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ASSISTANT DIRECTOR

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

October 11, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEFENSE AND SPACE INTERAGENCY GROUP

SUBJECT: Transition Paper

Attached is the paper on Questions on a Possible Transition to Greater Reliance on Effective Defenses for Deterrence as approved by the SACG on October 4 and given to the Defense and Space Negotiating Group.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Louis V. Nosenzo".

Louis V. Nosenzo
Acting Assistant Director
for Strategic Programs

Attachment
As stated

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October 7, 1985

Questions on A Possible Transition to Greater
Reliance on Effective Defenses for Deterrence

Introduction

The IG drafted a set of questions related to a possible transition to reliance on defenses for which appropriate responses are needed to support the requirements of the Defense and Space Negotiating Group. This paper provides material for such responses, i.e., the material in the main body of the paper is for use in the Negotiations in discussion with the Soviets. The material is aimed at specific issues to supplement, but not supersede, previous guidance on the general US approach to a possible transition.

Material from current guidance and additional material are woven so as to provide a single answer on each issue. A relatively small amount of new material is provided. In addition, illustrative questions designed to draw the Soviets into constructive dialogue are included in the answers. In general, it would be desirable to use such questioning to prevent the US from being placed in a "defensive position" on this issue in the talks.

Current guidance and relevant Soviet statements on each question are provided in Annexes A and B.

This paper is intended solely for use in the negotiations; it is not intended to be used with Congress, the Allies, or the Public.

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A1: What are the implications, given Soviet efforts on offenses and defenses, of a continuation of the present US deterrent posture based on offensive forces?

US Position

-- Continuing Soviet buildup of offensive and defensive capabilities would continue to erode stability and the long term deterrent on which the US and its Allies currently rely. These Soviet developments could diminish deterrence by improving their potential for a successful first strike against significant portions of our deterrent forces and by improving their active defenses to further minimize effective retaliation.

-- The several Soviet research programs, developments and deployments of specific concern include:

- Improved capabilities of Soviet nuclear forces to attack US deterrent forces, including the addition of new Soviet ICBMs contrary to SALT II.

- Improvements to Soviet ABM systems.

- Large increases in Soviet theater range ballistic missile capabilities.

- Extensive deployment of more effective surface to air missile systems with apparent increasing potential to engage some types of ballistic missiles.

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- Deployment of high performance look-down-shoot-down interceptor aircraft with airborne warning and control aircraft to engage penetrating cruise missiles and aircraft.

- Increasing efforts on passive defense measures for protecting Soviet offensive forces, Soviet command, control and communications, and the Soviet population against attack; and

- Extensive Soviet research into new technologies applicable to defensive systems.

-- The US has reviewed most of these developments in the current negotiations. The Soviets have not, however, provided a convincing rationale for their enormous and potentially dangerous efforts, nor presented their views on the present and future offense-defense relationship. The massive Soviet arms buildup of the past two decades and continuation of past trends implies a perspective on the role of forces and strategy that is substantially different from that of the US, which relies on deterrence. This difference in US and Soviet perspectives on the role of strategic forces must be recognized in these negotiations.

Questions for the Soviets

-- If the current situations were reversed (i.e., US development and deployment of offensive and defensive forces and Soviet development and deployment of offensive forces only) would

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the Soviet Union think it prudent to continue to rely on offensive forces only? Would the Soviets think that stability could be long preserved in such a situation?

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A2: What is meant by the criteria the US has established for evaluating the results of the US research program?

US Position

-- The US has established explicit criteria that SDI-derived ballistic missile defenses must satisfy. The criteria for effective defenses include the following:

-- Capability. Defenses would have to be effective against attacks by likely current and future offensive forces.

-- Survivability. Defenses would have to be sufficiently survivable to enable them to continue to function effectively even in the face of dedicated attacks against them. This is necessary not only to maintain the effectiveness of the defensive system, but also to maintain stability.

-- Cost-effectiveness at the margins. If new defenses could be countered easily by improvements in offensive forces, development and deployment of such defenses could serve to stimulate growth in offensive arms rather than to provide each side with increased security (unless there is an effective agreement limiting offensive forces). Therefore, for defenses to be effective, it must be possible to enhance them at significantly less cost than it would be to enhance, qualitatively and/or quantitatively, the offensive forces they are designed to counter. If this criterion can be met, there should be no incentive to increase offensive forces, because such an increase could be countered at less cost by a commensurate increase in the defenses.

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- New technologies have great potential for providing ballistic missile defenses, cost-effective at the margins, which can be augmented to counter increased threats at far less cost than that of an increased offensive threat.

-- The criteria are designed to assess technologies which must demonstrate that defenses would be effective in coping with a potentially unlimited threat.

-- Future decisions regarding strategic defense must await the results of our research which will determine if defenses can be effective in terms of our stated criteria. It will be several years before the US can determine the extent to which these criteria can be satisfied. The sides should reexamine the current strategic relationship to determine how it can be made safer and how incorporating defenses that would meet these criteria can afford greater stability and security for both sides.

Questions for the Soviets

- Does the Soviet Union believe that such criteria could never be met? In pursuing its defensive programs, does the Soviet Union share these criteria? What criteria does the Soviet Union use with respect to its own defensive programs including the Moscow ABM system?

- What is the purpose of the Moscow ABM system?

- Does the Soviet Union believe that, even if these criteria could be met, there would be no enhancement of global stability from deployment of defenses satisfying these criteria?

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- Or does it, as its actions in the area of defensive systems imply, fully understand the existence of a possible major role for defenses in the strategic equation and seek to use its long-term concentration on defensive systems to complement its offensive capability for unilateral advantage -- irrespective of whether or not such defenses are, in fact, cost effective at the margin?

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A3: What are possible criteria and scenarios for moving toward the ultimate goal of elimination of all nuclear weapons?

US Position

-- The President has stated, and the Soviet Union has agreed, that the ultimate goal of both sides should be the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. As a practical matter, certain prerequisites would apply before such a goal could be realized.

For example:

- Such a ban would have to be global in scope, including all nuclear weapons held by other nations;

- Verification measures would have to be extremely effective to establish compliance with such a ban; and

- Effective defenses would have to be erected to hedge against a possible violation or abrogation.

- There would have to be a stable conventional force balance.

- There would have to be safeguards against nuclear weapons possession by non-governmental organizations.

-- Eliminating the threat of nuclear-armed ballistic missiles would clearly be both a necessary element of, and a large step toward, eliminating all nuclear weapons. Threats of nuclear weapons delivered by other means would present comparable problems.

-- If effective defenses against ballistic missiles proved feasible the US would seek joint management of a transition to

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increased reliance on such defenses. Exploration of the other steps necessary for the longer term objective of complete elimination of all nuclear weapons would likely require the development of other defensive capabilities as well as comprehensive US-Soviet arms control agreements. It also would require the elimination of existing imbalances in conventional forces that favor the Soviet Union.

Question for Soviets

Under what circumstances does the Soviet Union envision realizing their stated goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons?

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B1: What would be the implications for deterrence (extended and central) and stability of deployment of effective defenses (within a continuum that includes partially through fully effective ones)?

-- Assuming US research criteria for effective defenses are met, following close consultations with our Allies, the US intends pursuant to the terms of the ABM Treaty to consult and negotiate with the Soviet Union, as appropriate, how security could be enhanced for both sides through greater reliance by both sides on new defensive systems, and to explore whether the Soviet Union is prepared to negotiate arrangements that would facilitate such a transition. This commitment should in no way be interpreted as according the Soviets a veto on possible future defensive deployments.

-- We seek to begin now a discussion of the offense-defense relationship and stability, in the Defense and Space talks, to lay the foundation to support such possible future consultations.

-- Defenses, of course, would not need to be perfect to enhance deterrence and to increase the stability of our deterrent forces.

-- Less than perfect defenses could enhance stability by creating uncertainties in the mind of a potential aggressor whether his attack could achieve its military objectives and hence decrease the likelihood of war.

-- Defenses that do not enhance stability should not be deployed by either side.

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-- Obviously, the greater the perceived effectiveness of strategic defenses, the more likely it becomes that military planners will be persuaded that an attack could not succeed and hence the greater is the likelihood that they will be deterred from planning aggression.

-- By reducing or eliminating the military effectiveness of ballistic missiles, and thereby making it more difficult for an attacker to destroy the other side's military forces, defensive systems have the potential for enhancing deterrence against not only strategic nuclear war, but against nuclear and conventional force attacks on our allies as well.

Questions for the Soviets

-- What does the Soviet Union believe are the levels of effectiveness required before defense investments are justified?

-- The SU is now investing heavily in air defenses. What level of effectiveness calculations were made to support such an investment? Would similar calculations be made in assessing Soviet ABM investments?

-- What impact does the Soviet Union believe different levels of effectiveness have (if any) on national security?

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B2: What would be the impact on nations other than the US, its Allies, and the Soviet Union, such as potential proliferating states, of possible moves by the US to greater reliance on defenses?

US Position

-- Any action that could decrease the likelihood of strategic nuclear war or any kind of nuclear war would benefit all of the nations and peoples of the world.

-- In addition, all possibilities for reducing the risk of war should be considered in accord with commitments made under the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Questions for the Soviets

-- Does the Soviet Union seek to perpetuate Soviet superiority in defensive systems in order to secure significant unilateral military advantage?

-- Is the USSR's investment in strategic defenses intended exclusively to protect against unlikely attacks against the Soviet Union by the US or are they understood to be useful in defending against third parties?

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C1: How are the Soviets likely, over time and depending on the results of both side's research programs, to view increased reliance on defense by the US, and under what conditions are they likely to join the US in a jointly-managed transition to such reliance on both sides?

