



Central Intelligence Agency
Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence

24 Nov

Note for DDT.

This is a good summary of the use of intelligence in this administration. It probably overstates some achievements at list to make the point.

Major point is that intelligence (people and information) has been intimately involved in the policy process. We have had an opportunity to be heard even if we don't always see the policy as coming directly out of our product. (That is not surprising, intelligence is just one input)

Dick

23 November 1986

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USE OF INTELLIGENCE IN REAGAN ADMINISTRATION

Process

- Better use of intelligence than any Administration since the war.
 - First time all NSC principals have read PDB. Same base of current intelligence. Dialogue with briefs has given us best feedback ever.
 - First time all NSC principals get National Estimates directly and in brief form.
 - First time principals have had (and used) opportunity to get long range CIA research papers directly, based on list each week in PDB.
 - Better access, use of intelligence and dialogue at lower levels too (Assistant Secretaries, etc.).
 - Greater participation and opportunity to express their views for chiefs of all intelligence components (military, State, NSA, FBI, Treasury, etc.) in formulation and finalization of intelligence estimates.
 - More intelligence sanitized for use with public than ever before: Soviet strategic forces, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Libya, terrorism, etc.

- Problem areas.
 - Almost no principals give us regular feedback on NIEs, good or bad, or other products or reporting either.
 - Few senior policymakers give us any time or energy on requirements, current or long range.
 - If policy agency has different view, intelligence is frequently ignored or discounted.
 - Few have come to us to complain intelligence not objective
 - only example, Shultz to me on Angola.

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Observations

- CPPG has been a useful policy vehicle and opportunity for second level officials to integrate intelligence information - same set of officials as core built mutual confidence and familiarity (and trust) at sub-NSC level. Few, if any, leaks in six years.
- State has become more shrill in attacking intelligence in last year or two [redacted] State disassociates self from some NIEs, footnotes most, questions value of many.
- In trying to get Presidential decisions by by-passing NSC meetings, Secretary of State shuts him off from views other than State's (Angola, sometimes Middle East and Central America, Reykjavik). Consequences on those occasions frequently bad.
- Absence of written summary of NSC meetings circulated to principals leaves them uncertain or disagreed about what National Security Adviser or President took away from the meeting. Not an orderly process that gives people confidence that President has seen and understood all points of view, including the intelligence.

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