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| Sov | viet Influ | uence            |
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| on  | Afghan     | <b>Education</b> |

25X1

A Research Paper

Secret

NESA 86-10020 April 1986

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| on | Afghan    | <b>Education</b> |

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A Research Paper

This paper was prepared by


Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. It
was coordinated with the Directorate of
Operations.

Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, South Asia Division, NESA

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|------------|---|--|---------------|
|            |   | Soviet Influence on Afghan Education   | 25 <b>X</b> 1 |
|            | Summary Information available as of 2 January 1986 was used in this report. | Soviet education programs in Afghanistan are designed to refashion Afghan society along Communist lines and eliminate the influence of Islamic tradition. Moscow is attempting in the short term to increase support for an unpopular regime and ideology. In the longer term it is seeking to create a cadre of pro-Soviet Afghans capable of assuming middle- and upper-level government posts. We believe that, because of cultural factors and poor security, the prospects that the Soviets will achieve these goals are slim.  | 25X1          |
|            |   | Communist doctrine permeates Afghan education. Soviet officials in the Afghan Ministry of Education remodeled the Afghan education system along Soviet lines in 1978 and continue to direct it. Ideological indoctrination also occurs in the military, KHAD (the Afghan intelligence organization), the ruling People's Democratic (Communist) Party, and government ministries.  | 25X1          |
|            |   | Fighting between the resistance and progovernment forces limits regime education programs to a few urban centers and a small number of rural Afghans. Even in areas controlled by the regime, the majority of Afghans are reluctant to participate:  • Most Afghans see little need for nonreligious education; more than 90 percent are illiterate. The Afghans' distrust of programs of the Communist regime is even greater than their distrust of previous governments' programs.  • Afghans fear that resistance forces will direct reprisals against regime schools, themselves, or their families.  | 25X1          |
|            |   | Moscow has sent more than 10,000 Afghans to the USSR and Eastern Europe for educational and training programs. These programs have developed the Afghans' expertise and Russian-language capabilities, but heavy doses of political training, poor treatment from Soviet instructors and the local population, and the Afghan regime's inability to give graduates suitable positions when they return alienate some students. The recent focus on Afghan youths of elementary school age, who are more vulnerable to indoctrination—especially when separated from their parents and traditions during years of training in the USSR—may have some success in developing regime supporters. | 25X1          |

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|  |               |
| The Soviets are probably achieving some success in meeting their short-  |               |
| term goal of establishing a limited educational infrastructure in Afghanistan. The ultimate objective of using an education system on the Soviet   | •             |
| model to shape Afghan society along Communist lines has little chance of success, in our opinion. Kabul's inability to control much of Afghanistan |               |
| outside the capital and traditional Afghan distrust of education will  |               |
| indefinitely frustrate the regime's educational and other social programs.   |               |

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
| Soviet Influence<br>on Afghan Education  |   |
|--|---|
| The Soviet Union has been actively trying to control the education of Afghans, either directly or through the regime and party programs, since the Communists took power in April 1978. During its first month in office, the Communist regime changed school curriculums—adding material translated from Soviet texts and some written by Soviet experts, replacing high school principals with members of the People's Democratic (Communist) Party, and creating a new secondary school in Kabul with Russian as the language of instruction. The Afghan education system remains | Communist Basis of Afghan Education  The regime's goal is that Communist ideology and principles should permeate Afghan education. The US Embassy in Kabul noted in 1984 a law on middle schools declaring that "inculcating a revolutionary spirit in the youth, strengthening their devotion to the principles of the party, and preparing them to defend the achievements of the April Revolution" were primary goals of the school system.                                    |
| under strong Soviet influence.  Kabul's lack of control in much of the country limits the impact of the Communist education system. The regime consistently exercises power in less than one-third of the country, and fewer than 100 government-controlled schools operate in a handful of cities and villages,  We estimate that less than 10 percent of the children of primary and secondary school age attend classes.  Most Afghans traditionally have not sent their children to any school, and even fewer now enroll them in  | Kabul seeks to emphasize Communism at all levels of education. A Western journalist reports that in 1984 the study of Communism was compulsory in all schools in Kabul. A source of the US Embassy in Kabul reported that study of Communism is initiated in the second grade. Political ideology classes that stress Communism range from three to six hours per week, and students at all levels are required to pass them to graduate.  Changes in the Formal Education System |
| regime-sponsored classes. Students in regime schools tend to be children of party members, government officials, or military personnel:  • Most Afghans are farmers or herdsmen who see little need for education. Less than 10 percent of all Afghans are literate,   | Curriculums The Soviets have revamped the Afghan education system by imposing curriculums almost identical to those used in the Soviet Union. Afghan officials, with the aid of Soviet advisers in the Ministry of Education, have developed 10 curriculums aimed at implementing a unified teaching program and upgrading  |
| <ul> <li>Afghans have traditionally distrusted government schools and distrust the current regime's programs even more than those of previous governments.</li> <li>Most Afghans fear reprisals from resistance elements if they enroll their children in government schools or cooperate in regime programs.</li> <li>Many parents disdain the Communist ideology that has replaced Islamic studies.</li> </ul>   | the level of political consciousness of the students and teachers,  Since 1978 new courses that strongly resemble or duplicate those in Soviet schools have been installed in Afghan elementary, middle, and high schools. In 1980  |

