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Africa Review



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22 January 1988

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ALA AR 88-003
22 January 1988
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Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA. Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief, Production Staff, Office of African and Latin American Analysis, []

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Articles**South Africa: Joint Management Centers—Concession or Coercion?** []

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A strong commitment to the restoration of order in the black townships has prompted South Africa to increase its use of Joint Management Centers (JMCs), government organizations that are responsible for social, political, and economic as well as security matters in the townships. Pretoria developed the JMCs, which are manned by both military and civilian personnel, because it believes that the problem of black unrest cannot be solved through solely military means. The effectiveness of the JMC system will be important in determining the nature and intensity of future conflict in the townships. []

Background

The JMCs are part of the government's National Security Management System, which was established in 1979 by P.W. Botha to address the lack of coordination among government departments on security issues and to institutionalize Pretoria's control over regional, local, and civic activity in the townships. The State Security Council heads the NSMS at the Cabinet level. On the regional level, 11 JMCs—organized along the defense force command structure—coordinate strategies to deal with actual or potential security problems. Under the JMCs, 60 sub-JMCs and 448 mini-JMCs operate at the sub-regional and local levels and include as members local military and police chiefs, postmasters, and other municipal officials. []

Every JMC, sub-JMC, and mini-JMC consists of three committees that are not equal in influence. The intelligence committee, with its security and oversight responsibilities, is considered the most important. It allows the police, military, civilian National Intelligence Service, and military intelligence to pool information and is comprised primarily of security force personnel. The political, economic, and social

committee—whose members are mostly civilian—deals with problems of rent, services, and the provision of facilities in the townships; these issues often become security matters. This committee works closely with the communications committee, which informs the public about JMC decisions and actions through the press, radio, or distribution of pamphlets. []

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Each JMC level concentrates on affairs within its own region and functions largely as a clearinghouse for information—including everything from rock-throwing incidents to local sanitary conditions. The JMC's primary objective is to anticipate, identify, and deal with flashpoints before they become security problems. According to press reports, each JMC monitors and evaluates the performance of administrators and politicians and checks on local implementation of decisions taken at higher levels. The centers draw up lists of grievances provided by residents, compile ideas on introducing or improving community facilities, and keep tabs on important local figures, particularly black activists. []

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The prominent role played by security force members in the JMCs has created friction among its members. The US Embassy reports that although civilians outnumber security force representatives, all JMC chairmen and many sub- and mini-JMC leaders are senior military or police officers. Pretoria's statement that increased security force involvement in the townships was necessitated by local government inadequacy and ineffectiveness has only served to aggravate civilian unhappiness with the prominence of security personnel. []

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JMC Case Study: The Oil Spot Strategy

The JMC is the vehicle through which Pretoria has sought to implement its "oil spot" strategy for dealing with black unrest. The term refers to the government policy of injecting large amounts of money into certain townships to improve living conditions; the goal is to win the hearts and minds of black township residents. Alexandra township, near Johannesburg, is the initial target for a \$47 million reconstruction project. Alexandra was chosen, in our view, because of the township's history of political activism and location on Johannesburg's doorstep. Government officials hope that the township will serve as an example to urban blacks, showing what can be accomplished by working with the authorities and the military. [redacted]

The oil spot strategy has led to a new focus for the Alexandra JMC. JMC activity in Alexandra initially involved massive searches by the security forces and the detention of hundreds of black activists, but now the JMC is improving housing, roads, and community services. Under JMC auspices, Alexandra has acquired its first post office and telephone service, four new schools, and a new health clinic. The JMC, according to Embassy reports, has also attempted to gain cooperation from organizations such as parent-teacher associations in an effort to gain legitimacy in the black community. [redacted]

