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USSR Review



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November-December 1985

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USSR Review

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Selected elements of Soviet forces in Central Europe—especially tank battalions, air combat squadrons, and air defense and surface-to-surface missile units—are kept in a relatively high state of readiness and could fight effectively on short notice. The bulk of the forces are kept at reduced strength and would need several weeks to bring in additional manpower and make other preparations needed to prosecute large-scale offensive operations. This posture reflects peacetime economic and manpower constraints, but also recognizes that NATO too would require weeks of preparation to reach a war footing. It is a posture suited to Soviet political and strategic needs: it helps to ensure the conformity of the East European satellites; it presents a continuing, strong military threat to NATO; and it helps to sustain a military strategy of keeping the likely arena of any future East-West conflict as far as possible from Soviet territory.		25X1
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Soviet strategy for war against NATO stresses the military principle of mass. To achieve mass, the Soviets maintain a very large force structure, most of which is at reduced manning, backed by a mobilization system designed to flesh out the structure quickly when war is imminent. The Soviets' current force concentrations, logistic preparations, and command and control systems indicate that they consider protracted conventional operations more likely than the brief conventional prelude to nuclear war that they formerly anticipated. Nevertheless, their deployments also provide a hedge against nuclear warfare or unreliability on the part of their Warsaw Pact allies.		25X1
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[Redacted]

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Readiness of Soviet Ground Forces in Central Europe [Redacted]

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Soviet military planners expect hostilities with NATO to be preceded by a period of tension that would allow sufficient time for a deliberate, phased preparation of forces. Consequently, they have adopted a concept of readiness that permits them to keep their ground forces in Central Europe manned well below intended wartime strength. The equipment holdings of these forces and the well-stocked Soviet logistic base in the region would ensure the immediate availability of major weapons and stocks, but at least two weeks would be needed to bring in the additional 100,000 soldiers required to begin a large-scale offensive. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Readiness of Soviet Air Forces in Central Europe [Redacted]

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The Soviets maintain large air forces in Central Europe that, even in peacetime, are equipped, trained, and positioned to mount a substantial defense within hours. To bring these forces to a wartime posture would require adding at least 18,000 men to the peacetime assigned strength of some 47,000 men. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Other Topics

[Redacted]

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Gorbachev's Antialcohol Program [Redacted]

27

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The antialcohol campaign is sharply reducing alcohol sales and public drinking. Although almost everyone favors eliminating the worst alcohol abuses, many reportedly believe the campaign is moving too far too fast. If the campaign succeeds, it will benefit the economy and strengthen General Secretary Gorbachev politically; failure could damage his reputation for tough and effective leadership. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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The Soviet Computer Literacy Program: Industrial Constraints [Redacted] 31

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In March 1985, the Politburo endorsed a program to provide up to 10 million personal computers to secondary and vocational schools over the next decade. The decision is part of an overall plan to increase computer literacy and thereby accelerate scientific and technical progress and spur development of high-technology industries. Although technical and political problems are likely to frustrate the program for the first few years, the long-term promise for the development and modernization of Soviet industry is considerable.

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[Redacted]

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Stalin's Ghost in Contemporary Soviet Politics [Redacted] 35

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After 30 years, the assessment of Joseph Stalin's historical role remains a controversial and highly charged political issue with the Soviet leadership and other elites attempting to manipulate the Stalin symbol for their own purposes. Gorbachev has adopted a differentiated approach to the matter—praising Stalin's highly centralized and disciplined economic system while resisting any broader rehabilitation. There are some signs he may favor a limited relaxation of Stalinist strictures on cultural life and on intraparty policy discussions while tightening the screws on overt dissidents.

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[Redacted]

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Viewpoint **What Constitutes Soviet Economic Reform?** [Redacted] 41

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Any analysis of changes in the Soviet economy must distinguish between genuine economic reform and mere tinkering that does not involve fundamental systemic change. In the author's view, true economic reform would require abandoning or drastically modifying the three basic elements of the economic system—administrative pricing, central planning, and large-scale party intervention.

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Assessing Soviet Economic Change:

45

Obstacles to Objective Analysis [Redacted]

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Analyses of prospects for Soviet economic change may be weakened by definitional problems, value judgments, and faulty comparisons. Unclear or careless use of the word *reform* sometimes encourages discussion of false issues. Similarly, using efficiency as the criterion for assessing economic systems promotes one-sided analysis that ignores political and social goals. Furthermore, comparing an operating planned economy with an abstract idealization of a market system may cloud insight on where the Soviet economy is headed.

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Soviet Theater Forces in Central Europe: Readiness for War



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Perspective



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Soviet forces in Central Europe are manned in peacetime at considerably less than full strength and would have to be filled out by a substantial number of men to be fully capable of offensive operations. In determining the organization and manning of these forces, the Soviets have carefully tailored their readiness to fulfill three needs:

- To guard against a sudden attack.
- To ensure that order and obedience are maintained in Eastern Europe.
- To provide the core of the forces that would be required for an offensive operation against NATO forces.



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The Soviets approach readiness from the viewpoint of a continental power that throughout its history has defeated its enemies by mobilizing numerically superior forces and by outlasting its opponents. From the experiences of World War II came a resolve that any future war would be fought on enemy—not Soviet—territory. Victory in that war gave the Soviets a buffer zone—Eastern Europe—between their homeland and their most powerful opponent, NATO. This buffer zone enables the Soviets to take an economical approach to readiness without incurring what they would regard as undue risks to the security of the USSR. Moreover, their organization and strategy are focused on the offensive. In the event of war, they would—once their forces were fully mobilized—launch an all-out offensive operation designed to achieve a decisive defeat of NATO forces.



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Because the Soviets view mass as the most important of the principles of war, they must provide for large ground forces. They could not, however, maintain at full strength in peacetime the forces that they evidently believe would be necessary to fight NATO. To do so would place an unacceptable burden on their economy, consuming far too large a portion of their

available manpower. They have chosen, therefore, to maintain and equip a very large force structure that provides a framework for rapid mobilization, but they limit its cost by keeping much of it at reduced manning. [redacted]

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The Soviets classify their divisions as "ready" or "not ready." Ready divisions (about 40 percent of the force) have more than 50 percent of the personnel required for wartime and have full sets of equipment. Most of the ready divisions are opposite the Central Region of NATO's Allied Command Europe and China. The highest manning levels are in their 26 divisions in Central Europe, which have about 80 to 85 percent of the personnel that would be required for full mobilization. Not-ready divisions are manned at less than 50 percent of full strength and often have shortages of support equipment and armored personnel carriers. [redacted]

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Soviet training is designed for economic support of a large force structure that would be brought to full strength on mobilization. The semiannual conscription of about a million 18-year-olds, who serve two years (three years in the Navy), provides a large pool of reservists. Training for conscripts, however, is narrowly focused on the specific duties of their positions, and most reservists are called up for training only infrequently. The training programs conducted in the divisions vary with the manning level. Ready divisions conduct a relatively full training program including field exercises up to division level, but training in not-ready divisions is rarely conducted above battalion or company level. [redacted]

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The Soviets follow maintenance practices that conform to their general approach to readiness. Their units operate under strict limitations on usage of vehicles and equipment and on fuel consumption. Many vehicles are kept in storage, and much small-scale training is conducted with separate sets of equipment to reduce wear and tear on units' combat equipment. These practices are designed to reduce overall maintenance costs as well as to prolong the service life of most of the equipment and keep it ready to use upon mobilization. Units of ready divisions use their combat equipment occasionally for large-scale training and exercises but return much of it to short-term storage when it is not in use. Not-ready divisions keep most of their equipment in storage. [redacted]

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The two-tiered readiness system effectively creates two armies: a well-trained and well-equipped force ready for early commitment and a much larger reserve force not immediately ready to fight but providing massive combat potential in the event of prolonged hostilities. Ready units are expected to be able to mount at least emergency defensive operations at any time. Tank battalions, tactical nuclear missile units, and air defense units are kept at relatively high manning levels and are more capable than most other units of immediate combat action. To prepare all Soviet forces

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in Central Europe thoroughly for offensive operations, however, would require several weeks. According to analysis of Soviet mobilization exercises and emigre statements, not-ready units in the western USSR are considered by Soviet planners to be incapable of offensive operations without longer periods of preparation—including mobilization and post-mobilization training—that could extend to a month or more. [redacted] 25X1

As with the ground forces, the Soviets cannot afford to keep their entire air forces at peak readiness. Combat regiments in Central Europe are well manned with trained pilots. Defensive air units could respond immediately to an attack, but offensive operations would require mobilization of at least 18,000 men. Logistic and command and control preparations that would be needed for a major offensive air operation against NATO could take about two weeks. [redacted] 25X1

The Soviets' "economy of force" approach to readiness is based on a longstanding assessment that war would most likely occur only after a period of increasing political tensions that would give the USSR ample time to mobilize its forces. In their view, their potential enemies—including NATO—are not on a war footing and would require substantial time to mobilize forces for an attack against the USSR and its allies. Thus, in Eastern Europe, the Soviets evidently are content to keep their forces at readiness levels that they believe guard against a surprise move by unreinforced NATO forces. (They follow the same approach with their strategic offensive forces, guarding against a surprise attack with their Strategic Rocket Forces while keeping their SSBN and intercontinental bomber forces at lower readiness.) [redacted] 25X1

The East European forces follow the Soviet model but are generally less well equipped and—except for the East German forces—are less well trained and kept at lower readiness than the Soviet forces in Central Europe. The Combined Command of the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact—headed by Marshal of the Soviet Union V. G. Kulikov—provides an official alliance structure through which the Soviets set standards for organization, equipment, training, and maintenance and monitor their allies' performance. [redacted] 25X1

The readiness of the theater nuclear forces opposite NATO follows the same pattern observed for the general purpose forces. Until recently no nuclear forces in Eastern Europe were kept on alert, even though US forces opposite them have kept some missiles and aircraft on quick-reaction alert for years. The Soviets evidently relied on their SS-20 IRBMs (and, earlier, a portion of their SS-11 ICBMs) to fill this role. In a declared response to the arrival of the US Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles in

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Western Europe, however, the Soviets moved three brigades of SS-12 Scaleboard missiles to Central Europe, and apparently now keep a portion of them on alert. [redacted]

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Among Soviet forces in Central Europe, the general trend of the past several years—a gradual increase in force structure accompanied by a decrease in readiness of combat and support units—is likely to continue through the 1980s. To improve their capability to conduct prolonged conventional operations, the Soviets have been increasing the size of some units, adding others, and making large increases in their forward stocks of fuel and ammunition. This expansion in structure and stocks, however, has not been accompanied by an increase in personnel; and, as a consequence, the overall level of manning—and readiness for offensive operations—has gradually declined. The Soviets are attempting to compensate somewhat for this with an improved training program designed to lessen the large seasonal fluctuation in overall readiness that results from their semiannual troop rotation. [redacted]

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The increase in force structure and logistic support for a campaign in Central Europe has been accompanied by improvements in the command structure. Soviet military writers—most notably Marshal Ogarkov—have stressed the need to think and plan at the theater level. Probably in response to this need and to a longstanding requirement to have all levels of the wartime command structure operational in peacetime, the Soviets in 1984 activated theater-level commands for their forces opposite the Central and Southern Regions of Allied Command Europe. These commands would also control the East European forces operating against NATO in wartime. Creation of these theater-level commands puts into place the commanders and staffs who would plan and direct the mobilization, deployment, and operations of forces opposite NATO. [redacted]

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Soviet Strategy for War Against NATO: Basis and Evolution []

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Serious innovations in military affairs, playing the decisive role they do in the fortunes of a state, must be introduced with extreme caution.