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| Soviet Education Strategy  |   |                          |
|--|---|--------------------------|
| We find that, to implement their goals in Afghanistan, the Soviets have adopted a strategy that stresses the importance of using local languages, blocking development of Afghan nationalism, and undercutting   | The regime has severely curtailed—and in many schools stopped offering—classes in foreign languages other than Russian.   | 25X<br>25X               |
| the traditionally strong role of Islam.  | 1984 English, French, and Turkish were dropped from the foreign languages department.   | 25X<br>25X               |
| Local Languages Versus Afghan Nationalism  | from the foreign languages acpartment.  | 23/                      |
| The Soviets, as they did in Muslim areas of the  | Minimizing Islam  | •                        |
| USSR in the 1920s and 1930s, are encouraging the use of local languages in education programs. The Soviets, in our view, expect that emphasizing ethnic identity through language will preserve the splits in Afghan society, setting back the development of Afghan nationalism that might ultimately challenge | The Soviets and the Afghan regime have also attempted to reduce the traditionally strong role of Islam in the schools. The regime has closed many schools operated by mullahs and reduced the number of hours of Islamic instruction in the secular schools. A paper presented at a pedagogical conference in |                          |
| Soviet hegemony in the country. Local languages—   | Kabul in 1983 argued that social science teachers in  |                          |
| including Uzbek, Turkmen, and Baluch—are lan-<br>guages of instruction from the first grade. They were<br>not taught before the Communist takeover. Students   | Afghanistan must deemphasize Islam and direct the youth to the study of Communism.  | 25X                      |
| learn one of two main languages—Dari is favored  | Soviet political training has replaced religious in-  |                          |
| over Pashtu—later on.  | struction in the secondary schools, according to a source of the US Embassy in Kabul. Instruction in  | 25 <b>X</b>              |
| Russian language training takes place at all levels of education. A US Embassy source in Kabul reported in 1982 that Russian language training starts in the   | Islamic theology, once taught four times a week at the Kabul Military High School, is limited to one hour per week and does not include study of the  | 25 <b>X</b> 1            |
| first grade in some experimental schools.  | Koran.  | 25 <b>X</b> <sup>2</sup> |
| all  | although religion is taught in  | 25X                      |
| Russian-language teachers are Soviets and that each  | some of the lower grades, Communist-trained offi-   | 25X1                     |
| student receives one hour of Russian instruction per day.  | cials are the instructors.  | 25X<br>25X               |
| the regime shortened the existing 12-year school   | dialectical materialism, the history of revolutionary   |                          |
| system to parallel the 10-year system then used in the   | movements, "scientific" sociology, and Russian lan-   |                          |
| USSR. In 1984 the US Embassy in Kabul reported that an Afghan Ministry of Education document   | guage. The regime added mandatory military courses for university students in 1982,   | o e v                    |
| prescribed that students from the seventh grade to   | including 11 hours of   | 25X<br>25X               |
| graduation were to study such subjects as "Socialism,  | classroom instruction in military topics each week.   | 237                      |
| The Dream of the World's Working Class," "The Struggle of the Two World Systems (Communism and   |   | 25X                      |
| Capitalism)," and "The Three Principal Forces of the   | Textbooks and Materials   |                          |
| Revolution."   | Textbooks have been substantially revised to include  | 25 <b>X</b>              |
|  | pro-Soviet and pro-Communist themes.  | 25X                      |
| Soviet and regime officials also have revised the curriculums of Kabul University. By 1980 required courses for university students included historical and  | in 1979 Soviet  | 25 <b>X</b> 1            |

