



**Directorate of
Intelligence**

~~Top Secret~~



Developments in Afghanistan



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3 July 1987

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SOV DA 87-007JX*

3 July 1987

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Developments in Afghanistan [Redacted]

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1 Perspective—USSR-Afghanistan: International Impact of Soviet-Afghan Peace Initiative [Redacted]

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Building methodically on the "peace" proposals made by their Afghan clients in January 1987, the Soviets are seeking to promote the growth of Kabul's international legitimacy. We believe the Soviets have concluded that the campaign is softening foreign support for the insurgents and is helping to make the war be seen as an East-West issue. [Redacted]

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15 Resistance Underground Developing in Kabul [Redacted]

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Because better security measures by Soviet and Afghan regime forces have impeded resistance infiltration into Kabul, some insurgent organizations have created underground organizations to sustain activity there. These neophyte clandestine groups must strengthen their operational capabilities before they are likely to have a significant impact. [Redacted]

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19 More Second Thoughts on Afghanistan [Redacted]

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Until Gorbachev and *glasnost*, the Soviets behaved as though they could conceal the extent of the egregious errors made by the political high command in 1979 regarding Afghanistan. The conventional line—that the Soviet position on Afghanistan was necessary, is desirable, and will be successful—remains dominant, but there have recently been signs of change, including a turn toward candor and gloom. [Redacted]


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
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Najib's Post-Plenum Factional Blues



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General Secretary Najib is unlikely to strengthen his hold on either the Parcham faction or the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan as the result of the Central Committee plenum held on 10 June. His personal fortunes, in fact, are likely to continue to decline and PDPA factionalism probably will escalate.



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Afghanistan: Selected Political Chronology, March-June 1987



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
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Developments in Afghanistan 


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Perspective

USSR-Afghanistan: International Impact of Soviet-Afghan Peace Initiative 


Building methodically on the "peace" proposals made by their Afghan clients in January 1987, the Soviets are seeking to promote the growth of Kabul's international legitimacy. The Soviets appear to have concluded that the campaign is softening foreign support for the insurgents and is helping to influence world public opinion to view the war in Afghanistan as an East-West issue. To further the peace process, Afghan party chief Najib recently extended Kabul's cease-fire and national reconciliation program. 

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Courting International Opinion

Since the peace offensive began in January, the Kabul regime has scored some important diplomatic successes. Zimbabwe, whose Prime Minister is chairman of the Nonaligned Movement (NAM), and Cyprus have recognized Kabul, although neither has accepted an Afghan envoy. Austria is likely to permit Kabul to open an embassy in Vienna this summer and seems ready—apparently at Riyadh's urging—to host an Afghan representation in Saudi Arabia. The Afghan regime is also seeking expanded ties to Algeria, Syria, Nicaragua, Argentina, and Mexico. In addition, Afghan Foreign Minister Wakil visited New Delhi in February, Indian Foreign Minister Tiwari visited Kabul in April, and Afghan Prime Minister Keshtmand visited Baghdad in early June. 


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The Soviets have intensified efforts to erode support for the Pakistani-sponsored UN resolution on Afghanistan. 

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


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Soviet officials, seeking to weaken the Organization of Islamic Conference's publicly hardline, anti-Soviet stance on the war, have been urging OIC members to show flexibility in their next resolution on Afghanistan to help the USSR withdraw with "honor." Officials of Kuwait, which is the OIC chairman until 1989, have told US diplomats they will ask Islamabad to be more responsive to Soviet proposals for ending the war. US diplomatic reporting indicates that Iran, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia are worried that the recent Iraq-Afghanistan cooperation agreement will have an adverse impact on the OIC members' attitudes toward the war. 

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Kabul's delegations to two NAM conferences in June apparently made some headway. At the "south-south" cooperation conference in North Korea, the Afghans elicited praise from the Algerian Foreign Minister for Kabul's national reconciliation campaign and prompted a hint that Algiers may expand bilateral ties. The Afghan envoy to the NAM's information ministers conference in Zimbabwe prevented any mention of Afghanistan in the final communique—reportedly because of Pakistan's diplomatic ineptness and the lack of moderate support for Islamabad's position. [redacted]

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These actual and potential diplomatic successes are not, however, solely the result of Kabul's peace plan. Moscow has long used various forms of leverage—weapons, economic aid, and diplomatic support—on nonaligned states, and Kuwait and Iraq may now be particularly susceptible. But the peace proposals also give those who have been resisting Soviet lobbying efforts a plausible pretext for distancing themselves from the insurgents. [redacted]

