




**Director of
Central
Intelligence**

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National Intelligence Daily

**Saturday
31 January 1987**



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Contents

South Africa: Date Set for White Election	1
USSR: Moscow Gains Little From Muslim Conference	2
Argentina: Civil-Military Tensions Rising	3
Sudan: Sadiq at Odds With Military	4

Notes



25X1



25X1

Mexico: National University Strike	7
Haiti: Heightened Tensions	7
In Brief	8

Special Analyses

India-Pakistan: Border Problems	9
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25X1

Western Europe: Concern About Limited SDI Deployments	14
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

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31 January 1987

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SOUTH AFRICA:

Date Set for White Election



President Botha's announcement yesterday setting 6 May as the date of a whites-only parliamentary election reflects the ruling National Party's confidence that it can renew its mandate.

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Botha made the announcement during his speech at the opening of parliament. He signaled no change in the ruling party's hardline security policies and made clear that the state of emergency would not be lifted soon. Botha implicitly rejected a proposal for a multiracial provincial government joining Natal Province and the KwaZulu homeland. Senior officials have recently backed away from other controversial reform proposals and reaffirmed the government's commitment to separate education and separate residential areas for whites.

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In preelection maneuvering, the Conservative Party failed last week to form a rightwing coalition with the Herstigte National Party. The liberal Progressive Federal Party and the tiny New Republic Party have formed a coalition for the election campaign. Several liberal National Party members of parliament, frustrated by the government's slow pace of reform and its heavyhanded security tactics, resigned recently to run as independents.

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Comment: The National Party, which holds 127 of the 188 seats in the white chamber of parliament, is likely to emerge with a comfortable majority and a renewed mandate for its policies of limited reform, tough security measures, and defiance of Western pressures and sanctions. The rejection of the Natal-KwaZulu proposal and the tougher line on reform are intended to reassure conservative whites and to blunt rightwing charges that reform will result in black domination.

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The most spirited battle in the election will be for the designation of official parliamentary opposition—currently held by the Progressives—the winner of which, under current emergency restrictions, will be the only group in the country outside the government to have freedom of speech. The rightwing opposition parties are unlikely to have much chance of gaining enough seats to oust the Progressives unless they reach at least an informal agreement not to compete with each other in individual constituencies. The resignations of a limited number of "enlightened" National Party members and their plan to run as independents may benefit the conservatives by further diluting the liberal vote.

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USSR:

[Redacted]

Moscow Gains Little From Muslim Conference

[Redacted]

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The Islamic Conference Organization, which met this week in Kuwait, has frustrated one of Moscow's foreign policy goals by adopting a slightly tougher stance on Afghanistan. [Redacted]

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Soviet officials lobbied the organization's Secretary General Pirzada four times last year, including talks with him in Moscow in November. ~~US Embassy reporting from Moscow and Jiddah~~ indicates that the Soviets pressed him on three issues: representation for Soviet Muslims in the organization, a reduction of the Afghan Mujahedin delegation's status, and less criticism of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Pirzada has repeatedly denied admission into the OIC to Moscow's chosen representatives of "official" Soviet Islam. [Redacted]

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~~Pirzada was one of several Muslim dignitaries to visit the USSR in the past year. Others include Algerian leader Bendjedid in March, Arab League Secretary General Chedli Klibi in May, and Saudi Oil Minister Nazir traveling as an OPEC representative this month. Press and embassy reports indicate that the Soviets have repeatedly tried to gain favor by citing their sham troop withdrawal from Afghanistan and their proposals for nuclear-free zones, an international peace conference on the Middle East, the withdrawal of the Soviet and US navies from the Mediterranean Sea, and a negotiated end to the Iran-Iraq war.~~ [Redacted]

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A TASS summary of the Islamic summit played up Syrian and South Yemeni support for Soviet policies in Afghanistan and the OIC communique's support for the international conference on the Middle East. TASS nonetheless attacked the tone of the Afghan resolution in the OIC's final communique and the fact that an Afghan Mujahedin observer delegation, not one from the Soviet-supported Kabul regime, represented Afghanistan. [Redacted]

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Comment: The Islamic summit's call for a complete withdrawal of all Soviet forces from Afghanistan is tougher than the OIC's previous resolutions and represents a setback for Moscow's yearlong drive to court world Islamic opinion on this issue. Although the effort cost the Soviets little and there is some consolation for Moscow in the OIC communique's explicit condemnation of the US, Moscow was clearly disappointed with the treatment of the Afghan issue. [Redacted]

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Several members of the OIC—Syria, South Yemen, Libya, and the PLO—support some Soviet policies. Even so, Moscow would have preferred to have its own voice in the organization. Neither the presence in the USSR of more than 50 million "Muslims" nor Moscow's concerted efforts to portray the USSR and the Kabul regime as tolerant of Islam, however, carried much weight with OIC officials. [Redacted]

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
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ARGENTINA: Civil-Military Tensions Rising

