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


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
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Argentina: The Military Under Civilian Rule



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A Research Paper

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Argentina: The Military Under Civilian Rule

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A Research Paper

This paper was prepared by [Redacted]
Office of Latin American Analysis, with a
contribution from [Redacted] the Office of
Leadership Analysis. It was coordinated with the
Directorate of Operations. [Redacted]

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Comments and queries are welcome and may be
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
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Argentina: The Military Under Civilian Rule



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Summary

Information available as of 31 March 1986 was used in this report.

Three years after Argentina's return to democratic rule, the nation's armed forces are facing serious problems. President Alfonsin has sharply reduced the defense budget; forced deep cutbacks in personnel benefits, training, and equipment acquisitions; and forcibly retired most of the senior officers who rose to key positions under military rule. He has tried to focus the armed forces' activities exclusively on military matters and has limited their size to reduce the drain on the economy. There is widespread resentment among the officer corps against the administration for the resulting decline in capabilities, and low morale has spurred a manpower exodus.




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President Alfonsin is sensitive to the military's problems, but is also committed to longer term reforms designed to professionalize and depoliticize the armed forces. He plans over time to transform the streamlined services into a more professional fighting force, possessing a clear external mission and armed with modern weapons. These measures, in our view, bode well for the US goal of promoting democratic institutions in Argentina and throughout South America. The military has been a persistent source of instability in Argentina, but, with the measures implemented so far, it will probably not play a major political role over the next few years.



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We believe that Buenos Aires will almost certainly press Washington for closer bilateral security ties and increased assistance in implementing its military reforms. The Argentines have repeatedly stressed their preference for military alignment with the West and favor a modernization program that features Western—and particularly US—equipment. In our judgment, Argentina will continue to seek US recognition and support of civilian control over the military and will increasingly approach the Pentagon for advice on military affairs.



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Close bilateral ties have associated risks, however. Major sales of US arms to Argentina could provoke a sharp response from London, but, by the same token, if Buenos Aires is deprived of all access to Western weaponry, it could flirt with the Soviets over arms supply issues. It is also possible that Argentina may seek to reduce some of the military's budgetary strictures by selling some of its warships, submarines, or aircraft—of both foreign and domestic manufacture—to countries that are unfriendly to the United States, such as Iran and Libya.




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Internally, the Argentine military is now in a state of transition as it tries to reconcile itself to its new nonpolitical role. Defeat in the Falklands and the record of poor economic performance and massive human rights abuses of


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the previous military government have left the services in a weak political position and bereft of public support. The armed forces blame Alfonsin for their reduced prestige and civil-military tensions remain high. 

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We believe Alfonsin will begin efforts over the next year to ease these strains with the services both through symbolic gestures such as increasing civilian government representation at military functions and by inviting their involvement in the restructuring plans. In our judgment, these efforts may ease tensions slightly, but they will not eliminate the major sources of government-military friction. We believe that rapidly escalating military fears of wholesale prosecutions of subordinate military officers for human rights violations will probably force Alfonsin to declare an end to the trials—in effect an amnesty—during the coming year. 

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For the moment, Alfonsin has succeeded in limiting the military's political influence, but we believe the major test will come as he tries to implement more far-reaching military reforms. Among these is the complete reorganization of the Argentine forces, with an emphasis on joint service cooperation. A new defense law currently being debated in Congress will deprive the military of its responsibility for internal security, limiting its activities to national defense. It will also strengthen Alfonsin's role as the commander in chief of the armed forces and place all peacetime defense planning under the control of the civilian Ministry of Defense. The armed forces are troubled by these proposals and several key problems affecting the military—the specter of continuing human rights trials, low salaries, reduced capabilities, and the fear of a resurgence of leftist terrorism—will probably combine with this resistance to keep civil-military tensions high.



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Aside from the issue of organization, we believe the civilian government is far from reaching its broader based goal of establishing complete control over the military and faces several long-term challenges. The administration must promote acceptance of democratic government within the officer corps, integrate the military into society, and try to convince the Argentine public that the armed forces should focus exclusively on professional military matters. Alfonsin will probably make only marginal progress toward these ends during the remainder of his six-year term. Consequently, we expect that civil-military relations will remain a prime concern of the President or any successor administration. 

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Figure 1



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Argentina: The Military Under Civilian Rule [redacted]

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Introduction

The Argentine armed forces have undergone significant changes since the return to civilian rule in December 1983. According to the [redacted] [redacted] has slashed the defense budget, reduced equipment acquisitions and manpower levels, and forcibly retired or tried for human rights violations many flag officers, thereby causing a sharp deterioration in the military's operational capabilities and political influence. A new defense law now before Congress will completely restructure the Argentine military through changes in mission and organization. This will go a long way in meeting what we believe are Alfonsin's long-term objectives—permanently reducing the size of the armed forces and transforming them into a more professional fighting force armed with modern weapons. The government is also openly pressing for greater interservice cooperation and reforms in military education in an apparent attempt to offset some of the financial cutbacks and to coax the services into actively supporting democratic rule in Argentina. [redacted]

US Embassy and press statements suggest that the military views Alfonsin as an adversary and is resisting what it perceives as governmental meddling in its internal affairs. We believe, however, that Alfonsin has so clipped the military's wings that the services will not threaten his government's stability over the next few years. Nevertheless, the armed forces show few signs of even grudgingly accepting enhanced civilian control, and government-military tensions are likely to remain high for the foreseeable future. [redacted]

Austerity and the Military

After Argentina's defeat in the Falklands conflict in 1982, the armed forces, anticipating a prompt return to civilian government, moved quickly to purchase as much foreign military equipment as possible, according to the [redacted] [redacted] took office, his administration was faced with a

long list of weapons contracts made by the military government. [redacted] [redacted] considered canceling many of these, but provisions for penalties made this an unattractive option. He decided, instead, to delay delivery of equipment and extend deadlines as much as possible. These economizing measures were insufficient to meet the acute financial squeeze confronting the new government, and Alfonsin concluded that more drastic military belt-tightening was required. In early 1984, according to the US Embassy and press reporting, he instructed the Ministry of Defense to reduce the defense budget over a two-year period from the traditional 4 percent of GDP to a total of 2 percent. Reductions in the military budget are forcing deep cutbacks in personnel benefits, training, and equipment, acquisition and maintenance spurring many careerists to leave the military. We believe that these austerity conditions will persist, and will accelerate the decline in military capabilities and morale. [redacted]

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Manpower Problems

Alfonsin's spending reductions have sharply reduced military wages and other benefits. Military pay increases did not keep pace with the high inflation that characterized the President's first 18 months in office, and [redacted] the government has been chronically late in making wage and pension payments. The purchasing power of military personnel is now at its lowest point in 10 years, according to [redacted]

