

~~TOP SECRET~~

26 November 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT: Meeting with Deputy Secretary of State
28 November, 1215 hours, DCI Dining Room

We have been told that "if there is time left after discussing Iran," State would like to discuss Items A through D.

TAB A How Did Kim Il Sung "Die"? State would like to hear our post-mortem this episode. [redacted] on this topic are at TAB A. 25X1

TAB B Is Cory Aquino Going to Make It? They would like our assessment of recent developments and our prognosis, including whether or not the threat of a coup has passed. The DI prepared the paper at TAB B.

NO TAB Central America: The Impact of the Iran Revelations. Clair George has been in on the meetings and is prepared to speak to this. Because this story has been evolving all week, we have not prepared a paper for you on this. 25X1

[redacted]

TAB C Suriname. State has asked for a status report.

TAB D Yemen. State has asked for a status report.

[redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~

*Copy - Mozambique
Ames - follow up
Ames - cut's
Ames*

Page Denied

Next 27 Page(s) In Document Denied

~~SECRET~~

28 NOV 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director for Operations

FROM:
Acting Chief, Latin America Division

SUBJECT: Summary Talking Points on Suriname

25X1

1. Current Military Situation. After a lull in October, Brunswijk is tightening his grip in the east.

- The insurgents have taken control of key economic facilities and transportation arteries, ending domestic cooking oil production, closing a key aluminum mine and insulating pockets of government troops.
- To shore up his position Bouterse is acquiring two helicopters and apparently has received Libyan-funded small arms from Nicaragua shipped via Cuba.

2. Political Situation. Internal political forces have been intimidated back to quiescence by recent murders of ethnic minorities.

- Brunswijk and exiles continue to contact internal political parties to ensure a smooth transition following Bouterse's ouster.

3. U.S. Policy. The State Department is taking the lead in reassessing our policy.

- The major allies are divided: Brazil favors sticking with Bouterse; the Venezuelans are passive; the Dutch believe he must go; and the French are mainly interested in securing French Guiana's borders with Suriname.
- We understand Under Secretary Armacost favors lining up the players before addressing the situation in Suriname; State Department's Latin American Bureau is looking for ways to engineer a "Marcos" solution.

NOV 28 1986
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
 SOUTH AND CENTRAL AMERICAN AFFAIRS

~~SECRET~~

25X1

Page Denied

Next 11 Page(s) In Document Denied