

# SECURITY/ESPIONAGE



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# The Need To Know

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**T**he primary purpose of intelligence is to avert war by flagging dangers to national security. The second role of intelligence is to help us make the wise judgments needed to retain our military, political and economic strength against the many threats to each of these. And some of these dangers will grow in the years ahead.

We are living in a world in which interdependence increases more quickly than we are able to assimilate its significance. That interdependence involves manufacture and trade, commodities and credit communications, vital resources and ideas. It also stimulates tensions between nations and instability within them. The technological developments that have revolutionized world banking and the transfer of credit result in consequences requiring prompt and accurate assessments. The United States depends increasingly, even for vital sources of military strength, on capabilities and resources that are diminishing within its borders and increasing elsewhere.

The difference of intelligence in the democracies and the Marxist-Leninist states is that the normal purpose of Western foreign intelligence is to buttress stability, make change as unturbulent as possible and protect the democratic order.

The KGB's role is almost the precise opposite except within its political domain. Its function is to generate and exploit turbulence. "The worse, the better" is an old Russian nihilist maxim that aptly describes the thrust of Leninist intelligence activities wherever stability exists. The Soviet intelligence apparatus is inherently the provocateur, the merchant of disorder, the magnifier of social, economic or political weakness or distress.

One of the requirements for the late Eighties is to confront the fact that there are those intellectuals who are blind to an adversary that prohibits ideas. Peacemakers exist who are uncritically ready to

serve a perpetual war-making machine. Journalists develop myopia when confronted with a system that prohibits the freedom of the press. Civil libertarians are slow to criticize a system that most completely obliterates civil freedoms.

It is said that Marxist-Leninism as an ideology no longer exerts the appeal it once did. Nevertheless, each of the previous paradoxes remains and is now expressed not by yesterday's adulation of the war-maker, the USSR, but by a constant and undiminished opposition to those who would keep the Kremlin's dangerous propensities in check. In short, *we*, not *they*, are the enemy.

## The Ambiguity about Hostility

Today's and tomorrow's societies differ in critical respects from the international military environment that essentially ended with World War II.

Among the 42 current conflicts involving 4 million people engaged in wars, rebellions or civil uprisings, few nations have declared war upon another. This ambiguity about hostility today places a particular premium upon effective intelligence.

The massive lethal power possessed by the great nations—and most particularly the United States and the USSR—has had a still inadequately understood effect upon warfare. Smaller nations are infinitely more free to take belligerent action than are the two muscle-bound giants.

This does not mean that the United States and the USSR adapt to this reality similarly. The belligerent propensities of smaller nations all too often involve the interests of the superpowers and, somewhat less often, the participation of a superpower by means short of war. How, where and why such indirect intervention occurs is a crucial difference. So, too, is the freedom or eagerness with which such indirect action occurs.

The Soviet Union has pressed to the hilt the use of proxy nations to perform its purposes, content to rely on the fear of wider war to keep the United States largely paralyzed.

Within this rubric, we have seen the growth of a new form of war—terrorism—supported, if not spawned, by nations virtually secure in the absence of risk to themselves. Such involvement is invariably supported by the Soviet Union and its client states, while joint action to punish those who unleash terror is shunned by U.S. allies.

There will be no more difficult task for intelligence in the years ahead than to penetrate the small, fanatical groups that perform the terrorist acts, groups utterly without moral restraint and that hold the innocent in complete contempt. But that intelligence task becomes a nearly impossible one unless there is a better understanding that terrorism is itself simply another form of warfare.

