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,	INTERAGENCY INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT	
	15 November 1985	
	THE CUBAN PRESENCE IN ANGOLA	
	This Interagency Intelligence Assessment was prepared under the auspices	
	of the National Intelligence Officer for Africa. The Assessment was	
	coordinated at the working level within the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the	
	intelligence organization of the Department of State. Also participating	
	were the intelligence organizations of the Departments of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; and the Headquarters, Marine Corps. Information	
	available as of 8 November 1985 was used in the preparation of this Assessment.	
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DISCUSSION
Estimate of Cuban Military Personnel in Angola
The Intelligence Community believes that approximately 28,000 Cuban combat troops are currently stationed in Angola. This figure excludes military advisers and logistical support personnel assigned to Angolan Armed Forces units and Cuban civilian personnel. Of the 28,000 Cuban troops in Angola, we estimate that approximately 21,000 are organized into at least 13 Cuban brigade type units, approximately 5,300 operate air defense sites, and another 1,300 are air force personnel.* In addition, reporting indicates that several hundred Cuban security personnel are assigned to the Angolan Ministry of Interior.
The Community's estimate of 28,000 combat troops reflects an increase of approximately 5,000 troops since late 1982. During late 1983 and throughout 1984, Cuba conducted a significant augmentation of its troop strength in Angola. This increase in Cuban military personnel was in response to the significant expansion of the UNITA insurgency in Angola and, to a lesser extent, to numerous South African military operations in the southern part of the country.
Most of the additional Cuban troops have been assigned to northern Angola, where they are defending large population centers against possible UNITA attacks. Since 1982, new Cuban brigade type units or elements of brigades have been identified in Luena, Malanje, Luanda, and Lobito. The increase in Cuban military strength in the north has not come at the expense of a drawdown in Cuban personnel in southern Angola.
The Cuban response to frequent South African cross-border operations into Angola has been limited to the deployment to the south of additional air defense units. With this exception, Cuban military forces have not moved closer to the Angolan-Namibian border since 1982.
In addition to the 28,000 combat troops, the Intelligence Community believes that there are also approximately 8,000 Cuban military advisers attached to FAPLA units. This figure includes military advisers, technicians, trainers and staff, many of whom serve in logistics, and brings our estimate of total Cuban military strength in Angola to 36,000.
*Totals are not exact due to rounding.
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