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Making the War an East-West Matter

Moscow and Kabul have paralleled their peace offensive with intensified public relations efforts to identify Washington as the main obstacle to a political settlement. Moscow has repeatedly asserted that the United States is escalating and prolonging the war—seeking to "bleed" the USSR—by providing increasingly sophisticated weapons to the insurgents. [redacted]

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Soviet claims of "interference" by the United States in Afghanistan probably are attracting attention in Western Europe and having some impact in the Third World and the Middle East, especially in the wake of US arms sales to Iran and the increased US naval presence in the Persian Gulf. Moscow has used Washington's stated policy of limiting Soviet influence in the Gulf to lend credence to its claim that the United States' Afghan policy is animated only by anti-Soviet motives. Any increase in the tendency of Third World and Islamic capitals to view the Afghan war as another insoluble East-West issue is likely to reduce their willingness to attribute sole responsibility for the continuing war to the USSR, as well as weaken their resistance to recognizing Najib's regime. [redacted]

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Prospects

Moscow may soon propose, as rumored in the media, the first direct talks among Moscow, Kabul, the resistance, Pakistan, and the United States. Even if these maneuvers are merely negotiating tactics, Moscow probably believes they will win public relations points because the resistance and its backers are unlikely to call the Soviet bluff. Furthermore, Moscow almost certainly expects the peace proposal to ensure less international criticism of a continued or even somewhat increased Soviet presence in Afghanistan should the Geneva process fail to produce a political settlement of the war. [redacted]

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
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
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Important Khalis Commander Killed [Redacted]

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Recent fighting around Qandahar has cost Mohammad Yunus Khalis' faction of the Hizbi Islami (Islamic Party) one of its best commanders. Lala Malang (not to be confused with Suleiman Mohammad—known as Mullah Malang—another well-known Khalis commander in Qandahar Province) was killed on 3 June when a shell hit his headquarters, according to a resistance press statement. Malang was defending insurgent positions in the Darya-ye Arghandab, northeast of Qandahar city, against an offensive by Soviet and regime forces at the time of his death. [Redacted]

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Although Malang directly commanded only about 100 men, [Redacted] [Redacted] he cooperated with other resistance commanders to launch attacks around Qandahar city. In the past year he had attacked regime outposts, ambushed Soviet convoys, and rocketed Qandahar airport, [Redacted] [Redacted] Malang, a native of the region, was captured by the regime in 1984 and exchanged in February 1986 for a Soviet prisoner held by the resistance. He later recounted sharing cells in Kabul's Pol-e Charkhi prison with Khalqi former cabinet ministers, some of whom have since been released. Malang was 27 at the time of his death. [Redacted]

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Insurgents Report Deteriorating Food Situation in Takhar [Redacted]

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A number of insurgent commanders in Takhar Province report that the region's food situation has deteriorated because of successive years of low rainfall, intermittent bombing of agricultural infrastructure, and the intentional destruction of harvested crops by Soviet forces. According to the US Consulate in Peshawar, Jamiat-i-Islami commanders say foodstuffs from Pakistan are appearing in the bazaars in Takhar because of the unavailability of local products. A further result of the poor agricultural situation is the steep climb in food prices since 1978; the price of wheat—a staple of the Afghan diet—has increased more than 400 percent since 1978. [Redacted]

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Because of the critical food situation, a number of residents were ready to flee to Pakistan in late 1986, insurgent leaders told the US Consulate in Peshawar. Most, however, obeyed the order of commander Masood and remained in Takhar. A number of commanders are now supporting the local civilian population by sharing foodstuffs brought in from Pakistan in insurgent supply convoys. [Redacted]

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Supporting the local population will increase the financial and logistic burden on resistance groups in Takhar. There was probably adequate precipitation this spring for at least an average crop, although it is too early to estimate the total size. [Redacted] [Redacted] does not confirm insurgent reports of widespread deliberate damage to crops or agricultural infrastructure. [Redacted]

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**Resistance Underground
Developing in Kabul** [Redacted]

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Because better security measures by Soviet and Afghan regime forces have impeded resistance infiltration into Kabul, some insurgent organizations have created underground organizations to sustain activity there. These neophyte clandestine groups must strengthen their operational capabilities before they are likely to have a significant impact. [Redacted]