One of the most penetrating and accurate descriptions of the true nature of terrorism was contained in a statement from a con-

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ference on "State Terrorism and the International System," held by the International Security Council in Tel Aviv. Sixty prominent senior statesmen, active and retired military officers and national security specialists from 12 countries convened to consider the character and extent of state-sponsored terrorism. Among their conclusions, the following are particularly penetrating:

The problem indeed is not just loose, gang-like incursions. It is terrorism—state-sponsored, state-supported, state-condoned, and even state-directed. Tyrannical and totalitarian ideologies have now subscribed to a new gospel of violence as an instrument of political change. A "radical entente" presently spearheaded by five militant states (Syria, Libya, Iran, North Korea and Cuba) is making coordinated efforts—by themselves and with others—to undermine the power and influence of the United States and its allies. Here the well-documented role of the Soviet Union is to provide the professional infrastructure of terrorism including money, arms, explosives, recruitment and training, passports, infiltration and escape routes, transport, communications, safe havens, control officers and more. Taken together, these constitute an elaborate international network of support systems for terrorists.

This is not to suggest that the Soviets push the buttons and that their hand is always, directly or indirectly, in play. None of us subscribes to that kind of oversimplification. But where they do not initiate it, they encourage it. The destabilization and subversion have a pattern which serves Soviet interests, and this must be faced by leaders of the Free World even if, for the moment, it is not high on the official diplomatic agenda. Both lives and liberties are at stake. We must learn more about what we are dealing with—and do more about it.

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union has pursued twin objectives since the end of World War II: to separate the United States and Western Europe and to mount a relentless, sophisticated and surprisingly effective propaganda campaign to persuade the world that peace is the Soviets' true purpose and that the risk to that peace resides in Washington, not Moscow. And the Soviet Union has perfected the manipulation of proxy bodies essential to the propagation of that all too widely accepted fantasy.

A great danger to stability is surprise. It is the vital attribute of terrorism and aggression. Intelligence is our only available instrument to keep these disasters in check.

**Means and Ends**

Terrorism provides the clearest spotlight with which to illuminate the true purpose of intelligence. Critics of U.S. intelligence efforts virtually never extend their distaste to include intelligence designed to alert the nations to impending terror or to identify the terrorist perpetrators once they have struck. Yet in no respect is the function of intelligence, whether analytic or clandestine, different when applied to the frightful consequences of terrorism than it is when applied to other international hazards, some of which involve the threat to life and human safety that are infinitely greater.

Intelligence will be increasingly important with each passing month of these years ahead to protect not only freedom, security and stability but to enhance the safety and stability of all the nations that

seek to avert war and cultivate their own growth with minimal risks to their own tranquility. It is here that the rapid growth of interdependence is especially relevant. Following are listed a few of the major dangers in which intelligence is an indispensable tool.

A decision was made by a handful of men that led to an oil price reduction by more than a third in less than a month. The life and death of nations and their economies will rest on how low that price falls. Some nations will benefit. Others face unmanageable social and economic turbulence. The consequences to the United States are many and varied. A number of U.S. banks may be in jeopardy. Some industries and many localities face serious hardship. And even as others momentarily remain unaffected or even benefit, an economic fire storm may overtake all of us. Only wise, and sometimes swift, government policy provides the possibility of moderating these consequences. Policy formation will be at least partially blinded in the absence of effective intelligence.

A number of less-developed nations are now indebted to banks and government and international institutions by more than \$900 billion. It is less the debts than the consequences that flow from their payment or nonpayment of the interest on those debts that hold a world economy in thrall.

It is unfortunate that many of those now in debt are countries that only recently adopted democratic governmental forms. Political and social instability in those countries can swiftly snuff out that recent progress. The danger may be as close to the United States as its southern border.

The meeting of the five leading finance ministers of the industrial nations illustrates the urgency of cooperative international policy if these shoals are to be navigated. Intelligence is an indispensable mapmaker of the charts needed to navigate these shoals.

This is the age of high technology married to the information age of microchip, supercomputer and the new sophisticated robots.

Labor-intensive industries will continue to die or adjust, move their operations to countries that suddenly enjoy comparative advantage or merge with successful foreign competitors.

There are virtually no U.S. automobiles made entirely of U.S.-made parts. The five leading Japanese car makers are now operating on U.S. soil. Television brings to every home in the United States the \$3,990 blessing of the Yugo, and South Koreans will make their automotive presence vivid indeed with the \$4,995 Hyundai.

