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Evolving Party Politics in Pakistan

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An Intelligence Assessment

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*NESA 87-10047
October 1987*

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Evolving Party Politics in Pakistan

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An Intelligence Assessment

This paper was prepared by [redacted] Office
of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis, with a
contribution by [redacted] Office of
Leadership Analysis, and [redacted] NESA. It
was coordinated with the Directorate of
Operations. [redacted]

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Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, South Asia Division, NESA [redacted]

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Evolving Party Politics in Pakistan

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Key Judgments

*Information available
as of 5 October 1987
was used in this report.*

Pakistan's myriad political parties have sprung back to life following the lifting of martial law in late 1985 by President Zia. So far, the ruling Pakistan Muslim League (PML) has the upper hand, but it is experiencing organizational difficulties that are impeding its political agenda. Antigovernment parties, including the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), Pakistan's largest opposition party, also are experiencing organizational problems and chronic infighting that make it difficult for them to mount serious challenges to the government. Neither the ruling party nor the opposition parties have been able to build a nationwide constituency. This stalemate has created an opportunity for smaller parties with narrow ethnic and religious agendas to agitate and appeal for greater public support.

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The PML, headed by Prime Minister Junejo, holds commanding majorities in both the national and provincial assemblies and is popular in Punjab. It shows little evidence, however, of creating the grassroots support outside Punjab that can help return it to power—without vote fraud—in the general election. Muslim League legislators in the national and provincial parliaments have done little to pass legislation that addresses pressing social and economic problems. The party organization has also been hurt by factionalism, provincial resentment, and corruption.

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The return of Benazir Bhutto, coleader of the PPP, in April 1986 after almost two years in exile gave a major boost to Pakistan's opposition movement. She, however, has run into serious organizational problems within her party and the opposition movement. She is also accused by smaller opposition parties of trying to dominate the Movement for Restoration of Democracy (MRD), a loose coalition of antigovernment parties. Finally, Bhutto is still repairing the damage from the failure of the opposition-led agitation in August 1986 to move the MRD closer to its goals of Zia's removal and new elections.

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Bhutto's inability to unite the opposition has led to further splintering. One party—the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal—left the MRD in protest against Bhutto's autocratic leadership. Ghulam Mustapha Jatoi, a former PPP rival of Bhutto, formed the National People's Party in August 1986, made up of anti-Bhutto opposition politicians. Jatoi may consider building a new coalition of moderate antigovernment parties opposed to Bhutto's efforts to control the opposition.

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Several parties that appeal to narrow ethnic or religious audiences have emerged to fill the vacuum created by the major parties' failure to build a national base. One of these parties, the Muhajir Quami Movement, depends on the Muhajir population of Sind Province for its support. Another party, the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Fiqh-e-Jaffria, appeals to Pakistan's Shia minority. These parties agitate—often violently—for the rights of their respective constituencies and may pose serious local challenges to the more established parties that have traditionally sought to appeal to as broad a national audience as possible.

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The local district and municipal elections tentatively scheduled for late this year or early next year will provide the next major challenge for both the Muslim League and the opposition. Although the elections will probably be held on a nonparty basis, the opposition will capitalize on the government's poor handling of domestic problems and make an impressive showing at the polls—probably winning a majority of the votes cast—if the voting is fairly tabulated. A good showing in the local elections would provide the PPP and the rest of the antigovernment movement a springboard for the general election, scheduled for 1990.

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The weaknesses and factionalism of Pakistan's political parties will frustrate US efforts to encourage the growth of democratic institutions there. Officials of the PML will continue to support US policy initiatives, but concerns about domestic opinion and preoccupation with party infighting will slow their responses to US policy approaches. Most of the opposition will continue to suspect US motives in Pakistan and resent Washington's support for the current government. The most anti-US parties are receiving political and material support from the Soviet Union and Afghanistan. A PPP-dominated government would probably create problems in the US-Pakistani relationship because such a government would be less responsive to US concerns on issues like nuclear weapons development, Afghanistan, and narcotics.

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Scope Note

This Intelligence Assessment focuses on the strengths and weaknesses of Pakistan’s major political parties. It presents an in-depth analysis of Pakistan’s current ruling party, the Pakistan Muslim League, and updates an earlier paper on Pakistan’s opposition groups.

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Evolving Party Politics
in Pakistan

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
Since its creation in 1947, Pakistan has seen a series of weak civilian governments overthrown by strong military regimes. The ineffectual civilian governments of the 1950s came to an end with Gen. Ayub Khan's coup d'etat of 1958. Ayub Khan drew up a new constitution and tried to transform his military regime into a democracy, but Pakistan's unsuccessful war with India in 1965 and unrest in East Pakistan led to Gen. Yahya Khan's coup four years later. After losing the 1971 war in which East Pakistan became the independent state of Bangladesh, Yahya Khan handed over power to Zulfikar Bhutto, whose Pakistan People's Party (PPP) had won the 1970 election in West Pakistan. Bhutto held power until 1977 when he was overthrown by General Zia-ul-Haq.

In this unstable political atmosphere, political parties in Pakistan have had difficulty establishing grassroots support, with once-powerful parties being replaced and suppressed by military rulers. Moreover, provincial and ethnic divisions have ruptured political organizations and split them into competing factions. To this day, many parties in Pakistan are often mere groupings of self-seeking politicians who have coalesced around a single popular political leader.

Emerging From Zia's Shadow

The basis for the current political scene lies in the unrest of 1977 that culminated in a military coup led by General Zia. In disputed elections that year, Prime Minister Zulfikar Bhutto's PPP won a lopsided victory that was immediately challenged by a coalition of conservative and Islamic parties. Street fighting between opponents and supporters of the PPP prompted Chief of Army Staff General Zia-ul-Haq to declare martial law and remove Bhutto from office. Bhutto was convicted of conspiracy to commit murder and hung in 1979.

Figure 1
Pakistan: Voting Results,
1970 and 1977^a



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^a Elections were held in 1985 but were on a nonparty basis.
^b Results are for West Pakistan only. East Pakistan became the independent country of Bangladesh in 1971.
^c The Pakistan National Alliance was an alliance of nine opposition parties formed to run against the Pakistan People's Party.

