




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
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National Intelligence Daily

**Saturday
25 July 1987**



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


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


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Contact mine



Persian Gulf Developments, 24 July 1987



Tehran has made contingency plans and trained personnel for mining operations in the Persian Gulf since early in the Iran-Iraq war. It probably has between 500 and 1,000 moored contact mines—each filled with more than 250 pounds of explosive—and some smaller limpet mines that are attached to ships by frogmen. The contact mines could be dropped from helicopters, warships, or by speedboats and fishing dhows. The small boats could secretly mine the channel the Bridgeton was following and the Mina al Ahmadi channel near Kuwait where at least nine mines were found last month.

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
PERSIAN GULF: Sea Mine Incident

~~**The mine attack on the reflagged tanker Bridgeton will reinforce Iran's conviction that it can frustrate the US escort program and eventually drive the US out of the Persian Gulf.**~~ 

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Iran has not directly claimed responsibility for the mine attack, but Assembly Speaker Rafsanjani's announcement of the mine incident to a large group of Iranians generated thunderous applause, according to Iranian press reports. Iranian Prime Minister Musavi-Khamenei asserted that "it was not the Kuwaiti tanker which hit a mine today, but rather US credibility has been damaged by the explosion." 

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Rafsanjani added that Iran will now attack economic targets of the Arab states of the Gulf allied with Baghdad in retaliation for Iraqi attacks on Iranian economic targets. 

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
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Comment: ~~Iran probably expects a limited US response to the mine attack but is unlikely to be deterred from continuing its activities to end the US presence in the Gulf. The Iranian leaders' statements are intended to increase the fears of Gulf states about an expanded conflict and fan concern in the US about the wisdom of the escort program.~~ 

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The success of the mine attack will encourage Iran to lay more mines randomly along shipping lanes to harass convoys. Mine-clearing operations may slow the progress of the convoys and make them more vulnerable to attack by small boats. The depth of the moored contact mine struck by the Bridgeton—about 24 feet (7.5 meters)—suggests Iran may be targeting the tankers ~~instead of US escorts, which have a much shallower draft.~~ 

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
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AFGHANISTAN:

No Letup in Resistance Activity




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The Afghan resistance, despite four major Soviet-Afghan operations in the last two months to interdict insurgent logistic routes and clear guerrilla-dominated areas, is maintaining heavy military pressure throughout the country—including areas in which traditionally there is little activity.



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The major Soviet-Afghan sweep operations in Paktia and Vardak Provinces, which ended in mid-June and mid-July, respectively, did little to reduce insurgent activity in the east.




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~~joint Soviet-Afghan operation is under way at the Sarowbi Dam, following insurgent attacks on road security posts and electric pylons located along the Kabul-Jalalabad road.~~




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Comment: The resistance traditionally takes the initiative in late spring or early summer. Therefore, the recent insurgent activity almost certainly means that Soviet and Afghan forces were unsuccessful in significantly reducing the flow of men and materiel into Afghanistan.



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The level of fighting in central Afghanistan—which usually sees little activity—indicates that the insurgents are well armed and supplied and that the chronic intra-Shia factionalism may be declining.



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Resistance activity almost certainly will remain high throughout the summer and early fall.



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LEBANON:

Christian Militants Gaining Strength

Samir Jaja, leader of the Christian Lebanese Forces militia, is expanding his influence in the Christian enclave and threatening to move against President Gemayel. [Redacted]

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~~A struggle to sway the balance of power is being played out in the Lebanese Armed Forces' Christian units. The Lebanese Forces militia is increasing its efforts to recruit Christian Army officers either to work directly with the militia or to remain neutral in the event of a conflict.~~ [Redacted] The Lebanese Forces are planning to oust Gemayel if he negotiates with Syria, possibly in September, according to Lebanese press reports. [Redacted]

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The Lebanese Forces have successfully portrayed Jaja as the most dynamic leader in the Christian community. ~~According to the US Embassy.~~ Little has been done to dispel the widespread opinion that the Lebanese Forces were responsible for the assassination of the late Prime Minister Karami. ~~The Embassy reports~~ Christian militia-controlled media are emphasizing the militia's growing involvement in public administration of the Christian enclave. [Redacted]

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on 24 July

In recent weeks, Jaja has stepped up his challenges to the government. Press reports indicate clashes between Jaja and Gemayel supporters erupted ~~yesterday~~ northeast of Beirut. Jaja has also publicly called for a government independent of Syrian dictates. ~~According to the Embassy,~~ he is strong-arming parliamentary support for a government more sympathetic to the militant Christian viewpoint. [Redacted]