Working Within Confines

A number of insurgent commanders in the Kabul area, concerned about more restricted infiltration opportunities and recognizing the value of more effective urban operations, have begun forming urban cells. [Redacted]

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A Tougher Nut To Crack

To constrain insurgent activity in the Afghan capital, Soviet and Afghan regime forces have gradually increased security measures over the past several years. These include periodic sweep operations by ground forces on the outskirts of the city and some air patrols, including attack helicopter escorts for arriving and departing aircraft at Kabul International Airport. Both Soviet and Afghan soldiers man numerous security outposts positioned on the perimeter of Kabul to inhibit infiltration. [Redacted]

The urban underground employed by these groups is typically composed of three-to-seven-man cells. Cell members frequently either serve in the government or possess counterfeit documents identifying them as government employees, army veterans, students, or secret police. [Redacted]

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Cell networks have a rear support base in the mountains outside Kabul, where meetings, planning sessions, training, and logistic activity occur. By using undercover insurgents and false documentation, cell members are able to acquire transportation to smuggle weapons and fighters into the city. [Redacted]

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Within Kabul, the Soviets and the Afghan regime have increased sentries at government offices and public buildings and established numerous checkpoints. [Redacted] To reduce vulnerability of their installations to attack, Soviet military forces in Kabul have erected barbed wire fences and dug barrier trenches. [Redacted]

[Redacted] Sympathizers in the government, including Khalqi party members, also pass information, [Redacted] [Redacted] In addition, the insurgents employ old people and children to provide tipoffs, monitor activities, and act as messengers. [Redacted]

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These measures have made it more difficult for insurgent forces to infiltrate Kabul and carry out operations. Jamiat-i-Islami commander Mullah Iza-tullah has underscored the restraining effect of the expansion of the belt of security posts around Kabul. He also reported that his forces suffered heavy casualties from Soviet counterbattery fire in mid-1986 when they initiated a rocket attack on Kabul. [Redacted]

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The Role of Urban Networks in Nonurban Insurgencies

Urban networks or infrastructures often play a critical role in rural-based insurgencies, such as in Afghanistan. This role varies greatly depending on the historical origin and the pattern of development of each insurgency. Generally, urban networks play a major role in most foco movements and politically organized insurgencies but have a more minor role in traditionally organized insurgencies.

[Redacted]

The role of urban networks in rural-based insurgencies can involve any of the following activities:

- Recruitment. *Urban networks sometimes are a major source of manpower for rural organizations, especially for skilled or educated cadres.*
- Intelligence. *Urban networks are frequently the major source of intelligence on the government and the military high command.*
- Liaison with urban political groups. *Urban cadres are the primary links of rural-based groups to urban political, labor, and student organizations. It is often through the urban networks that various national political groups are infiltrated.*

- Logistic support. *Urban networks sometimes are the major logistic base of support for rural movements.*
- Financing. *Some rural-based insurgencies rely mainly on urban areas for financing, especially during the initial phases of the insurgency.*
- Terrorism. *Without an urban network, rural insurgents cannot successfully engage in terrorism in the cities.*
- Sanctuary. *Urban networks sometimes become refuges for the remnants of defeated rural cadres, who use the time to regroup and plan their next move.*
- Diversionary campaigns. *Urban networks can divert the attention of security forces from rural areas through terrorism or agitation.*
- Facilitating military attacks. *Urban networks can aid military attacks against urban areas, especially during the final stages of a rural guerrilla war*

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Critical Gaps

The resistance's urban infrastructure lacks several important components of successful long-term undergrounds. Its support network has a high rate of turnover. [Redacted]

Moreover, most commanders from the major resistance parties apparently do not place much emphasis on propaganda, disinformation, or psychological operations against the regime. [Redacted]

Of particular significance is the fact that the resistance cells are not self-sustaining. The reliance on financial and material assistance from the resistance parties in Pakistan sometimes has a dampening effect on activity levels. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Outlook

Building an effective underground has not been easy for most Afghan insurgent groups because of the tight discipline and elaborate organization required. In the near term, continued heavy combat activity, increasingly stringent security measures around the country's main cities, and the preference of the rural-based insurgents for nonurban military operations are likely to slow efforts to develop a strong urban underground. Nonetheless, the insurgent leadership's growing recognition of the need for a better urban effort and the steps taken so far to establish underground organizations could eventually result in a more active and widespread urban-based resistance. [Redacted]

