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# Cuba: Training Third World Guerrillas

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A Research Paper

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# Cuba: Training Third World Guerrillas



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A Research Paper

This paper was prepared by [redacted] Office of African and Latin American Analysis, [redacted] [redacted] with a contribution from [redacted] Office of Leadership Analysis. It was coordinated with the Directorate of Operations. [redacted]

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Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Middle America-Caribbean Division, ALA, [redacted]

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**Cuba: Training  
Third World Guerrillas**

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**Summary**

*Information available  
as of 15 October 1986  
was used in this report.*

Over the past 27 years, Cuba's training and support of Third World guerrillas have become institutionalized within its political and governmental system. The complex network backing these programs involves party, foreign ministry, military, and intelligence elements. Even Cuba's mass organizations and commercial and cultural entities contribute to the training, equipping, funding, and transporting of leftist groups around the globe. The development of this apparatus into an international operation capable of training hundreds of insurgents per year portends continuing challenges for the United States as it grapples with Havana's efforts to export revolution to the Third World. [Redacted]

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Despite Cuba's current economic crunch, we see little likelihood that Havana will soon reduce its support to radicals. Moreover, there are increasing signs that Cuba—because of Nicaragua's widening participation in the training of guerrilla forces—may now be able to improve some insurgent groups' chances for success by focusing its resources on providing more specialized training, individually tailored to their needs. Over the longer term, this development could foreshadow stronger insurgent pressure on those governments targeted by Cuba in Latin America and elsewhere. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] the decision to assist a particular guerrilla group ultimately rests with Fidel Castro and the top members of the Cuban Communist Party. Responsibility for implementing the party's "liberation" programs in the Western Hemisphere falls to the Central Committee's America Department (AD), while its General Department of Foreign Relations (DGRE) handles these duties elsewhere. We believe that both of these organizations are given wide latitude by Castro in coordinating Havana's provision of training, supplies, and funds to radical leftist groups. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]  
[Redacted] guerrillas sent to Cuba for training probably are turned over to the Ministry of Interior's General Directorate of Special Troops (DGTE)—an elite paramilitary force of some 2,000 personnel. [Redacted] Cuba's guerrilla training programs consist of highly specialized and structured courses of instruction in infantry and artillery tactics, explosives, communications, frogman training, concealment techniques and devices, photography, and false documentation. [Redacted]

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Our review [Redacted] of at least two major guerrilla training centers in Cuba, and we have located several other facilities that probably function at least periodically in the training of insurgents. In our judgment, most of the groups that we have identified as currently being trained by Cuba can probably be accommodated in these training facilities, which we conservatively estimate are handling some 600 to 800 trainees per year. In addition, other, more specialized training—for which we are unable to calculate the number of trainees—almost certainly occurs at other military installations scattered throughout Cuba. [Redacted]

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Clientele for Cuba's guerrilla training programs include groups from Central and South America as well as Africa and the Middle East. In Central America, the survival of the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua—where Cuba's training efforts are now focused on conventional military programs—remains Havana's highest priority. Guerrilla forces in El Salvador and Guatemala still receive attention from Havana, but the Honduran and Costa Rican radicals have become attractive to the Cubans as they search for ways to reduce pressure on their Nicaraguan ally. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] Castro also apparently sees new opportunities in southern Africa, where he has shown an uncommon interest in South Africa's mounting domestic problems. As a result, the Cuban leader appears to be gambling that increased Cuban support for terrorist operations in South Africa will aid regional radical groups—and ultimately Havana's major ally in the region, Angola—by causing Pretoria to become preoccupied with internal security. [Redacted]

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Castro's fervor for promoting armed revolution, long regarded as the core of Cuban Communist philosophy, underscores his willingness to act boldly. In this regard, we see no evidence of a slackening of effort by Havana to carry out its strategy of subversion, although Cuba presumably will remain responsive to outside pressures in its choice of tactics. In the aftermath of the US action in Grenada and Libya, we believe Havana is likely to sidestep requests for support that might be construed as direct Cuban sponsorship of terrorist acts against Americans, lest they elicit such a strong response from Washington that Cuba itself could be threatened.

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**Scope Note**

This paper examines the large, permanent, guerrilla training apparatus that Cuba has developed for promoting international subversion. 

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taking an in-depth look at various aspects of the guerrilla training infrastructure within Cuba, including the state and party organizations responsible for its administration, the various insurgent training facilities and their curriculum, and the Third World clientele making use of these programs. Finally, it assesses the direction and impact of Cuba's guerrilla training programs and the implications for the United States. 


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Figure 1



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**Cuba: Training  
Third World Guerrillas**





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**Introduction**

*The Republic of Cuba . . . recognizes the legitimacy of the wars of national liberation . . . and considers that its help to those under attack and to the peoples that struggle for their liberation constitutes its internationalist right and duty.*


*Extract from Article 12 of the  
Cuban Constitution*

Since 1959, Cuban President Fidel Castro has viewed the support of Third World revolutionary movements as a vital instrument of Cuba's foreign policy. Regarded by Castro as a highly effective means of carrying out his "liberation" policies outside normal diplomatic or political channels, Havana's guerrilla training programs have evolved over the years to become an institutionalized part of Cuba's political and governmental infrastructure. Discouraged by the failure of several Cuban-backed insurgencies in Africa and Latin America during the early and middle 1960s, Moscow pressed Havana to shift its support away from regional guerrilla groups to local Communist party affiliates as the primary means of carrying out the revolutionary struggle—a policy that lasted through the mid-1970s. By 1978, however, the Castro regime—encouraged by the success of its expeditionary forces in Angola and Ethiopia—began to re-appraise its policy regarding the support of groups that advocate armed struggle to seize power. 

The Sandinista overthrow of the Somoza regime in Nicaragua in July 1979 clearly had a profound effect on Castro's thinking regarding Cuban support of subversion in Latin America, resulting in a return to a more active policy of supporting guerrilla movements in the region, especially in Central America. 