Civilian trials of Argentine military officers charged with human rights violations are increasing restiveness in the armed forces, but President Alfonsin's efforts to limit the trials are meeting with public resistance. [Redacted]

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Last month, Alfonsin issued a decree placing a 60-day limit on filing new charges against military personnel, and he tried last week to minimize the number of midlevel and junior officers who may be indicted by asking the courts not to proceed against personnel who were only following orders. Human rights groups and some judges are pushing to declare the decree unconstitutional, and much of the judiciary has already rejected Alfonsin's request not to file charges against subordinate officers. Proceedings have begun against 600 active-duty and retired officers in more than 1,000 cases, and several hundred additional cases are expected before the filing deadline on 22 February. [Redacted]

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Comment: Alfonsin appears to have failed to defuse the sensitive human rights issue. Human rights groups will probably not be able to overturn the 60-day statute of limitations legislation, and the courts are likely to move quickly to take advantage of the 60-day period to begin proceedings against a wide variety of military personnel, including field officers. [Redacted]

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Evidence in many of the cases is thin, however, and Alfonsin will probably try to convince the officers to appear in court by assuring them that there will be few convictions. At the same time, he will increase behind-the-scenes pressure on the judiciary to conclude the trials as quickly as possible. The appearance in court of officers on active duty could spur rightwing attacks on the left or provoke the military to defy the courts, but a direct challenge to the Alfonsin government is unlikely. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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SUDAN:

Sadiq at Odds With Military

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The Sudanese Government's sudden decision to request removal of pre-positioned US military equipment stored at Port Sudan has further weakened Prime Minister Sadiq's backing among Sudan's top military officers. [Redacted]

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[Large Redacted Area]

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Comment: Top military officers still support civilian government, but Sadiq's habitual failure to accommodate military interests may provoke a crisis. The General Staff wants to be consulted on decisions bearing on national security and is jealously guarding its prerogatives against civilian encroachments. Sadiq's flouting of those considerations is widening the gap between himself and the military hierarchy. [Redacted]

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MEXICO: National University Strike

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[Redacted]

President de la Madrid reportedly has ruled against a harsh response by his government to the student strike at Mexico's national university that began Thursday. [Redacted] the government believes the problem is an internal university affair, but it is carefully monitoring the situation. The university has scheduled a meeting on 10 February to discuss the reforms being protested, including higher tuition and stricter entrance standards. [Redacted]

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Comment: De la Madrid undoubtedly hopes to avoid a repeat of the university protests in 1968 during which hundreds of students were killed. A prolonged strike or any violence would probably place a cloud over Interior Secretary Bartlett, a front-running candidate to replace de la Madrid, and over Education Secretary Gonzalez Avelar, a darkhorse contender for the presidency. As a result, the government is likely to encourage the university to rescind the reforms. [Redacted]

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HAITI: Heightened Tensions

[Redacted]

The violent demonstration in Port-au-Prince on Thursday may portend future disturbances before the anniversary, a week from today, of the overthrow of former President Duvalier. The protest apparently was not politically motivated, according to the US Embassy, but the police killed a civilian and a mob attacked several US Embassy personnel in the area. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Comment: The cycles of demonstrations and violence in Haiti over the past year usually have stemmed from minor incidents fueled largely by discontent with dismal living conditions. Tolerance of dissident activity has helped the government to weather these outbursts. The rise in anti-US sentiment results partly from the perception of many Haitians that the US has not provided sufficient economic aid. A harsh response by Namphy to further unrest would probably lead to more violence and benefit the government's leftist opponents, who charge that little has changed since Duvalier left the country. [Redacted]

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In Brief

Middle East

— US Consulate in Jerusalem says **Israelis** dismantled bomb intended for Bethlehem mayor . . . fear Palestinian extremists will attempt to kill three new pro-Jordanian West Bank mayors to mark anniversary of assassination of Nablus mayor last March. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

USSR

[Redacted]

— Hardline **Soviet** Deputy Foreign Minister Kapitsa has retired . . . moderate Deputy Foreign Minister Rogachev directing all Asian relations, not just those with Communist regimes . . . shift may mean more flexible policy toward non-Communist Asia. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Americas

[Redacted]

— Sendero Luminoso terrorists in **Peru** ^{on 30 Jan.} ~~yesterday~~ assassinated senior official of ruling party . . . vowed to kill 10 party members for each of its approximately 250 comrades killed last year . . . assassination capped 15 days of attacks in capital. [Redacted]

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Special Analysis

INDIA-PAKISTAN:

Border Problems

[Redacted]

Indian Prime Minister Gandhi and Pakistani President Zia remain in regular contact through diplomatic intermediaries and anticipate that talks this weekend will reduce border tensions. Military deployments by both sides, however, are reducing the time available for either nation to contain an inadvertent clash before it erupts into full-scale hostilities. New Delhi, meanwhile, is taking advantage of the crisis to address domestic concerns.