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Zia, who became President in 1978, severely restricted political parties and activities. He often reaffirmed his distrust of civilian politicians, saying they practiced the "politics of destruction." He further rationalized his ban on political parties by claiming they were "un-Islamic" because they fostered divisions among Muslims. Consequently, Zia has refused to join a political party. []

Zia kept restrictions on political activity in place through the national and provincial elections of February 1985. The opposition Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD)—a loose coalition of antigovernment parties formed in 1981 to work for Zia's ouster and dominated by the PPP—boycotted the elections. Despite the boycott, the elections were heavily contested by candidates running as individuals who, for the most part, had well-known party affiliations. As a result of the boycott, the national and provincial assemblies that convened in March 1985 consisted mostly of moderate-to-conservative rural landlords, urban businessmen, and members of fundamentalist religious parties. []

Zia—at the urging of Prime Minister Junejo and other civilian politicians—gradually lifted restrictions on political activity following the elections. In December 1985 the National Assembly formally lifted the ban on parties and allowed political activity. The Political Parties Act stipulated that parties had to register with the government-run election commission, list party officials, and open their financial books to official inspection. Members of Parliament were prohibited from changing party affiliation. The Pakistan Muslim League (PML), which Junejo formed in January 1986, registered with the government, but most of the opposition refused, saying registration would imply recognition of the present government's legitimacy. []

With the lifting of martial law on 30 December 1985 came greater political activity and press freedom. Opposition parties regularly hold rallies and demonstrations, and newspapers and magazines give much more coverage to political activities, including those of nonregistered parties such as the PPP. The press is also much more critical of government policies than before the lifting of martial law, according to US Embassy reporting. []

Opposition activity also increased after PPP leader Benazir Bhutto—daughter of the late Prime Minister—returned to Pakistan from West European exile in April 1986. Although she was greeted with large crowds on her arrival, she failed to attract the sustained mass support necessary to overthrow Zia during a series of demonstrations in August 1986. Bhutto's failure and the arrest of many MRD activists led to infighting within the opposition over the wisdom of using violence to challenge Zia's rule, according to the US Embassy in Islamabad. By the summer of 1987 the political climate had calmed, with both the PML and MRD trying to build their organizations and map out future strategy. []

The PML: Old Goods in New Wrappings?

Despite the status and patronage powers it enjoys as the ruling party, the PML cannot match Benazir Bhutto's PPP supporters in terms of numbers and enthusiasm. Although it enjoys government patronage, the PML is seen largely by ethnic minorities, liberals, and Islamic fundamentalists as a rehash of the old Muslim League, which was Pakistan's first ruling party, according to US diplomatic reporting. We believe, on the basis of US diplomatic reporting over the past several years, that the PML is largely made up of opportunistic politicians from many different parties who have abandoned their original parties in return for the governmental favor and funds they can obtain through the PML. []

Prime Minister Junejo has been working to invigorate the PML, spurred by the return of opposition leader Benazir Bhutto last year. We believe his aim is to promote the PML as a populist party to rival the PPP as the party of have-nots. The Prime Minister has been pushing a program of granting property rights and provision of municipal services to slumdweller in Punjab and land grants to rural tenants in that province. His government also has announced with much fanfare a "Five-Point Program" to promote the welfare and prosperity of Pakistanis through a variety of government development programs. []

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Pakistan Muslim League

The original Muslim League was formed in British India in 1906 and soon became a vehicle for those advocating an independent Muslim state. The Muslim League became the ruling party when Pakistan was created in 1947 but gradually lost public support during the 1950s through mismanagement and corruption. It was formally dissolved when martial law was declared by the Army in 1958. The League gradually fell into disarray, splitting into three factions. It was resurrected by Prime Minister Junejo in January 1986 as the Pakistan Muslim League (PML). [redacted]

The nucleus of the new PML was the Muslim League of Pir Pagaro—a religious leader in Sind—that had supported the martial law regime of President Zia. Prime Minister Junejo, a longtime follower of Pagaro, became head of the League, and the party formally registered with the government in February 1986. At present, 50 of 87 Senators and 170 of 237 National Assembly members belong to the PML. Junejo is assured a parliamentary majority until the general election scheduled for 1990 because, by law, any legislator who changes party affiliation during his term is disqualified. This assurance does not protect Junejo from parliamentary votes of no confidence, since Zia retains the right to call such a vote. Zia does not hold a formal position in the PML in conformity with his personal opposition to political parties. A party official told US diplomats in 1986 that 5 million voters had joined the PML. [redacted]

Despite these efforts, the PML has had difficulty competing with the popularity of Benazir Bhutto's PPP. Bhutto's rally in Lahore in April 1986, for example, attracted about 500,000 people compared with a PML rally held there several days before that drew only 50,000, according to the US Consulate. US diplomatic reporting indicates that Junejo's lackluster speaking style has failed to arouse much enthusiasm at PML rallies. [redacted]

The Pakistan Muslim League's Five-Point Program

Prime Minister Junejo announced the PML's Five-Point Program for political, economic, and social development in a national address on 31 December 1985. The five points are:

- *To set up a durable Islamic democratic political system.*
- *To eradicate unemployment.*
- *To eradicate illiteracy.*
- *To eliminate corruption.*
- *To promote a strong national defense and pursue a nonaligned and balanced foreign policy.*

The PML has taken or is considering measures—some legal, some not—to circumvent the PPP's appeal at the polls. Last May the National Assembly raised the voting age from 18 to 21, a move that was castigated by many opposition leaders as a tactic to exclude younger people—a major source of Bhutto's support, in our view—from the polls. [redacted]

Even without the threat from the PPP, we believe that the PML faces problems resulting from provincial rivalries, party factionalism, and corruption. The image of the PML as a party meant to further only the interests of Punjab, Pakistan's most populous province, severely limits the party's appeal in the other provinces. The PML has established an adequate grassroots organization only in Punjab, according to the US Embassy. Although the government has spent heavily on development projects for Punjab, politicians from Sind, Baluchistan, and the North-West

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Mohammad Khan Junejo

*Prime Minister,
Head of the Pakistan Muslim
League*

First Prime Minister since imposition of martial law in 1977 . . . strong-willed, independent, ambitious politician . . . has worked hard to project himself as legitimate spokesman and chief policymaker of a popularly elected democracy . . . high moral character . . . holds cautious, conservative political views . . . well disposed toward the United States . . . wealthy son of prominent landowner from Sind . . . 54.