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Castro, apparently confident that events in Nicaragua would lead to revolution throughout Central America, moved to increase Cuba's training and logistic support for the insurgents in El Salvador and Guatemala. The failure of the Salvadoran guerrillas' "final offensive" in January 1981, and active US moves to stem the flow of Cuban arms into the region, however, handed Havana a series of political and military setbacks. These were compounded by US willingness to use military force to protect its interests abroad—as demonstrated in Grenada in October 1983 and against Libya in 1986—as well as by the reemergence of democratic institutions throughout Latin America. Although these events—as with the failures of the 1960s—probably have caused Havana again to re-evaluate its tactics, we believe Castro's longtime strategy for promoting and supporting armed revolution in the Third World remains virtually undisturbed. 

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**Insurgent Training Apparatus**

Over the past 27 years, the guerrilla training apparatus in Cuba has matured into a complex network of party, foreign ministry, military, and intelligence elements. Even mass organizations, as well as commercial and cultural entities, contribute to the training, equipping, transporting, and funding of leftist and revolutionary groups around the globe. This extensive infrastructure has as its principal long-term goal the systematic destabilization of governments targeted for overthrow by Havana. 

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[redacted]

Cuba has:

- Trained members of some two dozen African and Latin American insurgent groups in urban and rural guerrilla warfare.
- Supplied or arranged for the provision of arms and ammunition to radical elements dedicated to the overthrow of both elected and dictatorial governments.
- Funded and offered materiel assistance to regional leftist organizations in an effort to unify splintered radical groups.
- Sought to use its aid and advisory assistance to gain influence over local guerrilla fronts and leftist governments sympathetic to the Cuban cause. [redacted]

**Major Components**

As the regime's highest policymaking body, the Cuban Communist Party's 14-member Politburo theoretically functions as the chief decisionmaking and oversight body for Havana's tightly controlled guerrilla support program. In practice, however, these responsibilities fall to specific components of the larger Central Committee. [redacted]

[redacted] it is within these departments that the party's operational plans are initially developed. Our research—documented in appendix A and elsewhere in this paper—reveals, for example, the direct involvement of some half dozen senior Cuban officials in the orchestration of Havana's subversive activities in or from nearly every country in the Western Hemisphere and many countries in Africa. Moreover, it appears certain that such plans must first pass muster with Cuban President and Party First Secretary Fidel Castro before rubberstamp approval is granted by the Politburo. It is at this point, in our opinion, that the responsible Central Committee department begins marshaling resources from within the Cuban Government to carry out a designated party program or plan of action. [redacted]

**Policy Coordination and Implementation.** [redacted]

[redacted] the America Department of the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party (PCC/CC/AD, or simply

the AD) is responsible for providing cohesion and direction to Cuba's "liberation" programs in Latin America and the Caribbean. Since June 1974, the AD has been headed by Manuel Pineiro Losada, a charter member of Cuba's guerrilla "elite" and a favorite of the Castro brothers.<sup>1</sup> Charged with undermining US influence in the region and supporting local liberation movements, Pineiro's organization operates largely behind the scenes. [redacted]

[redacted] the AD, which we currently estimate has some 200 personnel, has conducted a variety of traditional intelligence activities such as penetration and agent-of-influence operations. The AD periodically conducts its activities openly, however, contacting other Communist or leftist parties and personalities, disseminating official Cuban Communist Party propaganda, and providing support to exile groups in the host country or in Cuba. Nonetheless, the principal role of the AD, in our judgment, has been to coordinate Havana's provision of training, supplies, and funds to guerrilla organizations and other radical leftist groups—actions that have touched most of the countries in this hemisphere. [redacted]

The AD has traditionally been organized into at least four regional sections: North America, South America, Central America, and the Caribbean. More recently, however, this bureaucratic structure may have been modified. [redacted]

<sup>1</sup> Prior to 1974, Cuba's "liberation" work was carried out by the National Liberation Department (NLD), which, by late 1961, had evolved into the General Intelligence Directorate (DGI) of the Interior Ministry (MININT). Pineiro, who was the first chief of the DGI, took personal charge of the activities of the NLD until late 1969, when he was given exclusive control of the newly formed Liberation Directorate (LD)—in effect, a MININT task force—now separated from the more "classical" overseas intelligence-collection-oriented DGI. Dissolution of the LD followed in June 1974, when Havana announced that the party's old department of foreign relations had been replaced by two new departments: the AD (under Pineiro), and a General Department responsible for affairs outside the Western Hemisphere. [redacted]

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
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**Figure 2**  
**Cuba: The America Department (AD)**



<sup>a</sup>Section believed to be divided into three branches. Nicaragua may now be a section in its own right due to Nicaragua's importance in Cuban eyes.

<sup>b</sup>Presumed branch.


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**America Department Officials: Architects of Revolution**



**Manuel Pineiro Losada**

*AD chief Manuel Pineiro, 53, is Cuba's principal proponent and focal point for subversive activities, including the export of revolution to other countries. A member of the revolutionary guerrilla elite that fought in the mountains with Fidel Castro and his brother Raul, he enjoys their trust and confidence. Pineiro, an original member of the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party, is close to President Castro ideologically, which we believe enables him to have considerable freedom of action in his sphere of influence.*

[Redacted]

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**Jose Arbesu Fraga**

*Veteran intelligence officer Jose Arbesu, 46, an AD deputy chief, has been responsible for North American and Caribbean matters for about 10 years. Acting as a backchannel contact to sound out officials of the US Interests Section in Havana, he seeks to gauge Washington's reaction to Cuban policy.*

[Redacted]

*Traveling frequently to the United States, he has participated in bilateral immigration talks and attended UN General Assembly and Decolonization Committee meetings. During the 1960s, Arbesu was a department head for Central and West Africa in the Foreign Ministry. He has served abroad as a counselor at Cuba's Embassies in Cairo and Algiers; in Algeria, he was also chief of center for the DGI.*

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[Redacted] It is likely, therefore, that Nicaragua, because of its importance to Havana, may now be a separate section.