M. V. Frunze

Warsaw Pact strategy for war against NATO relies on the Soviet principle of "mass," the application of overwhelming numbers, as it has evolved in reaction to Soviet experience in World War II, the advent of nuclear weapons, and current Soviet perceptions of the threat from NATO. While the fundamental purpose served by the strategy is to ensure the defense of the homeland, the Soviets have consistently emphasized offensive operations as the means to achieve that objective. []

Military Doctrine

Soviet writings and the structure of the USSR's armed forces clearly show that the Soviets continue to view themselves as primarily a land power encircled by hostile peoples. Situated between Europe and Asia, part of both yet belonging to neither, the Russians have sought expansion in both directions. Their history of invasion and counterinvasion over centuries has ingrained a sense of encirclement in the psychology of the Russian people and the Soviet state. That paranoia, combined with an offensive military philosophy and powerful nuclear-armed forces, has produced a dangerous adversary. []

The absence of natural defensive barriers has forced the Russians to emphasize the principle of mass as the foundation of their military doctrine. The most militarily significant attribute of the Russian topography was its expanse, on which the Russians capitalized to provide strategic depth. They complemented that depth with another natural resource available to them—a huge population capable of sustaining a large field army. The size of the Russian Army has been a historically consistent threat to weaker neighbors. Denied access to the sea and, therefore, to their enemies' flanks, the Russians concentrated on using

large numbers of men directly against their opponents. The advent of such technological developments as the increased firepower of World War I, the mechanization of World War II, and now the potentially decisive use of nuclear weapons has changed the ways in which mass may be applied. The Soviets' reaction has been to adjust their tactical and operational concepts but not to abandon their basic strategic principle. []

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World War II and Immediate Postwar Influences

Soviet faith in the principle of mass was confirmed in World War II, when over 400 divisions were needed to defeat Nazi Germany. Other principles, especially surprise, gained more attention after the Soviets suffered nearly total defeat when surprised by the initial German onslaught. The Soviets also found that they were unable to exert fully their manpower advantage because the qualitative gap between them and their opponent was too large. What high-quality equipment they had was not available in sufficient numbers. []

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At the end of the war, the Soviets retained a large active army deployed deep into Europe. The garrisoning of Eastern Europe provided a physical buffer to bear the brunt of future wars and mitigate the impact of another, potentially more destructive, surprise attack. Soviet troops could meet an attacker well to the west of Soviet borders. More important, the large Soviet force was in a position to threaten Western Europe directly. No longer separated behind the unpredictable and often hostile nations of Eastern Europe, the Soviets stood in mass directly on the border, astride the routes to the West. Even in peacetime, this presence provides benefits from the Soviet perspective. Intimidation of Western Europe is intended to advance the Soviets' policy interests and to validate their self-perception as the major European power. []

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Nuclear Weapons

The advent of nuclear weapons added new dimensions to the problems of war at the theater level, threatening the basic Soviet military principle of mass. Labeled "weapons of mass destruction" by the Soviets, nuclear weapons fielded in Europe by the United States negated the huge Soviet manpower advantage. They heightened concerns about surprise and readiness because war could begin quickly, with little or no warning, and initial operations could be both decisive and targeted on the Soviet Union proper. During the 1950s, as the Soviets acquired nuclear weapons of their own, their focus shifted. The Strategic Rocket Forces were created and gained ascendancy in Soviet perceptions of war with the West. Conventional forces were assigned the theater-level role of consolidating the victories ensured by the massive use of nuclear weapons. Since that time the Soviets have, in their own perception, at least matched the West's nuclear capabilities and thereby canceled the West's nuclear advantage. []

Checking the nuclear element returns the theater equation in the Soviet view to its traditional emphasis on conventional forces. In a recent book, Col. Gen. M. A. Gareyev illustrates the Soviet thinking behind the renewed emphasis on conventional war. Referring to Marshal Sokolovskiy's authoritative *Military Strategy*, Gareyev writes:

In the 1960s and 1970s the authors of this and many other books above all drew their conclusions from the fact that war, in all circumstances, would be waged with nuclear weapons, and military operations employing solely conventional means of destruction were envisaged only as a short episode at the beginning of the war. However, the perfecting and accumulating of nuclear missiles reached such proportions that the massive use of this weaponry in war could have catastrophic consequences for both sides. Added to this, in the armies of the NATO countries a furious program to improve conventional weapons is under way. The main thrust of this is on the development of highly accurate guided weapons approaching low-yield nuclear weapons in effectiveness. Under these conditions, according to Western statements, the possibility is growing of a comparatively protracted war with conventional weapons, above all with

weapons of high accuracy. Also the prospect of a nuclear war unleashed by the "imperialists" is not excluded. []

Despite the deterrent effect of nuclear parity, the Soviets recognize that their success in a nonnuclear offensive could provoke a nuclear response by NATO. Their doctrine prescribes a preemptive nuclear strike if they learn of NATO intentions to use nuclear weapons. Concurrently, they proclaim an apparently contradictory "no-first-strike" policy. They rationalize this seeming paradox by defining the nuclear period of war as beginning when the enemy decides to employ nuclear weapons rather than when the first one detonates. []

Current Strategic Concepts and Options

The Soviets currently maintain a large force of 30 divisions and 10,600 tanks in Eastern Europe, backed by significant reserves in the western USSR. In addition, they have encouraged the development of sizable East European forces—currently 55 divisions. Of these, 60 divisions—26 Soviet and 34 East European—are arrayed opposite NATO's Central Region. While the numbers are impressive, the Soviets also recognize that the effective application of mass is dependent on adequate quality. []

Soviet commanders and staffs continue to seek ways to assure high rates of advance and more responsive and effective integrated fire support. Reacting to NATO advances in ground and airborne antitank capabilities, the Soviets are reorganizing their ground forces units to protect and complement the tank. Their combat divisions are being restructured to provide commanders an array of mobile weapons with which to defeat NATO antiarmor forces. []

The overall quality of Soviet conventional forces, both ground and air, has improved markedly over the last decade. New weapons deployed include tanks, artillery, helicopters, and ground attack aircraft. The operational effectiveness of even high-quality equipment, however, is largely determined by the level and quality of training offered to the soldiers who employ it. The introduction of increasingly sophisticated

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weapons has resulted in novel Soviet training programs designed to allow crews to use their more capable weapons in a greater variety of complex tactical situations. [redacted]

Soviet manning levels, however, are below authorized wartime strengths. Almost 50,000 additional men would be required to reach intended wartime manning levels in the 26 Soviet divisions in Central Europe. In peacetime these divisions have about 270,000 men. Nondivisional units, which currently total 135,000, would require an additional 80,000 to 85,000 men, and possibly more. The East European armies that make up the remainder of the first strategic echelon are at generally lower readiness levels and would need to mobilize at least a half million men to ready for war. The Soviet forces in the western USSR that form the second strategic echelon currently number 300,000 men with 37 maneuver divisions. They would require an additional 500,000 men to mobilize. Together, nearly 1,130,000 men would have to be mobilized to bring the Western Theater to its authorized wartime strength. [redacted]

Strategic Surprise

The Soviets' only experience with a major transition to war occurred as a result of the German attack in 1941—and that was a disaster. Since that time they have relied on their manpower advantage, bolstered by their East European buffer, and a broad nuclear strike capability to deter or defeat an enemy attack. Protection against surprise implies great costs, and these the Soviets have largely endured at the expense of their civilian sector. [redacted]

Confident that their nuclear forces are an effective deterrent against a NATO “bolt from the blue” attack, the Soviets probably believe that standing NATO forces are too small to mount a conventional attack of decisive proportions. They would, therefore, expect a period of observable NATO preparations to provide warning of an attack. They probably believe that the reduced manning levels of their forces in Eastern Europe are adequate to ensure an effective defensive posture, as long as reserves can muster and deploy quickly enough to maintain a desired correlation of forces in the face of a NATO buildup. [redacted]

Readiness

In a 1979 article on Soviet military strategy, Col. Gen. V. N. Karpov wrote that “one of the principles of Soviet military strategy is the timely creation of strategic reserves as well as stocks of armament and other supplies, and their maintenance at the required level.” In fact, the Soviets have enough combat supplies in East Germany to support more than twice their current force there in the initial phase of a campaign against NATO. This is the result of a substantial expansion of the Soviet logistic structure in Central Europe since the mid-1970s. [redacted]

The buildup widens the range of options and contingencies open to Soviet planners. One clear use for the additional stocks is to support forces reinforcing the forward area from the western military districts of the Soviet Union—the second strategic echelon. Having the supplies already forward greatly reduces the effort and time required to deploy the echelon forward, thus mitigating what the Soviets claim are NATO and US advantages in preparing rapidly for war. The Soviets would also have significantly greater reserves of material immediately available in the forward area in the event the second echelon was cut off or delayed, or losses by the first echelon exceeded expectations. [redacted]

Stocks in place in Eastern Europe would also be less vulnerable to NATO “deep strike” attacks than would stocks in transit. The Soviets' major supply bases in East Germany lie under the extensive air defense umbrella protecting Soviet forces in the forward area. Materiel in transit across Poland could not be protected to a similar degree. Additionally, prior to use, stocks already in the forward area could be dispersed within the relative security of East Germany. The lines of communication across Poland, on the other hand, would be relatively dense and targetable, thus subject to significant disruption—particularly in the early phases of war. [redacted]

The stocks remaining with the forces in the western military districts apparently have not been diminished to support the forward-deployed supply base; thus

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they add yet another degree of flexibility to Soviet planning. Should the second echelon reach its forward supplies relatively unimpeded and find them intact, the logistic infrastructure of the western military districts could support the establishment and deployment of yet another strategic echelon. []

Command and Control

The Soviets have placed a great deal of emphasis on the establishment of wartime control authorities in peacetime. In a 1985 article, Army Gen. A. M. Mayorov wrote:

The course and outcome of the initial period of the last war demonstrated a pressing need for actually establishing appropriate organs of a scientifically substantiated system of strategic leadership in peacetime and for maintaining these in a condition to ensure constant management of the troops and the fleet from the outset of military actions without substantive changes in moving from the state of peace to a state of war [Mayorov's own emphasis]. The positive solution of this problem today is dictated by the fact that the main thrust of the military preparations of the "imperialist" states, and above all the entire aggressive NATO bloc, is the preparation for a surprise attack making use of all the very latest means of combined combat. The experience of the activities of high commands of strategic axes on the Soviet-German front and particularly of the Commander in Chief and his staff in the Far East have quite plainly demonstrated the necessity of establishing, in certain circumstances, intermediate and very important links of strategic command on major axes.

The Soviets have established just such commands, first for the Far East and subsequently for the Western, Southwestern, and Southern Theaters. []

As with the logistic preparations, these commands give Soviet planners considerable flexibility. Marsnal N. V. Ogarkov, currently the commander in chief of forces in the Western Theater, wrote in 1982 that the fundamentals of modern military operations must be reappraised:

Obviously they should no longer be based on the frontal system but on a wider scale of action—the strategic operation in a theater of military operations. In the course of such an operation each front

(or fleet) would be brought into action in sequence, either with short pauses between engagements or with two or more frontal operations conducted simultaneously. []

Soviet writings and training activities indicate that in wartime the Warsaw Pact would organize its forces in the Western Theater of Military Operations—which is located opposite NATO's Center Region—in two strategic echelons (see map and table). The first echelon, made up of Soviet and East European forces now in Central Europe and organized into three fronts, would have the mission of stopping a NATO attack and launching a counteroffensive into West Germany. Reinforcements from the USSR in two or more fronts would be brought up as quickly as they could be mobilized and moved forward to form a second echelon tasked to continue an offensive into NATO territory. []

Soviet Allies


Following World War II, the Soviets created East European military establishments that could assist them in policing their hegemony and absorb a percentage of any NATO attack. The size and quality of many of these forces now make them useful complements and, in some cases, substitutes for standing Soviet forces. Economic pressures, however, have limited efforts by East European military leaders to maintain qualitative parity with the modernizing Soviet forces, and political and societal realities have raised serious questions about reliability and military effectiveness in a protracted conflict. []

The Soviets have taken specific notice of their need for East European participation. In 1985, Army Gen. A. M. Mayorov wrote:

Since modern wars are waged by coalitions of states, the problem of organizing a reliable system for the control of coalition armed forces is becoming increasingly important in strategic management. Of particular importance are such tasks as ensuring the coordinated actions of the joint command, the achieving of national unity of planning for the operations of international formations, and the organization of strategic coordination among allied armies and groupings of coalition forces. []

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Western Theater of Military Operations



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**Warsaw Pact Forces in the
 Western Theater of Military Operations**

	Soviet	East European	Total
Ground forces			
Ready divisions	34	22	56
Motorized rifle	15	11	26
Tank	17	10	27
Airborne	2	1	3
Not-ready divisions	29	17	46
Motorized rifle	15	14	29
Tank	14	3	17
New-type army corps (ready)	1		1
Medium tanks	19,000	9,000	28,000
Air forces			
Tactical air regiments			
Fighter-interceptor	25	24	49
Ground attack	27	12	39
Reconnaissance and electronic warfare	10	3	13
Helicopter regiments			
Attack	12	6	18
Transport and special purpose	4	7	11
Combat aircraft			
Fighter-interceptor	915	985	1,900
Ground attack	500	460	960
Reconnaissance and electronic warfare	180	195	375
Attack helicopter	715	300	1,015
Transport and special-purpose helicopters	1,065	360	1,425
Amphibious forces			
Sea landing division	0	1	1
Naval infantry brigade	1	0	1
Landing ships	23	0	0

[Redacted]