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Comment: Until recently, Gemayel and Jaja have had a partnership of convenience against Syrian influence, but Jaja now seems determined to achieve preeminence in the Christian community. The timing of this challenge is closely linked to the 1988 presidential campaign and to the efforts of Christian hardliners to deal from a position of strength. ~~Jaja probably also believes he needs to take drastic initiatives before his many enemies move to assassinate him.~~ [Redacted]

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The Lebanese Armed Forces have played a critical role in maintaining a balance between the competing Christian forces. Although Commander Aoun is likely to continue supporting the President, the militant rhetoric of the Lebanese Forces appears to be gaining favor among the lower ranks; and their support in a confrontation is questionable. [Redacted]

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
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Major Sabotage Incidents, 1987



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PAKISTAN:

Political Fallout From Bombings

Despite calling up the Army and imposing a curfew this week, unrest broke out again yesterday in Karachi. KHAD, the Afghan intelligence service, is likely to continue its terrorist campaign that has sparked the Pakistani unrest.

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Rioting erupted again yesterday in Karachi, leaving 15 dead and more than 55 wounded. Earlier, protests over the bombings on 14 July, which killed 73 people, quickly turned into ethnic clashes and antigovernment riots. The Army was ordered into troubled neighborhoods and a 24-hour curfew was imposed Wednesday in response to charges that the government could not maintain law and order.

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Islamabad has ordered all foreigners and landlords with foreign tenants to register with the police, ~~according to the US Consulate in Karachi~~. Requirements for obtaining national identification cards have been tightened, and the government may try to move all refugees outside the city.

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~~Officials in the Ministry of Interior believe the poorly trained and equipped police are outmatched by KHAD saboteurs,~~

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Well-trained KHAD agents have been infiltrating Pakistan for at least two years and presumably are well equipped. Islamabad has set up new training programs for the police, created special tribunals to try terrorism cases quickly, and sought to raise security awareness.

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Comment: The bombings are likely to continue. ~~Police in Lahore discovered a bomb on 17 July outside the main bazaar; the next day border police in Baluchistan arrested an Afghan on a motorcycle packed with explosives. KHAD's strategy of targeting crowded public areas suggests there could be a succession of high-profile terrorist incidents.~~

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Key Pakistani officials are concerned that domestic political support for their Afghan policy may erode if the bombings continue, although there is no sign that Islamabad will alter its position soon. It may consider compromising with Kabul and Moscow on a successor Afghan regime and withdrawal timetable if opposition to the government's Afghan policy becomes widespread over the next year. ~~Islamabad is likely to use the threat of growing instability to try to forestall any cutoff of US aid in reaction to developments relating to Pakistan's nuclear program.~~

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ISRAEL-EGYPT: Results of Abdel Meguid Visit

Egyptian Foreign Minister Abdel Meguid's visit to Israel this week—the first in five years—probably was intended to demonstrate Cairo's resolve to move the peace process forward. The press says Abdel Meguid expressed Egypt's continuing interest in holding an international conference and hinted that Cairo might accept non-PLO Palestinians within a Jordanian delegation. Israeli Prime Minister Shamir reiterated his well-known opposition to an international conference, while Foreign Minister Peres noted his continuing support for one as a means to direct Israeli-Arab negotiations. According to US Embassy reporting, Israeli officials did not press for a quick resolution of disputed bilateral issues, including obstacles to increased trade and monetary compensation for the families of seven Israelis killed at a tourist site in Egypt last year [Redacted]

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Comment: Egyptian officials probably expected Shamir and Peres to disagree over peace negotiation strategy, but they may have been surprised by Israel's low-key stance on bilateral problems. Shamir probably hopes to cultivate a personal relationship with Egyptian officials to facilitate a future summit with President Mubarak. He may also hope his moderation will improve his image inside Israel as a leader with international credibility. [Redacted]

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LIBYA-BRAZIL: Possible Missile Agreement

Brazilian industrialists signed a preliminary agreement with Libya in March for the coproduction, in Libya, of a mobile, surface-to-surface missile, [redacted] The solid-propellant missile— a derivative of Brazil's Sonda III rocket—will be inertially guided and will carry a 450-kilogram warhead to a range of 40 to 100 kilometers. [redacted] 25X1