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More Second Thoughts on Afghanistan

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One day history may judge the Soviet record in Afghanistan as the USSR's sorriest extended performance in the international arena since the Winter War against Finland in 1939. The serious mistakes made by the political high command in Moscow in 1979 numb the analytical sensibilities of anyone not actively involved in the policymaking process at the time. Until Gorbachev and *glasnost*, the regime acted as if the extent of these egregious mistakes could somehow be concealed. The conventional line—that the Soviet position on Afghanistan was necessary, is desirable, and will be successful—remains dominant, but there have recently been signs of change, including a turn toward candor and gloom.

- Seriously misapprehended the extent and durability of international opprobrium over their role in Afghanistan and the willingness of outside powers—especially the United States—to support the resistance.

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A Turn Toward Candor and Gloom

Gorbachev set the tone in 1986 when he referred to Afghanistan as a “bleeding wound”—hardly a reassuring metaphor. Since then, the press has written about Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan who have fought (and implicitly died). Letters of complaints about the Afghan war have been regularly printed in Soviet papers. More surprising, a few Soviet writers, encouraged by high-level calls for fearless journalism, have begun to treat Afghanistan almost as a failure of national policy or a venture gone awry:

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Major Mistakes

It is difficult to imagine any important error in judgment the Brezhnev Politburo did not make in 1979 regarding Afghanistan. Probably assuming that victory would come relatively quickly and easily, Soviet leaders:

- Completely misjudged the time it would take to win the war or at least gain effective control over most of the country and its inhabitants.
- Badly underrated the hatred of the Afghan people and the will, skill, and staying power of the resistance.
- Grossly miscalculated the costs of the war in rubles, arms and equipment, diversion of resources, and, above all, casualties.
- Greatly underestimated the significance and extent of adverse reactions to the war within the USSR.
- Were much too optimistic about their Afghan allies' ability to attract support and their capacity to govern and fight.

- What was once described as a limited action against regional “bandits” has since been called by TASS a “protracted fratricidal war.” This statement implies Soviet involvement in a foreign civil war for which there is as yet no foreseeable outcome.
- The Soviet allies in this conflict are seen in some commentaries as weak, divided, and as running a sorely troubled enterprise. A television report on Afghanistan broadcast in February 1987 noted, “The dissensions, feuds, and the bloody clashes within the ruling party have weakened the new government and helped the internal and external counterrevolution.”
- It is now admitted publicly that the enemy is much stronger than the official portrayal had traditionally allowed. A Soviet radio spokesman conceded in March that the forces of the counterrevolution were an enormous army, well-armed and well-trained.

* This article was prepared by a contractor who relied exclusively on unclassified literature. It was not coordinated within this Agency. The views expressed are those of the author

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- The United States, it is now said, is able to exploit Soviet policy toward Afghanistan for its own purposes.
- One senior Soviet journalist has even tacitly admitted that the USSR, despite years of trying and the deaths of thousands of Soviet soldiers, has failed to pacify Afghanistan. [Redacted]

Interpreted in this manner, the new message may be that the Soviet Union should soon withdraw from Afghanistan. The message consists, moreover, of damning specifics (Kabul's weaknesses and the insurgents' strengths, for example), against which are arrayed old generalities (internationalist duty, imperialist aggression, and fraternal revolution). [Redacted]

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Puzzling Approach

This inclination in the Soviet media toward greater honesty and pessimism concerning Afghanistan probably reflects a fairly widespread body of Soviet opinion, particularly among the intelligentsia. But it also suggests an effort by the Gorbachev leadership to acquaint the public gradually with the truth about Afghanistan for reasons of its own. [Redacted]

The regime may be only testing the waters, trying to gauge the temper of the public, and, perhaps, seeking to move the people into support of a more active and conciliatory search for a solution. The new message has been put forward in bits and pieces, has not been advanced with any great frequency, and still could be withdrawn, probably without much effort or major repercussions. [Redacted]

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On the surface, this openness is puzzling, for it is likely to increase popular opposition to the war. The message inherent in the new approach appears to be devastating: the USSR intervened—on the basis of serious misjudgments—in a full-scale “fratricidal war” on the side of a movement seriously weakened by internal strife and is combating—so far with uncertain results—a force of substantial strength that is effectively supported by a superpower adversary. [Redacted]