[Redacted]

Once Castro determines—presumably with the pro forma concurrence of other Politburo members—that a particular operation is feasible and grants his approval for its implementation, we believe the AD is then given substantial latitude by the Cuban leader to decide how best to carry out the mission. An elite corps of AD officers—aside from the normal section, branch, and country desk personnel—apparently is


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**Ramiro Abreu Quintana**

*A longtime intelligence officer and Latin America specialist, AD Central America section chief Ramiro Abreu, 42, plays a key role in channeling political, financial, and logistic assistance to Nicaragua and revolutionary movements in the region. He is also Cuba's unofficial observer at the Contadora peace negotiations.*

*[redacted] Abreu enjoys access to, and the confidence of, Cuba's top policymakers. He accompanies Fidel Castro and Manuel Pineiro to meetings both in Havana and on trips abroad, and meets with foreign Communist party, guerrilla, and government leaders on their behalf. Abreu's earlier assignments included tours at Cuba's Embassy in Chile as third secretary and in Mexico as consular affairs officer. [redacted]*

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**Hector Duran Villavicencio**

*Hector Duran, 41, is Havana's South America chief charged with overseeing the AD's activities in Chile, Peru, and Bolivia. Duran only recently replaced longtime AD official Hector Humberto Sanchez Gonzalez, who was arrested in June on corruption charges. Before his dismissal, Sanchez had been heavily involved in coordinating support for Chilean exile and leftist groups since Augusto Pinochet came to power in 1973—duties that we believe Duran will now assume. Duran previously had been ostensibly attached to the Foreign Ministry for over 15 years, and, before receiving his current assignment, he had been posted to Peru as first secretary and then as charge d'affaires. [redacted]*

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*[redacted] More of a generalist than other AD officials, Duran has worked in the Foreign Ministry's Directorates of International Organizations, of Africa, of Socialist Countries, and of Latin America. He has also been a third secretary and consul general in Czechoslovakia. [redacted]*

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charged with carrying out special clandestine operations abroad. [redacted]

The implementation of the Central Committee's policy directives outside the Western Hemisphere falls to the AD's sister organization in the party, the General Department of Foreign Relations (DGRE). [redacted]

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[redacted] the responsibilities of the DGRE—like those of the AD—include liaison with Communist


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**Figure 3**  
**Cuba: The General Department of Foreign Relations(DGRE)**



<sup>a</sup> Information on the DGRE's organization beyond the section level is sketchy. Some similarities apparently exist between the geographic responsibilities of the DGRE and those of the Cuban Foreign Ministry, however, suggesting that individual branches probably are dedicated to the areas of heaviest Cuban involvement: Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique, for example.

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and leftist parties, information collection, propaganda dissemination, and influencing organizations and individuals that could prove useful to Cuba's foreign policy objectives. Although it apparently shares responsibility with the AD for the coordination and implementation of party policy dictates, the DGRE generally is less involved with supporting Third World radicals.




In our view, however, the DGRE's role in insurgent training has been less visible than that of the AD largely as a result of Cuba's more overt involvement

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Jesus Montane Orpesa

Figure 4. Since 1979, the DGRE had been headed by Jesus Montane Orpesa, a longtime Castro confidant, who, until losing his seat during the Third Party Congress last February, was a member of the Party Secretariat and an alternate member on the Politburo. Montane evidently lost his DGRE post as well at the Congress, although his successor has not yet been disclosed.

in Africa, and Havana's preference for localized training of groups such as the African National Congress (ANC) and the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO). Nonetheless, Havana has been embroiled in a series of largely low-intensity conflicts in Africa since the mid-1970s, and has longstanding ties to nearly a dozen African and Middle Eastern revolutionary groups; these ties probably are at least brokered through the DGRE.

**The Trainers.**

after an initial screening process, guerrilla trainees sent to Cuba for paramilitary training probably are turned over to the General Directorate of Special Troops (DGTE).<sup>2</sup> The Special Troops are an elite, highly trained, brigade-size paramilitary force under the direct control of the Minister of Interior that provides training and advisers to various guerrilla groups and foreign governments.

[redacted] 25X1  
[redacted] the Special Troops were 25X1  
among the first Cuban units sent to Angola in 1975, and DGTE personnel participated in the Sandinistas' overthrow of Somoza in Nicaragua in 1979. [redacted] 25X1

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**Logistic Support.**

[redacted] 25X1  
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[redacted] Cubana Airlines, the state-run airline, is used extensively in transporting insurgents to and from Cuba for training, as well as ferrying arms and supplies to regional radicals. [redacted] 25X1

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**Havana's Guerrilla-Makers: Top Guns in the Ministry of Interior**



**Division General Jose Abrantes Fernandez**

Soviet-trained counterintelligence and subversion expert Division General Jose Abrantes, 54, became Interior Minister in December 1985 after having served 23 years as MININT Vice Minister for Security. An original member of the Cuban Communist Party's Central Committee and long responsible for Fidel Castro's personal security at home and abroad, Abrantes is fiercely loyal to, and has the ear of, the President. A former student activist in the prerevolutionary Communist Party's youth wing, Abrantes joined the "Fidelista" ranks in the mid-1950s and lived as an exile in the United States and in Mexico to procure arms for his anti-Batista guerrilla comrades located in the Cuban mountainside. After Castro came to power, Abrantes returned to Havana [redacted]

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
**Brigadier General Alejandro Ronda Marrero**

MININT Special Troops chief Brigadier General Alejandro Ronda, 43, is one of Havana's key contacts for Cuban support to the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. He has held this post since at least 1983, and his election as an alternate member of the Central Committee in February suggests that he has performed well.