Comment: The Brazilians are seeking funding for the missile, which is still under development. Libya's unreliability in past coproduction agreements may prevent this agreement from progressing beyond the negotiation phase and could at least delay any Libyan production well past the missile's initial availability in Brazil. In any case, the missile probably will be unavailable to Libya before the early 1990s. Technology transfer, which would also benefit Libya's indigenous ballistic missile program, is not likely without Brasilia's authorization and probably will be the subject of future negotiations. Tripoli's ongoing missile projects are continuing with assistance from West German engineers and Poland. Libyan leader Qadhafi may be turning to Brazil to diversify suppliers should Bonn's investigations threaten Tripoli's relationship with West German firms. [redacted] 25X1

[redacted]

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BRAZIL-IRAQ: Tank Sale

[redacted] 25X1
[redacted] 25X1

Iraq has ordered from Brazil 300 Osorio main battle tanks armed with a 105-mm gun, [redacted] 25X1
Delivery schedules for the tanks—worth at least \$400 million—were not reported. Brazil is also pursuing sales of Osorio tanks with Saudi Arabia, which is currently putting the tank through a second round of trials. [redacted] 25X1

[redacted]

Comment: The order has not been confirmed but if realized will be a boost for the Brazilian arms industry, which has been touting the Osorio for two years in an effort to market advanced weapons and increase and diversify its arms exports. ~~The Brazilians probably offered Iraq attractive unit prices, concessionary financing, and to accept payment in oil, in order to effect the sale.~~ Iraq has a large inventory of tanks already, and the addition of the Osorios will only marginally improve its armor forces. Deliveries are at least a year away because the tank is not yet in production. [redacted] 25X1

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USSR: Commission To Study Tatar Demands

TASS reported yesterday that Moscow has established a commission headed by President Gromyko to study the status of ethnic Tatars who were banished from the Crimea by Stalin in 1944 and who are agitating for resettlement. The communique reiterated charges that Tatars had collaborated with the Nazis during World War II but acknowledged that the entire national group had been unjustly punished. Approximately 600 Tatars demonstrated during the afternoon outside the Kremlin wall, ~~According to US diplomats,~~ Tatar activists told journalists that the regime's latest concessions were reminiscent of steps taken 20 years ago; they warned that demonstrations would continue unless General Secretary Gorbachev met with them.

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Comment: The leadership apparently hopes that this move will defuse the potential for disorder that underlies the Tatars' well-organized demonstrations. The activists' dissatisfaction with the communique, especially its perpetuation of the "myth" of collaboration and the lack of a Tatar on the commission, suggests that demonstrations will probably occur in Moscow and Central Asia—where the majority of Tatars live. The regime, however, may be more concerned that a more conciliatory approach would encourage unacceptable demands by other dissidents.

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BULGARIA: Ethnic Turks Incident

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Disgruntled ethnic Turks—not common criminals, as Sofia has publicly maintained—were responsible for a bombing at a Black Sea resort earlier this month. The only other available account, an official Bulgarian announcement, said the perpetrators were overpowered by security forces after taking two children hostage and exploding grenades. Sofia reportedly instructed its missions to deny involvement by ethnic Turks and that they demanded free passage to Turkey and restored rights for Bulgarian Turks. The focus of the Turks' concerns was a three-year-old assimilation campaign—intended to integrate the large, fast-growing minority—that has included forced Bulgarization of names, mosque closings, and prohibitions on the teaching of Turkish in schools.

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Bulgarian leader Zhivkov will remain intransigent on Turkish assimilation regardless of US and Soviet pressure—a position echoed by Deputy Foreign Minister Gotsev in a recent US visit.

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Comment: This bombing, the first reported ethnic Turkish violence in more than two years, probably is an isolated incident but might spark additional attacks, particularly if the Turks become more organized. Further violence and resulting government repression would be likely to hamper improved relations with the US, irritate Moscow, and undermine Bulgaria's attempts to further pan-Balkan cooperation.

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In Brief

[Redacted]

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Terrorism

[Redacted]

Motives of **Lebanese** Shia hijacker of Air Afrique plane still unclear . . . **Swiss** believe he acted alone or with small group, probably related to **Iran-France** tensions . . . press links it to bid for Hammadi's release by **West Germany** [Redacted]

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East Asia

[Redacted]

Philippine military on high alert against possible violence timed to opening of new Congress Monday . . . police believe extremists from left and right may try to embarrass government . . . suspect weapons entering Manila. [Redacted]

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Americas

[Redacted]

Cuban President Castro giving "Rebellion Day" anniversary speech tomorrow in Artemisa, near Havana, according to press . . . likely to focus on austerity, anticorruption drives . . . may touch on alleged **US** spying. [Redacted]

