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THE DIRECTOR OF
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NOTE FOR THE DIRECTOR *16 APR 1984*

FROM: Herbert E. Meyer
Vice Chairman, NIC


The page may be of
value both in our Estimate and in David Low's
project. I forwarded copies accordingly.



Herbert E. Meyer

Att: "Early Warning"

STAT

**Confidential**

EARLY WARNING

Volume II, No. 3, April 1984

Losing Hart

A distinguished Lebanese philosopher recently expressed the view that "the central geopolitical fact of our times is that the Americans don't want to fight—and the world has noticed." Throughout his campaign for the Democratic presidential nomination, **Senator Gary Hart** has sought to appeal to isolationist sentiment, talking about world issues purely and simply in terms of whether American lives might be put at risk, and suggesting that he can't see a cause or a national interest that might be worth fighting for, not even the defense of vital oil routes from the Gulf. **Walter Mondale** accused Hart of trying to substitute guilt for foreign policy, and the Senator's constant harping on the supposed lessons of Vietnam lent substance to the charge. Hart claims to speak for a new generation of American leadership, and there is one sense in which that is true. He represents—and directs his primary appeal toward—Americans who think of Vietnam, rather than World War II, when international conflict is under discussion. They relate contemporary issues of war and peace to a traumatic defeat in a divisive frontier conflict, not to the successful defense of the Western democracies against totalitarian adversaries. Hart, who was the manager of **George McGovern's** 1972 campaign, is the extreme antithesis of the Democratic stance represented by the late Senator Henry "Scoop" Jackson: strong on defense, staunch in defense of America's allies, liberal on social issues.

Hart's vision of the world sometimes seems to be on the same level of sophistication as a Superman comic. A few days ago, he entertained a couple of astonished reporters, including **Morton Kondracke** of *The New Republic*, with a lurid tale of how the late Nicaraguan dictator, **Anastasio Somoza**, allegedly delighted in feeding opponents to panthers that he kept in his cellars. There wasn't a shred of truth to this story, which seems to have emanated from the Sandinista propaganda mills. But it was rather disquieting to see a man who aspires to the leadership of the Western alliance swallow it without chewing.

The outside world has been watching. Several very senior West European officials have privately expressed their gloom to *EW* about the effect of a Hart presidency on the NATO alliance and on Western interests in general. At the same time, the Soviets were clearly encouraged by Hart's early campaign successes to believe that a Democratic candidate was emerging who might actually beat Reagan. The Soviet media have been flattering toward Hart, while dismissive of Mondale. The Soviet's current reluctance to negotiate with the Reagan Administration—or even to receive a note via **Brent Scowcroft**—seems to indicate that **Konstantin Cher-**

nenko's advisers have been doing everything possible to gamble on the Hart candidacy. The Soviets can help by flogging the tired theme that Reagan is a "warmonger" and, therefore, confrontation will continue until the Americans put someone more "reasonable" in the White House. They can also seek to create new foreign policy embarrassments for Washington in the Middle East, and in Central America, as *EW* has analyzed in previous issues.

But they may have miscalculated. This issue of *EW* went to press before the vital Democratic contest in New York, but we are sticking to our prediction that Mondale will take his party's nomination, and that Reagan will be reelected next November. If this proves correct, the Soviets may have missed an opportunity to bargain with Reagan when he had most reason to make concessions.

The more exposure the initially obscure Senator from Colorado received, the more brittle his facade appeared. He fumbled questions about his personal life: why he changed his name to Hart from Hartpence; why he couldn't decide whether he was aged 46 or 47, even though his date of birth—1936—was legible on his birth certificate; whether it was true (as his former school-teacher claimed) that he had stolen a copy of his final high school chemistry exams, and was lucky not to be expelled before graduation; why he tried to obscure his deep early involvement in the Church of the Nazarene. (In his official biography, he described his college as Bethany College; it is actually Bethany Nazarene. He also "forgot" his time at Yale Divinity School.)

The movable birthday

The fact that a man claims "not to remember" his year of birth might seem trivial, if odd and unlikely, but it is

CONTENTS

The Hart campaign	1
Syria's proconsul in Lebanon	4
Soviet special forces	5
Security Alert: Heirs of the Black Panthers	7
Anti-business campaign in Mexico	8
Bailout and birth of a debtors' cartel	8

highly relevant in trying to form an assessment of his character if he is running for the highest office in the United States. Gary Hart knew his correct date of birth when he wrote his college applications, his job application to the Justice Department, and his 1965 application to the Denver Bar Association. But after 1967, he suddenly started making himself younger. He used the false birth date—1937—on his voter registration form, his driver's license, his official biography for the *Congressional Directory*, his sworn "declaration of Acceptance" filed with the Colorado Secretary of State on June 14, 1980 (after he was renominated for the U.S. Senate). He gave the wrong birth date to the Naval Reserve when he used his political influence in the last days of the Carter Administration to get himself a commission. Even so, he was over-age; they had to bend the rules to make him a reserve lieutenant. So far, nobody has found evidence that Gary Hart gained in any material way by changing his age. But this strange episode, never adequately explained—at one point, Hart told reporters he just couldn't remember his date of birth and it must be "whatever the records said"—is part of a pattern of secrecy and deceptiveness.

