




**Director of
Central
Intelligence**


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
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National Intelligence Daily

**Saturday
11 April 1987**



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CPAS NID 87-084JX

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USSR: [Redacted]

Gorbachev's Speech in Prague

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General Secretary Gorbachev elaborated on Soviet arms control positions in his major public speech in Prague yesterday but failed to offer the long-rumored unilateral withdrawal of one or two of the five Soviet divisions stationed in Czechoslovakia.

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Gorbachev reaffirmed Soviet interest in separate talks on shorter range INF missiles. He specified that such talks should cover only missiles with a range between 500 and 1,000 kilometers, be aimed at reducing and eventually eliminating these missiles, and be independent of the progress and outcome of current talks on longer range INF missiles. The General Secretary confirmed a willingness to impose a freeze on these shorter range missiles while talks proceeded.

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[Redacted]

In keeping with recent Soviet efforts to accelerate movement toward new conventional arms talks in Europe, Gorbachev called for a meeting of Foreign Ministers from all 35 CSCE participants to set a date for "large-scale talks" on reducing conventional forces and on tactical nuclear weapons. He again raised the Warsaw Pact's June 1986 Budapest Appeal as a basis for such negotiations and defended inclusion of tactical nuclear weapons on the agenda by citing the dual-purpose nature of the delivery systems involved.

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Comment: Gorbachev's specification that SRINF talks should cover only missiles in the 500- to 1,000-kilometer range clarifies a point left ambiguous in his 28 February statement and implies—as had argued the Soviets early in the INF talks—that constraints on shorter range systems should include only the 900-kilometer range SS-12. Moscow appears willing to sacrifice the SS-12 to eliminate Pershing IIs and GLCMs and to prevent ~~the US from~~ matching SS-12 numbers by fielding a 740-kilometer range Pershing Ib. The Soviets have fielded only 110 SS-12 launchers, of which 42 are in Eastern Europe and 24 in the European USSR.

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


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Moscow probably intends to exclude from SRINF talks the 400-kilometer range SS-23, which is replacing the Scud—a missile more widely fielded with Soviet Ground Forces than the SS-12. Gorbachev's statement echoes recent Soviet proposals that the much more numerous short-range ballistic missiles—with ranges of less than 500 kilometers—be discussed in broader, multilateral talks on the ground and air forces from the Atlantic to the Urals, whose mandate is under discussion in Vienna.



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Gorbachev evidently decided, perhaps at the urging of the military, that, despite the propaganda value of a unilateral troop withdrawal from Czechoslovakia, such a move would have little chance of influencing Western governments.




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
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USSR-CHINA:

Resumption of Political Talks



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The biannual Sino-Soviet deputy foreign minister talks aimed at resolving political disputes begin next week in Moscow in an atmosphere of improving ties, but lingering major problems probably will prevent any breakthrough at this round.



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


Since the generally unproductive ninth round last October, the two sides have resumed boundary negotiations after a nine-year hiatus and opened consulates. Moscow announced that on 16 April it will begin pulling out slightly more than a division of its troops from Mongolia and yesterday stated that the process has begun. In addition, late last year the Soviets stopped jamming Radio Beijing's Russian-language broadcasts and ended broadcasts to China from a clandestine radio station on Soviet territory.




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Both sides have portrayed the boundary negotiations positively, but the Chinese have publicly played down the significance of the Soviet withdrawal from Mongolia. Vice Foreign Minister Qian, who will head the Chinese delegation, was upbeat about this round of political talks at a press conference last week but said Beijing has no plans to send Foreign Minister Wu to Moscow this year.




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Comment: Soviet support for Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia is the main stumblingblock in improving Sino-Soviet ties. At the last round, Beijing welcomed Moscow's willingness to discuss this issue for the first time but was dissatisfied with the unyielding position of Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Rogachev.




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In an effort to detect any flexibility in Moscow's position, Qian may press Rogachev to elaborate on Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's hints during his trip to Southeast Asia last month that elements of the Communist resistance Khmer Rouge—although not its leadership—might be allowed to participate in settlement talks. Chinese media, however, have claimed Shevardnadze revealed no change in support for the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia, and Qian is likely to reiterate that only strong Soviet pressure on Hanoi to withdraw will lead to a settlement.




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Announcement of a date for the next session of boundary talks may be the only real achievement of the Qian-Rogachev discussions. Both sides agreed in principle in the opening talks in February to meet again; a resumption in the second half of 1987 seems likely.