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South Asia

[Redacted]

on 24 July
India ~~yesterday~~ brought Tamil insurgent leaders to New Delhi to approve accord with Colombo, reports press . . . Gandhi may believe he can hold both sides to commitments . . . **Sri Lanka's** Jayewardene must still persuade domestic Sinhalese. [Redacted]

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Middle East

[Redacted]

Kuwaiti Defense Minister reportedly traveling to Moscow Tuesday . . . probably will discuss arms purchases, including BMP-2 armored personnel carrier . . . [Redacted]

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Africa

[Redacted]

Zimbabwe has issued directives to cut imports from **South Africa**, preparing to restrict exports, ~~says US Embassy~~ . . . President's impulsive reaction to Frontline States refusal to impose sanctions . . . will compound Zimbabwean economic problems. [Redacted]

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Special Analysis

WESTERN EUROPE: Limited Persian Gulf Involvement

The US reflagging program has not prompted any change in Allied public policy toward merchant shipping in the Persian Gulf, although the French may be reassessing their options.



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Paris is fine-tuning its public statements about its policy of not escorting merchant ships in the Gulf. France has warned its commercial fleet against entering the Gulf, and French Navy officials reiterated to the [redacted] this week that their warships will not escort merchant ships. [redacted]

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Defense Minister Giraud subsequently announced the Navy would "accompany" a tanker scheduled to enter the Gulf this week. He made a distinction between "escorting"—which he defined as a defensive position—and "accompanying"—which he said could have medical or technical aspects. Meanwhile, the French commander on the scene told US Navy officers on Wednesday that one frigate would "escort" a French tanker out of the area while the other would "escort" the ship that was hit last week as it makes its way out of the Gulf. [redacted]

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Paris undoubtedly feels obligated to do something to help ships that were already in the Gulf or en route there before the announcement that French ships plying the Gulf will now do so at their own risk. It evidently is unwilling to define its role as "escorting," however, not only to avoid any linking of its efforts to those of the US but also because it believes the term implies guaranteeing the safety of merchant ships. "Accompanying," on the other hand, might only involve assisting ships under attack, already part of Paris's avowed policy. [redacted]

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The French Navy's presence in the Gulf has increased slightly since a French merchant ship was attacked last week. Three frigates plus the auxiliary that serves as the Indian Ocean flagship are in or near the Gulf, according to US Navy sources. They normally operate in the Strait of Hormuz and the southern Gulf, calling occasionally as far north as Bahrain [redacted]

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Giraud announced Wednesday that a destroyer would be added to the French presence. The ship is equipped to receive AWACS data; it left France on Wednesday and is scheduled to arrive in the Gulf early next month, [redacted] The destroyer will be able

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to defend itself more effectively than the frigates against air attack, and its presence will enhance French command and control capabilities. It will not, however, expand significantly French capabilities to escort merchant ships effectively.




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UK

The Royal Navy's Armilla Patrol consists of a destroyer and two frigates; two ships are routinely on station. The destroyer's medium-range surface-to-air missile system and the frigates' point defense systems provide a reasonably effective defense against cruise missile attacks when combined with electronic countermeasures.



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London has said that Kuwaiti ships could apply for registration in Britain, but these applications would be considered on a case-by-case basis if routine legal procedures are observed. Such a move would not automatically provide British protection, but London may imply to the Kuwaitis that these ships would be covered by the current policy of protecting British-flagged ships if a British warship is in the area.




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The Netherlands and Italy

The Hague has decided against any role in protecting maritime traffic in the Gulf outside of a UN-sponsored peacekeeping effort, although the Netherlands Navy favors establishing a presence in the region. Italian officials have reacted negatively to past US suggestions of an increased Allied presence in the Gulf, and the period of uncertainty surrounding the formation of a new government in Rome is likely to preclude any change in Italian policy for now.



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Hungary



Janos Kadar

Communist Party leader Janos Kadar's hold on the reins of power has loosened in recent years, and the disarray in the party may reflect his growing disengagement from day-to-day decision-making. Kadar, age 75, takes monthlong vacations three times a year and is totally out of touch with party affairs during those periods. Rumors that his health is worsening probably stem from the general perception that his grasp on power has weakened as well as from some physical decline. Perhaps in an effort to dispel that perception and assert his authority, he made a strongly worded speech this week supporting economic reforms and calling for firing managers who do not implement them. At the same time, Kadar conceded that Hungarians face tough times ahead as the regime institutes austerity measures.

