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DDCI

Meeting with Deputy Secretary of State

20 June 1986

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19 June 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Luncheon Meeting with Deputy Secretary of State Whitehead,  
Michael Armacost, Mort Abramowitz, Clair George and  
Dick Kerr, Friday, 20 June, 1200, at State Department

NO TAB SSCI Testimony on Regional Security Policy. Armacost has indicated a  
desire to discuss the testimony on regional security policy, he and the  
DDCI will be presenting next Tuesday before the SSCI.

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TAB C DDCI Appearance Before Secretary Shultz's Advisory Committee on South Africa. The DDCI intends to raise with Armacost this invitation to appear at the 10 July meeting of this group before responding to the invitation. At Tab C is a rundown on the membership of the Committee.

TAB D Moscow and an Angolan Offensive. We still are getting conflicting evidence on whether there will be large-scale offensive operations against UNITA this year. A variety of reports suggest that Luanda is concerned that falling oil prices would hinder its abilities to sustain operations and that its forces should concentrate on defending high-value economic targets in the north instead of going after UNITA's stonghold in the south.

[redacted] suggests that the Soviets also are arguing against a major offensive. Our analysts in SOVA don't buy this and believe that such reporting may well be Soviet disinformation. They point out that:

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- Angola holds out a particularly tempting near-term opportunity for the Soviets to back up commitments made in recent months to defend their Third World allies.
- The Soviets may calculate that Pretoria presently preoccupied with internal problems will be less willing and able to bring force to bear in Angola in support of UNITA this time around.

But the thing that weighs most heavy with our analysts is the fact that the Soviets, since last fall's government offensive, have been pumping record amounts of military equipment into Angola.

- Over the last couple of months at least a dozen and perhaps as many as 20 MIG-23 fighters have been delivered.
- Nineteen arms carrier ships have visited Angola since last November bringing at least 8 MI-25 attack helicopters, 20 MI-17 transport helicopters, more than 300 trucks, jeeps, vans and armored cars, radar and communications equipment and hundreds of tons of aircraft spare parts.

While some of this equipment makes up for losses in last year's campaign, the Soviets clearly have been augmenting Angolan offensive capabilities. At Tab D is a fuller SOVA argument.

DCI/DDCI Executive Staff

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19 June 1986

Recent Soviet Proposals on ABM, ASAT, and Space Weapons

At the 29 May session of the Nuclear and Space Talks (NST) the Soviets proposed that the United States and USSR strengthen the 1972 ABM Treaty by agreeing not to withdraw from the treaty for a period of 15 to 20 years. The proposal "assumes" that agreement on non-withdrawal would imply compliance with all obligations contained in the treaty including the ban on "large-scale" ABM systems and the prohibition on the development, testing and deployment of space-based systems and components. [REDACTED]

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The Soviet proposal calls for agreement on the following definitions "to avoid difficulties in understanding the treaty provisions:"

- The obligation not to develop space-based ABM systems or components "would" mean banning the construction and testing of mock-ups and test models of ABM systems or components in or outside of laboratories.
- A component "would" be understood to mean any space-based device capable of being part of an ABM system and capable of being used for tracking strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, guiding kill systems toward them, or actually destroying them.
- A mock-up "could" mean a simplified version of the weapon being developed that is used to check out the operational characteristics of the weapon design.
- A test model or prototype "could" mean a device that reproduces the actual weapon being developed and that is used to verify the operational and design specifications of the weapon. [REDACTED]

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The proposal calls for each side to use national technical means to monitor whether mock-ups or test models (prototypes) of space-based ABMs have appeared outside the laboratory for testing and to open relevant laboratories to allow the other side to verify that no work on the development of mock-ups or test models (prototypes) of such systems or components is being conducted inside. [REDACTED]

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The Soviets emphasized that none of the proposed definitions were final and that they should be considered as "guidelines for discussion," and they

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admitted that there were ambiguities in them. In particular, the use of the term "could" in the definitions for mock-up and test model may indicate that the Soviets are relatively less certain about the definitions they have assigned them. Their definition for "component," on the other hand, seems more clearly to reflect Soviet concerns and negotiating objectives. The Soviets acknowledged that the ABM Treaty definition for component applies only to systems existing at the time the treaty was drafted and not to those based on other physical principles. They said they had concluded that a clearer definition for space-based ABM components is required because it is not apparent what part of a space-based ABM system would replace an ABM interceptor, radar or launcher, that they want to make the definition specific to new technologies, and that the term "component" would refer only to major space-based elements of an ABM system. Their proposed definition for "development" would cover the same activities that they had sought to ban in the previous rounds even though they have now dropped the phrase "including scientific research." It appears to reflect continuing Soviet concern that real weapon capabilities can exist without test demonstrations and that the United States could use the results of SDI research for early strategic defense deployments. [REDACTED]