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The cuts in pay and other benefits, together with the post-Falklands decline in the social status of the military, have prompted an exodus of personnel from all three services. Many officers and NCOs who remain in the military feel forced to moonlight in the civilian sector, according to [redacted]

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The Legacy of Military Rule

Argentina's tradition of military intervention in politics began in 1930 when the Army overthrew President Hipolito Yrigoyen, the founder of Raul Alfonsin's Radical Party. Since then, the armed forces have mounted five successful coups against constitutional presidents and launched innumerable abortive uprisings. The military has held power for all but five of the last 20 years. Only one freely elected president—Juan Peron—has completed his term of office in the past half century, and he was an Army colonel who first achieved prominence through a coup. The armed forces have toppled nearly every variety of administration: conservative, Peronist, radical, and military. In recent decades, moreover, the duration of military regimes has increased while the lifespan of the civilian governments separating them has become shorter and more tenuous. [redacted]

The responsibility for this pattern, in our view, rests not only with the military but also with Argentine political culture in general. Academic studies have concluded that the armed forces have become accepted by the public and the politicians as one among many political power brokers, barely distinguishable in this regard from the parties or labor unions. Recourse by politicians to the military as a source of power has become a tacit rule of the Argentine political game. The services have worked in tandem with virtually every significant political force over the last 50 years. Few of the country's politicians can truthfully claim never to have knocked on the barracks door. [redacted]

Some scholars and Argentine politicians have speculated that Alfonsin's election marked a decisive shift from military intervention in politics. They argue that the systematic and massive counterterrorist campaign launched by the preceding military regime involved a degree of repression and violation of constitutional liberties unprecedented in Argentine history. This, combined with the Falklands disaster and the military's economic failures, uniquely discredited the armed forces, according to these observers. The result, in their view, has been a salutary affirmation by Argentine society of democratic processes and the rule of law. [redacted]

We agree with much of this analysis, but hesitate to conclude that Argentina's basic political dynamics have changed. The armed forces, in our view, remain key players, and the political impact of their human rights abuses will fade in time. The Argentine press still lavishes attention on the political views and maneuverings of the officer corps, and reporting from the US Embassy [redacted] indicates that politicians, labor leaders, and businessmen are cultivating military contacts as eagerly as ever. Most of the underlying causes of past coups—the absence of a powerful conservative party, labor's recourse to politicized strikes and protests, and the confrontational style of the political parties—continue unabated. We believe that, at a minimum, Alfonsin needs to complete his term and hand power to an elected successor before the revolving door of military and civilian regimes in Buenos Aires will begin to close. [redacted]

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commanders release personnel from their regular duties to pursue such work. In the Air Force, moreover, many servicemen request advance notice of transfers so they can seek outside employment in the area of the new assignment. Given these pressures, junior and noncommissioned officers are leaving in growing numbers to seek jobs in private industry, [redacted] Manpower losses are not limited to more seasoned personnel. The [redacted] for example, that the government has limited the Army's conscript intake

for 1986 to 25,000—less than half the number of draftees inducted under the military regime. The administration has also shortened the normal one-year conscription tour to four months and has implemented enforced vacation periods of up to three months annually for both officers and enlisted men. At the same time, the well-publicized financial plight of

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
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
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Figure 2
Argentina: Shrinking Salaries and
Manpower Exodus, 1980-85

Shrinking Salaries and Cost of Living a
 Index: 1980=100



Military Retirements and Releases b
 Thousand



^a Shrinking salaries are at their lowest level in 10 years. The curve shows the decline in purchasing power.
^b Military personnel are leaving the service in growing numbers. Retirements and resignations are at record highs.

[Redacted]

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military personnel has also caused enrollment in military academies to fall off sharply in the past two years. [Redacted]

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Army. [Redacted] the Army had expected an attrition rate of approximately 400 in 1985, but was faced with 3,600 retirements and discharges of officers and NCOs. [Redacted] most personnel left because of the decline in real wages, and that many stayed on only because other jobs were scarce. [Redacted]

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Navy. The Navy lost a third of its noncommissioned officers and about one-fourth of its officer corps and enlisted technicians during 1984 [Redacted]. Press reports indicate that the attrition levels dropped somewhat in 1985, but are still above normal, and that morale among remaining officers is extremely low. [Redacted]

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Air Force. The Air Force, in our view, is coping with the funding cutbacks more successfully than the other services and has not yet experienced the same massive personnel losses. [Redacted] however, that low wages and declining morale are beginning to take their toll. Although most career Air Force officers with 15 to 20 years' experience do not consider themselves suitable for civilian employment, many officers in the 24 to 27 age bracket feel they are still young enough to find civilian jobs. [Redacted] believes that even a small exodus of these young officers from the Air Force would encourage others to follow. [Redacted]

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Declining Capabilities

The budget cuts have also harmed operational readiness. The three services have suffered setbacks in a variety of areas, including training, equipment maintenance, and logistics. [Redacted]

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Figure 3. Morale among Argentine military personnel has plummeted as austerity measures have reduced benefits, training, and equipment maintenance and acquisitions. [redacted]

Army. The Army—which has received about 40 percent of national defense expenditures in recent years—has been allocated only 30 percent under Alfonsin’s austere 1985 budget. These reductions, coupled with manpower losses, have severely weakened the Army, [redacted] reporting. The Army has closed down as many as 30 installations and is also using NCOs and officers to perform duties normally reserved for conscripts. Moreover, [redacted] equipment maintenance has declined alarmingly because of the growing shortage of technical personnel. Army officers are concerned that the deterioration of equipment will accelerate as spare parts availability plummets. [redacted]



Army logistics also appear to be breaking down. At least twice during 1984 and 1985, suppliers stopped deliveries of foodstuffs to the Army because of overdue bills. The press reports that supplies of uniforms and fuel are low, and that some units severely restrict utilities to reduce operating costs. Finally, depleted ammunition stockpiles have seriously restricted training; [redacted] that many conscripts have received little or no weapons training. [redacted]

Navy. The Navy also has made dramatic cuts to stay within the constraints of its reduced budget, [redacted] Slowdowns ordered by the [redacted]




Figure 4. Many military facilities (upper and lower) have been forced to close because of a lack of operating funds. [redacted]