| advisers began to distribute teaching materials translated directly from Soviet texts, replacing West German materials.  Soviet scholars have reinterpreted and rewritten Afghan history to bring it into line with Communist theory and have used these efforts to produce new Afghan textbooks.  | frequent searches of schools, libraries, dormitories, and private homes for materials espousing views contrary to Communism and destroyed all they found. These efforts have little effect on most Afghans. US Embassy officials report that during their visit to Kabul's main library in 1985 only employees were present.  Faculty and Staff | 25X1<br>25X1<br>25X1<br>25X1<br>25X1 |
|--|---|--------------------------------------|
| Soviet scholars drafted a new history of Afghanistan and translated it into several Afghan languages. The book stresses that Afghanistan's history is dominated by the struggle of the working classes against imperi-   | After the Communist takeover in April 1978, a large number of Soviet advisers took posts in the Afghan Ministry of Education and, following the Soviet invasion in 1979, were assigned to the Ministry's Curricu-   | 23/1                                 |
| alism and that the country's independence is owed largely to the "fraternal assistance" of the Soviet  | lum and Textbook Department, according to Afghan press accounts. Soviet personnel currently in the  | 25 <b>X</b> 1                        |
| Union.   | Afghan Ministry of Education approve all important policies and help design and implement new curricu-  | 25X1                                 |
| In the Kabul Military High School,   | lums.   | 25 <b>X</b> 1                        |
| lessons for the world history and  |   | 25 <b>X</b> 1                        |
| history of Afghanistan courses were prepared by  | We believe several hundred Soviet teachers, instruc-  |                                      |
| Soviet advisers in the school's political department.  | tors, and advisers play key roles in Afghan education.  | 0EV4                                 |
| The texts stress Afghanistan's cultural and historical ties to Soviet Central Asia. Little mention is made of  | Soviets teach   | 25 <b>X</b> 1                        |
| the country's traditional links to Iran, the Indian  | most of the Russian-language courses and head politi-<br>cal and social education departments in secondary  |                                      |
| subcontinent, or the Middle East.  | schools. Soviet advisers are particularly pervasive in  | 25 <b>X</b> 1                        |
| subcontinent, of the winding East.   | higher education, especially at Kabul University. By  | 20/1                                 |
| The USSR publishes numerous textbooks and other  | 1985 the regime had closed the US-built School of   |                                      |
| materials used in the Afghan educational system.   | Engineering. Since 1981 the regime has permitted  |                                      |
| Many originate in the Soviet Muslim areas adjoining  | engineering students to enroll only at Kabul Polytech-  |                                      |
| Afghanistan. Publishers in Tashkent, capital of the  | nical Institute, built and supplied by the Soviets. In  |                                      |
| Uzbek SSR, for example, prepare materials in Uzbek   | 1980 the Soviets established the State Institute of   |                                      |
| and other languages, and the Tajik SSR sends books   | Medicine in Kabul. The Institute works closely with   |                                      |
| to the Kabul medical faculty.  | the Tajik State Medical Institute in the USSR, which  | 25 <b>X</b> 1                        |
|  | provides lecturers, textbooks, materials, and refresher   |                                      |
| Afghan bookstores, which supply textbooks to schools   | and postgraduate training.  | 25X1                                 |
| and other organizations, also feature other books  |   |                                      |
| published in the USSR, according to the US Embassy   |   | 25X1                                 |
| in Kabul. Emphasis appears to be placed on children's  | Soviets and   | 25 <b>X</b> 1                        |
| stories, with colorful books such as "Tales About  | regime supporters have replaced up to 80 percent of   |                                      |
| Lenin" in great supply. Embassy officials noted they   | the university faculty members who were teaching in   | 25 <b>X</b> 1                        |
| had yet to find any children's books—other than  | 1979. Many of the former teachers have emigrated;   |                                      |
| textbooks—that had not come from Moscow.   | others have been jailed, executed, or demoted. A US   |                                      |
| The Soviets and Afghan party members monitor   | Embassy source reported in the early 1980s that   |                                      |
| libraries and cultural centers to ensure that only pro-  | Soviets were assigned as deans to all faculties and that  |                                      |
| Soviet material is available, according to US Embassy  | there was a Soviet rector of Kabul University, in   |                                      |
| sources.   | •   | 25 <b>X</b> 1                        |
| in 1983 Soviet and Afghan officials conducted  |   | 25X1                                 |
| The state of the s |   | 20/(1                                |

The Polytechnical Institue in Kabul, built with the technical assistance of the Soviet Union, is a major educational institution for training engineers in Afghanistan.



addition to the Afghans already occupying those posts. A US Embassy source in Kabul reported in 1983 that 30 Soviet advisers worked at the medical school. By 1983 four Cubans were added to the Spanish department, and five advisers from East Germany were assigned to the university, according to another Embassy source.

Afghan professors at Kabul University are controlled by the ruling party.

joint committee of students and faculty that initially made decisions about teacher promotions, scholarships, seminar topics, and research programs at the university was gradually reduced to two or three party members. Feuding between members of the Parcham and Khalq factions of the party produces tension and occasional fisticuffs among faculty and students,

Soviets also teach and advise at technical and professional schools. An Afghan-Soviet agreement, signed in mid-1985, specified that the USSR will send more than 90 experts to Afghanistan to organize training at 10 technical colleges to be built in the next five years.

To ensure that Afghans entering teaching careers are regime supporters, the regime has instituted ideological training programs and often sends trainees to places like Tashkent, according to the US Embassy and Afghan press accounts. In 1981 the regime established a teacher training institute in the Ministry of Education to replace Western teachers with Soviets and to better implement the new Soviet-inspired education program. Afghan teachers are also required to attend special political seminars. The regime presses teachers to join the party and participate in other social organizations affiliated with the party and the regime.

Soviet advisers and professors dominate Afghan education conferences. Of 66 papers presented at a conference of the State Institute of Medicine held in Kabul in 1985, for example, 48 had one or more Soviet authors, according to documents obtained by the US Embassy in Kabul. Five of 10 editors of the collection of conference papers were Soviets. All of the students presenting papers at a 1982 conference had both a Soviet and an Afghan faculty adviser—the Soviet adviser always had the higher rank.

