

EXECUTIVE SEC. TARIAT
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TO:

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Remarks

[Redacted Signature Box]

Executive Secretary
30 September 1986

Date

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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D. C. 20505

Executive Registry

86- 4159/1

30 September 1986

The Honorable Jim Courter
U. S. House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515

Dear Jim,

Thanks very much for sending me copies of your summer output about Star Wars, contras, Angola, terrorists and Yugoslavs. They are very good and you should have more people speaking out on these issues.

Keep up the good work and if I can help you let me know.

Yours,


William J. Casey

NEW JERSEY

ARMED SERVICES
SELECT COMMITTEE
ON AGING

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Executive Registry
86- 4159X

September 15, 1986

The Honorable William Casey
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505


Dear The Honorable Casey:

Over the summer I continued work on a variety of national security issues which may be of interest to you, and I want to take a moment to send you a selection of new articles.

A number of the enclosures concern two public issues which have much absorbed our attentions, strategic defense and aid to the freedom fighters of Nicaragua and Angola. These remain causes of strong interest to the American people which we have a clear duty to advance during the precious last years of the Reagan Presidency. Other articles concern another subject of much past work in this office: terrorism. The long-deserved respite won by the President's air raid on Libya on April 14 may have come to an end with the events in Pakistan and Turkey. Now there may be other crimes against innocent people, and America may again be required to take harsh action against the states and individuals which are responsible.

If you wish to set aside time to discuss these issues, or others in the national security area, I would be glad to have you call Kathy Kish at my office and arrange an appointment.

Sincerely,


JIM COURTER
Member of Congress

JAC/ch
Enclosures

DCI
EXEC
REG

Human Events



THE NATIONAL CONSERVATIVE WEEKLY

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VOL XLVI No. 29

JULY 19, 1986

\$1

While Soviet 'SDI' Moves Ahead

U.S. Contemplates Surrendering 'Star Wars'

By REP. JIM COURTER (R-N.J.)

Not too long ago, the chief of the Soviet General Staff, Gen. Nikolai Chervov, arrived in London to tout the latest Soviet arms control proposal.

At a press conference and an appearance before the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Chervov announced that "on 'Star Wars,' the Soviet Union has actually made a very specific compromise." While the previous Soviet position had been that "everything was to be banned, including research," Chervov said, the new Soviet position says "let's limit it to research in laboratories."

It should be noted that the 1972 ABM treaty already permits SDI-type research and even some testing, so the "new" Soviet proposal is, in a very real sense, more than 14 years old. Even so, Chervov's announcement carries with it the implication that the Soviet Union is doing nothing more sinister than SDI research, and it is the U.S. that must rein in its ambitious strategic defense program if an arms control agreement is to be reached.

Unfortunately, the Soviet SDI proposal is evoking murmurs of interest and even approval from certain quarters within the Reagan Administration. Specifically, Secretary of State George Shultz and arms control adviser Paul Nitze have reportedly been urging a positive U.S. response to the Soviet scheme, either in a presidential letter to Mikhail Gorbachev or in Geneva when the arms control talks resume in September. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger is strenuously opposed.

Apparently the prospect of deep strategic offensive reductions, even at the alarming cost of a crippled



While Secretary of State Shultz (left) appears willing to seriously consider surrendering any near-term deployment of an American "Star Wars" or the Strategic Defense Initiative in exchange for a Soviet pledge to cut back offensive nuclear arsenals, Defense Secretary Weinberger (right) is vigorously opposed to such a proposal.

SDI program, is so irresistible that some senior Administration officials are losing their appreciation of the real dangers involved.

In conjunction with their campaign against our SDI program, the Soviets have become noticeably more modest about their own strategic defense accomplishments. But as early as 1967, Soviet official publications were bragging about having already licked the most nettlesome strategic defense challenges.

"The USSR has far outstripped the United States not only in the creation of intercontinental and other rockets, but also in the area of anti-missile defense," said the authoritative military publication *Soviet Rocket Forces*. "In our country, we have successfully solved the problem of destruction of rockets in flight."

Almost 20 years later, it is enlightening to review the strategic defense advances the Soviets have made, and the ones that they are likely to make before the end of the century.

Soviet SDI efforts can be divided into three general categories: activities related to the Moscow ABM system; deployed systems for possible nationwide ABM defenses; and work on advanced systems, most notably directed energy weapons.

All of this work is driven by Soviet military doctrine, which holds that strategic defensive forces are to be used to destroy any incoming strategic offensive weapons which may have survived the Soviet first strike. The protection provided by strategic defensive systems is not expected to be total; only essential leadership, military and core industrial centers are to be defended on a priority basis. The proletariat would be left to fend for itself.

The flagship of the Soviet SDI system is the ABM interceptor system deployed around Moscow. A major system upgrade was initiated in 1978 and is due to be completed by 1987. The completed system will consist of 100 launchers of two varieties.

Rep. Courter, a ranking member of the House Armed Services Committee, is one of Congress' leading experts on U.S. and Soviet defense systems.



How One Man Fought Anti-Business Media Bias

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U.S. TO SURRENDER 'STAR WARS'? / From page 1

ceptors at ballistic missile warheads outside the earth's atmosphere. The GAZELLE launchers will deploy interceptors designed to stop warheads within the atmosphere.

Because only launchers and not the actual interceptors are limited by the ABM treaty, the possibility exists for the launchers to be reloaded and fired again. In fact, two advanced atmospheric ABM interceptors have been fired from the same test launcher in less than two hours.

The launchers are supported by a sophisticated management, guidance and battle management radar network, designed to maximize the potential for successful warhead intercepts. The new early warning radar at Pushkino will be the "bell-ringer" for the Moscow ABM system; the MOG HOUSE and CAT HOUSE radars will track the incoming warheads; and the 24 TRY ADD radars will have actual battle management responsibilities.

The Soviet party elite are evidently quite pleased with the Moscow ABM system. They awarded one of only three senior military promotions in 1985 to Anatoly Konstantinov, the commander of the Moscow Air Defense District, whose primary responsibility includes maintenance and improvement of the Moscow ABM system.

Arrayed at more than a thousand locations around the Soviet Union are the more than 10,000 surface-to-air (SAM) missiles and associated radars which constitute the Soviet "air defense" system. But true "air defenses" are intended to thwart attacks by "air breathing" systems, such as strategic bombers and cruise missiles. Gen. Chervov and his colleagues have never explained why, for example, between 1973 and 1975, SAM missiles were tested 50-60 times at altitudes as high as 100,000 feet, when it is well known U.S. bombers and cruise missiles fly at much lower altitudes. It has also never been explained why SAM radars were used in ABM-related testing activity, which is a probable violation of the ABM treaty.