US Position

-- In contrast to the US, the USSR has long had a vigorous research, development and deployment program in defensive systems. This program includes: an ABM system deployed around Moscow which is being modernized with a new radar and new missile interceptors; extensive air defense deployments including development and testing of new air defense missiles that have capabilities against tactical and some strategic ballistic missiles; a new ABM system that can be deployed rapidly because it requires little site preparation; and extensive work on advanced ballistic missile defense technologies, such as high powered directed energy weapons. In fact, over the last two decades the Soviet Union has invested as much overall in its strategic defenses as it has in its massive strategic offensive buildup. As a result, today it enjoys certain important advantages in the area of active and passive defenses. There is no evidence that the Soviet strategic investment program has been sensitive to US decisions to forgo investments in defensive capabilities.

Questions for the Soviets

-- How, in view of this extensive concentration on defensive systems, can the Soviet side claim to lack interest in the

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possibility of a more secure future based on greater reliance on defenses?

-- Is not the Soviet Union creating an uncertain and undesirable situation by, at one and the same time, both conducting a comprehensive development and deployment of traditional defenses and an aggressive research program on new technologies, and yet refusing to discuss its nature and the potential implications of its possible success?

-- The Soviet side has implied that defenses could not be cost effective and survivable; how can the Soviet Union know this and still claim not to have conducted exhaustive research such as US SDI is only now beginning?

-- The Soviet side has asserted that SDI technologies would give rise to offensive weapons; to what offensive weapons is the Soviet side referring? How does the Soviet Union see the advantages of augmenting offenses (penetration aids, etc.) versus augmenting defenses?

-- If US research shows that effective defenses are feasible, would the Soviet side join in discussions at that time aimed at effecting a jointly-managed transition?

-- If the active Soviet research program were to show that effective defenses were feasible, would the Soviet side then propose, or agree to, such discussions? Or would the Soviet side seek unilateral advantage from such defenses?

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-- Would it not make sense to discuss now the possibility of mutual deployments of effective defenses? Such discussions would lay the groundwork for a possible jointly managed transition.

-- Defenses that met all the US criteria for effectiveness would render ballistic missiles militarily obsolete and would preclude any countermeasures. How then can the Soviet Union refuse to discuss this possibility?

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C-2: What are the potential negotiating tactics or approaches the US might take in anticipation of potential Soviet responses to US progress in the area of Defense and Space?

(No material under this heading is needed for discussion with the Soviets at this time.)

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C3: What are potential steps the US might take to guard against, discourage, or respond to any unfavorable Soviet programmatic, military, diplomatic, or declaratory responses to the SDI research program or to a possible future US decision to proceed to full-scale development and later deployment of defensive systems?

(No material under this heading is needed for discussion with the Soviets at this time.)

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D1: What are the different areas of cooperation that could be envisioned for a jointly-managed transition and what are possible scenarios for such transitions?

US Position

-- Should strategic defenses prove feasible, the US has made clear that, following consultations with its allies, it will consult or negotiate, as appropriate, with the Soviets (pursuant to the terms of the ABM Treaty) on how security might be strengthened through the phased introduction of defensive systems into the force structures of both sides. This commitment in no way implies a Soviet veto power over actions deemed necessary for US and allied security.

-- The raison d'etre of a jointly-managed transition would be to facilitate the transition from an offense dominated regime to increasing reliance on defensive systems so as to increase confidence in the effectiveness and stability of the evolving strategic balance. A possible transition should be managed so that neither side would see an increased risk of a first strike and so that neither side would have an increased incentive for a first strike. Contrary to unilateral, independently pursued transitions, a jointly managed transition would have the advantage of providing both sides with improved confidence in the future -- confidence derived from a predictable evolution of a more stable strategic balance.

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-- Joint management of a transition to greater reliance on defense could take many forms and variations, including, at least, the following:

- verifiable negotiated regime of offensive force reductions;
- discussions and verifiable agreements between the sides regarding the various steps in such a transition.

-- The US has not reached a decision yet on whether effective defenses are feasible and therefore does not seek a transition to reliance on defenses at this time. However, the US does seek to lay the groundwork for a possible future decision to proceed with such a transition.

Questions for the Soviets

-- In particular, the US seeks Soviet views on such a transition, including:

- What is the Soviet understanding of the current strategic relationship -- especially in light of the heavy emphasis the Soviet Union has placed, and continues to place, on strategic defense?

- Is the Soviet Union willing to provide the US with a description of Soviet research on new strategic defense technologies comparable to that given to the Soviets on SDI?
If not, why not?

-- Why are the Soviets anxious to limit BMD research now in view of the fact they have been conducting such research for a long time?

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D2: What would be the implications of various possible joint management scenarios, including the effects of each side's perception of the effectiveness of the other's offensive and defensive forces?

US Position

-- A transition to reliance on effective defenses against ballistic missiles would be more stable to the extent it would eliminate militarily meaningful first strike capabilities. In this connection the US believes radical reductions in offensive weapons would be in the interest of both sides today and for the future, independent of whether effective defenses prove feasible.

-- The introduction of strategic defenses could move the present strategic situation toward greater stability through decreased incentives to attack and increased uncertainty about the effectiveness of a prospective attack. A jointly managed transition could facilitate the mutual appreciation of these stabilizing factors, and thereby reduce potential misperceptions, but would not necessarily be itself a condition for enhancing stability.

Question for Soviets

-- A jointly managed transition to mutual deployments of effective defenses would eliminate the instabilities associated with the Soviet Union's first strike attack potential. If the Soviet Union does not favor such a transition, is it because the Soviet Union does not believe its first strike capability is

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destabilizing or is it because the Soviet Union believes its first strike capability is useful despite its destabilizing nature?

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D3: What are the implications, for joint management of a transition, of Soviet violations of existing agreements?

US Position

-- The US has determined that the Soviet Union has violated the 1972 ABM Treaty:

- The new large phased array radar under construction at Krasnoyarsk constitutes a violation of the ABM Treaty in that its associated siting, orientation, and capability are prohibited by this Treaty.

-- The US also has determined that the Soviet Union probably has violated the ABM Treaty in other respects:

- The number of incidents of concurrent operation of SAM and ABM components indicate the USSR probably has violated the prohibition on testing SAM Components in an ABM Mode. In several cases this may be highly probable.

- The aggregate of these and other Soviet ABM and ABM-related actions, such as the development of components of a new ABM system capable of being deployed at sites with little or no preparation, suggest that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory (which would be a violation of the ABM Treaty).

-- The Soviet Union is not in strict compliance with other arms control agreements either, as described in the President's report of February 1, 1985, on Soviet non-compliance.

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-- Soviet non-compliance is a serious matter. It calls into question important security benefits from arms control, and could create new security risks. It undermines the arms control process and makes achievement of new agreements very difficult.

-- Non-compliance with existing agreements would have a similar effect on joint management of a possible transition to greater reliance on defenses.

-- On the other hand, the US SDI program is in full compliance with all Treaties. While our research examines a potential future improved deterrent regime involving strategic defenses, we are also attempting to reverse the erosion of the ABM Treaty occasioned by instances of Soviet noncompliance and to seek major reductions in strategic and intermediate range nuclear forces.

-- The aggregate of the Soviet Union's ABM and ABM-related actions raises the question of whether the Soviet Union might be planning for a Soviet unilateral, rather than jointly managed, transition to greater reliance on defenses.

-- The US stands ready to work with the Soviet Union to find acceptable ways to resolve compliance issues and to establish a regime of strict compliance with existing agreements.

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- The Krasnoyarsk radar should be dismantled as one part of such an effort.

Questions for the Soviets

-- Does the Soviet Union believe that violations of arms control treaties undermine the arms control process and make achievement of new agreements very difficult?

- If yes, why isn't the Soviet Union willing to fully live up to its current arms control obligations? Does the Soviet Union expect the US to adopt a double standard of compliance that is harmful to its security? Would the Soviet Union adopt such a standard?

- If no, then what do you believe is the purpose of arms control, if you do not believe compliance is important?

-- Does the Soviet Union believe that the Krasnoyarsk radar and other violations of treaty obligations and commitments are worth the risk of undermining the possibilities for future US-Soviet arms control agreements?

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D4: What would be the possibilities for evolution of a non-cooperative transition and what would be the implications for stability of various alternatives?

US Position

-- The US must counter ongoing Soviet offensive and defensive advances, for they threaten the viability of deterrence - the cornerstone of global security and stability today.

-- The Soviet offensive buildup, particularly in ballistic missiles, poses an ever-increasing threat to the survivability of US retaliatory forces.

-- Recent improvements in Soviet active and passive defenses, which include the world's only operational ABM and ASAT systems, are also steadily eroding Western retaliatory capabilities.

-- If current and prospective progress in their two-decade-old strategic defense program continues unabated and unaddressed by the West, the Soviets could further undermine the effectiveness of the Western deterrent.

-- In the face of such extensive Soviet military developments, the US and its allies must continue to pursue their own offensive and defensive programs.

-- Modernization of US strategic and LRINF forces will help re-establish the nuclear balance; provide arms control incentives for the Soviets; and enhance deterrence while we explore options, such as SDI, for the future.

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-- Should effective defenses prove feasible, it would make little sense for the US to rely on offensive forces alone when a combination of offensive and defensive forces could bring increased deterrence effectiveness.

-- Under such conditions, the US would seek a jointly-managed transition to increased reliance on defenses.

-- The US could not allow a Soviet refusal to join in such a transition to prevent the US from taking steps necessary for establishing strategic stability and ensuring its security and that of its allies. We do not believe that a jointly managed transition is essential to bringing about the stable benefits of deterrence based on defensive as well as on offensive forces.

-- Because of the role we believe joint management might play in facilitating the transition, however, the US will continue in its attempt to secure Soviet participation.

Questions for the Soviets

-- In light of the intensive Soviet research program on strategic defense, the Soviet side should explain how they would proceed with their program should their research prove effective defenses feasible. What would their criteria be for effective defenses? Would they refrain from developing them if they failed to meet these criteria? What are the goals for current Soviet defensive programs? Would their criteria differ from ours? Would they seek joint management of a transition to reliance on defense, or would they seek to use such defenses for unilateral advantage?