[redacted] Ronda, [redacted]  
[redacted] has operated in the Latin America arena throughout his career. His earlier assignments included stints at the Cuban Embassy in Chile ostensibly as a logistics officer and in Argentina as an attache. [redacted]


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insurgents, and its training programs offered little more than rudimentary instruction in small-arms familiarization, small-unit tactics, and ideology. Moreover, the groups that Havana trained had little success or, in the case of Che Guevara's ill-fated expedition to Bolivia, met with glaring defeat. Nonetheless, the demand for Cuban training by regional radicals grew. Encouraged by its clients and the Soviet Union—which also provides training to insurgents—to expand its training capabilities, Havana has developed the infrastructure necessary to meet these demands. [redacted]

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**Major Guerrilla Training Camps.** On the basis of a thorough review of [redacted]

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[redacted] spanning many years, we have confirmed that there are at least two major guerrilla training centers in Cuba, although several other military installations also are probably used at least periodically for guerrilla training. The most prominent of these facilities, Guanabo Military Camp, is located east of Havana and is [redacted] operated by the DGTE's Special Troops. [redacted]

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[redacted] the camp is subdivided into

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several housing and training areas to segregate different national groups—apparently for security reasons. The facilities at Guanabo, which include infiltration courses, a mock airstrip, and hand-to-hand combat pits, suggest that its primary function is to train personnel in guerrilla warfare. [redacted]

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[redacted] the mission of the Cuban personnel stationed at Guanabo [redacted]

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[redacted] is to train "foreign troops in terrorist activities." [redacted]

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**Training and Support Facilities**

During the early 1960s, Cuba used the existing military and police facilities inherited from the deposed Batista government to train small groups of



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**Cuba's Propaganda Apparatus**

Cuba has long made use of its mass media network—managed by the Central Committee's Revolutionary Orientation Department—to disseminate propaganda in support of regional insurgent and leftist organizations.<sup>a</sup> [redacted]

USSR in a reciprocal arrangement that allows the Soviets the use of two shortwave transmitters in Cuba for Radio Moscow broadcasts to Latin America. [redacted]

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**Prensa Latina**

With 41 offices worldwide, the Cuban news service transmits stories in four languages and publishes a variety of magazines and news periodicals that are disseminated around the globe. Aside from its journalistic endeavors, however, the news agency sometimes carries out covert operations or intelligence gathering. [redacted]

**Official Liaison Offices**

Among the several insurgent and terrorist organizations represented in Havana are: Uruguay's Montonero and Tupamaro groups, El Salvador's Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN), the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Union (URNG), Namibia's South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), and South Africa's African National Congress (ANC). [redacted]

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[redacted] we believe these "services" cooperate closely with the Cuban media, particularly on matters of propaganda interest. [redacted]

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**Cuban Institute of Friendship Among Peoples (ICAP)**

Bringing foreign groups to Cuba—where they may be exploited for their propaganda value—is a major responsibility of ICAP, which is estimated to have about 113 such friendship organizations around the world. Soon after its establishment in December 1960, ICAP set about forming various friendship associations among foreigners residing in Cuba. These societies provided Havana not only with a registry of aliens that could prove useful to Cuban intelligence and operational needs in the individuals' homelands, but also formed a mechanism for mobilizing foreign nationals to lobby against their own governments on issues opposed by Havana. [redacted]


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**Radio Havana**

Once used to send coded messages to Che Guevara in Bolivia, Radio Havana historically has been regarded by Havana as a vital instrument in its export of the revolution. Today, it frequently broadcasts insurgent "war bulletins" from its eight transmitters in Cuba that extol, for example, guerrilla actions in El Salvador and Guatemala. In addition, Radio Havana, which broadcasts in eight languages, extends its coverage by maintaining two transmitters in the [redacted]

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Carlos Aldana Escalante

Figure 5. As chief of Cuba's Revolutionary Orientation Department and a propaganda and political mobilization specialist, Carlos Aldana, 44, is the Cuban Communist Party's ideology producer-director and scriptwriter. Aldana is a protege and key aide to Cuba's number-two man, Raul Castro, having gained his current post after serving as Raul's executive assistant and speechwriter. Elected a member of the Cuban Communist Party's Central Committee in 1980, he has appeared with increasing frequency in the company of the country's top leadership at home and abroad. Aldana, who was a teenage member of the Rebel Army that fought against the Batista regime, became involved in organizing mass support for Castro when he came to power.

Aldana, [redacted] previously has headed indoctrination sections of the Revolutionary Armed Forces, the Union of Young Communists, and the ruling party. [redacted]

A similar military camp at Candelaria—located in a remote mountainous area of western Cuba—also has been [redacted] used for the training of foreign guerrillas. Che Guevara reportedly used the facility to train guerrillas for his ill-fated Bolivian expedition of the mid-1960s [redacted]

[redacted] Candelaria is the location of Havana's School for Rural Warfare. Candelaria has facilities for airborne training, small-arms firing ranges, and isolated groups of barracks capable of housing small numbers of personnel. [redacted]

[redacted] Another, smaller training facility that we believe to be associated with Candelaria is located at [redacted]



Figure 6. Bolivian officers display the corpse of Ernesto "Che" Guevara following his death at the hands of the Bolivian military on 8 October 1967. As a revered revolutionary in Latin American leftist circles, the death of Guevara, which epitomized a series of failed insurgencies and other setbacks suffered by Havana, is regarded by many as the watershed in Cuban support to Third World revolutionary groups during the late 1960s. In the decade that followed Guevara's death, Havana—under pressure from Moscow to reduce its support for guerrilla movements in favor of assisting local Communist parties—adopted a generally more pragmatic policy of offering training and financial backing to insurgent groups, which it assessed as having at least some modest hope of success. [redacted]

Dolores, some 8 kilometers west of the Candelaria camp. The Dolores camp has a mock airstrip, hand-to-hand combat pits, and additional barracks and training areas. [redacted]

[redacted] the training facilities at Guanabo are more extensive than those at Candelaria. Guanabo, for example, has a permanent obstacle course, physical training apparatus, and a swimming pool; however, Candelaria has no such facilities. The Guanabo camp, on the other hand, does not have the advantage of being surrounded by rugged terrain that could provide realistic practical exercises, because of its proximity to urban areas. Nonetheless, both camps appear to provide adequate facilities, and probably similar training for the prospective guerrilla. The types of training offered at these installations, [redacted] include infantry and artillery tactics, explosives and field fortifications, politics and [redacted]

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
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**Figure 7**  
**Guerrilla Training Facilities**



**Guanabo Military Camp**

One of two major guerrilla training facilities [redacted] in Cuba . . . home of the School for Urban and Suburban Warfare . . . manned by MININT Special Troops . . . offers instruction in leadership, special skills . . . subdivided into separate housing, training areas to segregate groups and enhance security . . . training facilities include a mock airstrip, obstacle courses, hand-to-hand combat pits, as well as demolitions and firing ranges.