Movement for the Restoration of Democracy

The goals of the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD), as established in 1981, are the removal of President Zia from office, the immediate holding of a free and fair national election, and the complete restoration of the 1973 Constitution. As of August 1987, the component parties of the MRD were:

- *Pakistan People's Party.*
- *Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam.*
- *Pakistan Democratic Party.*
- *Pakistan Muslim League—Qasim Faction.*
- *Quami Mahaz-i-Azadi.*
- *Mazdoor Kissan Party.*
- *Pushtun-Khawa National Awami Party.*
- *Pakistan National Party.*
- *Awami National Party.*

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Frontier Province complain that Islamabad neglects the need for economic and social investment for these areas. The PML, in our view, runs a distant second or third in popularity in these provinces to the PPP and other, more local parties.

The PML organization in Punjab was distracted during late 1986 and early 1987 by a challenge to Chief Minister Nawaz Sharif's authority by a group of League dissidents in the provincial assembly. The dissidents were critical of Sharif's alleged arrogance and indifference to local PML concerns. The infighting stopped only when President Zia and Prime Minister Junejo intervened on Sharif's behalf, according to the US Consulate in Lahore.

The PML has also been tarnished with several cases of corruption involving federal cabinet ministers who are League members. In November 1986, for example, Commerce Minister Mohyuddin Baluch was

ousted for his involvement in a scheme to sell export quotas to a Pakistani business. Minister of Local Government Anwar Aziz Chaudry resigned his post in June 1987 after an official probe into the misuse of development funds in his electoral constituency. To deflect negative publicity generated by government corruption, Prime Minister Junejo has launched several well-publicized "anticorruption" drives.

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The MRD: In Search of a Strategy

We believe that the MRD has been an unwieldy vehicle for anti-Zia forces and has been unable to take full advantage of the PML's weaknesses. Since its inception, it has been a kaleidoscope of parties with different constituencies and views of what a post-Zia

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Fazlur Rahman

Secretary General
Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam

Heads only religious party in MRD . . . holds blend of radical, political, and religious fundamentalist views . . . calls for nationalization and land distribution . . . decries Zia's failure to implement Islamization but regards Shariat Bill as a sham . . . demands destruction of US and Soviet power in the Muslim world . . . unable to attract sizable following, especially among secular MRD members . . . attempts to broaden appeal through populist Islamic slogans.

[REDACTED]

government should look like. The leftist parties, for example, tend to favor increased provincial autonomy, while the more moderate groups want a continuation of strong central government. In our view, the nine component parties of the MRD have spent more time fighting among themselves than in working on a comprehensive strategy to force Zia's removal and new elections. In most cases of infighting, the moderate parties are often pitted against the more radical ones, while the smaller parties are usually opposed to the much larger PPP. The return of Benazir Bhutto has only widened the cleavages within the MRD by reinforcing the PPP's dominance. Nevertheless, the MRD will probably survive at least until the next general election is held because the smaller parties realize that, by themselves, they cannot gain power.

[REDACTED]

PPP Preeminence

The most persistent problem within the MRD is the smaller parties' complaint that the PPP—the largest party in the MRD—ignores their opinions and only wants to gain power for itself. The Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam, the MRD's only religious party, has criticized the PPP for trying to dominate the movement and has often threatened to leave the coalition, according to US diplomatic reporting. A moderate MRD party, the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal, withdrew from the movement in October 1986 after the PPP criticized its decision to register with the election commission. [REDACTED]

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Provincial Autonomy

A second major division in the MRD is the question of provincial autonomy. Two MRD parties—the Awami National Party (ANP) and the Pakistan National Party (PNP)—advocate greater autonomy for the North-West Frontier, Sind, and Baluchistan and castigate what they allege is increasing Punjabi domination of these provinces. These parties came out earlier this year in favor of limiting the federal government's jurisdiction to defense, foreign affairs, finance, and communications, according to US Embassy reports. Other MRD parties—including the PPP—oppose reducing the central government's authority so radically. These parties realize that, to gain power, they will need the support of the Punjabis who have traditionally favored a strong central government in Pakistan.

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[REDACTED]

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Election Strategy

Strategy over holding new elections is also a source of discord in the MRD. The PPP is demanding that a new general election be held immediately. The other MRD parties are less enthusiastic about an early poll, according to US diplomatic reporting. The smaller parties fear they will be overwhelmed by the PPP in an open election and have argued for a prearranged apportionment of parliamentary seats between the PPP and the other MRD parties. The PPP has refrained, so far, from making any preelection deal.

[REDACTED]

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Abdul Wali Khan

Head of the Awami National Party



Inveterate opposition leader . . . strong advocate of provincial autonomy . . . longtime symbol of Pushtun nationalism . . . sharply critical of US and Pakistani policy toward Afghanistan and resents influx of Afghan refugees into North-West Frontier Province . . . makes frequent visits to Kabul and Moscow . . . member of father's independence movement against British in 1947 . . . served numerous prison terms for illegal political activities . . . about 70.

[redacted]

Ghaus Bux Bizenjo

Head of Pakistan National Party



Formidable Baluch politician . . . strong proponent of Baluchistan's autonomy . . . backs Soviet presence in Afghanistan . . . willingness to negotiate with successive regimes has cost him support among dissident students . . . imprisoned by every Pakistani regime . . . Governor of Baluchistan in early 1970s until dismissed and arrested by Bhutto government . . . 84.

