

**EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP**

TO:		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
	1 DCI		X ³		
	2 DDCI		X ⁴		
	3 EXDIR				
	4 D/ICS				
	5 DDI	X /			
	6 DDA				
	7 DDO				
	8 DDS&T				
	9 Chm/NIC				
	10 GC				
	11 IG				
	12 Compt				
	13 D/OLL				
	14 D/PAO				
	15 D/PERS				
	16 VC/NIC				
	17 ES		X ⁵		
	18 ER		X ²		
	19				ER
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		SUSPENSE	26 APR 86		

Remarks To 5: Please provide your comments, as requested.

[Redacted Signature Box]

Executive Secretary
23 Aep 86

Date

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Executive Registry	
86-	4269

22 September 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Restructuring the IC Staff

I like the idea of restructuring the IC Staff along these lines with an analytic/requirements group and a broader and more effective committee structure for SIGINT, HUMINT, and IMINT. What do you think?



William J. Casey

Attachment:

Non-Memorandum from General Odom, subj. A Radical Approach to a Conservative Intelligence



L-212-15



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NON-MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: A Radical Approach to a Conservative Intelligence
Strategy

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1. I promised you that I would offer an "off-line" approach to meeting your requirement for a comprehensive intelligence strategy. It is "conservative" in the sense of being rather straight forward, simple, and related to U.S. commitments and user intelligence needs. It is radical in that to implement it you would have to make dramatic changes in program manager responsibilities, to include creating fundamentally new program managers for IMINT and HUMINT.

2. The logic of the memo is:

- define the "threat" to U.S. interests;
 - state briefly U.S. military and political commitments regionally and functionally;
 - clarify intelligence requirements in light of the threat and commitments;
 - describe our intelligence structure and capabilities to meet requirements;
 - set forth the functions required of each collection discipline (HUMINT, IMINT, SIGINT, and analysis);
- and,

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-- then add to each discipline a brief statement of its strategy for meeting the future requirements of the coming decade.

3. We do not operate this way today because you do not have program managers aligned to be responsible for individual disciplines. As a result, when the IC Staff tries to structure alternatives for resource increases or decreases, the results are not logical ties between "inputs" (money and manpower) and "outputs" (intelligence product) in the context of threats and policy/operational commitments. For example, in the recent program drills, IC Staff guidance to PMs affects SIGINT in the the GDIP, the CIAP, and the NRP as well as the CCP. I have no way of knowing if this makes sense. Nor does the IC Staff. If you had three collection program managers and an analysis program manager, then each could give you a coherent program with regard to outputs of intelligence. You and the IC Staff could then deal with cross-discipline trade offs (e.g., can we drop some SIGINT because HUMINT or IMINT can do the job?) and questions of quality and quantity of intelligence (e.g., do we really need to know about some things on the national intelligence requirements lists; and do we want to know more or less about a target, can we get by with less?).

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4. The DIRNSA is the logical manager for SIGINT and is more nearly in that position than is the case for any of the other

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disciplines. The CIA/DDO could take a DIRNSA-like role for HUMINT and deal with the military services and the foreign service (State) like I deal with the military services (SCEs working under my OPCON and tasking). You have no imagery manager; COMIREX is somewhat in that posture, but it has no program control. A new position with an institutional base needs to be created for this role. Your DDI could be the analysis program manager; or you split this function between military and non-military (DIA and DDI). In any event, the Director of DIA would be the major military producer.

5. I have left out two functions: counterintelligence and covert action. Each needs a tsar, in my view, and I have some ideas on structure, but for this purpose here, I believe you can see how my proposal for a "strategy" would necessitate a different management for both CI (crossing FBI, Treasury, DoD, CIA, and others) and covert action (where we need a review of who supplies the paramilitary forces, who does the non-military covert action, and who commands and controls both kinds of operations -- big issues between you and DoD, but I believe you could acquire virtual "OPCON" over all Special Operations Forces in DoD in exchange for abandoning CIA paramilitary and retaining all CIA non-paramilitary covert action. In the meanwhile, if you don't take some measure like this, Congressman Daniels will take it for you and the SECDEF by creating an independent agency and a C2 nightmare.

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6. I realize these are fairly sweeping proposals for change, but as I suggest in the title of this memo, they are radical organizationally but conservative fiscally and with regard to intelligence capabilities.

7. If you find the concept more serious than amusing, then I would like to talk with you about it.

WILLIAM E. ODOM

Lieutenant General, USA

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