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**Candelaria Military Camp**

Identified, along with camp at Guanabo, as one of two major guerrilla training facilities in Cuba . . . location of the School for Rural Warfare . . . probably in operation since the mid-1960s, providing basic training and several leadership courses . . . has facilities for airborne training, small-arms firing ranges, and isolated barracks similar to those at Guanabo . . . remote, mountainous terrain provides guerrilla trainees with realistic practical exercises.

**Lazaro Pena Workers School**

Suspected location of Cuba's School for Urban Warfare . . . although purported to be a school for training labor union cadre, [redacted] it provides classroom instruction on the theory of guerrilla warfare.

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**Dolores Military Training Area**

Probably a subcamp of Candelaria some 8 kilometers to the east . . . facilities include a mock airstrip, hand-to-hand combat pits, and additional barracks and training areas.

**El Cacho Military Camp**

Suspect guerrilla training facility [redacted] . . . formerly an abandoned, rundown military garrison renovated in 1984 . . . remarkably similar in appearance to Cuban guerrilla training camps at Guanabo, Candelaria, and Cuban-inspired facility at Jiloa, Nicaragua . . . training facilities include special-purpose firing ranges with popup targets, infiltration and assault courses, a mock airstrip, and a probable drop zone for airborne operations.

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**El Nicho Suspect Training Area**

Identified in June 1986 as a suspect training camp for insurgents . . . remote and austere with only a few relatively unsophisticated training areas . . . shares some similarities in appearance with Guanabo, Candelaria, and El Cacho.

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history, physical training, land navigation, communi-  
cations, military hygiene and first aid, and enemy  
order-of-battle studies. [redacted]

The El Nicho camp is located in a remote mountain-  
ous area of south-central Cuba, approximately 35  
kilometers east of Cienfuegos. A small training area  
with derelict aircraft and a mock airstrip, other  
training areas with defensive trenches, and a few  
small buildings were identified [redacted]

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**Suspected Training Facilities.** For several years,  
[redacted] the appearance and location of  
the Lazaro Pena Workers School in Havana have led  
us to suspect that it is a school for urban guerrillas. [redacted]

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[redacted]

**Other Training Facilities.** In our judgment, most of  
the guerrilla groups that are detailed in appendix A as  
being trained in Cuba today could probably be accom-  
modated by the training camps described above. On  
the basis of our evaluation of the two major guerrilla  
training facilities at Guanabo and Candelaria, [redacted]  
[redacted] and [redacted]  
[redacted] the training of personnel in guerrilla war-  
fare in Cuba between 1983 and 1985, we estimate—  
conservatively—that these facilities are capable of  
handling at least 600 to 800 guerrilla trainees each  
year. [redacted]

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[redacted] the school, located in an urban area, is  
regularly maintained and has small military-related  
training facilities such as an obstacle course, a troop  
formation area, and a military vehicle display that is  
changed periodically. [redacted]

In addition to the Lazaro Pena facility, we have  
identified two new camps [redacted] within the past  
14 months that may be associated with guerrilla  
training. These installations—El Cacho in western  
Cuba and El Nicho in south-central Cuba—have  
training facilities similar to those at the guerrilla  
training camps at Guanabo and Candelaria. The type  
of facilities observed—mock airstrips with derelict  
aircraft, special firing ranges, infiltration courses,  
demolition training areas, and hand-to-hand combat  
pits—are not usually seen at conventional military  
garrisons in Cuba. [redacted]

[redacted] 25X1  
[redacted] specialized training for a particu-  
lar group or mission is occasionally conducted at a  
number of remote, clandestine sites in Cuba [redacted] 25X1  
[redacted] 25X1

[redacted] only two were located reasonably close to  
existing military garrisons—Jibacoa military bar-  
racks and Mayari Arriba barracks—[redacted] 25X1

El Cacho, located in Pinar del Rio Province in western  
Cuba, was an abandoned and rundown military garri-  
son before its renovation in 1984. It is similar in  
appearance to the training camps at Guanabo and  
Candelaria, as well as to the Cuban-style training  
camp at Jiloa in Nicaragua. Although we have no  
[redacted] evidence that foreigners have received guer-  
rilla warfare training at El Cacho, its isolated location  
and specialized training facilities—[redacted]

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[redacted]—make it a likely candidate,  
in our opinion, for such activity. [redacted]

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***Cuban Subversion Exported: The Case of Nicaragua***

*Havana, in addition to institutionalizing its own guerrilla training and support apparatus within Cuba, has found a willing partner in the Sandinista regime. Since coming to power in July 1979, the Sandinistas—with Cuba's encouragement and assistance—have increasingly provided support to radical leftist elements in both Central and South America.*

[Redacted]

*Illustrative of Cuba's influence in this process was the establishment in 1984 of a Department of Special Operations—counterpart to the Cuban DOE—in Nicaragua's Ministry of Interior (MINT).*

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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*The MINT's Special Troops installation in Jiloa, located outside Managua, [Redacted] offers guerrilla training to regional radicals—primarily Salvadoran and Honduran insurgents.*

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

*[Redacted] the courses taught by Cuban and Sandinista instructors in Nicaragua run the gamut from urban and rural guerrilla training, to communications, sabotage, weapons and explosives, ambush techniques, and assassination.*

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
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**Future Directions and Opportunities**

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We expect to see little or no change in Havana's revolutionary philosophy or its support to regional radicals. The institutionalized nature of Havana's guerrilla training programs suggests that it will continue to be an integral part of Cuban foreign policy. Havana, in our view, will continue to concentrate its greatest resources and efforts on those insurgent or radical groups that it assesses as having at least some chance of success. Over the near term, for example, we expect Cuba to intensify its efforts to train, fund, and arm radical leftist groups in Chile and—albeit probably to a lesser extent—Colombia. Cuba's probable role in providing Chilean extremists with nearly 100 metric tons of arms and supplies uncovered by local security officials earlier this year demonstrates, in our opinion, that there has been no slackening of Havana's efforts to carry out its policy of subversion.

