

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP

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TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	EXDIR				
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI	X			
6	DDA				
7	DDO				
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC		X		
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/OLL				
14	D/PAO				
15	D/PERS				
16	VC/NIC				
17	NIO/USSR		X		
18	<i>ex</i>				
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SUSPENSE _____
Date

Remarks

[Redacted Signature Area]

Executive Secretary
17 Oct 86
Date

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Executive Registry
86- 4815

16 October 1986

NOTE TO: Deputy Director for Intelligence
FROM: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Soviet Analysis

1. I continue to worry that we are not being creative enough in the way we are analyzing internal Soviet developments. It seems to me we are looking at Soviet domestic (social) and economic issues in terms of relatively straight line projections, based on the methodologies and data sources that have dominated our analysis in the past, without opening new lines of inquiry, asking new questions and exploiting previously underutilized sources. [redacted]

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2. For example, with respect to new questions,

-- From talking to [redacted] people who are in touch with middle level Soviet officials in one way or another, I sense that there is a great deal more turbulence and unhappiness in the Soviet Union than we are conveying in anything we have written. I am hearing that there is growing restiveness over Gorbachev's demand that people work harder and drink less and yet his failure to provide any additional compensations or measures to ease daily living. If this is true popularly, then to what degree is it reflected also at lower levels of the Party, where these demands are joined by the campaign against corruption and the removal of job security? While I do not disagree with our analysis that his leadership is not threatened directly, to what degree may his effectiveness as a national leader and his internal and foreign policies be affected by a growing and perceptible undercurrent of resistance and unhappiness both in the Party and in the population as a whole. Is his honeymoon over? I just sense from what I hear and read that there is a great deal more turbulence under the surface in the Soviet Union than we have conveyed to anyone and that it has potentially important ramifications for both Gorbachev and us. I just don't sense that we're digging into this enough.

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-- Similarly, with the economy. It seems to me that our work on the economy still is very traditional. It strikes me that it is less important that Gorbachev raise the level of GNP growth than the kind of growth that he is achieving -- that is, the imperative for modernization. What kind of success is he having here? Again, this ties back into the first point. How long can he sustain any improvement with an increasingly disillusioned public that expected change and doesn't feel that its getting it. In this connection, I continue to believe that we have not paid enough attention to emigre Soviet economists and others because some of the things they say don't square with our economic models or perceptions -- and this doesn't have to do simply with defense spending.

[Redacted]

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-- To what degree, if at all, have we failed to give adequate attention to what Gorbachev actually has done? While we have talked about tinkering with the system, has he actually done a great deal more than that and set in motion even more to create the possibility of qualitative change in the Soviet system over a several year period. We seem to be focusing on changes in the party and government -- what about the economy? Are we missing some significant changes underway? I am concerned that we are so caught up in the day to day tactical and discrete changes he is making and measuring them against some larger objective called "reform," that we may not be pulling together all the strands in such a way as to identify the cumulative scope of what he is up to.

-- I was intrigued when some SOVA analysts told me about the changes at both the writers and cinematographers congresses. Using these as a base line, has Gorbachev set in motion a "thaw" in the Soviet Union, which will be difficult for the Soviet leadership to control?

[Redacted]

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3. In sum, I am worried that there are a lot of questions that one hears from Soviet analysts and in discussions with various people that we are not doing any publishing on. I am concerned that we are in a rut and may not be recognizing significant change in the Soviet Union even as it is taking place. I'm not arguing that all these things are true. I just don't see the issues being addressed in our publications. Everything seems too pat.

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Robert M. Gates

cc: DCI
NIO/USSR