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NFIC 64.4/74B
7 March 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Assistant, DDCI
FROM: Executive Secretary, NFIC
SUBJECT: NFIC Comments on CIPC's Mobile Missile Study
REF: NFIC 64.4/74A



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The Secretariat this morning unexpectedly received an additional comment on the Critical Intelligence Problems Committee's Soviet Land-Based Mobile Missile Study, this one from MGen Bissell, Air Force Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence. He concurs with the study and anticipates additional work. His comments, thus, do not alter the content of my memorandum to the DDCI of 5 March 1986 on this matter, but should be added to the package of comments.



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Attachment:
USAF ACSI Memorandum, 28 February 1986



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B-302-IR

SUBJECT: NFIC Comments on CIPC's Mobile Missile Study

Distribution: NFIC 64.4/74B

- 1 - EA/DDCI
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ES/NFIC/ (7 Mar 86)

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, D.C.

28 FEB 1986

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: INSUBJECT: Critical Intelligence Problem Committee's (CIPC) Soviet Land-Based Mobile Missile Study (S)

TO: Executive Secretary, NFIC

1. (S) I have reviewed the CIPC study and concur with its findings. Its conclusions are consistent with previous inquiries which indicate our ability to hold relocatable targets at risk will emanate from an evolution of intelligence capabilities, planning procedures, and computing power as opposed to a single "revolutionary" development.
2. (S) Members of my staff have recently participated in an Air Staff working group reviewing technology developments that may be applied for attacking relocatable targets. We reviewed technologies that apply to collection, processing, fusion, command and control, and providing a suitable force structure. We also took a cut at costing the solutions. Our conclusions were similar to yours. An interesting issue which surfaced is the possibility of investigating a mix of strategies for neutralizing mobile missiles which includes the Strategic Defense Initiative.
3. (S) Although an important milestone in addressing the Soviet land-based offensive mobile missile threat, the study cannot be considered the final word on the subject. We look forward to working with the CIPC Mobile Missile Panel on further efforts to improve the capability of intelligence to address the different aspects of this critical problem.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Schuyler Bissell".

SCHUYLER BISSELL Maj Gen, USAF
Asst Chief of Staff, Intelligence

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NFIC 64.4/74A
5 March 1986


MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Executive Secretary
National Foreign Intelligence Council

SUBJECT: NFIC Comments on Mobile Missile Study

John:


1. Attached, per your request, are the comments provided by the NFIC principals on the Critical Intelligence Problems Committee's Soviet Land-Based Mobile Missile Study.

- CIA recommends the study not be published for a variety of reasons.
- State concurs, but only if changes are made in the study's treatment of monitoring mobile missiles.
- Navy concurs implicitly and requests that sea-based mobile missiles be given greater attention.  also implicitly concurs, suggesting three modest changes.
- NSA, DIA, and OSD (C3I) concur with the study as written.
- The other principals did not comment, which the Secretariat takes as concurrence.

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
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SUBJECT: NFIC Comments on Mobile Missile Study

2. In view of the varied reactions to this study, do you wish an NFIC meeting called to discuss its disposition?



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Attachments:

- A. CIA Comments 
- B. State Comments (TS 0413-86, Copy 1)
- C. Navy Comments 
- D. 

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

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Yes: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

No: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Date: _____

*Lets have study updated
with the STAP approach
& mobile missiles and
also input from SACs
study them we can get
it out*

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[Redacted]

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SUBJECT: NFIC Comments on Mobile Missile Study

2. In view of the varied reactions to this study, do you wish an NFIC meeting called to discuss its disposition?

[Redacted]

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Attachments:

- A. CIA Comments [Redacted]
- B. State Comments [Redacted]
- C. Navy Comments ([Redacted])
- D. [Redacted]

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Yes:

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

No:

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Date: _____

[Redacted]

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Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

21 February 1986
Copy 1 of 14

[Redacted]

Series B, Copy 2

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Secretary
National Foreign Intelligence Council

FROM: [Redacted]

Executive Director

SUBJECT: Non-Concurrence with the Critical Intelligence Problem
Committee's Report Entitled Soviet Land-Based Mobile Missile
Study [Redacted]

1. This memorandum responds to your request for comments on the subject report. This Agency believes that the best course of action is to leave the study in its current form and not publish it under NFIB auspices. [Redacted]

2. The CIPC Mobile Missile report has provided some extremely useful information and resulted in increased Intelligence Community awareness of the enormity of the mobile missile problem. However, the report was drafted a year ago and the CIA demurral over six months ago. Since that time, our knowledge of Soviet mobile missile activities has increased. Intelligence Community sources and assessments have also been modified. Further, targeting and arms control concepts have changed so that the judgments in the CIPC's report must be reconsidered and modified if the report is to be completed formally. [Redacted]

3. The fact is that this report has already had much of its intended impact. Much of the significant recommended work--including a major systems development study by the NRO--is already underway. In any case, if the report is to be published as an NFIB document, at a minimum, it needs major updating and revision. However, because the CIPC Mobile Missile Panel Chairman and first two Executive Secretaries are no longer available, and virtually all of the original panel representatives have changed, this would require a major effort. [Redacted]

4. Both a year ago and particularly now--as things have evolved--our major problems are with the substance of the report. First and foremost, the key portions of this report--ranging from targeting to arms control--are out of balance with one another. Specifically:

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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Attachment B

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NO. PAGES 2	NO. OF ATTACHMENTS (CIA T.S. # of Attachment) None	BRANCH, BADGE #, OR LOCATION DCI/ICS		LOGGED BY BD

SUBJECT:

CIPC's Soviet Land-Based Mobile Missile Study

<u>CIA SOURCE INFORMATION</u> ORIGINATOR		<u>EXTERNAL SOURCE INFORMATION</u> ORIGINATOR		
DIRECTORATE DCI	OFFICE/BRANCH ICS/NFIB	AGENCY State	CONTROL NUMBER	COPY NO.

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Attachment C

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON, DC 20350-2000

IN REPLY REFER TO

Ser 009F/6S362555
25 February 1986

SECRET - NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

MEMORANDUM FOR NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL SECRETARIAT

Subj: The Critical Intelligence Problems Committee's Soviet Land-Based Mobile Missile Study (U)

Ref: (a) Draft CIPC Study TCS 1715-85/1

1. (S) Navy has reviewed the statement of the problem and proposed solutions stated in reference (a) for mitigating intelligence deficiencies in the area of Soviet mobile missiles. We are concerned that the study focuses exclusively on the development and application of new sensor capabilities to the land-based problem. The land-based mobile missile problem is very close in concept and solution to the sea-based mobile missile problem. Land, sea (and air) mobile missile challenges should be addressed as integral, complementary elements of the larger "Soviet strategic forces" problem. They are not, and should not be treated as competing, unique problems.

2. (S) At the 1985 off-site conference, the community leadership was in agreement that the land-based mobile missile problem constitutes only a part of the larger strategic problem and that a coordinated intelligence attack on one aspect of the mobile missile problem cannot be made in isolation from other crucial aspects of the same problem. We endorse this approach and recommend expanding the scope of reference (a) to include all aspects of the strategic relocatable targets problem.

RICHARD L. HAVER
Deputy Director of Naval
Intelligence

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