Like the Moscow ABM system, the territorial defense SAM systems and radars are being expanded and modernized. The new SAM missile, the SA-12, is projected to have the capability to intercept shorter-range ballistic missiles, as well as some submarine-launched and land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Of particular concern is the reported deployment of the SA-12 to defend SS-25 mobile CBMs. Consistent with Soviet military doctrine, the SA-12 could greatly augment the survivability of a mobile ICBM "strategic reserve" force, thereby enabling the Soviets to execute a second strike after absorbing a U.S. retaliatory attack.

Incidentally, the deployment of mobile radars to operate the SA-12 in an ABM mode and the deployment of the SS-25 itself are violations of the ABM treaty and the SALT II treaty respectively.

A great deal of attention has focused upon the six new large phased-array Pechora-class radars, five of which are deployed around the periphery of the Soviet Union. These radars are intended to provide early warning of U.S. and Chinese ballistic missile launches, as well as missile tracking data. Because five of the radars provide little or no coverage for the Soviet interior, they are judged to have little or no ABM capability.

The same cannot be said of the sixth radar, deployed near the town of Krasnoyarsk in the middle of the Soviet Union. This radar complex is located 3,700 kilometers east of Moscow and 750 kilometers north of the Mongolian border. But it is aimed toward the extreme northeastern tip of the Soviet Union, more than 4,000 kilometers away.

The Soviets claim that the Krasnoyarsk radar serves the same early warning function as the five other radars, but the ABM treaty requires that early warning radars be located on the Soviet border and pointed outward. Consequently, the Krasnoyarsk radar is widely acknowledged by most Western observers to be the Soviet Union's most blatant ABM treaty violation.

More importantly, the location and capabilities of the Krasnoyarsk radar present the threat of an evolving ABM battle management radar network. The Krasnoyarsk radar is located in the vicinity of at least four ICBM fields and at least one SAM deployment area. The radar's coverage "fan" may include potential U.S. ICBM attack corridors.

The laser weapons program appears to be the largest of the Soviet exotic SDI efforts. More than 10,000 top scientists and over \$1 billion per year are devoted to laser activity, which is conducted at six major centers. The largest center, at Sary Shagan, already boasts two ground-based lasers which could be used to interfere with U.S. satellites in low earth orbit. Work is also proceeding on three kinds of gas lasers, excimer lasers, nuclear weapon-driven X-ray lasers and argon ion lasers. These efforts could culminate in a space-based laser deployment by the year 2000.

The other exotic weapons efforts appear to be smaller and even more closely guarded than the laser program. Particle beam weapons, for instance, have been tested at laboratories in Sarova and Leningrad. Research on radio frequency weapons for damaging fragile missile and satellite electronic components may lead to tests in the 1990s. Guns for firing kinetic energy weapons, or

"smart rocks," were developed in the 1960s and could be deployed on space platforms in the mid-1990s.

The military significance of the total Soviet SDI program is considerable. Successful development and deployment of increasingly effective SDI systems, in conjunction with the continued deployment of sophisticated and mobile strategic offensive forces, would represent the fulfillment of the Soviet strategic military doctrine; that is, to inflict maximum damage on the imperialists' offensive forces and then provide maximum protection for important military and political assets in the face of the imperialists' retaliatory strike.

As Mikhail Gorbachev put it recently, "The interrelationship between offensive and defensive arms is so obvious as to require no proof."

Gen. Chervov is, no doubt, aware of this interrelationship, as well. No one expects the Soviet Union to abandon its vast and multifaceted SDI research, development and deployment program. Similarly, no one should expect the U.S. to abandon its embryonic SDI program.

The success or failure of U.S. efforts to build a defensive system will depend upon the Administration's ability to resist the siren's song of deep reductions in exchange for SDI limits.

Certainly, there are those who recall the inviting promise of the ABM treaty: strict limits on ABM activity, in exchange for deep reductions in strategic arsenals. Those same officials now know the cost of this treasured belief: The Soviets, through deceit and strategic arms violations, greatly expanded both their ABM system and their offensive arsenal, leaving this nation vulnerable to a Soviet first strike. The question left unanswered is: Will the mistakes of the past be repeated? It is a question only the President can answer.

The Philadelphia Inquirer

Op-ed Page

Monday, August 11, 1986

Page 13-A

Misguided allies

... and look who is aiding Managua

By Rep. Jim Courter

Not many Americans would be shocked to learn that Czechoslovakia boasts of giving the Sandinistas \$100 million in aid since 1979. After all, Czechoslovakia is a member of the Warsaw Pact and a colonial possession of the Soviet Union. Americans are well aware that Soviet bloc spending on Managua's Marxists is immense, indicative of an investment as important to the Kremlin as is Cuba.

What most Americans do not know is that Sweden, a gentle democracy that most frequently makes the news because of Soviet submarine espionage, has provided or pledged \$100 million to the Nicaraguan regime since 1979.


This disturbing parallel between Czech and Swedish assistance illustrates the degree to which many of our Western European friends are undoing our Nicaragua policy before our eyes.

For them, it would seem, Washington has not gone far enough by abandoning the Monroe Doctrine and permitting the construction of two communist states — Cuba and Nicaragua — a few hundred miles from U.S. borders. Instead, Americans are expected to endure the financial support of one of those governments by our democratic allies across the Atlantic.

Sweden is only one offender among many. Norway, which has its proper doubts about the growth of Soviet power, is nonetheless increasing assistance to Managua. This year \$11 million in government money will be spent to send fertilizer, paper, machines and direct technical assistance.

Finland, with a geopolitical position that condemns it to continual and wary study of the Soviet bloc, increased its contribution to Nicaragua to \$20 million this year. And Denmark granted Nicaragua \$9 million in soft loans last October for agricultural development. Most such aid goes to state collectives.

Spain gives more aid to Nicaragua



than to any other Central American nation and is increasing its assistance by \$26 million this year, according to the Sandinista daily *Nuevo Diario*. Agriculture, cooperative housing and health sectors are the scheduled beneficiaries. It is troubling indeed to see Spain, which has only recently put the fear of military juntas behind it, actively aiding the success of a junta in Central America.

The European aid is of "nonlethal" kinds, of course. That makes it less offensive to friends of freedom for Nicaraguans, but no less helpful to the Sandinista communists. Any aid permits them to reallocate indigenous resources to "lethal" realms. If butter comes free, there is more to spend on guns.

Second, the ultimate effect on the political opposition and besieged independent labor activists is no less discouraging than would be direct donations of weapons to the Sandinistas.

The Spanish foreign minister discovered this in January. After signing the new aid agreement in Managua, he ventured to balance Spanish policy by meeting with opposition parties. But the secretary general of

the Social Democratic Party, Luis Rivas Leiva, told him that Spain is something less than an ideal instrument to promote inter-Nicaraguan dialogue because, in his opinion, Spain supports the Sandinistas.

Other financial contributions have come from the governments of Austria, France and Holland and from private interests like the Federation of Social Workers of Denmark, a free labor union that delivered a small sum to a non-free Sandinista "trade union" on May Day this year.