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Navy Chief of Staff in sea exercises from December to February in both 1984/85 and 1985/86, for instance, kept two-thirds of the fleet in port. Moreover, warships—which require at least 60 days at sea annually to maintain fighting trim, based on Argentine Navy standards—sailed an average of only 20 days during 1985. With continued funding constraints likely in 1986, we believe that the Navy will lack the fuel and trained personnel to carry out lengthy exercises at sea. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] The United Kingdom's ban on military equipment sales to Argentina has deprived the Navy's British-built Type 42 destroyers of spare parts. [redacted]

[redacted]

Moreover, the [redacted] the flight deck and aircraft-handling equipment aboard the Navy's only aircraft carrier are badly in need of repair. Press reports also indicate that the carrier is unable to sustain speeds necessary for armed aircraft takeoff, thus limiting flight exercises to unarmed aircraft. [redacted]

Naval flight training has also suffered major cut-backs. The Navy believes its pilots require a minimum of 120 hours per year to maintain proficiency. The US [redacted] that flight hours have been well below this level in recent years for almost all units and that naval air units do not meet the required number of hours for night flying. [redacted] adds that the Navy has placed at least six of its Super Etendard fighter aircraft in long-term inactive status because it lacks funds to maintain them. Only a small number of the best Super Etendard pilots are flying regularly; the remainder are attending various military schools. [redacted]

Austerity is beginning to hamper the Navy's performance and hinder participation in joint exercises with foreign navies. [redacted] that manning problems and limited naval operations have resulted in a higher than normal incidence of errors. The effects of financial stringencies and loss of trained personnel were evident at recent joint exercises with Brazil's Navy. According to press reports,

Brazilian sailors were able for the first time to outperform the Argentines in speed and precision of weapons use—an embarrassment for Argentina, given the historical rivalry between the two services. [redacted]

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Air Force. Argentina's Air Force has sharply cut its flight training. Flying time for Mirage fighter aircraft is now limited to eight hours per month—compared with 18 in 1984—and the service has also reduced flying time for its A-4 Skyhawk fighters. Some A-4 squadrons, however, are cutting back on flight hours but increasing the number of sorties to ensure that the maximum number of pilots can maintain proficiency. [redacted]

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There is considerable evidence of growing concern within the Air Force about safety and maintenance. [redacted] Air Force officials attribute a rise in accidents to decreased flight training time. [redacted]

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Lack of funds is forcing the Air Force to reduce spending in several other areas, [redacted]

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[redacted] The Air Force is scaling back its attache representation overseas and is also canceling participation in many training programs abroad. Older aircraft are being cannibalized for parts because the service cannot afford spares. According to Argentine press reports, ammunition shortages have led the Air Force to sharply curtail exercises, while financial stringencies have forced drastic reductions in electricity, fuel, and paper usage. [redacted]

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Impact on Arms Acquisitions

[redacted] austerity has virtually halted all new weapons purchases; instead, the [redacted] the Alfonsin government is trying to cover some military costs by exporting Argentine- and foreign-manufactured weapon systems acquired in the 1970s. The Air Force has put Mirage III aircraft on the international market and

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
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Figure 5. These Mirage IIIs at the Argentine Air Force Base at Mendoza have been placed on the international market in an effort to generate funds for the financially strapped military.



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Figure 6. The trials of senior military officers for human rights abuses met with a generally favorable public response, but the specter of further prosecutions continues to be a chafing point in civil-military relations.



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Argentina's Arms Export Difficulties

Since he took office nearly three years ago, Alfonsin has pushed to increase the export of domestic and foreign-made weapon systems in the Argentine military inventory to generate revenue and offset the effects of the austerity program on the military. US Embassy and [redacted] however, that overseas sales have been minimal largely because of:

- High unit production costs and consequent high export prices.
 - Argentina's difficulty in offering attractive credit terms because of its financial problems.
 - Export restrictions set by governments of coproducing countries.
 - Opposition by some Argentine officials to arms sales to potentially lucrative markets in the Middle East.
- In addition, Argentine promotional efforts have long been weak. Defense industry officials neither attached high importance to publicity nor considered market research a prerequisite to production decisions. [redacted]

The TAM tank program embodies many of the problems that have plagued Argentina's export efforts. The TAM, like other Argentine ground forces equipment, was developed for the national Army, and little if any consideration was given to its exportability. [redacted] that, although

negotiations have been conducted with several Asian countries and Peru, no TAM export sales have been concluded. Exports of other Argentine-made ground force materiel have also been disappointing. [redacted]

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Argentina has also had trouble finding foreign buyers for its aircraft. The only customer so far has been Uruguay, which purchased six IA-58 Pucara light attack aircraft. [redacted] has canceled a contract it had signed for 24 IA-58s—probably, in our view, because the aircraft did not meet Venezuelan Air Force requirements. The Bolivian Air Force has expressed interest in buying IA-58s but lacks funds. [redacted]

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Iraq has signed a contract to purchase 20 IA-58s, but actual transfer of the aircraft is being delayed on both political and financial grounds. [redacted]

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has offered to sell Argentine-made Pucara aircraft already included in its inventory. [redacted]

[redacted] Buenos Aires is also seeking customers for two British-built destroyers and two West German-made Type 209 submarines. Argentina has yet to close a single deal, however, and we suspect that the glut on the arms market and the relatively poor condition of Buenos Aires's offerings will continue to impede progress in this area. [redacted]

to US reexport restrictions. The United States, responding to a request from the British Government to halt military sales to Argentina as a result of the Falklands conflict, has refused to permit delivery of the aircraft. Argentina is pressing Washington to release the planes, asserting that it has paid for them and cannot recoup the funds from Israel. In recent months, according to US Embassy and [redacted] Argentina has repeatedly raised the issue with US political and military representatives—following Alfonsin's announcement that reequipment appropriations for 1986 will again be minimal. [redacted]

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In 1982 Argentina contracted to purchase from Israel a number of A-4 fighter-bombers, which are subject

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Forcing Democracy on the Military

We believe that Alfonsin sees the military as the main obstacle to his goal of completing his term in office and transferring power in an orderly manner to another elected civilian government. The President used budget cuts to dilute the immediate threat, but, in our view, he must make more fundamental changes to remove the long-term danger of military intervention in politics. To achieve this end, the administration is planning massive reforms to restructure the armed forces and, it hopes, permanently alter their role in Argentine society. [redacted]

Many of Alfonsin's initial moves to curb the military were punitive in nature. He moved quickly to prevent the military from regaining any of the power and prestige it had lost following the Falklands debacle and the revelations of widespread human rights abuses during the "dirty war" against subversion in the 1970s. He established a national commission to investigate and publicize military human rights violations and ordered the trial of nine former Junta members for these abuses, first in military courts and later—when the military refused to convict its own—in the civilian judicial system. These trials resulted in the sentencing of three former Presidents and two Junta members to prison—the first time in Argentine history that a military government had been held accountable by a civilian successor regime. [redacted]

Alfonsin also moved to rid the military of potential troublemakers, according to US Embassy and press reports, forcibly retiring 50 out of 53 Junta-appointed senior officers during his first year in office. The President then promoted less contentious officers to key positions in the Joint General Staff and strengthened the authority of this staff as an impediment to independent action by the individual services. He also eliminated the First Army Corps headquarters in Buenos Aires—a staging area for past coups—and transferred its subordinate units to other corps located well away from the federal capitol. [redacted]

Alfonsin also made a number of bureaucratic changes in the strength of the civilian hold on the military. Alfonsin placed the armed forces under the administration of the newly civilianized Ministry of Defense.