What's in a name?

Take Gary Hart's change of name. For a man with political ambitions, "Hart" is obviously a catchier monicker than the clumsy "Hartpence." It's hard to imagine that Hitler would have risen far if he'd had to use the family name, Schickelgruber, and Stalin might not have become a household word if he'd remained Djugashvili. But this doesn't account for Gary Hart's ineptness in dealing with the questions that inevitably were asked. He told reporters that he changed his name because his family insisted on returning "to the original family name of Hart in Ireland." This simply wasn't true. His uncle Ralph immediately countered that it was Gary, not his parents, who had been pressing for the change. And it turns out that the original family name was "Pence" in any case. Again, does it matter? It does if you're concerned about the steadiness of a possible leader of the Western alliance.

A friend in the press

Hart's wife Oletha ("Lee", *nee* Ludwig), attractive and witty, popular with the press corps, has been an asset in his campaign, and figures with him in many advertisements. The Harts have been separated and reconciled several times during the marriage. Hart once told *Washington Post* reporter Sally Quinn: "I'm a believer in reform marriage." In 1982, when the Harts were living apart, the Senator shared his quarters for a time with the *Post's* star investigative reporter, **Bob Woodward**. At that time, Woodward was leading a *Post* taskforce that was investigating the intelligence community. This was an interesting conjunction, since Hart had been a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, with access to a wealth of classified material. Rumors soon began to circulate in Washington about the possible sources of a number of "leaks" to the *Post*, and Hart and Woodward found other living arrangements.

The "cheap hawks"

On defense issues, Senator Hart aligned himself with a group of younger congressional liberals who sometimes refer to themselves, humorously, as "cheap hawks." Their shared proposition is that, instead of concentrating on building a relatively small number of high-cost, technologically superior systems, the United States should build larger numbers of simpler, cheaper weapons systems. Their argument has some merits. Some defense experts are worried about the protracted lead times involved in building major new weapons systems; the gap between the research and development and the production and deployment stages may be eight or ten years. But there is a logic implied by the Hart approach which the Senator has not been prepared to follow all the way through. It would involve a much larger conventional standing army—and therefore, almost certainly, conscription as well as billions in additional manpower costs. Hart has tried to evade these questions.

Last year, he voted in the Senate to cut \$100 billion from the Pentagon over a five-year period by terminating or drastically slashing some 30 major military programs, including: the MX missile, the B-1 bomber, the Aegis-equipped destroyers and cruisers, the Bradley infantry fighting vehicle, the C-17 transport plane, new production of F-15s and F-18s, and the Nimitz-class nuclear-powered carriers (which Hart wants to replace by "mini-carriers"). In his voting record on defense, Hart has been willing to back spending on research and development, but regularly opposed production once R&D was complete. He was notably active in efforts to block the M-1 battle tank, relying uncritically on critiques promoted by anti-defense lobbies such as **Dina Raso's** Military Audit Project.

Hart has also been at the forefront of congressional efforts to block the "high frontier" concept of a space-based defensive system. He introduced Senate Resolution 28 "opposing the introduction of high technology weapons into outer space." He has not been taxed on the evidence that the Soviets have already conducted many successful tests of anti-satellite weapons capable of destroying American surveillance and communications satellites, or that they have been engaged for at least a decade in testing laser and particle beam systems for potential deployment in space.

In his campaign against the MX missile, Hart has had support from an unusual quarter. Two former CIA directors, **William Colby** and **Stansfield Turner**, flanked him at a press conference in May last year at which the Senator called for a "national mobilization" to stop the MX. (Colby is now a leading light in the Committee for National Security, whose founders were **Richard Barnet** of the far-left Institute for Policy Studies and former Carter Administration arms controller **Paul Warnke**.)

"Operation guilt"

Hart has been campaigning on Central America—his policy is the precipitous withdrawal of the U.S. presence from the entire region—as much as on any other issue, and his advertising has been rich in unwarranted analogies with Vietnam. His mastery of this and other foreign

policy issues seems, at best, precarious. Witness his interview with the *Washington Post* two years ago (February 28, 1982). He was asked to define the U.S. security interest in Central America and responded: "I think our interest lies in seeing the entire region is not totalitarian or totally anti-American." He was then asked if Nicaragua's regime was totalitarian. He replied, "No, not so far as I know"—despite the fact that the Soviets now officially refer to the Sandinista regime as "socialist," a term they reserve for orthodox Marxist-Leninist regimes like those of Eastern Europe, Cuba and Afghanistan. He was asked about Cuba, and said that "it is not totalitarian and it's not democratic." When asked, "If Cuba is not a totalitarian government, what is it?" he was reduced to admitting, "I don't know." In fact, he could only come up with one example of a "totalitarian" government in the Western Hemisphere at that time: Paraguay.

