

**EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT  
ROUTING SLIP**

TO:		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
	1 DCI		X		
	2 DDCI		X		
	3 EXDIR		X		
	4 D/ICS		X		
	5 DDI				
	6 DDA		X		
	7 DDO		X		
	8 DDS&T				
	9 Chm/NIC				
	10 GC				
	11 IG				
	12 Compt				
	13 D/OLL		X		
	14 D/PAO				
	15 VC/NIC				
	16 CH, SECOM		X		
	17 C/CI/DO		X		
	18 C/CCIS/ICS		X		
	19 NIO/FDIO/DI		X		
	20				
	21				
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		SUSPENSE	_____		
			Date		

Remarks

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Executive Secretary

6 Aug 85

Date

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STAT

WILLIAM V. ROY, JR. DELAWARE  
WILLIAM S. COYNE, MAINE  
OPPRIN HATCH, UTAH  
FRANK MURKOWSKI, ALASKA  
ARLEN SPECTER, PENNSYLVANIA  
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# United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE  
WASHINGTON, DC 20510

Executive Registry
85- 3078

ROBERT DOLE, KANSAS, EX OFFICIO  
ROBERT C. BYRD, WEST VIRGINIA, EX OFFICIO  
  
BERNARD F. McMANOR, STAFF DIRECTOR  
ERIC D. NEWSOM, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR

June 20, 1985

85-2129

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

60-4

Dear Mr. President:

Earlier today, I was asked to lead the opposition to a proposal by Senator Byrd and others to establish a National Commission on Security and Espionage. Such a Commission would have had four members appointed by the Congress and four by the President. We who opposed the proposal prevailed by a 50-48 margin.

I accepted the task of opposing the Byrd amendment because of a strong belief that the proposal would delay action on this immediate and serious problem for at least 18 months and probably longer. We are all committed to move as quickly as possible -- and that is most appropriately done within the existing structure. A crucial element in my conviction that we can make the current system respond quickly was the informal commitment that I had received from the Administration to full and complete support for the Senate Intelligence Committee's current study of the Soviet intelligence threat and U.S. counterintelligence and security programs.


It will be helpful to the Committee to have your personal commitment to Administration support of our enterprise, at each stage: determining how best to examine the problem; jointly developing recommendations; and ensuring implementation of improvements. Such an explicit commitment will not only facilitate the work of the Committee, but also help us when the Byrd proposal is raised again, which is quite likely.

You and we share an historic opportunity -- both to dramatically improve U.S. counterintelligence and

The President  
June 20, 1985  
Page Two

security and to demonstrate how Congress and the Executive can work together to achieve progress in sensitive intelligence areas. With your firm support, I am sure we can accomplish much indeed.

Sincerely,



Dave Durenberger  
Chairman

cc: The Honorable George P. Shultz  
The Honorable Caspar W. Weinberger  
The Honorable Edwin Meese, III  
The Honorable William Webster  
The Honorable William J. Casey

WILLIAM V. ROY  
WILLIAM S. COY  
ORRIN HATCH, UTAH  
FRANK MURKOWSKI, ALASKA  
ARLEN SPECTER, PENNSYLVANIA  
CHIC HECHT, NEVADA  
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PATRICK LEAHY, VERMONT, VICE CHAIRMAN  
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WASHINGTON, DC 20510

Executive Registry

85-

3078/1

ROBERT DOLE, KANSAS, EX OFFICIO  
ROBERT C. BYRD, WEST VIRGINIA, EX OFFICIO

July 12, 1985

85-2729/1

Dear Colleague:

We are all aware of recent compromises of U.S. security through the activities of hostile intelligence services. These events underline the seriousness of the espionage threat against the United States.

In view of this threat, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence can offer as a service to all Members of the Senate and to other interested committees a program to improve security procedures and practices among staff employees and in personal offices. This letter outlines that security program.

The Intelligence Committee can provide:

- Procedures for your staff office to arrange for the Capitol Police Special Investigations Branch to conduct electronic sweeps of your personal offices. The SSCI security staff is available to help with the necessary arrangements at your convenience.
- Scheduling for briefings on the threat of hijacking and the expectations, reactions and ability to cope in a hostage situation.
- Scheduling for briefings on defensive security when Members plan to travel abroad. These briefings, with modifications, can be extended to accompanying family members and staff as well.
- Briefings prepared by the FBI and NSA, at the SSCI request, designed to heighten security awareness and increase sensitivity to hostile intelligence efforts against employees of the Senate. SSCI security staff will begin scheduling these presentations on a regular basis and will issue notices well in advance so that those on your staff whom you wish to attend can make the necessary arrangements.

- In conjunction with security awareness briefings given to Senate employees, SSCI security staff have arranged for FBI Headquarters to make available similar briefings for Members' state office staffs. Our security staff is ready to make the appropriate arrangements for these briefings upon your request.
- The SSCI security staff is also available to review security procedures and practices in Members' personal offices. The same service is also available to any Committee which deals with classified material.
- The SSCI security staff is available to render advice and assistance on specific security questions which may arise from time to time in your personal offices.

We encourage every Member of the Senate to take advantage of these services. The security threat is real and we all must do our part in defeating it. Requests for assistance or for further information may be made to the Security Director of the Select Committee on Intelligence, at extension 41700.