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The Soviets will be assessing the impact on Beijing's policy toward Moscow of Hu Yaobang's ouster as party general secretary in January and the conservative drift of China's domestic policy since then.



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SURINAME:



Democratization Ploy Advances

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Leaders of Suriname's traditional political parties apparently have yielded to pressure from Head of Government Bouterse to proceed with his "democratization" program, even though a draft constitution guarantees the military a continued political role.

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~~The US Embassy reports that~~ the supreme policymaking council, the Topberaad, last week approved the draft constitution, after the appointed National Assembly incorporated only a few of many changes requested by the traditional parties. Bouterse reportedly announced that a legislative election will be held on 25 November, following a constitutional referendum in September.

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~~The Embassy says that~~ Surinamers will vote for a 51-member assembly, which will then elect a president and vice president. The constitution, however, reportedly calls for the establishment of a separate, military authority and stipulates that the military will not be subject to the civilian judiciary.

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~~The Embassy reports~~ Bouterse may seek the presidency, although he said his 25 February Movement will not participate in the election. In a recent press conference, Bouterse said he would seriously consider becoming the candidate of another party.

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Meanwhile, influential labor leader Derby and his labor federation have accepted Bouterse's invitation to participate in the government, ~~according to the Embassy.~~ Derby reportedly plans to form a labor party.

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Comment: Party leaders probably remain skeptical of Bouterse's democratization gambit but evidently fear that strong challenges to his efforts to retain power would lead him to act against them. They probably regard cooperation with Bouterse as their best chance of regaining a measure of political influence and hope to push the military strongman into a less dominant role.

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Barring a rebel victory or increased civilian opposition, Bouterse and the military are likely to continue dominating politics. The draft constitution probably guarantees that military personnel cannot be prosecuted for the murders of 15 regime opponents in 1982.

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An increased political role for labor might weaken the political power of the traditional parties and business groups. Derby's participation in the government probably will complicate economic policy making by making it more difficult for the government to adopt needed austerity measures.

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
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SOUTH AFRICA:


Black Labor Problems




Growing black labor unrest in South Africa has increased government concern about union militancy and could provoke a crackdown before the white election in May. 

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A month-old, illegal strike by at least 14,000 black employees of the government-run South African Transport Services, the country's largest employer, continues despite management threats to fire strikers. The strikers are demanding recognition of their union—an affiliate of the 660,000-member Congress of South African Trade Unions, the largest black labor federation. 


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Other black unions, including some outside the labor federation, are supporting the strikers. A wildcat strike this week by an independent black postal and telecommunications union has closed all post offices in Soweto and some in Johannesburg. According to ~~US Embassy and~~ press reports, the two strikes are the worst in the public sector in the Johannesburg area since 1980. 


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Government officials recently accused the labor unions of seeking to shift political conflict to the workplace. Foreign Minister Pik Botha warned in a campaign speech this week that "irresponsible" union behavior could lead to "the end of trade unionism." 

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Comment: Although black unrest and protest remain at low levels, Pretoria is worried about growing union militancy—particularly in such strategic sectors as transportation—and recently banned a labor rally to launch a national campaign for a "living wage." President Botha's recent decision to make the first-Friday-in-May an annual labor holiday was designed to defuse tensions but backfired because most unions resented not being consulted and insisted that 1 May be designated the official holiday. 

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Pretoria wants to prevent more significant labor problems before the 6 May election for whites. If the railway strike spreads or leads to more violence, such as the two recent bombings of rail lines, the government probably will crack down on unions by dismissing strikers and detaining more union leaders. An outright ban on unions is less likely because Pretoria has long showcased them as one of the most successful elements of its reform program. 

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


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BRAZIL: Contemplating Action Against President



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~~US Consul in Rio de Janeiro reports~~

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widespread talk of direct military intervention, and the press reports accusations that the former chief of the National Intelligence Service is involved in coup plotting. Aware of public animosity toward a possible coup, the military members of the President's cabinet have publicly endorsed continued civilian rule.

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Comment:



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


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Sarney could be removed by calling for an early presidential election or by the adoption of a parliamentary form of government that would weaken the President's power under the new constitution. Senior officers probably prefer either of these actions—which could risk benefiting the left—to a coup, which would be extremely unpopular and could be maintained only by force.


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EGYPT: Results of Assembly Election

Egypt's ruling National Democratic Party has emerged the clear winner in this week's election, according to press reports and the US Embassy in Cairo. Although a handful of runoff elections remain, the party has won about 75 percent of the 448 elected assembly seats. The makeshift Labor-Liberal-Muslim Brotherhood alliance won about 17 percent of the seats—taking the title of official opposition from the centrist New Wafd Party, which barely received the 8-percent national minimum vote needed to win elected seats. The leftist groups were shut out altogether.