In all, Western European nations are expected to send \$100 million to Nicaragua in 1986. That is the same amount President Reagan and members of the House fought long and hard to obtain for the enemies of Sandinista rule, the *contras*. (And they do not have it yet).

Under American pressure and relentless Sandinista thievery of the freedoms, properties and dignities of the Nicaraguans, France, Germany and Italy, at least, are decreasing their economic assistance. But even as these countries close down bilateral aid, they are yielding up gifts from another pocket; the European Economic Community has just promised the Sandinistas half of all EEC

food aid to be allocated to Latin governments this year.

Lamentably, the EEC has been nearly this generous to Nicaragua ever since the 1979 revolution. But it is still unfathomable that this year's EEC food consignment should not go to the hungry in Haiti, where democracy has its first opening in decades. Instead of Nicaragua, where the Sandinistas have been closing cell doors on democrats for years.

Failing that, could not the aid go to the troubled democracies of Central and Latin America? And if it must go to Nicaragua, why not at least to the dwindling private sector, as against government entities which benefit only the Sandinistas? In short, why are our European friends not rewarding free enterprise and democracy instead of collectivist repression?

There is irony in these free nations' aid programs for revolutionary despots, but there is also a grave geopolitical problem. Ours is a time when the shift in the correlation of forces makes the United States unsure of its ability to defend Western Europe against Soviet attack.

Yesterday our weakness and lack of vision allowed Cuba to become a direct and immediate danger to American defenses and American plans for the resupply of Europe in the event of war. Today Europe is wittlessly helping the Soviet Union build a second Cuba, another platform from which Soviet bloc air and sea power could interdict American air or seaborne assistance to European armed forces.

The answer is not in any renewal of discussion about decreasing the American commitment to Europe. We can permit that no more than can the Europeans. However, we can do that which our ambassador to the EEC is now attempting: ratchet up the diplomatic pressures against our allies for their contributions to our enemies.

(Rep. Jim Courter, who represents New Jersey's 12th Congressional District, is a member of the House Armed Services Committee.)

To the Editor

In the first paragraph of his open "Letter from the Ambassador of Nicaragua to the U.S." [June 1986], Carlos Tunnerman depicts the Sandinista revolution as aimed at independence and liberty, a revolt akin to the American one of two centuries ago. I wish that it were. Certainly other Central American republics such as Costa Rica and the renewed El Salvador have demonstrated that constitutional democracy needs no United States imprimatur to work well. Its principles are as universal as our founders declared them to be.

But the principles of Marxism-Leninism are also held to be universal, and it is they which guide certain modern revolutionaries, the Sandinista chiefs among them. Members of the junta bared their true allegiances at celebrations in Cuba a few days after the triumph over Somoza in 1979. The irony of the visit was that Cubans had overthrown Batista in the name of independence and democracy. Within a few years Cuba had neither, and Castro, who spoke in 1959 of an "olive-green revolution, as Cuban as the palm trees," admitted that his guide was the ideology of Marxism-Leninism.

Look at Nicaragua. As early as 1981 *La Prensa's* Pedro Chamorro declared that the new rulers "practically idolize Cuba. They say that someone needs to teach us 'the Cuban way' . . . There are moral and ideological ties that cannot be broken with Cuba, Russia, East Germany, Bulgaria, Hungary, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia." Today the Nicaraguan revolutionaries are counterrevolutionaries whose powers are concentrated in the East German-advised secret police, the militias, Cuban-style block committees, Red Guard-style youth mobs, state socialism, and the quiet death of the last independent presses and radios. The Sandinista-run elections of 1984 of which Tunnerman makes so much did no more to protect and preserve democracy in Nicaragua than did the elections of 1948 in Czechoslovakia.

Mr. Tunnerman extols the battle against Somoza because he imagines that Americans will remember their own rebellion and believe, adapting Gertrude Stein, that a revolution is a revolution is a revolution. But some revolutions make men free, and others make men the subjects of new dictators. The difference is in the revolutionaries' principles: either they base government on the principle of equality and limit the powers of their own governorship, or they base government on the principle that history anoints some to rule others, and to rule with irresistible means. Washington and Madison did the former. The Bolsheviks, the Castroites, and now the Sandinistas have done the latter.

*Jim Courter
Member of Congress (R)
12th District, New Jersey*

Regarding your July 1986 article on Morgan Fairchild by Bruce Brady: Please, give us a break. Your characterization of Morgan Fairchild as the actress-activist "at war" with the Hollywood stereotype, but nonetheless willing to buck the system in pursuit of her "ideals," is really too much.

In fact, the ideals that Ms. Fairchild espouses are exactly those which Hollywood holds nearest and dearest. First, Ms. Fairchild is "pro-choice". This is not surprising, in view of the fact that the entertainment industry as a whole endorses the idea that men and women should be able to do

what they want, when they want and how they want without regard to the consequences, particularly in matters of sex. Ms. Fairchild is obviously no exception.

Second, Ms. Fairchild is anti-censorship, and if it means allowing pornographers to distribute films, magazines, videos and what-have-you through the mass media, who is she to say it's wrong? Third, Ms. Fairchild is anti-school prayer. Yep, school is for reading Thoreau, Emerson, Jefferson and Franklin. Let's just make sure that we avoid those portions of their works which refer to God, the Almighty, the Creator, etc.—or would we be flirting with possible censorship? Obviously the reading of such highly moral and instructive works presents a knotty problem for Ms. Fairchild, who doesn't like fundamentalist Christian-type ideas.

That's all right, because kids in school are smart enough to make their own "choices" about what constitutes right and wrong, good and evil, moral and immoral. They don't need religion, they can listen to their inner voices. Or to shows such as *Falcon Crest*.

Bruce Brady's article would have put Ms. Fairchild in a kinder light had he stuck to the more basic things we are all just dying to know about Morgan—her weight, true age, dress size and make-up tips. I can believe she cares deeply about those.

*Mrs. Kerry Carter
Alexandria, VA*



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September 1986

AMERICAN POLITICS

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, FRIDAY, JUNE 6, 1986

European Edition

A Look at the Yugoslavia-Libya Link

By JIM COURTER

WASHINGTON—A week after American warplanes struck at Libya, the foreign secretary of Yugoslavia arrived in Tripoli to denounce the United States' "unprovoked aggression." The characterization of the long overdue retaliatory act was part of a joint declaration issued by visiting foreign ministers of a small delegation from the Non-Aligned Movement countries, among them Cuba.

The United Nations Security Council debate in New York followed, and the Non-Aligned Movement sent a delegation as a show of support for Libya. Five foreign ministers were expected, but Ghana and the Congo withdrew, leaving three harder arrivals: Cuba, Senegal and Yugoslavia.