[redacted] and press reporting, he also wrested control of Argentina's numerous defense-related industries from the individual services and transferred authority for military production policy making to the Ministry of Defense. This move, in our view, was designed to both reduce military autonomy and convert the arms industry to profitability by replacing military managers with civilians with business experience. The administration is now considering additional reforms that would transfer the previously military-run industries to the private sector. [redacted]

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The administration's long-term goal, according to US Embassy and [redacted] is to transform the military into a streamlined, efficient fighting force that will not be a drain on the national economy. Alfonsin has already accomplished the initial phase of this effort by reducing the annual number of conscripts per service and closing down many installations. In the next phase, Alfonsin hopes to ease his restrictions on weapons acquisitions, to allow this new smaller force to modernize its inventory (see appendix B). [redacted]

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We view the proposed national defense law as the culmination of Alfonsin's structural and organizational military reforms. According to US Embassy and [redacted] it changes the armed forces' mission from internal security to external defense—a radical alteration in the military's historical role in Argentine society—and transfers units from their traditional locations near major cities to remote but strategically important areas on the Chilean and Brazilian borders. In addition, the bill will shift all responsibility for antiterrorist and anti-insurgency efforts to the Federal Police, a security force under the direction of the Interior Ministry. [redacted]

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This legislation also reinforces the concept of direct government participation in armed forces planning by establishing a National Defense Cabinet and a Military Committee. The Cabinet, which will be composed of the vice president, five key ministers, and ad

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The Argentine Military Today

The armed forces consist of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force and are directly subordinate to the Ministry of Defense. The Army is predominant, with the Navy being second in size, but probably third in influence, after the Air Force. The Joint General Staff is responsible for plans, interservice coordination, and joint service matters and will be the military component of the proposed National Defense Committee. In addition, there are three paramilitary forces formerly under the direct orders of the individual services: the Border Patrol (Army), the Coast Guard (Navy), and the National Aeronautical Police (Air Force). Alfonsin has transferred all three to civilian control—the Aeronautical Police to the Ministry of Justice, and the Border Patrol and the Coast Guard to the Ministry of Defense.

21,070 noncommissioned officers, and 25,000 conscripts). Conscript duty normally lasts about nine months but has been reduced to four months or less to cut operating costs and scale down the size of the Army.

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The Navy has the mission of defending the country from attack by sea, protecting sea lines of communication, and enforcing national fishing laws involving offshore waters.

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The Air Force's mission is to provide homeland defense, tactical air support, and airlift support for ground and naval forces. The Argentine Air Force also has nonmilitary responsibilities such as the development of civil aviation, air traffic control, and administration of the national weather service.

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The Army's mission is to defend Argentine territory against external threats. President Alfonsin has given responsibility for internal security to the Argentine Federal Police—a national police force somewhat analogous to the US Federal Bureau of Investigation—and the civilian justice system. The Army's estimated personnel strength for 1985 based on US

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hoc presidential appointees, will assist the president in potential threat assessments by developing wartime strategies and coordinating force planning. The Military Committee—consisting of the minister of defense and four top military officers—will operate only during wartime and will advise the president in his capacity as commander in chief of the armed forces in all matters relating to the conduct of war.

US Embassy and press statements indicate that Alfonsin believes that he needs the law as a constitutional framework for further military reform and views it as one of the administration's major achievements.

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Military Reactions

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As things now stand, the bill has passed the House of Deputies and is now being debated in the Senate. US Embassy and press reporting indicates that the bill may face stiff opposition from the Peronists and from some elements of the President's own Radical Party, but we believe that Alfonsin will make the necessary political compromises to assure its eventual passage.

The officer corps, and Embassy reporting, is greatly troubled by the administration's attempts to change fundamentally the military's traditional role and organization. We believe that the services view Alfonsin as an adversary who is attempting to destroy them as viable institutions.

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Figure 7. Alfonsin's long-term objective is a smaller, more professional fighting force. [redacted]

The fragility of civil-military relations was exposed during the wave of terrorist bombings that afflicted Argentina last year. The government—suspecting that extremist elements in the military were trying to foment trouble prior to the November congressional

election—arrested six active-duty and retired officers accused of masterminding the violence and invoked state-of-siege provisions to make the detentions stick.¹

[redacted] many officers saw the arrests as part of a civilian campaign to discredit the armed forces; [redacted]

[redacted] the US Embassy indicated that hotheads within the military were ready to defend themselves against what they considered to be a direct affront to the military. [redacted]

[redacted] Lack of evidence later forced Alfonsin to release the detainees and cancel the state of siege, but the incident, in our view, had the salutary effect of sensitizing the President to the persistence of military discontent and the need to move carefully in restructuring and depoliticizing the armed forces.

[redacted] One of the military's main complaints, according to US Embassy [redacted] reporting, is that the human rights trials have become a forum for attacking military honor in general and the services' record in the war against subversion in particular. Despite

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press reports that Alfonsin intends to limit the trials to Junta members and a handful of particularly notorious offenders, the US Embassy affirms that many junior and midlevel officers still fear they will be held accountable in civilian courts for their role during the repression of the 1970s. [redacted]

The potential for renewed leftist subversion remains a prime military concern. The US Embassy reports that the services are particularly incensed over the national defense law's proposals to restrict internal security responsibilities to the Federal Police. The military believes that the Federal Police proved their incompetence during the "dirty war" and would be incapable of countering any resurgent leftist threat. [redacted]

The budget is another chafing point between the military and the civilian government, according to the US Embassy. The services want to preserve their historically large share of the national budget to ensure that military revenues will rise if and when Alfonsin's austerity program generates economic growth. Also, the military feels—in our view, correctly—that Alfonsin's budget cuts are as much designed to shatter its political and fighting power as to save money. [redacted] that many officers assert that they do not have sufficient funds to carry out even minimal duties, much less effectively defend Argentina from an external threat. All three services fear that the cutbacks will also thwart the administration's force modernization program because it so severely limits the acquisition of new equipment. [redacted]