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**Cuba's Guerrilla Clientele**

The list of clientele for Cuba's guerrilla training programs—discussed in detail in appendix A—includes groups from Central and South America as well as Africa and the Middle East. In Central America, the survival of the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua clearly remains Havana's highest priority. However, the focus of Cuba's training for the Sandinistas has shifted from guerrilla warfare to conventional military programs.

the guerrillas in El Salvador and, to a lesser extent, Guatemala still receive priority attention from Havana; however, the training of Honduran and Costa Rican radicals has become increasingly attractive to Havana as it searches for ways to reduce pressure on its Nicaraguan ally.

Even in those countries where the chances for gains by revolutionaries are marginal, Castro is willing to devote resources if he believes that his support to these groups might further Cuba's revolutionary goals. The training and financing of Honduran leftists, for example, has been under way for years, and, more recently, the Cubans have enlisted radicals in Costa Rica in their effort to foment regional unrest. Both countries, in our judgment, are likely to receive increased attention from Havana in coming months as Cuba searches for ways to reduce pressure on its Nicaraguan ally.

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Castro apparently sees conditions as "ripe" for revolution in Chile, and

Castro wants to intensify armed resistance to Pinochet and to make that regime his primary target of subversion in South America. In Colombia, the breakdown of the 1984 peace accord between the government and the guerrillas, as well as other events, may tempt Havana to step up its funding and training assistance to Colombian insurgents.

We believe Castro also sees new opportunities to expand Cuban influence in southern Africa.

we expect an increase in Cuba's support for ANC terrorist operations in South Africa. Castro also appears to be gambling that increased terrorist activity by the ANC will aid SWAPO—and ultimately Cuba's major ally in the region, Angola—by causing the South African military to become preoccupied with internal security.

Another example is South Africa, where Castro has been encouraged by mounting domestic turmoil and Pretoria's increasing international isolation. If the situation in South Africa continues to deteriorate, we believe Havana may try to exploit Pretoria's difficulties by expanding its African-based guerrilla training operations, as well as increasing aid to guerrilla groups combating the Botha government. The ANC probably would be the chief beneficiary of any expanded training program. Havana's disenchantment

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
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**Will Austerity Dampen Havana's Support for Revolution?**

[redacted]  
[redacted] the Armed Forces Ministry, which oversees some of the military facilities and bases used by the guerrilla trainees, is lumped under the "defense and law enforcement" category in officially published accounts. Nonetheless, the announcement by Cuban officials this past January that the declared budget for this category would be cut from \$1.6 billion to \$1.4 billion in 1986—a drop of some 11 percent from 1985—suggests that some elements of the military, along with other government ministries, may be asked to share the burden of Cuba's flagging economy. [redacted]

Aside from instructor salaries, however, we believe the direct cost to Havana for running its guerrilla training programs probably remains quite small. Many items such as munitions, food, housing, and clothing needed to support and train the guerrillas either are included among the annual appropriations to the Armed Forces, or, in the case of the military installations and other government-owned and operated facilities used by the trainees, are paid out over a period of many years. [redacted]

Despite worsening economic conditions and Castro's call for additional austerity measures aimed at improving the government's economic performance, we believe Havana has little, if any, intention of cutting back on its support of subversion—regarded by the Cuban leadership as its nonnegotiable "right." [redacted]  
[redacted]



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with the disunity of SWAPO guerrillas suggests that Cuban aid to that organization will remain limited, unless the situation worsens in South Africa. [redacted]

**Implications for the United States**

The evolution of Cuba's guerrilla training apparatus into a complex, highly institutionalized operation dedicated to training hundreds of guerrillas from

around the world each year portends continuing challenges for the United States as it grapples with Havana's efforts to export revolution to the Third World. [redacted]

[redacted] Cuba is increasingly relying on Nicaragua to train regional revolutionaries in the rudimentary aspects of guerrilla warfare. This development, in our opinion, allows Havana to focus its guerrilla training

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resources on more advanced course work for those groups it assesses as having a more immediate chance of success. Finally, Cuba's ability to offer an ever-expanding spectrum of specially tailored training courses potentially foreshadows stronger insurgent pressure on governments in Latin America and elsewhere. [redacted]

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Moreover, Cuba's reliance on commercial, diplomatic, and state-run bodies as an integral part of its guerrilla support apparatus, and its use of conventional military facilities for training insurgents, are likely to make detection of Cuba's subversive efforts even more difficult. Havana, for example, already uses its extensive network of front organizations and other commercial assets to mask its involvement in the transfer of arms and funds to various insurgent groups. [redacted]

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Indeed, Castro's fervor for the promotion of armed revolution—long regarded as the core of the Cuban Communist philosophy—underscores his willingness to act boldly if he perceives that the potential gains outweigh the immediate risks. We see no evidence, for example, that Castro has moderated his revolutionary strategy, although Cuba's tactics presumably remain responsive to outside pressures. [redacted]