In the meantime, word escaped of Colonel Qadhafi's deep displeasure at the ineffectual performance of his military forces during the American raid. Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia were the two friendly countries to which he turned for analyses of his nation's military deficiencies.

Tripoli-Belgrade Axis

These details, so inconspicuous within the mass of press stories on the Libyan affair, are indicators of something almost unnoticed: the strategic alliance between Libya and Yugoslavia. Over the past decade, events in the Mediterranean and business in the Non-Aligned Movement, of which both Libya and Yugoslavia are members, have often taken a turn around the Tripoli-Belgrade axis.

The reasons for this are several. Both Libya and Yugoslavia are self-described revolutionary socialist powers. Both commonly adopt anti-American positions on foreign policy issues and routinely vote against the U.S. in the U.N. Libya is a hard-line and consistent Soviet ally; Yugoslavia—while more independent—holds observer status in Comecon, the Soviet economic bloc. Both countries are reliable political supporters of radical Soviet allies who hold fast to their certificates of nonaligned status: countries like Cuba, Nicaragua and Syria. Both have military relations with North Korea, which inclines increasingly toward the Soviets. Both openly support Palestinian terrorist organizations, the Namibian South West Africa People's Organization and the Salvadoran communist FMLN.

The origins of this strategic axis, this Mediterranean marriage of geopolitical interests, seem to lie in the Mideast Wars. Libya turned against Israel and the West after 1969 when Colonel Qadhafi unseated King Idris in a coup. By then Yugoslavia's Tito had long favored Egypt's interests. He assured President Nasser's ambassador to Belgrade during the 1967 war that "as far as Egypt is concerned, I am not non-aligned." Tito proved it by granting overflight and refueling rights to Soviet transports and fighter aircraft.

Yugoslavia's generosity with its airspace—a beneficence which has never been extended to American warplanes—was even more pronounced in the Yom Kippur War of 1973. By one report, 1,000 Soviet planes used Yugoslav corridors during a two-week period in October of that year. According to another, the Red Air Force airborne unit which had been the vanguard of the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia was readied for possible use in the Middle East.

the war ended. The Soviets and Libyans both wanted closer relations, and may have been rewarded for their efforts. The Soviets had set precedents for use—with minimal restrictions—of Yugoslav ports and airfields. Soviet military personnel have been reported at bases on more than a few occasions, and a standing agreement permits Soviet surface ships and submarines to come to Yugoslav ports for service and repairs.

Belgrade's relations with the Libyans remain strong despite the death of Tito in

Perhaps we should ask if Yugoslavia hasn't made too much of holding Moscow at a distance while indulging Moscow's closest anti-American allies.

1980. Staff Major Abd al-Salam Jalloud, who today appears to be the second most powerful man in Libyan politics, visited and made undisclosed agreements with both Moscow and Belgrade in July 1981. Libya and Yugoslavia announced an agreement on military cooperation that October. Within the space of the next year alone, there were visits to Tripoli by the Yugoslav president, the Yugoslav federal secretary for national defense and the vice president of the Yugoslav federal executive council.

Development of Libyan-Yugoslav relations has been paralleled by development of military relations with Warsaw Pact members. Libya's tight relations with East Germany and Czechoslovakia, whose personnel work in Libya and in the Libyan army and security services in enormous numbers, is well known. Many also noticed when Colonel Qadhafi signed new military and economic agreements with Soviet leader Gorbachev in Moscow last October. But there were other state visits in 1985.

One dimension of Yugoslavia's interest in Libya is military hardware sales. Libya already possesses Yugoslav Galeb aircraft, and once sent air force cadets to Yugoslavia for training. Now Libya has reportedly ordered four P400-class missile corvettes from the Yugoslav yard at Kraljevica. These are "splendid little ship killers, packing a frigate punch in 525-ton hulls," writes the privately published periodical U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings.

And then there are Yugoslavia's well-crafted midget submarines, the sort of weapon and reconnaissance vehicle that Soviet frogmen and commando teams have used repeatedly in Sweden's coastal waters. The submarines' capabilities include sabotage actions such as the laying of mines in harbors, torpedo launching, and infiltration of commandos. According to the publication Jane's Fighting Ships, two of the R-2 Mala class midgets have been transferred to Libya. There's also an unconfirmed report that Yugoslavia may have already trained Libyan nations and Palestine Liberation Organization personnel in midget sub operation.

Such cooperation, with all its implications for terrorism in Europe and the Mediterranean, would not be outside the realm of normal Yugoslav relations with either Libya or the PLO. In the wake of last

Subsequently, when the EgyptAir airliner was hijacked to Malta, Greek police were said to believe that the leader and sole survivor of the pro-Libyan Abu Nidal team bought his ticket in Belgrade. The other two members of the troika had come from Libya to meet him in Athens.

There have been three other recent incidents involving Arab or Palestinian terrorists operating from or passing through Yugoslavia. Given the repeated declarations by Tripoli and Belgrade of support for Arab and other Mediterranean liberation movements, news of a Feb. 20 agreement promising "closer cooperation on security matters" between the two countries is of no small concern.

Americans are no longer surprised by the machinations of Cuba and Libya and Syria and other rigorously aligned "non-aligned" countries. They are less aware of, and, when cognizant, more delicate about Yugoslavia. This is not without reason. Yugoslavia is more independent, and less directly cooperative with the Soviet Union, than is Cuba. Its leaders, unlike Fidel Castro, do not speak of the American president as a "legitimate heir of Hitler." The government has received American Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, and American warships do call on Yugoslav ports a few times a year.

This small, bright corner in the big picture is partially the result of an immense and expensive American commitment to Yugoslav independence after the 1948 break between Tito and Stalin. Aid slowed drastically in the mid-1960s, but Belgrade still possesses most favored nation trading status. A decade ago, Laurence Silberman, the former U.S. Ambassador to Belgrade, dared to suggest "that Washington should reexamine its relations according to the United States' true interests" because "Yugoslavia had consistently sided with America's enemies in the world." The State Department disassociated itself from Mr. Silberman's views. But he had argued, and it is still true, that Belgrade's voting record in the U.N. bears out his judgment.

Ending Some Alignments

All the preceding is an attempt to adumbrate some much neglected realities of Yugoslav foreign policy. They do not accord easily with the opinions of those who have few second thoughts about Yugoslavia's conventional designation as non-aligned. Perhaps American policy makers should ask whether Yugoslavia has not publicly made too much of holding Moscow at a distance while simultaneously indulging Moscow's closest anti-American allies.

Once that question is answered, there is another, more difficult one: Given the Yugoslav penchant for courting the West's totalitarian enemies, and according them support they'd never dream of lending to the U.S. democracy, should America reduce its slender ties to Belgrade? Or, as with China, should it labor to make the best of an awkward relationship whose future will always be uncertain?