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In informal conversations about the Soviet proposal, one member of the Soviet negotiating team claimed that the Soviets were prepared to consider time frames other than the 15-20 year period they had suggested but that they did not believe a lesser period could be justified. Another member of the Soviet negotiating team commented that the suggested period was based on the program for eliminating nuclear weapons by the year 2000 proposed by General Secretary Gorbachev in January. Other members of the Soviet delegation explained that the USSR was proposing definitions only for space-based ABM systems and components because they are the subject of the NST negotiations. If the United States is interested in extending definitions to the other systems and components of Article V, they said, the Soviets would be prepared to discuss them. [REDACTED]

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At the 3 June session, the Soviets proposed two other agreements. One would prohibit the development, testing and deployment of space-based weapons capable of hitting targets in the atmosphere or on the ground, and the other would ban ASAT systems and ensure the immunity of satellites. At an 11 June joint plenary meeting the Soviets tabled a new initiative on offensive strategic arms reductions and linked it to US agreement to strengthen the ABM Treaty. [REDACTED]

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Taken together, the three new space-related proposals reflect the same goal that Moscow has been consistently pursuing since the opening of NST in March 1985--banning all "space-strike" arms. Although agreement on the ABM Treaty proposal alone would not place specific limits on space or ASAT

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weapons, the Soviets could claim that US research and development activities in these areas were aimed at circumventing ABM Treaty restrictions.



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The distinction that the Soviets appear to be drawing between permissible and banned ABM development activities fits better with Soviet weapons research and development activities than with those of the United States. They have not proposed changes that would affect the ABM Treaty provision that allows development and testing of ground-based ABM weapons or components based on new physical principles. Therefore, implementation of the proposal would:

- Permit the Soviets to continue pursuing advanced ground-based ABM technologies including those based on exotic technologies and such activities as the construction of the laser facility at Saryshagan, which could potentially have ASAT applications. Soviet negotiators in Geneva have argued that the Saryshagan facility is an experimental laser facility with a space track mission and that therefore its laser does not qualify as a mock-up, test model, or prototype of any kind of weapon system.
- Prevent the United States from pursuing SDI activities beyond the stage where mock-ups and models of a space-based ABM weapon system are constructed and tested, either inside or outside a laboratory.



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
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FROM AF/P: INFORM CONSULS AND PAOS

E.O. 12356: N/A  
TAGS: PREL. US. AF  
SUBJECT: ANNOUNCEMENT OF SECRETARY OF STATE ADVISORY  
COMMITTEE ON SOUTH AFRICA


1. THE FOLLOWING PRESS RELEASE IS TO BE ISSUED TOMORROW.  
DECEMBER 19 RPT DECEMBER 19 AT 12:30 P.M. EST RPT EST.  
ADDRESSEES SHOULD NOT RELEASE TEXT OR NAMES OF COMMITTEE  
UNTIL THAT TIME. TEXT FOLLOWS:

2. QTE: SECRETARY OF STATE GEORGE SHULTZ TODAY ANNOUNCED  
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF HIS ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON SOUTH  
AFRICA. THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE WAS MANDATED BY THE  
PRESIDENT IN HIS EXECUTIVE ORDER OF SEPTEMBER 9 CONCERNING  
U.S. RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AFRICA.

THE COMMITTEE WILL BE CO-CHAIRLED BY FRANK CARY, FORMER  
CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD OF THE IBM CORPORATION, AND WILLIAM  
T. COLEMAN, JR., SENIOR PARTNER IN THE LAW FIRM OF  
O'MELVENY AND MYERS.

THE COMMITTEE HAS BEEN FORMED TO ADVISE THE SECRETARY ON  
WAYS IN WHICH THE U.S. CAN ENCOURAGE PEACEFUL CHANGE IN  
SOUTH AFRICA, INCLUDING ABOLITION OF APARTHEID AND THE  
EFFECTS THEREOF. THE COMMITTEE WILL INVESTIGATE CONDI-

TIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA AND MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS ON U.S.  
POLICY TOWARD THAT COUNTRY. IT WILL GIVE A REPORT TO THE  
SECRETARY FROM TIME TO TIME AND RENDER A FINAL REPORT AS  
SOON AS POSSIBLE BUT IN ANY EVENT WITHIN ONE YEAR OF ITS  
FIRST OFFICIAL MEETING, WHICH IS PRESENTLY SCHEDULED FOR



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OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ARE: THE HONORABLE GRIFFIN B. BELL, SENIOR PARTNER IN THE LAW FIRM OF KING & SPALDING AND FORMER ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES; OWEN F. BIBER, PRESIDENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL UNION, UAW; JOHN R. DELLENBACK, PRESIDENT OF THE CHRISTIAN COLLEGE COALITION AND A FORMER CONGRESSMAN; THE HONORABLE LAWRENCE S. EAGLEBURGER, PRESIDENT OF KISSINGER ASSOCIATES AND FORMER UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS; TIMOTHY S. HEALY, S.J., PRESIDENT OF GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY; VERNON E. JORDAN, JR., ESQ., SENIOR PARTNER IN THE LAW FIRM OF AKIN, GUMP, STRAUSS, HAUER & FELD AND FORMER PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL URBAN LEAGUE; HELENE L. KAPLAN, ESQ., SENIOR PARTNER IN THE LAW FIRM OF WEBSTER & SHEFFIELD AND CHAIRMAN OF THE CARNEGIE CORPORATION OF NEW YORK AND OF BARNARD COLLEGE; ROGER B. SMITH, CHAIRMAN AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF THE GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, THE REVEREND LEON H. SULLIVAN OF THE ZION BAPTIST CHURCH, THE AUTHOR OF THE SULLIVAN PRINCIPLES; AND FRANKLIN A. THOMAS, PRESIDENT OF THE FORD FOUNDATION.