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Special Analysis

HUNGARY:

Communist Party in the Doldrums

The Hungarian Communist Party is finding it increasingly difficult to enforce its decisions and manage the flow of events as a result of dwindling popular respect and a serious lack of internal discipline. This situation will be especially troublesome in the next year if the regime implements recently approved austerity and reform measures that will reduce the standard of living further.

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~~Senior Hungarian social researchers believe grassroots support for the party is virtually nonexistent, [redacted] Recruitment of workers, young people, scientists, and artists is declining despite increased efforts by the party, [redacted]~~

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~~These groups formed the core of the revolt in 1956, and party leader Kadar's initial success in winning a degree of passive support from them has recently been eclipsed by persistent poor economic performance. Even workers in heavy industry who traditionally support the party have begun to voice disillusion and anger over the party's handling of the economy, according to the US Embassy, [redacted]~~

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~~The party rank and file also has morale problems. Party officials openly complain their work is "formal and empty," that a "large group" of party members refuse to help implement party decisions, and that many actually work against their implementation. At the local level, party groups on average meet about twice a year, and many of the meetings lack a quorum, [redacted] Articles in party publications often chide party members for avoiding debate during such meetings and for criticizing party policy at the workplace.~~

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Opposition at the County Level

~~Relations between the national apparatus, home to most of the party's reform-minded officials, and local party organizations are particularly bad. County party leaders are increasingly independent and are the major stumblingblock to economic reform, [redacted] After a conference of party officials last February, for example, a Central Committee staff member expressed surprise over the orthodoxy of regional officials and their lack of sophistication, according to the Embassy. Many local officials expressed serious reservations about General Secretary Gorbachev's program and reforms in Hungary. [redacted]~~

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[redacted] Local party leaders often join with enterprise directors—many of whom are also powerful party members—to oppose reform initiatives from Budapest that they fear would cause local economic and social dislocation. ~~US Embassy officers on a recent trip outside Budapest found that all~~ enterprise managers ~~they met~~ said they could not do without state subsidies to keep their inefficient plants running. One went so far as to say he was “wary” and “suspicious” of the latest reforms, like closing down money-losing enterprises and a tax reform that would increase incentives in the factory for productivity and efficiency. [redacted] 25X1

Outlook

Widespread opposition will make it difficult to implement the austerity and reform measures the Central Committee announced earlier this month. To the extent these measures do get implemented, they will further alienate local functionaries by threatening their authority and their sinecures. An exchange of party membership cards will occur over the next year, giving Budapest the opportunity to weed out some opponents, and party leader Kadar has publicly expressed his determination to replace officials unwilling to go along with his policies. A massive purge, however, would leave the party under strength and unable to fill vacancies with reliable people. [redacted] 25X1

The party, in any event, appears unprepared to deal with a major increase in public discontent of the sort that might occur if the regime carries out its austerity and reform plans. The regime may have no choice but to rely on the increased use of police coercion to maintain its authority. [redacted] 25X1

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
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Special Analysis

NICARAGUA:

Insurgent Strategy and Tactics



The Nicaraguan insurgents continue to emphasize road ambushes, destruction of lightly defended economic targets such as power poles and military associated-agricultural cooperatives, and occasional larger attacks on military bases. They are not challenging government control directly over any areas nor engaging in pitched battles with Sandinista military forces. Nevertheless, by continuously expanding the area of conflict, attacking harder targets, and forcing the regime to defend multiple fronts simultaneously, the strategy appears to be gradually wearing down government morale and stretching its resources.



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
Guerrilla Targets

~~Rebel commanders choose targets based on visibility rather than military significance,~~ [Redacted] The guerrillas apparently believe that disrupting electrical power and burning agricultural cooperatives defended by Army and militia units demonstrate the viability of the insurgency to the population, unlike attacks on isolated military garrisons, which can be ignored by the government-controlled press. Targeting cooperatives sometimes results in bad publicity, however, when civilians are killed. [Redacted]

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
Impact on Sandinista Forces




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The Sandinista regime remains in political and military control of every administrative jurisdiction, but the rebels, by avoiding pitched battles and letting war weariness erode Sandinista morale, appear to be having some success.

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What Next

The insurgents probably hope that more widespread and frequent attacks will eventually push Sandinista military resources close to the breaking point, forcing the regime to concentrate on defending key areas and to abandon some territory to rebel control. Insurgent strategists may calculate that from such safehavens they could launch raids into the heavily populated Pacific heartland and thereby undercut popular confidence in the regime. Such developments, although not likely to occur soon, would boost the guerrillas' credibility and might win them some international recognition.

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