I believe the answer is that in a world where Soviet military power is the supreme fact, the latter is the better course. But America should make better use of what influence it has. A good beginning would be to let Belgrade know that what it gains from American relations—including most favored nation trade status, markets for its compact cars, and government assistance in rolling over Yugoslavia's \$20 billion debt—could become contingent upon abatement of certain of the more insufferable of Yugoslavia's foreign alignments.

Daily Record Northwest N.J. Sunders, April 6, 1986—C5

POINT OF VIEW

Ortega and Khadafy are comrades in arms

By JIM COURTER
Special to the Daily Record

A remarkable photograph arrived in the mail last week amidst all the debate on aid to the Nicaraguan contra. It showed two of the world's best-known dictators, Commandante Daniel Ortega and Colonel Muammar Khadafy, standing together in Libya. With clenched fists upraised, they saluted the Libyan military forces which maneuvered beneath their gaze.

If the photograph was remarkable, the meeting that made it possible was less so. Official Libyan connections to Nicaragua have been evident at least since 1980, the first year after the Sandinista assumption of power. President Ortega dispatched the Interior Minister Tomas Borge to Libya that year to discuss joint agricultural arrangements and to finalize a \$100 million loan from Tripoli to Managua. Much more aid was to follow. According to one estimate, Nicaragua has received \$400 million in economic aid from Libya during the last four years.

ans are believed to work in Nicaragua with the police. Libyan allies like Cuba, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany have also helped train the Sandinista internal security forces. Covert arms shipments from Libya have been discovered on several occasions, the most impressive of which seized in 1983 by Brazilian authorities puzzled by irregularities on the cargo manifests of four Libyan transport aircraft loaded with "medical supplies." The planes turned out to hold 84 tons of arms destined for Nicaragua. Included were bazookas, multiple rocket launchers, wire-guided missiles, 600 light rockets, and two dismantled fighter aircraft.

Colonel Khadafy no longer hides this comradeship in arms with a country in Central America. In 1984 when Tomas Borge made another trip to the desert domain, Khadafy publicly lauded the Sandinistas with these words: "Libyan fighters, arms, and backing to the Nicaraguan people have reached them because they fight with us. They fight America on its own ground." Borge answered: "Our relationship with Libya is eternal."


Why? Why should a Central American nation lock hands with a radical Arab nation halfway around the globe? The reasons are ideological, military, and geopolitical, but they boil down to something which some Americans still wish to ignore: the profound differences between the totalitarian internationalists and the practitioners of self-government. Like forms are drawn towards like forms. America's bond to a distant parliamentary nation like Israel or Costa Rica is politically natural. So too are the Sandinista bonds to other revolutionary, socialist, pro-Soviet powers like Libya, the Palestine Liberation Organization, and Iran.

That is the simplest and truest explanation for the trips Ortega and Borge make to Tripoli, and for the three conferences Commandante Ortega has held with the Prime Minister of Iran, Mir Hoseyn Musavi. It explains why someone with as many troubles in the Middle East as Yasir Arafat would take the time to meet Sandinista officials in Managua, Tunis, and elsewhere. And it explains why Borge went to North Korea in June of 1980 to proclaim that "Nicaraguan revolutionaries will not be content until the imperialists have been overthrown in all parts of the world."

It is therefore of no small interest to see Nicaraguan and Libyan armed forces on the attack in the same few days. The timing of the attacks may or may not be a coincidence. What matters is that, in Tripoli and Managua, both attacks will be seen as blows against the same enemy, the forces of "imperialist reaction."

Such is the name dictators give to democracy, and to its strongest proponent, America. And it is to America that the free, the self-governing,

enemies of freedom. Congressmen Jim Courter, R-New Jersey, is fourth-term member of the House Armed Services Committee and a congressional observer of the Daily Record. L. REBACK is a Geneva arms talks



Section One: Page 46

THE SUNDAY STAR-LEDGER, August 31, 1986

JERSEY ON THE POTOMAC

Courter and Chevron debate politics of oil in war-torn Angola

By J. SCOTT ORR

Star-Ledger Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON—Rep. Jim Courter (R-12th Dist.) is taking on one of the nation's major oil companies in a dispute over oil fields in war-torn Angola.

The dispute centers on an amendment sponsored by Courter that would prohibit the Department of Defense from buying oil from any company that pumps oil in or sells oil from Angola.

Courter's amendment is intended as a slap at the Communist government of Angola and its use of Cuban troops and Soviet officers to protect itself against resistance fighters.

"While at this very moment the democratic resistance is battling a major offensive by the Cuban, Soviet, East German and Angolan Communist forces, private American companies are indirectly underwriting that offensive," Courter said in June when the House Armed Services Committee approved the amendment as part of the Department of Defense authorization bill.

The bill, with the amendment, later passed the House and was sent to the Senate.

The action set off an exchange of letters between Courter and George M. Keller, chairman of the board of Chevron Corp.—the correspondence was not exactly friendly.

"You should be aware," Keller wrote, "that driving Chevron and other U.S. companies out of Angola will not appreciably harm the Angolan oil industry nor affect government revenues there.

"Furthermore, this amendment could pose a potential threat to our nation's security by restricting the De-

fense Department's ability to readily obtain essential petroleum supplies around the world," Keller added.

Keller's letter went on to point out that the company has operated in Angola for 30 years and that the company "has always maintained a position of strict neutrality with regard to political matters in Angola and has acted in accordance with the expressed foreign policy of the U.S. towards Angola."

Courter responded earlier this month that he would be "surprised" if Chevron has maintained neutrality and pointed to an editorial distributed at the company's annual stockholder meeting.

"The article was a veritable diatribe against the Angolan resistance and what it called the 'radical right in the U.S.' which has the temerity to find virtue in (the) struggle for Angolan independence," Courter wrote.

He went on to point out that the American general manager of Chevron's Cabinda Gulf Oil corporation, Will Lewis, has been quoted as criticizing the Reagan Administration's support for Jonas Savimibi, leader of the resistance group UNITA, the national union for the total independence of Angola.

"Permit me to inquire whether your office has remembered to give Mr. Will Lewis the same guideline you have described to me concerning Chevron's strict neutrality on political matters," the letter said.

Courter said in the letter that he is concerned about what would happen to Angolan oil sales if U.S. companies leave, "but I am more concerned that I, as a representative of the U.S., do not begin making decisions based on what is good for our corporations rather than

what is necessary for our security.

"This is much more than a business question. It is a moral and geopolitical question. Your concern is profitability, while mine must be the American taxpayers' subsidization of our enemies.

"Your corporate officers' eyes are fixed—not improperly—on the bottom line; mine are fixed upon the struggle against the Cuban, Angolan and Soviet forces which are the enemies of Angolan freedom and American security," Courter wrote.

Beside Chevron, Texaco Inc. also has a significant investment in Angola. Shell Oil Co. has a smaller investment, and Conoco has a plant there but would not be affected by the amendment because it doesn't pump Angolan oil, according to Courter staffers.