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In this regard, we believe the US military action against Libya, like Havana's earlier reversal in Grenada, has given Castro cause—at least in the tactical sense—to be more cautious in doling out support to regional radicals whose position is especially weak. Even before the US attack on Libya in April, Havana [redacted] counseled many of its leftist clients in the Caribbean to move cautiously and to avoid entanglements with Tripoli. We also believe Havana is likely to sidestep requests for support that might ultimately be construed by Washington as direct Cuban sponsorship of terrorist acts against Americans, lest they elicit a strong negative response from the United States that could threaten the security of Cuba itself. [redacted]

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**Appendix A**

**Clients for Cuba's Guerrilla Training Programs**

**Central America**

**Nicaragua**

Since the overthrow of the Somoza regime in July 1979, helping the Sandinistas consolidate power in Nicaragua has remained Havana's top priority in Central America. [redacted] Havana was responsible for the training of several hundred Sandinista insurgents before and immediately after the ouster of Somoza. Cuban training programs during this decade, however, have shifted from guerrilla warfare training to helping the Nicaraguan military become a conventional military force. [redacted]

The Cubans still provide some guerrilla training to the Sandinistas, however, apparently to provide Managua with a nucleus of guerrilla cadre to advise and train radical groups in neighboring Honduras and Costa Rica, as well as insurgents from Latin America and the Caribbean. [redacted]

[redacted]

**El Salvador**

The five Salvadoran guerrilla organizations still receive priority attention from Havana, especially regarding training. [redacted]

[redacted] as many as several hundred insurgents per year from these factions benefit from Cuba's guerrilla training programs or its surrogate training efforts in Nicaragua. [redacted]

[redacted] the discovery

of ammunition, money, and other supplies uncovered during an investigation of an automobile accident in Honduras late last year, also back our judgment that the guerrillas in El Salvador continue to receive a variety of arms and supplies from Cuba via Nicaragua. Nonetheless, the declining fortunes of the rebel alliance since mid-1984 appear to have resulted in a reduced level of Cuban and Nicaraguan support.

[redacted]

[redacted]

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Figure 9. The Cuscatlan bridge over the Lempa River in central El Salvador is seen here after it was destroyed by Cuban-trained guerrillas on 1 January 1984. The ensuing disruption of transportation and trade caused by the bridge's destruction typifies the economic damage that has resulted from the many attacks carried out against the country's infrastructure by the Salvadoran guerrillas during the nearly eight-year-long war.


suggests that the level of Cuban support for these groups—in the absence of a unified command—is likely to remain modest. [redacted]

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**Honduras**

The Cubans, with the assistance of the Sandinistas, apparently have resumed their efforts to foment unrest in Honduras, despite the failure of their efforts in 1983 and 1984 to ignite a rural insurgency. [redacted]

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**Guatemala**

Data compiled on the 26-year-old insurgency by the US Embassy in Guatemala City in late 1985 indicate that some 25 percent of Guatemalan guerrillas probably have received training in Cuba. Over the last four years, however, Havana has seen the Guatemalan guerrilla force whittled back by an effective government counterinsurgency program from an estimated 3,000 full-time combatants in early 1982 to about 1,500 members at present. More important, in our view, is that the dwindling of popular support for the insurgency is being hastened by the military's orderly transfer of power earlier this year to the first popularly elected civilian government in Guatemala in 19 years. Havana apparently is undaunted by these setbacks, however; [redacted]

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[redacted] The two previous attempts to infiltrate guerrillas into Honduras—one in 1983 involving 96 Honduran insurgents trained in Cuba and Nicaragua, and another in 1984 involving at least 20 guerrillas—failed when the Honduran military killed or captured most of the infiltrators. [redacted]

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**Costa Rica**

Officials in Costa Rica also appear to be concerned about Cuban meddling. In July 1985, Costa Rica's Deputy Minister of Security publicly characterized the situation in his country as "dangerous," alleging that several hundred Costa Rican leftists had received military training in Cuba during the previous four years. Although we believe that Costa Rican radicals—whose alleged number appears inflated—are unlikely to initiate an armed insurgency at this time, Havana probably hopes that its training of insurgents targeted against Nicaragua's neighbors ultimately will help to relieve pressure on Managua by shifting the United States' attention elsewhere and weakening the resolve of US allies in the region. [redacted]

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
[redacted] According to US Embassy reporting [redacted], the three major guerrilla factions in Guatemala maintain contact with Havana through the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City, or use their Havana-based representative to the URNG—the insurgent umbrella organization formally established under Cuban and Nicaraguan tutelage in February 1982—to lobby Havana for aid. Cuba's frustration with the inability of the Guatemalan guerrilla factions to unite, however, has periodically resulted in Havana's threatening to cut off arms supplies. This

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**Figure 10**  
**Probable Cuban-Supplied Arms Seized in Chilean Caches**  
**6 August–9 September 1986**

**M-16 Assault Rifles**



**RPG-7 Rocket Launchers, Rocket-Propelled Grenades**



Manufacturer	Item	Quantity Found
US	M-16 assault rifles	3,351
Bloc	RPG-7 rocket launchers	114
Belgian	FAL rifles	148
US	M-60 machineguns	6
US	LAW light antitank weapons	167
US	M-16 ammunition	1,967,512
Bloc and Western	FAL ammunition	4,205
Soviet	AK-47 ammunition	965
US	M-60 rounds	2,700
Bloc	F-1 handgrenades	1,979
Bulgarian	PG-7 rounds	1,859
Soviet	Detonating caps	4,700
Unidentified	Brick explosives	2,204 kg
Unidentified	T-4 explosives	796 kg

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South America

Chile

[redacted] the Castro regime is devoting an increased amount of attention to Chile, and, in our opinion, has made the Pinochet government its primary target in South America. As early as February 1985, Cuban AD chief Manuel Pineiro—in uncharacteristic candor—admitted to US officials that Cuba was providing support to insurgents in Chile, as well as in El Salvador and Guatemala. Moreover, this past August and September, Chilean security forces uncovered several massive arms caches—unprecedented in Latin America—intended for the Communist Party of Chile (PCCh) and its terrorist affiliates, and the available evidence points strongly to Cuba as the likely supplier. [redacted]

[redacted]

Castro has publicly [redacted] encouraged the overthrow of the Pinochet regime, whose reputation as an international pariah practically assures a minimum of political risk for Havana in advocating its downfall.