The creation of theater commands is a direct response to these concerns. The commands also provide the Soviets with a sanctioned reason for more closely monitoring and influencing the training and preparedness of the East European forces. [Redacted]

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The Poles probably represent the single greatest strategic problem for Soviet planners. Their 15-division force is large enough, and of sufficient quality, to merit a planned frontal operation of its own. Yet, a grossly ineffective performance or, worse, a withdrawal or refusal to participate would leave a significant gap in the Soviets' theater operation. Moreover, the Soviets' own lines of supply to the forward area run directly through Poland. [Redacted]

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Questions about the reliability and effectiveness of East European forces most likely have caused the Soviets to plan operational and logistic alternatives. Nevertheless, an all-out rebellion in Eastern Europe, particularly by any of the states bordering NATO in the Central Region, would affect Soviet capabilities to conduct and sustain operations sufficiently to preclude a concurrent decision to attack the West. [Redacted]

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The forward location of the Soviets' second-echelon logistic base in the relative security of East Germany probably serves to lessen the severity of such problems. In the event of war, their standing forces in East Germany could be rapidly brought up to full strength by air and would not require the transport of huge quantities of materiel through a state in rebellion. Should operations against Poland be called for, the Soviets would be in a position to use the forward-based supplies of the second echelon to support operations into Poland from East Germany, supplementing forces from the USSR. This would allow the Soviets to avoid seriously depleting the stocks of the first echelon, most of which would likely be alerted to defend against a potential NATO attack. Forward stockage of material for the second echelon is also a hedge against disruption of the Polish lines of communication from confusion or delay imposed by grudging Polish cooperation. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

**Readiness of Soviet
Ground Forces
in Central Europe** [redacted]

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Soviet military writings indicate that it is not necessary or economically feasible to maintain forces at full readiness in peacetime. The Soviets are aware that NATO's military forces are not kept at full readiness for war. Furthermore, they believe that war in Europe probably would be preceded by a period of gradually escalating political and military tension, which should provide some degree of warning. This period of tension would allow them systematically to bring their forces to full combat readiness prior to the outbreak of hostilities. They intend to make the transition to a wartime posture by readying their forces according to a series of readiness or alert stages (see inset). [redacted]

We infer from their military writings and training practices that the Soviets have identified two general approaches to bringing Warsaw Pact forces to full combat readiness:

- In a slowly developing crisis—one where the sudden outbreak of war is not deemed likely—they might feel to some extent in control over the timing of events and probably would follow a deliberate, phased approach to preparing their forces.
- If they believed war was imminent, their preparations would be compressed. These preparations would be intended by the Soviets to ensure an effective defense but probably would not be considered sufficient to launch a general offensive. Nonetheless, they would significantly increase the Soviets' immediate combat potential and, thus, would represent an increased threat to NATO. [redacted]

To launch a large-scale general offensive in Central Europe, which Warsaw Pact strategy envisages as the only realistic way to defeat NATO, Soviet doctrine prescribes large, combat-ready forces in the main battle areas, backed by fully prepared follow-on and reserve forces. The Soviets recognize that the preparations, coordination, and maneuvers required to prepare such an offensive are extremely complicated, would demand the commitment of immense resources,

Soviet Alert Stages

Constant combat readiness: *The normal peacetime readiness status of the Soviet armed forces. Routine training and activity take place. Leaves and passes may be granted at the commanders' discretion.* [redacted]

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Increased combat readiness: *Unit personnel are recalled from leave or TDY, and division subunits conducting field training return to garrison. Mobilization and contingency plans are reviewed and updated by staffs. Unit personnel remove equipment from storage and begin to prepare reception points for reservists. The division's field command post (CP) is partially manned and deployed to a dispersal area. Staffing of the garrison command center is increased.* [redacted]

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Threat-of-war combat readiness: *Units deploy from garrison to dispersal areas. The control of the division is transferred from the garrison command center to the field CP. Selected reservists with specialized skills may join the unit.* [redacted]

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Full combat readiness: *Full mobilization takes place and reservists join their units. If required, equipment mobilized for the units also arrives. Units establish their wartime command, control, and communications structure. At this point, the alert, dispersal, and mobilization process is complete.* [redacted]

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and would severely test the abilities of Soviet commanders. Therefore, they would prefer to move to a wartime footing in a deliberate manner. [redacted]

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In this article, we examine how key factors such as manpower, training, equipment, and logistics would influence Soviet preparations of ground forces in

Central Europe for war. Preparation of the forces of the East Europeans, and of potential reinforcements from the western USSR—although an essential part of a Warsaw Pact buildup for war in Europe—is beyond the scope of this assessment. [redacted]

Readiness System


The Soviet readiness system divides units into “ready” and “not-ready” categories. A combat unit is considered ready if it has a full set of combat equipment, at least half of its total authorized wartime manning, and sufficient personnel to commit about 70 percent of its crew-served weapons to battle. Ready units, therefore, are those that are at least minimally prepared for combat operations in peacetime. [redacted]

Ground forces are maintained at varying degrees of readiness, depending on Soviet threat perceptions, because of the resource costs of maintaining forces at high readiness levels in peacetime. In the Western Theater of Military Operations, 33 of the 63 Soviet motorized rifle, tank, and airborne divisions are at least minimally ready for combat operations. A well-prepared force of 26 Soviet maneuver divisions is maintained in Central Europe, where Soviet interests are critical and where an indigenous Soviet population is not readily available for mobilization. Tank units are more fully manned than the other maneuver units. The most ready parts of Soviet ground forces in this region are the surface-to-surface missile (SSM) and surface-to-air missile forces. They are typically manned in peacetime near full wartime levels. Furthermore, at least part of the SSM force is kept sufficiently ready to respond within minutes to a launch order from higher authority. [redacted]

Manpower

[redacted]
[redacted] Soviet maneuver divisions in Central Europe (and Soviet combat units in general) are manned in peacetime at levels lower than previously estimated. This analysis leads to the conclusion that motorized rifle divisions are maintained in peacetime at about 80 percent of intended wartime strength and that tank divisions are manned at about 85 percent. Previously, they were estimated to be at 95 to 100 percent of intended wartime strength. [redacted]

**Figure 1
Manpower Levels of Soviet
Ground Forces in Central Europe**



[redacted]
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The evidence of lower peacetime manning levels in these maneuver units, as well as in combat support and service support units in Central Europe, indicates that the Soviets have a substantial need for personnel augmentation before the start of hostilities (see figure 1). We estimate that the 26 Soviet maneuver divisions would require almost 50,000 additional men to reach intended wartime levels. At least an additional 80,000 men would be needed to fill out nondivisional combat, combat support, and service support units (figure 2). [redacted]

There are three primary sources of personnel augmentation available to Soviet forces in Central Europe in preparing forces for war:

- Soviet civilians employed by the Soviet groups of forces in Central Europe. These civilians could be quickly mobilized and incorporated into in-place forces.

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
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Figure 2
Augmentation Requirement of Soviet
Ground Forces in Central Europe

Personnel Augmentation Requirement: 133,000



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- Soldiers assigned to Soviet units and facilities in Central Europe that are active in peacetime but could be reduced in size or disbanded in wartime. These troops could simply be transferred to active wartime units.
- Reservists or troops in the western region of the USSR who could be mobilized or transferred to Soviet units in Central Europe.

We lack sufficient information to estimate with confidence the number of personnel that would be drawn from each of these possible sources of personnel augmentation. Nevertheless, we believe it unlikely that the number would exceed 20,000 to 30,000 men. We expect, therefore, that preparation of Soviet ground forces for war would include the mobilization and movement of at least 100,000 men from the USSR.

The Soviets have attempted to minimize the impact of reduced peacetime manning on unit integrity and proficiency by restricting vacancies largely to positions they consider unskilled or not critical to the peacetime function of the unit. Nonetheless, the magnitude of reduced manning in peacetime does have a pronounced effect on the integrity and proficiency of some types of units.¹ Motorized rifle companies routinely train with only 50 to 65 percent of their full wartime complements. Therefore, when brought to full wartime strength, between one-third and one-half of the company will not have had recent training in individual skills and small-unit tactical operations.

Training

The Soviets' training programs do not bring their ground forces units to full readiness in peacetime. The standard training program, which emphasizes repetitive individual drills and small-unit tactics, is designed to permit the Soviets to integrate large numbers of conscripts into their ground forces every six months, while maintaining at least minimal levels of unit readiness. Ground forces conscripts are obligated to serve a two-year term of service. This leads to the rotation of about one-quarter of the conscripts every six months. This turnover, coupled with the standard practice of evenly distributing new conscripts throughout ground forces units, has led to a training system that focuses on the development of basic skills, chiefly at the individual and small-unit levels.

This approach to training serves to retard Soviet preparedness. It fails to develop individual initiative, retains training practices that do not fully exploit the capabilities of the more sophisticated weapons, and inadequately prepares junior officers for conducting complex combined-arms operations.

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Some senior Soviet military officers are aware of these deficiencies and have criticized the system repeatedly since the late 1970s. They believe the current training program lacks realism, fails to develop sufficient proficiency in individual skills, and usually results in junior NCOs having an inadequate grasp of small-unit tactics. Recently, there have been a number of attempts to correct some of the program's shortcomings. Articles in the Soviet military press over the past two years contain a number of references to more demanding unit evaluations. This would suggest that, at a minimum, Soviet military leaders are taking steps to attempt to ensure that units meet readiness standards. [redacted]

[redacted] the Soviets have begun to modify their rotation system and associated training practices. Whereas the established system called for a piecemeal rotation of conscripts across the force, the new scheme is designed to rotate troops on a subunit basis. This would permit conscripts joining a particular subunit to serve and train together for their entire two-year term of service. This change allows conscripts in each six-month training cycle to concentrate on different stages of training rather than simply repeat the same training program every six months. Moreover, the focus of training during the second year permits greater emphasis on company-level and small-unit tactical training—essential for mastering concepts and skills associated with using increasingly sophisticated weapons in combined-arms units. This new personnel rotation practice, however, has been identified only in motorized rifle, tank, and artillery subunits of six to seven Soviet divisions and one Soviet nondivisional artillery unit in East Germany. [redacted]

As this new system becomes more fully adopted, it increases the likelihood that conscripts in Soviet ground forces in Central Europe will assimilate the complex skills associated with modern combined-arms warfare. Furthermore, these improvements in individual and unit combat proficiency should minimize the extent to which soldiers would require substantial additional training when proceeding to a wartime posture. Under the new system, a Soviet unit of battalion size or larger will always have one subunit in individual and crew training, another in crew and

small-unit tactical training, and a third in small-unit and combined-arms training. It is unlikely, however, that the Soviets would consider subunits trained only in individual and crew skills to be adequately prepared to engage in offensive operations. [redacted]

Equipment

Soviet ground forces in Central Europe are equipped in peacetime with many of the most modern weapons and vehicles in the Soviet inventory. Equipment for combat forces in the area is estimated to be at intended wartime levels; therefore, the transition process is not expected to require any equipment augmentation. [redacted]

Historically, Soviet equipment has been simple to maintain and operate, and proven older equipment types are kept in service as illustrated by the continuing use of such weapon systems as the T-62 medium tank and the towed 122-mm howitzer (D-30). Although the Soviets attempt to maintain homogeneity in equipment throughout their forces, the size of the forces requires an incremental approach to modernization. This results in a mix of equipment in units, particularly in not-ready units, and complicates maintenance and the problem of providing spares and ammunition. Figure 3 illustrates the impact of recent modernization programs on Soviet capabilities to maintain weapon homogeneity. This lack of homogeneity would not prevent ground forces in Central Europe from making a rapid transition to a wartime footing, but it would impair their ability to sustain themselves over an extended period of time in a campaign against NATO. [redacted]

Logistics

Soviet logistic levels in Central Europe are much greater than had been earlier estimated. The Soviets have substantially expanded their military logistic structure in the area since the mid-1970s and probably could support 120 to 180 days of combat by the Soviet forces presently in Central Europe. They appear to have enough combat supplies in East Germany to support more than twice their current in-place forces for two to three months during the initial phase

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
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Figure 3
Soviet Tank Inventory Trends in
Central Europe



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of a campaign against NATO. These levels are such that logistics should not be a constraint to the forces' rapid transition to war. The Soviets, however, still would need to move a substantial number of troops from the USSR to fill out service support units in Central Europe. [redacted]

During the past decade in East Germany, the Soviets have:

- Built seven front-level fuel depots and expanded 34 others, providing a storage capacity of 600,000 metric tons.
- Constructed seven front-level ammunition depots and expanded nine others for an estimated storage capacity of 700,000 metric tons.
- Doubled the equipment available to form mobile equipment-repair units.
- Increased their mobile field hospitals from 37 to 65.
- Modernized motor transport units with new trucks built with Western technology and established a reserve of as many as 12,000 older trucks. [redacted]

This systematic investment in service support facilities and stocks would reduce the Soviets' need to burden their lines of communication before hostilities began with large quantities of bulky supplies, vulnerable to NATO interdiction. This would facilitate the fairly rapid movement to Central Europe of combat and combat support units from the USSR that may be intended to participate in the initial campaign of a war against NATO. [redacted]

Implications

The Soviets' overall readiness philosophy is to maintain sufficient forces in readiness to deter attack; to protect perceived interests, including containment of nations in their sphere of influence; and to defend home territories. This concept of readiness does not require that Soviet forces in Central Europe be fully prepared to immediately assume offensive missions. Instead, it stresses the deliberate, phased preparation of forces for war. [redacted]

We estimate the Soviets would need at least two weeks to bring their forces to a wartime footing and move some 100,000 troops from the western USSR to Central Europe. This estimate is based on the lift capacities manifest during the semiannual rotation of Soviet troops to the region. Also, upon arrival, these augmentees probably would be given some refresher training, which could involve up to an additional week. Although the Soviets would attempt to maximize surprise when preparing their forces for war in Central Europe, it is highly unlikely, given their doctrinal requirements and the steps needed to fully prepare these forces, that they would opt for an approach that would radically compress the time allocated for force readiness. [redacted]

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Readiness of Soviet Air Forces in Central Europe

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For nearly a decade Soviet writings on the preparation and employment of Warsaw Pact air forces for a general war with NATO have focused on a massive offensive—the initial air operation. These writings also define three important missions for tactical aircraft during the initial phase of an offensive campaign:

- Elimination of NATO's theater nuclear delivery capabilities.
- Establishment of theater air superiority.
- Fire support for ground forces.