IN INTRODUCING THE COMMITTEE TODAY AT THE DEPARTMENT, THE SECRETARY EXPRESSED HIS GRATITUDE TO ITS MEMBERS FOR VOLUNTEERING THEIR TIME AND FOR THEIR PATRIOTISM. HE ALSO DREW ATTENTION TO THE UNUSUAL IMPORTANCE OF DEVELOPMENTS INSIDE SOUTH AFRICA IN 1986, THE YEAR IN WHICH THE COMMITTEE WILL BE DELIBERATING. END QTE.

3. FOR PRETORIA: PLEASE INFORM APPROPRIATE SAG OFFICIALS ASKING THEM TO HOLD INFORMATION CONFIDENTIALLY UNTIL SECRETARY'S ANNOUNCEMENT HERE.

SHULTZ  
END OF MESSAGE

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18 June 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Fritz Ermarth, NIO/USSR,  
Fred Wattering, NIO/Africa

FROM:

[Redacted], SOVA/[Redacted]  
[Redacted] SOVA, [Redacted]

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SUBJECT: The Soviets and Angola's Expected Offensive

1. [Redacted] Moscow's attitude toward offensive operations by the Angolan government this summer and fall has painted a confused picture. [Redacted] indicate that the Soviets told diplomats in Luanda that they were not in favor of large-scale action against UNITA this year. Meanwhile [Redacted] portray the Soviets as favoring an offensive against UNITA in southern Angola.

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2. [Redacted] the Luanda government may indeed be having second thoughts about the timing and direction of an offensive. Reported motives for delaying the offensive include concern that falling oil prices will hinder Luanda's ability to sustain operations, and that Angolan forces should focus their attention on defending high-value economic targets in the north of the country against UNITA instead of attacking it in the south. However, we have to date no evidence to corroborate reports that Moscow is discouraging Luanda from major operations against UNITA this summer. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] raises the possibility that they are part of a deliberate campaign of deception intended to cover Soviet intentions.

3. Despite the confused reporting, we believe that the Soviets are still committed to an Angolan offensive this year. Our conclusion is based first and foremost on the extent and timing of military deliveries in recent months:

- o Since last fall's government offensive a record number of Soviet ships and transport aircraft have delivered military equipment to Angola. Between 15 April and 25 May, Soviet heavy-lift transports delivered at least a dozen and perhaps as many as 20 MiG-23 fighters. Nineteen arms carrier ships have visited Angola since last November, bringing at least eight Mi-25 Hind attack helicopters, 20 Mi-17 transport helicopters, more than 300 trucks, jeeps, vans, and armored cars, radars and communications equipment, and hundreds of tons of aircraft spare parts. In addition, late last year Moscow augmented its VTA element in Angola by sending another two AN-12 transport aircraft to Luanda. While some of this equipment makes up for losses in last year's campaign, we believe that Angolan capabilities in key areas has been expanded, most notably by the doubling of the force of Mig-23 interceptors.

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4. We also see several secondary considerations that point in the direction of Soviet support for an offensive in 1986:

- o The Soviets have generally counseled the Angolans to keep the military pressure on the insurgents. Such action this year offers Luanda the prospect of striking UNITA before outside aid builds up, and of getting the maximum from its Soviet-supplied equipment, which would be subject to attrition by UNITA if the Angolans delayed the offensive significantly.
- o Angola holds out a particularly advantageous near-term opportunity for the Soviets to back up commitments made in recent months to defend Third World socialist allies against "US neoglobalism." An Angolan offensive that Moscow could portray as successful might bolster Soviet credibility in the eyes of other allies facing insurgent challenges, and influence Western debate on aiding UNITA.
- o South African attention is presently focused on its severe domestic challenges, and the Soviets may calculate that Pretoria will have to commit more military units in its efforts to deal with opposition forces. This, Moscow might reason, could limit Pretoria's willingness and ability to bring force to bear in Angola in support of UNITA, as it did last year.

We expect the Soviets to play a strong advisory role in any offensive this year, including extensive involvement in planning operations. Soviet rules of engagement have apparently not changed, and Soviet military personnel probably will attempt to avoid combat. However, in rare situations in which the senior Soviet officer in Angola deems it advisable, Soviet advisers may play a more direct combat role, as scattered reporting suggests occurred last year when Soviet pilots may have flown a small number of fighter and helicopter missions. The Soviets also play a large role in logistic support, and likely will concentrate on improving this aspect of their support for Angolan offensive operations.

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