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* This article was prepared by a contractor who relied exclusively on unclassified literature. It was not coordinated within this Agency. The views expressed are those of the author. [Redacted]

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**Najib's Post-Plenum
Factional Blues** [redacted]

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General Secretary Najib is unlikely to strengthen his hold on either the Parcham faction or the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) as a result of the Central Committee plenum held on 10 June. Najib continued his purge of pro-Babrak Karmal loyalists from the Politburo and government but was forced by political realities, and perhaps Soviet pressure, to promote Minister of the Interior Gulabzoi—leader of the Khalq faction and a potential candidate to become the general secretary—to full Politburo membership. For the foreseeable future, Najib's personal fortunes are likely to continue declining, and PDPA factionalism is likely to escalate. [redacted]

Moreover, Najib's recently promoted loyalists lack the status and political experience to make the Politburo and Central Committee reliable instruments of the General Secretary's will. [redacted]

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Rising Khalqi Power

Najib's lack of control over the PDPA probably was also worsened by the plenum's nomination of Gulabzoi to full Politburo membership. Gulabzoi has significantly improved his standing in Kabul's pecking order during the past year largely because of his ability to win the loyalty of disparate groups of Khalqis. He has also shown a talent for exploiting the disarray of the Parcham faction spawned by Najib-Karmal tensions and the domestic failure of Kabul's peace initiative. Gulabzoi's command of the Interior Ministry's paramilitary organization—the Sarandoi—has also given him an independent power base with which his party rivals must reckon. [redacted]

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Purging Karmal Loyalists

Najib's principal purpose in conducting the short plenum—the meeting was adjourned before lunch on the day it started—was to continue his purge of Parchamis loyal to former party chief Karmal. Najib began the removals in the spring of 1987 by firing the Ministers of Public Health and Agriculture and the head of the State Committee on Radio, Television, and Cinema. He continued cleaning house in May 1987 by arranging for Karmal to travel to Moscow for "medical treatment" after the ex-leader repeatedly refused to support Kabul's peace initiative or voluntarily accept exile. In the recent plenum, Najib arranged to remove longtime Karmal loyalist Anahita Ratebzad from the Politburo under the guise of retirement and shunted Karmal's younger brother Mohammad Baryalai to a less important party post.

Gulabzoi and the Khalqis have been particularly bold since the failure of Najib's peace plan. In April, according to [redacted] US Embassy reporting, the Khalqis demanded an equal share of ministerial portfolios, the return of several prominent Khalqis from exile in diplomatic posts abroad, and the release of some Amin-era Khalqis imprisoned since 1979. Najib initially refused but eventually yielded to Soviet pressure and released a dozen prominent Khalqis from Pol-e Charkhi prison. [redacted]

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[redacted] Najib probably hoped that the released Khalqis would challenge Gulabzoi's hold on the faction because he had tried to oust several of the men from ministerial posts they held in the 1970s. According to the US Embassy, however, the freed Khalqis have sided with Gulabzoi, thereby maintaining the faction's unity. [redacted]

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[redacted] Najib also promoted several of his own supporters—including Najmuddin Kawiani and Niaz Mohammad Mohand, both secretaries of the PDPA Central Committee—to be candidate members of the Politburo. [redacted]

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None of these moves is likely to strengthen Najib's grasp on his own Parcham faction. So long as Ratebzad and Baryalai remain in Kabul, they will symbolize Babrak Karmal's enduring popularity and could potentially serve as a focal point for Najib's opponents.

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Gulabzoi's rapidly rising star also suggests that the Soviets may look to him as a potential successor to Najib. The US Embassy in Kabul reports that the Soviets may have recently brought the Khalqi leader to Moscow for private discussions. Moreover, Gulabzoi recently ignored the wishes of Najib and the Soviets by trying to arrest the troublesome but influential leader of a pro-regime tribal militia in Kabul, [redacted] Gulabzoi does not seem to have been upbraided for this; in fact, he was made a full member of the Politburo shortly after the incident. Finally, the Chinese press has recently carried several articles contending that Gulabzoi—with the assistance of Soviet advisers—has methodically replaced most Parchami district secretaries in the Afghan provinces bordering Pakistan with Khalqis loyal to him. There is no evidence that the Soviets are planning to dump Najib in the near future, but Moscow is cultivating Gulabzoi and carefully keeping open its options. [redacted]