To accomplish these missions, the Soviets must first move from their normal peacetime posture to one that can support the extensive demands of wartime operations. Soviet pilots, for example, would shift from flying about three training sorties a week to conducting two or three combat missions a day for a week or so.

The transition to a war footing involves preparing both the wartime command structure and the forces. A major benefit of the reorganization of Soviet air and air defense forces in 1980-81 was the restructuring of the peacetime command of Soviet air forces in Europe to serve as the framework for wartime command and control of theater air forces. This eases the transition to war by ensuring that preparations are coordinated through a chain of command already in place. Preparations include ensuring that critical aircraft systems and support equipment are functioning properly and that changes (for example, new radio frequencies) necessary to operate in wartime are accomplished. Once aircraft and their support equipment have been readied, they must be positioned so that they can be targeted against a variety of changing objectives in sufficient numbers. To meet doctrinally specified requirements, peacetime assigned manpower must be brought as close to wartime authorized strength as time permits. Aircrews and support personnel away on leave or TDY must be recalled, and manpower reserves mobilized. Aircraft repair capabilities must be augmented so that damaged aircraft can be returned rapidly to operational status. Logistic

pipelines must be readied to support higher demands for consumables for both aircraft and personnel over increasing distances.

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Rebasing and Dispersal

Soviet tactical air doctrine requires extensive rebasing and dispersal of tactical aircraft to accomplish the missions assigned to them in a theater war with NATO. Plans call for establishing theaterwide air superiority by achieving local superiority within a number of sectors throughout the theater. Soviet tactical air regiments in Europe do not have adequate range to accomplish this objective from their peacetime airbases, given the depth of the battlefield and the mobility of many critical targets. Rebasing is designed to move tactical air regiments closer to their sectors of operation to project airpower into enemy airspace and allow the Soviets to concentrate airpower as required by the air battle.

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Dispersal of a regiment's squadrons to alternate airfields or highway landing strips located 5 to 15 kilometers from the main operating field provides tactical air regiments with both offensive and defensive advantages. It makes the regiment more difficult to target and improves its survivability. Dispersal also yields multiple departure and recovery points, allowing the Soviets to launch large numbers of aircraft more quickly and minimizing recovery tieups. Aircraft that would be held back as part of a nuclear reserve strike force probably would be positioned at dispersal areas to ensure their survivability and allow them to react quickly.

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Peacetime Preparedness

The preparedness of Soviet tactical air units in Europe to conduct offensive operations against NATO is a function of four main factors:

- Aircraft and equipment availability.
- Maintenance and battle damage repair capabilities.

- Logistic support capabilities.
- Sufficient manpower.

The relative importance of each of these factors in turn depends on the readiness of forces in place and on the time that would be available for mobilization and reinforcement prior to war. [redacted]


Aircraft Availability and Maintenance. Since the mid-1970s, forward-deployed Soviet tactical air regiments have consistently maintained an aircraft operational readiness rate [redacted] suggesting these regiments would have enough aircraft for operational requirements on very short notice. The regiments are normally equipped with their full wartime complement of 40 to 45 aircraft. Moreover, the maintenance practices in these units are generally well suited for keeping a high level of aircraft combat ready by limiting maintenance to simple replacement of parts and equipment on a scheduled basis. Forward-deployed units also are likely to have first priority in building up sufficient stocks of key parts and supplies. [redacted]

These peacetime maintenance practices and procedures allow the Soviets to maintain high levels of operationally ready aircraft, but the lack of a capability at the regimental level to repair battle damage is likely to reduce significantly the number of operationally available aircraft during wartime.¹ In exercises the Soviets have projected an "attrition rate" of about 25 percent over the first five days of air operations. (We interpret this to mean the percentage of aircraft shot down.) This projection appears low in view of the strength of NATO defenses, but, in any case, when combined with aircraft losses resulting from battle damage, suggests a substantial erosion of tactical airpower in less than a week (see figure 1). [redacted]

Logistics. Initial wartime operations, particularly if war began with little prior warning, would rely almost exclusively on stockpiles of ammunition, POL, and other expendables already in place in Central Europe.

¹ Data on USAF F-4 losses in Southeast Asia during the Vietnam war show that the ratio of aircraft suffering battle damage to aircraft lost was 4:1 for air-to-ground missions and 1:1 for air-to-air missions. About half of those damaged were repaired in 24 hours, but some 20 percent required extensive work requiring over 10 days. [redacted]

Figure 1
Sortie-Generation Potential of a Soviet Fighter Regiment in Central Europe



- Assumptions:
- Attrition (in terms of aircraft shot down) is 25 percent over first five days: 10 percent on day 1, 7 percent on day 2, 4 percent on day 3, 3 percent on day 4, and 1 percent on days 5-7.
 - No battle-damaged aircraft are regenerated.
 - Ratio of aircraft damaged to aircraft shot down is 1:1.
 - Thirty-six aircraft are ready for combat at beginning of hostilities. Operational readiness declines to 90 percent on days 1 and 2, to 85 percent on days 3-5, and to 80 percent on days 6 and 7.

[redacted]
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[redacted] evidence on supplies in East Germany indicates they are sufficient to support at least three weeks of intense combat operations by forward-deployed tactical air regiments. Moreover, most Soviet tactical air regiments probably stockpile enough POL and ordnance at their main operating bases to sustain three to seven days of combat operations independently. [redacted]

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Although sufficient quantities of material apparently are available at the front level to sustain combat operations for several weeks, the peacetime logistics system could not move supplies from depots to main operating bases at a rate necessary to support wartime operations without a substantial augmentation of manpower. Logistic units responsible for moving these supplies are manned in peacetime at only 30 to 40 percent of their wartime levels, [redacted]

[redacted] The distribution problem will be further compounded during wartime by the expansion in supply links necessary to meet rebasing and dispersal requirements. [redacted]

Manning. Peacetime assigned manning in forward-deployed Soviet fighter and fighter-bomber regiments is approximately 70 to 80 percent of wartime authorized strength (see figure 2). The regimental elements that are manned at the lowest levels in peacetime are the headquarters unit, the aviation engineering services unit (TECh), and individual squadron maintenance sections. Squadron aircrews appear to be manned at or very near wartime authorized levels. Peacetime assigned manpower in key units that support the tactical regiments, however, falls far short of the numbers required to sustain wartime operations. [redacted]


Peacetime manning levels of aircrews appear adequate to meet wartime requirements. Soviet tactical air regiments in the forward area generally maintain an aircrew-to-aircraft ratio of 1.5 to 1 during peacetime, which appears sufficient to ensure adequate aircrew availability to allow for personnel on leave and TDY. [redacted]

Peacetime manning deficiencies are significant in the signals and radiotechnical battalion (OBSRTO) and the airfield technical battalion (OBATO). The OBSRTO provides communications and navigational support to regimental aircraft during flight operations, and the OBATO maintains runways, provides airbase logistic support to flight operations, and carries out routine airfield maintenance. These units provide support to the combat operations of the regiments but are administratively subordinate to other authorities. During peacetime both probably are manned at about 50 percent of their authorized

wartime strength. In the case of the OBATO, only about two-thirds of those assigned during peacetime serve in functions that directly support regimental flight operations. [redacted]

Manning deficiencies in these units have limited impact on peacetime training operations. During wartime, however, these deficiencies would become critical, partly because of the significantly increased tempo of airbase operations required to sustain wartime sortie rates,² but, more important, because of additional strains imposed by the rebasing and dispersal of tactical air regiments. [redacted]

Soviet doctrine stresses that during air unit rebasing it is necessary to maintain a minimum of two-thirds of the assigned forces in a status that allows them to conduct maximum-range operations. Because of the extensive demands of supporting regimental operations at alternate airfields and highway landing strips and the increased demands of wartime operations, the workload of in-place manpower would be considerably higher at the outset of a war that began with little or no warning than during either normal peacetime operations or after wartime mobilization. [redacted]



Sortie Generation

Forward-deployed Soviet fighter and fighter-bomber regiments in Europe generally fly only three days per week and conduct aircraft maintenance on alternate

² A sortie is a single flight by a single aircraft. Sortie rates represent the number of sorties flown in a given time period (generally one day). [redacted]

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
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**Figure 2
Manning Levels of Soviet Fighter and Fighter-Bomber Regiments
in Central Europe**



⁴ Fighter regiments have between 450 and 550 men, depending on the type of fighter assigned (units with newer generation aircraft generally have higher manning than those with older models). Fighter-bomber regiments have between 500 and 550 men.

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days. This amounts to a peacetime sortie rate of approximately 1.5 sorties per aircraft per flying day.³ Soviet doctrinal writings [redacted] indicate that during the first few days of a war tactical air regiments may be required to generate two to three sorties per aircraft per day, and in some cases, more. This increase in the daily aircraft sortie rate, combined

with the wartime requirement to fly at least six consecutive days, would result in a regimental sortie generation requirement two to three times that of the peacetime rate.⁴ Without any reinforcement of assigned squadron and TECH maintenance manpower,

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³ These figures are derived from Soviet fighter regiments operating in the forward area and are based on a regimental strength of 36 operational aircraft and 60 aircrews with 140 sorties per aircrew per year. [redacted]

⁴ These calculations discuss sortie "requirement" and assume a constant two sorties per aircraft per day. They do not account for sortie reduction due to losses or battle damage. [redacted]

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the workload on each assigned maintenance man to generate wartime sortie rates would increase by at least the same factor. [redacted]

[redacted]

To bring Soviet air forces in Central Europe to wartime strength would require augmenting the peacetime assigned strength of some 47,000 men with at least 18,000 men. The most significant shortfalls are in the OBATOs (7,700 men), tactical air regiments (5,000 men), and the OBSRTOs (5,500 men). While these figures are modest when compared with the manning requirements of Soviet ground forces in Central Europe, they represent 25 percent of the total wartime authorization for in-place tactical air regiments and 50 percent of that for the OBSRTO and OBATO. [redacted]

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Extensive hard use of tactical aircraft would be likely to raise the ratio of maintenance hours to flight hours. Aircraft losses would effectively increase the ratio of maintenance personnel to remaining aircraft, but this increase would probably be more than offset by the increase in the number of maintenance hours required to prepare remaining aircraft for combat after extended periods of operation relying on limited turnaround maintenance.⁵ Additional strains would be placed on maintenance crews by the wartime requirement to support flight operations out of one or more alternate airfields or highway landing strips. [redacted]

Soviet tactical air forces in Central Europe would be prepared for war at the same time as the ground forces. The far greater and competing demands of the ground forces would limit the capacity of transportation resources to move personnel to fill out air units. Thus, the preparation time for the air forces is likely to be about the same as that for the ground forces—approximately two weeks. [redacted]

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Implications

Soviet tactical air regiments in Central Europe are capable of generating a substantial defense from their peacetime posture within a matter of hours. They maintain high peacetime operational readiness rates, near-wartime manning levels among squadron aircrews, and airbase stockpiles of aircraft munitions and fuel sufficient to immediately support defensive operations for a short period. The Soviets are not nearly so well prepared, however, to mount and sustain sizable offensive operations using in-place forces. Such operations would require substantial preparation and manpower reinforcement, which could take weeks to accomplish. [redacted]

[redacted]

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⁵ USAF studies have shown that the three most important factors influencing sortie generation rates are battle damage repair capability, attrition, and general maintenance manpower. [redacted]

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Gorbachev's Antialcohol Program

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The antialcohol campaign, launched in May and given further impetus by subsequent measures, is sharply reducing alcohol sales and public drinking. Although a core of concerned citizens strongly supports the program in toto and almost everyone claims to favor eliminating the worst alcohol abuses, many reportedly believe the campaign is moving too far too fast. General Secretary Gorbachev is pushing the campaign for its potential economic and social benefits. He is also signaling that he intends to force the pace of change. The campaign will test Gorbachev's leadership. Success would strengthen him politically; failure could damage his reputation for tough and effective leadership.

