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TALKING POINTS FOR SUMMIT BRIEFINGS

-- THE PRESIDENT HAD TWO DAYS OF CANDID, COMPREHENSIVE DISCUSSIONS WITH GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV ON THE FULL RANGE OF EAST-WEST ISSUES. HE USED THIS OPPORTUNITY TO UNDERSCORE HIS INTEREST IN BUILDING THE BASIS FOR A MORE STABLE AND CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION.

-- AS THE U.S. HAD SOUGHT, THE TWO LEADERS HAD THE CHANCE FOR FULL AND LENGTHY EXCHANGES ON EACH ITEM OF OUR BASIC FOUR-PART AGENDA: ARMS CONTROL, REGIONAL ISSUES, BILATERAL QUESTIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS. THEIR MEETINGS INCLUDED SEVERAL LENGTHY ONE-ON-ONE EXCHANGES.

-- THE MEETINGS WERE CHARACTERIZED BY A GREAT DEAL OF SPONTANEITY AND SPIRITED GIVE-AND-TAKE. THE ATMOSPHERE WAS NON-CONFRONTATIONAL AND BUSINESSLIKE. GORBACHEV WAS CLEARLY IN CHARGE ON THE SOVIET SIDE, READILY DEFERRED TO AND ACTING WITH VISIBLE DECISIVENESS AND ENERGY. HE FREQUENTLY SPOKE WITHOUT A SCRIPT, AND SOMETIMES WITH ANIMATION. AT TIMES, HE TOOK PAINS TO TAKE A POSITIVE TONE WITH THE PRESIDENT, EVEN WHEN LAYING OUT FAMILIAR SOVIET DIFFERENCES WITH THE U.S.

-- THOSE GENERALLY PARTICIPATING ON THE SOVIET SIDE, IN ADDITION TO GORBACHEV AND SHEVARDNADZE, WERE DOBRYNIN, KORNIYENKO, YAKOVLEV, ZAMYATIN AND TARASENKO. THOSE ON THE US SIDE, IN ADDITION TO THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY SHULTZ, WERE MCFARLANE, REGAN, HARTMAN, RIDGWAY, NITZE, MATLOCK AND PALMER/PARRIS. THE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL SECRETARY MET IN PRIVATE FOR LENGTHY EXCHANGES, SOMETIMES RUNNING OVER AN HOUR, ON BOTH DAYS.

NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS CONTROL

-- THE PRESIDENT REAFFIRMED HIS COMMITMENT TO SECURING DEEP AND STABILIZING REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC AND INTERMEDIATE-RANGE OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS. IN REVIEWING OUR NOVEMBER *ST NST PROPOSAL, HE EMPHASIZED THAT THE U.S. IS SEEKING TO FIND WAYS IN WHICH PROGRESS TOWARDS A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT MIGHT BE FACILITATED.

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-- HE NOTED THAT IN START, THE NEW U.S. PROPOSAL BUILDS UPON THE FIFTY PERCENT REDUCTION CONCEPT CONTAINED IN THE EARLIER SOVIET COUNTERPROPOSAL AND INCORPORATES REDUCTIONS TO 4500 BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS AND LIMIT OF 500 ALCMS, WITH AN OVERALL SUM OF 6000 (A FIGURE THE SOVIETS HAD PROPOSED EARLIER).

-- THE PRESIDENT REITERATED OUR INSISTENCE THAT SUCH REDUCTIONS, HOWEVER, MUST BE APPLIED TO THE PROPER CATEGORIES OF SYSTEMS. WE CANNOT AGREE TO THE SOVIET PROPOSED DEFINITION OF "STRATEGIC DELIVERY SYSTEMS" OR ANY ATTEMPT TO INCLUDE WITHIN A COMMON LIMIT A CATEGORY OF DELIVERY SYSTEMS FOR THE U.S. SIDE WHILE EXCLUDING IT ON THE SOVIET SIDE.

-- HE NOTED THAT THE AGGREGATE RESULT OF THE REDUCTIONS AND LIMITS THE U.S. WAS PROPOSING FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS WOULD BE A MORE STABLE WORLD IN WHICH THE NUMBER OF THESE ARMS WOULD BE RADICALLY REDUCED TO COMPARABLE LEVELS ON BOTH SIDES. THE THREAT TO RETALIATORY CAPABILITIES OF EACH SIDE WOULD BE SIGNIFICANTLY DIMINISHED, AND THE PROSPECTS OF VERIFICATION WOULD BE ENHANCED.