Sincerely,



Dave Durenberger  
Chairman



Patrick Leahy  
Vice Chairman

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301

WILLIAM V. ROTH, JR., DELAWARE  
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# United States Senate

Executive Registry
85- 3078/3

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE  
WASHINGTON, DC 20510

ROBERT DOLE, KANSAS, EX OFFICIO  
ROBERT C. BYRD, WEST VIRGINIA, EX OFFICIO  
  
BERNARD F. McMAHON, STAFF DIRECTOR  
ERIC D. NEWSOM, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR

#85-2695

August 2, 1985

copy 4 85-2729/3

The Honorable Robert C. McFarlane  
Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

60-4

Dear Bud:

The Chairman has asked me to let you know what the Intelligence Committee is doing in its review of counter-intelligence and security programs in order to help us keep the Executive and Legislative branch efforts on parallel tracks during the August recess.

At the Senatorial level, we have held closed hearings on the Walker case and its impact, the situation regarding the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, and the nature of the hostile intelligence service threat. Senator Durenberger, in addition to writing the President, also sent a letter to Senators Roth and Eagleton (with a copy to the Minority Leader) showing how we are pursuing the Senate's interest in these matters, which was so forcefully demonstrated in the debate and vote on Senator Byrd's proposal of a National Commission. A copy of those letters is enclosed for your information.

The Committee and its staff have moved quickly and carefully to improve our own security programs, so that we and the Senate as a whole will also meet the security challenge. We are establishing a focal point for security clearance requests, regularizing our own compartmentation of sensitive information, and developing the role of our press officer to help each of our Members avoid unintentional disclosures of classified information. The Committee is also becoming an important provider and facilitator of defensive briefings, office sweeps and security advice for Members and staffers not on the Committee.

At the staff level, several of us have been getting briefings from senior officials and experts on all the CI and security programs and issues. Our intent has not been to act like a National Commission that spends months

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The Honorable Robert C. McFarlane  
August 2, 1985  
Page Two

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re-inventing the wheel, but rather to pick the brains of the many specialists who are working hard to improve the system. We have found a wealth of already defined issues and thoughtful proposals. We plan to examine them next month to see which ones we might jointly want to push with the Executive branch while the issues remain politically salient. The Committee's understanding is that the Executive branch would cast a similarly wide net in its own examination of proposals, while also taking action to implement those proposals on which there is already basic agreement.

At least a half dozen major studies seem worthy of our joint, serious consideration. The 1982 CCIS study for the DCI of Capabilities Against the Hostile Intelligence Threat, 1983-1988 remains a useful starting point, even though progress has been made in many of the areas covered by the wide-ranging report. The most recent National Assessment of Hostile Intelligence Services Threat and U.S. Countermeasures includes an up-to-date and cogent listing of problems in this field.

More focused and detailed studies that have proposals to examine include the Inman panel's recommendations on electronic and physical penetration of U.S. diplomatic facilities; the DoD Industrial Security Review Committee Report (the "Harper Panel" report); the Bross Commission recommendations on CI training needs; the recommendations of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations ("Nunn-Roth") on information and personnel security; the recommendations on overclassification of the latest report of the Information Security Oversight Office; and even the recommendations of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in its classified report on the FY 1986 Intelligence Authorization Act.

We are also aware of other studies and sets of recommendations that we have not yet seen in full text. These include the SIG-I proposals; the NSDD-84 Personnel Security Options and Recommendations forwarded by the Attorney General; the IG-CM study of countermeasures macro resources; Dr. Ruth Davis's study of computer security; and the Intelligence Research and Development Council study of R&D to Counter the Foreign Intelligence Threat. We hope to be able to review these materials, with your assistance if necessary.

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
The Honorable Robert C. McFarlane  
August 2, 1985  
Page Three

The Stilwell Commission, with which we are pleased to have such good relations, will also have important recommendations. And, undoubtedly, there will be other self-generated issues on both sides in addition to those highlighted by all these commissions and panels. Thus, we have noted some quiet but serious calls for better CI personnel and operations in both CIA and the FBI; more NSA assistance to CI elements; legislation on physical searches; and an overall policy structure that has some focal point and locus of accountability to bring coherence to the CI/CM field.

The Committee was very pleased to hear that the NSPG, including the President himself, will address these issues on August 7. The Chairman still feels strongly that a high-level commitment to action and to close coordination with the Committee would be most helpful in dissuading Congress from taking actions that would be cathartic but counterproductive. He also believes that our combined efforts offer the best hope for both legislative progress and the removal of bureaucratic roadblocks to needed improvements in CI and security programs.

This effort, to tackle such important and sensitive issues with the resources and wisdom of the Executive branch in cooperation with those of an Intelligence Committee and Senate that are clearly eager to be of help to the Nation, is rare and exciting. If we can jointly succeed, we may set a precedent for cooperative examination of a whole host of future issues -- issues of the very sort that, in the past, have so often led to squabbles, leaks, and stagnation. The Committee recognizes the significance of this venture and will work to make it one of which we can all be proud.

Sincerely,



Bernard F. McMahon  
Staff Director

BFM:rn

Enclosures

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