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Comment: The results are a victory for President Mubarak, whose party retains the two-thirds majority necessary to reelect him in October. At the same time, the almost doubled opposition presence will enable him to claim a step toward more representative government.



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ISRAEL: Debate on International Conference

The sharpened debate between Prime Minister Shamir and Foreign Minister Peres over an international Middle East peace conference will not threaten the stability of the unity government. Labor Party leader Peres has continually stressed this week that an international forum should serve as a framework for direct negotiations between Israel and a joint Jordanian/non-PLO Palestinian delegation. In coming weeks, he plans to follow up on recent meetings with Soviet officials and Palestinians from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Likud leader Shamir has stiffened his resistance to an international conference because he believes it would create a powerful Soviet-led Arab bloc demanding Israeli concessions.



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Comment: Neither Shamir nor Peres is inclined to force a Cabinet decision on an international conference because moderate Arab interlocutors have not yet agreed to a framework for talks. The contrasting views of the two Israeli leaders were already well known. Both men are likely to retreat soon from the excessively harsh tone of recent days. Shamir has probably been emboldened by his recent reelection at the Herut party convention, and, with a view to the national election next year, is playing to his natural hardline party constituency.



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MADAGASCAR:



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After

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prolonged demonstrations and rioting in the capital and outlying cities last month, Ratsiraka called for the opposition to wait patiently for a presidential election slated for 1989.

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Comment: Ratsiraka's strategy of nonconfrontation and appeasement has failed to settle the student strike or to win over the mostly southern-based opposition. He probably hopes his restrained approach will avoid alienating other groups, but he may also fear that his military would not follow orders to suppress opponents. Opposition leaders appear to be gaining confidence that they can force significant political concessions from him and probably hope to test the loyalty of the security forces during his absence. They do not yet appear to have the power, however, to mobilize enough opposition to push Ratsiraka from office.

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
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DENMARK: Defense Agreement Rejected

Denmark's opposition Social Democratic Party has rejected the government's proposed five-year defense plan. According to the US Embassy in Copenhagen, the government's plan called for annual increases totaling 6 percent over five years, whereas the Social Democrats are still calling for a zero-growth budget indexed for inflation. Unless reversed, the Social Democrats' rejection of the plan ends 20 years of interparty accords on defense budgeting outside of parliament.



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Comment: A new accord probably will not be reached before the next election, likely to be held this fall. Without such an accord, the budget will have to be debated in the full parliament, where the Social Democrats and leftist parties have a majority. As a result, there probably will be zero growth in the next five-year plan, but administrative adjustments may allow for some additional funds. A zero-growth defense budget would result in the cancellation of plans to replace dwindling ammunition stocks and old air defense missiles and would continue the strain on Denmark's limited manpower.



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USSR-PHILIPPINES: Offer To Build Power Plant

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The Philippines will probably reject a Soviet offer to build a \$350 million, 300-megawatt coal-fired power plant in northern Luzon. A senior Philippine energy official says that the Department of Foreign Affairs has not authorized even preliminary discussions and that serious negotiations, which he implies will prove fruitless, cannot begin until late this year, according to the US Embassy.



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Comment: The offer is consistent with the Soviets' desire to raise their profile in the Philippines. Moscow probably thinks Manila will be tempted by the offer—which would be the largest Soviet venture in an ASEAN country—because it would reduce electrical shortages caused by last year's scrapping of the Bataan nuclear power plant. Senior Philippine officials have been wary of Soviet overtures, and concerns about technical standards, financing, and potential demands for concessions on fishing rights make an agreement on the plant unlikely.



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
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In Brief



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Western Europe



Italian President Cossiga asking Christian Democratic Interior Minister Oscar Luigi Scalfaro to form government . . . pro forma step before early election . . . Scalfaro will head caretaker minority government to oversee election.

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Americas



Colombian President Barco has authorized special civilian judges to try drug traffickers, terrorists nationwide . . . circumvents Supreme Court decision voiding military jurisdiction in drug cases . . . protection of judges crucial to effective prosecution.

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East Asia




South Korean security officials concerned dissidents, police may clash at rally Monday for new opposition party . . . government prohibition of meetings between party cofounder Kim Dae Jung and other oppositionists will hinder new party's efforts.