-- IN THE AREA OF INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR ARMS, THE PRESIDENT NOTED THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO CAP U.S. LRINF MISSILE LAUNCHERS IN EUROPE AT THE LEVEL DEPLOYED AS OF DECEMBER 3rd, 1985, IN RETURN FOR SOVIET AGREEMENT TO REDUCE SOVIET LRINF MISSILE LAUNCHERS WITHIN RANGE OF NATO EUROPE TO THE SAME LAUNCHER NUMBER. FURTHER, WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS WITH THE SOVIETS THE EXACT MIX OF THESE SYSTEMS.

-- HE NOTED THAT OUR PROPOSAL WOULD INCLUDE REDUCTIONS IN THE NUMBER OF SOVIET SS-20 LAUNCHERS LOCATED IN ASIA AND OUTSIDE THE RANGE OF NATO EUROPE. THE END RESULT WOULD BE THAT BOTH SIDES WOULD BE LIMITED TO AN EQUAL GLOBAL LRINF MISSILE WARHEAD NUMBER.

-- AT THE SAME TIME, HE OUTLINED HIS GOAL OF MOVING DETERRENCE TOWARD A GREATER RELIANCE ON DEFENSE AND AWAY FROM THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR RETALIATION. HE STRESSED THAT THE U.S. DID NOT SEEK SUPERIORITY OVER THE SOVIET UNION. THE PURPOSE OF SDI RESEARCH WAS TO DETERMINE WHETHER STRATEGIC DEFENSES WERE POSSIBLE -- DEFENSES WHICH COULD BE AVAILABLE FOR THE PROTECTION OF ALL NATIONS.

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-- TO MEET SOVIET CONCERNS, THE PRESIDENT UNDERScoreD HIS READINESS TO SHARE WITH THE SOVIET UNION INFORMATION ON PROGRESS IN OUR LABORATORIES ("OPEN LABORATORIES"), INTER ALIA TO ASSURE THEM THAT WE WERE NOT SEEKING A FIRST-STRIKE CAPABILITY. WE WERE ALSO PREPARED TO SHARE POSSIBLE FUTURE RESULTS FROM SUCH RESEARCH.

-- AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, HE MADE CLEAR THAT THE U.S. WAS NOT PREPARED TO RESTRICT RESEARCH THAT WAS LEGAL UNDER THE ABM TREATY AND THAT COULD EVENTUALLY LEAD TO A MORE CIVILIZED FORM OF DETERRENCE, PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT OF THE SOVIET UNION'S OWN ACTIVE RESEARCH PROGRAM IN THE SAME AREA (WHICH GORBACHEV DECLINED TO DISCUSS). THE PRESIDENT REAFFIRMED U.S. INTEREST IN SEEKING A COOPERATIVE AND MANAGED APPROACH TO THE QUESTION OF FUTURE DEFENSES.

-- FOR HIS PART, GORBACHEV ASSERTED THAT THE SOVIET UNION SHARES OUR GOAL OF DEEP CUTS IN OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS, BUT DID NOT REALLY ADDRESS THE SPECIFICS OF OUR PROPOSALS, OR INDEED, OF INDIVIDUAL START AND INF PROBLEMS AT ISSUE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

-- RATHER, HE CHOSE TO MAKE MORE GENERALIZED COMMENTS. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD RESPOND TO OUR PROPOSAL IN A MANNER -- USING HIS WORDS -- SIMILAR TO THE WAY IN WHICH THE U.S. HAD HANDLED THE EARLIER SOVIET COUNTER-PROPOSAL, THAT IS, WELCOMING IT WHILE NOT DRAMATIZING THOSE ELEMENTS WITH WHICH THEY DIFFER.

-- HE DID NOT, HOWEVER, SPECIFY IN ANY WAY THOSE ELEMENTS IN THE NEW U.S. NST PROPOSAL FOR START AND INF THAT THE SOVIET UNION COULD ACCEPT OR WOULD REJECT. AT CERTAIN POINTS IN THE DISCUSSION, HE INDICATED THAT THE TWO PROPOSALS, U.S. AND SOVIET, NOW ON THE TABLE AT THE GENEVA NST COULD CONSTITUTE "THE BASIS FOR PROGRESS" TOWARDS DEEP OFFENSIVE REDUCTIONS, OR SPOKE IN QUITE GENERAL TERMS OF "SPLITTING THE DIFFERENCE" BETWEEN THE TWO PROPOSALS.