Large sectors of the armed forces also believe that the service chiefs and Ministry of Defense officials have been co-opted by the administration and now serve government policy interests rather than those of the

Defense Minister German Lopez



67 . . . President Alfonsin's longtime associate and closest adviser . . . in previous post as Secretary General of Presidency was Alfonsin's "eyes and ears" in government . . . no military or defense experience, but has support of President and his party—requisites for success of past defense ministers . . . appointment resisted by the armed forces because of his antimilitary reputation . . . employed by US companies in Argentina for 30 years . . . has been in favor of increased ties to United States. [redacted]

military as an institution. [redacted] many military personnel see the Joint General Staff—whose importance Alfonsin has repeatedly stressed—as little more than a home for pliant officers willing to do the government's bidding. Individual service chiefs also garner little respect; [redacted] that, with the exception of the Air Force, middle grade and junior officers of the other services think that their leaders were chosen because they would unquestioningly implement administration policies, rather than for their professional competence. The recent appointment of Defense Minister German Lopez also generated a considerable amount of ill feeling within the military. According to the US Embassy, Lopez has an antimilitary reputation; many officers worry that he will adopt a much more confrontational stance with the

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armed forces and will surround himself with civilian advisers who are ignorant of military affairs. [redacted]

[redacted]

The military's poor relations with civilian authorities have hampered military acceptance of Alfonsin's restructuring and reorganization program. [redacted]

[redacted] many officers view the current plan as rushed and unprofessional and lament that it did not emerge from a well-thought-out threat assessment. The military also criticized the government's use of a blue-ribbon panel of retired officers and Ministry of Defense civilians to draw up and implement the defense law. [redacted]

[redacted] felt shut out of this ambitious effort to remold the Argentine military establishment and resent Alfonsin for inadequately consulting with those most directly affected by his reforms. [redacted]

The Military: Isolated and Divided

Notwithstanding the open animosity between the military and Alfonsin, many factors prevent the armed forces from effectively opposing the government. First and foremost is the issue of popularity. Recent polls indicate that Alfonsin enjoys the support of about 60 percent of the public. He has transferred some of his personal appeal to his Radical Party, which bested the Peronist opposition in last year's congressional election. By contrast, the armed forces, in our judgment, remain totally discredited in the wake of the Falklands debacle, revelations of human rights abuses, and the rampant economic mismanagement that characterized the last military government. Recent polls indicate that the public continues to distrust the armed forces and believes that the verdicts in the Junta trials should have been much stiffer. Nearly 80 percent of the respondents in one poll do not want future civilian government to include active-duty military officers, and approximately the same percentage believe that a coup could not occur in the

near term, according to the US Embassy. The military also lacks the support of erstwhile civilian allies. Both the Peronists and organized labor—which worked closely with the military in the past—are steering clear of any association with what is now possibly Argentina's most reviled institution. [redacted]

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Divisions within the military itself have also worked to keep the troops in the barracks. There appear to be at least three major rifts preventing cohesive action by the armed forces:

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- *Interservice rivalries.* According to US Embassy reports, the three services profoundly distrust one another. They are reluctant to take any joint action and constantly squabble over resource allocation, as illustrated by the continuing feud between the Navy and the Air Force over which service will receive the A-4 aircraft now in Israel awaiting US reexport approval. The government carefully cultivates these rivalries: [redacted]

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- *Intraservice rivalries.* Both bureaucratic and personality-related disputes weaken solidarity within the services. The most drastic problems— [redacted] exist within the Army between the infantry and the cavalry. Army Chief of Staff Rios Erenu is from the infantry branch, and we believe that some of the criticism directed against him results from the cavalry and artillery branches' resentment at being shut out of top Army positions.

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- *Vertical rivalries.* According to the press [redacted] there is a growing rift between the senior and junior officers in each of the services. Senior officers—colonels and above—frequently support the decisions of the Joint General Staff and are making some efforts to work within the new budgetary and political restrictions established by

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Figure 8. President Alfonsin is likely to increase civilian presence at military functions in an effort to ease tensions with the armed forces. [redacted]



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Alfonsin. However, [redacted] and press reporting, the junior officers have little respect for their superiors and have denounced them for failing to stand up to the government. US Embassy officials indicate that junior officers are more willing to confront the Alfonsin administration, are generally more anti-American, and are more receptive to radical political and economic pronouncements than are their seniors. [redacted]

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allies. Divisions within the military and efforts by the services to protect their individual interests in the planned reorganization process will continue to inhibit a coordinated move against Alfonsin. [redacted]

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Outlook

Short-Term Prospects

The key issues over the next year are likely to be the same that have plagued Alfonsin since he took office—the tenor of civil-military relations, the extension of the human rights trials, continued austerity, and the reorganization of the armed forces. We believe that the military’s relationship with Alfonsin will remain adversarial and tense, but controllable. In our judgment, the chances of a coup over the next 12 months are negligible, since the military will remain unpopular and divorced from its traditional civilian

Alfonsin, in our view, will begin efforts to placate the military. There will be more symbolic gestures by the government, such as increased civilian attendance at important military functions and more visits to troop bases throughout Argentina during the coming year. According to the US Embassy, Alfonsin views these appearances as opportunities to applaud the armed forces and to praise them publicly as legitimate and necessary in a democracy. The government will also probably begin to involve senior members of the armed forces in the restructuring effort; [redacted] the service chiefs have already created working groups to supervise the implementation of the defense law. We believe that these efforts may ease tensions slightly but that they will not eliminate the major sources of government-military friction. [redacted]

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We believe that military fears of wholesale prosecutions of subordinate officers for human rights violations will probably force Alfonsin to declare an end to

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these trials during the coming year. In our judgment, he will try to appease human rights and leftist groups by prosecuting those accused of particularly egregious crimes. We believe that Alfonsin may try to deflect criticism by trying to place responsibility for such an action in the courts or in Congress, but he could also unilaterally decree a reprieve as commander in chief of the armed forces. []

In recent months, Alfonsin has shown some signs of softening his hardline stance on military austerity. For example, the US Embassy reports that early this year Alfonsin granted a 30-percent wage hike to career armed forces personnel while retaining wage controls on other public employees. We believe this will give a temporary boost to military morale, but it addresses only one facet of the military's disgruntlement with continued budgetary constraints. []