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
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Cuba: Trade With OECD Countries

Billion US \$



^a Estimated.

^b Projected.



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
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Special Analysis

CUBA:




Trade Showing No Sign of Improvement

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Inefficiency and worker apathy are damaging President Castro's efforts to revive the economy and diversify Cuba's exports. Hard currency shortages—which may reduce much-needed Western imports to 10 percent of total trade this year—will aggravate these problems.

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Inefficiencies in the industrial sector are contributing to Cuba's shaky financial situation, already a problem as a result of poor sugar and tobacco harvests and reduced prices for Cuban exports. ~~The US Interests Section reports that~~ a Belgian-built glass factory and a Swedish-built printing plant—both of which produce for export—are operating at 30 percent of capacity because of worker apathy, bad management, and a shortage of raw materials. Products of a ~~French-built~~ paper mill, originally intended for export to France and the UK for hard currency, are of such poor quality they could be marketed only as part of a barter deal with Algeria

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
Poor quality control and failure to guarantee delivery schedules have made it difficult to market traditional exports as well. Cuban citrus, for the most part, finds buyers only in CEMA countries because of the inferior quality of the fruit. Poor packaging ruined a shipment of pineapple juice to Saudi Arabia and a sugar shipment to Japan, according to the Interests Section.

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Such problems are leading Western trade partners to demand cash-in-advance or barter arrangements.

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Some Trade Continuing

Despite these problems, a few countries remain willing to trade with Cuba. Spain has granted concessional trade credits in order to retain a market share and political influence. Madrid almost certainly will be Havana's leading Western trade partner in 1987.

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Trade with the UK is declining, but British businesses have scheduled four trade shows for 1987, despite reports that Havana cannot repay the debts it already owes to 185 British firms. [redacted] trade with France fell sharply in 1986 and Italy will no longer ensure exports to Cuba. [redacted]

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Outlook

Cuba's economy will continue to deteriorate as Western imports become harder to acquire. Cuba is unlikely to receive new money or new trade credits, even if it eventually reaches rescheduling agreements with its commercial creditors. Havana for the most part will continue to have little success finding alternative credits and suppliers in South America. [redacted]

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Further deterioration in trade with the West will not only drive Havana closer to the USSR and other CEMA nations but also will probably make it impossible to implement any new program to revive and diversify the stagnating Cuban economy. [redacted]

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Special Analysis

ETHIOPIA:



Seeking Legitimacy

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Ethiopian Chairman Mengistu, who marked a decade in power in February, is proceeding with his plans to establish a people's republic next September in an effort to put a civilian face on his military regime. Mengistu appears to be firmly in control, and he and a few key military colleagues will dominate the new government. He probably hopes that the appearance of civilian control and popular institutions will please his Soviet allies and counter a growing perception in the Ethiopian military that his dictatorial rule has betrayed the goals of the revolution that toppled Haile Selassie. The next major step in the regime's drive for legitimacy will be the election of a national parliament—ostensibly the country's most powerful institution—in May.



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Since the overwhelming approval of the new Soviet-style constitution in a government-controlled referendum in February, Mengistu and his aides have turned their full attention to selecting candidates for the top posts in a new administration. In March, Addis Ababa announced a shuffle of high-level government and military personnel in part to prepare the way for a new regime. ~~Mengistu, who will become the new president, hopes to calm ethnic tensions by appointing representatives—all longtime members of his ruling clique—of the country's main ethnic groups to vice-presidential posts in the civilian government.~~



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Growing Role of the Party




Mengistu's eagerness to increase at least the nominal authority of civilians probably reflects his growing confidence in the 60,000-member Workers Party. Founded in 1984 with Soviet assistance, the party has steadily expanded its role in managing the regime's day-to-day affairs.



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The party is playing the leading part in the regime's controversial resettlement and villagization programs, which are designed to increase Addis Ababa's control over the countryside and to prepare the rural population for collectivized agriculture. Although Mengistu has announced that resettlement will not resume as expected this year, the party's participation in the expanding villagization effort and its role as a watchdog against disloyalty in the government and the military will probably ensure its growth as a lever of power.



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
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Signs of Discontent

The public has shown little enthusiasm for Mengistu's efforts to legitimize his rule, despite intense propaganda and the regime's painstaking attempts to create the image of popular involvement. Although some Ethiopians voiced reservations about the new constitution and the sweeping powers it grants to Mengistu, the vast majority appear to be resigned to his rule.