-- GORBACHEV USED SUCH COMMENTS, HOWEVER, PRIMARILY AS A STAGE FROM WHICH TO PRESS -- AT LENGTH AND AT TIMES WITH SOME ANIMATION -- THE FAMILIAR SOVIET CASE AGAINST SDI RESEARCH, THE CONTINUATION OF WHICH, HE ASSERTED, REPRESENTED A STEP BACK FROM THE TERMS OF THE JANUARY 8TH SHULTZ-GROMYKO AGREEMENT ON THE RESUMPTION OF NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS NEGOTIATIONS.

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-- HE TOOK A FIRM LINE LINKING PROGRESS TOWARDS OFFENSIVE REDUCTIONS TO AGREEMENT ON A BAN ON SPACE WEAPONS. HIS BASIC POSITION WAS TO PUT OFF ANY AGREEMENT ON OFFENSIVE REDUCTIONS, EVEN IF POSSIBLE IN THE NEAR FUTURE, WHILE CALLING FOR A BAN ON RESEARCH, ALREADY PERMITTED UNDER THE ABM TREATY AND SEVERAL YEARS AWAY FROM RESULTS. IN THIS CONTEXT, HE STATED HIS UNWILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER THE PRESIDENT'S OFFER OF "OPEN LABORATORIES" IF SDI RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT WERE INVOLVED.

-- DURING THE COURSE OF HIS CRITICISM OF SDI, GORBACHEV ASCRIBED A NUMBER OF MOTIVES TO THE U.S. INTEREST IN STRATEGIC DEFENSE [PRESSURE FROM "THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX," TEMPTATIONS TO OUTPACE SOVIET TECHNOLOGY OR TO SEEK SUPERIORITY] WHICH THE PRESIDENT STRONGLY REFUTED. IN WARNING OF THE SOVIET UNION'S READINESS TO COMPETE WITH SDI IF NECESSARY, GORBACHEV'S COMMENTS SEEMED TO INDICATE CONSIDERABLE PERSONAL CONCERN OVER THE WEST'S POTENTIAL TECHNOLOGICAL EDGE.

-- IT IS IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT GORBACHEV GAVE NO INDICATION AT ALL OF ANY NEW NUANCE IN HIS BASIC DEMAND FOR "A BAN ON SPACE WEAPONS," NOR DID HE FOLLOW UP ON HIS EARLIER TIME MAGAZINE STATEMENTS SUGGESTING THAT THE SOVIET UNION COULD ACCEPT AT LEAST SOME FORMS OF MORE BASIC SDI-RELATED RESEARCH.

-- THE PRESIDENT RESPONDED TO GORBACHEV'S CONCERNS BY STRESSING HIS OWN GOAL OF SEEKING TO MOVE DETERRENCE TOWARDS A GREATER RELIANCE ON DEFENSE AND AWAY FROM THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR RETALIATION WHILE REITERATING THAT SDI RESEARCH IS CLEARLY PERMITTED BY THE ABM TREATY.

-- IN THIS REGARD, THE PRESIDENT REAFFIRMED HIS READINESS NOT ONLY TO OPEN AMERICAN LABORATORIES, ON A RECIPROCAL BASIS, FOR VERIFICATION OF THE RESEARCH BEING CONDUCTED THERE BUT ALSO TO SHARE THE POSSIBLE FRUITS OF THAT RESEARCH WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

-- AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, THE PRESIDENT MADE CLEAR THAT THE U.S. WAS NOT PREPARED TO RESTRICT RESEARCH THAT WAS LEGAL UNDER THE ABM TREATY AND THAT COULD EVENTUALLY LEAD TO A MORE CIVILIZED, LESS THREATENING FORM OF DETERRENCE, PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT OF THE SOVIET UNION'S OWN ACTIVE RESEARCH PROGRAM IN THIS AREA. THE PRESIDENT ALSO REAFFIRMED U.S. INTEREST IN SEEKING A COOPERATIVE AND MANAGED APPROACH TO THE QUESTION OF FUTURE DEFENSES.

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SECRET**- 5 -****HUMAN RIGHTS**

-- THE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL SECRETARY DISCUSSED HUMAN RIGHTS IN A ONE HOUR TETE-A-TETE. HE TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO NOTE THAT RESPECT FOR THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE RULE OF LAW IS AS FUNDAMENTAL TO PEACE AND SECURITY AS IS ARMS CONTROL. HE ALSO PRESSED FOR SOVIET COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, INCLUDING THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT.

-- IN RAISING SPECIFIC INDIVIDUAL CASES, THE PRESIDENT INDICATED THAT PROGRESS ON HUMAN RIGHTS COULD HAVE A BENEFICIAL EFFECT ON OUR OVERALL RELATIONSHIP. HE NOTED THAT WE ARE INTERESTED IN THE PRACTICAL RESOLUTION OF THESE CASES, NOT IN TAKING PUBLIC CREDIT FOR IT.