Opposition to JMCs

Although some blacks support the economic—and to a lesser extent political—reforms implemented by JMCs, we believe that most politically active blacks view the JMCs as a tool of co-optation designed to suppress black opposition and divide the black community. Those blacks who see positive aspects argue that JMC efforts to involve black grievance committees in township management and the JMC commitment to economic progress suggest that Pretoria is reevaluating its strategy toward blacks. Opponents, however, charge that the JMCs use the media and other means to spread disinformation about organizations such as the United Democratic Front as part of an effort to counter black organizational activity at the grassroots level. Black opponents also point to the security forces' extensive network of informers in the townships as evidence that

the JMCs use questionable methods to achieve "negative" goals. Finally, the absence of blacks from JMC administrative machinery has convinced many blacks that Pretoria's objective is not political development, but rather more effective government control over the townships, according to the Embassy. [redacted]

While resistance to the JMCs is apparent among blacks, the most active political opposition to the system itself emanates from liberal whites. Liberal politicians argue that the JMCs are undemocratic by definition because they are composed of civil servants and not elected representatives, and are accountable to the State Security Council—an appointed body which reports only to the President. Liberal politicians also argue that the JMC's ability to go around normal government channels and to make important decisions in secret reflects the growing authoritarianism of the government. [redacted]

Outlook

Senior government officials do not believe that the days of violent confrontation have ended in the townships, but they apparently are convinced they have established a systematic process that will contain violence at an acceptable level. If unrest continues at current low levels the JMCs will increasingly emphasize local economic and—to a much lesser extent—political reforms. We believe that Pretoria still calculates that it will be able to accommodate black political aspirations without endangering white control if blacks can be co-opted into having a stake in the status quo. [redacted]

Despite government rhetoric, however, we judge that the JMC system will have only limited success because of its inability to address black political demands and because Pretoria has insufficient financial resources to improve black living conditions nationwide. In addition, Pretoria's theory that improved economic conditions will ease black political demands is problematic; [redacted] even better-off blacks remain politically active. The "oil spot" campaign, combined with tight security measures, may partially succeed in dividing

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black moderates from activists, but we believe the JMC system will not satisfy black political aspirations at the national level. Instead, the JMC system probably will lead to the institutionalization of the security force role in South Africa and the continued decline in importance of even white elective government bodies.

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**Somalia: Security Concerns
in the North** [redacted]

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Somali insurgent activity in the country's strategically vital north, though limited, continues to strain Mogadishu's limited resources and tie down government troops. Unless Ethiopia substantially increases its backing for the insurgents, however, they will lack the capability to prevail, and we believe the current stalemate is likely to persist. We doubt Addis Ababa will become significantly more involved so long as the Ethiopian regime remains preoccupied with supporting southern Sudanese insurgents and countering a recent surge of insurgent activity in Eritrea. [redacted]

Disaffected Majertain in 1976 formed the Somali Salvation Front (SSF) and, in 1981, joined forces with two other groups to form the Somali Democratic Salvation Front (SDSF)—ostensibly for the purpose of restoring Somalia to democracy, but, we believe, primarily to overthrow the Siad regime. The SSF had little impact before the Ogaden war between Ethiopia and Somalia in 1976-77, despite some support Addis Ababa provided to the movement in retaliation for Mogadishu's backing to the anti-Ethiopian Western Somali Liberation Front,² according to academic studies. [redacted]

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Nonetheless, President Siad is concerned about Ethiopia's involvement with Somali insurgents and further Ethiopian attacks in the north. He will continue to seek more US and other foreign military assistance to appease his military's demands for more sophisticated equipment. Mogadishu has been dissatisfied with the level of US military assistance and has sought aid from non-Western sources, such as Romania and Hungary. Efforts to obtain such assistance from the Soviet Bloc have met with little success to date. [redacted]

Growth of Ethiopian Involvement. Ethiopian involvement with Somalia's northern insurgents increased substantially following Mogadishu's crushing defeat in the Ogaden war. Although Addis Ababa stopped short of invading Somalia, Ethiopia increased pressure by augmenting support to the Somali rebels, [redacted]

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Somali Insurgents

Background. Somalia's insurgent groups date from the coup in 1969 that brought Siad Barre to power. A civilian government—whose leadership was drawn heavily from the Majertain clan¹—was ousted in favor of the small Marehan clan from which Siad filled key positions in the government and military. The coup was sparked by discontent in the military over concessions by the civilian regime to demands by neighboring countries that Somalia forsake its irredentist claims to disputed territories. The result has been a sharply diminished role for the Majertain, the Issak, and their allies in policymaking. [redacted]