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
The military continues to back Mengistu and to remain the regime's key pillar of support, but there is increased private criticism of Mengistu's heavyhanded methods, his handling of the stalemated northern insurgencies, and the country's ties to the USSR. Large numbers of senior officers are listening to attacks on Mengistu's policies by the former Ethiopian Foreign Minister on the Voice of America.



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
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Outlook

Mengistu probably hopes that his elaborate efforts to establish a civilian regime and the appearance of representative institutions will increase popular support for his regime and counter the perception that his rule has become increasingly authoritarian. Although Mengistu and a few key military supporters will continue to dominate the regime, he probably believes that giving the party more of a role will raise his status in Soviet eyes.



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The regime's pervasive security network will probably be able to deter any active coup plotting, at least for the short term. But the main causes of the military's unhappiness—particularly, the protracted northern insurgencies—are likely to persist. Should the Voice of America broadcasts contribute to increased unrest, Mengistu will probably crack down on disloyal officers and other officials, and may even threaten to break relations with the USSR.



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Cases of AIDS Symptoms

	Reported Cases	
	Per Million People	Total
Austria	7.1	54
Belgium	20.9	207
Britain	12.1	686
Denmark	25.0	131
Finland	2.8	14
France	22.6	1,253
Greece	3.5	35
Italy	8.0	460
Netherlands	14.9	218
Norway	8.4	35
Portugal	4.5	46
Spain	6.1	242
Sweden	11.1	93
Switzerland	29.6	192
US	136.2	32,825
West Germany	14.4	875

Based on data as of 16 March from the World Health Organization and the Center for Disease Control. The numbers indicate those people who have symptoms of the disease, not carriers of the AIDS virus.

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Special Analysis

WESTERN EUROPE: Response to AIDS



Public concern about the AIDS problem in Western Europe is increasing. Most governments are developing prevention and treatment programs. Political controversy is likely to grow, however, over proposals for mandatory screening of specific groups, including foreigners.

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According to the World Health Organization, some 4,000 West Europeans are reported to be ill with AIDS. This number is expected to double every 9 to 11 months. In addition, a half million to 1 million people in Western Europe are carrying the AIDS virus; if 10 to 30 percent of them actually develop AIDS, as seems likely, there will be from 50,000 to 300,000 deaths from AIDS in Western Europe over the next five years.

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In West Germany and France, the number of cases of AIDS jumped 150 percent over the past year. France has the most cases in Western Europe—1,253. Switzerland and Denmark have the highest per capita rates.

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Reactions by Governments

France has launched a \$2 million prevention campaign and has increased funds for testing for the virus from \$4 million to \$5.7 million this year. Concern about AIDS has prompted Paris to repeal a 20-year-old law banning condom advertisements. The Minister of Health has proposed mandatory AIDS testing for all couples wishing to get married.

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The UK will spend \$122 million in a three-year program to seek a cure and to develop a vaccine against AIDS. It also began a \$30 million crash education program in November; the government sent pamphlets to 23 million households describing the AIDS virus and ways to avoid it, including the use of condoms.

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West Germany has committed \$22.2 million for information campaigns and the establishment of 10 centers for AIDS victims. Another \$82 million has been earmarked for clinical researchers. The State of Bavaria has adopted controversial mandatory testing for high-risk groups, including prostitutes, prison inmates, and some foreigners. The federal government favors strict penal sanctions for individuals who knowingly infect others, but it has sharply criticized Bavaria's mandatory testing decision, arguing that high-risk groups can be located best on a voluntary basis, without driving them underground.

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
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Political Fallout

Proposals for mandatory testing of high-incidence groups and for registration of known AIDS carriers have been criticized by some West Germans on human rights grounds. The controversy will undoubtedly spread to other countries. Governmental promotion of condoms in Italy, Ireland, and Austria has drawn criticism from the Catholic Church and conservative groups, which argue that such programs implicitly endorse contraception.



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Anti-AIDS programs may complicate West European relations with some countries outside of Europe. Belgium's mandatory testing of African students and withdrawal of scholarships from those who test positively have drawn charges of racism from Zairian officials.



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Soviet disinformation that AIDS was developed in the US has made little headway in Western Europe. Nonetheless, US citizens—particularly military personnel, but also tourists—might increasingly become the focus of European scrutiny because the US has the highest reported incidence of AIDS. A recent British poll shows that 82 percent of respondents believe that all visitors to Britain should be tested before entry. As public concern grows, AIDS is likely to become a major consideration in West European policies on tourism, foreign labor, and immigration, and possibly on other issues.



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