There are all the makings of international tension in these facts of disappearing U.S. manufacture and growing U.S. manufacturing unemployment. And the mix is one that threatens the growth of protectionism. And all this is the grist of governmental policy that depends on accurate and early intelligence.

Some of the best work on this process of structural change is being done by the analysts in the Central Intelligence Agency augmented by expertise derived from conferences, many of them unclassified, with businesses, universities, think tanks and others.

**The Age of Information**

Most observers who have studied the structural change referred to believe we are entering the greatest threshold of destabilizing change in the history of man—greater than the change set into motion with the birth of cultivated agriculture, greater than the

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industrial age that followed, greater than mass manufacture, greater than the birth of the service economy that now provides more than 70 percent of U.S. jobs. We have entered the age of information, and we will wander through it blindly unless effective intelligence is an instrument that helps shape prompt, effective and peaceful policy. Without it, there is the greater certainty of turbulent, divisive and dangerous economic conflicts.

The focus on intelligence requirements for the balance of this decade may leave the misleading impression, especially in areas involving the dramatic economic difficulties we are likely to face, that the intelligence community is, or should be, the sole source of the information and judgment required for wise and timely government policy.

It is clear that in specific fields and on a number of the potential difficulties lying ahead, the U.S. Department of the Treasury, State Department, Federal Reserve Bank and Department of Commerce have specific responsibilities, and they are assisted by sophisticated sources of information available to them. Contributions made by the intelligence community to those key government agencies are on the one hand supplementary and on the other indispensable.

Not only must each of these instruments of the federal government seek to improve their own sources of advanced knowledge and judgment, not only must the intelligence community make a



unique contribution to that input, but it may well be that the greatest contribution required in the interval ahead is one that addresses itself to more effective coordination of intelligence sources without which the policy responses may prove inadequate or late.

**Tough, Indispensable**

There are other very specific intelligence tasks that will be of increasing importance for the balance of this decade. Some of them are altogether new. Regrettably, almost none of them are easy. Yet they are indispensable.

Among the urgent tasks for intelligence will be to fathom the means by which the Soviet Union intends to derive the benefits of the information age while withholding from its managers the technology and the freedom to use it, which are essential to eminence in the revolutionary structural change taking place.

Linked to the challenges of the information age, a host of intelligence questions emerge from the convulsive demographic changes taking place in the Soviet Union. These changes are shifting the balance of population to the Muslim republics and away from Russia, where its government, industry and education are concentrated. By what means can these ethnic tensions in the European and Asian USSR be exacerbated?


Is it possible that the Soviet Union had chosen to buy and steal the high technology it requires because those means of acquiring the most advanced technology are easier and cheaper than inventing and producing their own high-tech breakthroughs? Their technical ability is surely not the total impediment.

The spreading high-technology capability in the Third World creates an increased difficulty in averting transfer of sensitive technology to the Soviet Union. And this, too, will complicate the task for intelligence.

This new environment suggests still another need that partially involves both intelligence and the continuous planning for industrial mobilization that is the Defense Department's responsibility. That question is, how do we manage our economy in an emergency when we are increasingly dependent on strategic materials, facilities and processes in other nations that may or may not be amenable or reliable when needed?

There is still another intelligence question regarding the periodic difficulties in securing participation by U.S. allies in one or another of the international difficulties we confront. Perhaps the most striking illustration of this question is why nations that have suffered the destruction of life and property by terrorists far more than the United States appear quite unwilling to associate themselves with the United States in any action to redress state-sponsored terrorism.

Do we really understand why this is so? Are we altogether clear why neutralism and unilateralism play as large a role as they do in



Europe? May not the distaste for the United States among many Europeans exist because they correctly perceive the Soviet danger and correctly judge that they cannot moderate that danger, while the United States, by opposing the Soviet Union, would involve its allies in a risky and costly hazard they are not prepared to assume?