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Annex A -- Current Guidance on Transition Issues: Pages 28 - 57

Annex B -- Soviet Statements on Transition Issues: Pages 58 - 70

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August 12, 1985

Annex A

Current Guidance on Transition Issues

This annex includes the relevant existing guidance on each question addressed in this paper. Current Delegation material, drawn from instructions to Round One and Two, the SDI briefing given to the Soviets in Round Two, NSDD 172, and selected additional sources, it gives for each question individually.

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A1: What are the implications, given Soviet efforts on offenses and defenses, of a continuation of the present US deterrent posture based on offensive forces?

Current Guidance

From selected source

Emerging technologies offer the possibility of defenses that did not exist before. Of equal importance, the trends in the development of Soviet strategic forces, as well as the problems of Soviet deception and non-compliance with existing agreements, will, over the long-term, call into question the fundamental assumptions upon which our current strategy is based.

The Soviet Union's relentless improvement of its ballistic missile force, providing increased prompt, hard target kill capability, steadily attacks the fundamental survivability of our land-based retaliatory forces and the leadership structure that commands them. At the same time, the Soviet Union has continued to pursue strategic advantage through the development of active defenses with increased capability to counter surviving US retaliatory forces. Further, it is spending significant resources on passive defensive measures aimed at improving the survivability of its own forces, military command structure, and national leadership -- ranging from providing mobility for its latest generation of ICBMs, to constructing networks of super-hard bunkers to protect its leadership -- thus further eroding the effectiveness of our offensive deterrent.

These trends indicate that continued long-term US dependence on offensive forces alone for deterrence will likely lead to a steady erosion of stability to the strategic disadvantage of the United States and its allies. In fact, should these trends be permitted to continue and the Soviet investment in both offensive and defensive capability proceed unrestrained and unanswered, the resultant condition will destroy the foundation on which deterrence has rested for several decades.

From NSDD-178 10 July 85

The modernization program will guide the continued high priority, long term modernization of our strategic forces...to ensure that our national technical resources are fully utilized to develop and deploy strategic systems which insure the endurance of our national strategy to deter nuclear war and to provide strategic stability.

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A2: What is meant by the criteria the US has established for proceeding toward greater reliance on defensive systems?

Current Guidance

From SDI Presentation in D and S Talks 27 June 85

The Fletcher study also indentified the reasons why an intensive technology development and research program is necessary before any decision to proceed could be made. It identified five critical problems that need additional work. First, how, in detail, to intercept attacking missiles in boost phase or as soon after they are launched as possible. Second, as we pursue these new sensor technologies, we must be sure that we will be able to discriminate between the warheads and decoys. Third, and perhaps most important, for defense to be effective it has to have the ability to survive. By this we mean that the defensive system must be constructed so that it would not itself be an appealing target for attack. The fourth requirement is also as important. Once a system is in place, we must be able to engage additional ballistic missiles and warheads more cheaply than it would be for an opponent to proliferate those offensive forces. Moreover, we must be able to maintain that cost advantage even against redesigned offensive threats. Last, although we have computers that can do a billion calculations per second, we must find better ways to program and control these computers. The Fletcher study showed that a multi-layered defensive system would require a computer program that contains up to a hundred million computer instructions. This is much larger than computer programs today. This study has stood the test of time: the program is focused on technologies for defense that would be lethal, survivable, and cost effective.

From NSDD-172 30 May 85

We have identified key criteria that will be applied to the results of this research whenever they become available. Some options which could provide interim capabilities may be available earlier than others, and prudent planning demands that we maintain options against a range of contingencies. However, the primary thrust of the SDI research program is not to focus on generating options for the earliest development/deployment decision, but options which best meet our identified criteria.

Within the SDI research program, we will judge defenses to be desirable only if they are survivable and cost-effective at the margin.

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Two areas of concern expressed about SDI are that deployment of defensive systems would harm crisis stability and that it would fuel a runaway proliferation of Soviet offensive arms. We have identified specific criteria to address these fears appropriately and directly.

Our survivability criterion responds to the first concern. If a defensive system were not adequately survivable, an adversary could very well have an incentive in a crisis to strike first at vulnerable elements of the defense. Application of this criterion will ensure that such a vulnerable system would not be deployed, and, consequently, that the Soviets would have no incentive nor prospect of overwhelming it.

Our cost-effectiveness criterion will ensure that any deployed defensive system would create a powerful incentive not to respond with additional offensive arms, since those arms would cost more than the additional defensive capability needed to defeat them. This is much more than an economic argument, although it is couched in economic terms. We intend to consider, in our evaluation of options generated by SDI research, the degree to which certain types of defensive systems, by their nature, encourage an adversary to try simply to overwhelm them with additional offensive capability while others can discourage such a counter effort. We seek defensive options which provide clear disincentives to attempts to counter them with additional offensive forces.

In addition, we are pressing to reduce offensive nuclear arms through the negotiation of equitable and verifiable agreements. This effort includes reductions in the number of warheads on ballistic missiles to equal levels significantly lower than exist today.

From Instructions for NST 28 May 85

A possible transition should be managed so that neither side would see an increased risk of first strike and so that neither side would have an increased incentive for a first strike.

From Instructions for NST 28 May 85

Survivability of strategic offensive systems is essential to stability.

It would be important to stability that both sides be able

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to maintain, in a verifiable fashion, the survivability of their offensive forces during that portion of a transition when offensive forces would continue to be important for deterrence. In this manner, neither side would believe that improvements in defenses on the other side could create an additional capability for either side to carry out a first strike.

Survivability of strategic defensive systems would be essential to stability during and after a transition.

From Instructions for D and S Talks 10 March 85

Emerging technologies. Negotiating group should emphasize that emerging technologies offer the possibility of strategic defenses that could enhance deterrence. Present the rationale for the SDI program and emphasize that all activities under the program are being undertaken in strict compliance with all treaty requirements. Negotiating group should review with Soviet side relevant treaty requirements. Negotiating group should describe the US view of criteria by which we will judge the feasibility of systems based on new defensive technologies:

-- First, the defensive systems developed must be survivable. Otherwise, they would contribute to instability, not stability.

-- Second, they must also be cost effective, i.e., the defense's capability to neutralize offensive nuclear weapons must be less costly than either effective countermeasures or the proliferation of more offensive systems. Otherwise, the deployment of defenses would merely stimulate more offensive systems.

-- Third, the transition must be stable. One of the principal reasons we have offered to discuss SDI with the Soviet side now is that should these technologies prove feasible, we want the transition to a more stable and reliable strategic relationship to be a cooperative effort.

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A3: What are possible criteria and scenarios for moving toward the ultimate goal of elimination of all nuclear weapons?

Current Guidance

From NSDD-172 30 May 85

Negotiation and Diplomacy. During the next ten years, the US objective is a radical reduction in the power of existing and planned offensive nuclear arms, as well as the stabilization of the relationship between nuclear offensive and defensive arms, whether on earth or in space. We are even now looking forward to a period of transition to a more stable world, with greatly reduced levels of nuclear arms and an enhanced ability to deter war based upon the increasing contribution of non-nuclear defenses against offensive nuclear arms. A world free of the threat of military aggression and also free of nuclear arms is an ultimate objective to which we, the Soviet Union, and all other nations can agree.

To support these goals, we will continue to pursue vigorously the negotiation of equitable and verifiable agreements leading to significant reductions of existing nuclear arsenals. As we do so, we will continue to exercise flexibility concerning the mechanisms used to achieve these reductions, but will judge these mechanisms on their ability to enhance the security of the United States and our allies, to strengthen strategic stability, and to reduce the risk of war.

* * *

Our ultimate goal is to eliminate nuclear weapons entirely. By necessity, this is a very long-term goal, which requires, as we pursue our SDI research, equally energetic efforts to diminish the threat posed by conventional arms imbalances, both through conventional force improvements, and the negotiation of arms reductions and confidence building measures.

We fully recognize the contribution nuclear weapons make to deterring conventional aggression. We equally recognize the destructiveness of war by conventional and chemical means, and the need both to deter such conflict and to reduce the danger posed by the threat of aggression through such means.

Internal Discussion

The following material is taken from a draft internal analysis; completion of which was deferred by the IG in June, 1985:

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The President has stated, and the Soviets have agreed, that our ultimate goal is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. As a practical matter, there are certain prerequisites that must apply before the United States could agree to a nuclear weapons ban: such a ban would have to be global in scope, including all nuclear weapons held by other nations; verification measures would have to be extremely effective to enforce such a ban; we would have to maintain an effective residual strategic defense as a hedge against possible violations of the regime; there would have to be sufficient controls on nuclear weapon possession by non-governmental organizations; and the East/West conventional force balance would have to be such that nuclear weapons would not be needed to support deterrence.

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Bl: What would be the implications for deterrence (extended and central) and stability of deployment of effective defenses (within a continuum that includes partially through fully effective ones)?

Current Guidance

From NSDD-172 30 May 85

US and Allied security remains indivisible. The SDI program is designed to enhance Allied security as well as US security. We will continue to work closely with our allies to ensure that, as our research progresses, allied views are carefully considered.

Although this has been a fundamental part of US policy since the inception of my Strategic Defense Initiative, and US statements have been consistent on this point, we will continue to consult closely with our allies and to be sensitive to the manner in which we present and defend the SDI program before allied audiences. We have made a serious commitment to consult, and such consultations will precede any steps taken relative to the SDI research program which may affect our allies.

If and when our research criteria are met, and following close consultation with our allies, we intend to consult and negotiate, as appropriate, with the Soviets pursuant to the terms of the ABM Treaty, which provide for such consultations, on how deterrence could be enhanced through a greater reliance by both sides on new defensive systems. This commitment should in no way be interpreted as according the Soviets a veto over possible future defensive depoyments. And, in fact, we have already been trying to initiate a discussion of the offense-defense relationship and stability in the Defense and Space Talks underway in Geneva to lay the foundation to support such future possible consultations.

If, at some future time, the US, in close consultation with its allies, decides to proceed with deployment of defensive systems, we intend to utilize mechanisms for US/Soviet consultations provided for in the ABM Treaty. Through such mechanisms, and taking full account of the Soviet Union's own expansive defensive systems research program, we will seek to proceed in a stable fashion with the Soviet Union.