[redacted]

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Ideological Differences

MRD unity is hindered by ideological differences over foreign policy. The main leftist parties—the ANP and PNP—are critical of the PPP's efforts to seek US support. The US Consulate in Peshawar reported that a rally in May 1986 jointly held by the PPP and the ANP turned unruly when the leftists accused the PPP of “tilting” toward the United States. US Embassy reporting indicates that, at an MRD meeting in June 1986, six parties proposed a resolution over the PPP's objections that condemned the United States for “prolonging the Afghan war and endangering Pakistan's security.” [redacted]

The PPP itself is divided in its views of the United States. Party leader Bhutto presents herself publicly and privately as a moderate political leader who is

favorably disposed toward Washington. She has privately said that she supports continuing US economic aid to Pakistan, according to US diplomatic reporting. Sources of the US Consulate in Lahore reported in May 1986, however, that PPP leftists criticized Bhutto for her relatively moderate stance toward the United States. [redacted]

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We believe that the failure of the MRD's violent antigovernment campaign in August 1986 was a major setback in its efforts to unite and force Zia's ouster. About 30 people died in political protests over a two-week period, mainly in Sind, after the opposition defied a government ban on political rallies. In

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Figure 2. MRD demonstration in Karachi, August 1983 [redacted]

Benazir Bhutto



Cochairman,
Pakistan People's Party

our view, ideological and regional disagreements within the coalition were further exposed by the aborted campaign. The US Embassy reports that many MRD moderates resented being dragged by Bhutto and the PPP into a premature and counterproductive confrontation with the government which only resulted in mass arrests of opposition activists. Benazir Bhutto publicly acknowledged that the opposition movement was unprepared for the August confrontation. [redacted]

One result of the abortive campaign, in our view, was an effort by Bhutto to build up the Punjab wing of the PPP to match the strength of the party in Sind and to develop the party's credentials as a national party. In the aftermath of the August clashes, PPP members in Sind, where most of the violence was confined, accused their Punjab counterparts of failing to provide support, according to US Embassy accounts. To resolve this friction, Bhutto dismissed the head of the Sind PPP in October because of his criticism of the Punjabis. In June 1987 the PPP held internal party elections in Punjab to reinvigorate the provincial party apparatus. According to the US Consulate in Lahore, the elections resulted in a stronger, more unified PPP in Punjab. [redacted]

We expect the PPP will continue to depend on Bhutto for leadership. There is a lack of respected second-tier leaders in the party, and, if Bhutto were to die or be incapacitated, we believe it would split into provincial

Eldest child and political heir of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto . . . triumphantly returned to Pakistan in April 1986 after nearly three years of self-imposed exile . . . [redacted] her authoritarian style has alienated many party members . . . has moderated her political tone after failure of 1986 agitation campaign . . . intense, sharp intellect, accomplished orator . . . educated at Radcliffe and Oxford . . . recently engaged to be married . . . 34. [redacted]

factions. Although Bhutto realizes the need for greater party cohesion and long-term planning, she has been unwilling to dismiss or discipline several party officers—because of their loyalty to her—even though they are poor organizers. [redacted]

By the spring of 1987 the parties of the MRD were discussing the possibility of a conference of opposition parties to approve a coordinated program to force a new national election. After months of interparty wrangling over whether parties outside the MRD could participate in the meeting, the conference was held in mid-August in Lahore. According to press reports, the conference ended in disarray with the PPP refusing to sign the final declaration and walking out. [redacted]

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Figure 3. Benazir Bhutto returns to Pakistan, April 1986 [redacted]



Figure 4. PPP supporters campaign for Bhutto's release from prison, August 1986 [redacted]

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MRD Breakaways

One result of the MRD disarray has been the withdrawal of one party from the coalition and formation of another moderate non-MRD opposition party made up of anti-Bhutto politicians. [redacted]

The Tehrik-i-Istiqal (TI), led by former Air Force Chief Asghar Khan, quit the MRD in October 1986 after the other parties criticized his decision to register the TI with the government. Asghar Khan helped lead the political movement against Prime Minister Bhutto in 1977, and he has been critical of Benazir Bhutto's efforts to lead the opposition. He had earlier publicly demanded that the MRD renounce dictatorial aspirations—what he called “Bhuttoism”—and affirm its belief in Pakistan's territorial integrity, an implicit criticism of the provincial autonomist parties in the MRD. [redacted]

The MRD suffered another setback in August 1986 when Ghulam Mustapha Jatoi, a former PPP leader, established the National People's Party (NPP). Jatoi, who was a close ally of Prime Minister Bhutto, headed the PPP in Sind until his removal by Benazir in May 1986. The NPP is made up largely of moderate, older ex-PPP members who, like Jatoi, oppose Bhutto's “impetuousness,” according to the US Consulate in Lahore. Ghulam Mustafa Khar, a former governor of Punjab under Zulfikar Bhutto, is

associated with Jatoi in building the NPP. Jatoi sees Khar, a Punjabi, as a means to expand the NPP's appeal beyond its Sindhi base, according to the US Consulate in Karachi. For the time being, however, Khar's assistance is limited by his current incarceration while awaiting trial on a variety of charges, including murder. [redacted]

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Jatoi is trying to build a moderate image for the NPP. The party has not issued a formal manifesto and has kept its policy pronouncements limited to general calls for adherence to Islam, democracy, and Pakistan's territorial unity. Jatoi told US diplomats that he seeks a new general election but is against agitating for an immediate new poll. He has registered the NPP—which has one representative in Parliament—with the government and has said his party may run in the local elections when they are held. [redacted]

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Jatoi and the NPP are often rumored in the Pakistani press to be potential replacements for Prime Minister Junejo and the PML. [redacted]

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
[redacted] Although we believe Jatoi would be acceptable to Zia and the Army, the President is probably not seriously planning to remove

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Figure 5. PPP protest in Karachi,
August 1986 []

Junejo. The NPP has so far not demonstrated an impressive ability to attract many disaffected oppositionists to its flag, thus limiting its usefulness to Zia.