Hart has attempted to revise his statements on this, as on other foreign policy issues. The net effect has been to place him squarely in the isolationist camp, to the left of Mondale on both Central America and the Middle East. Ayatollah Khomeini, Libya's Colonel Qaddafi and Syria's President Assad must all have been encouraged by his statement, during the New Hampshire debate, that if he were President, "not one American life would be put ashore in any Persian Gulf area." He has gone even further than is customary in American politics to mortgaging the future defense of the United States and its allies to a series of campaign promises. In canvassing support for his positions, he makes a naked appeal to American guilt complexes, about Vietnam, about past involvement with corrupt or repressive Third World regimes.

His crude attempts to woo Jewish voters in New York did not enhance his stature as an international statesman. In his effort to make out that he was more pro-Israeli than Mondale, he did everything but say that he would invite the Israelis to run the State Department. He then fell flat on his face trying to explain just when he had made up his mind—as he now says he has done—that the U.S. Embassy should be moved from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, and had to apologize for a letter put out by his campaign staff that said something different.

Looking over his past record on foreign policy and arms control, the Soviets must be heartened by his totemistic faith in treaties—whether or not they can be monitored or enforced—and his rejection of "linkage", the idea that America's willingness to deal with Moscow in one area should be related to Soviet behavior in other areas. He went on backing SALT II, for example, despite the invasion of Afghanistan (which exploded the prospects for ratification by a Democratic-controlled Senate), and his position didn't change when the United States lost monitoring stations in Iran considered vital to verifying Soviet compliance with such accords. He still backs SALT II, and has boasted that he would compile a new arms control treaty between his election and his inauguration.

Allies from IPS

Despite his publicized friendship with a number of

famous actors and entertainers, including **Robert Redford** and **Warren Beatty**, Gary Hart has long been regarded as a "loner". He doesn't start out with the same kind of intimate circle of political cronies that surrounded past Democratic Presidents—Kennedy's Bostonians, Lyndon Johnson's Texans, Jimmy Carter's good ol' boys from Georgia. But he has attracted some capable staffers and advisers, some of them from the McGovernite wing of the Democratic Party and the unilateral disarmament lobbies, which were actively promoting Hart before his prospects and his campaign funds started expanding dramatically. For example, last year, Hart was persuaded to serve on the Twentieth Anniversary Committee of IPS, on the eve of the joint conference staged by IPS and the Soviet Institute of the USA (whose deputy director, **Radomir Bogdanov**, is a career KGB officer) in Minneapolis, which *EW* covered in detail. The year before, Hart was persuaded to contribute a long article to the Arms Control Association, an umbrella group heavily influenced by IPS, whose officers and directors include **Randall Forsberg** (the lady who claims credit for inventing the nuclear freeze proposal), IPS trustee Paul Warnke, and **Herbert "Pete" Scoville**, who was one of the participants in the first bureau meeting ever held in Washington by the Soviet-run World Peace Council.

In other political areas, the Hart stable of IPS-associated counselors includes **Sidney Harman**, former IPS trustee and Undersecretary of Commerce; D.C. Mayor **Marion Barry**; **Lee Webb**; **Barry Bluestone**; **Mark Green** and Harvard professor **Lester C. Thurow**.

It is worth recalling that in 1976 the early involvement of radicals associated with IPS and its offshoots with the Carter-Mondale campaign resulted in their being able to claim policymaking jobs for friends at the under secretary and deputy under secretary level in the State, Defense and Commerce Departments, at the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, in the Action/Vista social programs—not to mention some important posts in the National Security Council. The radicals who have climbed onto the Hart bandwagon are hoping to profit in an even bigger way if he manages to win.

The co-chairmen of the Hart campaign are **Ted Sorenson**, the former Kennedy speechwriter who is no doubt responsible, in no small measure, for Hart's efforts to evoke memories of JFK (he even affected the Kennedy mannerism of sticking his right hand in his pocket while making a speech) and liberal **Representative Pat Schroeder**. His campaign manager is a friend from his Yale Law School days, **Oliver "Pudge" Henkel**. Henkel's deputy is **David Landau**, 30, a former Capitol Hill lobbyist for the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). Hart has been able to draw on the talents of **Pat Caddell**, who plotted Carter's 1976 campaign and helped to develop the theme that a "new generation" of political leadership is required to pilot the country. Others in the candidate's kitchen cabinet include **Kathy Bushkin**, 34, the campaign press secretary; **John Holcum**, a former State Department official who was McGovern's chief aide on Capitol Hill; and **Larry K. Smith**, who was Hart's chief of staff in the Senate and now runs the Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government. [9]