Genesis of the Campaign

Over the last 30 years, an apparent doubling of per capita consumption of alcohol has aggravated a wide range of social and economic problems (see inset). Past leaderships tried to deal with the problem with three noisy but unsuccessful antialcohol campaigns. Previous efforts were weakened by a conflict of interest because the regime valued spirits as a means of diverting demand from other consumer goods, as a large source of tax revenue, and as an escape valve for frustrations. In recent years, however, the leadership's concern about alcohol abuse has grown. Disturbing studies of the negative effects of Soviet alcohol abuse have become increasingly prevalent in the Soviet popular and scholarly press in recent years, indicating a growing sense of alarm among the elite.

Several factors probably account for Gorbachev's decision to move boldly against the alcohol problem. He probably believed:

- The campaign would demonstrate his personal power and the regime's capacity for vigorous action to effect change, without involving a major commitment of resources.

The Soviet Alcohol Problem

The extent of the Soviet alcohol problem is indicated by the following statistics:

- *Drinking on the job has become widespread; one Soviet estimate published in Komsomol'skaya Pravda indicated 30 percent of the workers drink at the workplace.*
- *The rate of alcohol poisonings—from impurities in industrial alcohol products and home brew—is by far the largest in the world and has quadrupled since 1960.*
- *Alcoholism is a major factor contributing to the rapidly rising Soviet divorce rate. Women note it as a contributing cause in over one-half of their divorce petitions.*
- *According to Minister of Internal Affairs Fedorchuk, 70 to 80 percent of all public misbehavior and vandalism is committed by people under the influence of alcohol. Drunk people commit 67 percent of violent crimes that result in convictions.*
- *Alcohol abuse was probably a major cause of adverse trends in Soviet mortality figures in the 1970s. The Soviet Union is the only industrialized country in which male life expectancy fell (from age 67 in 1964 to age 62 in 1980) and infant mortality rose (from 22.9 per 1,000 in 1970 to 31.1 per 1,000 in 1975).*

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- The political environment was propitious. New elites beholden to him had been put into key positions, and the law enforcement apparatus had been purged of some of its most corrupt elements and its powers enhanced since Brezhnev's death.
- The campaign was compatible with—and perhaps necessary to—his effort to tighten social discipline and spur economic growth, and it complements his announced plans to improve consumer welfare.

[redacted]

Apparent Objectives

The antialcohol program has two objectives: the short-run, limited goal of curtailing the worst excesses of alcohol abuse largely through punitive actions; and the more ambitious, long-run objective of bringing about a fundamental change in the people's attitudes toward and habits of alcohol use—through education, medical treatment, and alternatives for consumers. These objectives are not mutually exclusive, but there is some tension between them; the Soviet leadership itself has probably not decided which approach it intends to emphasize. [redacted]

Gorbachev, for example, reportedly is chiefly interested in eliminating drinking on the job, which he sees as a major obstacle to improving labor productivity. He has publicly ruled out passing a "dry law," however, saying that "this approach has not justified itself in any country." Yet, the campaign is being implemented in the typically Soviet fashion of attempting to "fulfill and overfulfill" the plan. [redacted]

[redacted]

Program Specifics

The alcohol control initiative was approved at the 4 April 1985 Politburo meeting, at which "overcoming the monstrous phenomenon of alcoholism" was labeled a top national priority. On 17 May a Central Committee decree called for all party and government organs to "intensify the struggle against alcoholism." Simultaneously, a Council of Ministers decree set forth 28 orders to this end. The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet enacted a statute stiffening parts of the legal code dealing with alcohol consumption, sale,

and production. Since these initial steps, other implementing measures have been taken. These measures restrict sales and production of alcohol, increase penalties for alcohol abusers and illegal suppliers, punish supervisors who tolerate drinking on the job, raise the drinking age, expand treatment facilities, improve recreational alternatives, intensify antialcohol propaganda, and establish a mass temperance society (see inset). [redacted]

Implementation and Impact

Because of energetic enforcement, the campaign has touched most Soviet citizens, especially in Slavic areas where heavy drinking is most severe. The regime has sharply cut back the availability of alcoholic beverages, and alcohol sales are reported by the Central Statistical Administration to have fallen by a third. The regime has also sought to make illegal production of alcoholic beverages riskier, by stepping up police raids on stills and stiffening penalties for trade violators (see inset). [redacted]

Gorbachev has put managers and officials on notice that they will be held responsible for their subordinates' behavior. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] Sobriety is said to have become a prerequisite for party membership, and a number of middle-level officials have lost their jobs or received reprimands. The widespread belief that Grigoriy Romanov's drinking was a factor in his removal from the Politburo has probably also had a sobering effect on senior officials. [redacted]

The campaign has visibly affected public order. Public drunkenness has largely disappeared in most big cities. In his 6 November Revolution Day speech, KGB chief Chebrikov credited the campaign with a decline in the crime rate and an improvement in family life. [redacted] drinking openly on the job has been greatly reduced. [redacted]

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Main Provisions of the Antialcohol Decrees

The main provisions of Gorbachev's antialcohol program are:

- Law enforcement crackdown: *Police are directed to aggressively pursue violators on the streets, in public places, and homes; the Procuracy is directed to prosecute all possible criminal cases; and the judiciary is directed to sentence severely. Party organs and control commissions are to seek out administrative violations and managerial laxness.*
- Reduction in availability of alcohol: *The opportunity to purchase alcohol is sharply curtailed. Sale hours are reduced by four hours to 1400 to 1900 on weekdays; liquor outlets are to be closed near workplaces, schools, transportation, health facilities, public recreation, and most other areas of general congregation. Curtailment of alcohol production is to begin gradually in 1986.*
- Curtailing teenage drinking: *The legal drinking age is raised from 18 to 21. Parents or others who contribute to a minor's drunkenness can be fined or imprisoned.*
- Increasing penalties for alcohol violations: *Fines and sentences have in general been doubled. Drinking in public or on the job is now punishable by fines equivalent to one to two weeks' pay. Repeat offenders receive pay cuts and lose perquisites. Incurable alcoholics are likely to be sentenced to involuntary treatment (involving dangerous antabuse therapy) or sentenced to two years of hard labor in an expanded network of "treatment-labor camps."*
- Curtailing home brew production and sales: *Penalties for making, selling, and purchasing home brew are increased. An aggressive law enforcement campaign against illegal distillers is mandated.*
- Holding managers and officials responsible: *Public and managerial officials must eliminate drinking by subordinates or face public reprimands and potential dismissal.*
- Changing social attitudes and habits: *Propaganda and education are to be intensified and revitalized. Voluntary participation of citizens in the antialcohol campaign is to be encouraged through an all-union temperance society and sobriety clubs for reformed alcoholics.*
- Providing alternatives to alcohol: *Construction of community facilities and production of home repair, gardening, and hobby goods are to be accelerated so that the masses will have better ways to use their leisure. Production of nonalcoholic beverages is to increase sharply.*
- Expanding the treatment of individual alcoholics: *A nationwide system of treatment facilities is to be completed, building on the existing "narcological" centers. To be expanded are treatment hospitals, voluntary counseling for early-stage alcohol abusers, production of medicines, and training of personnel.* 25X1

[redacted] The campaign may have contributed to the economy's recovery from its first-quarter slump this year. [redacted]

Popular Attitudes

[redacted] the campaign was initially welcomed by many citizens and still enjoys substantial support. For example, many industrious workers believe that alcoholism was completely out of control and are grateful to Gorbachev for doing something

about it. Women also strongly support the campaign for helping control the drinking of their husbands. Even before Gorbachev initiated the campaign, temperance societies had been organized in several cities; in July one of these publicly protested that Gorbachev's program did not go far enough. The regime has endeavored to capitalize on this public support by enlisting volunteers to help with enforcement, including informing on violators. [redacted]

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Vigorous enforcement of the antialcohol measures, however, is encountering significant resistance from the public. [redacted]

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[redacted] Long lines at liquor stores are reportedly filled with sullen, angry workers, defiantly absent from their jobs. When stocks have run out or service has been slow, the crowds have become unruly and people have been hurt. Disturbances related to the antialcohol campaign have been reported in four Soviet cities. [redacted]

[redacted] US Embassy officers this summer observed that in many areas of Ukraine, Georgia, and Armenia the regulations appeared to be loosely enforced, if at all. [redacted]

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Many moderate drinkers are reportedly irritated by the inconveniences the antialcohol measures have caused them. They believe the campaign should be limited to attacking excessive rather than moderate drinking. [redacted]

Outlook

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The regime's performance in implementing the campaign so far clearly indicates that Gorbachev is strongly committed to eliminating the more conspicuous forms of alcohol abuse that are most damaging to the society and the economy—such as public drunkenness and drinking at the workplace—as well as to significantly reducing overall alcohol consumption. If he achieves these objectives, the effect on labor productivity, mortality rates, and crime could be significant. The regime, however, cannot monitor and completely control private consumption of home brew, which constitutes an estimated 20 percent of alcohol consumption. Illegal distilling and distribution on the black market, which has not yet had time to expand its supply networks, will to some extent make up for decreased availability of liquor in state stores. [redacted]

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The measures may also have increased opportunities for black-marketeers and corrupt officials. According to the Leningrad Consulate, the black-market price of vodka has nearly doubled. Moreover, *Pravda* reported in August that consumption of dangerous substitutes, such as perfume and industrial alcohol, had led to a sharp rise in alcohol poisonings. [redacted]

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Attitudes of the Elite

Some officials are concerned that the program is being implemented with too much haste and without adequate measures to prevent worker unrest. Others are said to have privately criticized the program for attacking the symptoms rather than the underlying causes of the problem. Although the attack on alcohol abuse has been accompanied by measures to upgrade the production of consumer goods, provide more recreational facilities, and increase production of nonalcoholic beverages, these decrees have not yet had a significant effect. [redacted]

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[redacted] some Soviet officials believe it was a mistake to move strongly against alcohol consumption in the absence of other outlets for workers' frustrations. [redacted]

The sustainability of the campaign will be tested by rising tensions in society. These may be alleviated somewhat over time if the regime is able to make substantial progress in improving consumer welfare and in providing recreational alternatives to drinking. But, in the short run, a real threat of spontaneous protest activity and violence will exist. This threat may intensify if Gorbachev moves to adopt other policy changes that jeopardize the workers' sense of security—such as increasing wage inequality and giving more authority to managers to fire undisciplined or surplus workers. [redacted]

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Some officials are also said to feel vulnerable to accusations that they have committed drinking offenses. They fear anonymous informers and malicious denunciations by grudge-bearing colleagues. Others have expressed concern that the cutback in alcohol production and sales might produce economic problems, because alcohol has been a major source of state revenue—about 10 percent of the state budget. [redacted]

Thus, the stakes are high for Gorbachev. Success in managing the campaign would benefit the economy while enhancing his reputation and the regime's image. Failure would tarnish his image as a strong and effective leader. [redacted]

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**The Soviet Computer
Literacy Program:
Industrial Constraints**

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In March 1985, the Politburo endorsed a program to provide up to 10 million personal computers (PCs) to secondary and vocational schools over the next decade. The decision is part of an overall plan to increase computer literacy and thereby accelerate scientific and technical progress and spur development of high-technology industries. Although technical and political problems are likely to frustrate the program for the first few years, the long-term promise for the development and modernization of Soviet industry is considerable. The Soviets will have to rely on Western computers in the early years of the program, but they hope to substantially increase the output of domestic PCs by the late 1980s. A deal for a Western turnkey PC plant is the favored solution, but COCOM restrictions are a major obstacle.