Other Parties

While the two major political parties—the PML and the PPP—strive to attract national constituencies, a recurring phenomenon of Pakistani politics has been the emergence of political parties that cater to specific ethnic and provincial audiences. We believe that these organizations reflect the inability of the larger, more established parties to address the more parochial concerns of Pakistan's many minority groups. One of these parties, the Muhajir Quami Movement (MQM), was formed in 1984 to better represent the interests of the Muhajirs, Muslim immigrants from India. The Sind-Baluch-Pushtun Front, formed in 1985, has been pressing for greater autonomy for Sind, Baluchistan, and the North-West Frontier than the central government is willing to allow. []

Religious parties have long been a part of Pakistani politics. The Jamaat-i-Islami, a fundamentalist Sunni party, has occasionally cooperated with President Zia and gained 10 seats in the National Assembly in the 1985 general election. It is sponsoring

Asghar Khan



President of Tehrik-i-Istiqlal


Moderate, secular, human rights activist . . . retired Air Marshal . . . respected for integrity but lacks charisma . . . sentenced to five years' house arrest by Zia for antigovernment activities during martial law period . . . disdains Bhutto family . . . withdrew party from MRD . . . about 66. []

legislation—the Shariat Bill—that would replace Pakistan's civil law with Islamic law. Another Sunni party is the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Pakistan (JUP), a moderate opposition party. A relatively new religious party, representing Pakistan's Shia minority, is the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Fiqh-e-Jaffria (TNFJ), which is pro-Iranian and antigovernment. []

The Parliamentary Opposition Group (POG) is not an organized political party but a grouping of about 20 opposition members of Parliament in the National Assembly who have flirted with resigning their seats in the National Assembly to join the PPP, according to the US Embassy. Led by former Assembly Speaker Fakhr Imam, the POG met with Benazir Bhutto and the PPP to discuss ways to coordinate strategy in June 1987. The POG endorses Bhutto's stand on a new election, Zia's resignation from the Army, and full revival of the 1973 Constitution, but by August 1987 it had not agreed to unite with the PPP. []

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Ghulam Mustapha Jatoi

Head of National People's Party

Savvy veteran politician and wealthy Sindhi land-owner . . . conservative, urges moderation rather than confrontation with Zia government . . . popular with rural elite and business community . . . sees himself as viable alternative to Prime Minister Junejo . . . Chief Minister of Sind (1974-77) . . . a longtime PPP stalwart, was ousted from party post in 1986 by Benazir Bhutto . . . well disposed toward United States . . . about 57.

Outlook**Local Elections**

Even if the elections for district and municipal councils that oversee the disbursement of government development funds are held on a nonparty basis, as is quite likely, we believe the larger opposition parties will indirectly participate to keep themselves before the public eye and to prepare for the 1990 general election. In October the PPP announced that, although it would not officially participate, it would support "democratic-minded" candidates. Most officeseekers will have clear party affiliations. In free and fair elections, we believe the MRD parties would almost certainly win a majority in Sind, Baluchistan, and the North-West Frontier, where resentment against Punjabis is high. We believe, however, that the prospect of vote fraud by the PML governments in these provinces will give the PML victories in important districts and lead to violent confrontations with

Fakhr Imam

Head of the Parliamentary Opposition Group . . . National Assembly member . . . Assembly Speaker until ousted by Junejo in 1986 for "antigovernment" maneuvering . . . often critical of government and has held talks with Benazir Bhutto . . . Shia Muslim from wealthy Punjabi family but has Western, secular outlook . . . wife Abida also a member of Parliament and her husband's opposition group . . . about 45.

the opposition. In Punjab the result will probably be a narrow PML victory due to the effectiveness of government-supported development projects.

The risk of well-known Muslim League politicians being defeated in the polls by members of the opposition will be a potential danger for the PML in the local elections. The victory of antigovernment politicians over established PML members would be a major boost to the opposition and an embarrassment to the government.

National Election

If a national election is held in 1990, we believe the ruling PML will be hard pressed to present an attractive record of legislative accomplishment to the public. Economic and social problems probably pose the biggest long-term challenge to the PML. It probably cannot fulfill promises of the Five-Point Program to increase employment, wage rates, and rural electrification because of budgetary constraints. We expect that difficulties in dealing with deep-rooted social problems, such as illiteracy, corruption, and crime, will also hurt the PML's credibility with the public.

We believe that the PML will be hurt in the general election by its inability to put down roots in Sind, Baluchistan, and the North-West Frontier. PML

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Pakistan's Local Elections

Local elections which are held every four years, elect officials to district (subprovincial), township (subdistrict), and municipal governments. These local government bodies have significant influence because they disburse federal and provincial development funds. No definite schedules have been set, but US diplomatic reporting suggests the ballot will be conducted this winter. []

The logistics of the local elections are still largely undecided. The government has not announced, for example, whether the elections will be held on a party or nonparty basis. Parties were banned in the last two local elections—1979 and 1983—and Pakistani press reports indicate that the government will decide that the elections will also be nonparty. Islamabad could also allow only registered parties, such as the PML, to participate in the polls. Such a maneuver could be used to exclude the PPP from the polling. Another issue that is still unclear is whether dual officeholding will be permitted. Many local officeholders are members of the provincial and national assemblies. If dual officeholding is not allowed, assembly members will have to decide whether to give up their seats to run in the local elections. []

efforts to increase its popularity in these areas will be hindered by the government's unwillingness to grant more provincial autonomy as well as a likely reduction in government funds for development projects outside Punjab. []

The PPP would probably be the main beneficiary of PML lethargy in the general election. We believe that, by highlighting the PML's shortcomings, reorganizing the party, and disavowing violence, the PPP's public image would be enhanced and Benazir Bhutto would become a stronger challenger to the PML in 1990. To be successful, however, Bhutto must first improve unity and discipline within her party, in our judgment. We believe that she will regard the other

MRD parties as increasingly irrelevant, although she will find it useful to keep the alliance alive to prevent the smaller parties' co-optation by the government and to present at least the appearance of opposition unity. []

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The non-PPP members of the MRD will also probably keep their alliance with the PPP alive, if only in name, out of concern that they are not strong enough individually to challenge the government. Nonetheless, we believe the political and provincial fissures within the MRD will deepen and reduce its public credibility. []

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We believe that the non-MRD opposition parties could be the wild card in future Pakistani politics. The emergence of a strong NPP and its possible alliance with the TI and JUP would provide a new political alternative to Pakistani voters who are tired of the continuing PML-PPP confrontation, in our judgment. NPP leader Jatoti is a respected political leader, and any party he leads in a future election would steal at least some votes from both the PML and the PPP. A strong showing by the NPP in the 1987 local elections would greatly strengthen the party's viability. []