Syria's Proconsul in Lebanon

Colonel Ghazi Kana'an, the chief of Syrian intelligence in the Bekaa Valley, is probably the most powerful man in Lebanon today. While factional leaders were assembling for talks in Lausanne that were dominated by the Syrian "observer", Vice President Abdul Halim Khaddam, Colonel Kana'an sent a special report to President Hafiz al-Assad that focused on relations between the Shiite Amal organization and the Druze leadership and contained a number of policy recommendations. It is worth noting that Kana'an is something of an expert in the repression of communal unrest; he was in charge of the bloody suppression of the Moslem Brotherhood—the core of Sunni opposition to the minority Alawite regime in Syria—before his assignment to Lebanon.

From Arab intelligence sources, *EW* has received a summary of Kana'an's report, which provides clues to the course that Syria will steer in Lebanon. Kana'an devoted considerable space to accounting for the rise of Nabih Berri, the Shiite Amal leader who was catapulted into national prominence since the fighting in the Shuf mountains last September and is now virtually the master of West Beirut, since his forces—in concert with the Druze—trounced the Sunni paramilitary organization, the Murabitoun. Colonel Kana'an accurately forecast an emerging alliance between Nabih Berri, the Druze leaders and leftist and Palestinian groups in order to bring down Amin Gemayel, perhaps by the constitutional device of shortening his presidential term from six to two years, so he would be out by September this year. Kana'an also predicted that the tactical alliance between Amal and the Druze will break down once they have achieved their common purpose of destroying Christian hegemony, since their long-term interests are opposed.

For example (as Kana'an reported) the Lebanese Shiites oppose the Druze demand for the "cantonization" of Lebanon, because it would neutralize the Shiites' numerical superiority—on which the Amal bases its hopes of a dominant political role in the future. There are deep tensions between the two groups in West Beirut, even though the Druze militia there was placed under Berri's nominal command.

Kana'an recommended that Syria should avoid public statements in support of either Shiite or Druze political ambitions. In private dealings both with Nabih Berri and with Walid Jumblatt, the leftist Druze warlord, on the other hand, the Syrians should flatter both with the idea that Damascus is on their side. At the same time, Syrian agents in both organizations should work to create an atmosphere of suspicion and mistrust, to the point of provoking armed clashes. The tactic is intended to ensure that Syria will appear to each faction as the sole power capable of guaranteeing its interests in Lebanon. It is a classic tactic of divide and rule, which the Syrians are also seeking to apply to the Christian community, and it will be entirely familiar to those who recall the past history of Syrian involvement in Lebanon and the long-term objectives the Assad regime is seeking to fulfill.

"Greater Syria"

The *leitmotif* for Assad in Lebanon, poorly understood in Washington when a series of State Department envoys were shuttling to Damascus in hopes of negotiating a Syrian pull-out, has been the old vision of a "Greater Syria," or Bilad al-Sham. Before Assad seized power in Damascus in 1970, Syria's territorial claims to Lebanon—reflected in the fact that there is no Syrian Embassy in Beirut, then or now—were ritualistic. Assad intervened militarily in Lebanon in 1975-76, and has been able to use the conflict across his legal borders to divert attention from internal troubles and to claim legitimacy for his unpopular regime, whose leadership is dominated by Alawites who represent, at most, 12 percent of the Syrian population. Control of the smuggling rings and hashish production of the Bekaa Valley has also been highly lucrative for the Syrian officer corps and those to whom they pay tribute. But the basic point is that it has long been plain that Hafiz al-Assad views Lebanon—and Jordan too—as a natural extension of Syrian territory. It is not in Syria's interest to permit a single faction to emerge triumphant in Beirut, or, indeed, to promote the formation of any stable coalition.

The return of Rifaat

At the same time, however, a succession struggle rages in Damascus, where Assad recently suffered another stroke and is said to be incapable of working more than a few hours a day. His brother, Rifaat, who has managed to retain control of the special forces (although that is supposed to be incompatible with his new status as a Vice President) is said to have strengthened his position. Interestingly, Yasser Arafat had some quite fond things to say about Rifaat in a recent interview with *Al-Watan al-Arabi*, claiming that he was in constant communication with him up until his forced departure from Tripoli, and pointing out that Rifaat's special forces did not take part in the attack on the PLO forces in Tripoli. But Rifaat's succession is by no means guaranteed. He is opposed not only by non-Alawite leaders, but from within the community itself. His most powerful rival appears to be the Defense Minister, Mustafa Talas, who is said to have Soviet backing. Our intelligence sources say that the KGB residency in Damascus has sent reports to Moscow warning about clandestine contacts between Rifaat Assad and the CIA, as well as envoys from conservative Arab states. This confirms other information suggesting that the Soviets do not regard Rifaat as reliable, and may, therefore, be actively engaged in covert operations to prevent his further advancement. There have already been several assassination attempts on Rifaat's life.