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| Nonregime Training of Afghans  |   |
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| A few insurgent groups have established schools, mostly for religious training, in the areas they control in the countryside. Most Afghans distrust nonreligious education, viewing it as corrupting to the young and contrary to local tradition:  • The Jamiat-i-Islami operates about 20 schools in Balkh Province that teach reading and religion and indoctrinate children in antiregime and pro-Jamiat propaganda.  • Herat Province insurgent councils, under the leadership of Jamiat commander Ismail Khan, run schools in their areas. | Nevertheless, an apparatus exists for development of a satisfactory education system. There are 251 primary schools and 12 secondary schools in the camps and two schools in Peshawar for females. All refugee camps offer schools for the first through the sixth grades. A few non-Afghan organizations—including the UN High Commission for Refugees, the Interaid Committee (a Pakistani Christian organization), and the International Rescue Committee (private, US backed)—also have set up a small number of schools. Instruction in all these schools is controlled by the main Afghan resistance parties in Peshawar. Few Afghan youths attend Pakistani schools. |
| Ittihad Islami, the resistance coalition formed among the major insurgent groups in Peshawar in 1985, is attempting to counter Soviet inroads in Afghan education.  it operates the Afghan Education Committee, whose mission is to provide schools, teachers, and textbooks for rural areas in Afghanistan. Because of insufficient funds and the lack of qualified teachers, only about 20 percent of requests for new elementary schools could be filled by late summer 1985.   | The schools propagate the religious views of the resistance groups that control them. The teachers, who are poorly trained, emphasize Islamic theology. There is no unified curriculum and little or no administrative control.  Pakistani officials, have done little to encourage improvements in education for the refugees. Afghans who attend Pakistani schools are subject to a quota, must pay tuition, and must be able to speak Urdu or English. Pakistan has been reluctant to allow Afghans to attend Pakistani universities.  |
| The educational programs for Afghan refugees in Pakistan also suffer from serious deficiencies, attributable to Afghan attitudes and Pakistani neglect,  |   |
| New Education Programs  The regime has initiated new education programs in day-care centers, nurseries, and kindergartens, most of them built in Kabul since the Communist takeover,   | probably the most secure city, we estimate that fewer than 25 percent of eligible first graders are enrolled. The thousands of rural Afghans who have migrated to Kabul traditionally do not send their children to   |

me's education and indoctrination program. In Kabul, dered the Cer

according to journalistic accounts. Many are associat-

ed with work places, such as the Kabul Bus Institute,

where in 1984 the regime established a nursery for children below 3 years of age and a kindergarten for

Low enrollment has reduced the impact of the regi-

those 3 to 6.

than 25 percent of eligible first graders are enrolled. The thousands of rural Afghans who have migrated to Kabul traditionally do not send their children to school. Some parents who view education favorably are reluctant to enroll children because they fear insurgent reprisals; others resent the regime's indoctrination efforts.

The Afghan Government is attempting to increase elementary school enrollment. The regime has ordered the Central Statistical Administration to keep 25X1 25X1