Mobil Corp. divested itself of its holding in Angola about three months ago and got out, the staffer said, adding that the company has said it is making a conscious effort not to buy Angolan oil.

Though Courter has heard little from Chevron in recent weeks, staffers said they don't believe they have heard the last of the company's objections to the amendment.

A10

WASHINGTON TALK

NEW YORK TIMES Friday August 22, 1986

Briefing

A Letter to Reagan


Eleven conservative Republicans in the House of Representatives have urged President Reagan to promote talks on power-sharing between the Government of South Africa and "nonviolent South African groups representing blacks."

In a letter to the President this week, the lawmakers suggested specifically that the South African Parliament be expanded from three to five chambers, with one of the two new bodies elected by blacks. The existing three chambers are elected by whites, people of mixed race and Indians. The second new house would be a Senate, with equal representation for each province and homeland in the country, to be elected by their residents. Legislation could be passed by three of the five houses.

"We are not recommending that the United States dictate a constitution to South Africa," the letter said. "Rather we urge you to propose some constitutional plan in order to begin the process of negotiations, making it unmistakably clear that what we seek is any reasonable form of democratic black power-sharing."

"There is no reason to insist on the principle of one person, one vote instantly, which few on any side of the debate think is realistic in the current context and should be allowed to evolve once black power-sharing has come about."

The appeal was initiated by Representative Jim Courter of New Jersey and signed by Representatives Dick Arme of Texas, William F. Clinger Jr. of Pennsylvania, Bob Dornan of California, Newt Gingrich of Georgia, John Hiler of Indiana, Robert J. Lagomarsino of California, Tom Lewis of Florida, John G. Rowland of Connecticut, Barbara F. Vucanovich of Nevada and Robert S. Walker of Pennsylvania. No response has been received from the White House.



Drawings by Redinger

The Calico Question

Reports from the California White House that one of the three newest members of the Reagan pet family is a male calico

probably not. According to experts in this arcane area, it is genetically all but impossible for a male offspring of any feline union, however checkered, to carry a three-color calico coat.

Reached in Santa Barbara, Elaine Crispen, Mrs. Reagan's press secretary, reported that the two other new cats, Cleo and Sara, had been established as female calico kittens. But since the cat story broke earlier this week, no one has ventured up to the Reagan ranch to make a closer inspection of Morris's markings, nor has he or she been photographed. Ms. Crispen said that Cleo, Sara and Morris, of whatever color or configuration, were co-existing peacefully with the considerable Reagan dog-pack at the ranch: Lucky, Victory, Millie, Freebo and Taka.

Money, Money, Money

From the Democratic point of view, the bad news is that Republican political committees raised 5.3 times as much money as their Democratic equivalents (\$186.1 million to \$35.1 million) from January of 1985 through last June. The good news is that the disparity was better than it was in 1981-82, when, according to the Federal Election Commission, the Republicans raised 6.5 times as much as the Democrats (\$161.2 million to \$24.8 million).

Public Opinion for Sale

The American Enterprise Institute, a Washington-based conservative research group that has recently been experiencing financial problems, is offering its bimonthly magazine, Public Opinion, for sale. The principal prospective buyer so far is Dow Jones & Company, which publishes The Wall Street Journal and has been seeking the acquisition for some time.

Sources close to the negotiations report that the staff of the magazine would probably continue to work out of offices at the institute but that Dow Jones would assume management of the magazine. Wall Street Journal editors are said to be interested in obtaining direct access to the polling information that makes up the "Opinion Roundup" section that has been a feature of Public Opinion.

Established in the late 1970's, Public Opinion now has a press run of about 7,800 copies, of which a little more than half is paid circulation and the rest is complimentary copies given to Government officials, journalists and the like.

COMMENTARY

JIM COURTER

Ex-Im's pipeline to Angola

When a government looks Communist, acts Communist, declares itself to be Communist, and depends for its survival upon "internationalist" troops from Communist countries, is it Communist?

That deceptively simple question is likely to be raised in the House of Representatives this afternoon when Republican Rep. Bill McCollum of Florida moves his amendment to the Export-Import Bank Reauthorization Act. Scores of millions of dollars in loans and loan guarantees by our Ex-Im Bank are still in the pipeline to Angola, and Mr. McCollum would have the flow sharply reduced, at least until the 35,000-man Cuban occupation army goes home.

It hardly seems too much to ask. The Ex-Im Bank's charter speci-

cally forbids expenditure of aid dollars in Communist countries. But it is the Department of State which has the authority to decide what "Communist" means, and that word is restricted in the case of Angola, since it "does not share the characteristics common to the countries such as the Warsaw Pact members...."

That is not the point. It is the 1962 Foreign Assistance Act to which the bank's charter points for a proper definition of "Communist," and that act does not say anything about the Warsaw pact. The phrase "Communist country" shall include specifically, but not be limited to the following . . . "All the pact countries can be found on the list, but so can China, Yugoslavia, Cuba, and their like."

Mr. McCollum, and Republican Rep. Duncan Hunter of California, who introduced a bill on this matter in February, must be forgiven for thinking that Angola is at least as Communist as Yugoslavia or Cuba. And if Angola is not in the Warsaw Pact, does it matter that the Warsaw Pact and its Cuban arm are in Angola?

I have found sufficient evidence of Angola's Communism in a rather obvious place: the first paragraph of the State Department's own *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices*. Angola permits the existence of but one political party. It is the "Marxist-Leninist Popular Movement for the

Liberation of Angola." All major decisions are made by the party's Central Committee. And President Jose Eduardo dos Santos heads both the party and the government.

To that one might add any number of indicators of Angola's politics. Streets in that remote African country are named for Karl Marx. Cuban experts in the workings of that tool of totalitarian organization, "the block committee," just finished a working visit in which they shared their "battle and ideological experience" with reliable Angolan counterparts. The party has marked its 10th year of rule by changing the day of national celebration from Nov. 11, when Portugal granted the Angolans

We could quit subsidizing the regime with Ex-Im loans that expand the production of oil which, when sold, generates the pay of the Cuban soldiers.

their independence in 1975, to Dec. 10, the day in that year on which the

MPLA was formed. New agreements, signed April 4 and April 6 this year, "strengthen ties" — including military ties — between Luanda and Havana.

The Cubans are in Angola because "solidarity" is more than a word, and because the MPLA needs them to protect the regime against its own people and Dr. Jonas Savimbi's UNITA. What is more, if Mr. dos Santos decided one day that the Cuban troops, the Soviet generals, and the East German security specialists should leave, there are good reasons to believe that the praetorian guard might find itself a new emperor.

If the Angolans are all but unable to make their friends leave, surely the U.S. State Department's negotiators can not expect to do so. But we could quit subsidizing the regime with Ex-Im loans that expand the production of oil which, when sold, generates the pay of the Cuban soldiers. The McCollum amendment would do that.