In our judgment, the administration will start to implement its armed forces' reorganization this year, despite military objections. The US Embassy reports that Alfonsin is committed to this effort and the Ministry of Defense views restructuring as the only way to halt the decline in capabilities in the face of continued austerity. All three services, in our view, will continue to fear that their readiness level is dangerously low and that they would be hard pressed to defend the country against a serious military threat. As the Defense Minister lobbies for Senate passage of the defense bill by stressing the need for force modernization, we believe the armed forces will become increasingly vocal in their demands that the government give some credibility to this goal by allocating funds for arms acquisitions. Government-military relations on the issue are likely to remain contentious, but the administration will almost certainly push its defense law through Congress and at least begin to lay the groundwork for a more rational, streamlined defense force. []

Long-Term Challenges

In our judgment, Alfonsin has effectively used short-term coercive measures such as limited funding and forced retirements to rein in the unruly military. Both the US Embassy and the [] however, question whether the military establishment can so change from within that it ceases to threaten the

stability of democratic government in Argentina. We echo that concern and believe that the administration is far from reaching its goal of establishing strong civilian control over the military. Several long-term challenges remain:

- The administration must work to eliminate the military's view of itself as a political party and promote acceptance of the legitimacy of democratic government within the officer corps. The Defense Ministry has moved to reform the curriculum at military schools, but has retained professors who were on the staff under military rule and are imbued with traditional notions regarding the armed forces' political role. 25X1
- The government needs to promote the idea among the general public that the armed forces should focus exclusively on professional military matters. As the US Embassy reports, the public is extremely sensitive to the opinions of the military, and each flutter of institutional or individual discontent becomes front page news. 25X1
- The civilian government must take steps to break the "caste-apart" status of the professional military and integrate it into Argentine society. We believe that this will be a daunting task because the armed forces have traditionally seen themselves as a separate elite; what little information we possess indicates that cadets continue to be recruited mainly from military families. [] 25X1

In our judgment, the Alfonsin government will make only modest progress in addressing these long-term problems. The military is likely to remain disgruntled and wary of Alfonsin's overtures toward conciliation throughout the remainder of his term. Alfonsin will probably have no option but to rely on punitive measures to limit the military's involvement in politics. The armed forces' ability to mount a coup will remain limited, but they will continue to probe the weaknesses of any civilian government in an effort to expand their influence. [] 25X1

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As things now stand, the only issue that could fundamentally shift public opinion is the handling of the economy.² If Alfonsin's current policies failed and Argentina was hit by runaway inflation and a major erosion of living standards, the resulting economic chaos could, in our view, spur social disorder, a resurgence of rightwing and leftwing terrorism, and a drop in the popularity levels now enjoyed by Alfonsin and his Radical Party. In our view, this political scenario could once again force the Argentine public and important civilian institutions to turn to the military for salvation, as they so often have in the past. [redacted]

We also believe that the military could move against Alfonsin in the absence of these elements if it felt sufficiently threatened as an institution. Two possible actions that could lead to such a move would be a decision by Alfonsin to initiate wholesale prosecution of subordinate officers for human rights abuses or to institute further drastic cuts in the defense budget or military capabilities. In our view, Alfonsin understands the potential impact of these actions and would vigorously resist implementing either one. [redacted]

Implications for the United States

We believe that Washington will face mounting pressure over the next year from both the Alfonsin administration and the military for an increased bilateral security relationship. According to US Embassy reporting, the Ministry of Defense seeks US recognition and support of civilian control over the military and looks to the Pentagon for advice on restructuring. In an effort to reinforce the change in military doctrine from internal security to national defense, we judge that the military will approve service participation in joint exercises such as UNITAS 87, and we expect that the Defense Minister may suggest additional bilateral exercises. Buenos Aires has repeatedly stressed its preference

[redacted]

for weapons acquisitions from Western—and especially US—suppliers. The armed forces will press Washington for training and equipment, with particular emphasis in coming months on the release of Israeli A-4 fighter aircraft now awaiting US reexport approval. [redacted]

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One pitfall to any expansion of US security ties to Argentina is the danger that any rapprochement, and especially sales of offensive weapon systems such as fighter aircraft, will work against perceived British interests in the region.³ The Argentines are well aware of this situation, and we believe Buenos Aires will continue to hint that the consequent impasse may force it to seriously consider Soviet arms deals. Argentina, in our judgment, is reluctant to accept Moscow's offers, but if military equipment and capabilities continue to deteriorate at the current rate and financial strictures endure, Buenos Aires may eventually adopt a more favorable stance toward Soviet offers. [redacted]

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Austerity is also the source of another arms transfer issue that is a high concern of the US Government. Buenos Aires has tried to limit its offers to sell arms—of both foreign and domestic origin—to countries that are acceptable to Washington and has refused sales to areas of conflict.⁴ Continuing austerity and repeated requests by some countries—particularly Iran and Libya—to purchase Argentine warships and submarines, however, may eventually weaken Alfonsin's resolve. [redacted]

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The low readiness level of the Argentine forces also has a detrimental effect on US global wartime strategy. [redacted] the Argentine military has responsibility for protecting the US

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³ Nearly four years after the Falklands war, negotiations between the United Kingdom and Argentina are moribund. Prime Minister Thatcher refuses to discuss the question of sovereignty and stresses the importance of the islanders' self-determination. The Argentine Government, for its part, insists that the sovereignty issue be included in the agenda before it will consent to negotiations. [redacted]

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USSR: Wooing the Argentine Military

Over the years, Moscow has made numerous unsuccessful attempts to expand its South American military equipment sales beyond Peru. Seeing Argentina's difficulty in securing Western materiel and wishing to balance its trade with Buenos Aires, Moscow may work harder to lure the Argentines into a military relationship. Moscow has renewed its longstanding offer to sell military equipment—including fighter and transport aircraft—to the Argentine armed forces, [redacted]

Strings Attached

One of the more recent overtures occurred last November when, [redacted] the Soviets offered to sell the Argentine Air Force 30 to 36 MIG-23 or MIG-25 fighter aircraft. The USSR offered attractive credit terms and guaranteed to underbid the price of any comparable fighter on the international market. [redacted] however, Moscow placed severe conditions on the sale, stipulating that:

- All Argentine officer and NCO training must take place in the Soviet Union.

- Argentina must offer Moscow all of its agricultural exports before placing them on the international market.
- Buenos Aires must permit a large Soviet support mission, including pilots, to be stationed in Argentina.