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[Redacted]

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Although Gandhi and Zia project the mistrust that has long existed between India and Pakistan, they have established a better rapport than had previous leaders. Each probably has at least some confidence in the other and almost certainly doubts the other would allow the situation to slide into war. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Foreign Secretaries To Meet

The Indian and Pakistani Foreign Secretaries, accompanied by senior military officials, are meeting this weekend in New Delhi. Press coverage on prospects for conciliation has been heavy, and both sides expect the meetings to remain cordial and gradually to dispel mutual fears of escalation.

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[Redacted]

[Redacted] The Indians, [Redacted] say publicly they want to discuss only a mutual drawdown of border units.

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
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Military Dangers

The Indian and Pakistani mobilizations increase the risk that an inadvertent local clash could spread. Indian ground and naval patrols have strayed into Pakistani territory at least twice this month, and small-scale shooting incidents occur regularly in Kashmir. [Redacted]

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The military preparations by each side have reduced the warning time either would have before an outbreak of major hostilities. In addition to the forward deployment of ground units and the increased readiness of the Air Forces, the Indians have dispatched troops from the Eastern Command to the west. These steps, however, remain largely defensive in the absence of other activity, especially logistic preparations by either side. [Redacted]

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Impact on Indian Domestic Security

Gandhi has used the crisis to emphasize his position that Pakistan should curtail support for Sikh and Muslim separatist movements in India. New Delhi also has used its charges that Pakistan is reinforcing units opposite Punjab as a pretext to increase the Indian Army's presence in the border states and to place all paramilitary units in Punjab under command of the Army. [Redacted]

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The increased Army presence is likely to reassure Hindus who fear Sikh and Muslim extremists and to weaken the appeal of opposition politicians who play on such fears. The military moves allow Gandhi to retain an elected moderate Sikh government in Punjab and, at the same time, to crack down on Sikh extremists. [Redacted]

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DIA Comment: DIA disagrees with the first two sentences of the second paragraph. Gandhi and Zia, according to reports, are not in communication and have little rapport. Consequently, each probably has little confidence in the other's intention and ability to prevent war. On the other hand, Gandhi and Pakistani Prime Minister Junejo do have some rapport and probably more confidence in each other's intentions. [Redacted]

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31 January 1987

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Special Analysis

WESTERN EUROPE: Concern About Limited SDI Deployments

Recent statements by US officials proposing an early decision on the first deployments of SDI have elicited reactions in Western Europe opposing such deployments unless they are compatible with a restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty and reversible as part of a possible arms control agreement with the USSR. The West Europeans expect Washington to consult them prior to any US decision to go beyond the research phase. [Redacted]

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The West Europeans doubt that SDI deployments would enhance Western security, but until recently their assumption that a decision to deploy would not be made until the early 1990s had assuaged their concern about US intentions. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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Consultations and Concerns

If the Allies conclude that the US is committed to limited SDI deployments, they will continue to call for a major NATO debate on SDI and almost certainly will accelerate intra-European consultations. West Germany and the Netherlands are insisting on a major examination by the Alliance of the political and military implications of SDI; they have the support of other Allies. West European leaders may try to use bilateral and multilateral security forums that exclude the US to develop a common position in opposition to SDI deployments if they believe that a US decision has already been made without consulting them. [Redacted]

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The West German and British Governments might come under growing public pressure to abandon their bilateral agreements with the US on SDI research, which would probably precipitate debates within those governments. Public controversy over SDI deployments would not be likely to prevent existing West European commercial participation in the US research program. London and Paris would probably want their companies to stay involved in order to develop effective countermeasures to future Soviet strategic defenses. [redacted]

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The Longer Term

Allied reactions to US SDI deployments will be influenced by the US military and political rationale as well as the timeliness and extent of US consultations with NATO and by Allied perceptions of Moscow's strategic defense efforts. The Allies probably would oppose US attempts to build large nationwide defenses as infeasible and serving only to spur the Soviets to greater military efforts, but they would be likely to acquiesce in limited strategic defenses that are aimed at protecting US retaliatory forces. The Allies would want even limited deployments to be bargaining chips, however, to gain restrictions on Soviet strategic offensive and defensive weapons. Thus, they would expect the US to be flexible on the timing of its SDI deployments and to seek new arms control agreements that limit strategic defenses in exchange for deep cuts in offensive forces. [redacted]

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DIA Comment: The West European posture on SDI is more varied than this analysis depicts. Most center and center-right forces—including the bulk of Prime Minister Thatcher's Conservatives, Chancellor Kohl's Christian Democrats, and Prime Minister Chirac's conservatives—are generally supportive of the program. They believe that SDI might enhance Western security while insisting that Washington must consult with its Allies in order to ensure that West European security interests are taken into account. Support for SDI has increased among these groups since the program was first announced in 1983. Leftwing and some liberal factions, on the other hand, remain strongly opposed. There is, however, little public pressure against SDI. [redacted]

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