Republican Rep. Jim Courter of New Jersey is a fourth-term member of the House Armed Services Committee.

POINT OF VIEW

A tour of Camelot on the Moskva River

By JIM COURTER
Special to the Daily Record

A claim for the new open Soviet leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev and his stylish wife Raisa, has filled the last two years. Comparisons with the secretive Josef Stalin are gone. The glamorous Gorbachevs have the star quality of a John and Jacqueline Kennedy. Is Moscow a new Camelot? On my trip there three weeks ago, I did not find it so.

We flew from the harried bustling of JFK to the empty, grey colossus of Moscow Airport. My party, including Congressman Dean Gallo and several New Jersejans, went on a private mission to meet with a group of refusniks, divided spouses and relatives of prisoners of conscience. One observation we made speaks volumes about the type of society we were visiting: the ordinary, cheerful smile which is so much a part of American life was almost nowhere to be seen on the faces of Soviet subjects.

Nearly every waiter, hotel official, storekeeper or other worker we met tended to be unpleasant, slow, sullen, surly and apparently unhappy. This behavior is utterly unlike the generous hospitality the Russian people were always famed for. It's as though human friendliness were illegal in Gorbachev's Camelot.

There is a dull, foglike oppressiveness about Moscow which is unnering because it is so diffuse, so subtle. Unlike other dictatorships, public places in Moscow are not awash with military uniforms. Police are visible but usually keep their distance. Two presences, though, help to sustain the somber atmosphere: the omnipresent bureaucracy and the KGB.

Alexis de Tocqueville described 150 years ago how a society enmeshed in a cobweb of petty rules and meaningless regulations can smother the humanity of personal relationships. The Soviet authorities have brought bureaucratic pettiness to state-of-the-art levels. In my hotel, supposedly one of the finest in the Soviet capital,

one was not permitted to move between hotel room and lobby, or lobby and the outside without standing on some line to exchange a passport for a form, a form for a card, a card for a key, a key for a pass. Every floor is guarded by a bureaucrat who keeps track of your comings and goings. You can't use the hotel restaurant without exhibiting your guest pass.

Standing on lines for every conceivable service is part of Moscovites' daily life. There are lines in the food shops for the little available food — huge lines in the alcoholic beverage stores — lines for restaurant service. Soviet housewives are estimated to spend an average two hours daily on shopping lines, and often return home disappointed.

Moreover, I was surprised to learn that ordinary Russians simply expect the elite to move to the front of lines to be recognized first. One evening I had the embarrassing experience of joining a restaurant line and being escorted to the front, where those who were ahead of me not only did not protest, but even helped clear up some confusion over a name in my party so that we could be seated instantly. I could just imagine what would have happened on a similar line in the United States. Capitalist America is, by Marxist definition, class ridden, but the "classless society of the workers' paradise" has privileged all its own.

Bureaucracy permeates every possible niche of Soviet society. Seeing the smothering effect of this meaningless regulation at close range as I did, I believe the Communist leaders designed the bureaucratic system with one purpose in mind: to convince the Russian people that the socialist state is literally everything, their family and companions are nothing. There is no one else to be thankful to for your daily bread — when bread is available — but the new socialist order. Once gratitude is monopolized by the Soviet state, human relationships are deprived of significance. The undermining of personal loyalty, love and friendship is of the essence of the totalitarian order.

For the same reason the Soviet rulers encourage ar insidious fear of the KGB. The secret police, of course wear no uniforms, but they are, or are thought to be, everywhere; mingled in every street crowd, in the subway stores, in your apartment lobby, at the theater. Our Jewish refusnik contacts told us of their weekly social gatherings in front of Moscow's only synagogue, where they exchange news about friends and relatives. KGB agents have also infiltrated here. Even at synagogue

Once gratitude is monopolized by the Soviet state, human relationships are deprived of significance.

can never be too cautious.

Because of the secret police, Moscovites in public places shun Westerners. It was difficult to secure help even on the strange Moscow subway where the clerk reluctant to speak to Americans for fear of suspicious KGB eyes.

Nothing was more pathetic than the realization that all the Russians, the refusniks, many of whom have been fired, interrogated, tortured and jailed, appear the only optimists. These people have decided they can no longer live the Soviet lie; they apply to emigrate. Israel, the United States, or elsewhere; they are released (hence their name); they are punished; they apply again. Some have tried a dozen times. Yet they, almost all still smile. They are sustained by the hope of leaving by their faith in the God of their fathers. Most of the low subjects have neither.

From Lenin to Gorbachev, the Soviet leaders' desire is to extend this "Camelot" across the world. Naturally, their emigration problem would disappear. It is hard to understand why a few men can only be happy, when the rest of mankind has lost every reason to smile.

Jim Courter, a Republican, represents New Jersey's 12th District in the U.S. House of Representatives.

OPINION

Pentagon-watching gone awry: over 45 committees

By Jim Courter

BURIED deep within the recently passed Senate bill reorganizing and streamlining the military bureaucracy were the first seeds of real, fundamental military reform.


While most of the public attention was focused upon the landmark changes mandated in the military command and structure, the Senate also took the unprecedented step of lopping almost 18,000 employees off the Pentagon's defense agencies and headquarters staffs. In addition, a critical eye fell upon the heretofore sacrosanct main of congressional defense oversight: More than 40 congressional reporting requirements were allowed to expire, and the wheels were set in motion to reduce further the burden of congressional micro-management of the Defense Department.

These small stirrings were driven by a growing realization that the multi-layered, green-eyeshaded "Military-Congressional Complex" (a term coined by a former *Wall Street Journal* editorial writer), intended to keep a sharp eye on every imaginable aspect of defense procurement, has begun to betray its original purpose. The sheer size and complexity of the "complex" are most striking features, as well as its most basic flaws. The Pentagon's own count, more than 200,000 people involved in some aspect of defense procurement. They use as their bible 32 volumes of defense procurement regulations that consume six feet of shelf space. They have at their disposal an army of 8,500 auditors to force 44,000 procurement specifications. These bureaucrats are layered in a dizzying hierarchy at towers more than 40 levels above the typical military procurement program manager. Indeed, Congress has repeatedly weighed in to ensure that every conceivable avenue for procurement disasters has been sealed off, but the result has only been more auditors auditing the auditors and, paradoxically, fewer weapons, of lower quality, reaching the troops in the field. But the paradox should not be surprising. There are now more than 45 congressional commit-

tees and subcommittees overseeing the Pentagon. They employ more than 300 aides and, in a typical year, receive testimony from 1,500 Pentagon officials, request more than 450 studies, change 700 budget line items, generate 150-page defense bills, tie up the House and Senate floor for almost three weeks, and still deliver defense appropriations bills to the President an average of 45 days late, or, as is often the case, not at all.