Buenos Aires was unresponsive, and Soviet officials have since adopted a more low-key approach, including promotional demonstrations of at least two types of transport aircraft in Argentina. [redacted]

The Argentine military has made it clear [redacted] that it is overwhelmingly anti-Communist, and its responses to Soviet overtures have been extremely cool. [redacted] however, that the Air Force and the Army are at least beginning to show mild interest in Soviet technology. One Army and two Air Force pilots recently went to Peru to fly and evaluate Soviet-made MI-8 helicopters and SU-22 fighter aircraft, [redacted]

In addition, [redacted] may have taken advantage of his visit to Lima for President Garcia's inauguration to inspect Peru's Soviet-made army materiel. [redacted]

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southern flank and sea lines of communication in the southern Atlantic. In our view, the deep cuts in personnel, training, and equipment acquisition and maintenance put in serious doubt Argentina's ability to successfully meet these obligations. [redacted]

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Finally, Alfonsin's curbing of military influence bodes well for the US goal of promoting democratic institutions in Argentina. The armed forces' continued exclusion from power should, in our view, help assure that pro-Western civilian regimes—whether Radical or Peronist—will rule in Buenos Aires. Also, the gradual emergence of a more professional military force focused on national defense instead of internal politics could, in the long run, provide a salutary example to other newly democratized countries in South America. [redacted]

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Appendix A

Proposed Redeployment and Reorganization of the Argentine Armed Forces

The government-directed reorganization plan will focus on the establishment of a more streamlined, professional force capable of conducting joint service operations. The plan will primarily affect the Argentine Army, which has appointed a separate staff charged solely with implementing the proposed changes. [redacted] peace-time reforms include dissolution of the I Army Corps at Buenos Aires—a staging ground for past coups—and its incorporation into an enlarged II Corps with headquarters at Rosario. In addition, the Army command will replace the current basic organizational structure of corps and independent brigades with a larger division-sized unit that combines combat and support forces. It will also merge several small subordinate bases in urban areas and relocate them in rural areas along the Chilean and Brazilian borders. The proposed reorganization plan calls for far less drastic changes to the Navy and the Air Force. Within the newly integrated defense structure, the Navy may expand its existing base facilities at Puerto Deseado and Puerto Santa Cruz, with the obvious intention of increasing its operational capabilities in the southern part of Argentina. [redacted]

Proposed changes in wartime deployment for all three branches of the military also reflect the new emphasis on joint service cooperation. We expect to see an increasing number of combined force exercises in coming months, as the military tests the new mobilization structure. According to press reports, defense planning now centers on three hypothetical theaters of operations in the case of armed conflict between Argentina and any of its border nations,³ each containing a fixed complement of units of the three services, plus an independent “Strategic Maneuver Force.” [redacted]

[redacted]

The first theater of operation, the North-Eastern Defense Force, will feature an enlarged II Corps (headquarters, Rosario), comprising the Ist Armored Cavalry Brigade (headquarters, Tandil) and the IX Mechanized Infantry Brigade (headquarters, Comodoro Rivadavia), the II Armored Cavalry Brigade (headquarters, Curuzu-Cuatia) and the VII Jungle Infantry Brigade (headquarters, Corrientes). Navy units in the force will include the Navy’s mine warfare squadron and river units, the 1st Marine Infantry Regiment at Zarate, the 3rd Marine Infantry Battalion at Rio Santiago, and the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Naval Air Wings, all based near Bahia Blanca. Participating Air Force units will be the III (Reconquista), VI (Tandil), and VII (Moron) Air Brigades; the first is an attack and reconnaissance unit, the second contains the bulk of the Air Force’s interceptor assets, and the third is primarily a helicopter element. [redacted]

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The Western Defense Force, primarily to counter any threats from Chile, will merge elements of the IV Army Corps with the III Corps (headquarters, Cordoba). These will include the V Mountain Infantry Brigade (headquarters, Tucuman) and the VIII Mountain Infantry Brigade (headquarters, Mendoza), together with the IV and V Air Brigades, (both are fighter-bomber units based at Mendoza and Villa Reynolds). [redacted]

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The Patagonian and South Atlantic Maneuver Force will combine the V Army Corps, whose headquarters will be transferred logically from Bahia Blanca to some point south of the Colorado River, with units from the VI Mountain Infantry Brigade (headquarters, Esquel) and the IX Mechanized Infantry Brigade (headquarters, Comodoro Rivadavia). Naval and Air Force units in the Maneuver Force will include the Navy’s minor combat units, based at Ushuaia, the 5th

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Marine Battalion at Rio Grande, the 6th (Antarctic) Naval Air Wing, and the Air Force's IX (Comodoro Rivadavia) and X Brigades (Rio Gallegos).

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The IV Airborne and the X Mechanized Infantry Brigades are to be removed from the jurisdiction of the III and II Army Corps to form a Strategic Reserve Force with headquarters at Campo de Mayo. The headquarters of these brigades will be transferred from Cordoba to Mendoza and from Buenos Aires to La Plata. The Strategic Maneuver Force may also include the fleet, the submarine force, the 5th Naval Air Wing, and the Air Force's I and II Air Brigades. The former operates most of the Air Force's airlift capacity, the latter is its only bomber unit.

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Appendix B

Current Weapons Requirements and Possible Suppliers

The Argentine military is slowly recovering from the Falklands debacle of 1982 and is looking seriously at its weapons requirements for the late 1980s. [redacted]

[redacted] primary concern is the acquisition of new fighter aircraft and the retrofit of its existing inventory. Navy leaders are concentrating on upgrading air/sea rescue operations and antisubmarine warfare capabilities through the purchase of new helicopters. The Army hopes to procure a small number of heavy-lift helicopters to enhance its troop transport capabilities. The profile of Argentine arms acquisitions and statements by military leaders indicate that Argentina favors Western suppliers, but the Soviets may be able, over time, to exploit the Argentine military's reduced budget and status with renewed efforts to establish an arms transfer relationship with Buenos Aires. [redacted]

Despite the sharp cuts in the defense budget undertaken by President Alfonsin as part of his overall national austerity program, the Argentine armed forces have not halted their efforts to procure new military materiel and to improve combat readiness. Each service has prioritized its current requirements and is offering to sell existing equipment to finance new purchases. [redacted]

The supplier of choice for the Argentine forces at this point appears to be the United States, although we believe frustration with export restrictions imposed by Washington may lead the Argentines to consider alternate suppliers. [redacted]

Air Force

The Air Force's first priority is the acquisition of new fighter aircraft to offset its losses in the Falklands and to modernize its aging inventory. [redacted] has placed its French-made Mirage III/V fighters and a number of the Argentine-built IA-58 Pucara ground attack

aircraft on the market to help finance such acquisitions. The current focus of Air Force efforts is the transfer of the 12 A-4/Skyhawk aircraft that Argentina has purchased from Israel. These aircraft, currently in Israel pending US approval for reexport, were originally earmarked for the Navy, but the Air Force is hotly contesting that decision, according to [redacted] and Embassy reports. The US [redacted]