Background

The long leadtime for the program—the main part of the program is to be implemented in 1991-2000—reflects the current state of affairs in the Soviet computer industry. According to Intelligence Community estimates, computer hardware lags that of the West by four to 10 years. The software industry has virtually no experience in developing software for PCs, and a lack of technical services and spare parts continues to frustrate users.

The most serious obstacle to the computer literacy program remains the shortage of PC hardware and required peripherals such as disk drives, floppy disks, and printers. Domestic production of PCs did not begin until 1983, and technical problems probably will limit production runs and reliability for the next several years.

Announced Objectives

In January 1985, the Politburo approved a program for the development, production, and use of computer technology and automated systems up to the year 2000. The goal of this program is to reequip the Soviet economy on the basis of computer technology and

microelectronics, thereby increasing labor productivity, raising product quality, and improving management and decisionmaking. The first area to be targeted is the machine-building sector, where Gorbachev has given a high priority to further automating the manufacture of such complex goods as automobiles, tanks, aircraft, and electronic systems.

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The CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers also passed a resolution¹ in early 1985 to foster widespread use of computers in Soviet education. While envisioning improvements in the teaching process for many subjects, the resolution is aimed mainly at familiarizing students with computer technology, programming, and applications—thereby supporting the modernization program. According to a variety of Soviet statements, the program's overall objectives are to:

- Provide the domestic computer industry with a large, steady market for PCs and related equipment.
- Help ease the critical shortage of skilled programmers.
- Break down some of the resistance to computer use on the part of industrial workers and managers.

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Soviet interest in computerization appears to stem from the belief that the USSR is forgoing many of the educational, industrial, and scientific advantages that are apparent in the Western "computer revolution." The literacy program will contribute to the computerization effort by fostering a greater acceptance and general knowledge of computers and their uses. It should also help alleviate the serious shortage of skilled programmers and computer users by creating a pool of people who can more readily benefit from advanced training and by identifying talented students for accelerated teaching programs.

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¹ "On Further Improvements in General Secondary Education for Young People and Better Operation of General Education Schools."

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Industrial Capabilities

The biggest obstacle to the implementation of the computer literacy program is supplying and maintaining the necessary computer equipment. According to the Academy of Sciences' Andrey Yershov, more than 50,000 computer labs equipped with a million PCs will be needed just to implement the first, or preparatory, level of the program. To give an indication of the immensity of the task, a recent *Trud* article reported that the Soviet computer industry is scheduled to deliver about 1,300 PCs to schools this school year and that 200 classrooms equipped with foreign-made computers for ninth-grade students were to open in the fall. During PC purchase negotiations with the Japanese and Australians, the Soviets indicated that they plan to equip each school with a single module of 16 to 20 computers. According to this scenario, approximately 265 schools (or less than 1 percent of all secondary schools in the USSR) will have their own computers this school year. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] the USSR is about eight years behind the West in the development of computer technology. The Soviets have particular difficulty producing personal computers. The primary Soviet-produced PC—a copy of the Apple—has been plagued with performance and production problems and is unlikely to meet the needs of the computer literacy program, either quantitatively or qualitatively, for at least the first phase. A [redacted] computer expert who operated the machine, known as the Agat, described the inside as a “nightmarish wiring maze,” indicating that the printed circuit boards and other components had been connected by obsolete and unreliable point-to-point hard-wire methods. This construction technique is prohibitively labor intensive and not readily adaptable to mass production [redacted]

Yevgeniy P. Velikhov, vice president of the USSR Academy of Sciences and head of the Academy's recently formed Department of Information Sciences, Technology, and Automation, stated in a recent journal article that the Soviet Union produces only “dozens” of PCs per year. In addition, a recent Soviet newspaper article pointed out that the Soviet computer industry meets only 5 percent of the country's

small-computer needs. Although [redacted] more than 1,000 PCs will be produced during this school year, this number is dwarfed in the West by IBM alone, which sold 1.5 million of its PCs and PCjrs in 1984. [redacted]

The Soviet computer industry also has been unable to provide its customers with adequate maintenance support. According to recent articles in the Soviet open press, industrial and economic enterprises are having trouble obtaining reliable technical service for their computers. Problems cited included a lack of spare parts, a shortage of trained personnel, and an incentive system that actually encourages shoddy repairs. The head of the Soviet institute responsible for purchasing foreign-made PCs for the literacy program, academician Boris Naumov, admitted that servicing computers is currently beyond the power of most schools. He said that allocation decisions in the early stages of the program will be based on the ability of the schools to provide maintenance for the PCs. [redacted]

Acquiring Western Computers

The most attractive vehicle for meeting long-term program objectives, while simultaneously improving domestic production capabilities, probably is the purchase of a Western-built turnkey computer plant. Such a plant could be operational within two to three years of a signed agreement and would prove an effective mechanism to transfer Western production technology and know-how. The Soviets have already started negotiations with several Western companies to build a PC plant in the USSR. A British journal reported that, during Gorbachev's visit to England in December 1984, Soviet officials met with representatives of a British computer firm to discuss the construction of a turnkey PC plant that could cost up to \$10 million. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] The feasibility of a turnkey plant purchase is questionable, however, because such a plant would include the capability to make high-speed

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microprocessors, which have weapons applications. The US Government has embargoed the sale of computer plants to the USSR since 1979, and COCOM requires the unanimous approval of all member nations. [redacted]

Soviet interest in a Western-built turnkey plant has centered primarily on a facility to manufacture sophisticated 16-bit machines of the IBM PCXT class. This is the area where the Soviets need the most help, and the acquisition of an entire plant would be an attractive method of quickly obtaining an indigenous capability. The Soviets also recognize the importance of the more powerful PCs for industrial and economic management applications and are eager to make them more widely available as part of the industrial modernization effort. They are probably less interested in a plant to build the smaller, eight-bit PCs—although they would probably settle for this if necessary—both because they can buy this type of computer more readily from the West and because their own industry is capable of producing eight-bit PCs in limited numbers and may be capable of mass-producing them in the near future with only limited Western assistance. [redacted]

To satisfy the immediate requirement for computers, the USSR, spurred by recently relaxed COCOM trade controls on certain PCs,² initiated negotiations with several Western and Japanese firms to buy PCs and related equipment. Several press reports indicated in July that a Japanese trading company had outbid 26 computer firms from around the world (including the US firm Apple) to win a contract to export 4,000 eight-bit personal computers and an undisclosed number of printers to the USSR. This is the first known contract that the Soviets have signed with a Western or Japanese firm for the purchase of PCs for their literacy program. [redacted]

² Under new rules set by COCOM, Western companies are allowed to sell low-powered, eight-bit microcomputers to the Soviets without a license. These machines process data eight bits at a time, rather than at the 16- or 32-bit rates of more powerful business computers. They have fairly small memories and would be sold in the West for \$100 to \$500 each as home computers. Sales of more sophisticated machines remain tightly controlled. [redacted]

The Soviets have also been actively seeking more powerful PCs to train advanced programmers in technical schools and universities and to take advantage of their data base and graphics capabilities to increase the productivity of research and design work. In December 1984 the Academy of Sciences placed an initial order for 50 IBM PCXT computers, declaring that it intended to purchase a total of 10,000 during the next year or so. [redacted]

[redacted]

We believe the Soviets will focus their PC purchases on a relatively small number of suppliers to ensure that the incoming computers are compatible, both with each other and with Soviet-produced models, and to reduce the complexity of the arrangements for maintenance and replacement. The Soviets will have to work closely with Western suppliers to establish a network for providing spare parts and installing and servicing these machines. The Soviet record in ensuring follow-on support to considerably less ambitious Western-supported projects—such as major industrial complexes—has been spotty at best. These support activities also could drain resources from indigenous Soviet development programs and could lead to a dependence on Western equipment. [redacted]

Despite the approaches being made to Western computer firms, the USSR probably will limit PC purchases to 4,000 to 5,000 machines for this school year. The scale of such imports will be limited by the need to preserve hard currency, the problem of providing service and spare parts for the PCs, and the desire to develop a domestic PC production capability as quickly as possible. [redacted]

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Outlook for the Program

The ultimate success, both of the literacy program and of the computerization effort in general, will depend on the Soviets' ability to manufacture and service at least hundreds of thousands of reliable PCs to overcome user resistance at the enterprise level. Also, the concerns of party and economic planning authorities over the impact of computerization must be allayed (see inset). [redacted]

Upgrading the performance of the computer industry will require significant Western assistance, at least in the short term, in the form of a turnkey plant or the direct sale of computers and related equipment. We believe the Soviets will be able to mass-produce the less powerful eight-bit PCs needed for the school program in the near term, but the production of the more sophisticated 16-bit business computers, which will be needed for industrial applications, will continue to be a problem for the foreseeable future. Production difficulties in this area, unless the Soviets can obtain a turnkey plant, will hinder efforts to automate industrial facilities. [redacted]

Hard currency limits and the concern that dependence on foreign sources of technology may stifle domestic development programs are likely to prevent imports of large numbers of PCs and peripherals from the West as a short-term solution. Moscow may put pressure on its suppliers in Eastern Europe to increase the quantity and improve the quality of peripherals exported to the Soviet Union. However, both the performance and availability of East European PC-related peripherals are likely to fall short of Soviet needs. [redacted]

The most serious threat to US interests posed by the literacy program is the potential transfer of a turnkey plant that would provide the Soviet computer industry with much-needed Western production know-how and equipment. A turnkey facility for even eight-bit PCs could significantly enhance Soviet production capabilities. Since COCOM restrictions on eight-bit computers were relaxed in January 1985, the Soviets have intensified their efforts to acquire a vertically integrated plant capable of producing the entire range of microelectronic devices and peripheral units—such as microprocessors, disk drives, and printers—that make up a personal computer. Experience in producing these subsystems would benefit the computer industry

Roots of Domestic Opposition

There is some opposition to the current approach to the computer literacy program on political, economic, scientific, social, and ideological grounds:

- *Soviet industrialists and scientists argue that the USSR can produce the needed high-quality circuits and PCs, and that plans to import Western PCs will stifle domestic development.* 25X1
- *Party and police officials probably view widespread use of computers as a threat to the traditional state monopoly of information in the USSR. In a society that tightly controls access to duplicating equipment, the prospect of millions of personal computers—each a printing press when coupled with a printer and word processing software—alarms the political leadership.*
- *Central authorities probably fear that, if computerization leads to replacing paper records with electronic recordkeeping, embezzlement or report padding by managers skilled in computer manipulation will become nearly impossible to detect. Falsification of data by factory managers is already a serious problem, and a major increase would further erode the integrity of statistical data upon which central authorities base their planning and management decisions.* 25X1
- *Party officials also evidently fear the social consequences of computerization. These include: formation of "utilitarian rational" values that would undermine party ideology, greater social inequality, computer-created unemployment, and development of "computer fetishism" among officials who view computerization as a cure-all for economic and organizational problems.* [redacted] 25X1

generally. The transfer of an eight-bit PC plant could also provide an opening wedge for later acquisition of technology to produce the more sophisticated 16-bit PCs required for many military and industrial applications. [redacted]

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Stalin's Ghost in Contemporary Soviet Politics [redacted]

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Despite the passage of more than 30 years, treatment of Joseph Stalin and his policies remains a highly charged political issue. The images conjured up by references to Stalin are both internally contradictory and inconsistent in their impact on various elements of the Soviet populace. This presents both a problem and an opportunity for the regime. Soviet domestic propaganda attempts to exploit broad public nostalgia for such "positive" aspects of Stalin's rule as national unity and social order, economic progress and efficiency, and strong leadership—as a means of shoring up regime legitimacy at home and marshaling support for the USSR's international role—while avoiding endorsement of the "negative" aspects of his leadership that frighten important segments of the public.

[redacted]

At the same time, the Stalin symbol is employed in intraelite politics to promote or oppose various policies associated with his name. As with the general public, however, elite political sensitivities about Stalin are so powerful that use of his image as a political weapon can backfire unless great care is exercised. Indiscriminate praise of Stalin would antagonize key elites, such as the military and the more liberal elements of the intelligentsia, who suffered greatly during the purge years. A blanket condemnation of him, however, would alienate those rightwing intellectual and managerial elites who see Stalin as a symbol of the established order and who might fear that renewing the attack on him would undermine regime legitimacy.

Evolution of Treatment of Stalin

From His Death Until 1979. The dominant desire of most of the Soviet elite and general population in the years immediately following Stalin's death was for a relaxation of Stalinist internal controls. Khrushchev attempted to exploit this yearning for political ends by moving toward a limited "de-Stalinization." He associated himself with the exposure of Stalin's abuses of power, ended political terror, rehabilitated many purge victims, and permitted a "thaw" in cultural and intellectual life. Equally as important, Khrushchev

capitalized on the Stalin issue to purge the KGB and to move against rivals within the leadership closely identified with Stalin.