The Soviet stake

The Soviets, who now have some 9,000 military advisers and personnel in Syria, have an enormous stake in

the outcome of the power struggle in Damascus. Syria is not a Soviet client-state, but is now the primary stalking-horse for Moscow in the region as a whole. The Syrian ports of Latakia and Tartus have become important basing areas for the Soviet navy, and the Russians are helping to construct a new railroad to link the two harbors. Syrian bases, both naval and military, enable the Soviets to pose a new threat both to Cyprus and Turkey. The Soviet SAM-5 surface-to-air missiles supplied to Syria are within range of vital NATO facil-

ities in Turkey. For example, the northernmost SAM-5 base, near the Syrian village of Mesken, is within striking distance of the squadron of U.S. F-4 Phantoms stationed at Incirlik in eastern Turkey. These SAM-5 systems are wholly operated by Russians; Syrian officers are only allowed inside the bases on occasional cosmetic visits. Huge recent Soviet arms deliveries may be designed to establish forward arms depots for Moscow's forces as well as to strengthen the Syrians. □

Moscow's Special Forces

There is now a fair body of evidence—in the form of reliable sightings of frogmen and the tracks of mini-submarines—to suggest that the Soviets have been using Sweden coastal waters (including the approaches to its most sensitive naval installations) for dress rehearsals by their naval “diversionary brigades.” These are the maritime counterpart of the Soviet Union's *Spetsnaz* forces, Moscow's equivalent of Britain's Special Air Service or America's Green Berets. Some first-hand insights into the structure and operations of Soviet special forces have recently been offered by a former Soviet army officer who uses the pen-name **Viktor Suvorov**. We are able to provide additional details.

Spetsnaz is the acronym for a Russian phrase meaning “Special Detachments.” The total strength of the *Spetsnaz* forces, organized as independent companies and brigades attached to the headquarters of Military Districts, army groups in satellite countries and Afghanistan, and the four Soviet fleets, is about 30,000. They constitute an elite arm of the Soviet armed forces. The men are predominantly Russians, Byelorussians and Ukrainians (Jews and Central Asians, with the exception of a few Tatars, are excluded) and they are chosen for superior intelligence and physical strength. They are also screened carefully for political loyalty; all *Spetsnaz* officers are required to be members of the Communist Party.

In time of war, the role of *Spetsnaz* is to go behind enemy lines, destroy command centers, communications and strategic bases, and to liquidate key political and military leaders. To prepare for that role, *Spetsnaz* recruits receive extensive training in foreign languages and covers, and in methods of infiltration. They would be able to count on networks of “sleeper agents”, including members of Soviet-controlled terrorist cells in the West, in order to carry out their functions.

Their prowess has been demonstrated in two situations in recent years: in Prague in 1968, where *Spetsnaz* troopers were used to capture airfields and arrest political leaders in advance of the Soviet invasion, and in Afghanistan since 1979. *Spetsnaz* troops took part in the assault on the Darulaman palace, spearheaded by a KGB hit-team directed by Colonel **Bayerenov** (who was killed by his own men in the confusion) in which President **Hafizollah Amin** was murdered. More recently, they have been involved in cross-border strikes against *Mu-*

jahideen sanctuaries inside Iran, and in counter-insurgency operations in rebel-held territory. Their fighting record has been notably superior to that of the remainder of the Soviet expeditionary forces—officially described by Moscow as the “Limited Contingent.”

Mini-sub

The incursions into Swedish waters since 1981, a recent embarrassment to the left-wing government of **Olof Palme**, indicate the role *Spetsnaz* units might play in the event of military hostilities between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, as well as their commanders' attention to realism in training exercises.

Each Soviet fleet has a *Spetsnaz* brigade which includes a battalion of paratroops, two or three frogmen battalions, and a squadron of mini-submarines; each mini-sub has a crew of between five and seven men. Their major task, in wartime, is to infiltrate enemy territory and knock out nuclear bases—including nuclear submarines, before they could put to sea—and other strategic targets. Their rehearsals include maritime infiltration of the United States, and they are believed to have conducted exercises in the Caribbean and along the coastline of Cuba.

According to recent military defectors, the Soviet navy has been keenly interested in developing mini-sub for in-shore operations against NATO ports and naval bases since World War II. The midget submarine that is most widely used at present weighs about 100 tons, and essential parts are manufactured at the Krasnoye Sormovo plant in Gorky. Recently the Soviets have started producing an improved model, which may be nuclear-powered. The standard mini-sub can carry two torpedoes or anti-ship missiles, or six mines, or several frogmen in addition to the crew. The original design was stolen from the Italians. Today the Soviet military intelligence service, the GRU, has standing orders to seek to obtain any new technology relating to the miniaturization of underwater craft. This ranks high on the list of priorities in its annual requirements book. The mini-sub that had been intruding deep inside Swedish waters are from the Diversionary Brigade of the Baltic Fleet, whose targets are West Germany and Scandinavia.