Factional feuding in the SDSF, coupled with the movement's inability to broaden its base of support beyond the Majertain tribe, led Ethiopia in 1986 to switch the bulk of its assistance to another clan-based anti-Siad movement in the north, the Somali National Movement (SNM), [redacted] Like the SDSF, the SNM—rooted in the disaffection of the large Issak clan-family—primarily seeks the overthrow of the Siad regime. The emergent SNM rapidly eclipsed the SDSF, whose capabilities we believe continue to decline. [redacted]

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² The Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF), established in 1963, is a Somali-backed insurgency devoted to regaining the Somali-inhabited Ogaden for Mogadishu. Seriously weakened by declining Somali assistance and by Ethiopian military sweeps, this group has an estimated military strength of approximately 1,000. [redacted]

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¹ In Somalia, clan is a group bound by its presumed descent through the male line from a common ancestor. There are six major groups of clans—or clan-families: the Darod, Hawiye, Issak, Dir, Digil, and Rahanweyn. The Majertain and Marehan clans belong to the Darod group. [redacted]

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Current Threat. Although Ethiopia continues to provide sanctuary, weapons, finance, and logistic support to the Somali National Movement, the SNM has fared poorly in military encounters with Somali Government forces and is still regrouping from recent defeats. [redacted] for example, [redacted] the SNM took heavy casualties in a combined assault with Ethiopian forces on the Somali garrison at Balli Digh in February 1987. [redacted]

[redacted] in spite of the latter's Ethiopian air and armor support. In our view, the low level of SNM activity since Balli Digh—limited to small attacks and banditry, according [redacted] and US Embassy reporting—suggests that the Somali armed forces' claims to have inflicted major losses on the SNM probably are justified. [redacted]

We believe SNM recruitment suffered significantly after the demoralizing defeat at Balli Digh. Factional squabbling also has probably discouraged potential recruits. In some cases, the internecine fighting has led to assassination attempts by rival leaders, according to US Embassy reporting [redacted]

In our judgment, SNM setbacks have further reduced its ability to launch a major military attack without massive Ethiopian assistance. Although the SNM's clandestine Radio Halkan continues to claim that the group is inflicting significant casualties on government forces, eyewitness accounts by US Embassy sources of one encounter suggest the rebel claims are groundless. SNM units remain capable of acts of banditry, primarily against commercial vehicles, and [redacted] activity of this type is common in SNM-frequented areas of the north. [redacted]

Government Response

The Somali Government's counterinsurgency effort in the north—led by General Morgan—is constrained by manpower and equipment shortages. Army units are able to do little more than defend garrisons and patrol limited areas. [redacted]

The Northern Military Sector

Northern Somalia is vital to Somali security and important to US strategic interests. The Somali northern, or 26th, military sector is key to ensuring Mogadishu's control of its coastline along the Gulf of Aden. The strategic value of this coast derives from its proximity to Saudi oil pipeline terminals and the major shipping lanes to the Persian Gulf and Red Sea. The US maintains basing rights at several key installations in Somalia under the 1980 Somali-US Access Agreement, which expires in 1990. Under the terms of the agreement, Berbera, Somalia's major port in this region, is currently being upgraded and expanded with US financing. [redacted]

[redacted] Morgan's command suffers from limited communications and reconnaissance capabilities, the latter because of a dearth of trained personnel. Efforts by Morgan and other military leaders to secure more manpower and equipment, including armor, have made little headway, largely because the shortages they face reflect nationwide conditions. Diplomatic reporting indicates that the northern command already receives men and materiel at the expense of other sectors. [redacted]

Despite the shortage of resources, General Morgan has implemented several measures aimed at undercutting local support for the rebels. His forces deal harshly with captured insurgents, but generally disarm and "reeducate" defectors, according to Embassy reporting. Radio Hargeisa employs these defectors to urge other insurgents to surrender. Local party officials hold neighborhood orientation meetings to explain government policy and encourage cooperation. A strict curfew is enforced, and the results in Hargeisa and most large villages are peaceful and secure conditions, according to US diplomats. [redacted]