It is our intention and our hope that, if new defensive technologies prove feasible, we (in close and continuing

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consultation with our allies) and the Soviets will jointly manage a transition to a more defense-reliant balance.

From Instructions for D and S Talks 28 May 85

If strategic defenses prove feasible, we believe that a transition to greater reliance on such defenses would enhance strategic stability and hence improve Soviet as well as US security.

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Cl: How are the Soviets likely, over time and depending on the results of both side's research programs, to view increased reliance on defense by the US, and under what conditions are they likely to join the US in a jointly-managed transition to such reliance on both sides?

Current GuidanceFrom NSDD-172 30 May 85

The Soviet Union also fully understands that the SDI program -- and most especially, that portion of the program which holds out the promise of destroying missiles in the boost, post-boost, and mid-course portions of their flight -- offers the prospect of redressing Soviet offensive advantages, accumulated over years of investment. In reponse, even while continuing its own pursuit of improved defenses, the Soviet Union will likely continue to emphasize its propaganda theme of "preventing the militarization of space." In doing so, it can be expected to continue to attempt to block certain advanced technologies associated with the SDI research program in order to confine the potential for future defensive developments to more traditional areas which are consistent with the long-term pattern of Soviet investment and where the Soviet Union now holds a competitive advantage. The Soviet Union is likely also to propose restraints on US anti-satellite capability to inhibit or block related SDI technologies.

From NSDD-172 30 May 85The Soviet Union's View of SDI

As noted above, the USSR has long had a vigorous research, development and deployment program in defensive systems of all kinds. In fact, over the last two decades the Soviet Union has invested as much overall in its strategic defenses as it has in its massive strategic offensive buildup. As a result, today it enjoys certain important advantages in the area of active and passive defenses. The Soviet Union will certainly attempt to protect this massive, long-term investment.

A central theme in Soviet propaganda is the charge that SDI is designed to secure military superiority for the US. Put in the proper context of the strategic challenge that we and our allies face, our true goals become obvious and clear. Superiority is certainly not for purpose. Nor is the SDI program offensive in nature. The SDI program is a research program aimed

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at seeking better ways to ensure US and allied security, using the increased contribution of defenses -- defenses that threaten no one.

* * *

Soviet propagandists attempts to contrast the US and Soviet strategic defense programs by claiming that the SDI research program is a violation of the ABM Treaty while similar Soviet research is not. This is based upon their false assertion that the US has already decided to deploy a territorial defense. To support this allegation, they assert: "that the US has already decided to abrogate the ABM Treaty; that the US is emphasizing Soviet noncompliance with the ABM Treaty and other obligations in order to justify this action; and that abrogation will occur in the near future."

* * *

Soviet propagandists have accused the US of reneging on commitments to prevent an arms race in space. This is clearly not true. What we envision is not an arms race; rather, it is just the opposite -- a cooperative approach designed to maintain, at all times, control over the mix of offensive and defensive systems of both sides, and thereby increase the confidence of all nations in the effectiveness and stability of the evolving strategic balance.

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C-2: What are the potential negotiating tactics or approaches the US might take in anticipation of potential Soviet responses to US progress in the area of Defense and Space?

Current Guidance

From NSDD 172 30 May 85

We should take every appropriate opportunity to make clear that we are conducting a broad-based research program, in full compliance with the ABM Treaty and with no decision made to proceed beyond research. Some of the themes below build upon this critical point.

From Instructions for D and S Talks 10 March 85

Further understandings. Negotiating group should not raise the subject of future understandings, clarifications and modifications of the ABM Treaty. But should do nothing to preclude them. If the Soviet side brings subject up, negotiating group should ask questions for clarification but offer no further encouragement.

Space and ASAT weapons. Negotiating group should not make any US ASAT or "space" arms control proposals in the first round. Negotiating group should seek to clarify any Soviet proposals, and in response to Soviet proposals should describe the defects in the Soviet proposal and present the difficulties of further "space" arms control in general, within the context of overall US objectives for Round I.

Response to a Soviet moratorium proposal. If Soviets repeat their proposal for a moratorium on testing and deployment of ASAT weapons, negotiating group should indicate to the Soviets that this specific proposal is not acceptable and provide reasons to the Soviets for this conclusion but avoid stressing our difficulties in verifying compliance with a moratorium.

Mutual restraints. If the Soviets question the US regarding the President's UNGA statement on mutual restraints, or similar statements by US officials, negotiating group should respond along the following lines:

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-- The President's remarks on restraints must be read in the context of the full statement regarding the offense/defense relationship and his call for genuine stability at substantially lower levels of nuclear arms.

-- The President's remarks were not restricted to ASAT restraints. The US will consider any specific Soviet proposal on its merits. Any restraints would have to be in the context of progress toward a broader range of arrangements which would provide for stabilizing reductions in nuclear arms.

From selected source.

The US Approach. For our part, the thrust of the US effort for the foreseeable future will be as follows.

1. We will continue to pursue the negotiation of equitable and verifiable agreements leading to reduction of existing nuclear arsenals, and to seek other complementary means (including cooperative and confidence-building measures) of enhancing stability and reducing the risk of war.
2. As we do so, we will protect the promise offered by the ASAT/SDI program to alter the adverse, long-term prospects we now face and to provide a basis for a more stable deterrent at some future time. This specifically involves protecting those SDI technologies that may permit a layered defense, including boost, post-boost, and mid-course elements.
3. Complementing this, we will also protect the US strategic modernization program which is needed to maintain existing deterrence, to restore the balance of offensive forces, and to provide incentives for negotiating real reductions in the size of existing nuclear arsenals.

Characterizing the US Approach. To support this approach publicly, the following paragraph can be used to characterize to the Soviet Union, the Congress, our Allies, and Western publics the basic, central concept that the US is pursuing at the Geneva meetings and in subsequent negotiations.

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"During the next ten years, the US objective is a radical reduction in the power of existing and planned offensive nuclear arms, as well as the stabilization of the relationship between offensive and defense nuclear arms, whether on earth or in space. We are even now looking forward to a period of transition to a more stable world, with greatly reduced levels of nuclear arms and an enhanced ability to deter war based upon the increasing contribution of non-nuclear defenses against offensive nuclear arms. This period of transition could lead to the eventual elimination of all nuclear arms, both offensive and defensive. A world free of nuclear arms is an ultimate objective to which we, the Soviet Union, and all other nations can agree."

From selected source.

Addressing the Offense/Defense Relationship. Early in the discussions, the US delegation will provide to the Soviet delegation our conceptual thinking about the offense/defense relationship. This presentation is critically important since it sets the stage for the US proposals about format, objectives and substance which follow. It also should permit the US to preempt Soviet charges about the US SDI program by citing the record of Soviet actions which have called into questions the fundamental assumptions underlying the ABM Treaty and which have contributed to the growing instability in the current situation.

This presentation should make the following points:

- The United States has no territorial ambitions. It is inconceivable that the US would initiate military action against the Soviet Union or the Warsaw Pact unless it or its allies were to be directly attacked. The US hopes the Soviet Union comparably has no intention of initiating an attack on the United States or its allies.
- The United States is determined to assure itself and its allies of a high-quality deterrent to an attack by anyone on our vital security interests. The US expects that the Soviet Union intends to maintain a similar capability.
- It is hard to understand why the Soviet Union places so much emphasis upon massive expansion and modernization

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of its nuclear forces, both offensive and defensive. The US is forced thereby not to neglect its own offensive and defensive capabilities.

- Perhaps the explanation is to be found in the fact that each side looks at the nuclear strategic situation primarily from the viewpoint of its own security. Each must assume that at some time a situation may arise in which the risk of war in the immediate future cannot be dismissed. In that situation each side will carefully analyze what it must do to deny the other side a meaningful military victory.

- Under today's conditions and those of the foreseeable future, both sides have certain incentives to act quickly and decisively with their military power, both nuclear and conventional. This creates an unstable situation which could make crises more difficult to manage and, if conflict breaks out, makes rapid, perhaps immediate, escalation to high levels of destruction more likely.

- This is a dangerous situation. It is one the US and the Soviet Union must address both together and unilaterally. The political and military measures necessary to do so will be difficult for both sides. But we must tackle this problem; the danger must be defused.

- In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the US hoped that both sides would be able to agree on measures which would be helpful to the security of each of nation. It was accepted that each side should have rough equality in the aggregate power of its nuclear weapons systems, that if defensive capabilities were to be limited, there should be comparable limitations on offensive capabilities, and that limitations should preclude break-out, circumvention or failure to adhere to the letter and spirit of the limitations agreed upon.

- For a time it appeared that we had made some progress in that direction. As one looks at the situation today, it appears that US anticipation of such progress may have been illusory.

- Since that time, your building program -- in both offensive and defensive systems -- has violated any reasonable sense of strategic balance.

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C3: What are potential steps the US might take to guard against, discourage, or respond to any unfavorable Soviet programmatic, military, diplomatic, or declaratory responses to the SDI research program or to a possible future US decision to proceed to full-scale development and later deployment of defensive systems?

From NSDD-172 30 May 85

US policy supports the basic principle that our existing method of deterrence, and NATO's existing strategy of flexible response, remain fully valid, and must be fully supported, as long as there is no more effective alternative for preventing war. It is in clear recognition of this obvious fact that the US continues to pursue so vigorously its own strategic modernization program and so strongly supports the efforts of its allies to sustain their own commitments to maintain the forces, both nuclear and conventional, that provide today's deterrence.

We must avoid denigrating current western nuclear deterrent strategy. The US objective is to explore better ways of maintaining deterrence and the strategic balance in the future. The purpose of the SDI research program is to generate options for future decision that will permit us to do more than simply threaten offensive retaliation. We seek options that would let us move to a more stable and secure deterrence of all war based upon the contribution of defenses that threaten no one. However, our research will take time.

