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28 December 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation with D/ACDA

1. D/ACDA Kenneth Adelman telephoned last week to invite me to lunch; he said he wanted advice on how to solve his "intelligence problem."
2. We met for lunch on 26 December, and Adelman elaborated on his point. He said he had a "people" problem; that he knew a lot of US intelligence officials "couldn't get along with [redacted]." He added that he felt he was being cut out of certain intelligence, and had no influence over the choice arms-control related products the intelligence community produces. Adelman said he plans to remain in office and is prepared to make whatever personnel or organizational changes might be needed "so I can play with a full deck." He asked for my advice on what to do.
3. I replied that I would not discuss personnel or personality issues, and we put those aside. I pointed out that only a very few senior officials received all the "tidbits" that Adelman seemed to believe were due him, and I added that in the great scheme of things the lack of such "tidbits" probably was not his big problem. As for having an influence on the choice of arms-control related products to be undertaken by the Intelligence Community, I explained that we all have projects we would like to do but cannot do because of too few resources. I talked about how the estimates process works, and how subjects for estimates are chosen. I explained that the DCI makes the final decisions based on his judgment of the potential value to policymakers of a particular subject. Suggestions from policymakers are always considered carefully, and the decision rests on a combination of factors including the policymaker and the value of the suggestion itself.
4. Adelman asked whether more regular contact between himself and the DCI would lead to greater influence over the choice of intelligence products. I replied that I could not answer the question adequately. To my question of how he saw his own role in the arms control process, Adelman replied that he was the Administration's "top expert" and the one to whom other officials ultimately turn when the level of detail exceeds their technical grasp simply because he and ACDA spend full time on arms

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control while others do not. He portrayed ACDA as a think tank with himself as its chief. He did not talk about an operational role for himself or ACDA.

5. I asked whether he thought the DCI shared his perception of ACDA's and his own role, and he said yes. I said I had no idea what the correct answer was, but that I was confident the DCI would provide him and ACDA with the intelligence he felt they needed to do their jobs.

6. Adelman said he would try to spend a bit more time with the DCI in coming months, perhaps by arranging regular meetings on a bi-monthly basis.



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