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| political artitude:  Educational Programs Outside the School System Outside the formal education system, the Soviets attempt to indoctrinate Afghans through training of military and KHAD (the Afghan intelligence organization) personnel, adults in literacy programs, and a wide spectrum of party-led activities, including military training for government officials. Despite strong and persistent regime pressure, not many Afghans participate in these programs, and even fewer accept the Communist ideology, in our view.  Military  The regime views political indoctrination as an important part of military training. A Department of Political Affairs has been established in the Ministry of National Defense. A political officer attached to units down to company level conducts political training.  The regime views political indoctrination as an important part of military training. Imany troops are illiterate and do not understand or are not interested in political education, but every soldier must attend at least four hours of political indoctrination each week—more time than is spent in combat training.  Four Soviet instructors are present at all levels of Afghan military education.  Four Soviet instructors are present at all levels of Afghan military officers, were required to attend weekly classes given by Soviet political officers.  Front programs aimed at bringing youth into Communist organization perses and suddents.  Educational Afghans through training of officers with training of personnel attended three- to six-month courses in Tashkent in 1983.  25X1  The National Fatherland Front.  The National Fatherland Front The National Front, a regime-sponsored umbrella organization of Afghanistan, the Democratic Women's Organization of Afghanistan, training of the Front the Front to Provide classes and materials to enhance the political and ideological training of teac | accurate birth records and age data to identify those children who should be in school, according to press  | held in the USSR emphasized Communism, and a student could not pass courses without the "proper"  | 25 <b>X</b> 1 |
|--|---|---|---------------|
| Outside the formal education system, the Soviets attempt to indoctrinate Afghans through training of military and KHAD (the Afghan intilitience organization) personnel, adults in literacy programs, and a wide spectrum of party-led activities, including military training for government officials. Despite strong and persistent regime pressure, not many Afghans participate in these programs, and even fewer accept the Communist ideology, in our view.  Military  Military  The regime views political indoctrination as an important part of military training. A Department of Political Affairs has been established in the Ministry of National Defense. A political officer attached to units down to company level conducts political training.  Imany troops are illiterate and do not understand or are not interested in political education, but every soldier must attend at least four hours of political indoctrination each week—more time than is spent in combat training.  Ipolitical ideology courses account for six hours of the military school week, while only five hours are used for classroom military instruction.  Soviet instructors are present at all levels of Afghan military education.  Four Soviet Frigadier generals were sent to advise and assist their Afghan counterparts at that school.  Faculty members at the Kabul Military High School, whose graduates form the core of Afghan military officers, were required to attend weekly classes given by Soviet political officers.  KHAD  Ideological training is especially important for members of KHAD.  Soviet training:  Oscietal raining is especially important for members at the Kabul Military High School, whose graduates form the core of Afghan military officers, were required to attend weekly classes given by Soviet political officers.   |   | political attitude. KGB officials do the recruiting, looking first for individuals  | 25X1          |
| Autional Fatherland Front on the National Patherland Front on The National Fatherland Front on The National Fatherland Front on The National Patherland Front on The  | Educational Programs Outside the School System  | 3,600 KHAD personnel attended three- to six-month   | 0EV4          |
| trade unions, and associations for writers, artists, and other groups are part of the Front. The Soviets view these organizations of urban activities as important part of military training. A Department of Political Affairs has been established in the Ministry of National Defense. A political officer attached to units down to company level conducts political training.  many troops are illiterate and do not understand or are not interested in political education, but every soldier must attend at least four hours of political indoctrination each week—more time than is spent in combat training.  political ideology courses account for six hours of the military school week, while only five hours are used for classroom military instruction.  Soviet instructors are present at all levels of Afghan military education.  four Soviet Instructors are present at that school.  faculty members at the Kabul Military High School, whose graduates form the core of Afghan military officers, were required to attend weekly classes given by Soviet political officers.  trade unions, and associations for writers, artists, and other groups are part of the Front. The Soviets is important recruiting and training grounds for future party leaders.  25X1  President Babrak Karmal has called on the Front to provide classes and materials to enhance the political and ideological training of teachers and students, and to carry out activities among the party committees and social organizations in the schools, according to provide classes and associal organizations in the schools, according to provide after the Soviet Komsomol, carries out an aggressive program, seeking recruits for the Afghan Pioneer program, seeking recruits of the Afghan pioneer program, seeking recruits of the Soviet Comsomol, carries out an aggressive program, areaded in 1980 for children 10 to 15 years old and patterned after its So | attempt to indoctrinate Afghans through training of military and KHAD (the Afghan intelligence organization) personnel, adults in literacy programs, and a wide spectrum of party-led activities, including military training for government officials. Despite strong and persistent regime pressure, not many Afghans | The National Fatherland Front The National Fatherland Front, a regime-sponsored umbrella organization, promotes party goals and Communist themes in its educational programs. The Democratic Youth Organization of Afghanistan, the |               |