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Between now and 1990 regional and ethnic political parties will probably grow in popularity as more Pakistanis become disillusioned with the established political parties. We believe the MQM, in particular, will attract increasing numbers of Muhajirs in Sind who consider themselves discriminated against by other ethnic groups. The growth of the MQM, however, will be limited to Sind, given the comparatively few Muhajirs outside the province. Although some tactical cooperation between the MQM and the PPP is likely in this year's local elections, a long-term alliance between the parties is improbable, given the MQM's distrust of the established political parties. []

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We believe that the religious parties—Shia as well as Sunni—will play only a minor role in the political process. The Sunni parties have never received more

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than 10 percent of the vote in past national elections and we believe they are far from their goal of imposing a theocratic Islamic state in Pakistan. Shia organizations such as the TNFJ are also too small to determine political events, but they appear to be well financed, have a committed following, and will probably cause trouble for the government on issues such as religious rights for Shias and relations with Iran and the United States. The TNFJ will also serve as a front for Iranian-sponsored subversion in Pakistan. []

Effect on Pakistani Stability

We believe that the fractious nature of Pakistan's political parties will hinder Prime Minister Junejo's efforts to create a stable political order. Although disorganization within the MRD takes some of the pressure off him, the likelihood of future dissension within Junejo's Muslim League will weaken his standing, and he may be replaced if party infighting increases in the runup to the 1990 general election. Junejo's handling of the fall local elections will largely determine his political future and perhaps that of the PML. []

President Zia is not immediately threatened by Pakistan's chaotic party structure. He has put distance between himself and the MRD-PML confrontation as well as the PML's own infighting. Nonetheless, we believe future government-opposition confrontations—over PML vote fraud in this fall's local elections, for example—and the weak structure of the PML could prompt criticism from Zia's Army colleagues on his lack of success in creating a stable political system in Pakistan. []

Although another military takeover is not likely in the near term, a new martial law regime, dominated by the Army, would probably mean another ban on political parties and the imprisonment of many party leaders. [] the Army is becoming increasingly irritated with what it observes as a deterioration in law and order under Pakistan's civilian government. New military rulers might eventually allow a new national election, but it would probably be closely supervised by the Army and restricted to "acceptable" political parties. []

In the long run, the prospect of continuing party factionalism and disorganization, along with increasing law-and-order problems, works against the establishment of civilian democracy in Pakistan and makes another military regime more likely. The Army has a tradition of restoring political and economic stability and preserving national integrity. The civilian political parties, on the other hand, have failed to establish themselves as credible vehicles for long-term national development—civilian administrations in Pakistan have already been replaced three times by military governments—and there is not much likelihood that the current parties will improve on this record. []

Implications for the United States

The disorganized and fragmented nature of Pakistan's political parties will make it harder, in our judgment, for the United States to encourage the establishment of democratic institutions in the country. We believe the corruption and lethargy of the PML and its inability to address growing social and economic problems will lead to public disillusionment with the civilian government. The tendency of opposition parties, such as the PPP, to merely criticize the government instead of offering constructive policy proposals for these problems will also increase popular cynicism about political parties. []

Although the PML is basically friendly toward the United States, we believe its preoccupation with party infighting and gaining popular support may cause some League members in the government to hesitate in backing US-supported initiatives. Some PML members of the National Assembly, for example, protested the government's efforts to enforce poppy eradication in the North-West Frontier Province in March 1986 after violence broke out between police and local farmers. US Embassy reporting indicates that caucus meetings between Prime Minister Junejo and PML members of Parliament to discuss pending legislation are often poorly organized and rarely accomplish much. []

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Foreign Support for Pakistan's Opposition?

Charges that the PPP and the rest of Pakistan's opposition are receiving financial and political support from foreign countries have often been raised by government spokesmen in an effort to tarnish the opposition's image. President Zia publicly insinuated in June 1986 that PPP leader Benazir Bhutto was receiving money from the Government of India. A

Bhutto has publicly denied any foreign financial support for the PPP. She has told US diplomats, however, that Libyan leader Colonel Qadhafi financed her brother Mumtaz—leader of the terrorist organization Al-Zulfikar—and had “helped” her family in the late 1970s while Zulfikar Bhutto was in jail.

Soviet and Afghan support was evident in the creation of the leftist Awami National Party in July 1986. The Pakistani press reported that several Afghan diplomats were present at the ANP's formation in Karachi. Party leader Abdul Wali Khan made a highly publicized visit in late summer 1986 to Afghanistan and the Soviet Union where he publicly praised Soviet policy toward Afghanistan and criticized Islamabad's support for the Afghan insurgents.

We believe that the continuing influence of leftist forces will give the opposition MRD alliance an anti-US tinge for the foreseeable future. Issues of concern to the United States, such as Pakistan's nuclear program and opium production, will provide more opportunities for leftist parties to criticize US “interference” in Pakistani internal affairs, in our view. Even PPP leader Benazir Bhutto, who has largely refrained from publicly criticizing the United States, will probably be driven to adopt more anti-US positions to whip up greater popular enthusiasm and placate her leftist supporters.

In our view, a PPP government headed by Benazir Bhutto would create strains between Islamabad and Washington, especially if she perceived that US support was lacking during her drive to power. Although she would probably want continued access to US economic assistance, she would also try to placate the powerful left wing of the PPP. We believe Bhutto would be more agreeable to leftist demands for direct talks with the pro-Soviet government in Afghanistan, be more accommodating to Soviet terms for a military withdrawal, and might also curtail support to the Afghan insurgents. A PPP government would probably continue Pakistan's clandestine nuclear weapons program and be more resistant to US urgings to control narcotics in order to win support among farmers in poppy-growing areas.