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Morgan is implementing an economic strategy designed to dry up Issak financial support for the SNM, [redacted] Besides imposing internal travel restrictions, he has denied Issak businessmen access to bank credit and import permits, while extending these benefits to more cooperative clans in his military sector. [redacted]

[redacted]

Although Morgan's policies probably have eroded the SNM's economic strength, we believe they also have reinforced anti-Siad sentiment among the Issaks. [redacted] [redacted] Issak leaders claim the severe disruption of economic activity caused by Morgan's policies have spurred some newly unemployed Issak to join the SNM's ranks. We doubt, however, that such enlistments have substantially replenished the SNM's depleted ranks. [redacted]

Outlook

We believe the Somali military and anti-Siad insurgents in the north will remain stalemated over the near term. Somali forces probably will maintain counterinsurgency efforts at current levels, enough to keep the rebels off balance but not to prevail. Maintaining the counterinsurgency program, however, will continue to drain scarce Somali Government resources and to corrode the Army's morale over time, while restrictive security measures will fuel growing Issak discontent. [redacted]

In our view, there is little chance that the SNM will be able to mount a major challenge to Morgan's forces without a substantial increase in support from Ethiopia—a development we consider highly unlikely over the next year. Nor do we expect Ethiopia to mount another punitive raid similar to that on Balli Digh. Addis Ababa currently is preoccupied with providing support to southern Sudanese rebels as well as countering a recent surge of insurgent activity in Eritrea—developments that, in our view, have reduced the availability of military assets for deployment elsewhere and probably will continue to do so. [redacted]

The Insurgents

Somali Democratic Salvation Front . . . favors a vague form of democratic government . . . driven primarily by opposition to Siad . . . radicals within call for the revitalization of Islamic principles . . . advocates a nonaligned foreign policy, rapprochement between Ethiopia and Somalia, and end to US military presence in Somalia . . . military strength approximately 1,500. [redacted]

Somali National Movement . . . now the primary recipient of Ethiopian assistance to Somali insurgents . . . formed in 1981 as a focus for Issak disaffection . . . lacks any guiding ideology or political philosophy . . . propaganda statements often reflect divided ranks . . . seeks to overthrow Siad and establish an autonomous, Issak controlled region in the north . . . military strength approximately 3,000. [redacted]

The Siad regime's concern over Ethiopian involvement with the SNM and its fears of another Ethiopian attack in the north nevertheless will continue to add to Mogadishu's preoccupation with obtaining more US and other foreign military assistance. These security concerns and the military's demands for more sophisticated equipment with which to counter the perceived Ethiopian threat probably have heightened Mogadishu's dissatisfaction with the level of US military assistance and encouraged the Somalis to seek military aid from non-Western sources, such as Romania and Hungary. Efforts to obtain assistance from the Soviet Bloc have met with little success to date. [redacted]

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Nigeria**1988 Budget**

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Nigerian President Babangida announced a 1988 deficit budget last month that is intended to stimulate the economy through special spending allocations, lifting of the four-year wage freeze, and expanding bank credit. The new spending proposals will be aimed at improving mass transportation, rehabilitating the deteriorating infrastructure, and generating employment. Moreover, the regime appears to have backed down for now on reducing government subsidies on domestic petroleum products—a move demanded by the IMF and international creditors. Although Babangida reaffirmed his commitment to economic reform, the reflationary measures are an attempt to placate the disgruntled population, unhappy that despite major restructuring and the imposition of painful austerity measures, the economy has not improved significantly.

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Lagos plans to finance the projected \$2.1 billion deficit partially with domestic borrowing and probably will turn to the World Bank and official creditors for additional loans. The government—which expects to receive over 77 percent of its revenues from oil exports—calculated the budget on a world price of oil at \$16 per barrel. Weakening world oil prices, however, which could result in lower revenues, coupled with continuing domestic petroleum subsidies and a general slowing of economic reform plans may make it difficult for Nigeria to conclude new loan agreements.

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