The whole situation would be comic, were it not so tragic. The "complex" was erected and is inhabited by well-meaning patriotic Americans who want nothing more than for our military forces to have at their disposal sufficient numbers of advanced weapons systems

JEFF DANZIGER - STAFF



to defend our country and our allies. But while the procurement "horror stories" featuring the \$700 toilet seat and the \$7,000 coffeemaker may make good copy, they do not explain how the "complex" has undermined its own promise. Constructed for the purpose of eliminating fraud and inefficiency, the "complex" has only aggravated inefficiency by raising procurement costs and lengthening acquisition time.

The real story is found in the weapons depots, airfields, and ship magazines of America's military forces. We do not have available the numbers of sophisticated weapons to fulfill our present obligations. The weapons that are in the inventory may not work. System costs are rising, production rates are falling, and our adversaries are beginning to erode our technological edge.

No major category of weapons system is immune from this process. For example, in the 1950s and '60s, the Air

Force had 3,400 fighters and was building 1,000 more a year. We now have only 600 fighters and barely 300 a year being built. Congressionally reduced production rates increased the costs of the F-15 fighter by \$10 million per plane. In general, wildly fluctuating and uneconomical weapons production rates increase weapons costs by more than \$300 million a year.

The "complex" also imposes unnecessary production and delivery delays. With 2,000 congressionally mandated "competition advocates" in place, the Air Force Logistics Command now takes 260 days to process even small spare-parts orders and two more years to deliver the parts. In one defense plant, with 300 Air Force oversight personnel in residence, it now takes 17 days to deliver a standard military aircraft engine; a similar commercial engine can be delivered in 26 hours.

It is this procurement "gridlock" which, in part, prompted the Senate to vote 95-0 to simply chop away 18,000 Pentagon bureaucrats.

I applaud the Senate's boldness and have proposed the elimination of the 50,000-member Pentagon buying agency, the Defense Logistics Agency, and the centralized audit bureaucracy, the Defense Contract Audit Agency. The military services can and should handle their own procurement and audits, and they can do with fewer bureaucrats.

The Senate's cancellation of 265 congressional reporting requirements is another landmark step, but I propose going directly to the source of the problem. Under my legislation, the number of congressional defense oversight bodies would be cut dramatically, from 45 to 17. The defense budget would undergo only two instead of three reviews in the Congress each year, thereby streamlining the Pentagon funding and procurement process.

The Senate has planted the seeds of future fundamental defense procurement reforms. It now falls to the House to demonstrate a similar boldness.

In a very real sense, America's future security hangs in the balance.

Rep. Jim Courter (R) of New Jersey is a member of the House Armed Services Committee.

JIM COURTER

Midgetman missile under the gun

According to Murphy's Law, if everything appears to be going well, you must have overlooked something.

So it must have seemed to the supporters of the single-warhead small ICBM, affectionately known as the "Midgetman." Until last year the program had basked in a relatively unblemished, uncritical atmosphere. But with the jarring release of a critical General Accounting Office report on the small ICBM program, serious questions about the system began to emerge. As a result, the small ICBM program may be in jeopardy of losing support from both ends of the political spectrum.

In the present austere budget environment, the projected Midgetman-system cost of \$44 billion-\$49 billion is exorbitant. (This works out to \$98 million for each of 500 deployed warheads.) The undersecretary of defense, Don Hickey, has proposed buying the same number of warheads deployed on 170 Midgetman, with three warheads per missile, for \$22 billion. Five hundred warheads on 50 MX missiles in virtually indestructible, superhardened silos would cost \$8 billion. Highly accurate, survivable Trident II weapons based on submarines cost \$13 million apiece.

The daily task of operating 500 mobile missile launchers would also be almost incomprehensible in terms of sheer effort and complexity. Between 4,000 and 28,000 square miles of real estate would be needed to ensure Midgetman survivability under attack. Nearly 34,000 trained personnel would be required to operate and protect the missiles.

The missile launch crews will have to possess superhuman courage, for they will be asked to drive their unwieldy vehicles through actual detonations of high-yield Soviet weapons. Communications will be virtually impossible, due to electromagnetic interference, and it is likely that most of the launchers will not be able to withstand the cyclonic winds and searing radiation. Quite simply, we will be asking brave men to undertake a suicide mission.

As was the case with the Carter administration's mobile MX missile proposal, the potentially adverse environmental effects on the deployment area will come under intense scrutiny. The GAO reported that "most of the installations (under consideration for Midgetman deployment) are biologically or archaeologically sensitive, and impacts could be large."

Rep. Jim Courter, a New Jersey Republican, serves on the House Armed Services Committee and is an official House observer to the Geneva arms-reduction negotiations.

Wisconsin. "That's the reverse of something like the MX with 10 warheads where one of ours can knock out five of theirs. Midgetman, in other words, provides real stability."

But for Midgetman to be stabilizing it must be militarily effective. To be effective, it has to survive a Soviet first strike in sufficient numbers to threaten its assigned Soviet targets. Even assuming that the Soviets have not precisely targeted individual launchers, they can certainly mount a barrage attack covering virtually the entire Midgetman deployment area, the boundaries of which will be well-known to the Soviets long before the first missile is deployed. A barrage attack will disrupt communications, disable missile crews, and destroy many launchers, leading to a low percentage of surviving operational missiles. This problem could be mitigated by deploying three warheads on each missile, but Midgetman supporters insist on a single warhead missile, as ineffective as it would be.

The Soviets are developing and deploying mobile missiles, and they face many of the same survivability problems that we face. But look at how they solve them:

Their "small" road-mobile missile weighs nearly three times as much as the Midgetman, and may have the capability of carrying three warheads, and will probably be deployed on railroad cars. In this deployment scheme, the Soviets need not fear a barrage attack, since the essentially unrecognizable launchers will have the capability to roam the entire Soviet rail network and be invulnerable to counterforce attack. If America were a police state and Midgetman could roam the interstate highways, we might have reason to follow the Soviet lead in developing mobile missiles. But this type of deployment, which would be required to make the Midgetman survivable, is neither sensible nor desirable in our society.

There is no denying that this renewed discussion of the small ICBM system has touched a raw nerve among the missile's supporters. But they only have themselves to blame; with each passing day the accumulating weight of critical evidence threatens to crush the single-warhead Midgetman — the least of offensive weapons system ever contemplated for an offensive mission.




Illustration by Alexander Humber/The Washington Times

If recent history is any guide, we can also expect protracted litigation and anti-nuclear activism to complicate small-missile basing decisions. Perhaps the most heated arguments erupt over the potential military effectiveness of a single-warhead small ICBM. During the course of this debate, Washington has been introduced to the curious notion that the weapons system that threatens best is the one that threatens least. "We would have to expend 200 Midgetmen in order to knock out only 100 Soviet missiles," said Democratic Rep. Les Aspin of