Can we win the war of systems if we cannot win the war of ideas or are unwilling to pay for what it takes to do so? The Soviet Union spends far more to jam VOA, BBC, Deutsche Welle and Radio Français than the West spends in efforts to reach the Soviet Union. Are there means that have been neglected?

Among the pressing tasks facing intelligence for the balance of this decade is the redefinition and legitimization of covert action, unless of course we are prepared to accept the notion that covert action is legitimate if used by the Soviet Union, its client states and the states that sponsor terrorism, but unacceptable as a U.S. counterforce. We are no longer in Henry Stimson's world where "gentlemen do not read others' mail" or George Kennan's world where "if covert action cannot be kept secret, it must not exist."

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And closely linked to this, a fresh assessment must be made of the consequences of sharply limiting the presence of the KGB on U.S. soil. The Soviet Union's pervasive capabilities for telephonic eavesdropping enjoy immunity among us, and they operate from key urban locations. How can genuine symmetry be achieved in the privileges the Soviet Union enjoys in the United States and those they accord Americans in their midst? This is a major challenge that will continue to bedevil U.S. intelligence.

If the Soviet Union is long permitted to enjoy a field day in the United States, it should be noted that they have not had uninterrupted success in many of the world areas under their influence. We must better understand what is producing Soviet distress among its clients elsewhere in the world and particularly in Africa. That distress varies, but it has included Egypt, Somalia, Mozambique, Grenada, South Yemen and Tanzania. There are now several ongoing insurgencies fighting against Soviet-backed Marxist regimes; the wave of the future is not assuredly theirs.

Do we periodically subject our most certain conclusions and cherished conceptions about our adversary to remorseless reexamination? For example, are we too ready to assume that the Soviet Union's economic problems significantly diminish the continuing danger to security represented by Soviet power and will?

It is clear that the tasks ahead for intelligence are both different and greater than any intelligence community has previously confronted. There will be many problems in dealing with this painful reality. Almost all of them are affected significantly by the public's misconceptions, let alone repeated evidence of media hostility. There are bureaucratic and budgetary problems. There are problems that flow from the very nature of a democratic state and some that flow from the particular culture of the United States. The United States has a remarkable tendency to look at the mirror when it considers its adversaries, and mirror-imaging is the curse of accurate intelligence.

The United States must also ask: can U.S. intelligence be as good as it must be as long as U.S. knowledge of foreign languages and cultures remains as poor as it is and is handicapped further by the disinvolved centers of learning, research, science and technology, some of which shun "contaminating" contact with the world of intelligence?

In conclusion: a prophecy and a challenge. One is unavoidable,

and the other as yet unmet.

Less than 50 years ago, the United States, unlike England, had no need for economic intelligence. Whatever intelligence the United States had was focused on the capabilities and intentions rooted in dangers it perceived to be military.

During the remainder of the decade, the greater threats to stability will flow from economic, social, cultural and political hazards. Do not misunderstand. It is not that the military dangers have receded. They have changed their character but are painfully with us. But a new panoply of dangerous troubles creates urgent intelligence needs in the years immediately ahead.

### The Challenge

Now the challenge! The actors in this new international drama are not only governments, but include industries, labor unions, universities, banks and stock and commodity exchanges.

Intelligence has thus far been essentially limited to informing other government sectors. The United States imposes understandable limits—and they are sharp—to keep the world of foreign intelligence and U.S. domestic life apart. The United States also has its antitrust laws. It does not, as the Japanese do, have an instrument like MITI that performs some of the coordinating and judgmental functions for Japanese industry.

Yet, how does the United States meet the manifold challenges of the Information Age? How does it share essential intelligence with the private sectors of society, the sectors upon whom tomorrow's eminence depends?

And even were that intelligence to be shared, there remains the central problem that exists even in the most urgent governmental use of intelligence—how to make effective use of the information. By informing a man about to be hanged of the exact size, location and strength of the rope, you do not remove either the hangman or the certainty of his being hanged.

All that intelligence can do is seek to concentrate the mind sufficiently to reduce the chance of unanticipated crisis or, more hopefully—and less likely—avert it altogether. ☞

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