Outlook

Parchami factionalism is likely to remain problematic for Najib and could be exacerbated if [redacted] [redacted] Karmal is returned to Kabul shortly before the six-month anniversary of the peace initiative. Moscow's failure to remove Ratebzad and Baryalai from the scene also suggests that the Soviets may be mulling over the idea of replacing Najib either with Karmal or some combination of pro-Karmal Parchamis and the Gulabzoi-led Khalqis. Moreover, Moscow's recent appeasement of Khalqi demands, the Soviets' acquiescence in the rise of Gulabzoi's personal power, and Gulabzoi's recent trip to the USSR also may indicate that the Soviets have not ruled out the possibility of dumping the Parcham faction altogether and giving the Khalqis another shot at power.

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Afghanistan: Selected Political Chronology

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March-June 1987

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- 24 March** Cyprus agreed to open relations with the Kabul regime, according to Kabul media reports. Sarwar Mangal, the Afghan Ambassador to Hungary, was reportedly designated nonresident Ambassador to Cyprus.
- 27 March** Najib released 13 prominent members of the Khalqi faction jailed since the Soviet invasion.  the former prisoners included Abdul Hakim Jauzjani, former Minister of Justice and Attorney General; Abdul Ghorbandi, former Minister of Commerce; and Dr. Adbar Shahwali, former Politburo member and Deputy Prime Minister. 25X1
- 31 March** Zimbabwe announced it will establish diplomatic relations with Kabul.
- 2 April** *Pravda* reported that Afghan insurgents rocketed a town in the Tajik SSR in early March, killing one and wounding two. This was the first public Soviet acknowledgement of cross-border attacks by Afghan insurgents.
- 6 April** The Kabul regime participated for the first time in a United Arab Emirates trade fair at the invitation of the Emir of Sharjah.
- 25 April** Foreign Minister Wakil met with Fidel Castro and other Cuban leaders while in Cuba for a session of the Group of 77.
- 27 April** Ninth anniversary ceremonies commemorating the Saur Revolution were interrupted by supporters of former Afghan leader Karmal.
- 3-5 May** F. N. Tiwari became the first Indian Foreign Minister to visit Kabul since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Tiwari publicly praised Kabul's national reconciliation program and dismissed the Afghan threat to Pakistan as "imaginary."
- 4 May** TASS reported erstwhile Afghan leader Babrak Karmal's arrival in Moscow for "medical treatment."
- 5-6 May** A series of bombings in Kabul—including one at City Polytechnic University in which a PDPA official was killed—probably were protests of Karmal's forced departure from Afghanistan, according to the US Embassy in Kabul.
- 6 May** Yunis Khalis began a six-month term as resistance alliance spokesman. He is the first to serve a second term in the position, previously occupied for three-month stints.

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- 6 May** The International Trade Center (ITC) reportedly told US Embassy officials that it will permanently close its Kabul office in June. Western donors to the ITC—which serves as the local executing agency for the UN Conference on Trade and Development and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade—claimed its presence helped legitimize the Kabul regime.
- Early May** Mohammedullah Safi Subhani, Afghan Ambassador to the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen since January 1986 and a Khalq-faction member, was recalled to Kabul.
- 14 May** International Committee for Red Cross (ICRC) officials broke off prison visits in Kabul following a dispute with the Kabul regime over access to prisoners. Work on an ICRC orthopedic center in Kabul—earlier tied to prison visits—is reportedly slowed but continuing.
- 17-28 May** Afghan Foreign Minister Wakil visited Czechoslovakia, Poland, Bulgaria, and Moscow to discuss Afghan–East European trade and “cultural ties,” according to the Kabul regime press.
- 20 May** In an interview with the Italian magazine *L'Express*, Soviet leader Gorbachev strongly hinted at a role for Zahir Shah in a post-Soviet Afghan government.

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- 3 June** Najib announced the extension of the regime's unilateral “cease-fire,” due to expire 4 July.
- 4-7 June** Prime Minister Keshtmand led an official delegation to Baghdad.
- 10 June** The “June” plenum of the Central Committee of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan was convened, following numerous postponements.
- 11 June** Amanullah, the chairman of the Qandahar National Reconciliation Council, was killed by the resistance.
- 14 June** Mourners at funerals in Kabul for Afghan military officers and soldiers killed in action in Qandahar and Paktia clashed with police, according to US Embassy reporting.

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