Since the range of mini-sub is not great, they are

dependent on mother ships. Enter the Soviet merchant marine and the Soviet fishing fleet. Naval experts tell *EW* that the Soviets' whale factory ships are ideal for transporting mini-sub, and that some have been specially adapted for this purpose. It may be worth noting that the "Dnieper" class merchant ships the Soviets have been delivering to Cuba might have a similar dual role in the event of need. The Cubans recently took delivery of a sixth ship in this class, the *Antonio Guitera*, which had a dead-weight of 15,000 tons and a cruising speed of 15 knots.

Organization

Spetsnaz forces are organized into 16-17 brigades, more than 40 independent companies, several autonomous regiments (one of which uses the army's Central Sporting Club in Moscow for cover) and the separate naval units. A typical Spetsnaz company includes 110-120 men, organized into a headquarters unit, three paratroop platoons, a communications platoon (versed in rapid-burst transmissions) and support units. It has nine or ten officers, plus 10 or 11 *praporshchiki* (commissioned quartermasters) and is usually divided into 12-15 sabotage teams. Typically, Spetsnaz units are commanded by officers of higher rank than in other branches of the Soviet army; a company commander is more likely to be a major than a captain. Control is decentralized—there is no command center for Spetsnaz as a whole. This is partly for security reasons.

Covers

Inside the USSR, Spetsnaz troops are frequently dressed in Airborne uniforms (minus the Guards badges the six Airborne divisions won in World War II). In Eastern Europe, they sometimes act under cover as signals troops. "Headquarters companies," which specialize in the assassination of enemy leaders, are often disguised as athletic teams, both at regional level and in Moscow. (It is not generally realized that a very high proportion of the Soviet Olympics team is drawn from Spetsnaz—officially, the Central Army Sporting Club, a Spetsnaz cover—and the KGB's "Dynamo" Sports Club.) Senior Lieutenant **Valentin Irykalin**, a naval Spetsnaz officer from the Black Sea Fleet, won a silver medal for rowing at the Mexico City Olympics in 1968. Later, he was arrested by the Turkish police in Istanbul while on an espionage assignment for the GRU. It is likely that a dozen or more of the Soviet athletes who will come to Los Angeles for this year's Olympics will be Spetsnaz officers.

Combat training

Spetsnaz recruits receive intensive training in parachute, sabotage and hand-to-hand combat techniques. They are required to make at least 20-25 parachute jumps over a two-year period. In training exercises, great stress is laid on realism in simulated attacks on NATO bases and command centers. Inflatable dummies of NATO missiles and aircraft are used. Major annual exercises are held around Kirovograd, close to uranium mines worked by forced labor. Interrogation

methods (and resistance to interrogation) are a major element in Spetsnaz training. So are foreign languages.

Special weapons

Like all special forces, Spetsnaz units are lightly armed. Their basic sidearms are the standard Kalashnikov assault rifle; the Malish mini-machinegun (identical to the Czech-made Skorpion); and the P-6 pistol, an assassin's weapon with a built-in silencer. For attacks on strategic bases and similar facilities, Spetsnaz units are also equipped with powerful directional mines (the Mon-100 and Mon-200; a superior version has recently been developed); Mukha grenade-launchers; and SAM-7 Strela missiles.

Sleeper agents

Agents run by the Soviet military intelligence service, the GRU, are divided into two basic categories: "strategic" and "operational." The so-called "strategic" agents are handled by GRU residencies abroad under the supervision of the geographical departments at headquarters. "Operational" agents are run by the intelligence directorate in each military command. They are "cross-border" agents, run from a Soviet headquarters in a neighboring area (for example, agents in Turkey may be run from Odessa or the Trans-Caucasian Military District) who are required to supply intelligence of immediate relevance to military operations, such as the location of a radar station or the exact strength of a garrison on a given day. They include agents specifically assigned to Spetsnaz work, who come under the supervision of the Third Department of the Intelligence Directorate (RU) in each command. Spetsnaz agents in West Germany are directed by Third Department officers attached to the Soviet army headquarters in Czechoslovakia and Poland, since they are the ones responsible for cross-border operations against the Federal Republic.

The Spetsnaz agents are, for the most part, "sleepers"—in other words, fully recruited agents of non-Soviet origin whose task is to gain access to targets in readiness for a future role in sabotage and destruction. They are expected to provide local knowledge, support and sanctuary for Spetsnaz teams, and are also used to maintain forward caches of weapons and equipment inside target countries. Many are themselves trained saboteurs, whose entire career may be devoted to maintaining themselves in readiness for an order to attack one or more strategic targets (an order that, of course, may never come). They will be directed to seek accommodation close to critical targets, and to try to obtain jobs connected with strategic installations.