| recruiting and training grounds for future party leaders and military training. A Department of Political Affairs has been established in the Ministry of National Defense. A political officer attached to units down to company level conducts political training.    many troops are illiterate and do not understand or are not interested in political deucation, but every soldier must attend at least four hours of political indoctrination each week—more time than is spent in combat training.    political ideology courses account for six hours of the military school week, while only five hours are used for classroom military instruction.    Soviet instructors are present at all levels of Afghan military education.   | the Communist ideology, in our view.  | trade unions, and associations for writers, artists, and other groups are part of the Front. The Soviets view   | 25X1          |
| of National Defense. A political officer attached to units down to company level conducts political training.  many troops are illiterate and do not understand or are not interested in political education, but every soldier must attend at least four hours of political indoctrination each week—more time than is spent in combat training.  political ideology courses account for six hours of the military school week, while only five hours are used for classroom military instruction.  Soviet instructors are present at all levels of Afghan military education.  four Soviet brigadier generals were sent to advise and assist their Afghan counterparts at that school.  faculty members at the Kabul Military High School, whose graduates form the core of Afghan military officers, were required to attend weekly classes given by Soviet political forms.  KHAD  Ideological training is especially important for members of KHAD.  President Babrak Karmal has called on the Front to provide classes and materials to enhance the political and ideological training to enhance the political and ideological training of teachers and students, and to carry out activities among the party committees and soudents and ideological training in diedological training of teachers and students, and to carry out activities among the party committees and soudents and ideology classes and materials to enhance the political and ideological training of teachers and students, and to carry out activities among the party committees and soudents, and to carry out activities among the party committees and soudents, and to carry out activities among the party committees and soudents, and to carry out activities among the party committees and soudents, and to carry out activities among the party committees and soudents, and to carry out activities among the party committees and soudents, and to carry out activities among the party committees and soudents. The youth organizations in the schools, according to carry out activities among the party committees and social | tant part of military training. A Department of   | recruiting and training grounds for future party lead-  | 25 <b>X</b> 1 |
| political ideology courses account for six hours of the military school week, while only five hours are used for classroom military instruction.  Soviet instructors are present at all levels of Afghan military education.  four Soviet brigadier generals were sent to advise and assist their Afghan counterparts at that school.  faculty members at the Kabul Military High School, whose graduates form the core of Afghan military officers, were required to attend weekly classes given by Soviet political officers.  Front programs aimed at bringing youth into Communist organizations have not succeeded, in our view. The regime mounted a campaign in Afghan high schools to increase membership in the youth organization, threatening students who did not join with expulsion, jail, or conscription. The effort backfired because of strong resistance by parents and students.  EHAD  Ideological training is especially important for members of KHAD.  | of National Defense. A political officer attached to units down to company level conducts political training.  many troops are illiterate and do not understand or are not interested in political education, but every soldier   | provide classes and materials to enhance the political<br>and ideological training of teachers and students, and<br>to carry out activities among the party committees<br>and social organizations in the schools, according to     | 25X1          |
| Kabul and has had little success in breaking down traditional and religious barriers to a larger social and educational role for women.  Soviet instructors are present at all levels of Afghan military education.  four Soviet brigadier generals were sent to advise and assist their Afghan counterparts at that school.  Afghan counterparts at the Kabul Military High School, whose graduates form the core of Afghan military officers, were required to attend weekly classes given by Soviet political officers.  KHAD  Ideological training is especially important for members of KHAD.  Kabul and has had little success in breaking down traditional and religious barriers to a larger social and educational role for women.  25X1  Front programs aimed at bringing youth into Communist organizations have not succeeded, in our view.  the regime mounted a campaign in Afghan high schools to increase membership in the youth organization, threatening students who did not join with expulsion, jail, or conscription. The effort backfired because of strong resistance by parents and students.  25X1  KHAD  Ideological training is especially important for members of KHAD.  | training.  political ideology courses account for six hours of the military school week, while only five  | program, seeking recruits for the Afghan Pioneer program—created in 1980 for children 10 to 15 years old and patterned after its Soviet counterpart. The  |               |
| Soviet instructors are present at all levels of Afghan military education.    four Soviet brigadier generals were sent to advise and assist their Afghan counterparts at that school.  |   | Kabul and has had little success in breaking down   | 25 <b>X</b> 1 |
| Afghan counterparts at that school.  faculty members at the Kabul Military High School, whose graduates form the core of Afghan military officers, were required to attend weekly classes given by Soviet political officers.  KHAD Ideological training is especially important for members of KHAD.  in late 1984  25X1  the regime mounted a campaign in Afghan high schools to increase membership in the youth organization, threatening students who did not join with expulsion, jail, or conscription. The effort backfired because of strong resistance by parents and students.  25X1  25X1  25X1  25X1  | military education. four Soviet   | educational role for women.   | 25 <b>X</b> 1 |
| Afghan military officers, were required to attend weekly classes given by Soviet political officers.  tion, threatening students who did not join with expulsion, jail, or conscription. The effort backfired because of strong resistance by parents and students.  25X1  KHAD  Ideological training is especially important for members of KHAD.   | Afghan counterparts at that school.  faculty members at the Kabul Military  | in late 1984 the regime mounted a campaign in Afghan high   | 25 <b>X</b> 1 |
| KHAD Ideological training is especially important for members of KHAD.   | Afghan military officers, were required to attend   | tion, threatening students who did not join with expulsion, jail, or conscription. The effort backfired   |               |
|  | Ideological training is especially important for members of KHAD.   |   | 25X1          |