[redacted] hopes to resolve the argument through his request that the United States not only release the A-4s in Israel, but also sell Argentina an additional 16 A-4s that could be given to the Air Force. [redacted]

Air Force leaders are considering longer term plans as well, possibly without the administration's knowledge. According to [redacted]

[redacted] is proposing to replace its Mirage III/Vs in phases with increasingly more sophisticated US-made aircraft. The Argentine plan calls for the purchase of 24 A-4s in 1985, 24 A-4s in 1986, a squadron of A-7s in 1987, and discussions on the purchase of F-16s and F-20s in the 1988-90 time frame. Air Force Chief of Staff Crespo has already approached a US firm to discuss the purchase of 12 A-4Bs. [redacted]

[redacted] with approximately 12 rebuilt A-4B airframes with the original J-65 engines. A second phase would involve reengining the retrofitted airframes with newer US-made F404-100D engines—a version with no afterburner. The US firm would provide the prototype rebuilt airframe and would supply Argentina with detailed guidelines, equipment, and technical advice to complete the remaining airframes locally. In addition, the US firm has proposed a one-for-one swap as the aircraft are retrofitted—an old Argentine Air Force A-4 would be retired when a rebuilt A-4 became operational. [redacted] the swap plan was suggested to reduce the

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Table 1
Air Force Order of Battle, 1985

Personnel	16,300
Jet combat aircraft	
Supersonic fighters	75 Mirage III and V
Subsonic fighter-bombers	24 A-4
Dual-capable trainers	8 Aermacchi MB-326 and MB-339
Bombers	7 Canberra
Antisubmarine warfare/ maritime patrol	14 S-2 and P-2
Airborne tankers	2 KC-130
Transport/utility/special use	
Jet aircraft	3
Turboprop and piston aircraft	109
Helicopters	37
Trainers (other than jet)	
Fixed wing	84

[Redacted]

initial cost of the contract and to increase the chances for US Government approval of the sale. The cost of the first phase, including the completed prototype, technical advice, and the used airframes, is estimated at \$20 million. [Redacted]

If Argentina is unable to fulfill its fighter requirement through US suppliers, there is some indication that it may turn to the French. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Moreover, the Air Force is also attempting to standardize its air transport capabilities, [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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Navy

The Navy's procurement program centers on helicopters for air/sea rescue operations and for antisubmarine warfare (ASW). Navy officials are trying to generate revenues by offering for sale many items in the Navy inventory, including the British Type 42 destroyers, the Type 209 diesel submarines, the new West German-built frigates, and at least two TR-1700 attack submarines, according to US Embassy and [Redacted]

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The Navy plans to procure 10 to 12 helicopters for air/sea rescue operations. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] These helicopters will be acquired in lieu of the Westland Lynx aircraft that had been ordered from the United Kingdom prior to the Falklands conflict. Two of the helicopters will be deployed aboard each of four destroyers, and the remainder will be land based for training and maintenance purposes. [Redacted]

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Table 2
Naval Order of Battle, 1985

Personnel	19,580
Warships	
Aircraft carriers	1
Destroyers	2
Frigates/corvettes	8
Submarines	4
Amphibious ships	1
Mine warfare ships	6
Patrol boats	15
Amphibious craft	18
Auxiliary ships	16
Yard and service craft	20
Naval aircraft	
Jet combat	19 Super Etendard, A-4
Antisubmarine warfare/ patrol fixed wing	14
Other fixed wing	90
Helicopters	16 ^a

The Navy recently completed an evaluation of various ASW helicopters, [redacted] and concluded that the US-built Kaman SH-2 Light Airborne Multipurpose System (LAMPS) is the best helicopter for use on the new Meko-140 frigates. The Argentines considered French, Italian, and West German models but found them unacceptable because they contain ASW electronic sensing equipment manufactured in the United Kingdom. [redacted]

US State Department reporting also indicates that Navy officials have expressed interest in the following US-made items:

- Raytheon DE1191 hull-mounted sonar.
- AN/ASQ-18 sonar system.
- LVT-P7A1 marine tracked amphibious vehicle.

[redacted]

Army

Because the Argentine defense industries produce many of the items needed by the Army, its foreign procurement requirements are minimal. According to the US Embassy, the Army is seeking an unspecified number of US-built Sikorsky UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters for troop transport. A likely alternate choice would be the French Aerospatiale Super Puma. According to the State Department, the Army is also interested in other US equipment such as the Bell 206B helicopter with combat configuration and the M-113 family of armored personnel carriers. The Army—as well as the Navy and the Air Force—is also seeking US training through credits and grants to offset the current cutbacks in the domestic defense budget. [redacted]

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Funding

Funding for new weapons procurement contracts is likely to remain a problem for Argentina. The military's 1984 budget allowed only for payments on equipment contracts that had been negotiated by the previous military government. The 1985 budget has still not been approved, but press reports speculate that, once again, very little funding will be designated for weapons procurement. The armed forces hope to supplement any allotted procurement funds with revenues from sales of equipment now in their inventories, but there has been little interest shown in these offers. If Buenos Aires does not negotiate any successful sales agreements in the near future, financing for new military purchases will have to come from changes in budget legislation, discretionary funds at the disposal of the president, or easy credit terms offered by suppliers. [redacted]

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Coproduction Agreements

Argentina's defense industries are also suffering from the budget cutbacks, and President Alfonsin is placing new emphasis on arms exports to generate needed

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Table 3
Ground Forces Order of Battle, 1985

Personnel	51,230
Armor	
Tanks, medium	380 (105 mm; TAM, M4)
Tanks, light	58 (105 mm; AMX-13)
Tank destroyers/ reconnaissance vehicles/ combat cars	115 (105 mm; Panzerjaeger K)
Armored personnel carriers	470 (TAM-VCTP and M-113)
Antitank guided missiles	600 Cobra-Mamba, 2,000 Mathogo
Artillery	
Self-propelled and towed	
155 mm	204
105 mm	227
Multiple rocket launchers	Unknown number of Sapba-1, SLAM-Pampero
Air defense artillery	
Surface-to-air missiles	1 Roland, 117 SA-7 SAMs, 35 Tigercat launchers, 20 Blowpipe
Air defense guns	484
Army aircraft	
Fixed wing	46
Helicopters	48

income. The current industry offerings, however, have not done well on the international arms market, and defense production officials are pressing Western nations for agreements to coproduce more marketable weapons. Argentina has approached the Italians for possible coproduction accords. The Defense Ministers of Argentina and Italy signed a military cooperation agreement in early September, according to press reports, whereby Rome will provide technology for the development and production of unspecified military equipment.

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