Since we will be living with reliance on offensive retaliation for deterrence for many years to come, it does us and our allies a significant disservice to question the morality of our current deterrent. Given the realities of the situation we face, including the limited options we currently have for maintaining peace and freedom, deterrence based upon the threat of nuclear retaliation is both necessary and moral. However, we do hope that our research will extend the range of options available to us and, thus, the fundamental nature of the situation. Until it does, we should not fail to recognize fully the necessary contribution that deterrence based upon the threat of nuclear retaliation makes and will be required to make for some time to come. In this regard, we strongly support efforts by our allies to strengthen their forces, just as we as strongly support basic Alliance military strategy.

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For the foreseeable future, offensive nuclear forces and the prospect of nuclear retaliation will remain the key element of deterrence. Therefore, we must maintain modern, flexible and credible strategic nuclear forces.

This point reflects the fact that we must simultaneously use a number of tools to achieve our goals today while looking for better ways to achieve our goals over the longer term. It expresses our basic rationale for sustaining the US strategic modernization program and the rationale for the critically needed national modernization programs being conducted by the United Kingdom and France.

From selected source.

-- And, most importantly, there has been no treaty of indefinite duration on offensive arms to parallel the ABM Treaty.

-- For the immediate future the United State wishes to work with the Soviet Union to restore and strengthen the regime for stability which, in 1972, was thought by both sides to be our common objective. We must negotiate the follow-on effective limitations on offensive systems called for when we signed the ABM Agreement in 1972, in order to remove the inherent instability in the present and projected array of offensive systems on both sides, and we must reverse the erosion of the ABM Treaty which has taken place.

-- The research, development, and deployment programs of both sides must be consistent with the ABM Treaty. The US SDI program is. The Soviet program should be.

-- If either side ever wishes to amend the Treaty, then there are provisions for discussing that. In the US view, such discussions should precede action by sufficient time so that stability is guaranteed.

-- The US SDI research program is fully consistent with the ABM Treaty. The Soviet Union has had a large SDI program of its own for some years. We do not believe that either country wants at this time to ban the research and concept development permitted by that Treaty. We doubt an effective ban on such activities could be designed, even if desired.

-- For the long run we should have bolder and more radical objectives. Both sides seem to be agreed that with respect to

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nuclear weapons as a whole, the objective should be their total elimination. This should be worldwide and agreed to by all nations.

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D1. What are the different areas of cooperation that could be envisioned for a jointly-managed transition and what are possible scenarios for such transitions?

Current Guidance

From NSDD-172 30 May 85

-- At the same time, the SDI research program is and will be conducted in full compliance with the ABM Treaty. If the research yields positive results, we will consult with our allies about the potential next steps. We would then, consult and negotiate, as appropriate, with the Soviet Union, pursuant to the terms of the ABM Treaty, which provide for such consultations, on how deterrence might be strengthened through the phased introduction of defensive systems into the force structures of both sides. This commitment does not mean that we would give the Soviets a veto over the outcome anymore than the Soviets have a veto over our current strategic and intermediate-range programs. Our commitment in this regard reflects our recognition that, if our research yields appropriate results, we should seek to move forward in a stable way. We have already begun the process of bilateral discussion in Geneva needed to lay the foundation for the stable integration of advanced defenses into the forces of both sides at such time as the state of the art and other considerations may make it desirable to do so.

Allied Views Concerning SDI

Our allies understand the military context in which the Strategic Defense Initiative was established and support the SDI research program. Our common understanding was reflected in the statement issued following my meeting with Prime Minister Thatcher in December, to the effect that:

- first, the United States and Western aim was not to achieve superiority, but to maintain the balance, taking account of Soviet developments;
- second, that SDI-related deployment would, in view of treaty obligations, have to be a matter for negotiations;
- third, the overall aim is to enhance, and not to undermine deterrence; and,
- fourth, East-West negotiations should aim to achieve security with reduced levels of offensive systems on both sides.

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From NSDD-172 30 May 85

If and when our research criteria are met, and following close consultation with our allies, we intend to consult and negotiate, as appropriate, with the Soviets pursuant to the terms of the ABM Treaty, which provide for such consultations, on how deterrence could be enhanced through a greater reliance by both sides on new defensive systems. This commitment should in no way be interpreted as according the Soviets a veto over possible trying to initiate a discussion of the offense-defense relationship and stability in the Defense and Space Talks underway in Geneva to lay the foundation to support such future possible consultations.

If, at some future time, the US, in close consultation with its allies, decides to proceed with deployment of defensive systems, we intend to utilize mechanisms for US/Soviet consultations provided for in the ABM Treaty. Through such mechanisms, and taking full account of the Soviet Union's own expansive defensive systems research program, we will seek to proceed in a stable fashion with the Soviet Union.

It is our intention and our hope that, if new defensive technologies prove feasible, we (in close and continuing consultation with our allies) and the Soviets will jointly manage a transition to a more defense-reliant balance.

Soviet propagandists have accused the US of reneging on commitments to prevent an arms race in space. This is clearly not true. What we envision is not an arms race; rather, it is just the opposite -- a cooperative approach designed to maintain, at all times, control over the mix of offensive and defensive systems of both sides, and thereby increase the confidence of all nations in the effectiveness and stability of the evolving strategic balance.

From Instructions for D and S 28 May 85

-- If strategic defenses prove feasible, we believe that a transition to greater reliance on such defenses would enhance strategic stability and hence improve Soviet as well as US security.

-- Discussion now about the possible contributions of defensive technologies to enhancing stability could allow us to reach some consensus views before specific technologies may be available.

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-- Our goal, should effective defenses prove feasible, would be for our two nations to manage jointly a future transition to greater reliance on strategic defenses.

-- We do not seek superiority over the Soviet Union and believe that our past and current strategic force structures demonstrate this fact clearly: furthermore, we believe we could ensure that neither side would obtain superiority and thus achieve our mutual goal of preventing an arms race in space through a jointly-managed transition to greater reliance on defenses.

-- The arms control process can provide a mechanism for facilitating the transition we envision. We wish to embark now on a US-Soviet dialogue which we see as continuing over the long term on strategic defense. These discussions can serve to clarify ambiguities and could contribute toward smoothing a transition on both sides to a strategic posture more reliance on defenses.

-- A possible transition should managed so that neither side would see an increased risk of first strike and so that neither side would have an increased incentive for a first strike.

-- In order for arms control to contribute effectively to cooperation, the arms control process must be in a satisfactory condition to begin with: this is one of the reasons we are seeking to reverse the erosion of the ABM Treaty regime and one reason why we are seeking now to deal with the matters of Soviet non-compliance with the Treaty.

-- When the time for decisions on the possible production and deployment of defensive systems comes, we should discuss and negotiate these issues with the Soviet Union; however, we would not allow a Soviet veto over actions which we deem necessary to improve our security and that of our allies.

-- We believe that, even now within the limits of our current knowledge of potential defensive systems, as well as within the limits of military security considerations on both sides, meaningful and useful exchanges can take place.

-- Reductions now in offensive nuclear weapons, especially those that are most threatening and destabilizing, such as large,

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highly-MIRVed land-based, intercontinental ballistic missiles, would help create more stable conditions for the future, independent of whether effective defenses prove possible. If such defenses prove feasible in the future, prior reductions could also help enhance stability during a transition.

-- Substantial reductions in offensive arms, with priority on the most destabilizing systems would decrease concerns in a jointly-managed transition that growth of defenses could be part of a first strike strategy. Such offensive force reductions could allow an offense-defense regime that is more stable and involves fewer forces on both sides.

-- A transition should be implemented in a manner which would enhance stability during the transition and afterwards -- a period in which we need jointly to manage in ways that would limit the possibility of unilateral advantage.

From selected source.

-- Whenever research validates that a defensive technology can make a contribution to strengthening deterrence, the United States would expect to discuss with the Soviet Union the basis on which it would be integrated into force structures.

-- At the same time, both the US and the Soviet Union recognize that we must find a safe path down the road of reductions toward disarmament. The US believes that during the transition from reliance on the retaliatory capability of massive forces of offensive arms it could be extremely useful to move toward a more and more effective defense on both sides.

-- It appears that new technologies may open possibilities of assuring the security of both sides through a substantial improvement in our respective defenses. To the US, high-confidence defenses would appear to be a sounder approach to peace and security than equal and high-confidence vulnerability to every manner of nuclear strike by the other side, and could produce a more stable offense-defense relationship.

-- The United States recognizes that arms control and other forms of cooperation could play an important role in creating and sustaining such a more stable, less threatening environment. We believe that the security interests of both sides could be served by such an evolution.

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D3: What are the implications for joint management of a transition of Soviet violations of existing agreements?

Current Guidance

From NSDD-172 30 May 85

Soviet Non-compliance and Verification. Finally, the problem of Soviet non-compliance with arms control agreements in both the offensive and defensive areas, including the ABM Treaty, is a cause of very serious concern. Soviet activity in constructing their new phased array radar near Krasnoyarsk, in Central Siberia, has very immediate and ominous consequences. When operational, this radar, due to its location, will increase the Soviet Union's capability to deploy a territorial ballistic missile defense. Recognizing that such radars would make such a contribution, the ABM Treaty expressly banned the construction of such radars at such locations as one of the primary mechanisms for ensuring the effectiveness of the Treaty. The Soviet Union's activity with respect to this radar is in direct violation of the ABM Treaty.

Against the backdrop of this Soviet pattern of non-compliance with existing arms control agreements, the Soviet Union is also taking other actions which affect our ability to verify Soviet compliance. Some Soviet actions, like their increased use of encryption during testing, are directly aimed at degrading our ability to monitor treaty compliance. Other actions contribute to the problem we face in monitoring Soviet compliance. For example, Soviet increases in the number of its mobile ballistic missiles, especially those armed with multiple, independently targetable reentry vehicles, and other mobile systems, will make verification less and less certain. If we fail to respond to these trends, we should also expect to reach a point in the foreseeable future where we would have little confidence in our assessment of the state of the military balance or imbalance, with all that implies for our ability to control escalation during crisis.