6

counterproductive.



This class is being taught by a member of the Democratic Youth Organization, a member organization of the regime-sponsored National Fatherland Front. The Front provides political and ideological training for women, youths, and professionals.

Shortly thereafter, Babrak Karmal appeared on Afghan television, blamed a misguided party official for the error, and permitted children who had been expelled or jailed to return to school.

#### The Literacy Program

A much touted six-year nationwide literacy campaign is being used to promote political indoctrination.

course content is

almost wholly political. One brochure used in a literacy class, published in Moscow, shows the teacher writing the first word of the lesson—Lenin. Regime claims of more than 1 million participants in the campaign probably are exaggerated.

#### Afghan Students in the USSR

In our judgment, the extensive Soviet programs to train and indoctrinate Afghans in the USSR have produced limited results and have sometimes proved

| ٠  | counterproductive.                                      | 20/(1         |  |  |
|--|---|---------------|--|--|
|  | estimate that annually some 10,000 Afghans, includ-     |               |  |  |
| ١  | ing about 2,000 military personnel, attend Soviet       |               |  |  |
| 1  | institutions for training and education. The Soviets    |               |  |  |
| 1  | also emphasize political training courses for party     |               |  |  |
| 1  | members, middle-level regime officials, teachers, ad-   |               |  |  |
|  | ministrators, and foreign trade officials,              |               |  |  |
| ١  | In 1984 the Kabul press reported                        | 25X1<br>25X1  |  |  |
| ļ  | that Afghans were attending 66 educational institu-     | 25 <b>X</b> I |  |  |
|  | tions in 24 locations in the USSR.                      | 25 <b>X</b> 1 |  |  |
| l  |   |               |  |  |
|  | the majority of facilities are in Tashkent,             | 25X1          |  |  |
|  | Moscow, Leningrad, and Kiev.                            | 25X1          |  |  |
|  | The Coviete and the African marines have recently       |               |  |  |
|  | The Soviets and the Afghan regime have recently         |               |  |  |
|  | emphasized sending 7- to 9-year-old Afghans for a       | 0514          |  |  |
| Г  | decade of instruction in the USSR.                      | 25X1          |  |  |
| L  | during the last four months of 1984,                    | 25 <b>X</b> 1 |  |  |
|  | more than 700 youths departed Kabul for Tashkent,       |               |  |  |
|  | and another 300 left for the                            | 25X1          |  |  |
|  | USSR in August 1985. Most of these students are         |               |  |  |
|  | children of party members or come from regime-          |               |  |  |
|  | controlled orphanages.                                  | 25X1          |  |  |
|  |   |               |  |  |
|  | Approximately two-thirds of those who left in late      | 25 <b>X</b> 1 |  |  |
| 1984 were from Kabol and Nangarhar Provinces. The      |   |               |  |  |
| regime, probably realizing the need for greater influ- |   |               |  |  |
|  | ence in the rural areas, approved a plan in early 1985  |               |  |  |
| •  | to send to the USSR some 600 youths from Afghan         |               |  |  |
| _  | tribes near the Pakistani border and Shia minority      |               |  |  |
|  | groups in central Afghanistan,                          | 25X1          |  |  |
|  |   | 25X1          |  |  |
|  |   |               |  |  |
| l  | Most Afghans seek higher and technical education in     |               |  |  |
|  | the USSR to escape military service, attend higher      | 25 <b>X</b> 1 |  |  |
|  | quality programs than those available in Afghanistan,   | 25 <b>X</b> 1 |  |  |
|  | particularly in medical and technical fields, and enjoy | 7             |  |  |
| • _  | a higher standard of living,                            | 25 <b>X</b> 1 |  |  |
|  | A smaller number go because they are party              | 25X1          |  |  |
|  | members and expect better jobs and salaries when        |               |  |  |
|  | they return. The regime has more than enough appli-     | 25X1          |  |  |
|  | cants for the approximately 3,000 scholarships avail-   |               |  |  |
|  | able as ab year for study in the HCCD. The much as of   |               |  |  |

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able each year for study in the USSR. The number of

Afghans complain that

scholarships has risen dramatically since 1979,

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Afghan children at Kabul Airport before their departure for the Soviet Union.



TASS ©

only students well connected to the regime elite are getting the eagerly sought scholarships to Eastern Europe. These countries probably grant several hundred such scholarships each year.

Afghan students returning from the USSR are placed throughout the bureaucracy. According to the Soviet press, the Afghan Irrigation Minister stated in late 1985 that 90 percent of his ministry's personnel had been trained in the USSR. Afghan military officers who receive technical training in the USSR are reported to be more qualified than their counterparts who have not.

Training in the USSR does not guarantee ideological commitment.

Afghans trained in the USSR maintain the same political views that they had beforehand.

1983 a group of 70 Afghan military students returning from the USSR had had a fight with their Soviet instructors. The Afghans criticized Soviet treatment of them and ridiculed the constant emphasis on

"Leninism" throughout their training.

Many Afghans resent their hostile treatment by the Soviets when they studied in the USSR.

cases of physical attacks on Afghan students, refusal of services, and condemnation by instructors, presumably a reaction to increasing Soviet casualties in Afghanistan.

as of mid-1985 Afghan students were required to live in separate dormitories and attend separate classes, and were not permitted to leave their compounds except in organized group excursions. The US Embassy in Kabul indicates that most Afghans, like most Third World students trained in the USSR, are antagonized by strong Soviet prejudices against non-Europeans.

Many returnees from the USSR choose to work in nongovernment fields unrelated to their Soviet training. A US Embassy officer in Kabul in summer 1984 reported meeting three young men who had studied in the Soviet Union—two sold Japanese stereos, and the third was unemployed. One asked the Embassy officer how to obtain a visa to the United States.

25**X**1

25X1 25X1

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in

#### Afghan Students in the USSR a

|      | Postsecondary and Technical | Military |  |
|------|-----------------------------|----------|--|
| 1972 | 750                         | 200      |  |
| 1978 | 700                         | NA       |  |
| 1979 | 4,000                       | NA       |  |
| 1980 | 4,850                       | 800      |  |
| 1981 | 6,225                       | 400      |  |
| 1982 | 7,535                       | 150      |  |
| 1983 | 8,800                       | 650      |  |
| 1984 | 8,300                       | 2,000    |  |

<sup>a</sup> The figure for postsecondary and technical students is an estimate of full-time students in the USSR at the end of each year.

