


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DDCI

Meeting with Secretary Weinberger

9 May 1986

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5/14 (DDCI did not attend)*



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8 May 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Meeting with Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense,
9 May 1986

1. You are scheduled for a breakfast meeting with Secretary Weinberger and Deputy Secretary Taft tomorrow at 0715 at the Pentaton.

2. The following items were coordinated with the Secretary's staff:

NO TAB Secretary Weinberger wishes to hear from you about the front page piece in Wednesday's Post on the potential for prosecuting the press under the 1950 COMINT statute, as well as the Post piece yesterday on reported reactions in the Justice Department.

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NO TAB Ability of Abu Abbas to Launch Attacks in the United States. Abbas believes the United States is responsible for the pressure on him which has limited his mobility and restricted his access to press interviews. He has made several threats against US and Israeli personnel and facilities since the Achille Lauro operation last October and Abbas' subsequent exile in Iraq. In mid-March Abbas first threatened that his group would launch terrorist attacks within the United States--using US citizens--if US pressure against him continued. We doubt that he has an immediate capability to make good on his threats, however, since the PLF's operational capabilities are even more limited now than before the Achille Lauro hijacking.

- The FBI does not believe the PLF has built a network or placed operatives in the US.
- At the moment, the Iraqi government seems to be keeping Abbas on a short leash and there are few other Arab governments willing to receive him.

Over the longer term, we must take seriously his threats to target the US directly. At least prior to Achille Lauro, the PLF had support networks throughout West Europe. We know about a high-level meeting of the PLF held last month in Baghdad in which the creation of a covert apparatus to operate in an unspecified hostile environment was discussed.

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TAB B West European Reactions to US Decisions on SALT II Compliance. You may wish to pass to Secretary Weinberger a copy of George Kolt's paper on West European reaction to a future US decision on whether or not to continue SALT II compliance.

The next US decision point on SALT II will come this fall when the US will be in a position to take a militarily significant action beyond SALT II constraints--namely the continued conversion of B-52s to ALCM carriers without corresponding reductions of MIRVed ICBMs or SSBMs. George argues that such a step would be an unmistakable message to the Soviets that they must either forget about using arms control to create a more predictable military environment or move into a new arms control regime that entails genuine reductions and compliance.

Unfortunately, European governments are signaling us that they would prefer indefinite compliance with SALT II--a preference that runs counter to the President's implied warning in NSDD-222. A US decision to move beyond SALT II limits could pose difficult political problems for the French, Italian and British governments.

- In France, cohabitation rivalry is already making French foreign policy less predictable and prey to the Mitterrand-Chirac power struggle.
- In the UK, prominent Labor leaders are trying to capitalize on the negative public reaction to Thatcher's decision on the US strikes against Libya and to make the "special relationship" with the US a partisan issue.
- In Italy, differences among the parties which form Prime Minister Craxi's coalition government run deep and have become increasingly strained over foreign policy, where Foreign Minister Andreotti's compromising approach to Libya, as well as the Soviet Union, have irritated not only his coalition partners but also members of his own party.

NO TAB Status of the NRO. You may wish to raise with Secretary Weinberger your concerns about the situation at the NRO.

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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC No. 002146-86
30 April 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: George Kolt
National Intelligence Officer for Europe

SUBJECT: Proposed Discussion Item for DCI Meeting with
Admiral Poindexter, National Security Council

1. European governments have reacted approvingly to the President's decision to continue abiding by the mutual restraints of SALT II but, as Paul Nitze's conversations in Bonn and Rome show, they are also signalling us they would prefer indefinite compliance with SALT II. This European preference runs counter to the President's implied warning in NSDD 222 that this was the last time the US would countenance Soviet arms control violations without taking action itself.

2. The next US decision point on SALT II will come this fall when, for the first time, the US will be in a position to take a militarily significant action that will involve acquisition of new weapons systems beyond the SALT II constraints--namely the continued conversion of B-52's to ALCM carriers without corresponding reductions of MIRVed ICBMs or SSBMs.

3. This decision will be a strategic one and, thus, even more significant than the Carter Administration's tactical decision in 1979 not to seek ratification of SALT II. The upcoming decision could in effect be the coup de grace for the arms control regime of the 70's. It could be an unmistakable message to the Soviets that they must either forget about using arms control to create a more predictable military environment or move into a new arms control regime--one that entails genuine reductions, genuine verification and genuine compliance.

4. The intrinsic difficulty of taking such a step is clear:

-- Arms control may not have the sentimental support it had in the 70s but it still has many powerful devotees.

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- The Europeans are generally among those devotees and will undoubtedly maintain their preference for deploring hostile actions--in this case Soviet arms control violations--rather than doing anything about them. Given the importance to the West as a whole of the North Atlantic Alliance, this is a factor that must be taken into account. But it should not be the primary determining factor as some may urge.
- Finally, and probably most importantly, there is the question of which side is better prepared for a break-out should arms control as epitomized by SALT II be abandoned.

The answer to that question hinges not so much on production capabilities as on the development of a long-range strategy and programs to support it.

5. Besides these intrinsic problems, timing will be difficult:

- As things now stand, fall will be the time when the US and the Soviets are preparing for the next Summit. The administration thus will be under pressure not to jeopardize the Summit by abandoning SALT II constraints. A better way to look at the situation might be to foresee that the US will have this SALT II action as potential leverage over Soviet decisions during this period . . . whereas the Soviets could conceivably goad the US into abandonment of the SALT II treaty if they wanted either an excuse to cancel the Summit or a propaganda advantage.
- From the perspective of Europe we will need to think very specifically about the effect of our decision on the FRG where the campaign for the January 1987 federal elections will be going into full gear.

6. We will also need to consider the effect of our decision on France, Italy, and the UK where internal political strains have complicated foreign policy debates and formulation. In France, cohabitation rivalry is already making French foreign policy less predictable and prey to the Mitterrand-Chirac power struggle. In the UK, prominent Labor leaders are trying to capitalize on the negative public reaction to Thatcher's decision on the US strikes against Libya and to make the "special relationship" with the US a partisan issue. In Italy, differences among the parties which form Prime Minister Craxi's coalition government run deep and have become increasingly strained over foreign policy where Foreign Minister Andreotti's compromising approach to Libya as well as the Soviet Union have irritated not only his coalition partners but also members of his own party. The upshot of these domestic policy debates is that the governments concerned probably will prefer a US policy of "no change" in order to avoid having to make controversial decisions themselves.


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7. In sum, it seems rather predictable that if we come to the next decision point without having formulated and having discussed with our allies a long-term strategy, the politics of the moment will again dictate a decision to continue abiding by SALT II restraints. This may or may not be the best course for us, but it certainly should not be decided principally on ephemeral reasons. It, thus, seems imperative that we begin developing a game plan that will see us at least through the next year.



George Kolt

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