The vast training program that the GRU has been running for international terrorists, both directly and via subcontractors like the Cubans, has undoubtedly produced many recruits for these sleeper networks. It may be worth noting that former members of the Venceremos Brigades—which took more than 4,000 young Americans to Cuba—have turned up in California and the southwest United States as employees of major utilities and, in one case at least, of a police department. [C]

SECURITY ALERT

Heirs of the Black Panthers

Among the militant groups that are planning to join in demonstrations at the Democratic National Convention in San Francisco in July is the African People's Socialist Party (APSP), based in Oakland. Leaders of the group acknowledge direct contacts with revolutionary groups abroad including the Irish Republican Socialist Party (IRSP) of Northern Ireland and the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) of South Africa. They support **George Habash's** terrorist organization, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the guerrilla Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) in El Salvador.

The APSP was founded in St. Petersburg, Florida in 1972, and traces its ideological heritage to **Kwame Nkrumah**, **Malcolm X** and the racial separatism and pan-Africanism of **Marcus Garvey**, whose portrait adorns the party's green, red and black banner. Its initial recruits came from the "black power" movements of the 1960s, notably the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee and the Black Panther Party. Its 14-point program, revised and endorsed at a 1981 congress, states that "the present condition of existence for African people within current U.S. borders is colonialism, a condition of existence where a whole people is oppressively dominated by a foreign and alien state power for the purpose of economic exploitation and political advantage." The program asserts the party's "right and obligation to build an African People's Liberation Army...to win our actual freedom from our oppressive colonial slave masters." It demands the removal of the police—described as "a colonial army"—from black neighborhoods, "to be replaced by our liberation forces." Tax resistance is another form of struggle: "African people must refuse to pay taxes to a government which uses such taxes to prop up and support brutal dictators."

Chairman Omali

The party's founder and leader is **Joseph Waller**, who now calls himself **Omali Yeshitala** or "Chairman Omali." A former employee of the *St. Petersburg Times*, he was fired in 1966 for taking time off to join the civil rights protests in Mississippi. He was a founder of the Junta of Militant Organizations, active in Florida and Kentucky. He was arrested several times in skirmishes with the police, and spent two years in Florida jails. (He was subsequently arrested in San Francisco in 1978 on charges of passing counterfeit money.)

The APSP started organizing in Oakland in the vacuum caused by the break-up of the Black Panther Party, with sufficient success that two years later, the party newspaper, *Burning Spear*, was moved to Oakland from St. Petersburg. The group has followed the Black Panthers' lead with black community projects and tenant organizing, and is planning to open an African People's

Health Clinic later this year to replace the defunct BPP George Jackson Health Clinic.

Feminist fronde

Two prominent women members of the party—Chairman Omali's second wife, **Linda Leaks**, and **Ajowa Ifateyo**, who formerly ran its bookstore in Louisville—recently led a feminist attack on Omali that resulted in a split in the organization. They complained that he was living off APSP members who were made to take conventional jobs to support him as a "professional revolutionary"—and they played up his two court appearances on charges of failing to keep up child support payments to his first wife. Chairman Omali countered that these "slanders" were the product of "FBI covert operations" and that the women's "participation in the Workers' World-influenced Dykes Against Racism Everywhere" had "placed them in bed with the white ruling class."

White auxiliaries

Despite Omali's ideology of black separatism, he has recognized the usefulness of white support fronts. When the APSP was active in organizing prisoners' protests in the mid-1970s, it developed contacts with a number of predominantly white organizations such as the Prairie Fire Organizing Committee, a front for the Weather Underground, and "solidarity" groups supporting Latin American revolutionaries. A central element in the ideology of the Weather Underground and its offshoots was that white revolutionaries must negate their "skin privilege" by conscientiously taking their cues from black and Third World radical leaders. A number of former Weather Underground sympathizers who were attracted by Joe Waller's flamboyant style banded together in a new support group for the APSP—an auxiliary that now calls itself the Committee in Solidarity with African Independence (CSAI). In New York, the CSAI holds frequent public meetings at the Washington Square Methodist Church on West 4th Street.

Foreign contacts

The APSP is promoting the formation of an African Socialist International, composed of Caribbean revolutionaries, radical African exiles based in Europe, and the party itself. The idea was touted at a meeting in Paris last year that was hosted by **Samba Mbuub**, a radical exile from Senegal. Last month Chairman Omali and his International Director **Neil Holmes** set off on another European tour. Their itinerary included Belfast, where they planned meetings with the Irish Republican Socialist Party, and London and Paris, where they intended to confer with leaders of a number of militant African and Caribbean organizations.

