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4 September 1986



MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Associate Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT: Meeting with Mort Abramowitz and Mike Armacost, 5 September,
12:30 in the DCI Dining Room

TAB A Arms Control. At Tab A, you will find [redacted] memo to the DCI yesterday outlining the status of—and his concerns about—various arms control issues. 25X1

TAB B The Daniloff Case. You may wish to discuss this case with State. At Tab B, you will find a memo from [redacted] who attended a meeting at the White House on the issue Wednesday, as well as a NODIS cable. 25X1

NO TAB Afghanistan. You may wish to pass on a few new developments on the air defense issue: 25X1



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
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
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TAB D Angola: Possible New Government Offensive. You will recall that Fred Wettering raised this issue at Wednesday's NIO meeting. He believes that there are several signs pointing to a new government offensive against UNITA territory:



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
Fred argues that the MPLA will likely move on UNITA within the next week or so. At Tab D, you will find talking points.



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TAB F Abu Nidal. You may wish to share the information and judgments coming out of the debriefing of an Abu Nidal defector. At Tab F, you will find talking points from CTC on Abu Nidal's East European connection.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 15206

NODIS

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, UR, US
SUBJECT: UPDATE ON DANILOFF CASE

REF: STATE 275834

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION MAY BE RELEVANT TO DELIBERATIONS REFTEL.

3. ON SEPTEMBER 2 CONSUL GENERAL ACCOMPANIED MORTIMER ZUCKERMAN, EDITOR IN CHIEF OF U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT IN HIS MEETING WITH NICK DANILOFF. THE SOVIET INVESTIGATOR WAS PRESENT THROUGHOUT THE MEETING TAKING COPIOUS NOTES. THE DISCUSSION BETWEEN ZUCKERMAN AND DANILOFF CONCERNED THE DETAILS OF DANILOFF'S ARREST IN GREAT DETAIL. IN THIS CONNECTION ZUCKERMAN QUESTIONED DANILOFF EXTENSIVELY ON THE HISTORY OF HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH "MISHA," THE FRIEND FROM FRUNZE WHO HANDED DANILOFF THE PACKAGE OF "CLIPPINGS." DANILOFF DID NOT KNOW MISHA'S LAST NAME. DANILOFF SAID THAT HE HAD MET MISHA FOUR YEARS AGO AND HAD ASKED HIM TO PROVIDE NEWSPAPER CLIPPINGS FROM CENTRAL ASIA

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TO ASSIST IN HIS COVERAGE OF THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN. SUBSEQUENTLY MISHA DID PROVIDE SUCH MATERIALS FROM TIME TO TIME, INCLUDING ON OCCASION SOME PICTURES OF SOVIET TROOPS IN AFGHANISTAN. DANILOFF INDICATED THAT HE HAD ALREADY PROVIDED THIS INFORMATION TO THE SOVIET INVESTIGATOR, UNDER QUESTIONING.

4. TOWARD THE END OF THE SESSION, ZUCKERMAN EXPLAINED TO THE INVESTIGATOR THAT THE AMERICAN PRESS HABITUALLY REACHES BEYOND "OFFICIAL" SOURCES FOR INFORMATION, AT TIMES MANAGING TO OBTAIN VERY SENSITIVE INFORMATION ABOUT U.S. GOVERNMENT POLICY. THE INVESTIGATOR RESPONDED THAT THE ISSUE HERE WAS HOW CORRESPONDENTS OBTAINED INFORMATION THEY WERE NOT AUTHORIZED TO POSSESS IN THE SOVIET UNION.

5. THE INVESTIGATOR APPEARS TO BE PURSUING A LINE OF INQUIRY THAT WILL PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR CHARGING DANILOFF WITH IMPROPER CONDUCT UNDER SOVIET PROCEDURES. THE DEFINITION OF ESPIONAGE IN ARTICLE 65 OF THE RSFSR CRIMINAL CODE INCLUDES THE "TRANSMISSION OR COLLECTION AT THE REQUEST OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE OF OTHER MATERIALS TO BE USED TO DAMAGE THE INTERESTS OF THE USSR IF THE ESPIONAGE IS CARRIED OUT BY FOREIGN CITIZENS OR STATELESS PERSONS." IN THIS CONTEXT "OTHER MATERIALS" WOULD SEEM TO INCLUDE NON-SECRET MATERIAL. UNDER THIS DEFINITION THE FACT THAT "MISHA" PROVIDED DANILOFF SENSITIVE MATERIALS -- CLASSIFIED OR UNCLASSIFIED -- EVIDENTLY COULD BE USED TO BOLSTER A CASE OF ESPIONAGE.

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6. WITH REGARD TO REPORTS FROM MRS. DANILOFF THAT HER HUSBAND WILL BE HELD TEN DAYS, AND THEN CHARGED OR RELEASED, THIS IS NORMAL PRACTICE IN ACCORDANCE



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WITH ARTICLE 121 OF THE RSFSR CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FOR THE FIRST STAGE OF INVESTIGATION. THIS STAGE -- DURING WHICH PERSONS UNDER SUSPICION ARE DETAINED AND INTERROGATED, WITNESSES ARE QUESTIONED, AND EVIDENCE IS COLLECTED -- IS RESTRICTED TO TEN DAYS. IN "EXCEPTIONAL CASES" THE LENGTH OF THIS STAGE MAY BE EXTENDED BY THE PROCURATOR. AFTER THIS STAGE, THE CASE IS TRANSFERRED TO ANOTHER AUTHORITY FOR "PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION," WHICH CAN LAST UP TO FOUR MONTHS, AND EVEN LONGER IN "COMPLICATED" CASES. WE BELIEVE THAT IN QUOTING THE TEN DAY PERIOD TO DANILOFF (AS U. S. PRESS HAS REPORTED), THE INVESTIGATOR WAS SIMPLY RESPONDING TO MRS. DANILOFF'S QUESTIONS ABOUT HER HUSBAND'S STATUS BY EXTRAPOLATING FROM NORMAL SOVIET LEGAL PROCEDURE. COMBS

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