With respect to Soviet non-compliance with the ABM Treaty and with other obligations, we have made it clear that we have expressed our legitimate concerns because such actions threaten US and allied security and significantly undermine the prospects for genuine progress in negotiated arms reductions. Our concerns about Soviet non-compliance should be presented in this context. Care must be exercised that they not be linked to SDI in such a way as to appear to reinforce the Soviet propaganda line.

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From Instructions for Defense and Space 28 May 85

In order for arms control to contribute effectively to cooperation, the arms control process must be in a satisfactory condition to begin with: this is one of the reasons we are seeking to reverse the erosion of the ABM Treaty regime and one reason why we are seeking now to deal with the matters of Soviet non-compliance with the Treaty.

Treatment of compliance issues. Negotiating group should draw on guidance to the US SCC component to ensure consistency on compliance issues. Negotiating group should press strongly for Soviet corrective action with regard to the Krasnoyarsk radar; it should, drawing on papers prepared for the US SCC Component, reiterate reasons for the US view that this radar violates the ABM Treaty and repeat the US call that the radar be dismantled. Negotiating group should also present concerns regarding mobile ABM components.

From Instructions for Defense and Space 10 March 85

Erosion of the ABM Treaty regime. Negotiating group should describe in general our views about how recent Soviet actions have eroded the basis of the ABM Treaty. Such Soviet actions include:

- Violation of the ABM Treaty (Krasnoyarsk Radar).
- A probable violation (testing air defense components in an ABM mode).
- An aggregate of ABM-related activities which suggests that the USSR may even now be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.

In addition, negotiating group should stress two other factors with respect to offensive forces that are of direct concern to the viability of the ABM Treaty.

- The massive Soviet offensive buildup.
- Failure to agree on effective offensive limitations that constrain and reduce the offensive forces of both sides as provided for in Article XI of the ABM Treaty, the importance of which was emphasized in ABM Treaty negotiations by the May 9, 1972 Smith statement.

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Treatment of compliance issues. Negotiating group should describe our views that recent Soviet violations and probable violations of Arms Control treaties undermine the arms control process and make achievement of new agreements very difficult. In particular, negotiating group should press strongly for Soviet corrective action with regard to the Krasnoyarsk radar. It should, drawing on papers prepared for the US SCC Component, reiterate reasons for the US view that this radar violates the ABM Treaty and repeat US call that construction be halted pending resolution of our concerns. Negotiating group is authorized also to repeat US call for discussion between US and Soviet civilian space experts within either this forum or the SCC. Negotiating group should not, however, explicitly condition achieving new agreements on the prior resolution of compliance issues.

From Selected Source

-- And on the defensive side, the Soviet Union at least has also continued to improve its capabilities. It has done everything permitted by the ABM Treaty, and it has also taken steps we believe are almost certainly not consistent with it.

-- The ABM Treaty rested importantly in the limitations of large Phased-Array Radars; these radars took five to ten years to build and were easily identifiable. The limits on such radars would assure each side against break-out or circumvention in less time than would be required for the other side to take offsetting actions.

-- Allowance was made for early warning radars, but these were to be on the periphery, outward looking and should not be defended, and for radars required for space track and for national technical means of verification.

-- It was also agreed that ABM interceptors, launchers, and radars should be non-mobile, non-transportable, i.e., fixed to the ground.

-- It was further agreed that other systems, such as air defense, should not be given ABM capabilities, i.e., that line between air defenses and ABM defenses should be kept clear and unambiguous.

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-- Finally, it was agreed that the ABM Treaty should be accompanied by a comprehensive treaty on offensive nuclear forces from of indefinite duration to parallel the ABM Treaty; it was hoped that such a treaty could be agreed in two years, and certainly within five years.

-- Today all of those assumptions appear invalid.

From Selected Source

-- The five Soviet early warning radars and the Krasnoyarsk radar (which appears to be identical in physical characteristics to those for detecting and tracking ballistic missile RVs) can, if interconnected, provide a base for a nationwide defense.

-- The SH-08 ABM system with its Flat Twin radar seems to be transportable. The United States has seen it erected and made operational in a relatively short period of time.

-- The SA-10 and SA-X-12 anti-aircraft systems seem to have a capability against certain ballistic reentry vehicles in an intercontinental trajectory, thus blurring the distinction between air defense systems and ABM systems.

-- The Soviet Union is pursuing active research programs on more advanced technologies, which have a direct application to future ballistic missile defense capabilities.

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D4: What would be the possibilities for evolution of a non-cooperative transition and what would be the implications for stability of various alternatives?

Current Guidance

From NSDD-172 30 May 85

-- Of equal importance, the Soviet Union has failed to show the type of restraint, in both strategic offensive and defensive forces, that was hoped for when the SALT process began. The trends in the development of Soviet strategic offensive and defensive forces, as well as the growing pattern of Soviet deception and of non-compliance with existing agreements, if permitted to continue unchecked over the long-term, will undermine the essential military balance and the mutuality of vulnerability on which deterrence theory has rested.

-- Soviet Offensive Improvements. The Soviet Union remains the principal threat to our security and that of our allies. As a part of its wide-ranging effort further to increase its military capabilities, the Soviet Union's improvement of its ballistic missile force, providing increased prompt, hard target kill capability, has increasingly threatened the survivability of forces we have deployed to deter aggression. It has posed an especially immediate challenge to our land-based retaliatory and conventional forces which provide our collective ability to deter conflict and aggression.

-- Improvement of Soviet Active Defenses. At the same time, the Soviet Union has continued to pursue strategic advantage through the development and improvement of active defenses. These active defenses provide the Soviet Union a steadily increasing capability to counter US retaliatory forces and those of our allies, especially if our forces were to be degraded by a Soviet first strike. Even today, Soviet active defenses are extensive. For example, the Soviet Union is currently improving all elements of this system. It also has the world's only currently deployed anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system, deployed to protect Moscow. The Soviet Union is currently improving all elements of this system. It also has the world's only deployed anti-satellite (ASAT) capability. It has an extensive air defense network and it is aggressively improving the quality of

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its radars, interceptor aircraft, and surface-to-air missiles. It also has a very extensive network of ballistic missile early warning radars. All of these elements provide them an area of relative advantage in strategic defense today, and, with logical evolutionary improvement, could provide the foundation of decisive advantage in the future.

-- Improvement in Soviet Passive Defenses. The Soviet Union is also spending significant resources on passive defensive measures aimed at improving the survivability of its own forces, military command structure, and national leadership. These efforts range from providing rail and road mobility for its latest generation of ICBMs, to extensive hardening of various critical installations, including the construction of a network of super-hard bunkers to protect its leadership.

-- Soviet Research and Development on Advances Defenses. For over two decades, the Soviet Union has pursued a wide range of strategic defensive efforts, integrating both active and passive elements. The resulting trends have shown steady improvement and expansion of Soviet defensive capability. Furthermore, current patterns of Soviet research and development, ranging from demonstrating a capability with their SA-X-12 surface-to-air missile against some ballistic missiles to a long-standing and intensive research program in many of the same basic technological areas which our SDI program will address, indicate that these trends will continue a pace for the foreseeable future. If unanswered, continued Soviet defensive improvements will further erode the effectiveness of our own existing deterrent, based as it is now, almost exclusively on the threat of nuclear retaliation by offensive forces. Therefore, this long-standing Soviet program of defensive improvements, in itself, poses a challenge to deterrence which we must address.

-- Responding to the Challenge. In response to this long-term pattern of Soviet offensive and defensive improvement, the United States is compelled to take certain actions designed both to maintain security and stability in the near-term, and to ensure these conditions in the future. We must act in three main areas.

-- Retaliatory Force Modernization. First, we must modernize our offensive nuclear retaliatory forces. This is necessary to reestablish and maintain the offensive balance in the near-term, and to create the strategic conditions that will permit us to pursue complementary actions in the areas of arms

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reduction negotiations and defensive research. For our part, in 1981 we embarked on our strategic modernization program was specifically designed to preserve stable deterrence and, at the same time, to provide the incentives necessary to cause the Soviet Union to join us in negotiating significant reductions in the nuclear arsenals of both sides.

-- In addition to the US strategic modernization program, NATO is modernizing its Longer-range Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (LRINF). Our British and French allies also have underway important programs to improve their own national strategic nuclear retaliatory forces. The US SDI research program does not negate the necessity of these US and allied programs. Rather, the SDI research program depends upon our collective and national modernization efforts to maintain peace and freedom today as we explore options for future decision of how we might enhance security and stability over the longer term.

-- The Soviet Union and SDI. Another important factor influencing Soviet behavior, especially in returning to nuclear arms reduction negotiations, is the Soviet desire to block our Strategic Defense Initiative as soon as possible. The Soviet Union knows that the SDI represents a major US resurgence of interest in strategic defense. The USSR has long had a vigorous research, development and deployment program in defensive systems of all kinds. In fact, over the last two decades the Soviet Union has invested as much overall in its strategic defenses as it has in its massive strategic offensive buildup. As a result, today it enjoys certain relative advantages in the area of defenses. The Soviet Union will certainly attempt to protect this massive, long-term investment.

-- The Soviet Union fully recognizes that the SDI program -- and most especially, that portion of the program which holds out the promise of destroying missiles in the boost, post-boost, and mid-course portions of their flight -- offers the prospect of permitting the US technologically to flank years of Soviet defensive investment and to shift the "state-of-the-art" in defenses into areas of comparative US advantage. This is one of the reasons that the primary Soviet focus has not been on attacking the idea of the increased contribution of defenses to deterrence, which lies at the heart of the SDI program; but rather, on "preventing the militarization of space." While the Soviet Union may also be concerned about other potential "space weapons" programs, in large part, its focus on space reflects an attempt to confine future US defensive activity within more

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traditional areas which are consistent with the long-term pattern of Soviet investment and where the Soviet Union now holds a competitive advantage.