At the end of this month, Omali and **Rick Ayers**, the New York-based chairman of the CSAI support group, are planning to start a national tour in the United States to strengthen ties with militant American Indian groups—especially the Dine Nation and the Big Mountain Defense Committee in Arizona—and recruit white activists to take part in the APSP's "Oakland Summer."

Despite the internal feuding and the surreal quality of

many of its pronouncements, the APSP appears to be well-funded and expanding toward fulfillment of its primary objective: to assume the former role of the Black Panther Party. It is running a number of businesses out of its Oakland headquarters, "Uhuru House," including a vitamin pill company and typesetting and graphics companies that recently acquired an AB Dick 3609 printing press and a Compugraphic 7500 typesetting machine. [C]

Corporate Targets

Mexico's "Silicon Valley"

Since President Miguel de la Madrid's government changed the rules last year to permit certain foreign companies to own 100 percent of their business in Mexico, there has been renewed interest by foreign investors—and an intensifying opposition campaign by the Mexican left. Since the new policy was adopted, the *Consejo Nacional del Comercio Exterior* (Conacex) and Mexican government agencies have been encouraging U.S., Japanese, South Korean and Hong Kong corporations to expand their activities. A special drive has been made to attract electronics plants to the north of the country. Some government aides talk about creating a Mexican "silicon valley" around the city of Chihuahua, Pancho Villa's old stamping-ground.

The Mexican left, both within the *Confederación de Trabajadores*, which is controlled by the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), and as represented by the *Partido Socialista Unificado Mexicano* (PSUM), a coalition of Communists and smaller Marxist splinter groups, is violently opposed to the new government policy on the grounds that it entails "the loss of economic sovereignty." The PSUM was the moving force in a wave of industrial unrest in Monterrey and Nuevo Leon last year. On the other side of the border, U.S. labor organizers are worried about what they regard as the export of jobs to low-income workers south of the Rio Grande. There is sufficient community of interest for coordinated action against U.S. companies moving plants into Mexico.

Plans for joint industrial action against U.S. automakers, electrical and electronics companies were discussed at a recent "Conference on the Social and Economic Problems of the Border." It was attended by delegates from the PSUM, "independent" Mexican unions like the Mexican Union of Communications Workers and the Union of Auto Workers and "rank-and-file" factory organizations. Among the U.S. participants were members of Local 645 of the United Auto Workers (UAW) from Van Nuys, California, and Humberto Camacho, the "International Representative" of the United Electrical Workers, from Los Angeles. Camacho

is now taking the lead in efforts to work out plans for joint labor organizing, strikes and boycotts against "U.S. monopolies" by groups on both sides of the border. [C]

The Bailout and Birth of a Debtors' Cartel

The eleventh hour resolution of Argentina's latest debt crisis enabled the heads of American money center banks to sleep more easily. It came just as the deadline expired on March 31—the one which would have obliged U.S. banks to prescribe bad loans (non-performing for 90 days or more) as just that, and to deduct interest that wasn't collected on those from their first quarter earnings statements. This would have reduced Manufacturers Hanover's earnings per share, for example, for the first quarter 1984 by about 25 percent.

The \$500 million bailout for Argentina involved cooperation between four Latin American countries (Venezuela, Colombia, Mexico and Brazil) who will put up \$300 million between them, and the United States, which will pay back their loans when and if President Raul Alfonsin agrees to an IMF dictated austerity program. This arrangement was hailed by Treasury Secretary Donald Regan and others as a breakthrough in Hemispheric cooperation, through which the big-debtor countries of Latin America will gently nudge one another into accepting IMF proposals that would otherwise be politically indigestible. Regan even suggested that the deal had put "paid" to alarmist talk about countries being declared in default and about the rise of a "debtors' cartel."

Unfortunately, that isn't obvious just yet. One malign effect of the Argentine bailout is that it could encourage other big debtors to wait until the last minute to settle their accounts, provoking a new series of heartstopping crises and new efforts to capitalize on Western panic, particularly in the boardrooms of the big U.S. banks. Closer cooperation among the major Latin American debtor countries may have been helpful on this occasion. But the precedent could lead to a tougher united front toward Western creditors and the IMF in the future, especially when seen against the backdrop of high interest rates in the United States and the radical political changes that are shaping elsewhere in the hemisphere.

It was significant that the 11 Western banks contributed \$100 million to the bailout, but were persuaded to lend at only one-eighth of one percent over libor, an unusually low rate for risky loans in Latin America. The new grouping of Latin American debtor nations can be expected to exert joint downward pressure on lending rates—and they have learned that the fear of a Wall Street rout is a powerful weapon in their hands. Stocks of the major U.S. banks steadied after the Argentine deal was announced, but we predict more shocks ahead. [C]

