possible that the Soviet organizers will encourage national affiliates to give even greater attention to local issues that benefit Moscow. [redacted]</p>	25X1
June	<p>Caribbean Trade Union Conference: Trinidad and Tobago. This conference, [redacted] will include [redacted] union leaders from Cuba and the English-speaking Caribbean nations, [redacted]. [redacted] Although the conference will concentrate on issues [redacted] directly affecting regional workers, we expect it will also endorse Soviet and Cuban propaganda themes such as disarmament for development and cancellation of Third World debt. [redacted]</p>	25X1
		25X1
		25X1
23-27 June	<p>World Congress of Women and Ninth Congress of Women’s International Democratic Federation (WIDF), Moscow. With the theme “Toward 2000—without nuclear weapons! For peace, equality, development,” this major propaganda effort—sponsored by the Soviet-controlled WIDF—is intended to give the appearance of being a continuation of the 1985 UN-sponsored Conference on Women in Nairobi. [redacted]</p>	25X1

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Calendar of Key Events, 1987

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26-28 June

International Symposium To Consider the Effect of the 1978 UNESCO Declaration on the Media, Finland. Although described as a UNESCO event, this conference is sponsored by the International Organization of Journalists (IOJ), a Soviet front. The IOJ and other pro-Soviet groups probably will use it to try to legitimize the idea of government control of the media. [redacted]

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July

Meeting of the Disarmament Commission of the World Peace Council, Tokyo. The first official WPC conference in Japan, it will be used to look for ways to generate anti-US publicity on the 42nd anniversaries of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, [redacted]. [redacted] The involvement of the Japanese Peace Committee, a front of the Japanese Communist Party (JCP), in the conference indicates that Soviet cultivation of the JCP over the past two years is reaping benefits. [redacted]

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15-22 July

International Week of Solidarity With Cyprus. Sponsored by the WPC, this observance will seek to stir up support for Soviet proposals on Cyprus, particularly Moscow's call for an international peace conference under UN auspices. Given that Dr. Vassos Lyssarides, President of the Cypriot House of Representatives, is a Vice President of the Soviet-directed Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) and the head of the local affiliate, AAPSO probably will give it high priority as well. Outside of Cyprus, Greece is likely to be a focal point for activities, with the Greek Committee for International Detente and Peace, a front of the pro-Soviet Greek Communist Party, taking the lead there. [redacted]

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6 August

Presentation of the People's Appeal for Peace, New York, Moscow, and Washington. The Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace controls this petition campaign aimed at gathering millions of signatures on a document supporting Soviet arms control positions. The sponsors hope to present the petition to President Reagan, General Secretary Gorbachev, and UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar on the anniversary of Hiroshima. [redacted]

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24 August-
11 September

Conference on the Relationship Between Disarmament and Development, New York. This UN-sponsored conference will address a favorite Soviet and Third World theme—a supposed link between the arms race and Third World poverty. Originally scheduled for Paris, the United Nations changed the venue to New York in hopes of prompting US participation. [redacted]

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Calendar of Key Events, 1987

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7-11 September

International Conference on the Question of Palestine, Vienna. The International Coordinating Committee on Palestine (ICCP), a Geneva-based affiliate of the World Peace Council, is sponsoring this meeting and a series of regional seminars that will precede it. The Palestinian question will be a major Soviet propaganda target in 1987, the 40th anniversary of the UN partition of Palestine.

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November

Third European Congress of IPPNW, Prague. According to Czech organizers of the meeting, the agenda will include discussion of the establishment of nuclear-free zones and ways to achieve more effective cooperation among IPPNW's members. The congress will probably give a further push to growing cooperation between the East European and the West European national affiliates, which are among the most active in the organization.

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