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Khrushchev's condemnation of the worst abuses of Stalin alarmed many other leaders, who were concerned that going too far toward de-Stalinization might prove politically destabilizing and who feared being implicated in Stalin's crimes. Immediately after Khrushchev's removal in October 1964, the official denigration of Stalin was halted, and a period of uneasy official silence about the dictator settled in. During this period Soviet leaders occasionally commented favorably on Stalin's wartime role or disparaged his violations of "Soviet legality." Generally, however, references to Stalin were avoided and no clear-cut "line" on the Stalin issue emerged.

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Since 1979. By the late 1970s several developments impelled many citizens and lower level elites to move toward a more positive appraisal of Stalin:

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- Economic growth rates declined and class lines hardened, causing many Soviets to recall with nostalgia the "good old days" under Stalin, when rapid industrialization created vast opportunities for upward social mobility.
- The memory of Stalin's repressions ebbed, official ideology grew stale, and popular cynicism about regime propaganda increased.
- Society became less orderly and disciplined, and social pathologies such as crime and corruption grew.
- Many citizens unfavorably contrasted the drift of policy under Brezhnev with the tough leadership associated with Stalin.

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[redacted] since the late 1970s [redacted] many Soviet citizens from various walks of life have become increasingly attracted to the Stalin symbol. [redacted]

[redacted] Soviet youth are especially inclined to see Stalin as a positive and heroic figure. A recent USIA poll of Westerners who have had extensive contact with Soviet elites suggested that about 85 percent of senior Soviet officials and 67 percent of middle-level officials felt that the Soviet people need a strong leader, although many of them preferred a leader more tolerant and "sophisticated" than Stalin was. [redacted]

As a consequence of these phenomena, in 1979, on the 100th anniversary of Stalin's birth, the regime articulated an official policy on the public portrayal of Stalin's historical role designed to exploit the Stalin "myth"—and, in particular, the World War II years—to legitimize the system and strengthen patriotism. The new party line portrayed the dictator as a "complicated" leader who deserves credit for his contributions—particularly his wartime leadership of the country—but whose "errors and blunders" and "gross violations" of law cannot be ignored. A 1979 article in the authoritative party journal *Kommunist* took the same tack, calling Stalin "neither an angel nor a demon," and this view of Stalin became standard. [redacted]

By maintaining that each aspect of Stalin's activity must be considered discretely in its own particular historical context, the regime ruled out an overall evaluation of Stalin and attempted to ward off inferences that Stalin's personal "excesses" were in any way endemic to the Soviet system or that other Soviet leaders could be linked to his deeds—notions that have been anathema to the regime since Khrushchev first exposed Stalin's crimes in 1956. In actual practice, however, the official line—by providing for both positive and negative portrayals—has encouraged a continued veiled debate about Stalin in the Soviet media. [redacted]

Current Debate Over Stalin. Brezhnev's death and the ensuing leadership review of internal policy in a succession environment have given impetus to the debate within the Soviet elite over how to deal with the Stalin issue. Some Soviet commentators have pushed harder to extend the selective rehabilitation of Stalin as war leader to more sensitive areas of his rule, while others have voiced criticism of his policies. [redacted]

Stalin's wartime role remains a controversial issue. Over the past year and a half, propagandists have unleashed a flood of new films and printed materials in celebration of the 40th anniversary of victory over Nazi Germany. Much of this propaganda provides extensive and positive treatment of Stalin's leadership. [redacted]

But recent media references to Stalin have not been uniformly positive. In two major World War II documentaries—a film on Marshal Zhukov's life released in December 1984 and a March 1985 television film—Stalin was shown ignoring or rejecting the advice of military leaders to prepare for war. A previously unpublished section of the memoirs of former Politburo member and close Stalin associate Anastas Mikoyan that appeared in a recent issue of an important historical journal also presents a negative picture of Stalin. He is depicted as rejecting warnings of other leaders on the eve of the war and failing to give strong leadership after the Nazi attack. A selection from Zhukov's reminiscences published in *Izvestiya* in May 1985 and a tribute to former Defense Minister Ustinov in a March 1985 issue of *Sovetskaya Rossiya* portrayed Stalin as highhanded and unfair in his treatment of subordinates. [redacted]

Aside from continued ambivalence about Stalin's behavior as a wartime leader, there have been new signs of controversy over his general reputation. Some elites have pushed for a broader rehabilitation of Stalin:

- An authority on Lenin described Stalin in a November 1984 *Sovetskaya Rossiya* article as a vital supporter of Lenin in 1917 and one of a new "finely honed type of professional revolutionary."

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- A May 1985 *Sovetskaya Rossiya* literary review article tried to exonerate Stalin from persecution of peasants during collectivization and to present him as the voice of moderation and mercy during the “tragic events” of 1933.
- In 1983 a novel by Ivan Stadnyuk, which portrayed Stalin as a basically sympathetic figure and was attacked in the media in 1974 for historical inaccuracies, was pulled out of obscurity and awarded the State Prize for Literature. The Komsomol’s literary journal *Molodaya Gvardiya* recently serialized another Stadnyuk novel, which praises Stalin not only as a wartime strategist but also as a compassionate person.
- A historical World War II novel by the conservative editor of *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, Aleksandr Chakovsky, serialized in 1983-84, showed Stalin as a wise and firm diplomat who outshone Roosevelt. [redacted]

At the same time, critical media references to Stalin continue to appear:

- A January 1984 *Izvestiya* article stated that Stalin’s erroneous nationalities policy was “refuted” by Lenin during his last days. Last year, articles by two Central Committee officials in the journal *Voprosy Filosofii* repudiated Stalin’s theory that the class struggle intensifies as socialism develops—which he used to justify repression of ethnic and social groups.
- The reformist economist Yevgeniy Ambartsumov in a 1984 *Molodoy Kommunist* article criticized Stalin’s adherence to only the repressive aspects of Lenin’s teachings.
- *Literaturnaya Gazeta* in April 1985 and *Izvestiya* in May 1985 implicitly condemned Stalin’s purges.
- The prominent poet Yevgeny Yevtushenko—whose poem published in *Pravda* in 1962 was one of the most famous public attacks on Stalin in the Khrushchev period—has again publicly derided him. A new Yevtushenko poem in the 9 September *Pravda* indirectly maligned Stalin (without naming him) by mocking Trofim Lysenko—the pseudogeneticist who was a favorite of Stalin. The poem also

criticized Stalin’s refusal to allow the USSR to enter the computer age and his repression of Bulgakov’s innovative novel *Master and Margarita*.

The proliferation of both positive and negative references to Stalin suggests heightened debate over whether to move toward greater reform or greater repression in various areas—including economic, cultural, and nationalities policies. [redacted]

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Gorbachev’s Position

Like his immediate predecessors, Gorbachev appears to have adopted a differentiated approach toward the Stalin issue. A self-described friend from their student days at Moscow State University law school—the emigre former Czechoslovak Communist Party secretary Zdenek Mlynar—has written that in 1952 Gorbachev confided his distaste for Stalin’s arrests of political opponents. Also, there are some indications that he has resisted the efforts of leaders who want to go further in rehabilitating Stalin. On the other hand, he clearly sees a political value in evoking Stalin’s name to gain support for some of the policies he is promoting. [redacted]

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In his 8 May 1985 speech commemorating the 40th anniversary of the defeat of Nazi Germany, Gorbachev referred to Stalin as head of the State Defense Committee, which, together with the Central Committee, guided the party’s “gigantic” war effort. Gorbachev praised the “efficiency” of Stalin’s centralized war economy, which was guaranteed by the “immutable authority” of the state plan, “discipline and strict responsibility,” “initiative” of workers and scientists, and the “organizing abilities” of industrial managers. This statement could be read as Gorbachev’s own prescription for economic success and as an appeal for support for his discipline and order campaigns. Gorbachev probably was also sensitive to the need to allay fears that he would institute radical liberalizing changes and to rally support among the military and conservative elements in the bureaucracy and population. Gorbachev balanced these positive remarks, however, by listing “miscalculations on our side” as one of the factors that contributed to the early wartime defeats. [redacted]

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The remarks offered by Gorbachev on this occasion appear to have been carefully calibrated to present a modulated picture of Stalin as a complex figure worthy of both praise and blame for specifically identified actions. This approach is consistent with Gorbachev's insistence that official spokesmen must discuss problems more openly so as to enhance the credibility of regime propaganda. Thus, in his speech to the December 1984 party ideological conference, Gorbachev recommended a more realistic portrayal of Soviet history, stating that, although the USSR has achieved "great victories," it has experienced "errors, failures, and mistakes" as well. A *Pravda* editorial of 17 January 1985 elaborated this theme, arguing that history must be examined in all its complexity and not "rewritten or erased." Matter-of-fact media references to some other controversial Soviet historical figures, such as Khrushchev, have increased over the past year or two. [redacted]

[redacted] suggests that Gorbachev is not in favor of any general rehabilitation of Stalin. He reportedly opposed a proposal made in the spring of 1985 to change the name of Volgograd—site of the USSR's greatest wartime victory—back to Stalingrad before the World War II anniversary celebrations.

[redacted] Politburo member Grigoriy Romanov strongly supported renaming Volgograd, and his clash with Gorbachev over this issue became part of an ongoing political battle between the two men, leading to a "very serious" situation prior to Romanov's ouster from the Politburo. According to dissident Soviet historian Roy Medvedev, Chernenko had approved a decree changing the city's name, which Gorbachev canceled shortly after his accession. Gorbachev may have opposed restoration of the city's old name because he believed such a move would be seen to signal the complete rehabilitation of Stalin and a drastic policy swing toward extremely repressive internal policies. [redacted]

Despite Gorbachev's efforts to tighten discipline and strengthen social order, there are straws in the wind suggesting that he might be inclined to move in the

direction of limited relaxation of strictures in some areas of Soviet life:

- Yevtushenko, in a bold mid-December speech to the Russian Republic Writers Union leaked to Western journalists, insisted that Soviet writers must confront politically sensitive topics that have long been taboo. He called for honest accounts of Stalin's purges and the collectivization of agriculture and frank treatment of current corruption among privileged Soviet officials.
- According to Medvedev, Gorbachev has specifically refused appointment requests by several pro-Stalinist literary figures, such as Aleksandr Chakovsky.
- The new draft of the CPSU program published in October includes a negative reference to the "personality cult"—a codeword for Stalin's abuse of power. [redacted]

It is possible that Gorbachev—although probably an admirer of Stalin's centralized economic organization and tight management of society—is also more inclined than some leaders to permit expanded internal party discussion of policy options. Yevtushenko's speech, the publication of his anti-Stalinist poem, and the appearance of a few other literary works by relatively liberal writers, suggest that Gorbachev may be seeking ways of making cultural life more appealing to Soviet intellectuals, even as he tightens the screws on overt dissidents. [redacted]

Prospects

The Stalin issue will remain a political "hot potato" and a bellwether of regime priorities as Gorbachev fleshes out his programs in the coming months. The regime may find it easier to deal with the issue of Stalin's crimes in a few years, after Stalin's few remaining lieutenants have left the scene.¹ But the

¹ Vyacheslav Molotov—Stalin's Foreign Minister and Premier—was readmitted to the party in March 1984, on his 94th birthday, after a gap of over 20 years. [redacted]

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party formula of selective rehabilitation harbors fundamental contradictions. The regime's desire to create a more neutral and believable historical record conflicts with its determination to convey the impression that Stalin was an aberration in an otherwise flawless system. The attempt to exploit the Stalin symbol as a source of legitimacy conflicts with the goal of avoiding association of the leadership with the negative aspects of his rule. Moreover, if Gorbachev moves very far to expand the bounds of permissible discussion of the Stalin period, the process could prove difficult to control. As happened during the cultural "thaw" under Khrushchev, a limited relaxation of strictures encourages pressure from intellectuals for further liberalization. This, in turn, tends to generate conservative counterpressures within the elite that could reverse the process. These dilemmas will not be easily resolved.

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Viewpoint

The views expressed in the following articles are the authors'; they do not necessarily represent a CIA consensus.

What Constitutes Soviet Economic Reform?

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Gertrude Shroeder coined the phrase "a treadmill of reforms" to describe the historical Soviet tendency to tinker with parts of the economic mechanism but to maintain its underlying structure. Tinkering, by and large, has not prevented a secular decline in Soviet economic growth rates; thus we have no a priori reasons to expect a surge in growth to result from future tinkering.