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Appendix A

Pakistan's Ethnic and Religious Parties

In the past several years, new ethnic political forces have emerged to compete with both the government and the established political opposition for voter popularity. One of these, the *Muhajir Quami Movement (MQM)* is a growing political vehicle for the Muhajirs, or Muslims who migrated to Pakistan from India after the 1947 partition, according to US diplomatic reporting. Muhajirs comprise about 5 to 10 percent of the Pakistani population and are found mainly in urban areas of Sind. The MQM emerged from obscurity in Sind after violent ethnic riots between Muhajirs and Pushtuns in Karachi and Hyderabad in late 1986. The leader of the MQM, Altaf Hussain, has become the leading Muhajir spokesman and has organized many Muhajirs who have long felt persecuted by Pushtuns and other Pakistani ethnic groups, according to the US Consulate in Karachi. []

The MQM has already disrupted the political balance in Sind. According to US diplomatic reporting, the MQM has succeeded in drawing many Muhajir members from established religious parties by charging that these parties are not doing enough to protect and defend Muhajir rights. []

The *Sind-Baluch-Pushtun Front (SBPF)* is another maverick political organization that opposes both the government and the established political parties. Formed in April 1985, the SBPF is led by Mumtaz Bhutto, a cousin of Benazir and a former Chief Minister of Sind under Zulfikar Bhutto. The aim of the front is to press for greater autonomy for Sind,

Altaf Hussain

Leader, Muhajir Quami Movement . . . political opportunist and firebrand spokesman for Muhajirs . . . imprisoned for inciting riots in Sind in October 1986 . . . rhetoric has cooled since release in January 1987 . . . espouses equality in education and public sector . . . has capitalized on disaffection of Muhajir youth . . . Muslim immigrant from India . . . 34.

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Baluchistan, and the North-West Frontier than the government is willing to allow, according to the US Consulate in Karachi. Mumtaz Bhutto also considers Benazir and the PPP to have "sold out" to the majority Punjabi population. In November 1986, Mumtaz Bhutto and several followers were arrested in Karachi on charges of treason and sedition but were released on bail in September 1987, according to US diplomatic reporting. Even though the government felt compelled to detain him, the Consulate in Karachi reports that Bhutto has never had a major following in Pakistan outside of a small segment of alienated rural youth in Sind. []

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Pakistan's religious parties are divided along sectarian and political lines that impede unity and enable the government to play them against each other. The Sunni and Shia parties disagree over the imposition of Islamic law in Pakistan, with each sect promoting its own version. Most of the Sunni parties oppose Benazir Bhutto for being a secular female politician. The Shia parties, however, may come to see her as a bulwark against Sunni-imposed religious legislation and as a possible sympathizer, given that her mother is a Shia from Iran. []

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Mian Tufail Mohammad*Leader, Jamaat-i-Islami*

Conservative religious leader for past 36 years . . . rigid, reserved Muslim . . . sees party as moral movement first, political party second . . . tacitly supports Zia but criticizes failure to implement Islamization policy . . . strong supporter of Shariat Bill . . . 73.

[redacted]

The *Jamaat-i-Islami (JI)* is a small, influential fundamentalist Sunni party that seeks to turn Pakistan into an Islamic state. It has occasionally cooperated with President Zia, participating in the 1985 national and provincial elections and holding 10 seats in the National Assembly, but it generally seeks to adopt an equidistant position between the government and the opposition. It has, for example, urged Zia to retire from the Army and criticized him for using Islam for his own political ends. [redacted]

[redacted]

US diplomatic reporting indicates that the JI is becoming increasingly frustrated with Prime Minister Junejo and the PML. The Jamaat and the PML openly disagree on the Shariat Bill, which seeks to replace Pakistan's civil law with Islamic law. According to US Embassy reporting, the JI strongly supports the Shariat Bill, while the PML is proposing an alternative that preserves some responsibilities for the

civil courts and Parliament. A JI official told the Embassy that party members will resign their parliamentary seats if an acceptable compromise cannot be worked out with the government. The Jamaat was also upset with the PML-dominated Sind provincial government's dismissal of the JI-dominated Karachi city government in February 1987 after an allegedly illegal JI demonstration in the city. In response, the JI opened a dialogue last spring with the MRD, including the PPP, on the possibility of joint action to press for an early national election. [redacted]

Despite these contacts with the opposition, we see little likelihood of the JI resigning from Parliament and joining the PPP in opposing the government. If it gave up its parliamentary seats, the JI would lose status and access to government development funds. A clean break between the JI and Zia—who both support the Shariat Bill—is also unlikely, although we expect disagreements between the JI and the PML to continue. [redacted]

Moreover, fundamental disagreements remain between the JI and the MRD, particularly the PPP. Mian Tufail Mohammad declared in April 1987 that a female could never become leader of a Muslim country. This sparked anti-JI demonstrations by the PPP, which interpreted his remark as a slur against PPP leader Benazir Bhutto. [redacted]

The *Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Pakistan (JUP)*, a moderate Sunni party, also tries to remain nonaligned in relation to both the PML and the MRD. Most party members boycotted the 1985 election, but they also refuse to join the MRD because of the harsh treatment JUP leaders received during Prime Minister Bhutto's rule, according to US diplomatic reporting. A party leader told US diplomats in September 1986 that the JUP sees itself as a potential go-between for the government and the opposition and stressed the need for negotiations to solve political disputes. The leader also said the party supports a new general election but not until political passions have cooled in Pakistan. [redacted]

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Shah Ahmed Noorani

Leader, Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Pakistan

Pious Muslim fundamentalist . . . commands considerable authority among 2 million Brelvi Sunni sect . . . proud of religious position but politically naive . . . distrusts US intentions in Pakistan and espouses anti-US sentiment . . . imprisoned several times under Bhutto and Zia governments . . . 61.

[redacted]

There has been speculation that the three moderate non-MRD parties—the JUP, NPP, and TI—will join forces to present a political alternative to the PML and PPP. US diplomatic reporting indicates that JUP party leader Maulana Noorani has close personal ties to NPP leader Ghulam Mustapha Jatoi. There were preliminary discussions between Noorani, Jatoi, and TI leader Asghar Khan in 1986 on the possibility of forming a non-MRD opposition coalition. [redacted]

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The *Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Fiqh-e-Jaffria (TNFJ)* is the major Shia party. Pakistan's Shia minority—about 10 to 15 percent of the total population—has been relatively slow to organize politically. We believe, however, that this politization has accelerated in response to the government's Sunni-oriented Islamization program, the Shariat Bill, and the influence of neighboring Iran. Party leader Arif ul-Husseini, a pro-Iranian Shia, declared the TNFJ's objectives at a large rally in Lahore in July 1987, demanding that the Shias' rights be safeguarded and that the Pakistani Government reduce its relations with the United States. He also expressed his interest in joining the MRD. [redacted]