[redacted]



Figure 11. Cuban AD chief Manuel Pineiro applauds then Colombian M-19 guerrilla leader Rosenberg Pabon (victory sign raised) on his arrival in Cuba in April 1980. Pabon and other M-19 members were accompanied on their flight to Havana by 11 of the hostages they had held for 61 days in the Dominican Republic's Embassy in Bogota, Colombia. [redacted]

Colombia

[redacted] Havana, despite its endorsement of a negotiated truce between Colombian insurgents and the Betancur government in 1984, has continued to provide training and other support to M-19 guerrillas and other Colombian radicals. AD chief Pineiro, during his talks with US officials in February 1985, denied that Cuba had aided any Colombian guerrilla group since the inauguration of President Betancur in August 1982. He explained, however, that Havana's training and provisioning of the M-19 had been under way for years and lamely blamed bureaucratic inertia for the return of Cuban-trained M-19 insurgents to Colombia

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
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Carlos Pizarro Leongomez

Figure 12. Carlos Pizarro has headed the Colombian M-19 guerrilla group and its affiliates—the National Guerrilla Coordinating Committee and the multinational American Battalion—since his predecessor was killed in March 1986. Regarded as a military commander rather than a politician, he is among the many Latin American insurgent leaders who have received guerrilla training in Cuba over the years. Now in his thirties, Pizarro credits his father—once Commander in Chief of the Colombian Armed Forces—as being his greatest influence.

after 1982.

Despite Castro's desire for improved relations with Bogota, we believe the unraveling of the 1984 truce and Betancur's departure from office in August 1986 could prompt Havana to step up its funding and training assistance to the Colombian insurgents.

**Argentina**

[redacted] Cuba is continuing to provide limited funding and training to the Montoneros and the People's Revolutionary Army.

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**Bolivia**

Cuban influence in La Paz has waned since President Paz Estenssoro took office in 1985.

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**Ecuador**

Havana provides training and perhaps some funding to the Alfaro Vive, Carajo (AVC) terrorists, mostly through the Colombian M-19.

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**Uruguay**

Cuba presumably funds and trains some members of the Tupamaro guerrilla group

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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**Caribbean**

Havana's support to Caribbean radicals dates back to the unsuccessful Cuban-backed expeditions against the Dominican Republic and Haiti in 1959. However, the embarrassing reversal suffered by Cuba in Grenada three years ago apparently has caused Castro to adopt a long-term program to rebuild Cuba's influence in the region. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] Castro, as a result of his diplomatic successes in South America, is content for now to concentrate on trying to build up Havana's bilateral political and economic relations in the region. The Cuban leader also is encouraging regional leftists to organize quietly under the umbrella of legitimate political parties so that they can compete for power through elections. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Nonetheless, Cuba continues to provide small-scale military assistance, including training, to regional radicals in order to prepare for a climate of instability. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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**Africa and the Middle East <sup>5</sup>**

**South Africa**

[Redacted]

[Redacted] Castro apparently calculates that the "irreversible crisis of apartheid" in South Africa presents new opportunities to expand his regime's

[Redacted]

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influence in southern Africa. [redacted]

[redacted]

**Sudan**

[redacted] the bulk of Cuban training for members of the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) probably is conducted at bases inside Ethiopia, although limited numbers of SPLA personnel may also be undergoing training in Cuba.

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[redacted]

**Saharan Democratic Arab Republic**

More popularly referred to as the Polisario—the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro—this mix of Saharan nationalist and tribal groups has longstanding political ties to Cuba, but apparently receives only limited materiel and training assistance from Havana. [redacted]

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[redacted] Havana has offered to increase its support to the Polisario, but that Algerian objections to such aid have stymied Havana's efforts. In early 1983, for example, Algeria's objection to the Cubans' wanting to train some 50 to 100 Polisario troops locally necessitated that these personnel travel to Cuba for this training, [redacted]

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**Namibia**

Cuban assistance to SWAPO began only months after Cuban troops began arriving in neighboring Angola in late 1975. [redacted]

[redacted] training for SWAPO guerrillas is carried out by Cuban, East German, and Soviet advisers at the organization's operational headquarters in south-central Angola. We believe that Cuban and Soviet advisers help plan and direct the operations of SWAPO's 7,000 to 8,000 armed personnel. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]—for more aid, including money, weapons, and munitions, [redacted]

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and that the Cubans have offered to supply military and civilian schooling, ammunition, and other assistance such as medical aid. [redacted]

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**Zaire**

[redacted]  
[redacted] from 1979 to 1982 several hundred of an estimated 2,000 to 3,500 combat-age dissidents from the Front for the National Liberation of the Congo (FLNC) received military training in Cuba.

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[redacted]

[redacted] Nonetheless, Cuban support to the FLNC—whose military capabilities have significantly deteriorated in the past eight years because of inadequate external support, ethnic divisions, and dispersion to numerous camps in the Angolan interior—has declined since the late 1970s, when Havana helped to fund FLNC attacks into Zaire’s Shaba region. We believe Havana probably would renew its support to Zairian dissidents at Luanda’s request, however, if the dos Santos regime decided to revive the nearly moribund group for new attacks into the Shaba region in retaliation for President Mobutu’s support to Angolan guerrillas.

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[redacted]

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**Palestinian Terrorist Groups**

Cuba has been providing limited support, including political and military training, to several Palestinian terrorist groups since at least the early 1970s. [redacted]

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[redacted] the majority of Cuba’s assistance probably has gone to Yasir Arafat’s Fatah; however, Havana has also developed warm relations with the radical Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and its splinter group, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP). The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)—the umbrella organization for most of the Palestinian groups—established a permanent office in Havana in 1974, and both the PFLP and DFLP later followed suit. [redacted]

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