REGIONAL ISSUES

-- THE PRESIDENT STRESSED THAT IN ADDITION TO SEEKING A SAFER AND MORE STABLE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT, THE U.S. AND SOVIET UNION NEED TO WORK TOGETHER TO END TRAGIC REGIONAL CONFLICTS.

-- IN THIS REGARD, THE PRESIDENT NOTED THAT AMONG THE CAUSES FOR LACK OF CONFIDENCE AND TRUST BETWEEN THE U.S. AND SOVIET UNION IS THE SOVIET UNION'S CONTINUING INTERVENTION, BOTH DIRECTLY AND THROUGH PROXIES, IN SUCH REGIONS OF THE WORLD AS AFGHANISTAN, CENTRAL AMERICA AND CAMBODIA.

-- THE TWO LEADERS DISCUSSED AT LENGTH THEIR DIFFERENCES WITH REGARD TO THE CAUSES OF REGIONAL TENSIONS. THE PRESIDENT URGED AN INTENSIFIED CONSULTATIVE PROCESS ON LOCAL CONFLICTS.

-- IN RESPONSE TO THE PRESIDENT'S COMMENTS, GORBACHEV CLAIMED THE SOVIET UNION HAS NO SELFISH INTEREST IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD AND NO INTENTION TO IMPOSE ITS VIEWS OR EXPORT REVOLUTION.

-- ADDRESSING AFGHANISTAN, GORBACHEV SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION SUPPORTS "THE SOLUTION EMERGING AROUND THE UN." IT IS PREPARED TO COOPERATE ON A PACKAGE INCLUDING INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES AND WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN TROOPS. THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT, HE STATED, "HAS PUBLISHED DOCUMENTS TO THIS EFFECT."

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-- THE PRESIDENT STRESSED THAT THE SOLUTION TO THE AFGHAN PROBLEM IS A MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL OUTSIDE FORCES. A GOVERNMENT ACCEPTABLE TO THE AFGHAN PEOPLE SHOULD THEN BE INSTALLED.

-- THEY AGREED TO REGULARIZE PERIODIC DISCUSSIONS BY U.S. AND SOVIET REGIONAL EXPERTS AND THAT REGIONAL ISSUES SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE DISCUSSED IN DEPTH AT THE FOREIGN MINISTER LEVEL.

BILATERAL RELATIONS

-- THE TWO LEADERS AGREED TO THE SIGNING OF A CULTURAL AGREEMENT AND ON THE IMPORTANCE OF MOVING AHEAD ON AN EXCHANGES INITIATIVE TO FACILITATE GREATER CONTACT BETWEEN OUR TWO PEOPLES.

-- THEY ALSO AGREED TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY OF CONDUCTING RESEARCH ON A MULTILATERAL BASIS INTO ENERGY BASED ON FUSION.

-- WHILE THEY DID NOT FIGURE EXTENSIVELY IN THE TALKS, THEY ALSO REVIEWED PROGRESS IN A NUMBER OF OTHER AREAS, INCLUDING CIVIL AVIATION, NORTHERN PACIFIC AIR SAFETY, AND OPENING CONSULATES IN NEW YORK AND KIEV.

-- WE CONSIDER THESE MODEST STEP FORWARD, BUT NECESSARY AND USEFUL ONES WHICH HELP TO LAY THE FOUNDATION FOR A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE AND COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIP.

CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE STEPS

-- THE TWO DAYS OF DISCUSSIONS ALLOWED BOTH LEADERS TO EXPLAIN THEIR DIFFERENCES, AND THERE WERE OBVIOUS ONES RANGING FROM POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

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-- AT THE SAME TIME, AS THE PRESIDENT SAID AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE MEETINGS, THESE TALKS PROVIDED AN OPPORTUNITY TO EXPLORE COMMON CONCERNS AS WELL IN ALL FOUR AREAS OF THE RELATIONSHIP. WHERE THERE ARE DIFFERENCES, THEY ARE BETTER UNDERSTOOD; WHERE SHARED CONCERNS EXIST, THERE IS NOW A MORE SOLID FOUNDATION FOR DEALING WITH THEM.

-- AS A RESULT OF THESE TALKS, BOTH LEADERS AGREED TO CONTINUE THIS PROCESS, WITH A VISIT BY GORBACHEV TO THE UNITED STATES IN '986 AND A VISIT BY THE PRESIDENT TO THE SOVIET UNION IN '987.

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