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Appendix B**Major Political Party Profiles****Pakistan Muslim League (PML)**

Leaders: Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Jun-ejo, President
Iqbal Ahmad Khan, General Secretary

Founded: 1986 (from several existing parties)

Status: Ruling party; holds majorities in national and provincial assemblies

Ideology: Centrist party, pro-private enterprise, secular, friendly to the West

Jamaat-i-Islami (JI)

Leaders: Qazi Hussain Ahmed, Secretary General; Mian Tufail Mohammad, leader of Punjab wing

Founded: 1941

Status: Independent party; holds seats in national and provincial assemblies but often opposes government policy

Ideology: Sunni fundamentalist party, critical of United States, supportive of Afghan resistance, opposed to Pakistan People's Party

Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Pakistan (JUP)

Leader: Maulana Shah Ahmed Noorani

Founded: 1970 (splinter group of older religious party)

Status: Independent party; does not hold any seats in national and provincial assemblies and is not a member of the MRD opposition alliance

Ideology: Moderate Sunni religious party; represents Brelvi sect of Sunni Muslims; is often critical of both government and opposition but has ties to both camps; supports call for a new national election

Muhajir Quami Movement (MQM)

Leader: Altaf Hussain

Founded: 1984

Status: Independent party; does not hold any seats in national and provincial assemblies and is not a member of the MRD opposition alliance

Ideology: Ethnically based party; predominant in urban areas of Sind; promotes the cause of Muhajirs, Muslims of Indian origin

National People's Party (NPP)

Leader: Ghulam Mustapha Jatoi

Founded: 1986

Status: Independent opposition party; holds one seat in Parliament; not affiliated with MRD

Ideology: Moderate in political views; supports call for a new election, but is anti-Bhutto; party made up largely of ex-PPP members

Tehrik-i-Istiqlal (TI)

Leader: Asghar Khan

Founded: 1970

Status: Independent opposition party; no parliamentary representation; not affiliated with MRD

Ideology: Moderate in political views; resigned from MRD in 1986 to protest PPP's "domination" of opposition alliance; supports call for new election

National Democratic Party (NDP)

Leader: Sherbaz Mazeri, founder

Founded: 1975

Status: Independent opposition party; no parliamentary representation; not affiliated with MRD

Ideology: Small, left-of-center party, strong in Baluchistan; supports call for new election, but Mazeri has been critical of Bhutto

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Secret**Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Fiqh-e-Jaffria (TNFJ)**

Leader: Arif Hussain ul-Husseini
Founded: 1987
Status: Independent religious party; no parliamentary representation; may seek affiliation with MRD
Ideology: Main political party for Pakistan's Shia minority; seeks to preserve religious rights for Shias; pro-Iranian and anti-US

Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam (JUI)

Leaders: Fazlur Rahman, First Secretary; Abdullah Darkhasti, leader of rival JUI group
Founded: 1945
Status: Divided into two factions; Rahman faction is member of MRD, but splinter Darkhasti group opposes the MRD and holds a seat in the Senate
Ideology: Fundamentalist Sunni religious party; represents Deobandi school of Sunni Islam; Rahman faction often at odds with rest of MRD alliance

Pakistan Democratic Party (PDP)

Leader: Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan
Founded: 1969
Status: Member of MRD
Ideology: Small, left-of-center party based in Punjab; calls for new election; Nasrullah Khan often plays conciliator role in MRD

Pakistan People's Party (PPP)

Leaders: Benazir Bhutto, Nusrat Bhutto
Founded: 1967
Status: Member of MRD
Ideology: Large, left-of-center party; is organized nationally, but is strongest in Sind and Punjab; demands immediate ouster of Zia and holding of new election; is often accused of trying to dominate rest of MRD parties

Pakistan Muslim League—Qasim Faction (PML-Q)

Leaders: Malik Mohammad Qasim
Founded: Date unknown
Status: Member of MRD
Ideology: Small, left-of-center party; remnant of original Muslim League

Pushtun-Khawa National Awami Party (PK-NAP)

Leader: Mahmood Khan Achakzai
Founded: Date unknown
Status: Member of MRD
Ideology: Small, leftist party; popular mainly in ethnic Pushtun areas of Baluchistan; advocates creation of new province for Pushtuns in Baluchistan

Pakistan National Party (PNP)

Leader: Ghaus Bux Bizenjo
Founded: 1979
Status: Associate member of MRD
Ideology: Leftist party, has its strongest following in Baluchistan; calls for new election and unconditional autonomy for Pakistan's four provinces; opposes Islamabad's Afghanistan policy; full entry into MRD blocked by disagreements over provincial autonomy; faction of PNP joined ANP in 1986

Awami National Party (ANP)

Leader: Abdul Wali Khan
Founded: 1986
Status: Member of MRD
Ideology: Leftist party; formed from four smaller leftist parties; strongest in North-West Frontier Province; often opposes Benazir Bhutto for being too moderate; strongly opposes Islamabad's Afghanistan policy; calls for new election and more autonomy for provinces

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Mazdoor Kissan Party
(Workers-Farmers Party; MKP)
Leader: Fatehyab Ali Khan
Founded: Date unknown
Status: Member of MRD
Ideology: Small, leftist party based in North-West Frontier Province; large faction of party joined ANP in 1986

Quami Mahaz-i-Azadi (QMA)
Leader: Mairaj Mohammad Khan
Founded: Date unknown
Status: Member of MRD
Ideology: Small, leftist party; has base of support in Karachi labor unions; faction of party joined ANP in 1986

Sind-Baluch-Pushtun Front (SBPF)
Leaders: Mumtaz Bhutto, Ataullah Mengal
Founded: 1985
Status: Independent party; no parliamentary representation; not affiliated with MRD
Ideology: Advocates confederation for Pakistan and unconditional provincial autonomy; Bhutto and other party leaders were arrested in late 1986 on sedition charges

Communist Party of Pakistan (CPP)
Leader: Imam Ali Nazish, Secretary General; Jam Saqi
Founded: 1948
Status: Banned since 1954
Ideology: Pro-Soviet in orientation; has gone largely underground since 1954



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