-- The Soviet Union's relentless improvement of its ballistic missile force, providing increased prompt, hard target kill capability, steadily attacks the fundamental survivability of our land-based retaliatory forces and the leadership structure that commands them. At the same time, the Soviet Union has continued to pursue strategic advantage through the development of active defenses with increased capability to counter surviving US retaliatory forces. Further, it is spending significant resources on passive defensive measures aimed at improving the survivability of its own forces, military command structure, and national leadership -- ranging from providing mobility for its latest generation of ICBMs, to constructing a network of superhard bunkers to protect its leadership -- thus further eroding the effectiveness of our offensive deterrent.

-- These trends indicate that continued long-term US dependence on offensive forces alone for deterrence will likely lead to a steady erosion of stability to the strategic disadvantage of the United States and its allies. In fact, should these trends be permitted to continue and the Soviet investment in both offensive and defensive capability proceed unrestrained and unanswered, the resultant condition will destroy the foundation on which deterrence has rested for several decades.

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Annex B

Soviet Statements on Transition Issues

This annex includes relevant Soviet statements on each question addressed in this paper on which the Soviets have spoken.

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A3: What are possible criteria and scenarios for moving toward the ultimate goal of elimination of all nuclear weapons?

Soviet Statements

From DST-11-003 Soviet Plenary Statement 4 June 85

-- You express the hope that this transition period of saturating space with space-strike systems could ultimately lead to the elimination of all nuclear arms. But this hope is totally unfounded. The US side itself is not counting on such a prospect. In any event you do not conceal your intent to base your strategy on "nuclear intimidation," which will be supplemented by the deployment of space-strike systems, for the duration of this period. Why then do you ask us to believe what you do not believe yourselves? Why do you ask us to join in a venture which, it is known, will not solve the problem on which the future of humanity depends, namely, the complete elimination of nuclear arms everywhere? After all, we are not dealing with an issue which it might seem advantageous to turn one way today and another way tomorrow. We are dealing with decisions which will determine the course of events for the entire period under consideration. Political games and maneuvers based on expediency and looking ahead just a year or two are totally inappropriate here.

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C1: How are the Soviets likely, over time and depending on the results of both sides research programs, to view increased reliance on defense by the US, and under what conditions are they likely to join the US in a jointly managed transition to such reliance on both sides?

Soviet Statements

From DST-11-M-032 Post-plenary 9 July 85

-- Modisett asked Goryainov to specify what the Soviets would like to know about the transition period. Goryainov responded that the US side has not revealed what kinds of weapons it has in mind, what it considers the ultimate goal of the negotiations, what kind of final document it has in mind, and how the outcome it envisions would relate to the goal of preventing the militarization of space. He asked what weapons would be subject to prohibition in the initial phase of a transition. Moser noted that the US side already has answered these questions on which data was available and that the answers to others depended upon the results of SDI research. He said that a document dealing with the transition period could be modeled upon the 1971 US/Soviet measures agreement. He noted that the sides could discuss the criteria for defensive systems, the schedule for reducing offensive systems, and the kinds of offensive systems that would remain deployed during the transition.

From DST-11-011 Soviet Plenary Statement 18 June 85

-- It is as if this program has become a unique sort of sacred cow for the US Administration as a result of the political and military brouhaha around it. In any event, the blinders of the "Strategic Defense Initiative" clearly hinder our US partners from taking a sober look at the real world and giving thought to what the Soviet side is proposing. And this is futile. You are deluding yourselves with the dream of scaling the heights of military superiority through the SDI program and are thus refusing to even consider the possibility of banning space-strike arms. There may be a rude awakening. We are not afraid of the US SDI program. We want an honest accord. But we have the wherewithal to counter US military programs. We have the economic and intellectual potential to effectively ensure the security of the USSR and the countries of the Socialist community. The US side should take this into account from the very outset.

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-- The US side asserts that the space-strike arms being developed within the framework of the SDI are being developed for defense. Of course, discussions about defense are a convenient front. But in reality the possible use of space-strike arms depends on the intentions of those who have them at their disposal. And these intentions may very well be determined by the illusion of impunity from a retaliatory strike by the other side. After all, it is no accident that apostles of the SDI are not in any way limiting their efforts to space, but are at the same time actively working to build up the offensive nuclear potential of the United States by giving all elements of that potential the capability of being used in a first strike.

-- It is also completely obvious that if so-called "defensive" space-based ABM systems are developed, they can serve as systems for striking analogous systems of the other side, not to mention military space objects for support purposes (spacecraft for communications, navigation, intelligence, meteorological support, topographic and geodesic support, early warning of missile attack, etc.), as well as those serving practical economic and scientific-research purposes.

-- And can there really be any doubt that even when using technologies already in existence, the relevant space-strike systems are fully capable of being used to strike targets in the earth's atmosphere and on its surface?

-- We cannot ignore all this, nor do we have the right to do so.

From DST-11-007 Soviet Plenary Statement 11 June 85

-- The US side has again spoken here in favor of "orderly," "predictable" and "stabilizing" deployment of space-strike arms. In this connection, we consider it necessary to emphasize once again that there can be no stabilizing manner of deploying space-strike arms. Once begun, such deployment will be difficult to predict. And it will not be orderly -- on the contrary, everything indicates that it will result in a galloping arms race in all areas.

* * *

-- The beginning of a race in space arms is by no means a

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remote, theoretical prospect, as the US delegation at times assures us here. The US side has made a number of official statement about its intention to demonstrate prototypes of space-strike arms soon. And tests of the ASAT anti-satellite system against an actual target in space are planned for the near future.

-- One should not think that the Soviet side will stand idly by and watch. As stated in 1983, the Soviet moratorium on putting anti-satellite arms into space is in force so long as and provided that other countries do not place such arms into space.

From DST-11-008 Post-plenary 11 June 85

-- Grinin then asked how SDI deployment would be managed and which weapons would be managed. Moser responded that Grinin's question was premature because SDI is presently a research program with no weapons as yet developed. He stated that the weapons we can manage now are those in our strategic and INF arsenals. He went on to say that if we were to agree to reduce these weapons now, then we would have taken the first step by limiting the arms race on earth, which was one of the objectives of the 8 January statement. He concluded by saying that if SDI research produces weapons, the United States has offered to jointly manage their deployment to prevent an arms race in space. Worden continued that while we do not have specific weapons now, we can talk about functional steps in the transition. He noted that the first step is to reduce offensive forces. Defenses could then be added, along with additional offensive reductions to stabilize the strategic relationship and add stability at each step. He continued that possible defenses may or may not be space-based. What we should be discussing now are the capability and effectiveness steps for a transition, not specific systems.

-- Grinin then asked if his conclusion was correct that the United States does not want to limit or ban weapons but just regulate systems under the SDI program. Wattawa responded that his question was not appropriate because SDI is a research program as Moser and Worden had explained. He continued that it was clear the Soviets understand the need for defenses and that should serve as a basis for discussion. He noted that the publication "Soviet Military Power" provided by Barry during the first round, clearly shows that the Soviets understand defensive capabilities and forces as reflected in their decades of work in the area. Consequently, the United States doesn't understand the

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Soviet reluctance to talk about a move to a defense dominant environment which would be safer for all peoples. Goryainov responded saying that the fact is that we have 40 years of stability based on mutual vulnerability. He stated that whether it is good or bad is not the question but that the Soviet side was convinced that we should not tamper with this foundation. He went on to say while fear of mutual annihilation is not the best basis for stability and is admittedly bad, but the Soviets don't want to change the foundation -- the Soviet Union is opposed to disrupting the foundation although they are not opposed to defense.

-- Grinin then continued stating that he did not understand what Wattawa's problem was. He asked how could the United States understand a transition without regulation, management, and control of SDI weapons. He indicated that all the United States seems to desire controlling is strategic offensive forces. He stated that the United States asserts that there are no weapons deployed under SDI yet. He then asked how the United States envisions the steps in a transition. Wattawa answered, noting that it was premature to completely answer Grinin's question now, but that the Soviet side would clearly see the details of our approach in future US statements. He went on stating that our goal is to President Reagan has clearly stated. He noted that it was the Soviet offensive force build-up that is making the world situation more unstable and that improved defenses on both sides would make the world safer -- which is a view the Soviets must share. Consequently, we must have a basis for discussion.

From DST-11-003 Soviet Plenary Statement 4 June 85

-- The US side has urged us to join it in studying the possible consequences of implementing the President's concept of a "Strategic Defense Initiative," advertising this as a means of preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on earth.

-- We have already provided our assessment of SDI as part of an overall offensive plan designed to destroy strategic parity and obtain military superiority and the capability of delivering a first nuclear strike with impunity. At the same time, we are perfectly willing to set forth once again our view on the consequences of what the US side is contemplating. We would ask, however, that you listen carefully to our words and try to understand that our objections are prompted by concern over the real possibility of serious destabilization of the situation and an increase in the military threat. And, of course, such a turn of events would not be in anyone's interest.

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-- If, as the US delegation stated on March 19, 1985, the US is in fact pursuing the objective of reaching agreement on measures which would ensure greater security for both sides, if it wants to build a stable strategic relationship between our two countries at significantly lower levels of nuclear armaments, if it wants to preserve the integrity of the regime established by the ABM Treaty, then the course of developing space-strike arms, which it has taken, precludes achievement of the above objectives. Such a course will lead to directly opposite results.

* * *

-- And as for discourses about "orderly" deployment of space-strike systems, these are either falsehoods or self-deception. The same can be said of assertions regarding the possibility of some sort of "stabilizing" deployment of only defensive space systems, which it is alleged, would not be arms in the strict sense of the word. If a new class of arms is permitted to emerge, its further development will acquire its own momentum. Experience with the emergence of nuclear arms demonstrates this quite eloquently. Only one conclusion is possible here, namely that the "Strategic Defense Initiative" does not and cannot bring about any stabilization of the relations between the US and the USSR. Nor will it bring tranquility or security to the world as a whole.

* * *

-- You believe that the process of making space-strike arms operational marks some sort of "period of transition to a more stable world with greatly reduced levels of nuclear arms." This is also not the case. The true picture would be different.