The figure for military students is reported departures for training in the USSR.

Outlook and Implications

In our view, it will take many years for the Soviets to produce a significant change in Afghan attitudes through education and indoctrination. First, to rebuild and control the schools, the Soviets and the regime would have to establish control over more of the countryside and fully secure the major cities. Second, most Afghans have little interest in formal education, regard the Kabul regime as a puppet of foreign invaders, and distrust nonreligious education. Finally, many, if not most, Afghans who are being educated in the USSR will probably reject Soviet values either because of bad personal experiences at the hands of Soviet citizens or simply because Soviet values conflict with Afghan traditions.

The Soviets almost certainly realize they are making little progress toward their goal of building an ideologically motivated and effective cadre. We do not believe, however, that this will deter their efforts to indoctrinate Afghans through education programs, either directly or through the regime and party apparatus. In our view, they expect significant results from their efforts only after the generation that they are now training enters the middle and upper levels of

the Afghan Government. We believe the Soviet experience in Central Asia, Eastern Europe, and Mongolia gives the current leaders reason to hope that in the long term they can attract and train a core of opportunists and ideologues willing to do their bidding

opportunists and ideologues willing to do their bidding.

As long as security is poor in many parts of the country, Afghans will be reluctant to participate in

country, Afghans will be reluctant to participate in regime education activities. The programs will continue to focus on the cities and areas under regime control, but we expect the regime to increase its efforts to entice and bribe the tribes and local groups in rural areas to participate. In our view, any gains in rural areas will be temporary. Traditional Afghan values—including the predominance of local and tribal concerns, distrust of any central government, the Islamic faith, and deep-seated anti-Communist resentment—all undercut Soviet and regime goals.

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## **Appendix**

# Afghanistan's Education System Before and After the Revolution

|   | Afghanistan's education system has always been dis-     | Most students are women, though the number of        |               |
|---|---|--|---------------|
|   | mal by Western standards.                               | women enrolled probably is less than in 1978 because | 25X1          |
|   | the system met the needs of only a fraction of          | fewer schools exist and enrollments have dropped     | 25X1          |
| L | the people before the Communist takeover in 1978.       | sharply. Most eligible men have fled the country,    |               |
|   | Despite two decades of government expressions of        | joined the resistance, or been conscripted.          | 25X1          |
|   | concern over illiteracy, less than 20 percent of Afghan |  |               |
|   | youth had access to schools under pre-Communist         | The regime recently began to grant high school       |               |
|   | governments. Of those enrolled, more than 80 percent    | diplomas to males only after the graduates completed |               |
|   | attended substandard primary schools, which lacked      | two years of service in the Afghan armed forces,     |               |
|   | adequately trained teachers and such basic materials    | effectively limiting entrance to the universities.   | 25X1          |
|   | as pencils and paper,                                   | the few remaining males                              | 25X1          |
|   | Much of Afghanistan's population lived—and lives—       | attending the universities are members of KHAD or    |               |
|   | in rural areas that have been only marginally associat- | have connections with the party elite.               | 25X1          |
|   | ed with the government in Kabul. The relatively few     |  |               |
|   | village schools were operated by local mullahs who      |  | 25 <b>X</b> 1 |
|   | did little more than teach young boys recitations from  |  |               |
|   | the Koran and other religious lessons. Girls received   |  |               |
|   | almost no instruction. Secondary school enrollment      |  |               |
|   | accounted for barely 4 percent of the total enrollment. |  |               |
|   | Of those fortunate enough to graduate, few could gain   |  |               |
|   | admission to a university.                              |  | 25 <b>X</b> 1 |
|   |   |  |               |
|   | Afghanistan nevertheless had been improving its         |  |               |
|   | schools during the 1960s and 1970s.                     |  | 25X1          |
|   | the number of   |  | 25 <b>X</b> 1 |
|   | elementary and secondary schools doubled in the 10      |  |               |
|   | years before the April 1978 revolution, reaching a      |  |               |
|   | total of 2,700. The government was implementing a       |  |               |
|   | new curriculum developed with the help of Columbia      |  |               |
|   | University.   |  | 25 <b>X</b> 1 |
|   |   |  |               |
|   | Since the Soviet invasion, we believe the school        |  |               |
|   | system has ceased functioning everywhere but in a       |  |               |
|   | few major cities. the                                   |  | 25X1          |
|   | regime operated only 28 secondary and 50 primary        |  |               |
|   | schools in 1985. Kabul University—the only major        |  |               |
|   | university in the country—saw enrollment drop from      |  |               |
|   | 14,000 in 1978 to 6,000 in 1983,                        |  | 25X1          |
|   |   | _  | 25 <b>X</b> 1 |
|   |   |  |               |

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