Genuine reform would be more likely to have a major effect on economic growth. Economic predictions are heavily laced with the *ceteris paribus* clause—that is, they are valid only if prior relationships hold. Economic reform, by its very nature, seeks to change past relationships. The key question, then, is how can we discern between real reforms and tinkering camouflaged as reform?

The Soviet economic model, as I see it, has three key characteristics that constitute its underlying structure. They are long-term centralized price formation, central planning, and party intervention. In my view, if these are changed we have a reform and thus a real possibility of major positive or negative changes in long-term growth prospects. If these three characteristics are unchanged, we have tinkering, disguised as reform.

Prices

In market economies, prices (including those in futures markets) result from allocating scarce resources among different preferences. When an economy grows, both relative scarcities and preferences change. Economies are at their most efficient when prices can change quickly to reflect new information regarding changed scarcities and preferences. In market economies, when prices are sticky, inefficiencies such as inventory buildup, spot shortages, or unemployment can result (other reasons, such as poor judgment, can cause these same phenomena, but sticky prices exacerbate the effects).

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The Soviet economic model sets prices by administrative fiat. Prices are usually based on the long-term average cost of producing a good during some previous period, plus a profit markup. Major price changes occur infrequently, at intervals of six to 10 years. This method of price formation ensures that prices exist mainly for accounting purposes. They do not incorporate current information on either relative scarcities or preferences. This inflexible price structure makes it impossible for individuals, managers, and planners to make optimal allocations of current resources, or to make optimal preparations for the future. Even if prices were adjusted annually and were based on the

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principle of marginal—as opposed to average—costs, they could be, after a short time, inadequate signals for rational decisionmaking. [redacted]

Soviet economists occasionally propose permitting bankruptcies as a reform. In the absence of prices that reflect real scarcities, it is not clear that this would be real reform. Just because a Soviet firm incurs losses under administered prices does not mean it would suffer losses under market prices. Permitting bankruptcies without changing the price system could, at least theoretically, eliminate those enterprises that would make the most efficient use of resources if prices reflected scarcities. [redacted]

Because Soviet prices do not contain the information inherent in market-based, flexible prices, the Soviets use an alternate method, central planning, which attempts to allocate resources both to fulfill current production goals and to generate future production possibilities. [redacted]

Central Planning

Soviet central planners seek to deliver the correct inputs at the proper time and place so that a production process can add labor and capital to generate the outputs the central planners desire. Central planning has two principal characteristics. Because of information overload and span-of-control problems, it is hierarchical. Thus the national-level planners allocate tons of steel, a lower level planner allocates steel types, and a still lower level planner allocates specific lengths and diameters of steel pipes. There are too many inputs and outputs in a modern economy for all of them to be allocated in a specific and timely manner by the center. Changing the number of levels in a planning process is tinkering, not reform. Reducing levels will increase both the amount of information to be processed and the number of decisions to be made at every level. Increasing levels can hinder the timeliness of information and decisions as they pass up and down the hierarchy. [redacted]

The other characteristic of central planning is that it is always, to a degree, incorrect. Weather, for example, is unpredictable. If a harvest is larger than expected, central planners will find too few trucks in the fields, and part of the crop will rot. If the weather

is poor, too many trucks will stand idle in the fields when they could have been used elsewhere to advantage. (These problems also exist in market economies, but price signals and expected profits tend to motivate individual entrepreneurs to correct temporary, unforeseen fluctuations in the economy.) Even if the weather is perfect, Soviet planners make next year's plans on the basis of last year's (or earlier) information, and production relationships will have changed. Because prices do not change in response to changes in production possibilities, Soviet planners must wait for information about changes to filter up through the hierarchy before they can reallocate resources. The reallocation process causes further disruptions, as enterprises or consumers with low priorities find that their expected inputs have been delivered elsewhere. [redacted]

Soviet central planners also allocate investment—the wherewithal to produce goods in the future. If planners were omniscient, the capital goods produced each year would be added to the next year's capital stock and would be allocated perfectly so as to be capable of producing the next year's desired assortment of goods. However, if the plan is inconsistent, or not fulfilled, or natural resource conditions deteriorate, or the planner's preferences change, investment will be allocated inefficiently. [redacted]

Faulty prices and the inevitable constraints on planning ensure that plans will be inconsistent and the investment will be misallocated. Central planners will react slowly to these distortions because information about bottlenecks or surpluses will not get back to them with the speed market pricing provides. They will, however, learn of some of the distortions because of the third characteristic of the Soviet economic system—party intervention. [redacted]

Party Intervention

The Communist Party reserves for itself the right both to set long-term economic goals, by long-range plans or by party congress resolutions, and to adjust for the continual microfailures during a current plan period. Thus, if in September of a given year a temporary gasoline shortage occurs, it will be the

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party leadership that ultimately decides which "priority" project (the agro-industrial complex, the consumer program, the energy program, or the economic experiment) will bear the brunt of the shortage. Scarce resources will be allocated through a political process, in part because the information required to make economically rational decisions among competing claimants is lacking. [redacted]

The political allocation of resources is rarely economically efficient. The Soviet system uses political intervention to correct and compensate for some of the more obvious or politically important errors that result from the interaction of imperfect prices and imperfect planning. This political intervention, while ensuring the relative success of certain sectors, has its own costs. It tends to increase uncertainty for most actors in the system and to undermine what little information on scarcity and preference is contained in Soviet prices. Transferring resources away from relatively productive sectors into troubled but politically important sectors is not a prescription for efficient economic growth. [redacted]

These characteristics of the Soviet system ensure that there will be both current inefficiencies and future possibilities to correct them. Thus, real reforms could make significant contributions to future Soviet growth. Conversely, tinkering, disguised as reform, could exacerbate the problems of the system by increasing the speed of the treadmill. How can we tell the difference? I use the rules in the following tabulation.¹

Conclusions

Economic reform means that previous relationships no longer hold. There can be economic changes, such as lengthening the workday, that increase output per year but do not change output per man-hour. We must distinguish between such changes as permitting people to make better decisions in their workdays

¹ It should be noted that elimination of administrative price formation, central planning, and large-scale party intervention—though treated separately here for analytical purposes—are interrelated. Effective reform would almost certainly require simultaneous action on all three fronts. Indeed, piecemeal or partial action could make things worse. For example, curtailing party intervention without also changing the rigid price structure could deprive the USSR of a means of mitigating the misallocation of resources that occurs when prices send the wrong signals. [redacted]

Prices	
Reform	Prices can be changed quickly, in response to changing conditions, and goods can be acquired at these prices.
No reform	Prices still change infrequently, or change by predetermined mechanical formulas.

Planning	
Reform	Hierarchical planning is abandoned, or supplemented by some mechanism by which producers can bid effectively for scarce resources.
No reform	Central planning continues. Goals are set by the center, and resources believed sufficient to achieve these goals are allocated by the center on the basis of a prior period's set of input-output relationships.

Restructuring the composition of investment or the intersectoral, interregional, or intertemporal pattern of investment is not a reform. This reflects a change in planners' preference—a policy change, not a change from central planning.

Administrative decentralization—reducing the power of ministries relative to enterprises—is not a reform. It is continued central planning with a different span of control unless the enterprises simultaneously are freed from Goskomsen, Gosnab, and the party—representing central pricing, central materials supply, and central allocation of labor and capital.

Party intervention	
Reform	Party intervention is limited in scope and context. When it occurs, it is tempered by economic opportunity costs and based on realistic prices.
No reform	Party intervention continually occurs when politically important economic goals get more resources. These interventions are conducted without reference to real economic opportunity costs. [redacted]

(intensive growth) and changes that require longer workdays (extensive growth). We should beware the temptation to call a change a reform if it merely increases output. The Soviets are well aware of the difference between intensive and extensive growth. They are trying to achieve the former, but their track record indicates that they have achieved extensive growth, even if the changes that produced it were cloaked in the rhetoric of intensification. We should be alert to the differences between tinkering and reform so that we do not get caught up on a treadmill of our own and lose sight of the true dynamics of the Soviet economy. [redacted]

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Assessing Soviet Economic Change: Obstacles to Objective Analysis

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Western analysts frequently use the word *reform* as a kind of shorthand to describe attempts to improve the Soviet economic system, applying it to specific measures that are far below the threshold of systemic change. There are problems in using *reform* in this way without careful definition. For example, others may take the term more literally, read in interpretations and impressions that were not intended, and make flawed comparisons that result in poor analysis. Although careless use of the word lends itself to the creation of interesting topics for debate, it may also lead to discussion of false issues that can provide little, if any, illumination on possibilities for economic change in the USSR and their implications for economic performance.

for improving Soviet economic growth prospects, and efficiency is the highest goal of an economic system and the most important criterion for evaluating Soviet economic performance.

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In regard to the first assumption, we cannot totally rule out possible "learning curve" effects; more effective tinkering may bring some improvement. While it is true that piecemeal change may exacerbate problems, the opposite is also a possibility. Similarly, real reform might promote growth *or* create disruption that would undermine growth and, if severe, the regime itself. Real reform may be both economically and politically unacceptable and, therefore, virtually impossible in the Soviet context.

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An additional danger of describing proposals and measures as reformist is that it attributes false motives to Soviet actions. The analyst labels Soviet measures reforms, concludes after more thorough study that the measures are not reforms but mere tinkering within the system, and then blames the Soviets for trying to disguise tinkering as reform! However, the Soviets seldom use the word reform—especially when describing specific measures taken to improve economic performance—and would be more likely, for political reasons, to try to disguise serious proposals for "real reform," that is, changes in the economic system, as merely tinkering. If continuous tinkering should result in real reform, the Soviet leadership would likely be the last to admit it.

The second assumption is closely related to the first. Optimal efficiency is an artificial construct that ignores the tradeoffs necessary in the real world between political expediency, social goals, and economic efficiency. It is largely a value judgment to argue that resources are "misallocated" according to market preferences for highest efficiency and to ignore the priority the Soviet leadership gives to political and social considerations in allocation decisions. The same type of value judgment appears in discussions of party intervention in economic decisions. In conditions of limited supplies, is allocation by the political leadership necessarily worse than if market prices did the allocating? Some situations are best managed by political control, such as rationing in the United States during World War II.

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Too much attention to defining reform and identifying measures as reformist or not can obscure less theoretical, but essential questions such as how much and what type of change is feasible and/or likely and what are the most likely effects. In short, concern about labels does not provide the best insight on where the Soviet economy is going. Furthermore, it may encourage tunnel vision and failure to examine alternative possibilities. This happens when the word reform becomes a value judgment based on two questionable assumptions: reform is the best method

There is a tendency to blame all Soviet economic shortcomings on the economic system and to ignore other factors. Yet study of specific situations does not demonstrate that all problems can be surmounted by the economist's ideal solution of optimally efficient allocation through supply-demand pricing. There is a related tendency to compare the Soviet system in

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action with an idealized abstraction of a market system—a scientifically questionable procedure that could produce poor analysis. Although it is valid to compare a market system in operation with a centrally planned economy, it is perhaps even more insightful to examine how the Soviet economy in operation diverges from the conception of a centrally planned system.

Search for the most appropriate label does not obviate the need for careful and detailed analysis. Applying terms such as market, centrally planned, reform, or tinkering will not tell us where the Soviet economy is headed. For better insight, we might do well to put aside the eye-catching issue of general reforms and set to work examining specific attempts to tinker and the results they are most likely to have.

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For example, a comparison of US and Soviet agriculture is often used to demonstrate the benefits of a free market system over central planning. Agriculture is a particularly poor example for such a comparison. Aside from climatic advantages and the benefits of a technologically more advanced society in the United States, it ignores US price supports, the land bank, and other intervention in the market. Furthermore, while Soviet planners are not omniscient, make mistakes about investment decisions, are subject to unforeseen events, and respond only after a timelag, private entrepreneurs face similar limitations. The weather is unpredictable also in unplanned economies, and the private farmer cannot respond to price signals from the market before the next growing season. Perhaps a million small mistakes are simply more politically and socially acceptable in a democratic system than one big mistake—or perhaps mistakes have less severe repercussions in a more abundant economy.

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Obviously, there are in actuality many exceptions to the ideal market-type economy. We estimate US prospects for growth on how the economy actually operates—not on how an ideal market economy might perform. Prospects for the Soviet economy need to be estimated in similar fashion. It is insufficient, for example, to say that Soviet prices are centrally planned and are, therefore, inefficient. Periodic price changes bring temporary improvements. Which prices are most inefficient, are they becoming more or less so, and what political or social goals are served thereby? What is the extent and impact of decentralized setting of supplements and reductions to wholesale prices according to quality?

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