-- Even now the "Star Wars" program stands in the way of solutions for limiting and reducing nuclear systems. And this is understandable. When, under conditions of approximate parity, one side announces its intent to render as many as possible of the other side's arms "meaningless" and "obsolete," it cannot expect the other side to assist it in this endeavor. On the contrary, in order to ensure its own security, it will be compelled to do everything to prevent the success of such a project.

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-- No special shrewdness is required to realize that the transition period which the US side refers to would not be a period of increased stability in the world. Nor would it be a period during which the levels of nuclear arms would be lowered. It would be a period of an inevitable heightening of tension, of the appearance of ever newer and more sophisticated nuclear systems, as well as other arms, and of a corresponding increase in the nuclear threat, including the nuclear threat to the United States of America.

-- You are advocating a program whose success is not guaranteed even by its authors. What you will actually get --and you will most assuredly get it -- is twenty or more years of steady deterioration of US security and increased threat of military catastrophe. We do not understand why such a transition period, or such a prospect in general, should be so attractive.

From DST-1-013 Soviet Plenary Statement 16 April 85

-- During the SALT I negotiations the USSR and the US reached the joint conclusion that only an unambiguous renunciation of attempts to deploy any large-scale ABM Treaty ensures the necessary conditions for efforts to reduce strategic offensive arms. This was not an accidental or temporary conclusion; rather it ensued from the objective situation. The logic of nuclear confrontation is such that if one side acquires an additional potential just in ABM systems, this inevitably leads to upsetting the existing strategic parity, to destabilization, and to an increase in the risk of nuclear war. How much more serious and destabilizing, then, would be the appearance not just of additional anti-missile systems but of a whole new class of arms, namely, space-strike arms. The side which embarked on the path of developing such arms would obviously be seeking military superiority in the hope of acquiring the capability of delivering a first nuclear strike with impunity, having deprived the other side of its retaliatory capability or having substantially weakened that capability.

-- This is precisely how one should understand the meaning of the interrelationship between limitations on defensive and offensive arms and the reason why it was only the ban on large-scale ABM systems that opened the way for the process of limiting and reducing strategic nuclear arms in 1972. Herein also lies the meaning of the interrelationship between the question of preventing an arms race in space and the question of halting the arms race on earth, which was recorded in the joint Soviet-US

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statement of January 8, 1985. What we have here is one basic line, one premise, one indisputable conclusion, which was valid in 1972, which is still valid in 1985 and which will be valid for the foreseeable future. And it is certainly no accident that the preamble to the ABM Treaty emphasizes the "effective measures to limit anti-ballistic missile systems would be a substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms and would lead to a decrease in the risk of outbreak of war involving nuclear weapons." This provision is recorded in the Treaty, which is of unlimited duration. It must serve as the guiding principle for the actions of the two sides both now and in the future.

* * *

-- While eroding the reliable basis established by the ABM Treaty and proven in practice, the US is attempting to justify its actions by presenting a concept which comes down to the following: in the current situation, where significant technological developments are taking place, possibilities are opening up for strengthening security through a substantial improvement in strategic defense systems. The US contends that this process will render offensive arms powerless and useless and will all but automatically lead to the elimination of nuclear weapons. And at the same time the US itself is stepping up its programs for both nuclear and space-strike arms. The lack of substance and, what is more, the danger of such an approach are obvious. The development of a fundamentally new class of weapons, i.e., space-strike arms, would have consequences which at this time it is even difficult to foresee. The arms race would not be halted; on the contrary, it would even be given new impetus. The introduction of qualitatively new systems into the structure of strategic forces would considerably alter the whole system used for assessing the strategic balance, would increase the risk of ambiguity and uncertainty on both sides, and would increase mutual suspicion as a result, the world would be faced with a drastic increase in political and military tension, the security of our countries would sharply decrease, and efforts to limit and reduce offensive arms would be blocked. In a case like this, how in the world can one talk about a sensible approach to questions of peace and security?

From DST-1-007 Soviet Plenary Statement 2 Apr 85

-- In other words, it is being suggested that we talk up a storm about nothing, while the US feverishly tries to take the

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high ground of military superiority in space. And as if that were not enough, at the same time the US side graciously proposes that we shelve the question of space-strike arms and reach an accord on reducing strategic nuclear arms in order to make the system being developed by the US for protecting itself from a retaliatory strike function more effectively.

-- We readily believe the US side's statement at the last meeting that such a turn of events would be "central" for it. But this would in no way serve the objectives of strengthening stability. In order to resolve the question of nuclear arms, an honest and constructive solution to the issue of space is required. In order to radically reduce strategic offensive arms, it is necessary to ban space-strike arms. Anyone who does not want an agreement on space does not want an agreement on nuclear arms either. Thus and only thus can the matter be viewed.

From DST-1-004 Soviet Plenary Statement 26 March 85

-- Today the space arms group is beginning its work. As the USSR delegation emphasized at plenary meetings, the question of preventing an arms race in space is of priority importance. The Soviet side, of course, advocates that all the questions assigned to the negotiations be considered in a businesslike, specific manner, and in parallel, with all three areas -- space, strategic and medium-range arms -- considered in linkage with each other. However, it is obvious that if things were to move toward implementation of programs to develop space-strike arms, including the development of large-scale ABM systems with space-based elements, i.e., what you addressed so eloquently just now, then limitations and reductions of nuclear arms would become impossible. Moreover, there would be an impetus for developing new systems and kinds of such arms and making them operational. This would have a highly negative effect on strategic stability and a negative impact on the negotiations. On the other hand, progress by the space arms group in resolving the questions assigned to it -- and we would again like to remind you of this -- would act as a stimulus for considering and solving problems in other areas of the negotiations.

From NST-1-021 Soviet Plenary 21 March 85

-- A cardinal solution that would block all channels for an arms race in space is precisely what is required now. Only a ban on the entire class of space-strike arms can provide a truly effective solution.

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-- This would be a step of immense importance. Such a solution would protect our countries -- and, indeed, all humanity -- from a new, exhausting spiral in the arms race and would reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war. Conversely, development and deployment of space-strike arms would bring about an unprecedented destabilization of the strategic situation, an increase in political tensions, an intensified arms build-up in all areas, and the diversion of vast material and intellectual resources from the solution of crucial problems of global significance, problems which involve the very future of our planet and civilization. Together we have a political and moral duty to prevent this.

From NST-1-021 Soviet Plenary Statement 21 March 85

-- Naturally, in discussing questions related to space arms, we do not intend to consider some kind of joint schedules for violating the ABM Treaty and suspending over the planet one series of space-strike arms after another. The Soviet Union is not a partner for plans of that kind.

-- Let me now turn to the question of strategic offensive arms. As indicated above, it is very closely connected with the subject of space.

-- If the US side would agree to work in the negotiations toward a total ban on space-strike arms, this would open the way for considering the possibility or reaching agreement on radical reductions in strategic offensive arms. These reductions would involve both the total number of nuclear weapons on all strategic delivery vehicles themselves.

-- In the context of such a radical solution the sides could also assume a mutual obligation to fully refrain from programs for the development and deployment of new kinds and types of strategic offensive arms, namely, long-range cruise missiles of all basing modes, ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers.

From NST-1-008 Soviet Plenary

-- For objective reasons the question of space strike weapons is now of key, priority importance. If implemented, the US administration's plans to extend the arms race to space would lead to a sharp increase in the nuclear threat. Attempts to camouflage these plans with references to some sort of

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"defensive" considerations are nothing more than sophistry and playing with words. This is by no means a matter of defense; rather it involves measures which are part of an overall offensive plan designed to destroy strategic parity, as well as to obtain military superiority and the capability of delivering a first nuclear strike with impunity. Such designs cannot but give rise to legitimate concern. It is quite obvious that these are incompatible with the task of reducing and completely eliminating nuclear weapons.

-- If, in defiance of common sense and the will of the overwhelming majority of states, which has been clearly expressed at the United Nations, the US were to take to course of implementing space militarization programs, including the development of a large-scale ABM system with space-based elements. This would have the gravest consequences. The Soviet Treaty on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems, which is of unlimited duration, would be wrecked and many other international agreements now in force would be undermined. Limitations and reductions of strategic offensive arms would become impossible moreover, there would be an impetus for developing new systems and kinds of strategic arms and making them operational.

-- The development of space strike weapons would inevitably be a catalyst for an unrestrained arms race in other areas as well. All this taken together would have a highly negative effect on strategic stability and would increase the risk of outbreak of nuclear war. Peace on earth would become even more precarious.

-- The USSR delegation would like to emphasize that if the United States moves toward the militarization of space, this would ultimately blow the negotiations apart. The responsibility for this would rest entirely with the US. We are stating this bluntly from the very outset of the negotiations so that there be no ambiguities on this score and no need to talk about this in the future during the discussion of specific issues.

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D4: What would be the possibilities for evolution of a non-cooperative transition and what would be the implications for stability of various alternatives?

From DST-11-011 Soviet Plenary 18 June 85

-- In this connection, I would like to recall an old truth: he who digs a hole will fall into it and he who knocks down a fence shall be bitten by a serpent. The development of a large-scale ABM system and the resulting inevitable destruction of the ABM Treaty will force the other side to take countermeasures. This would be dictated by the interests of maintaining stability and preventing illusions about the possibility of delivering a nuclear attack with impunity.

-- It is completely obvious that the other side can take the path of building up and qualitatively improving its nuclear arms, with the aim of saturating and penetrating or circumventing the ABM system of its adversary. It can take the path of developing systems to counter an ABM system and the path of parallel deployment of its own ABM system.

-- All this would inevitably be accompanied by a race in the quantitative buildup and qualitative improvement of the respective systems. The US side must realize that it is impossible today to foresee all the consequences of such a course of events. In any case, it would be idle for the US side to count on the other side's taking the course of copying US programs and acting within the framework of the schemes to change the correlation of forces in the international arena, devised by the United States for its own benefit. We are warning you about this in advance.

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